2026-04-19 — Initial Release v1.0.0.1
UEFIExtract is a Windows x64 utility for parsing and extracting UEFI firmware images. It builds a full tree of Firmware Volumes, FFS files, and sections — with transparent decompression of Tiano and LZMA-compressed sections. Supports IFR/HII package extraction, BIOS setting offset search (
biosfind), Intel FIT parsing, and live BIOS flash read via FPTW64 (readbios). Runs in both GUI and CLI mode from the same binary.

UEFIExtract parses UEFI firmware images into a structured tree of nodes and provides multiple extraction and analysis operations on that tree.
| Capability | Description |
|---|---|
| Firmware tree parsing | Full Volume → File → Section hierarchy from raw .rom, .bin, or vendor update packages. Volumes are found by signature sweep at any offset, including inside raw and pad files where vendors nest them |
| Transparent decompression | EFI Standard (Tiano) and LZMA sections decoded automatically during parsing |
| Dell PFS extraction | Reads a Dell BIOS update executable directly: zlib containers, nested PFS, and Intel BIOS Guard blocks reassembled at the addresses they declare |
| NVRAM store parsing | VSS, VSS2, FTW, Phoenix EVSA and AMI NVAR stores walked into variable nodes |
| IFR / HII extraction | Detects EFI and UEFI IFR protocol variants; dumps human-readable form text |
| BIOS setting finder | Text-query search over decoded IFR output to locate setup_var variable offsets, annotated with the values the running machine currently holds |
| Live UEFI variables | vars: lists the firmware variables of the running system, Setup / SaSetup / CpuSetup included |
| Intel FIT parsing | Reads microcode revisions, Startup ACM, TPM policy, and BootGuard KM/BP entries |
| Live flash read | readbios: detects Intel PCH via SetupAPI, extracts matching FPTW64 from bundled archive, dumps BIOS region. Parsing of .rom files works on any UEFI FFS image regardless of CPU vendor. |
| Targeted GUID extraction | Extract a specific FFS file by GUID, with optional section type filter and dump mode selection |
| Surgical patching | Replace a node's body in-place; recomputes FFS integrity checksum when FFS_ATTRIB_CHECKSUM is set |
| GUI + CLI | Single binary: no arguments → GUI (Win32, DWM/Mica); any other argument → CLI |
PatchNode() replaces body bytes in-place at original size; compressing and rebuilding a section is not supportedreadbios requires Intel PCH + MEI; parsing a .rom file from any platform (Intel, AMD, ARM) works normally via FfsParserbiosfind and vars read and locate; writing is left to external tools (e.g. setup_var, UnderVolter)archiveint.dll for its zlib inflate. Everything else works without itThe binary uses WinMain as its entry point. When launched with arguments it calls AttachConsole(ATTACH_PARENT_PROCESS) or AllocConsole() as needed, then routes through RunCli(). Version string is 2.0.0.
UEFIExtract {-h|--help|-v|--version}
UEFIExtract <image>
UEFIExtract <image> all
UEFIExtract <image> dump
UEFIExtract <image> report
UEFIExtract <image> guids
UEFIExtract <image> ifrscan [-o <dir>]
UEFIExtract <image> biosfind <query> [-o <txt>]
UEFIExtract <image> <GUID> [-o <outfile>] [-m <mode>] [-t <type>]
UEFIExtract vars [<filter>] [-n] [-o <txt>]
UEFIExtract readbios [-o <output.rom>]
| Command | Output |
|---|---|
<image> |
Report (.report.txt) + GUID CSV (.guids.csv) + leaf dump (.dump\) |
<image> all |
Report + GUID CSV + full dump with subdirectories |
<image> dump |
Extraction only — no report, no GUID CSV |
<image> report |
Text report only |
<image> guids |
GUID CSV only |
<image> ifrscan [-o <dir>] |
Scans all tree nodes for IFR; prints matches; optionally dumps .ifr.txt files to <dir> |
<image> biosfind <query> |
Finds BIOS setup variable candidates from IFR; see BIOS Setting Finder |
<image> <GUID> ... |
Targeted extraction — accepts multiple GUIDs, each with its own -o, -m, -t |
vars [<filter>] |
Lists the live UEFI variables of the running machine; see Live UEFI Variables |
readbios |
Detect PCH, run FPTW64, dump BIOS region, then parse and report |
vars Flags| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
<filter> |
Case-sensitive substring; only matching variable names are listed |
-n |
Names and GUIDs only — skips reading each variable's contents, which is much faster |
-o <txt> |
Also write the listing to a file |
| Flag | Values | Description |
|---|---|---|
-o <path> |
file or directory path | Output path for this GUID target |
-m <mode> |
all body header unc_data info file |
Data to extract; see Dump Modes |
-t <type> |
hex byte, e.g. 0x10 |
Filter by EFI section type; 0xFF = no filter (default) |
Multiple GUIDs can be listed on one command line; each reads its own -o/-m/-t after it.
The binary is compiled as a GUI subsystem application (WinMain). When invoked from a shell with arguments, it calls AttachConsole(ATTACH_PARENT_PROCESS). If that fails (e.g. an elevated process that lost its parent), it falls back to AllocConsole(). Stdout, stderr, and stdin are reopened to CONOUT$ / CONIN$ accordingly.
After CLI work completes, if the console was attached (not allocated), the function InjectEnterToConsole() writes a synthetic VK_RETURN key-down + key-up pair into the console input buffer via WriteConsoleInputW. This causes the parent shell (CMD, PowerShell) to redraw its prompt — without it, the cursor blinks indefinitely because the shell already printed the prompt before the GUI-subsystem process returned. If the console was allocated (new window), FreeConsole() is called instead so the window closes cleanly.
0 on success. Non-zero ErrorCode value on failure (see Error Codes).
Launched when no arguments are passed (or with --gui / -g). Built on ModernWindow — a Win32 window class with DWM Mica styling. Defaults to dark mode; toggleable at runtime via Dark Mode button.
| Control | Description |
|---|---|
| Open | File open dialog (BrowseForFile) — loads a firmware image |
| Dump | Dumps the currently selected node using the Current dump mode |
| Report | Generates text report for the loaded image |
| Read BIOS | Runs the readbios pipeline; requires the data archive next to the EXE |
| Dark Mode | Toggles SetDarkMode(bool) — updates DWM attributes and repaints all controls |
| Search box + Search | Runs SearchEngine::SearchAll() over the tree; results are highlighted and cycled |
| Tree | Hierarchical view of all parsed nodes (Volume / File / Section / FreeSpace) |
| Details pane | Shows node type, subtype, offset, size, GUID, name, info strings, and IFR text if applicable |
| Hex pane | Raw hex dump of the selected node's data |
| Progress bar | Used during readbios FPTW64 execution; updated via WM_APP+1 message |
| Status bar | Running status messages |
| Action | Description |
|---|---|
| Extract IFR | Calls ExtractIFR() on the node's best available data view; shows result in details pane |
| Dump Node | Dumps the selected node to disk using a folder browser |
| Replace Body | Opens a file dialog, loads the file as new body data, calls FirmwareImage::PatchNode() |
Nodes that contain detectable IFR packages are indicated in the tree using a lazy-evaluated cache (m_ifrCache). Detection uses IsIfrCandidate() which scans the first 2 MB of a node's data for EFI/UEFI IFR protocol markers. The cache is keyed by TreeNode* and is cleared on each image reload in PopulateTree().
A separate m_ifrTextCache stores the full ExtractIFR() text output per node. On the first access (e.g. via Extract IFR or a biosfind search), the text is parsed once and stored. All subsequent accesses for the same node return the cached string immediately — avoiding repeated IFR decode passes during interactive search.
Two draggable splitters: vertical (m_splitX, default 300 px) separating the tree from the right panes; horizontal (m_splitY, default 220 px) separating details from hex. Minimum pane width/height: 80 px / 40 px.
FirmwareImage::FromFile() reads the entire file into a ByteBuffer, runs vendor detection, and strips the wrapper if found (see Vendor Wrapper Detection). The buffer is then handed to FfsParser::Parse(). Decompressed section data is stored in m_ownedBuffers; TreeNode objects hold non-owning ByteView spans into these buffers.
Scans the image for Firmware Volume headers (_FVH signature 0x4856465F). For each valid volume, enumerates FFS files and recurses into sections. Decompression is triggered inline when a Compression or GUID-Defined section is encountered.
Each node carries:
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
type() |
NodeType |
Root, Volume, File, Section, FreeSpace — free space between FFS files within a volume is represented as a distinct node type, not silently discarded |
subtype() |
uint8_t |
Cast to VolumeSubtype, FileSubtype, or SectionSubtype |
offset() |
uint64_t |
Byte offset within the firmware image |
size() |
uint64_t |
Total node size in bytes (includes header) |
guid() |
Guid |
EFI GUID (16 bytes, little-endian layout); valid if hasGuid() is true |
name() |
std::wstring |
GUID string or human-readable name |
text() |
std::wstring |
User Interface section string (module name) |
info() |
std::wstring |
Supplemental info (version string, dependency expression, etc.) |
header() |
ByteView |
Non-owning view of the raw header bytes |
body() |
ByteView |
Non-owning view of the payload bytes |
tail() |
ByteView |
Non-owning view of any trailing bytes |
uncompressedData() |
ByteView |
Non-owning view of decompressed data (empty if section is not compressed) |
| Subtype | String | Filesystem GUID |
|---|---|---|
Ffs1 |
FFSv1 |
{7A9354D9-0468-444A-81CE-0BF617D890DF} |
Ffs2 |
FFSv2 |
{8C8CE578-8A3D-4F1C-9935-896185C32DD3} |
Ffs3 |
FFSv3 |
{5473C07A-3DCB-4DCA-BD6F-1E9689E7349A} |
Nvram |
NVRAM |
{FFF12B8D-7696-4C8B-A985-2747075B4F50} |
An NVRAM volume carries no FFS file stream; its body is handed to the NVRAM store parser instead.
A volume is named by the FvName GUID from its extended header when one is present, and by its filesystem GUID otherwise. The extended header normally lives inside a pad file, which is why it appears in the tree as one.
| Subtype | Notes |
|---|---|
| Raw | |
| FreeForm | |
| SecurityCore | SEC phase |
| PEICore | Pre-EFI Init core |
| DXECore | Driver Execution Environment core |
| PEIM | PEI module |
| Driver | DXE driver |
| Combined PEIM/Driver | |
| Application | UEFI application |
| SMM | System Management Mode driver |
| VolumeImage | Embedded FV |
| Combined SMM | |
| MM Core | |
| MM Standalone | |
| MM Combined | |
| Pad | Padding file |
| Type | Subtype | Notes |
|---|---|---|
0x01 |
Compression | Tiano payload, or an uncompressed section stream when the declared type is 0x00 |
0x02 |
GUID Defined | GUID-tagged; decompressed for LZMA and Tiano GUIDs, parsed through when no processing is required |
0x03 |
Disposable | |
0x10 |
PE32 | x64 PE image |
0x11 |
PIC | Position-independent code |
0x12 |
TE | Truncated PE (terse executable) |
0x13 |
DXE Dependency | Dependency expression for DXE phase |
0x14 |
Version | Version string (read into node.info()) |
0x15 |
User Interface | Module name string (read into node.text()) |
0x16 |
Compatibility16 | Legacy CSM payload |
0x17 |
Firmware Volume Image | Nested FV — recursed into |
0x18 |
Freeform GUID | |
0x19 |
Raw | |
0x1B |
PEI Dependency | |
0x1C |
MM Dependency | Formerly SMM Dependency |
Section type numbers are listed explicitly because they are easy to get wrong: EFI_SECTION_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_IMAGE is 0x17, not 0x16. Treating it as 0x16 mislabels it as a freeform section and, worse, never descends into the volume it carries — which on a typical image hides the bulk of the firmware.
Sections larger than 16 MB use the extended header form, signalled by a size field reading 0xFFFFFF with the real length in a following 32-bit field.
A volume whose filesystem GUID is {FFF12B8D-7696-4C8B-A985-2747075B4F50} holds variable stores rather than FFS files. This is where BIOS settings live, so NvramParser.cpp walks it into Store and Variable nodes.
| Store | Recognised by | Contents parsed |
|---|---|---|
| VSS / $SVS | Signature $VSS or $SVS, then a 32-bit store size |
Variables |
| VSS2 | Store GUID {DDCF3617-3275-4164-98B6-FE85707FFE7D} |
Variables |
| VSS2 auth | Store GUID {AAF32C78-947B-439A-A180-2E144EC37792} |
Variables, authenticated header form |
| FTW | Working block GUID {9E58292B-7C68-497D-A0CE-6500FD9F1B95} |
Header only; write queue length reported |
| Phoenix EVSA | Entry type 0xEC whose payload names itself EVSA |
GUID, Name and Data entries |
| AMI NVAR | NVAR signature at the start of a run of entries |
Entry chain |
Regions between stores are recorded as free space or as an unrecognised region, so the whole volume is accounted for rather than silently skipped.
VSS variables come in two layouts — a plain 32-byte header and an authenticated 60-byte one — and the classic $VSS store does not say which it uses. Both are tried, and the one whose name length, data length and terminator land inside the store is accepted.
EVSA splits a variable across three entry types: a GUID entry, a Name entry, and a Data entry that refers to both by numeric id. The store is therefore walked twice — once to collect the id-to-GUID and id-to-name mappings, once to emit nodes — so a data entry is labelled with the name and GUID it actually belongs to instead of a bare id.
Variable stores inside a BIOS update image are empty by construction: settings live in flash, not in the update package. Every capsule, ISO and vendor executable will show these stores as present but blank. Populated stores appear only in a dump read from a live machine — or, more conveniently, through live UEFI variables.
| Algorithm | Trigger |
|---|---|
| EFI Standard (Tiano) | Compression section with a non-zero compression type, or a GuidDefined section tagged with the Tiano GUID {A31280AD-481E-41B6-95E8-127F4C984779} |
| LZMA | GuidDefined section tagged {EE4E5898-3914-4259-9D6E-DC7BD79403CF}; uses LZMA SDK (7-Zip) v24.x |
| zlib (inflate) | Dell PFS containers; see below |
| (pass-through) | Compression section declaring type 0x00, and GuidDefined sections whose attributes do not set PROCESSING_REQUIRED (CRC32-guided and similar) — the payload is a plain section stream and is parsed directly |
Decompressors are called from FfsParser and the result is stored as an owned ByteBuffer in FirmwareImage::m_ownedBuffers. The node's uncompressedData() view points into that buffer.
The LZMA implementation bundles the LZMA SDK C files (LzmaDec.c, Bra.h, 7zTypes.h) directly in the source tree under src/Compression/SDK/C/.
Dell PFS containers are zlib streams, but no zlib sources are vendored for them. archiveint.dll — the libarchive that ships inside Windows, and the same library the live BIOS read already uses for its 7z handling — is used instead.
That DLL does not re-export raw inflate entry points, so the stream is re-framed: a zlib stream and a gzip stream carry the same deflate payload behind different framing, so the two-byte zlib header is replaced with a minimal gzip header and the result is read back through libarchive's gzip filter and its raw format. The gzip trailer cannot be computed without first decompressing, so the trailing integrity check is expected to fail; that check is not what guards this path. Every caller validates the inflated bytes against the structure it expects — a PFS container header, and ultimately the firmware volumes themselves — which is a stronger test than a checksum.
The consequence is a dependency: Dell PFS extraction requires Windows 11, where archiveint.dll is present. Everything else — parsing, IFR, biosfind, reports, dumps — degrades gracefully and continues to work without it.
LZMA/F86 ({D42AE6BD-1352-4BFB-909A-CA72A6EAE889}) decompresses, but the x86 BCJ branch filter is not reversed, so instruction bytes in the result are not restored to their original form. The node's info() says so rather than presenting the data as correct.
VendorLoader.hpp detects known firmware packaging formats before the FFS parser runs:
| Wrapper | Detection Criterion | Unwrap Strategy |
|---|---|---|
| Dell PFS | PFS marker followed by a zlib stream, or a bare PFS.HDR. container |
Full container walk — see Dell PFS Packages |
| Dell/HP/Lenovo EXE | First two bytes are MZ |
Scan 512-byte-aligned offsets for Intel FD magic (5A A5 F0 0F at offset+16) or an FV header whose _FVH signature sits at offset+0x28 |
| UEFI Capsule | First 16 bytes match GUID {3B6686BD-0D76-4030-B70E-B5519E2FC5A0} |
Skip capsule header (HeaderSize at offset 16) |
| HP HPQOEM | First 6 bytes are ASCII HPQOEM |
Same scan as EXE wrapper |
If unwrapping succeeds, only the inner payload is parsed; FirmwareImage::wrapperInfo() holds a description of what was unwrapped.
Note that the FFS parser also sweeps for firmware volumes on its own, at any offset and inside raw and pad files. Unwrapping is therefore an optimisation and a labelling step rather than a precondition: an image whose wrapper is not recognised still parses, as long as its volumes are stored uncompressed.
A Dell BIOS update executable does not store its firmware at any offset a signature scan can reach. The payload sits behind four layers:
PE executable
└── zlib stream (Dell PFS marker)
└── PFS container (PFS.HDR. … PFS.FTR.)
└── entries, themselves PE files with their own PFS containers
└── Intel BIOS Guard blocks — the system BIOS, split up
DellPfs.cpp walks all of it. Two details matter:
Several containers per level. Dell keeps utilities and firmware in separate zlib streams side by side, so every stream in a blob is followed, not just the first.
BIOS Guard blocks are not stored in address order. Each block carries an Intel BIOS Guard header stating ScriptSize and DataSize, followed by a script whose first 0x51 instruction gives the flash offset the block belongs at. Concatenating blocks in storage order produces a corrupt image; placing each at its declared address reproduces the original exactly.
Reassembly is refused unless the blocks account for themselves completely: every block's 0x30 + ScriptSize + DataSize must equal its length, every address must be unique, and together they must tile the image with no gap and no overlap. Arbitrary data cannot satisfy those conditions simultaneously.
| Stage | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Locate container | Dell PFS marker (10 fixed bytes, one vendor byte, then a zlib header) |
| Inflate | WinArchive::InflateZlib — see Compression Support |
| Walk entries | PFS.HDR. header, entries with revision 1 (0x48) or revision 2 (0x58) headers |
| Recurse | Entry data that is a PFS container, or carries zlib streams, is followed |
| Reassemble | BIOS Guard blocks placed at the address each one declares |
| Select | The largest recovered payload containing firmware volumes |
The XZ-based Dell package variant is not handled; only the zlib/PFS form is.
Internal Forms Representation (IFR) is the binary encoding of UEFI HII setup forms stored inside firmware.
IFRBridge::DetectProtocol() distinguishes two variants:
| Protocol | Identifier |
|---|---|
EFI |
Legacy EFI IFR encoding |
UEFI |
PI/UEFI IFR encoding (UEFI 2.1+) |
IsIfrCandidate() limits scanning to the first 2 MB of any node's data as a fast pre-filter before committing to full extraction.
ifrscan Output Format[N] IFR <Protocol> <NodeType> / <SectionSubtype> @ 0x<offset> size=0x<size> data=<body|uncompressed> <displayName>
With -o <dir>, each match is saved as <displayName>.ifr.txt. A ifrscan_summary.txt index is always written to the output directory.
PeAnalyzer runs automatically in the GUI details pane (UpdateDetailsPane) whenever a PE32 or TE section node is selected. It parses the image header and displays:
| Field | PE32 | TE |
|---|---|---|
| Image type | Image: PE32 (x86) or PE32+ (x64) |
Image: TE (x64) etc. |
| Entry RVA | Entry RVA: 0x<addr> from AddressOfEntryPoint |
Entry RVA: 0x<addr> adjusted for TE stripped header offset |
TE (Terse Executable) is a stripped PE format used by PEI and some DXE modules to minimise image size. The analyzer handles both formats via separate AnalyzePe() and AnalyzeTe() functions. This is independent of IFR detection — it activates on section type alone.
biosfind automates the lookup of BIOS setup variable offsets from IFR text. This is the equivalent of manually grepping IFR dumps for CFG Lock, overclocking settings, or any other NVRAM variable.
The query string is split on ,, ;, \n, and \r. Each phrase is independently normalized (lowercased, non-alphanumeric replaced with spaces) and tokenized. Generic tokens (lock, setting, option, feature, mode, state, enable, disable, support, control) carry a scoring penalty.
| Match Type | Base Score |
|---|---|
| Exact normalized match | 1400 |
| Prefix match | 1200 |
| Substring match | 1050 |
| All query tokens matched | base + 420 |
| Per matched token | +110 |
| Per word-boundary (prefix) token | +35 |
| Per generic token matched | −90 |
Minimum score threshold for a candidate to be included: 260.
Candidates are extracted from IFR text using two regular expressions:
(Setting|Checkbox|Numeric|Password):\s+(.+?),\s+Variable:\s+0x([0-9A-Fa-f]+)
Numeric:\s+(.+?)\s+\([^)]*\),\s+Variable:\s+0x([0-9A-Fa-f]+)
Variable: 0x0 entries are always discarded. Deduplication key: kind:offset:name.
#Rank Score setup_var_3 0x<offset> 0x00 <matchedPhrase> <name> [<nodeName> | <protocol>]
Up to 24 candidates are printed; additional results are indicated by a count message. The command format shown (setup_var_3) is a heuristic for AMI/Dell-style BIOSes.
When the machine's own UEFI variables are readable, a second block follows the table showing what each candidate offset currently holds:
Live values on this machine
---------------------------
#1 VT-d SaSetup[0x52]=0x01 CpuSetup[0x52]=0x00 Setup[0x52]=0x00
IFR gives the offset of a setting but not which variable store holds it, so the value is shown for every setup variable large enough to contain that offset, and the output says as much rather than picking one and hoping. In the example above SaSetup is the right store — VT-d is a System Agent setting — and 0x01 means enabled.
This turns a guessed offset into a value that can be checked against the firmware setup screen before anything is written. The block is omitted when the variables cannot be read, which is the case without Administrator rights, on a legacy-BIOS boot, or when the image belongs to a different machine than the one running the tool.
SearchEngine supports four pattern kinds, all auto-detected from the query string:
| Kind | Detection | Matching |
|---|---|---|
| GUID | String length ≥ 36, dashes at positions 8/13/18/23 | 16-byte EFI little-endian layout (Data1 LE, Data2 LE, Data3 LE, Data4 BE) |
| Hex | All space-separated tokens are exactly 2 hex digits or ?? |
Exact bytes with optional ?? wildcard positions |
| ASCII | Fallback for non-GUID, non-hex input | Case-insensitive byte scan |
| Unicode | Paired with ASCII for plain-text queries | Case-insensitive UTF-16LE scan |
Plain text queries (AutoDetectAll) generate both an ASCII and a Unicode pattern and search with both simultaneously.
std::boyer_moore_horspool_searcher for fast bulk scan.??) — linear scan with per-byte mask check.std::tolower per byte against lowercased pattern bytes.std::towlower.Each node is searched across three data views:
body() — raw payloadheader() — only when searchHeaders = trueuncompressedData() — if non-empty (decompressed content)Node metadata (name(), text()) is also checked for text and Unicode patterns; metadata matches report matchOffset = 0.
FitParser.hpp locates and decodes the Intel Firmware Interface Table present in SPI flash images.
The FIT pointer is a 64-bit physical address stored at image_base + image_size - 0x40. The image is assumed to map to the physical range [0x100000000 - image_size, 0x100000000).
| Type Code | Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|
0x00 |
Header | Entry count in Size[23:0] |
0x01 |
Microcode | Reads CPUID (offset +12), revision (offset +4), date (offset +8). Date is BCD-encoded: bits [31:24] = month, [23:16] = day, [15:0] = year — displayed as Date=MM/DD/YYYY |
0x02 |
Startup ACM | Size in 64-byte granules from Size[23:0] |
0x07 / 0x08 |
BIOS Startup Module | Physical address only |
0x0C |
TPM Policy | Presence flag |
0x10 |
BootGuard KM | Key Manifest physical address |
0x11 |
BootGuard BP | Boot Policy physical address |
| Condition | Output |
|---|---|
| Both KM and BP entries present | BootGuard: ENABLED (KM + BP present) |
| Only one of KM / BP | BootGuard: PARTIAL |
| Neither present | BootGuard: not detected |
FIT output is appended to the GUI details pane when an image is loaded.
vars reads the firmware variables of the machine it runs on. This is the practical answer to a problem that has no other solution on recent hardware: the variable stores in an update image are always blank, and a flash dump needs an Intel Flash Programming Tool build that matches the chipset — which for platforms newer than the last public CSME release simply does not exist outside OEM channels.
Windows exposes the variables directly, so none of that applies. There is no chipset support matrix, no SPI access, and no vendor tooling.
| Step | Call |
|---|---|
| Enable privilege | AdjustTokenPrivileges for SE_SYSTEM_ENVIRONMENT_NAME |
| Enumerate | NtEnumerateSystemEnvironmentValuesEx, information class 1 |
| Read contents | GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableExW per variable, buffer grown on demand |
Administrators hold SE_SYSTEM_ENVIRONMENT_NAME but it is disabled in the token by default, which is why an elevated process still gets ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD until it is switched on explicitly.
Enumeration returns a chain of records: a 32-bit offset to the next record, a vendor GUID, and a NUL-terminated wide name. A zero offset marks the last one.
UEFIExtract.exe vars Setup
SaSetup {72C5E28C-7783-43A1-8767-FAD73FCCAFA4} 853 B attr 0x00000007
CpuSetup {75E3088B-88BB-490F-AA29-FAA83244E8E3} 1311 B attr 0x00000007
Setup {EC87D643-EBA4-4BB5-A1E5-3F3E36B20DA9} 1330 B attr 0x00000007
PchSetup {4570B7F1-ADE8-4943-8DC3-406472842384} 2281 B attr 0x00000007
Requires Administrator rights and a UEFI-booted system; a legacy-BIOS boot has no variables to enumerate.
readbios reads the BIOS SPI flash region from a running Intel platform using Intel's Flash Programming Tool (FPTW64).
| Requirement | Details |
|---|---|
| Administrator rights | Required for Intel MEI driver access via SetupAPI |
| Intel platform | PCH detection queries PCI devices via SetupAPI |
data archive |
Must be present next to UEFIExtract.exe; download from https://kvc.pl/data |
DetectPch() — scans PCI devices, returns PchInfo with fptwName (e.g. FPTW64_CSME_v12r38.exe) and meVersion string.RunFptw() — extracts the matching FPTW64 executable from the bundled in-memory 7z archive, runs it, monitors stdout for percentage lines (progress callback 0–100).bios_dump.rom next to the EXE, or -o <path>).FfsParser and a report + dump are generated automatically.The prefix Reading BIOS: is printed once. A 7-character dynamic suffix (NNN% <spinner>) is updated at 100 ms intervals by backspacing over the previous value. The spinner characters are -\|/.
PchDetect maps the PCI device ID of the LPC/eSPI controller to the FPTW64 build that supports it, from Sandy Bridge through Lunar Lake. Because Intel revises these tools without changing what they do, an exact filename match is not required: if FPTW64_CSME_v19r1.exe is absent, any archive entry beginning FPTW64_CSME_v19 is accepted.
There is a hard limit that no amount of detection can work around. Intel's last publicly released CSME System Tools branch is 16.x, so platforms newer than Raptor Lake have no obtainable FPTW64. On Meteor Lake and Lunar Lake the tools that do exist answer:
Error 39: PCH is not supported.
Error 623: Unknown hardware platform.
The device IDs are mapped and the code is ready, but the tool itself is not available outside OEM channels. For reading current settings on such a machine, vars does the job without any Intel tooling at all.
FirmwareDumper supports six extraction modes controlled by DumpOptions::mode:
| Mode | Enum | Files Written |
|---|---|---|
Current |
Default (no second arg) | Header + body for leaf nodes; .info.txt for all |
All |
all |
Header + body + uncompressed + .info.txt; creates subdirectories per node |
Header |
header |
Raw header bytes only |
Body |
body |
Raw body bytes only |
Uncompressed |
unc_data |
Decompressed data (falls back to body if not compressed) |
Info |
info |
.info.txt text summary only |
File |
file |
Complete FFS file (header + body + tail) |
FileNamingStrategy generates names from the node's text, name, or GUID string. Illegal filesystem characters are stripped. Collisions are resolved by appending a counter suffix. Extended names are enabled by default.
DumpOptions::guidFilter — if non-empty, only nodes whose GUID string matches are dumped.
DumpOptions::sectionTypeFilter — if not 0xFF, only sections whose raw type byte matches are dumped.
ReportGenerator produces two output formats from the parsed tree:
| Output | File | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Text report | <image>.report.txt |
Indented tree with node type, subtype, offset, size, GUID, name, text, info; UTF-8 |
| GUID CSV | <image>.guids.csv |
One row per node that has a GUID: GUID, NodeType, Name; UTF-8 |
Both are generated by the default <image> command and by <image> all. Each can be requested independently with the report or guids sub-commands.
FirmwareImage::PatchNode() replaces a node's body bytes in the original buffer.
newBody.size() must be ≤ node.body().size(). Expansion is not supported.newBody.size() to node.body().size() are filled with 0xFF (erased flash state).When the FFS file header has FFS_ATTRIB_CHECKSUM (bit 0x40) set in the Attributes byte (offset 19 of the 24-byte FFS header), the IntegrityCheck.File byte (offset 17) is recomputed:
IC1 = (uint8_t)(0 - sum_of_all_body_bytes)
This maintains the invariant sum(body) + IC1 = 0 mod 256. The IntegrityCheck.Header byte (offset 16) is computed over the header with IC1 = 0 and is therefore unaffected by body changes.
The GUI exposes this via the Replace Body context menu item.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Project file | UEFIExtract.vcxproj |
| Toolset | MSVC v145 (Visual Studio 2026) |
| Standard | C++23 (std::expected, std::format, std::span) |
| Platform | x64 |
| Configuration | Release |
| Output | bin\x64\Release\UEFIExtract.exe |
| Subsystem | Windows GUI (WinMain) — CLI attaches/allocates console at runtime |
| Build script | build.ps1 (PowerShell) — locates Visual Studio via vswhere.exe, calls MSBuild with /t:Rebuild /m /v:minimal. The /t:Rebuild target always performs a clean build (delete + compile), never an incremental build. Cleans obj\ on success. |
.\build.ps1
Requires Visual Studio 2026 with the C++ Desktop workload and vswhere.exe present in %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Microsoft Visual Studio\Installer\.
All build-time dependencies are bundled in the source tree; no package manager or external download is required to compile.
| Dependency | Location | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| LZMA SDK (7-Zip) | src/Compression/SDK/C/ |
LZMA decompression |
| EFI Tiano decompress | src/Compression/EfiTianoDecompress.c |
Tiano/EFI standard decompression |
| Win32 / DWM | System | Window management, console, PCH detection |
archiveint.dll |
System (Windows 11) | zlib inflate for Dell PFS, 7z for the live BIOS read |
archiveint.dll is the libarchive that ships inside Windows 11. It is loaded at run time, never linked, and its absence is not fatal: only Dell PFS extraction and readbios depend on it, and both report a clear error rather than failing obscurely. No zlib sources are vendored — see Compression Support for how a zlib stream is read through a library that does not export inflate.
src/
├── main.cpp Entry point: mode dispatch, console attach/inject-Enter
├── CliRunner.cpp / .hpp CLI command parsing and dispatch
├── Analysis/
│ ├── BiosSettingFinder.hpp biosfind: query parser, scorer, candidate extractor
│ ├── FitParser.hpp Intel FIT parser (header-only)
│ ├── PeAnalyzer.cpp / .hpp PE/TE image analysis helpers
│ └── SearchEngine.hpp Multi-pattern search engine (header-only)
├── Common/
│ ├── ErrorHandling.hpp ErrorCode enum, Result<T> = std::expected<T, ErrorCode>
│ ├── GuidUtils.hpp GUID ↔ string conversion
│ ├── StringUtils.cpp / .hpp UTF-8 / wide string conversion
│ ├── Types.hpp ByteBuffer, ByteView, Guid, String type aliases
│ └── WinApiUtils.cpp / .hpp File I/O, directory creation, full path resolution
├── Compression/
│ ├── EfiTianoDecompress.c / .h EFI standard (Tiano) decompressor
│ ├── LzmaDecompress.c / .h LZMA wrapper
│ ├── UefiDecompressor.cpp / .hpp High-level decompress API
│ ├── WinArchive.cpp / .hpp Binding to the in-box Windows libarchive; zlib inflate
│ └── SDK/C/ LZMA SDK (7-Zip) C sources
├── Dumper/
│ ├── FileNamingStrategy.cpp / .hpp Node → filename generation with collision avoidance
│ └── FirmwareDumper.cpp / .hpp Tree walk → file extraction
├── Firmware/
│ ├── DellPfs.cpp / .hpp Dell PFS containers + Intel BIOS Guard reassembly
│ ├── FfsParser.cpp / .hpp FV + FFS + Section recursive parser
│ ├── FirmwareImage.cpp / .hpp Image load, buffer ownership, PatchNode()
│ ├── NodeType.cpp / .hpp Node type and subtype enums
│ ├── NvramParser.cpp / .hpp VSS / VSS2 / FTW / EVSA / NVAR variable stores
│ ├── TreeNode.hpp Node data model (type, GUID, views, children)
│ └── VendorLoader.hpp Vendor wrapper detection and stripping (header-only)
├── IFR/
│ ├── EFI.cpp / .h EFI IFR protocol decoder
│ ├── IFRBridge.cpp / .hpp Protocol detection, ExtractIFR() entry point
│ ├── UEFI.cpp / .h UEFI IFR protocol decoder
│ └── util.h IFR utility types
├── Report/
│ └── ReportGenerator.cpp / .hpp Text report and GUID CSV generation
├── UI/
│ ├── MainWindow.cpp / .hpp Application main window: controls, tree, hex, search, IFR
│ └── ModernWindow.cpp / .hpp Win32 base window with DWM/Mica styling
└── Utils/
├── FptwRunner.cpp / .hpp FPTW64 extraction from 7z archive + execution + progress
├── PchDetect.cpp / .hpp Intel PCH detection via SetupAPI
└── UefiVariables.cpp / .hpp Live UEFI variable enumeration and reading
RunCli() and most internal operations return or propagate these codes as process exit values:
| Code | Numeric | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
Success |
0 | Operation completed successfully |
FileNotFound |
1 | Input file does not exist |
FileOpenFailed |
2 | File could not be opened |
FileReadFailed |
3 | Read error during file load |
FileWriteFailed |
4 | Could not write output file |
DirCreateFailed |
5 | Output directory creation failed |
InvalidParameter |
8 | Null pointer or out-of-bounds argument |
ItemNotFound |
9 | GUID target not found in tree |
ParseError |
10 | No FFS volumes found, or tree root unavailable |
UnsupportedFormat |
11 | Unrecognised firmware format |
BufferTooSmall |
12 | PatchNode: new body larger than original |
Symptom: CLI prints the error and exits with ParseError.
Solutions:
.exe or .cab extension._FVH or Intel FD magic. A non-standard update format may not be detected — in that case extract the raw ROM manually with 7-Zip or binwalk.Symptom: ifrscan reports No IFR matches found.
Solutions:
Compression or GUID Defined sections — these are decompressed automatically and should contain IFR.biosfind Returns No CandidatesSymptom: Command exits with No BIOS setting candidates found.
Solutions:
ifrscan first to confirm IFR is present at all.lock, enable, mode).UEFIExtract image.rom biosfind "CFG Lock, overclocking lock".readbios Fails: PCH Not DetectedSymptom: Error: Intel PCH not detected via SetupAPI.
Solutions:
readbios Fails: FPTW64 ErrorSymptom: Error: FPTW64 failed to dump BIOS.
Solutions:
UEFIExtract.exe as Administrator. FPTW64 requires direct hardware access.data archive is present next to the EXE. If missing, download from https://kvc.pl/data.Symptom: [+] Target {GUID} dumped 0 items to: ...
Solutions:
XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX. Curly braces are accepted but not required.guids sub-command first to obtain the exact GUID strings present in the image: UEFIExtract image.rom guids.-t <type> filter — if set, only matching section types within the file are extracted. Omit -t to extract everything.Symptom: After Replace Body, the firmware does not boot.
Considerations:
IntegrityCheck.File field are updated. Secure Boot signatures and other integrity measurements (BootGuard BP hash) are not recomputed — a modified image will fail measured boot on BootGuard-protected platforms.Apache License 2.0
Full text available in project repository (LICENSE file).
WARNING: This tool accesses raw firmware data and can interact with system hardware (FPTW64 flash read). It is provided for research, analysis, and educational purposes. Incorrect use — especially with
readbioson locked or production systems — may result in system instability. Use at your own risk.
All trademarks, logos, and brand names are the property of their respective owners. Intel, Management Engine, and related marks are trademarks of Intel Corporation.
Last updated: 2026-04-19
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